@blamejs/blamejs-shop 0.3.19 → 0.3.21

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ upgrading across more than a few patches at a time.
 
 ## v0.3.x
 
+- v0.3.21 (2026-05-30) — **Customers can cancel an order from their account before it ships.** A signed-in customer can now cancel one of their own orders from the order page, as long as it has not started fulfillment. The Cancel control appears only while the order is still cancellable — a paid or pending order — and is absent once the order is fulfilling, shipped, delivered, already cancelled, or refunded. The action is tied to the signed-in customer, so a customer can only cancel their own order. Note: cancelling a paid order changes its status to cancelled but does not by itself refund the charge — issue the refund from the admin console as usual; a customer-initiated cancellation of a paid order is your signal to do so. **Added:** *Cancel an unfulfilled order from the account* — The order page now shows a Cancel button while an order is still in a pre-fulfillment state (paid or pending). Cancelling moves the order to cancelled and shows a confirmation; the control does not appear once an order is fulfilling, shipped, delivered, cancelled, or refunded, and a customer can only cancel their own order. A paid-order cancellation updates the status but does not automatically refund the captured payment — refund it from the console; treat a customer cancellation of a paid order as the prompt to do so.
+
+- v0.3.20 (2026-05-30) — **Served media carries hardened headers, primary-image changes are product-scoped, and image-by-URL imports are size-capped.** Three defense-in-depth fixes on product media. Media assets served from storage now carry X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff and Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: same-origin, and SVG files additionally carry a content policy that prevents script from running when the file is opened directly while still rendering normally inside a product image. Setting a product's primary image now verifies the image actually belongs to the product named in the request rather than acting on the image alone. And importing a product image by URL now refuses a response larger than the same 10 MiB limit the file-upload path enforces, instead of buffering an unbounded download. **Changed:** *Setting the primary image is product-scoped* — The endpoint that makes an image a product's primary (hero) now verifies the image belongs to the product in the request path and returns not-found otherwise, instead of acting on the image regardless of the product named. A request whose product and image don't match is now rejected. · *Vendored runtime updated to v0.14.9* — The vendored blamejs runtime is updated to v0.14.9, a documentation-path and source-comment fix with no API, wire-format, or behavior changes. No operator action is required. **Security:** *Hardened response headers on served media* — Media served from storage now sets X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff and Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: same-origin, so a mistyped or hostile upload can't be content-sniffed into something executable or embedded cross-origin. An SVG additionally carries a default-src 'none' sandbox content-security policy, so opening an SVG URL directly cannot run script (it still renders inside an img tag). This sits behind the existing SVG-upload sanitizer as a second layer. · *Importing an image by URL is size-capped* — Importing a product image from a URL now refuses a response larger than 10 MiB — the same limit a direct file upload uses — returning a clear error instead of buffering an unbounded download.
+
 - v0.3.19 (2026-05-30) — **Edit announcement bars, automatic-discount terms, and subscription plans from the console.** Three admin entities could be created but only partly edited from the console — the rest of their fields were reachable only through the API, so changing them meant archive-and-recreate or a manual API call. Each now has a detail screen with the full edit form. An announcement bar can have its message, links, schedule, audience, and dismissibility changed in place. An automatic discount can have its actual terms changed — the amount, percentage, threshold, or buy-x-get-y values — not just its title, priority, and on/off state. A subscription plan can have its price, billing interval, trial length, active state, and variant edited. Create and archive behavior is unchanged. **Fixed:** *Announcement bars are editable in place* — A detail screen now lets you change an announcement's message, link, theme, audience, start/end schedule, and whether it can be dismissed — instead of archiving it and creating a new one (which lost the slug and any recorded dismissal state). · *Automatic-discount terms are editable from the console* — The discount detail screen now edits the rule's trigger and value — the amount off, percent off, cart threshold, or buy-x-get-y terms — which previously could only be changed through the API. The inline priority and on/off controls are unchanged. · *Subscription plans have an edit screen* — A subscription plan's price, billing interval count, trial length, active state, and variant can now be edited from a detail screen. The Stripe-bound fields (the price id, interval unit, and currency) remain read-only, as they were always immutable.
 
 - v0.3.18 (2026-05-30) — **Write and publish blog posts from the admin console.** The storefront already served a blog — the index at /blog, individual posts at /blog/:slug, an RSS feed, and sitemap entries — but there was no way to write a post, so it rendered empty. The admin console now has a Blog screen with the full lifecycle: create a draft, edit its title, body (Markdown), tags, hero image, and meta fields, publish it, unpublish it, and archive or restore it. A post is created as a draft and stays off the storefront until it is explicitly published, so work in progress is never visible to shoppers. **Added:** *Blog authoring in the admin console* — A new Blog screen lists posts by status and lets an operator create, edit, publish, unpublish, archive, and restore them. New posts start as drafts and do not appear on the storefront /blog, its RSS feed, or the sitemap until published; archiving removes a published post from the storefront and is reversible. This wires the admin over the blog backend that was already serving the customer-facing pages.

package/lib/admin.js

@@ -1086,6 +1086,18 @@ function mount(router, deps) {
 
   // ---- media ----------------------------------------------------------
 
+  // True when media `mid` exists AND its product_id equals `productId` — the
+  // self-consistency check the per-product media routes assert before acting,
+  // so a `/admin/products/:id/media/:mid/...` request can't name product A in
+  // the path while operating on product B's media. A malformed `mid` makes
+  // catalog.media.get throw TypeError (the caller maps it to a clean 400);
+  // an unknown id, a foreign-product id, or a variant-only row (no
+  // product_id) returns false so the caller renders the same not-found.
+  async function _mediaBelongsToProduct(mid, productId) {
+    var row = await catalog.media.get(mid);
+    return !!(row && row.product_id && row.product_id === productId);
+  }
+
   router.post("/admin/media", W("media.attach", async function (req, res) {
     var m = await catalog.media.attach(req.body || {});
     _json(res, 201, m);
@@ -1156,16 +1168,28 @@ function mount(router, deps) {
       // Fetch the source bytes. The framework's httpClient runs every
       // outbound through the SSRF gate, so a `source_url` pointing at
       // a cloud-metadata IP (169.254.169.254) / RFC 1918 host can't
-      // smuggle internal data into the bucket.
+      // smuggle internal data into the bucket. `maxResponseBytes` caps the
+      // buffered body at the same media budget the direct-file path enforces
+      // (`_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES`): without it the client buffers up to its
+      // ~1 GiB GET default, so a `source_url` pointing at a multi-gigabyte
+      // resource would balloon memory before the magic-byte sniff ever runs.
+      // The client rejects with `RESPONSE_TOO_LARGE` the moment the body
+      // crosses the cap; that surfaces below as a clean 413, never an OOM or
+      // a 500.
       var fetched;
       try {
         fetched = await b.httpClient.request({
-          method:    "GET",
-          url:       body.source_url,
-          timeoutMs: 20000,
-          headers:   { "accept": body.content_type + ",*/*;q=0.5" },
+          method:           "GET",
+          url:              body.source_url,
+          timeoutMs:        20000,
+          maxResponseBytes: _UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES,
+          headers:          { "accept": body.content_type + ",*/*;q=0.5" },
         });
       } catch (e) {
+        if (e && e.code === "RESPONSE_TOO_LARGE") {
+          return { status: 413, code: "source-too-large",
+            detail: "source_url body exceeds the " + _UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES + "-byte media upload cap" };
+        }
         return { status: 502, code: "source-fetch-failed", detail: (e && e.message) || String(e) };
       }
       if (fetched.statusCode < 200 || fetched.statusCode >= 300) {
@@ -1515,10 +1539,23 @@ function mount(router, deps) {
   // id is in the path, the product id only used to PRG back to the detail.
   // A malformed id throws TypeError (→ 400 / ?err=1); an unknown or
   // variant-only row returns false (→ 404 / ?err=1). DB-only.
+  //
+  // The :id (product) path segment is asserted against the media row's own
+  // product_id before the promote: the primitive scopes its reorder by the
+  // row's product, so naming product A in the path while pointing :mid at
+  // product B's media would silently act on B. Refuse that mismatch (and a
+  // variant-only row, which has no product to lead) with the same clean
+  // not-found status, so the path is self-consistent and the contract
+  // doesn't lie about which product it touched.
   router.post("/admin/products/:id/media/:mid/primary", _pageOrApi(false,
     W("media.set_primary", async function (req, res) {
       var ok;
-      try { ok = await catalog.media.setPrimary(req.params.mid); }
+      try {
+        if (!(await _mediaBelongsToProduct(req.params.mid, req.params.id))) {
+          return _problem(res, 404, "media-not-found");
+        }
+        ok = await catalog.media.setPrimary(req.params.mid);
+      }
       catch (e) { if (e instanceof TypeError) return _problem(res, 400, "bad-request", e.message); throw e; }
       if (!ok) return _problem(res, 404, "media-not-found");
       _json(res, 200, { ok: true });
@@ -1528,7 +1565,12 @@ function mount(router, deps) {
       var id  = req.params.id;
       var enc = encodeURIComponent(id);
       var ok = false;
-      try { ok = await catalog.media.setPrimary(req.params.mid); }
+      try {
+        if (!(await _mediaBelongsToProduct(req.params.mid, id))) {
+          return _redirect(res, "/admin/products/" + enc + "?err=1");
+        }
+        ok = await catalog.media.setPrimary(req.params.mid);
+      }
       catch (e) {
         _safeNotice(e, "media.set_primary");
         return _redirect(res, "/admin/products/" + enc + "?err=1");

