@blamejs/blamejs-shop 0.3.69 → 0.3.71

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/layer-0-primitives/redis-client.test.js

@@ -119,6 +119,66 @@ async function run() {
   check("frameToValue: error becomes _redisError marker",
         efv && efv._redisError === true && efv.message === "ERR boom");
 
+  // ---- create() config-time opt validation ----
+  // db / connectTimeoutMs / commandTimeoutMs / maxReconnectAttempts were
+  // coerced with bare Number() + falsy fallback: a bad type silently became
+  // the default (or, for a negative timeout, sailed into setTimeout; for a
+  // non-numeric maxReconnectAttempts, NaN made the `>= 0` reconnect cap
+  // false and disabled the bound entirely). They now throw at the entry
+  // point. db and maxReconnectAttempts must still allow 0.
+  function _createThrows(label, badOpts) {
+    var threw = false;
+    var msg = "";
+    try { redis.create(Object.assign({ url: "redis://127.0.0.1:1/0" }, badOpts)); }
+    catch (e) { threw = true; msg = (e && e.message) || ""; }
+    check("create rejects " + label, threw);
+    check("create rejects " + label + " with a clear message",
+          threw && msg.length > 0 && /must be/.test(msg));
+  }
+
+  _createThrows("connectTimeoutMs:\"abc\"", { connectTimeoutMs: "abc" });
+  _createThrows("connectTimeoutMs:-1", { connectTimeoutMs: -1 });
+  _createThrows("connectTimeoutMs:0", { connectTimeoutMs: 0 });
+  _createThrows("commandTimeoutMs:\"abc\"", { commandTimeoutMs: "abc" });
+  _createThrows("commandTimeoutMs:-5", { commandTimeoutMs: -5 });
+  _createThrows("db:\"3\"", { db: "3" });
+  _createThrows("db:-1", { db: -1 });
+  _createThrows("db:1.5", { db: 1.5 });
+  _createThrows("maxReconnectAttempts:\"abc\"", { maxReconnectAttempts: "abc" });
+  _createThrows("maxReconnectAttempts:-1", { maxReconnectAttempts: -1 });
+  _createThrows("maxReconnectAttempts:2.5", { maxReconnectAttempts: 2.5 });
+
+  // Absent opts keep the documented defaults.
+  var cDefaults = redis.create({ url: "redis://127.0.0.1:6379/0" });
+  var sDefaults = cDefaults._state();
+  check("create default connectTimeoutMs is 5000", sDefaults.connectTimeoutMs === 5000);
+  check("create default commandTimeoutMs is 10000", sDefaults.commandTimeoutMs === 10000);
+  check("create default maxReconnectAttempts is 10", sDefaults.maxReconnectAttempts === 10);
+  check("create default db comes from url (0)", sDefaults.db === 0);
+
+  // Valid values flow through unchanged.
+  var cValid = redis.create({
+    url: "redis://127.0.0.1:6379/0",
+    db: 7, connectTimeoutMs: 3000, commandTimeoutMs: 8000, maxReconnectAttempts: 3,
+  });
+  var sValid = cValid._state();
+  check("create accepts valid db", sValid.db === 7);
+  check("create accepts valid connectTimeoutMs", sValid.connectTimeoutMs === 3000);
+  check("create accepts valid commandTimeoutMs", sValid.commandTimeoutMs === 8000);
+  check("create accepts valid maxReconnectAttempts", sValid.maxReconnectAttempts === 3);
+
+  // 0 is a legitimate value for both db and maxReconnectAttempts and must
+  // NOT throw. db:0 = no SELECT on connect; maxReconnectAttempts:0 = give
+  // up immediately (the `reconnectAttempt >= maxReconnectAttempts` gate is
+  // true on the first reconnect call) — both preserved from prior behavior.
+  var cZero = redis.create({
+    url: "redis://127.0.0.1:6379/0", db: 0, maxReconnectAttempts: 0,
+  });
+  var sZero = cZero._state();
+  check("create accepts db:0", sZero.db === 0);
+  check("create accepts maxReconnectAttempts:0 (give-up-immediately bound)",
+        sZero.maxReconnectAttempts === 0);
+
   // ---- close()/reconnect leak guard (v0.13.40) ----
   // After close(), a reconnect timer scheduled during backoff must be
   // cancelled and _connect() must refuse to re-open — otherwise a post-

