@blamejs/blamejs-shop 0.4.68 → 0.4.70

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/backup/index.js

@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ var os = require("node:os");
 var nodePath = require("node:path");
 var bCrypto = require("../crypto");
 var atomicFile = require("../atomic-file");
+var C = require("../constants");
 var backupBundle = require("./bundle");
 var frameworkFiles = require("../framework-files");
 var backupManifest = require("./manifest");
@@ -721,11 +722,16 @@ function create(opts) {
         try {
           await storage.readBundle(bundleId, stagingDir);
           manifestPath = nodePath.join(stagingDir, "manifest.json");
-          if (!nodeFs.existsSync(manifestPath)) {
-            throw new BackupError("backup/test-no-manifest",
-              "manifest.json missing under restored bundle " + bundleId);
-          }
-          manifest = backupManifest.parse(nodeFs.readFileSync(manifestPath, "utf8"));
+          // Capped fd-bound read inside the scheduled restore-drill tick: an
+          // oversized manifest must not OOM the scheduler worker.
+          manifest = backupManifest.parse(atomicFile.fdSafeReadSync(manifestPath, {
+            maxBytes: C.BYTES.mib(4), encoding: "utf8",
+            errorFor: function (kind) {
+              if (kind === "enoent") return new BackupError("backup/test-no-manifest", "manifest.json missing under restored bundle " + bundleId);
+              if (kind === "too-large") return new BackupError("backup/test-bad-manifest", "manifest.json too large under restored bundle " + bundleId);
+              return new BackupError("backup/test-no-manifest", "manifest.json unreadable under restored bundle " + bundleId + ": " + kind);
+            },
+          }));
           // Verify the manifest signature so a tampered backup test
           // surfaces here, not as a regulator finding later.
           sigVerification = backupManifest.verifySignature(manifest, {
@@ -837,11 +843,17 @@ function verifyManifestSignature(target, opts) {
   var manifest;
   if (typeof target === "string") {
     var manifestPath = nodePath.join(target, "manifest.json");
-    if (!nodeFs.existsSync(manifestPath)) {
-      throw new BackupError("backup/no-manifest",
-        "verifyManifestSignature: manifest.json missing at " + manifestPath);
-    }
-    try { manifest = backupManifest.parse(nodeFs.readFileSync(manifestPath, "utf8")); }
+    // Capped fd-bound read OUTSIDE the parse try (so a missing/oversized manifest
+    // surfaces backup/no-manifest|bad-manifest, not a generic parse error).
+    var manifestRaw = atomicFile.fdSafeReadSync(manifestPath, {
+      maxBytes: C.BYTES.mib(4), encoding: "utf8",
+      errorFor: function (kind) {
+        if (kind === "enoent") return new BackupError("backup/no-manifest", "verifyManifestSignature: manifest.json missing at " + manifestPath);
+        if (kind === "too-large") return new BackupError("backup/bad-manifest", "verifyManifestSignature: manifest.json too large");
+        return new BackupError("backup/bad-manifest", "verifyManifestSignature: unreadable: " + kind);
+      },
+    });
+    try { manifest = backupManifest.parse(manifestRaw); }
     catch (e) {
       throw new BackupError("backup/bad-manifest",
         "verifyManifestSignature: parse failed: " + ((e && e.message) || String(e)));
@@ -2187,19 +2199,28 @@ bundleAdapterStorage.fsAdapter = function (fsOpts) {
       // mode 0o600 matches the v0.12.9 directory-format readback
       // discipline — backup payloads carry operator-owned bytes
       // (potentially PHI / PCI / GDPR-scoped); owner-only is the
-      // strict posture. wx is not set here because writeFile is
-      // the storage primitive (operators legitimately rewrite the
-      // same key, e.g. resuming a multipart upload); upper layers
-      // (writeBundle's `bundle-exists` check) enforce no-overwrite
-      // at the bundle level.
-      nodeFs.writeFileSync(path, bytes, { mode: 0o600 });
+      // strict posture. Overwrite of an existing key stays allowed
+      // (operators legitimately rewrite the same key, e.g. resuming a
+      // multipart upload); upper layers (writeBundle's `bundle-exists`
+      // check) enforce no-overwrite at the bundle level. writeSync's
+      // atomic rename preserves that overwrite semantic while refusing a
+      // symlink pre-planted at `path` (CWE-59) and never leaving a torn
+      // payload — a bare writeFileSync did both.
+      atomicFile.writeSync(path, bytes, { fileMode: 0o600 });
     },
     async readFile(key) {
       var path = _keyPath(key);
-      if (!nodeFs.existsSync(path)) {
-        throw new BackupError("backup/no-key", "fsAdapter: key not found: " + JSON.stringify(key));
-      }
-      return nodeFs.readFileSync(path);
+      // Capped fd-bound read (no existsSync check-then-read window): fetches a
+      // whole bundle payload, so an oversize/swapped file is an OOM lever. 8 GiB
+      // matches the writeBundle maxBundleBytes ceiling.
+      return atomicFile.fdSafeReadSync(path, {
+        maxBytes: C.BYTES.gib(8),
+        errorFor: function (kind) {
+          if (kind === "enoent") return new BackupError("backup/no-key", "fsAdapter: key not found: " + JSON.stringify(key));
+          if (kind === "too-large") return new BackupError("backup/key-too-large", "fsAdapter: payload for key " + JSON.stringify(key) + " exceeds the read cap");
+          return new BackupError("backup/no-key", "fsAdapter: key " + JSON.stringify(key) + " unreadable: " + kind);
+        },
+      });
     },
     async listKeys(prefix) {
       var out = [];