package/lib/asset-manifest.json

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 {
-  "version": "0.3.19",
+  "version": "0.3.21",
   "assets": {
     "css/admin.css": {
       "integrity": "sha384-1SIn6oAf1DjECbRfKENZasdKHJiywGdXR58wn0hsFGcdVHzUmvfgMkEz5ANIAZJ3",

package/lib/storefront.js

@@ -4569,6 +4569,20 @@ function _orderEligibleForReorder(status) {
   return status !== "pending";
 }
 
+// Cancel is offered only while the order is still pre-fulfillment: the
+// order FSM (lib/order.js) accepts the `cancel` event from `pending`
+// (awaiting capture) and `paid` (captured, not yet picked) only. Once
+// the warehouse starts fulfilling — and through shipped / delivered —
+// the order is no longer the customer's to cancel; the terminal off-ramps
+// (cancelled / refunded) have no cancel edge either. Keeping this in lock-
+// step with the FSM's cancel edges means the button never offers a
+// transition the primitive would refuse. A cancel on a `paid` order does
+// NOT void the captured charge — the FSM only moves the status — so a paid
+// cancel leaves the operator to issue the refund from the console.
+function _orderEligibleForCancel(status) {
+  return status === "pending" || status === "paid";
+}
+
 // Render the lifecycle timeline. Every step up to and including the
 // current status is marked done; the current step is also marked
 // current. A terminal off-ramp (refunded / cancelled) collapses the rail
@@ -4669,6 +4683,12 @@ function _orderActionsBlock(o) {
     btns.push(
       "<a class=\"btn-secondary order-action\" href=\"/account/orders/" + esc(String(o.id)) + "/return\">Request a return</a>");
   }
+  if (_orderEligibleForCancel(o.status)) {
+    btns.push(
+      "<form class=\"order-action\" method=\"post\" action=\"/orders/" + esc(String(o.id)) + "/cancel\">" +
+        "<button type=\"submit\" class=\"btn-ghost\">Cancel order</button>" +
+      "</form>");
+  }
   if (!btns.length) return "";
   return "<div class=\"order-page__actions\">" + btns.join("") + "</div>";
 }
@@ -4733,6 +4753,7 @@ function renderOrder(opts) {
       actions_html:        actionsHtml,
       can_return:          _orderEligibleForReturn(o.status),
       can_reorder:         _orderEligibleForReorder(o.status),
+      can_cancel:          _orderEligibleForCancel(o.status),
       recommendations:     recs,
       has_recommendations: recs.length > 0,
       asset_css_main:      opts.theme.assetUrl("css/main.css"),
@@ -4759,6 +4780,14 @@ function renderOrder(opts) {
   var reorderNotice = opts.reordered
     ? "<p class=\"form-notice form-notice--ok\" role=\"status\">Items from this order were added to your cart. <a href=\"/cart\">View cart →</a></p>"
     : "";
+  // Confirmation banner after a successful cancel (the POST redirects to
+  // ?cancelled=1). A paid order's captured charge is not auto-voided by the
+  // cancel — the refund is the operator's call from the console — so the
+  // copy stays neutral ("cancelled") rather than promising a refund the
+  // status transition didn't perform.
+  var cancelNotice = opts.cancelled
+    ? "<p class=\"form-notice form-notice--ok\" role=\"status\">This order has been cancelled.</p>"
+    : "";
   var body = _render(ORDER_PAGE, {
     order_id:  o.id,
     status:    o.status,
@@ -4768,7 +4797,7 @@ function renderOrder(opts) {
     shipping:  shipping,
     total:     total,
   }).replace("RAW_LINES", rows)
-    .replace("RAW_REORDER_NOTICE", reorderNotice)
+    .replace("RAW_REORDER_NOTICE", reorderNotice + cancelNotice)
     .replace("RAW_ORDER_TIMELINE", timelineHtml)
     .replace("RAW_ORDER_TRACKING", trackingHtml)
     .replace("RAW_ORDER_ACTIONS", actionsHtml)
@@ -8557,6 +8586,7 @@ function mount(router, deps) {
         recommendations: recommendations,
         shipments:       shipments,
         reordered:       ordUrl ? ordUrl.searchParams.get("reordered") === "1" : false,
+        cancelled:       ordUrl ? ordUrl.searchParams.get("cancelled") === "1" : false,
         shop_name:       shopName,
         theme:           theme,
       }));
@@ -10895,6 +10925,68 @@ function mount(router, deps) {
       res.setHeader && res.setHeader("location", "/orders/" + encodeURIComponent(o.id) + "?reordered=1");
       return res.end ? res.end() : res.send("");
     });
+
+    // POST /orders/:id/cancel — customer-initiated cancellation of an
+    // order that hasn't been fulfilled yet. The order FSM (lib/order.js)
+    // accepts the `cancel` event from `pending` and `paid` only; this
+    // route gates on the same eligibility (_orderEligibleForCancel) so a
+    // shipped / delivered / already-cancelled / refunded order can't be
+    // cancelled here. Two refusals guard against IDOR: the order must
+    // belong to the signed-in customer (a foreign or guest-owned order is
+    // a clean 404, never acted on and never leaked), and only then is the
+    // transition attempted. A cancel the FSM still refuses (a status that
+    // raced past `paid` between the page render and the POST) maps to a
+    // clean redirect back to the order rather than a 500. Cancelling a
+    // `paid` order moves the status only — the captured charge is NOT
+    // auto-voided by the transition, so the refund remains the operator's
+    // action from the console.
+    router.post("/orders/:order_id/cancel", async function (req, res) {
+      var orderId = req.params && req.params.order_id;
+      // Cancel is a logged-in-customer action — resolve the session first
+      // so an unauthenticated POST goes to login, never near the order.
+      var cancelAuth = _currentCustomerEnv(req);
+      if (!cancelAuth) {
+        res.status(303); res.setHeader && res.setHeader("location", "/account/login");
+        return res.end ? res.end() : res.send("");
+      }
+      var o;
+      try { o = orderId ? await deps.order.get(orderId) : null; }
+      catch (e) { if (e instanceof TypeError) { o = null; } else throw e; }
+      // Ownership gate against IDOR: a missing order, a malformed id, an
+      // order owned by another customer, OR a guest order with no owner
+      // all 404 — the cancel never touches an order the caller doesn't own.
+      if (!o || !o.customer_id || o.customer_id !== cancelAuth.customer_id) {
+        return _send(res, 404, renderNotFound({ shop_name: shopName, theme: theme }));
+      }
+      // Eligibility gate mirrors the FSM's cancel edges (pending | paid).
+      // A non-cancellable status (fulfilling / shipped / delivered /
+      // cancelled / refunded) bounces back to the order page unchanged —
+      // a clean 303, no transition attempted, no 500.
+      if (!_orderEligibleForCancel(o.status)) {
+        res.status(303);
+        res.setHeader && res.setHeader("location", "/orders/" + encodeURIComponent(o.id));
+        return res.end ? res.end() : res.send("");
+      }
+      try {
+        await deps.order.transition(o.id, "cancel", { reason: "customer-requested" });
+      } catch (e) {
+        // The FSM refuses the event (a status that advanced out of the
+        // cancellable window between render and POST). order.transition
+        // tags the refusal with .code = ORDER_TRANSITION_REFUSED; surface
+        // it as a clean redirect to the order page rather than a 500.
+        if (e && e.code === "ORDER_TRANSITION_REFUSED") {
+          res.status(303);
+          res.setHeader && res.setHeader("location", "/orders/" + encodeURIComponent(o.id));
+          return res.end ? res.end() : res.send("");
+        }
+        throw e;
+      }
+      // PRG back to the order page with a confirmation banner (a refresh
+      // doesn't re-fire the cancel).
+      res.status(303);
+      res.setHeader && res.setHeader("location", "/orders/" + encodeURIComponent(o.id) + "?cancelled=1");
+      return res.end ? res.end() : res.send("");
+    });
   }
 
