@blamejs/blamejs-shop 0.1.8 → 0.1.10

package/lib/returns.js

@@ -429,6 +429,16 @@ function create(opts) {
       return await _hydrate(r.rows[0] || null);
     },
 
+    // The moderation events legal from a given status, as {on, to} —
+    // drives the action buttons on the operator return-detail page. A
+    // terminal status returns []. Synchronous (pure lookup over the
+    // transition table). `on` is the API method name (approve / reject /
+    // markReceived / refund).
+    transitionsFrom: function (status) {
+      var edges = TRANSITIONS[status] || {};
+      return Object.keys(edges).map(function (on) { return { on: on, to: edges[on] }; });
+    },
+
     byCode: async function (rmaCode) {
       var canonical = _canonicalCode(rmaCode);
       var r = await query(

package/lib/vendor/MANIFEST.json

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
   "_about": "blamejs.shop vendors a single framework — blamejs — which itself bundles every server-side crypto/identity dependency. The transitive packages blamejs ships are surfaced in its own MANIFEST.json at lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/vendor/MANIFEST.json — Trivy / Grype rely on that nested data for CVE attribution.",
   "packages": {
     "blamejs": {
-      "version": "0.12.50",
-      "tag": "v0.12.50",
+      "version": "0.12.51",
+      "tag": "v0.12.51",
       "license": "Apache-2.0",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "source": "https://github.com/blamejs/blamejs",

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ upgrading across more than a few patches at a time.
 
 ## v0.12.x
 
+- v0.12.51 (2026-05-25) — **`b.network.dns.dane.matchCertificate` — DANE / TLSA certificate matching (RFC 6698 / 7671).** Pin a service's certificate through DNS instead of a public CA. matchCertificate checks a server certificate against a set of TLSA records: the selected data — the full certificate (selector 0) or its subjectPublicKeyInfo (selector 1) — is hashed per the matching type (exact / SHA-256 / SHA-512) and compared in constant time to the record's association data. For a DANE-EE (usage 3) record a match is self-authenticating — the TLSA pins the key, so no public-CA path is needed (the common SMTP-DANE case, RFC 7672); for the PKIX usages a match is reported as necessary-but-not-sufficient so the caller still runs PKIX. This is the payoff of the DNSSEC verifier: verify the TLSA RRset with b.network.dns.dnssec, then match the certificate. Verified against a live DNSSEC-signed TLSA record and the matching server certificate. **Added:** *`b.network.dns.dane.matchCertificate(opts)`* — Matches a leaf certificate (and optional `chain`) against a TLSA RRset (`{ usage, selector, matchingType, data }`). Selector 0 hashes the full certificate DER, selector 1 the subjectPublicKeyInfo; matching type 0 is an exact comparison, 1 SHA-256, 2 SHA-512 (SHA-1 and any other type are refused, not guessed). End-entity usages (PKIX-EE 1, DANE-EE 3) match the leaf; trust-anchor usages (PKIX-TA 0, DANE-TA 2) match the leaf or any supplied chain certificate. Returns `{ ok, matched, daneAuthenticated, trustAnchorMatch, pkixRequired, matchedCertIndex }` — `daneAuthenticated` is true only for a DANE-EE match (the key is pinned, no CA needed); `pkixRequired` flags the PKIX usages. Throws `dane/no-match` when nothing matches, and refuses unknown usage / selector / matching values and unparseable certificates. Verify the TLSA RRset with `b.network.dns.dnssec` first — an unauthenticated TLSA record proves nothing.
+
 - v0.12.50 (2026-05-25) — **`b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyChain` — validate a DNSSEC delegation chain to a pinned root anchor.** Completes local DNSSEC verification: validate a full delegation chain from the root down to a zone against a pinned trust anchor (RFC 4035 §5), instead of trusting any single resolver. For each link, the zone's DNSKEY RRset must be self-signed by one of its keys, and that key must be vouched for either by a pinned anchor (at the root) or by a DS record served + signed by the already-trusted parent — so trust flows root → TLD → zone with no gap. The IANA root KSKs (KSK-2017 tag 20326, KSK-2024 tag 38696) ship as the default anchors; override with opts.trustAnchors for a private root. verifyChain returns the leaf zone's trusted DNSKEY set, which you then hand to verifyRrset / verifyDenial for the actual answer. Composes verifyRrset + verifyDs + the key tag; verified end-to-end against a live root→org chain. **Added:** *`b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyChain(opts)`* — Walks an ordered, root-first list of `links` ({ zone, dnskeys, dnskeyRrsig, dsRdatas?, dsRrsig? }). At each link it verifies the DNSKEY RRset's self-signature (composing `verifyRrset`), then establishes trust in the signing key: at the root by matching a pinned anchor's DS digest (`verifyDs`), at every delegation by verifying the parent-served DS RRset's signature with the already-trusted parent key and confirming the signing KSK matches one of those DS records. Returns `{ ok, zone, keys, path }` with the leaf zone's trusted DNSKEY set. Refuses a root key that matches no anchor (`dnssec/chain-anchor-mismatch`), a KSK that matches no parent DS (`dnssec/chain-ds-mismatch`), and a missing parent key (`dnssec/chain-no-parent-key`). The default `DEFAULT_ROOT_ANCHORS` are the published IANA root KSK DS records; `opts.trustAnchors` overrides them for a private or test root.
 