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/backup/manifest.js

@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ function _validateFileEntry(f, idx, errors) {
   if (!_isHex(f.salt, true)) {
     errors.push("files[" + idx + "].salt: required hex string");
   }
-  if (typeof f.kind !== "string" || !VALID_KINDS[f.kind]) {
+  if (typeof f.kind !== "string" || !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(VALID_KINDS, f.kind)) {
     errors.push("files[" + idx + "].kind: must be one of raw, vault-sealed, plaintext");
   }
 }
@@ -239,6 +239,11 @@ function create(opts) {
   if (opts.metadata && typeof opts.metadata === "object" && !Array.isArray(opts.metadata)) {
     manifest.metadata = Object.assign({}, opts.metadata);
   }
+  // Marks that every file blob was sealed with its relativePath as AEAD
+  // associated data (the blob-remap defense). Set on all bundles this version
+  // writes; absent on legacy bundles, which restore decrypts without AAD.
+  // Carried into the signed payload so it cannot be flipped on a signed bundle.
+  if (opts.aadBound === true) manifest.aadBound = true;
   var v = validate(manifest);
   if (!v.ok) {
     throw new BackupManifestError("backup-manifest/invalid",
@@ -271,6 +276,7 @@ function _canonical(manifest, includeSignature) {
     }),
   };
   if (manifest.metadata) canonical.metadata = manifest.metadata;
+  if (manifest.aadBound === true) canonical.aadBound = true;
   // Signature block lives alongside the rest of the manifest fields
   // and is itself stable-ordered. Sign-time canonicalization (the
   // bytes the audit-sign keypair signs) excludes the signature field

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/break-glass.js

@@ -120,10 +120,13 @@ function _appSqlOpts() { return { dialect: clusterStorage.dialect(), quoteName:
 // Populated on first access per-table; invalidated on policy.set/delete.
 var policyCache = new Map();    // table -> policy
 var initialized = false;
-// Framework-wide trustProxy setting (set at init). When true, the
-// break-glass primitive consults X-Forwarded-For to populate the
-// grant row's `ip` field — same trust boundary as middleware.
-var _trustProxy = false;
+// Framework-wide client-IP resolver (built at init). The grant row's `ip`
+// field is a security control — a grant is pinned to the IP that minted it
+// and re-checked on redeem. X-Forwarded-For is forgeable, so the binding is
+// meaningful only when resolution is peer-gated: operators declare their
+// reverse proxies via init({ trustedProxies }) or own resolution via
+// init({ clientIpResolver }). Default resolves the socket address only.
+var _ipResolver = requestHelpers.trustedClientIp();
 