   // POST /cart/lines — add a line. Reads variant_id + qty from the

package/lib/vendor/MANIFEST.json

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
   "_about": "blamejs.shop vendors a single framework — blamejs — which itself bundles every server-side crypto/identity dependency. The transitive packages blamejs ships are surfaced in its own MANIFEST.json at lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/vendor/MANIFEST.json — Trivy / Grype rely on that nested data for CVE attribution.",
   "packages": {
     "blamejs": {
-      "version": "0.14.8",
-      "tag": "v0.14.8",
+      "version": "0.14.9",
+      "tag": "v0.14.9",
       "license": "Apache-2.0",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "source": "https://github.com/blamejs/blamejs",

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ upgrading across more than a few patches at a time.
 
 ## v0.14.x
 
+- v0.14.9 (2026-05-30) — **Corrects EU AI Act doc paths that named an uncallable namespace, plus source-comment hygiene and two new codebase checks.** A documentation fix and internal hygiene. The `@primitive` / `@signature` / `@example` blocks for the EU AI Act fundamental-rights-impact-assessment and GPAI training-data-summary helpers advertised `b.complianceAiAct.*`, which is undefined — the callable path is `b.compliance.aiAct.*` — so an operator copying the documented call got `undefined is not a function`. The documented paths now match the real surface. Alongside that: a duplicate parser entry in a doc block is removed, version stamps embedded in section-divider comments are stripped, and two codebase checks are added — one that fails the build when a `@primitive` block documents a wholly-unresolvable namespace (the gap that hid the AI Act paths), and one that flags a version stamp left inside a section divider. No exported API, error code, wire format, or runtime behaviour changes. **Changed:** *Source-comment hygiene* — Removed a duplicate `env` entry from the parsers `@module` doc block, and stripped internal version stamps (`vX.Y.Z`) from `// ---- ... ----` section-divider comments across several files, keeping the descriptive label. Comment-only; no behaviour change. **Fixed:** *EU AI Act helper documentation named an uncallable path* — `b.compliance.aiAct.fundamentalRightsImpactAssessment` and `b.compliance.aiAct.gpai.trainingDataSummary` were documented as `b.complianceAiAct.*` in their `@primitive` / `@signature` / `@example` blocks (and one returned reference string). `b.complianceAiAct` is undefined, so the documented call failed; the documented paths now match the callable surface. **Detectors:** *`@primitive` reachability covers wrong-namespace paths* — The reachability check previously only flagged a missing leaf on a resolved namespace; a `@primitive` whose entire dotted prefix is unresolvable (the shape that hid the AI Act doc paths) was silently skipped. It now walks each prefix segment and fails the build on any unresolvable one, while preserving the factory-instance-shorthand exemption. · *Version-stamp-in-divider check* — A new check flags a version stamp (`vX.Y.Z`) left immediately after a section divider's dashes (`// ---- vX.Y.Z ...`) — internal release vocabulary that does not belong in shipped source comments — without matching legitimate `@since` tags or prose version references.
+
 - v0.14.8 (2026-05-30) — **Source-comment and codebase-check hygiene, plus a new require-block alignment check; no API or behaviour changes.** Internal lint and comment cleanup with no operator-facing surface change. Several codebase-check comments and one stub helper name that described behaviour the check no longer has are corrected; an unused lint-suppression class and a set of stale duplicate-cluster qualifiers (functions that were since renamed or extracted) are pruned or re-pointed. Fifty-nine `// allow:` markers that named the byte-size or time-literal check on values those checks no longer flag are removed, and twenty self-negating rationales on markers the time check genuinely fires on are rewritten to say why the value coincidentally matches. A new codebase check holds top-of-file require blocks to consistent `=` column alignment, with the files that currently carry drift listed as a migration allowlist. No exported API, error code, wire format, or runtime behaviour changes. **Changed:** *Lint-suppression and codebase-check comment cleanup* — Corrected codebase-check comments that overstated their check's scope (a duplicate-code threshold described as three files when the advisory threshold is two, a narrowed byte-literal check carrying its pre-narrowing description, and a deferred-scan helper named as though it enforced a guarantee it does not yet provide). Removed an unused lint-suppression class and its one dead in-code marker, and pruned or re-pointed stale duplicate-cluster qualifiers that named functions since renamed or extracted into shared helpers. Removed fifty-nine `// allow:` markers that suppressed nothing, and rewrote twenty self-negating marker rationales (which read "not seconds" while sitting on a value the time check fires on) to explain the coincidental match. Source-comment and test hygiene only. **Detectors:** *Require-block `=` alignment check* — A new codebase check flags a top-of-file require block that mixes its `=` column alignment — a fittable line whose `=` drifts off the column the rest of the block shares. Compact single-space blocks are exempt (only blocks that declare alignment intent are checked), as are destructures and long names physically too wide to reach the column, and blank- or comment-separated tiers align independently. The files that currently carry such drift are an explicit migration allowlist, reflowed over time; new code is held to the rule.
 
