@blamejs/blamejs-shop 0.3.11 → 0.3.13

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/auth/oid4vci.js

@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ function _verifyProofJwt(proofJwt, expectedAud, expectedCNonce, expectedClientId
       "credential issuance: proof JWT alg \"" + header.alg + "\" not in issuer-supported set " +
       "(alg-allowlist gate — refused before key lookup)");
   }
-  // AUTH-5 / RFC 7515 §4.1.11 — refuse non-empty `crit`. Pre-v0.9.x
+  // RFC 7515 §4.1.11 — refuse non-empty `crit`. Pre-v0.9.x
   // silently ignored, letting an attacker-controlled wallet declare
   // critical extensions the verifier doesn't understand.
   if (header.crit !== undefined && header.crit !== null) {
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ function _verifyProofJwt(proofJwt, expectedAud, expectedCNonce, expectedClientId
   }
   if (expectedCNonce !== null) {
     // Constant-time c_nonce compare — secret-shaped value vs
-    // attacker-controlled wallet payload. (Audit 2026-05-11.)
+    // attacker-controlled wallet payload.
     if (typeof payload.nonce !== "string" ||
         !timingSafeEqual(payload.nonce, expectedCNonce)) {
       throw new AuthError("auth-oid4vci/wrong-proof-nonce",
@@ -148,14 +148,14 @@ function _verifyProofJwt(proofJwt, expectedAud, expectedCNonce, expectedClientId
       "credential issuance: proof JWT must include iat");
   }
   var nowSec = Math.floor(Date.now() / C.TIME.seconds(1));
-  // AUTH-34 — use C.TIME for the 60s skew tolerance rather than a bare
+  // Use C.TIME for the 60s skew tolerance rather than a bare
   // 60 literal; matches the framework's constants discipline.
   var iatSkewSec = C.TIME.seconds(60) / C.TIME.seconds(1);
   if (payload.iat > nowSec + iatSkewSec) {
     throw new AuthError("auth-oid4vci/proof-iat-future",
       "credential issuance: proof JWT iat is in the future");
   }
-  // AUTH-26 — operator-tunable proof max-age. Default 10 minutes per
+  // Operator-tunable proof max-age. Default 10 minutes per
   // OID4VCI §7.2.1.1; operators with longer-lived wallet flows raise.
   var effectiveMaxAgeMs = (typeof proofMaxAgeMs === "number" && isFinite(proofMaxAgeMs) && proofMaxAgeMs > 0)
     ? proofMaxAgeMs
@@ -304,12 +304,12 @@ function create(opts) {
   var preAuthTtl = opts.preAuthCodeTtlMs || DEFAULT_PRE_AUTH_TTL_MS;
   var accessTokenTtl = opts.accessTokenTtlMs || DEFAULT_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL;
   var cNonceTtl = opts.cNonceTtlMs || DEFAULT_C_NONCE_TTL_MS;
-  // AUTH-26 — operator-tunable proof iat-too-old window. Default 10
+  // Operator-tunable proof iat-too-old window. Default 10
   // minutes per OID4VCI §7.2.1.1.
   var proofMaxAgeMs = (typeof opts.proofMaxAgeMs === "number" && isFinite(opts.proofMaxAgeMs) && opts.proofMaxAgeMs > 0)
     ? opts.proofMaxAgeMs
     : C.TIME.minutes(10);
-  // AUTH-6 — access-token single-use. OID4VCI §7's credential endpoint
+  // Access-token single-use. OID4VCI §7's credential endpoint
   // does NOT inherently make the access token single-use; pre-v0.9.x
   // c_nonce rotation alone defended against proof replay, but a stolen
   // access token combined with a fresh proof could re-mint
@@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ function create(opts) {
     var newCNonce = generateToken(16);                                                           // 128-bit c_nonce
     await cNonceStore.set(iopts.accessToken, newCNonce);
 
-    // AUTH-6 — when single-use is on (default), DELETE the access token
+    // When single-use is on (default), DELETE the access token
     // after successful credential mint. A stolen access token paired
     // with a fresh proof would otherwise re-mint credentials; the
     // c_nonce rotation alone defends against proof replay but not

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/auth/oid4vp.js

@@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ function create(opts) {
           continue;
         }
         try {
-          // Per-presentation vct enforcement (audit 2026-05-11): when
+          // Per-presentation vct enforcement: when
           // DCQL's `vct_values` has 1 entry, `expectedVct` pins it.
           // With 2+ entries the verifier's expectedVct opt can't hold
           // a list, so we verify-without-expected and then validate