 // Factor lockout — wrap auth.lockout so a hostile actor brute-forcing
 // TOTP codes against break-glass gets shut out after a few failures.
@@ -457,28 +460,45 @@ async function migrate(table, opts) {
  * @related   b.breakGlass.policy.set, b.breakGlass.grant
  *
  * One-shot boot wiring. Clears the in-memory policy cache, resets the
- * factor-lockout counter, and records the framework-wide trustProxy
- * boundary so subsequent `grant()` calls populate the grant row's `ip`
- * field from `X-Forwarded-For` only when proxies are trusted. Operators
- * call this once at boot, before any policy / grant / unseal call —
- * every other primitive throws `breakglass/not-initialized` until init
- * has run.
+ * factor-lockout counter, and records how the grant row's `ip` field is
+ * resolved. That IP is a security binding — the grant pins to it at mint
+ * and re-checks it on redeem — so resolution is peer-gated: declare your
+ * reverse proxies via `trustedProxies` (CIDRs; X-Forwarded-For honored
+ * only from a trusted peer) or own resolution via `clientIpResolver`. A
+ * bare `trustProxy` is refused — a forgeable pin is no pin. Operators call
+ * this once at boot, before any policy / grant / unseal call — every other
+ * primitive throws `breakglass/not-initialized` until init has run.
  *
  * @opts
- *   trustProxy: boolean,   // honor X-Forwarded-For when populating grant.ip (default false)
+ *   trustedProxies:   string|string[],          // CIDRs of your reverse proxies — peer-gates X-Forwarded-For
+ *   clientIpResolver: function(req): string|null,  // own grant-IP resolution
  *
  * @example
- *   b.breakGlass.init({ trustProxy: true });
+ *   b.breakGlass.init({ trustedProxies: ["10.0.0.0/8"] });
  *   // → undefined  (init returns nothing; throws on bad opts)
  */
 function init(opts) {
   opts = opts || {};
-  validateOpts(opts, ["trustProxy"], "breakGlass.init");
+  validateOpts(opts, ["trustProxy", "trustedProxies", "clientIpResolver"], "breakGlass.init");
+  var resolver;
+  try {
+    resolver = requestHelpers.trustedClientIp({
+      trustedProxies:   opts.trustedProxies,
+      clientIpResolver: opts.clientIpResolver,
+    });
+  } catch (e) {
+    throw new BreakGlassError("breakglass/bad-opt", e.message);
+  }
+  if ((opts.trustProxy === true || typeof opts.trustProxy === "number") && !resolver.peerGated) {
+    throw new BreakGlassError("breakglass/bad-opt",
+      "trustProxy is spoofable — a grant pinned to a forgeable X-Forwarded-For is no " +
+      "pin at all. Declare your reverse proxies via trustedProxies: [\"10.0.0.0/8\", …] " +
+      "or supply clientIpResolver(req).");
+  }
   initialized = true;
   policyCache.clear();
   _factorLockout = null;
-  _trustProxy = opts.trustProxy === true || typeof opts.trustProxy === "number"
-    ? opts.trustProxy : false;
+  _ipResolver = resolver;
 }
 
 function _resetForTest() {
@@ -490,7 +510,7 @@ function _resetForTest() {
   }
   _factorLockout = null;
   _factorLockoutCache = null;
-  _trustProxy = false;
+  _ipResolver = requestHelpers.trustedClientIp();
 }
 
 function _requireInit() {
@@ -1119,11 +1139,10 @@ async function grant(opts) {
   var nowMs    = Date.now();
   var grantId  = "bg-" + generateToken(GRANT_ID_BYTES);
   var sessionId = (opts.req && opts.req.session && opts.req.session.id) || null;
-  // Honor the framework-wide trustProxy setting from init() — same
-  // boundary as middleware. Without trustProxy, X-Forwarded-For is
-  // ignored as attacker-forgeable, and the grant pins to the socket
-  // remoteAddress only.
-  var ipFromReq = requestHelpers.clientIp(opts.req, { trustProxy: _trustProxy });
+  // Peer-gated client-IP resolution from init() (trustedProxies /
+  // clientIpResolver). Without it, X-Forwarded-For is ignored as
+  // attacker-forgeable and the grant pins to the socket remoteAddress only.
+  var ipFromReq = _ipResolver.resolve(opts.req);
 