 - v0.14.7 (2026-05-30) — **Storage and audit-trail hardening: queries are gated to declared columns, raw SQL refuses embedded literals, the database key is bound to its location, sealed-column lookup hashes gain a keyed mode, audit-chain purges can require dual control, and breach deadlines ship a running clock.** This release tightens the data and audit layers against a set of failure modes that were previously reachable. Database queries are now checked against the columns a table declared in its schema: a reference to an undeclared column fails closed by default instead of silently matching nothing, and the `whereRaw` escape hatch refuses an embedded string literal so values bind through placeholders. The database encryption key is sealed with its purpose, data directory, and key path as additional authenticated data, so a key file cannot be relocated to another deployment and unsealed there; an older key without that binding upgrades itself on first load. Sealed-column equality-lookup hashes can now be computed as a keyed MAC (HMAC-SHAKE256) off a per-deployment key, making the lookup hash unforgeable without that key, while the salted-SHA3 default is unchanged. Purging the tamper-evident audit chain can be placed under a two-authorizer dual-control grant so one operator cannot erase it alone, and database credential-rejection audits now record which relation the rejected credential tried to reach. Finally, breach-notification deadlines get a running clock that raises approaching and passed alerts as each regime's window elapses. One behavior change to note: the column gate defaults to reject — if a service issues queries against columns it did not declare in its schema, set `db.init({ columnGate: "warn" })` (audited, allowed) or `"off"` while the schema is reconciled. **Added:** *Column-membership gate on every query* — `b.db.from(table)` now checks each referenced column against the table's declared schema. The mode is set with `db.init({ columnGate: "reject" | "warn" | "off" })` (default `reject`), and `query.allowedColumns([...])` narrows a single query to an explicit allowlist that is always enforced. `b.db.getDeclaredColumns(table)` returns a table's declared column names (or `null` for an unknown table). This is defense in depth against typo'd or caller-influenced column names reaching the SQL layer (CWE-89). · *Keyed mode for sealed-column lookup hashes* — Equality-lookup ("derived") hashes for sealed columns can be computed as `hmac-shake256` — a keyed MAC over a per-deployment key — instead of the default `salted-sha3`. Set it per table with `cryptoField.registerTable(name, { derivedHashMode: "hmac-shake256" })` or per column with `{ from, mode: "hmac-shake256" }`. The keyed hash is unforgeable and un-correlatable without the deployment's MAC key, which raises the bar against offline lookup-table attacks on low-entropy sealed values (CWE-916). `b.vault.getDerivedHashMacKey()` exposes the 32-byte per-deployment key; it is created on first use and re-sealed across key rotation automatically. · *Dual-control gate on audit-chain purge* — `b.auditTools.purge` accepts `dualControlGrant`. When `audit_log` is placed under dual control, a verified archive and `confirm: true` are no longer sufficient: the purge additionally requires a consumed m-of-n grant whose action is bound to the purge, so a grant minted for another operation cannot be replayed and one operator cannot erase the tamper-evident chain alone (NIST SP 800-53 AU-9, separation of duties). · *Running clock for breach-notification deadlines* — `b.incident.report.createDeadlineClock({ notify, approachThresholds })` tracks open incidents and raises `deadline_approaching` and `deadline_passed` alerts as each regime's window elapses (GDPR 72h, DORA, NIS2, and the rest of the registry). Alerts are deduplicated per incident and stage, suppressed once a submission stage is acknowledged, and the clock can run on an interval or be ticked manually. **Changed:** *Queries against undeclared columns now fail closed by default* — The column gate defaults to `reject`: a query that references a column the table did not declare throws rather than silently matching nothing. A service that intentionally queries undeclared columns can set `db.init({ columnGate: "warn" })` to audit and allow, or `"off"` to disable the gate, while its schema is reconciled. Framework-declared columns (including `_id` and derived-hash columns) are always members. **Security:** *Database encryption key bound to its location* — `db.key.enc` is sealed with additional authenticated data over its purpose, resolved data directory, and resolved key path. A sealed key copied to a different deployment or path no longer unseals there — the AEAD authentication fails — which prevents silent key relocation. A legacy key sealed without this binding is detected and re-sealed in the bound format on first load, with no operator action required. · *`whereRaw` refuses embedded string literals* — `whereRaw(sql, params)` and `WhereBuilder.raw(sql, params)` reject a raw fragment containing a string literal (`'...'`); values must bind through the `params` array. A static, operator-controlled literal can opt in with `{ allowLiterals: true }`. This closes a path where a value concatenated into a raw fragment would reintroduce SQL injection (CWE-89). · *Credential-rejection audits record the attempted relation* — A `db.auth.failed` audit row (SQLSTATE 28000 / 28P01 / 42501) now carries `attemptedTable`, the relation the rejected credential tried to reach, extracted defensively from the statement. Triage can scope the blast radius of a credential-abuse event without correlating back to the raw SQL log (CWE-778). **Detectors:** *Audit-purge dual-control gate* — A new check fails the build if a call to `purgeAuditChain` appears in a file that does not also route through the dual-control gate, so a future caller cannot physically delete chain rows without two-authorizer enforcement. · *Raw-SQL literal/interpolation guard* — A new check fails the build on a `whereRaw` / `.raw` call whose SQL argument is built by template interpolation or string concatenation, keeping the bound-params discipline enforceable in framework code. · *Hand-rolled lookup-hash guard* — A new check fails the build if a sealed-column lookup hash is derived from the per-deployment salt outside the canonical helper, so call sites cannot bypass the keyed-mode and per-column mode policy. · *Auth-audit attempted-relation guard* — A new check fails the build if a `db.auth.failed` audit is emitted in a file that does not name `attemptedTable`, so the forensic field cannot be dropped from a future emitter.

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/api-snapshot.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "version": 1,
-  "frameworkVersion": "0.14.8",
-  "createdAt": "2026-05-30T23:08:17.846Z",
+  "frameworkVersion": "0.14.9",
+  "createdAt": "2026-05-31T03:42:29.026Z",
   "exports": {
     "a2a": {
       "type": "object",

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/auth/saml.js

@@ -842,7 +842,7 @@ function create(opts) {
       "</md:EntityDescriptor>";
   }
 
-  // ---- v0.10.16 — Single Logout (RFC SAML Bindings §3.4 HTTP-Redirect) ----
+  // ---- Single Logout (RFC SAML Bindings §3.4 HTTP-Redirect) ----
 
   /**
    * @primitive b.auth.saml.sp.buildLogoutRequest
@@ -1250,7 +1250,7 @@ function create(opts) {
     };
   }
 
-  // ---- v0.10.16 — SLO HTTP-POST binding (SAML Bindings §3.5) ----
+  // ---- SLO HTTP-POST binding (SAML Bindings §3.5) ----
 
   /**
    * @primitive b.auth.saml.sp.buildLogoutRequestPost
@@ -1524,7 +1524,7 @@ function create(opts) {
   };
 }
 
-// ---- v0.10.16 — SAML EncryptedAssertion decrypt (XMLEnc) ----
+// ---- SAML EncryptedAssertion decrypt (XMLEnc) ----
 
 // XMLEnc Algorithm URIs we support.
 //
@@ -1722,7 +1722,7 @@ function _decryptEncryptedAssertion(encAssertion, spPrivateKeyPem) {
   return clearBytes.toString("utf8");
 }
 
-// ---- v0.10.16 — SAML SLO XMLDSig-Enveloped (HTTP-POST/SOAP) ----
+// ---- SAML SLO XMLDSig-Enveloped (HTTP-POST/SOAP) ----
 
 // PQC SignatureMethod URIs used by the embedded XMLDSig signatures.
 // Standard XMLDSig vocabulary classical signing URIs (W3C XMLDSig
@@ -1936,7 +1936,7 @@ function _verifyEmbeddedXmlDsig(xml, idpVerifyKey, idpVerifyAlg, expectedRootLoc
   }
 }
 
-// ---- v0.10.16 SAML SLO signature-alg dispatch ----
+// ---- SAML SLO signature-alg dispatch ----
 
 function _sigAlgUrn(alg) {
   // PQC signers — framework-private experimental URIs. The `urn:`