 - v0.12.49 (2026-05-25) — **`b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyDenial` — NSEC / NSEC3 denial-of-existence.** Prove a DNS name does not exist, or has no records of a given type, from the signed NSEC (RFC 4034 §4) or NSEC3 (RFC 5155) records a server returns. This is the other half of local DNSSEC verification: verifyRrset proves a positive answer, verifyDenial proves a negative — so a resolver client can confirm an NXDOMAIN / NODATA itself instead of trusting the upstream resolver. NSEC3 proofs run the closest-encloser / next-closer / covering-range logic over iterated-SHA-1 hashes, with the iteration count capped (default 500) to bound the work an attacker can force, and an Opt-Out NXDOMAIN refused unless explicitly accepted (opt-out only proves 'no signed records', not non-existence). The companion b.network.dns.dnssec.nsec3Hash computes the RFC 5155 §5 hash directly. NSEC verifyRrset support is also enabled: per RFC 6840 §5.1 the NSEC Next Domain Name is not downcased, so its RDATA is verbatim-canonical. **Added:** *`b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyDenial(opts)`* — Proves NXDOMAIN or NODATA from already-verified NSEC / NSEC3 records (supply one of `opts.nsec3` or `opts.nsec`). Like `verifyDs`, it checks the denial RELATION — closest-encloser matching, covering ranges, and type-bitmap absence — not the record signatures, which the caller verifies with `verifyRrset` first. NSEC3 supports name-error proofs (matching closest encloser + covered next-closer + covered wildcard), NODATA (matching record with the type and CNAME absent from the bitmap), Opt-Out DS NODATA, and wildcard NODATA. The iterated-SHA-1 count is capped by `opts.maxIterations` (default 500); an NXDOMAIN proof that depends on an Opt-Out NSEC3 is refused unless `opts.allowOptOut` is set. NSEC supports covering-name NXDOMAIN (with the source-of-synthesis wildcard) and matching-name NODATA. Verified end-to-end against a live iana.org NXDOMAIN proof. · *`b.network.dns.dnssec.nsec3Hash(name, opts)`* — Computes the RFC 5155 §5 NSEC3 hash of a name — iterated SHA-1 over the canonical (lowercased, root-terminated) wire form with the zone salt. The base32hex encoding of the result is the NSEC3 owner label. SHA-1 is the only hash IANA registers for NSEC3, so this is a wire-protocol constant rather than a cryptographic default. Useful for checking an owner label or analyzing a zone's hashing parameters. **Changed:** *`verifyRrset` now accepts NSEC and NSEC3 RRsets* — NSEC (type 47) and NSEC3 (type 50) are no longer refused as uncanonicalizable: NSEC3's next-owner is a hash, and per RFC 6840 §5.1 the NSEC Next Domain Name field is not downcased for DNSSEC canonical form, so both RDATAs are verbatim-canonical. This lets a caller verify the signatures on the records that `verifyDenial` then reasons over.