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/layer-0-primitives/safe-redirect.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * b.safeRedirect — open-redirect (CWE-601) defense for operator-supplied
+ * post-login redirect targets.
+ *
+ * Run standalone: `node test/layer-0-primitives/safe-redirect.test.js`
+ * Or via smoke:   `node test/smoke.js`
+ */
+
+var helpers = require("../helpers");
+var b     = helpers.b;
+var check = helpers.check;
+
+function testSurface() {
+  check("b.safeRedirect is object",            typeof b.safeRedirect === "object");
+  check("b.safeRedirect.resolve is fn",        typeof b.safeRedirect.resolve === "function");
+  check("b.safeRedirect.DEFAULT_FALLBACK",     b.safeRedirect.DEFAULT_FALLBACK === "/");
+}
+
+function testRelativeAndFragmentTargets() {
+  check("relative path is same-origin safe",
+        b.safeRedirect.resolve("/dashboard", { fallback: "/x" }) === "/dashboard");
+  check("query-only target is safe",
+        b.safeRedirect.resolve("?q=1", { fallback: "/x" }) === "?q=1");
+  check("fragment target is safe",
+        b.safeRedirect.resolve("#section", { fallback: "/x" }) === "#section");
+}
+
+function testHostileTargetsFallBack() {
+  check("protocol-relative // → fallback",
+        b.safeRedirect.resolve("//attacker.example.com", { fallback: "/safe" }) === "/safe");
+  check("backslash-relative \\\\ → fallback",
+        b.safeRedirect.resolve("\\\\attacker.example.com", { fallback: "/safe" }) === "/safe");
+  check("control char → fallback",
+        b.safeRedirect.resolve("/a\nb", { fallback: "/safe" }) === "/safe");
+  check("empty target → fallback",
+        b.safeRedirect.resolve("", { fallback: "/safe" }) === "/safe");
+  check("full URL with no allowlist → fallback",
+        b.safeRedirect.resolve("https://attacker.example.com/x", { fallback: "/safe" }) === "/safe");
+}
+
+function testAllowedOriginsAndHosts() {
+  check("full URL matching allowedOrigins passes",
+        b.safeRedirect.resolve("https://app.example.com/next",
+          { allowedOrigins: ["https://app.example.com"], fallback: "/safe" })
+        === "https://app.example.com/next");
+  check("full URL not in allowedOrigins → fallback",
+        b.safeRedirect.resolve("https://evil.example.com/x",
+          { allowedOrigins: ["https://app.example.com"], fallback: "/safe" })
+        === "/safe");
+  check("full URL matching allowedHosts passes",
+        b.safeRedirect.resolve("https://app.example.com/next",
+          { allowedHosts: ["app.example.com"], fallback: "/safe" })
+        === "https://app.example.com/next");
+}
+
+// ---- base wiring (opts.base is the app's own origin) ----
+
+function testBaseOriginImplicitlyAllowed() {
+  // A full URL on the same origin as base is same-origin by definition,
+  // so it passes even without an explicit allowedOrigins / allowedHosts.
+  check("full URL on base origin allowed via base alone",
+        b.safeRedirect.resolve("https://app.example.com/dashboard",
+          { base: "https://app.example.com", fallback: "/safe" })
+        === "https://app.example.com/dashboard");
+
+  // A cross-origin full URL is still refused when only base is supplied.
+  check("cross-origin full URL refused with base only",
+        b.safeRedirect.resolve("https://attacker.example.com/x",
+          { base: "https://app.example.com", fallback: "/safe" })
+        === "/safe");
+
+  // base combines with allowedOrigins (both are accepted).
+  check("base origin allowed alongside allowedOrigins",
+        b.safeRedirect.resolve("https://app.example.com/y",
+          { base: "https://app.example.com",
+            allowedOrigins: ["https://other.example.com"], fallback: "/safe" })
+        === "https://app.example.com/y");
+
+  // A different port is a different origin → refused.
+  check("base origin port mismatch refused",
+        b.safeRedirect.resolve("https://app.example.com:8443/x",
+          { base: "https://app.example.com", fallback: "/safe" })
+        === "/safe");
+}
+
+function testBaseDefaultBehaviorUnchanged() {
+  // No base + no allowlist → full URLs still refused (default safe).
+  check("no base, no allowlist → full URL fallback",
+        b.safeRedirect.resolve("https://app.example.com/x", { fallback: "/safe" }) === "/safe");
+
+  // Relative paths are unaffected by base.
+  check("relative path safe regardless of base",
+        b.safeRedirect.resolve("/home", { base: "https://app.example.com", fallback: "/safe" })
+        === "/home");
+
+  // A malformed / non-http(s) base is ignored (no crash, falls through
+  // to refuse the full URL with no other allowlist).
+  check("malformed base ignored → full URL fallback",
+        b.safeRedirect.resolve("https://app.example.com/x",
+          { base: "not a url", fallback: "/safe" })
+        === "/safe");
+}
+
+function run() {
+  testSurface();
+  testRelativeAndFragmentTargets();
+  testHostileTargetsFallBack();
+  testAllowedOriginsAndHosts();
+  testBaseOriginImplicitlyAllowed();
+  testBaseDefaultBehaviorUnchanged();
+  console.log("OK — safe-redirect tests");
+}
+
+module.exports = { run: run };
+if (require.main === module) {
+  try { run(); process.exit(0); } catch (e) { console.error(e); process.exit(1); }
+}