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/backup/index.js

@@ -1015,7 +1015,7 @@ module.exports = {
   BUNDLE_ID_RE:              BUNDLE_ID_RE,
 };
 
-// ---- v0.12.7: bundleAdapterStorage ---------------------------------------
+// ---- bundleAdapterStorage ---------------------------------------
 
 /**
  * @primitive b.backup.bundleAdapterStorage
@@ -2257,7 +2257,7 @@ bundleAdapterStorage.fsAdapter = function (fsOpts) {
   };
 };
 
-// ---- v0.12.13: objectStoreAdapter ----------------------------------------
+// ---- objectStoreAdapter ----------------------------------------
 
 /**
  * @primitive b.backup.bundleAdapterStorage.objectStoreAdapter
@@ -2475,7 +2475,7 @@ bundleAdapterStorage.objectStoreAdapter = function (client, osOpts) {
   };
 };
 
-// ---- v0.12.8: migrate ----------------------------------------------------
+// ---- migrate ----------------------------------------------------
 
 /**
  * @primitive b.backup.migrate

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/compliance-ai-act.js

@@ -538,8 +538,8 @@ function deployerChecklist(assessment) {
 }
 
 /**
- * @primitive b.complianceAiAct.fundamentalRightsImpactAssessment
- * @signature b.complianceAiAct.fundamentalRightsImpactAssessment(opts)
+ * @primitive b.compliance.aiAct.fundamentalRightsImpactAssessment
+ * @signature b.compliance.aiAct.fundamentalRightsImpactAssessment(opts)
  * @since     0.8.77
  *
  * EU AI Act Article 27 — Fundamental Rights Impact Assessment (FRIA).
@@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ function deployerChecklist(assessment) {
  *   }
  *
  * @example
- *   var fria = b.complianceAiAct.fundamentalRightsImpactAssessment({
+ *   var fria = b.compliance.aiAct.fundamentalRightsImpactAssessment({
  *     systemId: "credit-scoring-v3",
  *     deploymentContext: { purpose: "loan approval", sector: "financial",
  *                          geography: "EU", scale: "1M decisions/year" },
@@ -603,13 +603,13 @@ function fundamentalRightsImpactAssessment(opts) {
     notificationStatus:   "operator-must-notify",
     note:                 "Notify national market-surveillance authority before first use (Art 27(3))",
     auditHook:            "b.audit emission action='aiact.fria.completed' recommended",
-    annexIVReference:     "see b.complianceAiAct.annexIVScaffold for technical documentation",
+    annexIVReference:     "see b.compliance.aiAct.annexIVScaffold for technical documentation",
   };
 }
 
 /**
- * @primitive b.complianceAiAct.gpai.trainingDataSummary
- * @signature b.complianceAiAct.gpai.trainingDataSummary(opts)
+ * @primitive b.compliance.aiAct.gpai.trainingDataSummary
+ * @signature b.compliance.aiAct.gpai.trainingDataSummary(opts)
  * @since     0.8.77
  *
  * EU AI Act Article 53(1)(d) — GPAI training-data summary template
@@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ function fundamentalRightsImpactAssessment(opts) {
  *   contentProvenance: object,    // { synthIdEmbed, c2paManifestEmbed, watermarkProvider }
  *
  * @example
- *   var summary = b.complianceAiAct.gpai.trainingDataSummary({
+ *   var summary = b.compliance.aiAct.gpai.trainingDataSummary({
  *     modelId:        "acme-llm-7b",
  *     modelVersion:   "1.0",
  *     provider:       { name: "Acme AI", address: "1 St", contact: "ai@acme.example" },