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/README.md

@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ The framework bundles the surface a typical Node app reaches for. Every primitiv
   - In-process CIDR fence (`b.middleware.networkAllowlist`)
   - `Cache-Control: no-store` on every 401 from `requireAuth` / `requireAal` / `requireStepUp` per RFC 9111 §5.2.2.5
 - **Outbound HTTP client** — HTTP/1.1 + HTTP/2 with SSRF gate (cloud-metadata IPs hard-denied; private / loopback / link-local overridable per call); scheme + userinfo + per-host destination allowlist; redirects, multipart, interceptors, progress, encrypted cookie jar (`b.httpClient`, `b.ssrfGuard`, `b.safeUrl`)
-- **Network configurability (`b.network`)** — env-driven NTP / NTS (RFC 8915), IPv4/IPv6 NTP, DNS with IPv6 / DoH / DoT (private-CA pinning) / cache / lookup timeout; local DNSSEC signature verification (RFC 4035 — `b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyRrset` over a canonicalised RRset against RSA / ECDSA P-256·P-384 / Ed25519 DNSKEYs, plus DS-digest + key-tag, plus `verifyDenial` for NSEC / NSEC3 (RFC 5155) NXDOMAIN / NODATA proofs with iteration caps + Opt-Out handling, plus `verifyChain` to validate a full root→TLD→zone delegation chain against the pinned IANA root anchors) so a resolver client can verify both positive and negative answers instead of trusting the upstream AD bit; outbound HTTP proxy (`HTTP_PROXY` / `HTTPS_PROXY` / `NO_PROXY`); runtime DPI trust-store CA additions; application-level heartbeats; TCP socket defaults
+- **Network configurability (`b.network`)** — env-driven NTP / NTS (RFC 8915), IPv4/IPv6 NTP, DNS with IPv6 / DoH / DoT (private-CA pinning) / cache / lookup timeout; local DNSSEC signature verification (RFC 4035 — `b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyRrset` over a canonicalised RRset against RSA / ECDSA P-256·P-384 / Ed25519 DNSKEYs, plus DS-digest + key-tag, plus `verifyDenial` for NSEC / NSEC3 (RFC 5155) NXDOMAIN / NODATA proofs with iteration caps + Opt-Out handling, plus `verifyChain` to validate a full root→TLD→zone delegation chain against the pinned IANA root anchors) so a resolver client can verify both positive and negative answers instead of trusting the upstream AD bit; DANE / TLSA certificate matching (RFC 6698/7671 — `b.network.dns.dane.matchCertificate`) to pin a service's key through DNSSEC instead of a public CA; outbound HTTP proxy (`HTTP_PROXY` / `HTTPS_PROXY` / `NO_PROXY`); runtime DPI trust-store CA additions; application-level heartbeats; TCP socket defaults
 - **Error pages** — operator-rendered, no app-frame leakage (`b.errorPage`)
 ### Defensive parsers
 