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/layer-0-primitives/scim-server.test.js

@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ async function run() {
   check("BulkResponse URN exported",      scimMod.SCIM_MESSAGE_BULK_RESPONSE === "urn:ietf:params:scim:api:messages:2.0:BulkResponse");
 
   await _runBulkTests();
+  await _runBulkRefOrderingTests();
 }
 
 // RFC 7644 §3.7 — /Bulk operations.
@@ -247,6 +248,264 @@ async function _runBulkTests() {
   check("bulk: bad maxOperations refused",   threwCap);
 }
 
+// Deep-walk a value asserting no string carries an unresolved
+// "bulkId:<id>" cross-reference token (RFC 7644 §3.7.2 — a literal token
+// must never reach the adapter as if it were a real resource id).
+function _containsBulkIdToken(value) {
+  if (typeof value === "string") return /^bulkId:/.test(value);
+  if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.some(_containsBulkIdToken);
+  if (value && typeof value === "object") {
+    return Object.keys(value).some(function (k) { return _containsBulkIdToken(value[k]); });
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+// A user adapter that records every data object it is handed so a test
+// can assert the adapter NEVER received a literal "bulkId:<id>" token.
+function _mkRecordingUsers() {
+  return {
+    _records:  new Map(),
+    _seq:      0,
+    _received: [],
+    async create(rec) {
+      this._received.push(rec);
+      var id = "u-" + (++this._seq);
+      var out = Object.assign({ id: id, meta: { resourceType: "User" } }, rec);
+      this._records.set(id, out);
+      return out;
+    },
+    async read(id)        { return this._records.get(id) || null; },
+    async update(id, rec) { this._received.push(rec); var r = Object.assign({}, rec, { id: id }); this._records.set(id, r); return r; },
+    async patch(id, ops)  { this._received.push(ops); var r = this._records.get(id); return r; },
+    async remove(id)      { this._records.delete(id); },
+    async list()          { return { totalResults: this._records.size, Resources: Array.from(this._records.values()) }; },
+  };
+}
+
+function _mkRecordingGroups() {
+  return {
+    _records:    new Map(),
+    _seq:        0,
+    _received:   [],
+    _lastCreate: null,
+    async create(rec) {
+      this._received.push(rec);
+      var id = "g-" + (++this._seq);
+      var out = Object.assign({ id: id, meta: { resourceType: "Group" } }, rec);
+      this._records.set(id, out);
+      this._lastCreate = out;
+      return out;
+    },
+    async read(id)        { return this._records.get(id) || null; },
+    async update(id, rec) { this._received.push(rec); var r = Object.assign({}, rec, { id: id }); this._records.set(id, r); return r; },
+    async patch(id, ops)  { this._received.push(ops); var r = this._records.get(id); return r; },
+    async remove(id)      { this._records.delete(id); },
+    async list()          { return { totalResults: this._records.size, Resources: Array.from(this._records.values()) }; },
+  };
+}
+
+// RFC 7644 §3.7.2 — forward references, circular references, undeclared
+// references, and failed-dependency references.
+async function _runBulkRefOrderingTests() {
+  // --- Forward reference: the GROUP op references the USER op that comes
+  // AFTER it in request order. Both must succeed and the token must be
+  // substituted with the real id (success path, end-to-end).
+  var fwdUsers  = _mkRecordingUsers();
+  var fwdGroups = _mkRecordingGroups();
+  var fwdMw = b.middleware.scimServer({
+    basePath: "/scim/v2", users: fwdUsers, groups: fwdGroups, bulk: { maxOperations: 10 },
+  });
+  var fwd = await _bulkBody(fwdMw, [