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/auth/openid-federation.js

@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ function verifyEntityStatement(jwt, jwks, vopts) {
         "verifyEntityStatement: no JWKS key matches kid \"" + parsed.header.kid + "\"");
     }
   } else {
-    // AUTH-10 — refuse kid-less entity statements unless the operator
+    // Refuse kid-less entity statements unless the operator
     // explicitly opts in. JWKS rotation creates a window where the
     // rotated-out key is still cached but the rotated-in key is already
     // published; a kid-less statement during that window gets the
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ function verifyEntityStatement(jwt, jwks, vopts) {
   }
 
   var nowSec = Math.floor(Date.now() / C.TIME.seconds(1));
-  // AUTH-30 — operator-tunable clock skew (sibling primitives accept
+  // Operator-tunable clock skew (sibling primitives accept
   // tunable). Default matches the prior fixed 60s.
   var skew = (typeof vopts.maxClockSkewSec === "number" && isFinite(vopts.maxClockSkewSec) && vopts.maxClockSkewSec >= 0)
     ? vopts.maxClockSkewSec
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ async function buildTrustChain(opts) {
   var chain = [];
   var current = opts.leafEntityId;
   var depth = 0;
-  // AUTH-9 — visited-set cycle guard. The maxDepth cap alone caps the
+  // Visited-set cycle guard. The maxDepth cap alone caps the
   // loop count but doesn't distinguish "long chain" from "cyclic
   // chain"; a hostile authority that lists itself in authority_hints
   // walks the verifier until depth runs out and then surfaces as
@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ async function buildTrustChain(opts) {
     // operators with multiple federations usually have one anchor
     // active; we walk in order and pick the first success.
     // Track every per-authority failure reason and surface them on
-    // `no-ascent` rather than masking. Audit 2026-05-11 — silently
+    // `no-ascent` rather than masking — silently
     // swallowing `catch (_e) {}` lets a hostile intermediate that
     // serves a malformed-then-valid pair shape-walk the verifier.
     // We continue past 404 / fetch errors but refuse on
@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ async function buildTrustChain(opts) {
         chain[chain.length - 1].claims.jwks = parsedSub.claims.jwks || chain[chain.length - 1].claims.jwks;
         chain[chain.length - 1].subordinateJwt = subordinateJwt;
         chain[chain.length - 1].subordinate    = parsedSub.claims;
-        // AUTH-9 — refuse revisit. A trust anchor terminates the loop
+        // Refuse revisit. A trust anchor terminates the loop
         // before re-entry, so a revisit here ALWAYS means a cyclic
         // authority_hints graph.
         if (visited[authority]) {

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/auth/passkey.js

@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ function _requireString(v, name) {
   }
 }
 
-// AUTH-28 — WebAuthn extensions allowlist. Pre-v0.9.x `opts.extensions`
+// WebAuthn extensions allowlist. Pre-v0.9.x `opts.extensions`
 // was forwarded verbatim to the vendor, letting an operator (or a
 // caller threading user-input through opts) ship arbitrary extension
 // keys to the authenticator. Restrict to the framework-supported
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ async function verifyRegistration(opts) {
 // <input autocomplete="webauthn">.
 // Null-prototype map so `opts.mediation === "__proto__"` /
 // `"constructor"` can't truthy-match an inherited property and slip
-// past the allowlist (audit 2026-05-11).
+// past the allowlist.
 var ALLOWED_MEDIATION = Object.assign(Object.create(null),
   { silent: 1, optional: 1, required: 1, conditional: 1 });
 
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ function _b64urlExtInput(value, name, maxBytes) {
   // browser turns it into an ArrayBuffer before passing to the
   // authenticator).
   //
-  // AUTH-29 — when `maxBytes` is set, refuse decoded inputs longer than
+  // When `maxBytes` is set, refuse decoded inputs longer than
   // the cap. Per CTAP2.1 §6.5 PRF salts are 32 bytes; pre-v0.9.x the
   // framework accepted arbitrary length, which is undefined behavior on
   // authenticators that may truncate / reject / behave inconsistently.
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ function _prfExt(args) {
     throw new AuthError("auth-passkey/missing-prf-first",
       "extensions.prf eval.first is required");
   }
-  // AUTH-29 — CTAP2.1 §6.5 caps PRF salts at 32 bytes.
+  // CTAP2.1 §6.5 caps PRF salts at 32 bytes.
   var out = { prf: { eval: { first: _b64urlExtInput(args.eval.first, "eval.first", MAX_EXT_INPUT_BYTES) } } };
   if (args.eval.second !== undefined && args.eval.second !== null) {
     out.prf.eval.second = _b64urlExtInput(args.eval.second, "eval.second", MAX_EXT_INPUT_BYTES);
@@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ async function verifyAuthentication(opts) {
     throw new AuthError("auth-passkey/missing-credential",
       "opts.credential { id, publicKey, counter? } is required");
   }
-  // Counter regression bypass fix (audit 2026-05-11) — pre-v0.9.2
+  // Counter regression bypass fix — pre-v0.9.2
   // shape `opts.credential.counter || 0` silently zeroed an
   // undefined / null / NaN counter, defeating CTAP 2.1 clone-
   // detection on credentials whose stored counter is > 0. An
@@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ async function verifyAuthentication(opts) {
  * @signature b.auth.passkey.compareBackupState(prev, current)
  * @since     0.9.57
  *
- * AUTH-27 — WebAuthn L3 §6.1.3. Inspect the credential's persisted BE
+ * WebAuthn L3 §6.1.3. Inspect the credential's persisted BE
  * (backupEligible) + BS (backupState) flags against the values
  * surfaced on a fresh assertion. Returns a normalized verdict the
  * operator routes into audit / step-up decisions:

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/auth/saml.js

@@ -717,7 +717,7 @@ function create(opts) {
         // Constant-time compare against the AuthnRequest ID the
         // operator stored — protects against timing-based InResponseTo
         // probing. timingSafeEqual returns false for missing /
-        // length-mismatch without leaking. (Audit 2026-05-11.)
+        // length-mismatch without leaking.
         if (inResponseTo === null || inResponseTo === undefined ||
             !timingSafeEqual(inResponseTo, vopts.expectedInResponseTo)) {
           throw new AuthError("auth-saml/bad-in-response-to",

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/auth/sd-jwt-vc.js

@@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ async function verify(presentation, opts) {
     jwtExternal._assertAlgKtyMatch(alg, issuerKey);
   }
   var jwtParsed = _verifyJwt(jwt, issuerKey, alg);
-  // AUTH-25 — post-verify header compare. Pre-verify we parsed the
+  // Post-verify header compare. Pre-verify we parsed the
   // header bytes to look up the key; _verifyJwt parses again from the
   // cryptographically-verified signing input. Both decodes MUST yield
   // the same JSON; a mismatch indicates a JWS-canonicalization or
@@ -538,7 +538,6 @@ async function verify(presentation, opts) {
   // selective-disclosure-jwt §4.1.1). Earlier the framework defaulted
   // to its own DEFAULT_HASH_ALG (`sha3-512`) which broke verification
   // against spec-conformant issuers when `_sd_alg` was omitted.
-  // (Audit 2026-05-11.)
   var hashAlg = jwtParsed.payload._sd_alg || "sha-256";
   if (!SUPPORTED_HASH_ALGS[hashAlg]) {
     throw new AuthError("auth-sd-jwt-vc/bad-hash",
@@ -566,7 +565,7 @@ async function verify(presentation, opts) {
     // Disclosure-replay defense — a holder presenting the same _sd
     // digest twice (with the same or different values) is malformed
     // per spec and is the shape of a partial-disclosure smuggling
-    // attack. Refuse on duplicate digest. (Audit 2026-05-11.)
+    // attack. Refuse on duplicate digest.
     if (seenDigests[digest]) {
       throw new AuthError("auth-sd-jwt-vc/disclosure-replay",
         "verify: disclosure digest \"" + digest.slice(0, 12) +
@@ -622,9 +621,7 @@ async function verify(presentation, opts) {
         "verify: KB-JWT nonce mismatch (replay defense)");
     }
     // Validate KB-JWT sd_hash matches the presentation, using the
-    // credential's declared `_sd_alg` (audit 2026-05-11 — was
-    // hardcoded sha256 regardless of issuer's choice, breaking
-    // verification when issuer used sha3-512).
+    // credential's declared `_sd_alg`.
     var kbHashInput = jwt + "~";
     if (disclosureParts.length > 0) kbHashInput += disclosureParts.join("~") + "~";
     var kbNodeHash = SUPPORTED_HASH_ALGS[hashAlg];

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/backup/index.js

@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ var BackupError = defineClass("BackupError");
 // compliance.js); list them here so bundleAdapterStorage's
 // posture check refuses plaintext bundles under these regimes
 // alongside the long-standing HIPAA + PCI-DSS pair.
-// Codex P1 on v0.12.26 PR #177 — the legacy `ai-act` short
+// The legacy `ai-act` short
 // name MUST appear in the backup encryption-required list too,
 // otherwise a deployment pinned to `posture: "ai-act"` (the
 // stated back-compat path) bypasses the cryptoStrategy refusal
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ function create(opts) {
       "create: opts.vaultKeyJson is required (string or function returning string)");
   }
 
-  // Posture-enforced backup encryption (F-BUDR-4). HIPAA / PCI-DSS
+  // Posture-enforced backup encryption. HIPAA / PCI-DSS
   // operators MUST keep encryption on. The framework's backup pipeline
   // is encrypted-by-default — passphrase + per-file XChaCha20-Poly1305
   // — but operators in third-party storage backends sometimes pass
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ function create(opts) {
     }
   }
 