   var grantRow = {
     _id:                grantId,
@@ -1218,7 +1237,7 @@ function _enforceGrantPins(policy, grantRow, redeemReq, actorFor) {
         "captured at mint (fail-closed) — re-mint from a request whose client " +
         "IP the framework can resolve", true);
     }
-    var redeemIp = requestHelpers.clientIp(redeemReq, { trustProxy: _trustProxy });
+    var redeemIp = _ipResolver.resolve(redeemReq);
     if (redeemIp !== grantRow.ip) {
       audit.safeEmit({
         action:   "breakglass.unsealrow",

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/cbor.js

@@ -55,10 +55,17 @@
 
 var C = require("./constants");
 var safeBuffer = require("./safe-buffer");
+var boundedMap = require("./bounded-map");
 var { defineClass } = require("./framework-error");
 
 var CborError = defineClass("CborError", { alwaysPermanent: true });
 
+// Hoisted so the map-decode loop's per-key uniqueness guard doesn't allocate a
+// closure per key (the decode hot path).
+function _throwDuplicateKey() {
+  throw new CborError("cbor/duplicate-key", "cbor.decode: duplicate map key (RFC 8949 §5.6)");
+}
+
 var DEFAULT_MAX_DEPTH = 64;                                                            // nesting depth, not a size
 var ABSOLUTE_MAX_DEPTH = 256;                                                          // nesting depth ceiling, not a size
 var DEFAULT_MAX_BYTES = C.BYTES.mib(16);
@@ -127,6 +134,7 @@ function _encodeFloat(value) {
 // exponent must fit the half range and the low 13 mantissa bits must
 // be zero (half has a 10-bit mantissa vs float32's 23).
 function _doubleToHalfBits(value) {
+  if (value === 0) return Object.is(value, -0) ? 0x8000 : 0x0000;                       // ±zero → half zero (sign-preserving); -0 must not fall to the subnormal path
   var fbuf = Buffer.alloc(4);
   fbuf.writeFloatBE(value, 0);
   if (fbuf.readFloatBE(0) !== value) return -1;                                        // not exact in float32 → not in float16
@@ -177,8 +185,10 @@ function _encodeValue(value, opts) {
     // Exact integers within the safe range encode as CBOR integers;
     // an integer-VALUED number beyond 2^53 (e.g. 1e300) has lost
     // integer precision and is a float — encode it as a float (use a
-    // bigint for exact 64-bit CBOR integers).
-    if (Number.isInteger(value) && Math.abs(value) <= Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER) {
+    // bigint for exact 64-bit CBOR integers). NEGATIVE ZERO is excluded:
+    // CBOR integers have no -0, so encoding -0 as the uint 0 would silently
+    // drop the sign; it falls through to the float branch (float16 -0.0).
+    if (Number.isInteger(value) && !Object.is(value, -0) && Math.abs(value) <= Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER) {
       return value >= 0 ? _head(0, value) : _head(1, -1 - value);
     }
     if (!isFinite(value) && !opts.allowNonFinite) {
@@ -337,7 +347,11 @@ function _need(state, n) {
 