+    { method: "POST", path: "/Groups", bulkId: "admins",
+      data: { schemas: ["urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:core:2.0:Group"], displayName: "Admins",
+              members: [{ value: "bulkId:carol" }] } },
+    { method: "POST", path: "/Users", bulkId: "carol",
+      data: { schemas: ["urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:core:2.0:User"], userName: "carol" } },
+  ]);
+  var fwdResp = JSON.parse(fwd.res._body());
+  check("bulk fwd-ref: 200 envelope",        fwd.res._sc() === 200);
+  check("bulk fwd-ref: both succeed",        fwdResp.Operations[0].status === "201" && fwdResp.Operations[1].status === "201");
+  // Response array stays in ORIGINAL request order (group first, user second).
+  check("bulk fwd-ref: response in request order",
+        fwdResp.Operations[0].bulkId === "admins" && fwdResp.Operations[1].bulkId === "carol");
+  var fwdUserId  = Array.from(fwdUsers._records.keys())[0];
+  var fwdMembers = fwdGroups._lastCreate && fwdGroups._lastCreate.members;
+  check("bulk fwd-ref: token resolved to real id",
+        Array.isArray(fwdMembers) && fwdMembers[0].value === fwdUserId);
+  check("bulk fwd-ref: adapter never saw a literal token",
+        !fwdGroups._received.some(_containsBulkIdToken) && !fwdUsers._received.some(_containsBulkIdToken));
+
+  // --- Circular reference: two POSTs each reference the other's bulkId.
+  // Both fail with HTTP 409 (RFC 7644 §3.7.1) and the adapter is NEVER
+  // called with a literal token (in fact never called at all here).
+  var cycUsers  = _mkRecordingUsers();
+  var cycGroups = _mkRecordingGroups();
+  var cycMw = b.middleware.scimServer({
+    basePath: "/scim/v2", users: cycUsers, groups: cycGroups, bulk: { maxOperations: 10 },
+  });
+  var cyc = await _bulkBody(cycMw, [
+    { method: "POST", path: "/Users", bulkId: "ua",
+      data: { schemas: ["urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:core:2.0:User"], userName: "ua",
+              manager: { value: "bulkId:ub" } } },
+    { method: "POST", path: "/Users", bulkId: "ub",
+      data: { schemas: ["urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:core:2.0:User"], userName: "ub",
+              manager: { value: "bulkId:ua" } } },
+  ]);
+  var cycResp = JSON.parse(cyc.res._body());
+  check("bulk circular: 200 envelope",       cyc.res._sc() === 200);
+  check("bulk circular: 2 results in order", cycResp.Operations.length === 2 &&
+        cycResp.Operations[0].bulkId === "ua" && cycResp.Operations[1].bulkId === "ub");
+  check("bulk circular: both fail 409",      cycResp.Operations[0].status === "409" && cycResp.Operations[1].status === "409");
+  check("bulk circular: adapter never called with token",
+        !cycUsers._received.some(_containsBulkIdToken));
+  check("bulk circular: nothing persisted",  cycUsers._records.size === 0);
+
+  // --- Undeclared reference: a member points at a bulkId no operation
+  // declares — that op fails invalidValue; the well-formed op succeeds.
+  var undUsers  = _mkRecordingUsers();
+  var undGroups = _mkRecordingGroups();
+  var undMw = b.middleware.scimServer({
+    basePath: "/scim/v2", users: undUsers, groups: undGroups, bulk: { maxOperations: 10 },
+  });
+  var und = await _bulkBody(undMw, [
+    { method: "POST", path: "/Users", bulkId: "real",
+      data: { schemas: ["urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:core:2.0:User"], userName: "real" } },
+    { method: "POST", path: "/Groups", bulkId: "grp",
+      data: { schemas: ["urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:core:2.0:Group"], displayName: "G",
+              members: [{ value: "bulkId:ghost" }] } },