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/SECURITY.md

@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ This is the minimum-viable security posture for a production deployment. The fra
 - [ ] At boot, before any outbound socket opens: call `b.network.bootFromEnv({ env: process.env, audit: b.audit })` so operator-supplied NTP / DNS / proxy / DPI-trust / TCP socket settings (`BLAMEJS_NTP_*`, `BLAMEJS_DNS_*`, `HTTP_PROXY` / `HTTPS_PROXY` / `NO_PROXY`, `BLAMEJS_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`, `BLAMEJS_SOCKET_*`) apply uniformly
 - [ ] If the deployment sits behind a deep-packet-inspection proxy with its own re-signing CA: install the CA via `b.network.tls.addCa("/path/to/corp-ca.pem", { label: "corp-mitm" })` and pass `allowDpiTrust: true` to `b.security.assertProduction` — every CA addition audits with subject + fingerprint so a forensic review can reconstruct the trust path
 - [ ] For authenticated time (HIPAA / PCI / FIPS shops): use `b.network.ntp.nts.query({ host: ntsKeServer })` (RFC 8915) instead of plain SNTP; set `BLAMEJS_NTS_REQUIRE=1` to fail closed on negotiation failure
-- [ ] When a DNS answer drives a trust decision (DANE / TLSA pinning, SSHFP, CAA enforcement, OPENPGPKEY lookup) and the upstream resolver isn't itself trusted: verify the answer's DNSSEC signature with `b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyRrset(...)` rather than trusting the resolver's AD bit — an on-path or compromised resolver can set AD on a forged answer, but cannot forge the RRSIG. Validate the whole delegation chain root→TLD→zone with `b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyChain(...)` (default-pinned to the IANA root KSKs, or `trustAnchors` for a private root) so trust is anchored, not borrowed from the resolver. For a negative answer that drives a fail-closed decision (an allowlist lookup, a revocation check), verify the NSEC / NSEC3 proof with `b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyDenial(...)` so a forged NXDOMAIN cannot suppress a record; keep the default Opt-Out refusal unless the zone's opt-out spans are acceptable for that decision
+- [ ] When a DNS answer drives a trust decision (DANE / TLSA pinning, SSHFP, CAA enforcement, OPENPGPKEY lookup) and the upstream resolver isn't itself trusted: verify the answer's DNSSEC signature with `b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyRrset(...)` rather than trusting the resolver's AD bit — an on-path or compromised resolver can set AD on a forged answer, but cannot forge the RRSIG. Validate the whole delegation chain root→TLD→zone with `b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyChain(...)` (default-pinned to the IANA root KSKs, or `trustAnchors` for a private root) so trust is anchored, not borrowed from the resolver. For a negative answer that drives a fail-closed decision (an allowlist lookup, a revocation check), verify the NSEC / NSEC3 proof with `b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyDenial(...)` so a forged NXDOMAIN cannot suppress a record; keep the default Opt-Out refusal unless the zone's opt-out spans are acceptable for that decision. For DANE / TLSA, once the TLSA RRset is DNSSEC-verified, pin the peer certificate with `b.network.dns.dane.matchCertificate(...)` — a DANE-EE(3) match authenticates the key with no public CA, while PKIX usages are flagged as still needing PKIX
 - [ ] At boot in production: call `await b.security.assertProduction({ vault: "wrapped", dbAtRest: "encrypted", auditSigning: "wrapped", ntpStrict: true, requireEnv: ["BLAMEJS_VAULT_PASSPHRASE"], dataDir: "./data" })` to refuse to start on weak posture instead of warning
 - [ ] At boot: call `await b.configDrift.create({ dataDir, audit }).checkpoint({ allowedOrigins, csp, vaultMode, ... })` so the next boot detects + audits any silent runtime config change
 - [ ] At boot, before any listener opens: call `b.configDrift.verifyVendorIntegrity({ manifestPath: "./lib/vendor/MANIFEST.json", audit: b.audit })` so a tampered `lib/vendor/*.cjs` artifact aborts start instead of running with a swapped crypto bundle

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/api-snapshot.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "version": 1,
-  "frameworkVersion": "0.12.50",
-  "createdAt": "2026-05-25T13:31:06.521Z",
+  "frameworkVersion": "0.12.51",
+  "createdAt": "2026-05-25T14:53:56.538Z",
   "exports": {
     "a2a": {
       "type": "object",
@@ -41574,6 +41574,53 @@
               "type": "function",
               "arity": 0
             },
+            "dane": {
+              "type": "object",
+              "members": {
+                "DaneError": {
+                  "type": "function",
+                  "arity": 4
+                },
+                "SELECTORS": {
+                  "type": "object",
+                  "members": {
+                    "0": {
+                      "type": "primitive",
+                      "valueType": "string"
+                    },
+                    "1": {
+                      "type": "primitive",
+                      "valueType": "string"
+                    }
+                  }
+                },
+                "USAGES": {
+                  "type": "object",
+                  "members": {
+                    "0": {
+                      "type": "primitive",
+                      "valueType": "string"
+                    },
+                    "1": {
+                      "type": "primitive",
+                      "valueType": "string"
+                    },
+                    "2": {
+                      "type": "primitive",
+                      "valueType": "string"
+                    },
+                    "3": {
+                      "type": "primitive",
+                      "valueType": "string"
+                    }
+                  }
+                },
+                "matchCertificate": {
+                  "type": "function",
+                  "arity": 1
+                }
+              }
+            },
             "discoverEncrypted": {
               "type": "function",
               "arity": 1