 function _readArgument(state, ai) {
   // ai is the low-5-bits additional info. Returns the argument as a
-  // Number (or BigInt for 8-byte values beyond Number range).
+  // Number (or BigInt for 8-byte values beyond Number range). Non-minimal
+  // (non-canonical) heads are tolerated here by design — strict canonical
+  // enforcement is the opt-in `requireDeterministic` mode (round-trip compare);
+  // duplicate keys encoded non-minimally are caught value-based in the map
+  // decoder regardless of mode (RFC 8949 §5.6).
   if (ai < CBOR_AI_1BYTE) return ai;
   if (ai === CBOR_AI_1BYTE) { _need(state, 1); var v1 = state.buf[state.pos]; state.pos += 1; return v1; }
   if (ai === 25) { _need(state, 2); var v2 = state.buf.readUInt16BE(state.pos); state.pos += 2; return v2; }
@@ -410,17 +424,26 @@ function _decodeItem(state, depth) {
     case 5: {                                                                           // map
       var mlen = _lenOf(_readArgument(state, ai));
       var m = new Map();
-      var seen = [];
+      // O(1) duplicate-key detection (RFC 8949 §5.6) keyed on the CANONICAL
+      // re-encoding of each decoded key — not its raw input bytes. A per-key
+      // Buffer.compare scan over a `seen` array is O(n²), and cbor.decode runs on
+      // raw attacker bytes BEFORE any signature check on every COSE / CWT / EAT /
+      // mdoc verify path, so a large distinct-key map is an unauthenticated
+      // algorithmic-complexity DoS (CWE-407). Keying on the canonical encoding
+      // (rather than the input bytes) also closes the bypass where the SAME key
+      // value is sent twice with different (e.g. non-minimal) encodings to dodge
+      // a byte-wise dup check and silently last-value-win — both copies
+      // re-encode identically here and the duplicate is caught regardless of the
+      // requireDeterministic mode.
+      var seen = new Set();
       for (var j = 0; j < mlen; j++) {
         var keyStart = state.pos;
         var key = _decodeItem(state, depth + 1);
-        var keyBytes = state.buf.slice(keyStart, state.pos);
-        for (var s = 0; s < seen.length; s++) {
-          if (Buffer.compare(seen[s], keyBytes) === 0) {
-            throw new CborError("cbor/duplicate-key", "cbor.decode: duplicate map key (RFC 8949 §5.6)");
-          }
-        }
-        seen.push(keyBytes);
+        var keyId;
+        try { keyId = encode(key).toString("latin1"); }
+        catch (_e) { keyId = "raw:" + state.buf.toString("latin1", keyStart, state.pos); }
+        boundedMap.requireAbsentMember(seen, keyId, _throwDuplicateKey);
+        seen.add(keyId);
         var val = _decodeItem(state, depth + 1);
         m.set(key, val);
       }

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/cdn-cache-control.js

@@ -376,9 +376,13 @@ function parse(headerValue) {
         }
         continue;
       }
-      var n = Number(val);
-      if (isFinite(n) && n >= 0) {
-        out[_camel(key)] = Math.floor(n);
+      // RFC 9111 delta-seconds is 1*DIGIT — Number() would also accept hex
+      // ("0x10"), exponential ("1e3"), and surrounding whitespace, which are
+      // not valid cache-directive values. Round-trip parseInt to require pure
+      // decimal digits.
+      var n = parseInt(val, 10);
+      if (Number.isFinite(n) && n >= 0 && String(n) === val) {
+        out[_camel(key)] = n;
       }
       continue;
     }

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/cert.js

@@ -125,7 +125,9 @@ function _createSealedDiskStorage(opts) {
     async readSealed(relPath) {
       var p = nodePath.join(rootDir, relPath + ".sealed");
       if (!nodeFs.existsSync(p)) return null;
-      var sealed = nodeFs.readFileSync(p);
+      // Cap + fd-bound (sealed cert/key envelope is well under 256 KiB). NO
+      // refuseSymlink: the sealed store may be operator-mounted.
+      var sealed = atomicFile.fdSafeReadSync(p, { maxBytes: C.BYTES.kib(256) });
       var plain = vaultStore.unseal(sealed);
       return Buffer.isBuffer(plain) ? plain : Buffer.from(plain);
     },
@@ -139,7 +141,7 @@ function _createSealedDiskStorage(opts) {
     async readMeta(certName) {
       var p = nodePath.join(_certDir(certName), "meta.json");
       if (!nodeFs.existsSync(p)) return null;
-      try { return safeJson.parse(nodeFs.readFileSync(p, "utf8"), { maxBytes: C.BYTES.kib(16) }); }
+      try { return safeJson.parse(atomicFile.fdSafeReadSync(p, { maxBytes: C.BYTES.kib(16), encoding: "utf8" }), { maxBytes: C.BYTES.kib(16) }); }
       catch (e) {
         // meta.json is a derived index (expiry + fingerprint), not a
         // source of truth — the sealed cert is. A corrupt meta must not
@@ -429,7 +431,7 @@ function create(opts) {
   function _loadOrGenerateAccountKey() {
     // Read sealed account JWK; generate + persist if absent.
     var sealedBuf = nodeFs.existsSync(nodePath.join(storage.rootDir, "account/jwk.json.sealed"))
-      ? nodeFs.readFileSync(nodePath.join(storage.rootDir, "account/jwk.json.sealed"))
+      ? atomicFile.fdSafeReadSync(nodePath.join(storage.rootDir, "account/jwk.json.sealed"), { maxBytes: C.BYTES.kib(64) })
       : null;
     if (sealedBuf) {
       var jwk;