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/compliance.js

@@ -107,12 +107,12 @@ var KNOWN_POSTURES = Object.freeze([
   "bsi-c5",          // Germany BSI C5
   "ens-es",          // Spain Esquema Nacional de Seguridad
   "uk-g-cloud",      // UK G-Cloud
-  // ---- v0.8.70 expansion — 2026 effective deadlines ----
+  // ---- 2026 effective deadlines ----
   "modpa",           // Maryland Online Data Privacy Act (effective 2025-10-01) — strict data-min
   "nydfs-500",       // NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500 Amendment 2 — financial cybersecurity (multi-factor + asset inventory + governance)
   "hipaa-2026",      // HHS HIPAA Security Rule 2026-Q4 final — extends hipaa with mandatory MFA + asset inventory + 72h restoration testing
   "quebec-25",       // Quebec Law 25 final phase (effective 2026-09-22) — DPIA + automated-decision opt-out
-  // ---- v0.8.77 expansion — US state consumer-privacy postures ----
+  // ---- US state consumer-privacy postures ----
   // Each posture carries per-state cure-period, profiling opt-out
   // and minor-consent metadata via b.dsr.stateRules(state). The
   // generic DSR primitive (b.dsr.submit) covers ~80% of the surface;
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ var KNOWN_POSTURES = Object.freeze([
   "ct-sb3",          // Connecticut SB 3 Consumer Health Data
   "tx-cubi",         // Texas Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier
   "fl-fdbr",         // Florida Digital Bill of Rights (SB 262, effective 2024-07-01) — narrow scope ($1B+ revenue threshold)
-  // ---- v0.8.81 expansion — AI-governance postures ----
+  // ---- AI-governance postures ----
   // State + sectoral AI regulations crystallizing through 2026. Each
   // posture is a flag that operators pin alongside their base
   // privacy/sectoral posture; the floors enforce audit-chain signing
@@ -153,20 +153,20 @@ var KNOWN_POSTURES = Object.freeze([
   "ca-tfaia",        // California SB 53 — Transparency in Frontier AI Act (effective 2026-01-01)
   "kr-ai-basic",     // South Korea AI Basic Act (effective 2026-01-22)
   "cn-ai-label",     // China Measures for Labelling of AI-Generated Content (effective 2025-09-01)
-  // ---- v0.8.81 expansion — AI management cross-walks ----
+  // ---- AI management cross-walks ----
   "iso-42001",       // ISO/IEC 42001:2023 — AI Management System
   "iso-23894",       // ISO/IEC 23894:2023 — AI Risk Management Guidance
-  // ---- v0.8.81 expansion — content-credentials posture flags ----
+  // ---- content-credentials posture flags ----
   "ca-sb942",        // California SB-942 (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §22757) gen-AI disclosure (effective 2026-08-02)             // regulatory identifier + date, not bytes
   "ca-ab853",        // California AB-853 platform-side gen-AI detection (effective 2026-08-02)                                // regulatory identifier + date, not bytes
-  // ---- v0.8.81 expansion — substrate-to-posture cleanup ----
+  // ---- substrate-to-posture cleanup ----
   "eaa",             // EU Accessibility Act / Directive (EU) 2019/882 (effective 2025-06-28)
   "wcag-2-2",        // W3C Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 2.2 (Oct 2023 Recommendation)
   "eu-data-act",     // EU Data Act / Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 (effective 2025-09-12)
   "hitech",          // Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (2009)
   "ferpa",           // Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (20 U.S.C. §1232g)
   "dpdp",            // India Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023 (rules-pending; cascade tier exists)
-  // ---- v0.8.82 expansion — privacy 2026 sweep ----
+  // ---- privacy 2026 sweep ----
   // US federal child / financial privacy
   "coppa",           // Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (15 U.S.C. §6501)
   "coppa-2025",      // COPPA 2025 Amendment (FTC final 2025-04-22; effective 2026-06-23 — biometric expansion + knowing-collection disclosure)
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ var KNOWN_POSTURES = Object.freeze([
   "eu-cer",          // EU Critical Entities Resilience Directive (2022/2557; transposition 2024-10-17)
   "eu-cyber-sol",    // EU Cyber Solidarity Act (Regulation 2025/38; effective 2025-02-04)
   "eidas-2",         // eIDAS 2 / EUDI Wallet (Regulation 2024/1183; rollout 2026-2027)
-  // ---- v0.8.86 expansion — sectoral + cybersecurity directives ----
+  // ---- sectoral + cybersecurity directives ----
   "cmmc-2.0",        // US DoD Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification 2.0 (effective 2025-Q1)
   "cjis-v6",         // FBI Criminal Justice Information Services Security Policy v6.0 (Dec 2024)
   "iso-27001-2022",  // ISO/IEC 27001:2022 — Information Security Management System
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ var KNOWN_POSTURES = Object.freeze([
   "nist-800-66-r2",  // NIST SP 800-66 Rev 2 — HIPAA Security Rule implementation guidance                                       // NIST publication number, not bytes
   "ehds",            // EU European Health Data Space (Regulation 2025/327; phased 2027-2029)
   "circia",          // US Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act (final rule pending)
-  // ---- v0.9.6 expansion — exceptd framework-control-gap closure ----
+  // ---- exceptd framework-control-gap closure ----
   // Postures added to recognise every framework cited in the
   // exceptd 2026-05-11 framework-control-gaps catalog. Each posture
   // either (a) maps to a framework the operator must audit against,
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ var KNOWN_POSTURES = Object.freeze([
   "cwe-top-25-2024",             // CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses (2024)
   "cis-controls-v8",             // CIS Controls v8
   "cmmc-2.0-level-2",            // CMMC 2.0 Level 2 (Advanced) — 110 NIST 800-171 Rev 2 controls                                                                                                          // NIST pub number / level, not bytes
-  // ---- v0.9.57 — granular CMMC level distinction ----
+  // ---- granular CMMC level distinction ----
   // CMMC 2.0 maturity levels carry distinct control-mapping
   // expectations: Level 1 = 15 controls (FAR 52.204-21), Level 2 =
   // 110 controls (NIST 800-171 Rev 2), Level 3 = additional NIST
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ var KNOWN_POSTURES = Object.freeze([
   // L1/L2/L3 postures are the recommended pin for new deployments.
   "cmmc-2.0-level-1",            // CMMC 2.0 Level 1 (Foundational) — 15 FAR controls; FCI-only data        // regulatory identifier, not bytes
   "cmmc-2.0-level-3",            // CMMC 2.0 Level 3 (Expert) — NIST 800-172 enhanced controls atop L2       // regulatory identifier, not bytes
-  // ---- v0.12.1 — promote POSTURE_DEFAULTS-only entries into the
+  // ---- promote POSTURE_DEFAULTS-only entries into the
   // canonical KNOWN_POSTURES surface so operators can actually
   // `b.compliance.set(...)` them. Each entry had cascade
   // configuration wired but couldn't be pinned because set()'s
@@ -757,7 +757,7 @@ var REGIME_MAP = Object.freeze({
   "ct-sb3":    { name: "Connecticut SB 3 Consumer Health Data",        citation: "Conn. P.A. 23-56 (effective 2023-07-01)", jurisdiction: "US-CT", domain: "health" },
   "tx-cubi":   { name: "Texas Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier", citation: "Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §503.001 (effective 2009-09-01)", jurisdiction: "US-TX", domain: "biometric" },
   "fl-fdbr":   { name: "Florida Digital Bill of Rights",              citation: "Fla. Stat. §501.701 et seq. SB 262 (effective 2024-07-01)", jurisdiction: "US-FL", domain: "privacy" },
-  // ---- v0.8.81 — AI governance ----
+  // ---- AI governance ----
   "co-ai":       { name: "Colorado AI Act",                            citation: "C.R.S. §6-1-1701 et seq. SB24-205 (postponed to 2026-06-30; enforcement stayed)", jurisdiction: "US-CO", domain: "ai-governance" },
   "il-hb3773":   { name: "Illinois HB 3773 — AI in Employment",        citation: "775 ILCS 5 IHRA AI amendment (effective 2026-01-01)", jurisdiction: "US-IL", domain: "ai-governance" },
   "tx-traiga":   { name: "Texas Responsible AI Governance Act",        citation: "Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ch. 552 HB 149 (effective 2026-01-01)", jurisdiction: "US-TX", domain: "ai-governance" },
@@ -766,20 +766,20 @@ var REGIME_MAP = Object.freeze({
   "ca-tfaia":    { name: "California Transparency in Frontier AI Act",  citation: "Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §22757.10 et seq. SB 53 (effective 2026-01-01)", jurisdiction: "US-CA", domain: "ai-governance" },