-  // F-CBT-3 — backup destination residency posture. EU-tagged primary
+  // Backup destination residency posture. EU-tagged primary
   // backing up to a US-region destination is a GDPR Article 46
   // cross-border transfer; without an explicit operator opt-in the
   // framework refuses to create the pipeline under gdpr / dpdp /
@@ -1110,7 +1110,7 @@ function bundleAdapterStorage(opts) {
   // HIPAA + PCI-DSS recipe raises the floor to 128 bits (per
   // BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_REQUIRED_POSTURES below); default 80 matches
   // OWASP "strong password" guidance for generic deployments.
-  // Codex P1 on v0.12.11 PR #162 — typeof NaN === "number" and
+  // Typeof NaN === "number" and
   // typeof Infinity === "number" both pass the typeof gate but
   // bypass downstream comparisons (NaN < 128 is false; estimated
   // < NaN is false). Use Number.isFinite + a finite integer check
@@ -1136,7 +1136,7 @@ function bundleAdapterStorage(opts) {
         "passphraseMinEntropyBits defaults to 80; HIPAA / PCI-DSS postures raise the floor to 128.");
     }
   }
-  // Codex P1 on v0.12.10 PR #161 — the wrap layers (recipient AND
+  // The wrap layers (recipient AND
   // passphrase) compose only with the tar / tar.gz writeBundle
   // branches. Pairing encryption strategy with format: "directory"
   // would silently write plaintext per-file payloads. Refuse upfront
@@ -1168,7 +1168,7 @@ function bundleAdapterStorage(opts) {
       passphraseMinEntropyBits = 128;                                                  // entropy-bits floor, not byte count
     }
   }
-  // Codex P2 on v0.12.8 PR #159 — tar mode builds the whole archive
+  // Tar mode builds the whole archive
   // in memory before adapter.writeFile because the v0.12.8 adapter
   // contract is bytes-in (no writeStream method). The OOM-prevention
   // gate is maxBundleBytes: writeBundle pre-walks the source tree,
@@ -1244,7 +1244,7 @@ function bundleAdapterStorage(opts) {
         // wire). Bundle sizes drop ~3-5× on text-heavy backups
         // (databases, JSON exports, mail spools) under tar.gz.
         //
-        // Codex P2 on v0.12.8 PR #159 — tar bytes are materialized in
+        // Tar bytes are materialized in
         // memory because the v0.12.8 adapter contract is bytes-in
         // (writeFile takes a Buffer, no writeStream method). The
         // maxBundleBytes pre-walk computes the uncompressed payload
@@ -1312,7 +1312,7 @@ function bundleAdapterStorage(opts) {
       }
       atomicFile.ensureDir(destDir);
       if (hasTarGz) {
-        // Codex P1/P2 on v0.12.9 PR #160 — propagate maxBundleBytes
+        // Propagate maxBundleBytes
         // to the gz restore path + disable the expansion-ratio cap.
         // archive.read.gz defaults (1 GiB output / 100× ratio) are
         // bomb-defense settings appropriate for adversarial input;
@@ -1386,7 +1386,7 @@ function bundleAdapterStorage(opts) {
       // writeBundle path produced (rule §2 — the format is part
       // of the storage layout, not behind a probe).
       //
-      // Codex P2 on v0.12.17 PR #168 — track WHICH suffixes a
+      // Track WHICH suffixes a
       // bundle carries (set of booleans) then apply explicit
       // precedence at the end: tar.gz > tar > directory. Matches
       // readBundle's preference (which checks hasTarGz first)
@@ -1595,7 +1595,7 @@ function bundleAdapterStorage(opts) {
           "cloneBundle: dstBundleId '" + dstBundleId + "' already exists; " +
           "pass opts.overwrite=true to replace");
       }
-      // Codex P1 on v0.12.23 PR #174 — when overwrite=true, the
+      // When overwrite=true, the
       // existence guard was the only protection but it didn't
       // delete the destination's existing keys before writing
       // the source keys. Stale-format bundles (dst=tar, src=
@@ -1654,7 +1654,7 @@ function bundleAdapterStorage(opts) {
       var rwKeySuffix = info.format === "tar.gz" ? TAR_GZ_KEY_SUFFIX : TAR_KEY_SUFFIX;
       var sealed = await adapter.readFile(bundleId + rwKeySuffix);
       var envelopeKind = info.envelopeKind;
-      // Codex P2 on v0.12.21 PR #172 — when the adapter has no
+      // When the adapter has no
       // readPartial capability, bundleInfo returns envelopeKind:
       // "unknown" rather than risk a full payload load. For
       // rewrap, we already have to load the payload (to unwrap),
@@ -1705,7 +1705,7 @@ function bundleAdapterStorage(opts) {
           "rewrapBundle: opts.newPassphrase is required (string or Buffer) to re-seal");
       }
       inner = await archiveLazy().unwrapWithPassphrase(sealed, { passphrase: oldPass });
-      // Codex P1 on v0.12.21 PR #172 — preserve the storage's
+      // Preserve the storage's
       // configured entropy floor across rewrap. The
       // writeBundle path raises the floor to 128 bits under
       // HIPAA / PCI-DSS postures (per
@@ -1770,7 +1770,7 @@ function bundleAdapterStorage(opts) {
       var inflight = [];
       var aborted = false;
       function _spawn() {
-        // Codex P1 on v0.12.22 PR #173 — synchronously drain
+        // Synchronously drain
         // non-wrappable entries inside _spawn until we hit one
         // that actually needs an async rewrap (or the pending
         // queue empties). The prior implementation returned
@@ -1850,7 +1850,7 @@ function bundleAdapterStorage(opts) {
     },
     async verifyAllBundles(vOpts) {
       vOpts = vOpts || {};
-      // Codex P1 on v0.12.20 PR #171 — clamp fractional + zero
+      // Clamp fractional + zero
       // floors so a stray `0.5` doesn't spawn zero workers + return
       // a silent ok=0/failed=0 report on non-empty storage. Default
       // 4; minimum 1; non-finite / non-positive falls back to
@@ -1876,7 +1876,7 @@ function bundleAdapterStorage(opts) {
         if (aborted) return null;
         if (pending.length === 0) return null;
         var entry = pending.shift();
-        // Codex P2 on v0.12.20 PR #171 — wrap each worker so any
+        // Wrap each worker so any
         // verifyBundle rejection becomes a failed-result entry
         // rather than rejecting the whole batch. Without this, a
         // mid-walk failure (payload disappeared between listBundles
@@ -2063,7 +2063,7 @@ function bundleAdapterStorage(opts) {
       var envelopeKind = "none";
       var sizeBytes = null;
       var createdAt = null;
-      // Codex P2 on v0.12.18 PR #169 — directory-format bundles
+      // Directory-format bundles
       // leave payloadKey null but DO have a manifest.json that
       // statKey can read. For createdAt parity with
       // listBundles({ withStats }), stat the manifest in the
@@ -2085,7 +2085,7 @@ function bundleAdapterStorage(opts) {
         }
       }
       if (payloadKey !== null) {
-        // Codex P1 on v0.12.17 PR #168 — claim was a 5-byte magic
+        // Claim was a 5-byte magic
         // probe; the implementation was reading the entire bundle
         // into memory. For multi-GB bundles, an administrative
         // metadata call would allocate the whole payload and put
@@ -2381,7 +2381,7 @@ bundleAdapterStorage.objectStoreAdapter = function (client, osOpts) {
       // prefix manually so `listKeys("")` enumerates everything
       // under the operator-supplied namespace.
       var realScoped = prefix + (keyPrefix || "");
-      // Codex P1 on v0.12.13 PR #164 — object-store backends page
+      // Object-store backends page
       // results (default 1000 keys). Without continuation, listKeys
       // silently dropped bundles past page 1 — listBundles missed
       // them, deleteBundle skipped them. Follow the