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/cli.js

@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ var os = require("node:os");
 var nodePath = require("node:path");
 var apiSnapshot = require("./api-snapshot");
 var argParser = require("./arg-parser");
+var atomicFile = require("./atomic-file");
 var auditChain = require("./audit-chain");
 var auditTools = require("./audit-tools");
 var backup = require("./backup");
@@ -1484,7 +1485,10 @@ async function _runMtls(args, ctx) {
           validityDays: daysP,
         });
         if (outPath) {
-          nodeFs.writeFileSync(outPath, p12.p12, { mode: 0o600 });
+          // Atomic, symlink-refusing write — a bare writeFileSync follows a
+          // symlink an attacker pre-planted at the operator-supplied --out
+          // path (CWE-59) and could expose the client key bundle through it.
+          atomicFile.writeSync(outPath, p12.p12, { fileMode: 0o600 });
           report.write("p12 written: " + outPath);
         } else {
           // No --out: stream the bytes to stdout for piping. Operators

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/cloud-events.js

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
  */
 
 var nodeCrypto = require("node:crypto");
+var numericBounds = require("./numeric-bounds");
 var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
 var rfc3339 = require("./rfc3339");
 var safeJson = require("./safe-json");
@@ -265,7 +266,7 @@ function parse(envelope) {
   for (var j = 0; j < keys.length; j += 1) {
     var key = keys[j];
     if (REQUIRED_ATTRS.indexOf(key) !== -1) continue;
-    if (KNOWN_OPTIONAL_ATTRS[key]) continue;
+    if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(KNOWN_OPTIONAL_ATTRS, key)) continue;
     extensions[key] = envelope[key];
   }
 
@@ -309,7 +310,7 @@ function _extIssue(name, v) {
   if (v === null) return null;
   if (typeof v === "string" || typeof v === "boolean") return null;
   if (typeof v === "number") {
-    if (!isFinite(v) || Math.floor(v) !== v) return "extension '" + name + "' must be an integer (CloudEvents has no float type)";
+    if (!numericBounds.isFiniteInt(v)) return "extension '" + name + "' must be an integer (CloudEvents has no float type)";
     if (v < INT_MIN || v > INT_MAX) return "extension '" + name + "' integer out of 32-bit range";
     return null;
   }

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/cluster-storage.js

@@ -327,9 +327,13 @@ var _activeTx = null;
 // synchronous this runs atomically to completion with no interleaving.
 function _localExec(sql, params) {
   var stmt = _localDb().prepare(sql);
-  // Heuristic: if the statement returns rows (SELECT or has RETURNING),
-  // use .all(); otherwise .run() and report changes as rowCount.
-  if (/^\s*SELECT\b/i.test(sql) || /\bRETURNING\b/i.test(sql)) {
+  // Choose .all() vs .run() by whether the statement returns rows. A leading-
+  // keyword check (`^\s*SELECT`) mis-routes a WITH (CTE) read — "WITH c AS (...)
+  // SELECT ..." does not start with SELECT — to .run(), which on node:sqlite
+  // silently returns only a changes count and DROPS the rows. The shared
+  // CTE/EXPLAIN-aware classifier resolves the effective verb (and a top-level
+  // RETURNING) so every row-returning statement reaches the caller via .all().
+  if (externalDb._statementReturnsRows(sql)) {
     var rows = stmt.all.apply(stmt, params || []);
     return { rows: rows, rowCount: rows.length };
   }