+  ]);
+  var undResp = JSON.parse(und.res._body());
+  check("bulk undeclared: real op succeeds", undResp.Operations[0].status === "201");
+  check("bulk undeclared: ref op fails 400", undResp.Operations[1].status === "400" &&
+        undResp.Operations[1].response.scimType === "invalidValue");
+  check("bulk undeclared: group adapter never saw token",
+        !undGroups._received.some(_containsBulkIdToken));
+  check("bulk undeclared: no group persisted", undGroups._records.size === 0);
+
+  // --- Failed dependency: the creating op fails, so the op that
+  // references it must fail invalidValue rather than receive the token.
+  var depUsersBase = _mkRecordingUsers();
+  var depUsers = {
+    _records: depUsersBase._records,
+    _received: depUsersBase._received,
+    create: async function (rec) {
+      depUsersBase._received.push(rec);
+      var e = new Error("user create rejected"); e.statusCode = 409; e.scimType = "uniqueness"; throw e;
+    },
+    read: depUsersBase.read.bind(depUsersBase), update: depUsersBase.update.bind(depUsersBase),
+    patch: depUsersBase.patch.bind(depUsersBase), remove: depUsersBase.remove.bind(depUsersBase),
+    list: depUsersBase.list.bind(depUsersBase),
+  };
+  var depGroups = _mkRecordingGroups();
+  var depMw = b.middleware.scimServer({
+    basePath: "/scim/v2", users: depUsers, groups: depGroups, bulk: { maxOperations: 10 },
+  });
+  var dep = await _bulkBody(depMw, [
+    { method: "POST", path: "/Users", bulkId: "willfail",
+      data: { schemas: ["urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:core:2.0:User"], userName: "willfail" } },
+    { method: "POST", path: "/Groups", bulkId: "grp",
+      data: { schemas: ["urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:core:2.0:Group"], displayName: "G",
+              members: [{ value: "bulkId:willfail" }] } },
+  ]);
+  var depResp = JSON.parse(dep.res._body());
+  check("bulk failed-dep: creator fails 409", depResp.Operations[0].status === "409");
+  check("bulk failed-dep: dependent fails 400 invalidValue",
+        depResp.Operations[1].status === "400" && depResp.Operations[1].response.scimType === "invalidValue");
+  check("bulk failed-dep: group adapter never saw token",
+        !depGroups._received.some(_containsBulkIdToken));
+  check("bulk failed-dep: no group persisted", depGroups._records.size === 0);
+
+  // --- Backward reference unchanged: a member references an EARLIER POST.
+  var bwUsers  = _mkRecordingUsers();
+  var bwGroups = _mkRecordingGroups();
+  var bwMw = b.middleware.scimServer({
+    basePath: "/scim/v2", users: bwUsers, groups: bwGroups, bulk: { maxOperations: 10 },
+  });
+  var bw = await _bulkBody(bwMw, [
+    { method: "POST", path: "/Users", bulkId: "dave",
+      data: { schemas: ["urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:core:2.0:User"], userName: "dave" } },
+    { method: "POST", path: "/Groups", bulkId: "team",
+      data: { schemas: ["urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:core:2.0:Group"], displayName: "Team",
+              members: [{ value: "bulkId:dave" }] } },
+  ]);
+  var bwResp = JSON.parse(bw.res._body());
+  check("bulk back-ref: both succeed",       bwResp.Operations[0].status === "201" && bwResp.Operations[1].status === "201");
+  var bwUserId  = Array.from(bwUsers._records.keys())[0];
+  var bwMembers = bwGroups._lastCreate && bwGroups._lastCreate.members;
+  check("bulk back-ref: token resolved",     Array.isArray(bwMembers) && bwMembers[0].value === bwUserId);
+  check("bulk back-ref: adapter never saw token",
+        !bwGroups._received.some(_containsBulkIdToken));
+