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/cache.js

@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ var { CacheError } = require("./framework-error");
 
 var log = boot("cache");
 var observability = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./observability"); });
-// D-L5 — opt-in vault seal for cluster-backend cache values. Lazy so
+// Opt-in vault seal for cluster-backend cache values. Lazy so
 // vault-not-initialized in tests with a memory cache doesn't crash
 // at module load.
 var vault = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./vault"); });
@@ -501,7 +501,7 @@ function _clusterBackend(cfg) {
       ).catch(function () { /* best-effort */ });
     }
     var stored = row.valueJson;
-    // D-L5 — sealed-row decode. Sealed entries are prefixed at write
+    // Sealed-row decode. Sealed entries are prefixed at write
     // time so the unseal-on-read path is a strict opt-in: rows
     // written without seal:true continue parsing as before.
     if (typeof stored === "string" && stored.indexOf(CACHE_SEAL_PREFIX) === 0) {
@@ -521,7 +521,7 @@ function _clusterBackend(cfg) {
     // changed value, app code treats it as the original" — a subtle
     // freshness bug that's hard to debug.
     var json = safeJson.stringify(value);
-    // D-L5 — opt-in vault seal. When the caller passes seal: true,
+    // Opt-in vault seal. When the caller passes seal: true,
     // wrap the JSON via b.vault.seal (XChaCha20-Poly1305) before
     // landing in _blamejs_cache.valueJson. The marker prefix is what
     // get() looks for to know it must unseal on read.
@@ -1091,7 +1091,7 @@ function create(opts) {
         }
       }
     }
-    // D-L5 — opt-in vault seal. Strict-shape check: must be the literal
+    // Opt-in vault seal. Strict-shape check: must be the literal
     // boolean true, not just truthy. Backends that don't support seal
     // (memory, custom) ignore the flag transparently; cluster backend
     // wraps valueJson via b.vault.seal before INSERT.