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/codepoint-class.js

@@ -356,9 +356,26 @@ function firstControlCharOffset(s, opts) {
   return -1;
 }
 
+// Decode HTML numeric character references (hex &#x..; and decimal &#..;) just
+// enough to expose a scheme hidden behind entity-encoding. The trailing
+// semicolon is OPTIONAL — a browser decodes `&#106avascript:` (no semicolon)
+// the same as `javascript:`, so a semicolon-required decoder lets the
+// no-semicolon form bypass a scheme allowlist. Shared so guard-html / guard-svg
+// / guard-markdown cannot drift on this (the bug class that shipped one buggy
+// + one correct copy).
+var NUMERIC_ENTITY_RE_G = /&#(?:x([0-9a-f]+)|(\d+));?/gi;
+function decodeNumericEntities(s) {
+  return String(s == null ? "" : s).replace(NUMERIC_ENTITY_RE_G, function (m, hex, dec) {
+    var cp = hex !== undefined ? parseInt(hex, 16) : parseInt(dec, 10);
+    if (!isFinite(cp) || cp < 0 || cp > 0x10FFFF) return m;
+    try { return String.fromCodePoint(cp); } catch (_e) { return m; }
+  });
+}
+
 module.exports = {
   isForbiddenControlChar:  isForbiddenControlChar,
   firstControlCharOffset:  firstControlCharOffset,
+  decodeNumericEntities:   decodeNumericEntities,
   isAsciiAlnum:      isAsciiAlnum,
   isUnreserved:      isUnreserved,
   hex4:              hex4,

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/compliance-eaa.js

@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ function create(opts) {
       throw new ComplianceEaaError("compliance-eaa/bad-decl",
         "compliance.eaa.declareCriterion: decl must be an object with { conformance, note? }");
     }
-    if (!VALID_CONFORMANCE[decl.conformance]) {
+    if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(VALID_CONFORMANCE, decl.conformance)) {
       throw new ComplianceEaaError("compliance-eaa/bad-conformance",
         "compliance.eaa.declareCriterion: conformance must be one of " + Object.keys(VALID_CONFORMANCE).join(", "));
     }

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/compliance-sanctions.js

@@ -368,13 +368,14 @@ function create(opts) {
 
     for (var c = 0; c < index.length; c++) {
       var candidate = index[c];
-      // Type filter: when input.type is set, skip candidates of
-      // the wrong type unless candidate is an entity (entities can
-      // be matched regardless to catch operator-side type errors).
-      if (input.type && candidate.type !== input.type &&
-          candidate.type !== "entity") {
-        continue;
-      }
+      // A sanctions screen MUST over-match on the legally-operative NAME. The
+      // operator-asserted input.type is an unverified counterparty
+      // self-classification, NOT data-driven non-match confidence — using it to
+      // EXCLUDE a name hit inverts the screen to under-match (a false negative
+      // that processes a payment which should have been blocked). So never skip
+      // a candidate on type; the name match runs against every record and the
+      // type mismatch is surfaced as a non-dispositive `typeMatch` signal on
+      // each hit for operator triage.
 
       var bestForCandidate = { score: 0, name: "" };
       for (var qi = 0; qi < queryNames.length; qi++) {
@@ -404,6 +405,7 @@ function create(opts) {
           listed:    candidate.listedAt,
           programs:  candidate.programs,
           type:      candidate.type,
+          typeMatch: input.type ? candidate.type === input.type : null,
           country:   candidate.country,
         });
       }

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/compliance.js

@@ -953,7 +953,7 @@ var REGIME_MAP = Object.freeze({
  *   b.compliance.describe("not-a-real-posture");   // → null
  */
 function describe(posture) {
-  return REGIME_MAP[posture] || null;
+  return Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(REGIME_MAP, posture) ? REGIME_MAP[posture] : null;
 }
 