+  // --- PATH references (RFC 7644 §3.7.2) — a bulkId can appear as the
+  // resource id in an operation's path ("PATCH /Users/bulkId:u1"), not
+  // just in operation data. Forward path refs order like data refs and
+  // the path token is substituted with the real id before dispatch.
+  var pthUsers = _mkRecordingUsers();
+  var pthPatchedIds = [];
+  var pthPatchInner = pthUsers.patch.bind(pthUsers);
+  pthUsers.patch = async function (id, ops) { pthPatchedIds.push(id); return pthPatchInner(id, ops); };
+  var pthMw = b.middleware.scimServer({
+    basePath: "/scim/v2", users: pthUsers, bulk: { maxOperations: 10 },
+  });
+  var pth = await _bulkBody(pthMw, [
+    { method: "PATCH", path: "/Users/bulkId:newbie",
+      data: { Operations: [{ op: "replace", path: "active", value: true }] } },
+    { method: "POST", path: "/Users", bulkId: "newbie",
+      data: { schemas: ["urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:core:2.0:User"], userName: "newbie" } },
+  ]);
+  var pthResp = JSON.parse(pth.res._body());
+  check("bulk path-ref: 200 envelope",      pth.res._sc() === 200);
+  check("bulk path-ref: both succeed",
+        pthResp.Operations[0].status === "200" && pthResp.Operations[1].status === "201");
+  check("bulk path-ref: response in request order",
+        pthResp.Operations[1].bulkId === "newbie");
+  var pthUserId = Array.from(pthUsers._records.keys())[0];
+  check("bulk path-ref: patch received the real id, not the token",
+        pthPatchedIds.length === 1 && pthPatchedIds[0] === pthUserId);
+
+  // Backward path ref on DELETE: the created resource is removable via
+  // its bulkId path token in the same request.
+  var delUsers = _mkRecordingUsers();
+  var delMw = b.middleware.scimServer({
+    basePath: "/scim/v2", users: delUsers, bulk: { maxOperations: 10 },
+  });
+  var del = await _bulkBody(delMw, [
+    { method: "POST", path: "/Users", bulkId: "gone",
+      data: { schemas: ["urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:core:2.0:User"], userName: "gone" } },
+    { method: "DELETE", path: "/Users/bulkId:gone" },
+  ]);
+  var delResp = JSON.parse(del.res._body());
+  check("bulk path-ref delete: both succeed",
+        delResp.Operations[0].status === "201" && delResp.Operations[1].status === "204");
+  check("bulk path-ref delete: record removed", delUsers._records.size === 0);
+
+  // Undeclared path ref: fails per-op invalidValue, adapter never called.
+  var updUsers = _mkRecordingUsers();
+  var updMw = b.middleware.scimServer({
+    basePath: "/scim/v2", users: updUsers, bulk: { maxOperations: 10 },
+  });
+  var upd = await _bulkBody(updMw, [
+    { method: "DELETE", path: "/Users/bulkId:phantom" },
+  ]);
+  var updResp = JSON.parse(upd.res._body());
+  check("bulk path-ref undeclared: fails 400 invalidValue",
+        updResp.Operations[0].status === "400" &&
+        updResp.Operations[0].response.scimType === "invalidValue");
+  check("bulk path-ref undeclared: adapter untouched",
+        updUsers._received.length === 0 && updUsers._records.size === 0);
+
+  // --- maxPageSize garbage throws at create() (entry-point tier).
+  var threwPage = false;
+  try { b.middleware.scimServer({ basePath: "/scim/v2", users: _mkUsers(), maxPageSize: "lots" }); }
+  catch (e) { threwPage = /bad-max-page-size/.test(e.code || ""); }
+  check("maxPageSize garbage refused at create()", threwPage);
+
+  var threwPage2 = false;
+  try { b.middleware.scimServer({ basePath: "/scim/v2", users: _mkUsers(), maxPageSize: -3 }); }
+  catch (e) { threwPage2 = /bad-max-page-size/.test(e.code || ""); }
+  check("maxPageSize negative refused at create()", threwPage2);
+}
+
 module.exports = { run: run };
 