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/calendar.js

@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ function validate(jsCal) {
         "b.calendar.validate: Group.source MUST be a string URI when present (RFC 8984 §1.4.4)");
     }
     if (jsCal.categories !== undefined) {
-      // Codex P1 — `typeof null === "object"` would let `categories:
+      // `typeof null === "object"` would let `categories:
       // null` through this check, and the subsequent Object.keys
       // throws a raw TypeError instead of a structured CalendarError.
       // Refuse null explicitly so callers depending on the
@@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ function _expandSingleRule(rule, startMs, ctx) {
       var n = parseInt(arr[i], 10);
       if (isFinite(n) && n >= lo && n <= hi) { s[n] = true; hasAny = true; }
     }
-    // Codex P2 — when every value in the BY* list is out of range,
+    // When every value in the BY* list is out of range,
     // return null instead of an empty set. An empty truthy set would
     // cause `_matchesBy` to reject every candidate (`!set[n]` is
     // true) and silently turn malformed input into a "match nothing"
@@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ function _expandSingleRule(rule, startMs, ctx) {
     if (byMonthSet && !byMonthSet[d.getUTCMonth() + 1]) return false;
     if (byMonthDaySet && !byMonthDaySet[d.getUTCDate()]) return false;
     if (byWeekNoSet) {
-      // Codex P1 — ISO week-year vs Gregorian year. 2021-01-01 is ISO
+      // ISO week-year vs Gregorian year. 2021-01-01 is ISO
       // week 53 of WEEK-YEAR 2020 (since 2021 only has 52 ISO weeks).
       // Comparing only the numeric week would let a Jan 1 2021 date
       // match a BYWEEKNO=53 rule whose implicit year is 2021. Refuse
@@ -884,7 +884,7 @@ function _expandWithBysetpos(ctx) {
     // Emit picked candidates in ascending order, gated by window +
     // untilMs + per-rule count cap.
     //
-    // Codex P1 — recurrence instances MUST NOT precede DTSTART (per
+    // Recurrence instances MUST NOT precede DTSTART (per
     // RFC 5545 §3.8.5.3). The period-boundary enumeration above
     // includes candidates BEFORE startMs when the period containing
     // startMs has earlier BY*-matching days (e.g. start = May 20
@@ -960,7 +960,7 @@ function _veventToJsCalEvent(ve) {
   if (tzid) {
     jsCal.timeZone = tzid;
   } else if (typeof dtstart === "string" && /Z$/.test(dtstart)) {
-    // Codex P1 — RFC 8984 §1.4.4: a UTC-suffix DTSTART (`...Z`) in
+    // RFC 8984 §1.4.4: a UTC-suffix DTSTART (`...Z`) in
     // iCalendar maps to a JSCalendar Event with `timeZone: "Etc/UTC"`.
     // Without this, round-tripping `fromIcal` → `toIcal` would drop
     // the UTC anchor + emit floating time, shifting the absolute

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/circuit-breaker.js

@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ function create(opts) {
   // split the name out of opts before invoking the constructor.
   // Caught by hermitstash-sync operator review against v0.9.12.
   //
-  // CRYPTO-19 — the previous empty-string fallback was unreachable
+  // The previous empty-string fallback was unreachable
   // (retryHelper.CircuitBreaker validator throws on "" first) AND
   // produced a confusing error message ("name must be a non-empty
   // string, got string \"\"") that obscured the real opt-shape

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/cms-codec.js

@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ function decode(buf, opts) {
 
 // OIDs whose AlgorithmIdentifier specifies ABSENT parameters per their
 // publishing RFC — emitting NULL here would make the CMS structure
-// non-conformant for strict validators (Codex P1 finding on PR #102).
+// non-conformant for strict validators.
 // ML-DSA per RFC 9909 §3, SLH-DSA per RFC 9881 §3, ML-KEM per
 // RFC 9936 §3. SHAKE-family per FIPS 202 (NIST registry — absent params).
 var ABSENT_PARAM_OIDS = new Set([
@@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ function _writeImplicitPrimitive(tagNumber, value) {
   // [N] IMPLICIT context-specific PRIMITIVE — for wrapping primitive
   // ASN.1 types (OCTET STRING / INTEGER / OID) that have been IMPLICIT-
   // tagged. The constructed bit MUST NOT be set or strict CMS parsers
-  // reject the structure (Codex P1 finding on PR #102 — RecipientIdentifier
+  // reject the structure (RecipientIdentifier
   // CHOICE's SubjectKeyIdentifier alternative is `[0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING`,
   // a primitive type).
   var tagByte = 0x80 | (tagNumber & 0x1f);                                                            // context-specific primitive mask