 // POSTURE_DEFAULTS — per-posture configuration knobs that primitives

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/config-drift.js

@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@
  * @card
  *   Monitor + alert when runtime config diverges from a declared baseline.
  */
-var nodeFs = require("node:fs");
 var nodePath = require("node:path");
 var auditSign = require("./audit-sign");
 var canonicalJson = require("./canonical-json");
@@ -45,6 +44,7 @@ var safeJson = require("./safe-json");
 var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
 var { defineClass } = require("./framework-error");
 var atomicFile = require("./atomic-file");
+var C = require("./constants");
 
 var audit = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./audit"); });
 var auditEmit = require("./audit-emit");
@@ -163,9 +163,13 @@ function create(opts) {
   var _emit = auditEmit.gatedReasonEmitter({ audit: auditOn, sink: auditInstance });
 
   function _readSidecar() {
-    if (!nodeFs.existsSync(sidecarPath)) return null;
+    // Capped fd-bound read (no existsSync check-then-read window): the signed
+    // config-baseline sidecar is parsed + verified, so a tampered multi-GB file
+    // would OOM the reader before signature verify. refuseSymlink stays OFF: the
+    // data dir may be a symlink-mounted volume (k8s PVC). Any read failure
+    // (missing / too-large) → null, the existing "no baseline yet" behavior.
     var raw;
-    try { raw = nodeFs.readFileSync(sidecarPath, "utf8"); }
+    try { raw = atomicFile.fdSafeReadSync(sidecarPath, { maxBytes: C.BYTES.mib(1), encoding: "utf8" }); }
     catch (_e) { return null; }
     var parsed;
     try { parsed = safeJson.parse(raw); }
@@ -190,9 +194,12 @@ function create(opts) {
       publicKeyPem:     auditSign.getPublicKey(),
       snapshot:         snapshot,
     };
-    var tmp = sidecarPath + ".tmp";
-    nodeFs.writeFileSync(tmp, JSON.stringify(payload, null, 2));
-    atomicFile.renameWithRetry(tmp, sidecarPath);
+    // Atomic, symlink-refusing write. The previous hand-rolled form staged
+    // into a PREDICTABLE temp name (`sidecarPath + ".tmp"`) via a plain
+    // writeFileSync, so an attacker could pre-plant a symlink at that exact
+    // path and have the signed sidecar written through it (CWE-59 / CWE-377).
+    // writeSync uses a CSPRNG temp name opened O_EXCL | O_NOFOLLOW.
+    atomicFile.writeSync(sidecarPath, JSON.stringify(payload, null, 2), { fileMode: 0o600 });
   }
 
   function _verifySidecar(parsed) {
@@ -367,7 +374,10 @@ function verifyVendorIntegrity(opts) {
   var libVendorDir  = opts.libVendorDir  || nodePath.join(__dirname, "vendor");
   var manifestPath  = opts.manifestPath  || nodePath.join(libVendorDir, "MANIFEST.json");
   var raw;
-  try { raw = nodeFs.readFileSync(manifestPath, "utf8"); }
+  // Capped fd-bound read of the vendor MANIFEST.json (operator-bundled, install-
+  // time). refuseSymlink OFF — the vendored tree ships read-only and an install
+  // may symlink lib/. The cap precedes the alloc.
+  try { raw = atomicFile.fdSafeReadSync(manifestPath, { maxBytes: C.BYTES.mib(4), encoding: "utf8" }); }
   catch (_e) {
     throw _err("VENDOR_MANIFEST_MISSING",
       "vendor MANIFEST.json missing at " + manifestPath, true);
@@ -397,7 +407,11 @@ function verifyVendorIntegrity(opts) {
       var abs = nodePath.isAbsolute(rel) ? rel : nodePath.join(libVendorDir, relInVendor);
       var actual;
       try {
-        var bytes = nodeFs.readFileSync(abs);
+        // Capped fd-bound read (raw bytes — hashing, no encoding). Sanity ceiling
+        // so a corrupted/huge vendored file is a read-failed mismatch (caught
+        // below) rather than an OOM in the boot integrity loop. NO refuseSymlink
+        // (vendored tree ships read-only; installs may symlink lib/).
+        var bytes = atomicFile.fdSafeReadSync(abs, { maxBytes: C.BYTES.mib(64) });
         actual = "sha256:" + require("node:crypto")
           .createHash("sha256").update(bytes).digest("hex");
       } catch (_e) {