 if (require.main === module) {

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/layer-0-primitives/sd-jwt-vc.test.js

@@ -650,6 +650,51 @@ function testHolderValidation() {
   check("holder.create: missing holderKey throws", threwNoKey);
 }
 
+// The holder must derive the KB-JWT alg from the holder key type when no
+// explicit `algorithm` is given — a fixed "ES256" default signed a non-EC
+// holder key under a header alg that disagreed with the key (un-signable
+// or a self-invalid KB-JWT a verifier rejects).
+async function testHolderAlgFromKeyType() {
+  var issuerKey = _newKeyPair();
+  var edHolder = nodeCrypto.generateKeyPairSync("ed25519");
+  var sd = sdJwtVc.issue({
+    issuer: "https://issuer", vct: "https://example/identity",
+    claims: { given_name: "Alice" },
+    selectivelyDisclosed: ["given_name"],
+    issuerKey: issuerKey.privateKey,
+    holderKey: _jwk(edHolder.publicKey),
+  });
+  var holder = sdJwtVc.holder.create({
+    storage:   sdJwtVc.holder.memoryStorage(),
+    holderKey: edHolder.privateKey,        // Ed25519, no explicit algorithm
+  });
+  await holder.store({ id: "c", sdJwt: sd.token });
+  var pres = await holder.present({
+    credentialId: "c", disclosedClaimNames: ["given_name"],
+    audience: "https://verifier", nonce: "n-1",
+  });
+  var kbJwt = pres.presentation.split("~").pop();
+  var kbAlg = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(kbJwt.split(".")[0], "base64url").toString("utf8")).alg;
+  check("holder: Ed25519 key infers EdDSA KB-JWT alg (not fixed ES256)", kbAlg === "EdDSA");
+  var verified = await sdJwtVc.verify(pres.presentation, {
+    issuerKeyResolver: async function () { return issuerKey.publicKey; },
+    audience: "https://verifier", nonce: "n-1", requireKeyBinding: true,
+  });
+  check("holder: Ed25519-bound presentation round-trips", verified.valid && verified.kbValidated);
+
+  // An RSA holder key has no KB-JWT alg in SUPPORTED_ALGS — refuse at
+  // create time rather than emit a self-invalid ES256-headed token.
+  var rsaThrew = null;
+  try {
+    sdJwtVc.holder.create({
+      storage:   sdJwtVc.holder.memoryStorage(),
+      holderKey: nodeCrypto.generateKeyPairSync("rsa", { modulusLength: 2048 }).privateKey,
+    });
+  } catch (e) { rsaThrew = e; }
+  check("holder.create: RSA holder key refused with a clear error",
+        rsaThrew && rsaThrew.code === "auth-sd-jwt-vc/holder-key-unsupported");
+}
+
 // ---- Module exports ----
 
 function testExports() {
@@ -696,5 +741,6 @@ function testExports() {
   await testHolderDelete();
   await testHolderPresentNonexistent();
   testHolderValidation();
+  await testHolderAlgFromKeyType();
   testExports();
 })().catch(function (e) { console.error(e); process.exit(1); });

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/layer-0-primitives/security-headers.test.js

@@ -150,6 +150,110 @@ function testDefaultDocumentPolicyExportedConstant() {
     typeof m.DEFAULT_DOCUMENT_POLICY === "string" && m.DEFAULT_DOCUMENT_POLICY.length > 0);
 }
 