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/compliance.js

@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ var KNOWN_POSTURES = Object.freeze([
   "nyc-ll144-2024",              // NYC Local Law 144 — Automated Employment Decision Tool bias audits (2024 enforcement update)             // statute identifier, not bytes
 ]);
 
-// SUPPLY-34 — Artifact standards (SBOM / VEX format families) are NOT
+// Artifact standards (SBOM / VEX format families) are NOT
 // regulatory regimes. Pinning a posture like `cyclonedx-v1.6` to
 // cascade audit + TLS floors conflates the act of EMITTING a SBOM
 // format with the regulatory floor an operator needs. Operators who
@@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ function set(posture) {
   STATE.setAt   = Date.now();
   _emitAudit("compliance.posture.set", { posture: posture });
 
-  // SUPPLY-34 — emit a `format_as_regime` audit warning when an
+  // Emit a `format_as_regime` audit warning when an
   // operator pins an artifact-standard format (cyclonedx-v1.6 /
   // spdx-v3.0 / vex-csaf-2.1) as the regulatory posture. These names
   // remain in KNOWN_POSTURES for back-compat but pinning them as the
@@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ function set(posture) {
       "warning");
   }
 
-  // SUPPLY-21 — emit `fips_conflict` audit warning when posture is
+  // Emit `fips_conflict` audit warning when posture is
   // FedRAMP / CMMC L3 AND the framework's PQC-first crypto defaults
   // are active without an explicit fipsMode opt-in. Operators see
   // this in the audit chain and either (a) document the deviation
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ function set(posture) {
       "warning");
   }
 
-  // F-POSTURE-1 — cascade the posture into every primitive that owns a
+  // Cascade the posture into every primitive that owns a
   // posture-conditioned default. Each primitive exposes an
   // `applyPosture(name)` that merges the POSTURE_DEFAULTS entry for the
   // posture into its own state and emits
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ function set(posture) {
   // skipped rows surface in the audit chain so a forensic review can
   // reconstruct the boot order.
   _applyPostureCascade(posture);
-  // F-AUD-5 — TZ awareness. Auditors expect timestamps in UTC.
+  // TZ awareness. Auditors expect timestamps in UTC.
   // process.env.TZ controls Node's local-time conversion for any
   // operator code that uses non-UTC formatters; under regulated
   // postures (hipaa / pci-dss / sox / gdpr / soc2) emit a boot
@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ function set(posture) {
   }
 }
 