   "kr-ai-basic": { name: "South Korea AI Basic Act",                    citation: "Framework Act on Development of AI (effective 2026-01-22)", jurisdiction: "KR", domain: "ai-governance" },
   "cn-ai-label": { name: "China — Measures for Labelling AI-Generated Content", citation: "CAC + MIIT + Ministry of Public Security + NRTA Order (effective 2025-09-01)", jurisdiction: "CN", domain: "ai-governance" },
-  // ---- v0.8.81 — AI management cross-walks ----
+  // ---- AI management cross-walks ----
   "iso-42001":   { name: "ISO/IEC 42001 — AI Management System",        citation: "ISO/IEC 42001:2023", jurisdiction: "international", domain: "ai-governance" },
   "iso-23894":   { name: "ISO/IEC 23894 — AI Risk Management",          citation: "ISO/IEC 23894:2023", jurisdiction: "international", domain: "ai-governance" },
-  // ---- v0.8.81 — content-credentials posture flags ----
+  // ---- content-credentials posture flags ----
   "ca-sb942":    { name: "California Gen-AI Provenance Disclosure",     citation: "Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §22757 SB-942 (effective 2026-08-02)", jurisdiction: "US-CA", domain: "content-credentials" },
   "ca-ab853":    { name: "California Platform Gen-AI Detection",        citation: "Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §22757 AB-853 (effective 2026-08-02)", jurisdiction: "US-CA", domain: "content-credentials" },
-  // ---- v0.8.81 — substrate-to-posture cleanup ----
+  // ---- substrate-to-posture cleanup ----
   "eaa":         { name: "EU Accessibility Act",                        citation: "Directive (EU) 2019/882 (effective 2025-06-28)", jurisdiction: "EU", domain: "accessibility" },
   "wcag-2-2":    { name: "W3C Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 2.2", citation: "W3C Recommendation (Oct 2023)", jurisdiction: "international", domain: "accessibility" },
   "eu-data-act": { name: "EU Data Act",                                 citation: "Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 (effective 2025-09-12)", jurisdiction: "EU", domain: "data-sharing" },
   "hitech":      { name: "Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act", citation: "Pub. L. 111-5, Title XIII, Subtitle D (2009)", jurisdiction: "US", domain: "health" },
   "ferpa":       { name: "Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act",   citation: "20 U.S.C. §1232g; 34 CFR Part 99", jurisdiction: "US", domain: "student-records" },
   "dpdp":        { name: "Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023",   citation: "Act 22 of 2023 (India; rules pending)", jurisdiction: "IN", domain: "privacy" },
-  // ---- v0.8.82 — privacy 2026 sweep ----
+  // ---- privacy 2026 sweep ----
   // US federal
   "coppa":           { name: "Children's Online Privacy Protection Act",         citation: "15 U.S.C. §§6501-6506; 16 CFR Part 312 (effective 2000-04-21)", jurisdiction: "US", domain: "child-privacy" },
   "coppa-2025":      { name: "COPPA 2025 Amendment",                              citation: "FTC final rule (2025-04-22; effective 2026-06-23) — biometric expansion + knowing-collection-13-and-under disclosure", jurisdiction: "US", domain: "child-privacy" },
@@ -815,7 +815,7 @@ var REGIME_MAP = Object.freeze({
   "eu-cer":          { name: "EU Critical Entities Resilience Directive",        citation: "Directive (EU) 2022/2557 (transposition 2024-10-17)", jurisdiction: "EU", domain: "cybersecurity" },
   "eu-cyber-sol":    { name: "EU Cyber Solidarity Act",                          citation: "Regulation (EU) 2025/38 (effective 2025-02-04)", jurisdiction: "EU", domain: "cybersecurity" },
   "eidas-2":         { name: "eIDAS 2 / EUDI Wallet",                            citation: "Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 (rollout 2026-2027)", jurisdiction: "EU", domain: "identity" },
-  // ---- v0.8.86 — sectoral + cybersecurity directives ----
+  // ---- sectoral + cybersecurity directives ----
   "cmmc-2.0":        { name: "Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification 2.0",   citation: "32 CFR Part 170 (DFARS rule effective 2025-Q1)", jurisdiction: "US", domain: "cybersecurity" },
   "cjis-v6":         { name: "FBI CJIS Security Policy v6.0",                    citation: "CJIS Security Policy v6.0 (effective 2024-12)", jurisdiction: "US", domain: "law-enforcement" },
   "iso-27001-2022":  { name: "ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Information Security Management System", citation: "ISO/IEC 27001:2022", jurisdiction: "international", domain: "cybersecurity" },
@@ -826,7 +826,7 @@ var REGIME_MAP = Object.freeze({
   "nist-800-66-r2":  { name: "NIST SP 800-66 Rev 2 — HIPAA Security Rule Guidance", citation: "NIST SP 800-66 Rev 2 (Feb 2024)", jurisdiction: "US", domain: "health" },
   "ehds":            { name: "European Health Data Space",                        citation: "Regulation (EU) 2025/327 (phased 2027-2029)", jurisdiction: "EU", domain: "health" },
   "circia":          { name: "Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act", citation: "6 U.S.C. §681 et seq. (final rule pending)", jurisdiction: "US", domain: "cybersecurity" },
-  // ---- v0.12.1 — REGIME_MAP backfill for KNOWN_POSTURES without
+  // ---- REGIME_MAP backfill for KNOWN_POSTURES without
   // describe() coverage. Each entry resolves `b.compliance.describe
   // (posture)` → { name, citation, jurisdiction, domain } so admin
   // UI / generated audit reports rendering "running under <name>
@@ -870,7 +870,7 @@ var REGIME_MAP = Object.freeze({
   "bsi-c5":          { name: "Germany BSI C5 — Cloud Computing Compliance Catalogue", citation: "BSI Cloud Computing Compliance Criteria Catalogue (C5:2020)", jurisdiction: "DE", domain: "cybersecurity" },
   "ens-es":          { name: "Spain Esquema Nacional de Seguridad",             citation: "Real Decreto 311/2022",                            jurisdiction: "ES", domain: "cybersecurity" },
   "uk-g-cloud":      { name: "UK G-Cloud Framework",                            citation: "UK Crown Commercial Service G-Cloud 14",          jurisdiction: "UK", domain: "cybersecurity" },
-  // ---- v0.9.6 expansion REGIME_MAP backfill (cybersecurity / AI / supply-chain frameworks) ----
+  // ---- REGIME_MAP backfill (cybersecurity / AI / supply-chain frameworks) ----
   "nist-800-53":              { name: "NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 — Security & Privacy Controls", citation: "NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5",                jurisdiction: "US", domain: "cybersecurity" },
   "nist-ai-rmf-1.0":          { name: "NIST AI Risk Management Framework 1.0",  citation: "NIST AI 100-1 (Jan 2023)",                        jurisdiction: "US", domain: "ai" },
   "iso-42001-2023":           { name: "ISO/IEC 42001:2023 — AI Management System", citation: "ISO/IEC 42001:2023",                          jurisdiction: "international", domain: "ai" },
@@ -1176,7 +1176,7 @@ var POSTURE_DEFAULTS = Object.freeze({
   "nist-800-66-r2":  Object.freeze({ backupEncryptionRequired: true,  auditChainSignedRequired: true, tlsMinVersion: "TLSv1.3", requireVacuumAfterErase: true  }),
   "ehds":            Object.freeze({ backupEncryptionRequired: true,  auditChainSignedRequired: true, tlsMinVersion: "TLSv1.3", requireVacuumAfterErase: true  }),
   "circia":          Object.freeze({ backupEncryptionRequired: false, auditChainSignedRequired: true, tlsMinVersion: "TLSv1.3", requireVacuumAfterErase: false }),
-  // ---- v0.9.6 — exceptd framework-control-gap closure cascade ----
+  // ---- exceptd framework-control-gap closure cascade ----
   "nist-800-53":             Object.freeze({ backupEncryptionRequired: true,  auditChainSignedRequired: true, tlsMinVersion: "TLSv1.3", requireVacuumAfterErase: true  }),
   // NIST AI-RMF MANAGE.4.3 / ISO 23894 §6.5 / ISO 42001
   // §A.6 require encrypted backups for AI system state (model
@@ -1242,7 +1242,7 @@ var POSTURE_DEFAULTS = Object.freeze({
   "cmmc-2.0-level-1":        Object.freeze({ backupEncryptionRequired: false, auditChainSignedRequired: true, tlsMinVersion: "TLSv1.3", requireVacuumAfterErase: false }),
   "cmmc-2.0-level-2":        Object.freeze({ backupEncryptionRequired: true,  auditChainSignedRequired: true, tlsMinVersion: "TLSv1.3", requireVacuumAfterErase: true  }),
   "cmmc-2.0-level-3":        Object.freeze({ backupEncryptionRequired: true,  auditChainSignedRequired: true, tlsMinVersion: "TLSv1.3", requireVacuumAfterErase: true, fipsMode: false }),
-  // ---- v0.10.16 — sectoral catch-up ----
+  // ---- sectoral catch-up ----
   // 42 CFR Part 2 — Substance Use Disorder records confidentiality
   // (HHS final rule 2024-04-16 aligns Part 2 with HIPAA but retains
   // a stricter consent floor; encrypted backups + signed audit chain