+function testReportOnlyHeadersEmittedWhenOptedIn() {
+  var mw = b.middleware.securityHeaders({
+    coopReportOnly:           'same-origin; report-to="coop"',
+    coepReportOnly:           'require-corp; report-to="coep"',
+    documentPolicyReportOnly: 'document-write=?0; report-to="docpol"',
+  });
+  var res = _mkRes();
+  mw({ headers: {} }, res, function () {});
+  check("Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy-Report-Only emitted when coopReportOnly set",
+    res._hdrs["Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy-Report-Only"] === 'same-origin; report-to="coop"');
+  check("Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy-Report-Only emitted when coepReportOnly set",
+    res._hdrs["Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy-Report-Only"] === 'require-corp; report-to="coep"');
+  check("Document-Policy-Report-Only emitted when documentPolicyReportOnly set",
+    res._hdrs["Document-Policy-Report-Only"] === 'document-write=?0; report-to="docpol"');
+}
+
+function testReportOnlyDoesNotTouchEnforcingHeaders() {
+  // Monitor-mode opt-ins must not alter the enforcing COOP / COEP /
+  // Document-Policy headers: COOP stays same-origin, COEP stays off by
+  // default, Document-Policy keeps its enforcing default.
+  var mw = b.middleware.securityHeaders({
+    coopReportOnly: "same-origin",
+    coepReportOnly: "require-corp",
+  });
+  var res = _mkRes();
+  mw({ headers: {} }, res, function () {});
+  check("enforcing COOP unchanged by coopReportOnly",
+    res._hdrs["Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy"] === "same-origin");
+  check("COEP stays off by default despite coepReportOnly",
+    res._hdrs["Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy"] === undefined);
+  check("enforcing Document-Policy unchanged by report-only opts",
+    res._hdrs["Document-Policy"] === b.middleware._modules.securityHeaders.DEFAULT_DOCUMENT_POLICY);
+}
+
+function testReportOnlyDefaultOff() {
+  var mw = b.middleware.securityHeaders();
+  var res = _mkRes();
+  mw({ headers: {} }, res, function () {});
+  check("Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy-Report-Only default off",
+    res._hdrs["Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy-Report-Only"] === undefined);
+  check("Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy-Report-Only default off",
+    res._hdrs["Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy-Report-Only"] === undefined);
+  check("Document-Policy-Report-Only default off",
+    res._hdrs["Document-Policy-Report-Only"] === undefined);
+}
+
+function testRequireDocumentPolicyEmittedWhenOptedIn() {
+  var mw = b.middleware.securityHeaders({ requireDocumentPolicy: "unsized-media=?0" });
+  var res = _mkRes();
+  mw({ headers: {} }, res, function () {});
+  check("Require-Document-Policy emitted when opted in",
+    res._hdrs["Require-Document-Policy"] === "unsized-media=?0");
+}
+
+function testRequireDocumentPolicyDefaultOff() {
+  var mw = b.middleware.securityHeaders();
+  var res = _mkRes();
+  mw({ headers: {} }, res, function () {});
+  check("Require-Document-Policy default off",
+    res._hdrs["Require-Document-Policy"] === undefined);
+}
+
+function testServiceWorkerAllowedEmittedWhenOptedIn() {
+  var mw = b.middleware.securityHeaders({ serviceWorkerAllowed: "/" });
+  var res = _mkRes();
+  mw({ headers: {} }, res, function () {});
+  check("Service-Worker-Allowed emitted when opted in",
+    res._hdrs["Service-Worker-Allowed"] === "/");
+}
+
+function testServiceWorkerAllowedDefaultOff() {
+  var mw = b.middleware.securityHeaders();
+  var res = _mkRes();
+  mw({ headers: {} }, res, function () {});
+  check("Service-Worker-Allowed default off",
+    res._hdrs["Service-Worker-Allowed"] === undefined);
+}
+
+function testNewOptsNonStringIgnored() {
+  // Defensive reader: a non-string (truthy-but-wrong) value emits no
+  // header rather than serializing an object into the response.
+  var mw = b.middleware.securityHeaders({
+    coopReportOnly:        { not: "a string" },
+    serviceWorkerAllowed:  123,
+    requireDocumentPolicy: [],
+  });
+  var res = _mkRes();
+  mw({ headers: {} }, res, function () {});
+  check("non-string coopReportOnly emits no header",
+    res._hdrs["Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy-Report-Only"] === undefined);
+  check("non-string serviceWorkerAllowed emits no header",
+    res._hdrs["Service-Worker-Allowed"] === undefined);
+  check("non-string requireDocumentPolicy emits no header",
+    res._hdrs["Require-Document-Policy"] === undefined);
+}
+
+function testUnknownOptStillRefused() {
+  var threw = false;
+  try {
+    b.middleware.securityHeaders({ coopReportOnlyy: "same-origin" });
+  } catch (_e) { threw = true; }
+  check("typo'd report-only opt refused at config-time", threw);
+}
+
 async function run() {
   testFencedFrameSrcInDefaultCsp();
   testDocumentPolicyDefault();
@@ -163,6 +267,15 @@ async function run() {
   testPermissionsPolicyMultiEntryAccepted();
   testV0870PermissionsPolicyDefaults();
   testDefaultDocumentPolicyExportedConstant();
+  testReportOnlyHeadersEmittedWhenOptedIn();
+  testReportOnlyDoesNotTouchEnforcingHeaders();
+  testReportOnlyDefaultOff();
+  testRequireDocumentPolicyEmittedWhenOptedIn();
+  testRequireDocumentPolicyDefaultOff();
+  testServiceWorkerAllowedEmittedWhenOptedIn();
+  testServiceWorkerAllowedDefaultOff();
+  testNewOptsNonStringIgnored();
+  testUnknownOptStillRefused();
 }
 
 module.exports = { run: run };