-// _applyPostureCascade — F-POSTURE-1. Walks every primitive that
+// _applyPostureCascade — walks every primitive that
 // participates in posture-conditioned defaults and asks it to merge
 // the named posture into its state. Each step is best-effort at the
 // audit-emission level (a primitive that isn't loaded yet emits
@@ -936,11 +936,11 @@ function describe(posture) {
 // floors.
 //
 // Keys per posture:
-//   backupEncryptionRequired  — backup.create refuses encrypt:false (F-BUDR-4)
+//   backupEncryptionRequired  — backup.create refuses encrypt:false
 //   auditChainSignedRequired  — audit emissions MUST be ML-DSA-87 chain-signed
 //   tlsMinVersion             — minimum TLS version (string e.g. "TLSv1.3")
 //   sessionAbsoluteTimeoutMs  — hard session expiry ceiling
-//   requireVacuumAfterErase   — F-RTBF-2: cryptoField.eraseRow must call
+//   requireVacuumAfterErase   — cryptoField.eraseRow must call
 //                               b.db.vacuumAfterErase({ mode: "full" })
 //                               so freed B-tree index pages don't linger
 //                               with sealed-column ciphertext readable
@@ -1178,7 +1178,7 @@ var POSTURE_DEFAULTS = Object.freeze({
   "circia":          Object.freeze({ backupEncryptionRequired: false, auditChainSignedRequired: true, tlsMinVersion: "TLSv1.3", requireVacuumAfterErase: false }),
   // ---- v0.9.6 — exceptd framework-control-gap closure cascade ----
   "nist-800-53":             Object.freeze({ backupEncryptionRequired: true,  auditChainSignedRequired: true, tlsMinVersion: "TLSv1.3", requireVacuumAfterErase: true  }),
-  // SUPPLY-18 — NIST AI-RMF MANAGE.4.3 / ISO 23894 §6.5 / ISO 42001
+  // NIST AI-RMF MANAGE.4.3 / ISO 23894 §6.5 / ISO 42001
   // §A.6 require encrypted backups for AI system state (model
   // weights, training data, prompt logs all contain regulated
   // payload). All AI-domain postures now enforce backupEncryption.
@@ -1186,7 +1186,7 @@ var POSTURE_DEFAULTS = Object.freeze({
   "iso-42001-2023":          Object.freeze({ backupEncryptionRequired: true,  auditChainSignedRequired: true, tlsMinVersion: "TLSv1.3", requireVacuumAfterErase: true  }),
   "iso-23894-2023":          Object.freeze({ backupEncryptionRequired: true,  auditChainSignedRequired: true, tlsMinVersion: "TLSv1.3", requireVacuumAfterErase: true  }),
   "owasp-llm-top-10-2025":   Object.freeze({ backupEncryptionRequired: true,  auditChainSignedRequired: true, tlsMinVersion: "TLSv1.3", requireVacuumAfterErase: true  }),
-  // SUPPLY-19 — OWASP ASVS v5.0 §8.3.4 (sensitive-data deletion)
+  // OWASP ASVS v5.0 §8.3.4 (sensitive-data deletion)
   // requires post-delete storage reclamation. Set requireVacuumAfterErase
   // so operators pinning ASVS v5.0 inherit the proper floor.
   "owasp-asvs-v5.0":         Object.freeze({ backupEncryptionRequired: false, auditChainSignedRequired: true, tlsMinVersion: "TLSv1.3", requireVacuumAfterErase: true  }),
@@ -1194,7 +1194,7 @@ var POSTURE_DEFAULTS = Object.freeze({
   "nist-800-82-r3":          Object.freeze({ backupEncryptionRequired: true,  auditChainSignedRequired: true, tlsMinVersion: "TLSv1.3", requireVacuumAfterErase: false }),
   "nist-800-63b-rev4":       Object.freeze({ backupEncryptionRequired: false, auditChainSignedRequired: true, tlsMinVersion: "TLSv1.3", requireVacuumAfterErase: false }),
   "iec-62443-3-3":           Object.freeze({ backupEncryptionRequired: true,  auditChainSignedRequired: true, tlsMinVersion: "TLSv1.3", requireVacuumAfterErase: false }),
-  // SUPPLY-21 — FedRAMP Rev 5 Moderate baseline references FIPS 140-3
+  // FedRAMP Rev 5 Moderate baseline references FIPS 140-3
   // validated cryptography for protect-against-disclosure controls
   // (SC-13, SC-28). The framework's PQC-first defaults (ML-KEM-1024,
   // XChaCha20-Poly1305, SHA3-512) are NOT FIPS-140-3 validated as of
@@ -1230,7 +1230,7 @@ var POSTURE_DEFAULTS = Object.freeze({
   "nist-800-115":            Object.freeze({ backupEncryptionRequired: false, auditChainSignedRequired: true, tlsMinVersion: "TLSv1.3", requireVacuumAfterErase: false }),
   "cwe-top-25-2024":         Object.freeze({ backupEncryptionRequired: false, auditChainSignedRequired: true, tlsMinVersion: "TLSv1.3", requireVacuumAfterErase: false }),
   "cis-controls-v8":         Object.freeze({ backupEncryptionRequired: true,  auditChainSignedRequired: true, tlsMinVersion: "TLSv1.3", requireVacuumAfterErase: false }),
-  // SUPPLY-20 — CMMC 2.0 levels differ in control mapping:
+  // CMMC 2.0 levels differ in control mapping:
   //   L1 (Foundational, 15 FAR controls, FCI data only) — encrypted
   //       backups NOT mandated; audit-chain encouraged.
   //   L2 (Advanced, 110 NIST 800-171 Rev 2 controls, CUI data) —
@@ -1325,7 +1325,7 @@ var POSTURE_DEFAULTS = Object.freeze({
   // erased from a system's storage, the residual EXIF / metadata
   // entries pointing at the model must be cleared too.
   "eu-ai-act":               Object.freeze({ backupEncryptionRequired: true,  auditChainSignedRequired: true, tlsMinVersion: "TLSv1.3", requireVacuumAfterErase: true  }),
-  // Codex P1 on v0.12.26 PR #177 — the legacy `ai-act` short
+  // The legacy `ai-act` short
   // name carries the SAME cascade as `eu-ai-act` so deployments
   // pinned to the legacy alias get the new encryption / audit /
   // TLS / vacuum floors instead of falling through to null. The
@@ -1526,7 +1526,7 @@ function list() {
  * Return the set of SBOM / VEX artifact standards the framework can
  * emit. These are FORMAT FAMILIES, not regulatory regimes — pinning
  * one of these names as the deployment's compliance posture conflates
- * "format I emit" with "regulatory floor I meet" (SUPPLY-34). Pin
+ * "format I emit" with "regulatory floor I meet". Pin
  * the regulatory regime (FedRAMP / SSDF / HIPAA / etc.) via
  * `b.compliance.set()` and surface the emitted artifact standards via
  * this read-only catalog.