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/dsr.js

@@ -1078,7 +1078,7 @@ function dbTicketStore(opts) {
   };
 }
 
-// ---- v0.8.77 — US state-law DSR drift registry -------------------
+// ---- US state-law DSR drift registry -------------------
 //
 // Each US state consumer-privacy law expresses the same DSR core
 // (access / deletion / correction / portability) but with per-state

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-archive.js

@@ -905,7 +905,7 @@ module.exports = {
   tarEntryPolicy:      tarEntryPolicy,
 };
 
-// ---- v0.12.7 extensions ---------------------------------------------------
+// ---- extensions ---------------------------------------------------
 
 /**
  * @primitive b.guardArchive.inspect

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/mail-crypto-pgp.js

@@ -928,7 +928,7 @@ function _audit(auditHandle, action, outcome, metadata) {
   } catch (_e) { /* drop-silent — audit failures must not crash callers */ }
 }
 
-// ---- v0.10.16 experimental encrypt/decrypt + WKD ----
+// ---- experimental encrypt/decrypt + WKD ----
 //
 // PQC PGP encrypt/decrypt for ML-KEM-1024 recipients shipped under
 // `experimental` namespace (RFC 9580bis PKESK ML-KEM codepoints

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/parsers/index.js

@@ -36,12 +36,6 @@
  *           parsed as `country: false`). Block + flow style;
  *           literal `|` and folded `>` block scalars with chomp
  *           indicators.
- *   env  — .env file loader with size cap + schema validation;
- *           refuses to expand $VAR references; refuses to silently
- *           overwrite existing process.env values unless explicitly
- *           opted in. Dev-tooling — production secrets should still
- *           come through the operator's secrets-management; this is
- *           the local-development convenience.
  *   ini  — INI / .gitconfig / systemd-unit / php.ini / tox.ini parser.
  *           Sections (incl. [parent.child] / [parent "child"] nesting),
  *           ; or # comments (inline + leading), single + double quoting

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/core",
-  "version": "0.14.8",
+  "version": "0.14.9",
   "description": "The Node framework that owns its stack.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/release-notes/v0.14.9.json

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "../scripts/release-notes-schema.json",
+  "version": "0.14.9",
+  "date": "2026-05-30",
+  "headline": "Corrects EU AI Act doc paths that named an uncallable namespace, plus source-comment hygiene and two new codebase checks",
+  "summary": "A documentation fix and internal hygiene. The `@primitive` / `@signature` / `@example` blocks for the EU AI Act fundamental-rights-impact-assessment and GPAI training-data-summary helpers advertised `b.complianceAiAct.*`, which is undefined — the callable path is `b.compliance.aiAct.*` — so an operator copying the documented call got `undefined is not a function`. The documented paths now match the real surface. Alongside that: a duplicate parser entry in a doc block is removed, version stamps embedded in section-divider comments are stripped, and two codebase checks are added — one that fails the build when a `@primitive` block documents a wholly-unresolvable namespace (the gap that hid the AI Act paths), and one that flags a version stamp left inside a section divider. No exported API, error code, wire format, or runtime behaviour changes.",
+  "sections": [
+    {
+      "heading": "Fixed",
+      "items": [
+        {
+          "title": "EU AI Act helper documentation named an uncallable path",
+          "body": "`b.compliance.aiAct.fundamentalRightsImpactAssessment` and `b.compliance.aiAct.gpai.trainingDataSummary` were documented as `b.complianceAiAct.*` in their `@primitive` / `@signature` / `@example` blocks (and one returned reference string). `b.complianceAiAct` is undefined, so the documented call failed; the documented paths now match the callable surface."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "heading": "Changed",
+      "items": [
+        {
+          "title": "Source-comment hygiene",
+          "body": "Removed a duplicate `env` entry from the parsers `@module` doc block, and stripped internal version stamps (`vX.Y.Z`) from `// ---- ... ----` section-divider comments across several files, keeping the descriptive label. Comment-only; no behaviour change."
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "heading": "Detectors",
+      "items": [
+        {
+          "title": "`@primitive` reachability covers wrong-namespace paths",
+          "body": "The reachability check previously only flagged a missing leaf on a resolved namespace; a `@primitive` whose entire dotted prefix is unresolvable (the shape that hid the AI Act doc paths) was silently skipped. It now walks each prefix segment and fails the build on any unresolvable one, while preserving the factory-instance-shorthand exemption."
+        },
+        {
+          "title": "Version-stamp-in-divider check",
+          "body": "A new check flags a version stamp (`vX.Y.Z`) left immediately after a section divider's dashes (`// ---- vX.Y.Z ...`) — internal release vocabulary that does not belong in shipped source comments — without matching legitimate `@since` tags or prose version references."
+        }
+      ]
+    }
+  ]
+}

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/layer-0-primitives/codebase-patterns.test.js

@@ -10801,12 +10801,46 @@ function testPrimitiveReachability() {
     return cur;
   }
 
+  // Walk the dotted prefix (every segment except the leaf) so a break at
+  // ANY segment — including a wholesale-wrong namespace whose parent
+  // resolves to undefined — is surfaced rather than silently skipped. A
+  // function OR a `.create`-bearing object anywhere in the chain is a
+  // factory-instance shorthand and stays exempt.
+  function walkPrefix(name, surface) {
+    var parts = name.split(".");
+    var cur = surface;
+    for (var i = 1; i < parts.length - 1; i += 1) {
+      // A missing prefix segment is a wrong-namespace doc path even when
+      // `cur` is itself a factory (has `.create`): a namespace that ALSO
+      // has real static children (e.g. b.mail.create + b.mail.bimi /
+      // b.mail.rbl) is used statically, so an undefined child is a typo,
+      // not a factory-instance method. The factory-shorthand exemption is
+      // therefore applied ONLY at the leaf parent (the trailing function
+      // check below + the caller's `.create` check) — never at an
+      // intermediate segment, which would mask the typo.
+      if (cur == null || typeof cur[parts[i]] === "undefined") {
+        return { brokenName: parts.slice(0, i + 1).join(".") };
+      }
+      cur = cur[parts[i]];
+    }
+    if (typeof cur === "function") return { factory: true };
+    return { parent: cur, parentName: parts.slice(0, -1).join(".") };
+  }
+
   // @primitive paths that legitimately don't resolve as a flat member
   // (documented elsewhere / intentional). Keyed by dotted name.
   var REACHABILITY_ALLOWLIST = {
     // (none — every surfaced gap is fixed in-tree)
   };
 
+  // Self-test (locks the fix): a missing intermediate segment under a
+  // mixed factory+static namespace must be flagged, never masked by the
+  // factory-shorthand exemption.
+  var _rMock  = { mail: { create: function () {}, bimi: {} } };
+  var _rProbe = walkPrefix("b.mail.bmi.recordShape", _rMock);
+  check("primitive-reachability: typo under a mixed factory namespace is flagged",
+        _rProbe.brokenName === "b.mail.bmi");
+
   var libFiles = _libFiles();
   var unreachable = [];
   for (var i = 0; i < libFiles.length; i += 1) {
@@ -10818,9 +10852,24 @@ function testPrimitiveReachability() {
       var name = m[1];
       if (REACHABILITY_ALLOWLIST[name]) continue;
       if (typeof resolve(name) !== "undefined") continue;
-      var parts = name.split(".");
-      var parentName = parts.slice(0, -1).join(".");
-      var parent = resolve(parentName);
+      var w = walkPrefix(name, bSurface);
+      // Factory-instance shorthands (b.X.create() → instance method) skip.
+      if (w.factory) continue;
+      if (w.brokenName) {
+        // The whole dotted namespace prefix is unresolvable — the parent
+        // resolved to undefined, so the flat-namespace check below never
+        // fired and the doc-lie was silently skipped. Flag it.
+        unreachable.push({
+          file:    rel,
+          line:    1,
+          content: "@primitive " + name + " documents a b.* path that does not resolve (the namespace `" +
+                   w.brokenName + "` is undefined — no prefix segment resolves on the public surface). " +
+                   "Correct the @primitive/@signature namespace, or wire the namespace into the surface.",
+        });
+        continue;
+      }
+      var parent = w.parent;
+      var parentName = w.parentName;
       // Flag only flat namespaces (object parent without a `create`
       // factory). Factory-instance shorthands are skipped.
       if (parent && typeof parent === "object" && typeof parent.create !== "function") {
@@ -10913,6 +10962,7 @@ function testNoInternalNarrativeComments() {
     { re: /\b[Aa]udit\s+\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}/,         what: "dated audit/decision residue" },
     { re: /\bReported\s+\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}/,         what: "dated report residue" },
     { re: /\bCore Rule\s+§\d/,                 what: "internal CLAUDE.md rule-number citation" },
+    { re: /----\s*v\d+\.\d+\.\d+/,             what: "version stamp in a section-divider comment" },
   ];
   var files = _libFiles();
   var bad = [];

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/blamejs-shop",
-  "version": "0.3.19",
+  "version": "0.3.21",
   "description": "Open-source framework built on blamejs. Vendored stack, zero npm runtime deps, PQC-first crypto, security-on by default.",
   "main": "lib/index.js",
   "scripts": {