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/network-dane.js

@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * @module b.network.dns.dane
+ * @nav    Network
+ * @title  DANE / TLSA
+ *
+ * @intro
+ *   DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (RFC 6698, updated by
+ *   RFC 7671) — match a server certificate against a TLSA record so the
+ *   DNS, not a public CA, vouches for which key a service uses. This is
+ *   the payoff of DNSSEC: verify the TLSA RRset with
+ *   <code>b.network.dns.dnssec</code> first, then
+ *   <code>matchCertificate</code> checks the certificate against it.
+ *
+ *   A TLSA record carries a certificate usage (PKIX-TA 0, PKIX-EE 1,
+ *   DANE-TA 2, DANE-EE 3 — RFC 7218 mnemonics), a selector (full
+ *   certificate 0, or subjectPublicKeyInfo 1), and a matching type
+ *   (exact 0, SHA-256 1, SHA-512 2). The selected certificate data is
+ *   hashed per the matching type and compared, in constant time, to the
+ *   record's association data. For DANE-EE(3) a match means the
+ *   certificate IS the pinned end-entity key — no public-CA path is
+ *   needed (the common SMTP-DANE case, RFC 7672). For the PKIX usages a
+ *   match is necessary but the caller still performs PKIX validation.
+ *
+ * @card
+ *   DANE / TLSA certificate matching (RFC 6698 / 7671). Pin a service's
+ *   key through DNSSEC instead of a public CA — verify the TLSA RRset,
+ *   then match the certificate (DANE-EE / DANE-TA / PKIX usages,
+ *   full-cert or SPKI selector, SHA-256 / SHA-512).
+ */
+
+var nodeCrypto = require("node:crypto");
+var bCrypto = require("./crypto");
+var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
+var { defineClass } = require("./framework-error");
+
+var DaneError = defineClass("DaneError", { alwaysPermanent: true });
+
+// RFC 6698 §2.1 + RFC 7218 mnemonics.
+var USAGES = { 0: "PKIX-TA", 1: "PKIX-EE", 2: "DANE-TA", 3: "DANE-EE" };
+var SELECTORS = { 0: "Cert", 1: "SPKI" };
+// Matching types: 0 = exact match on the selected data, 1 = SHA-256,
+// 2 = SHA-512. SHA-1 is not registered for TLSA, so anything else is
+// refused rather than guessed.
+var MATCHING = { 0: null, 1: "sha256", 2: "sha512" };
+
+function _bytes(x, what) {
+  if (Buffer.isBuffer(x)) return x;
+  if (x instanceof Uint8Array) return Buffer.from(x);
+  if (typeof x === "string") return Buffer.from(x, "hex");
+  throw new DaneError("dane/bad-bytes", "dane: " + what + " must be a Buffer / Uint8Array / hex string");
+}
+
+function _selectedData(x509, selector) {
+  if (selector === 0) return Buffer.from(x509.raw);                                   // full certificate DER
+  if (selector === 1) return x509.publicKey.export({ format: "der", type: "spki" });  // subjectPublicKeyInfo DER
+  throw new DaneError("dane/unsupported-selector", "dane: unsupported TLSA selector " + selector + " (0 = full cert, 1 = SPKI)");
+}
+
+function _associationOf(selected, matchingType) {
+  if (matchingType === 0) return selected;
+  var hashName = MATCHING[matchingType];
+  if (!hashName) throw new DaneError("dane/unsupported-matching", "dane: unsupported TLSA matching type " + matchingType + " (0 = exact, 1 = SHA-256, 2 = SHA-512)");
+  return nodeCrypto.createHash(hashName).update(selected).digest();
+}
+
+function _parseCert(der, what) {
+  try { return new nodeCrypto.X509Certificate(_bytes(der, what)); }
+  catch (e) { throw new DaneError("dane/bad-certificate", "dane: could not parse " + what + ": " + ((e && e.message) || e)); }
+}
+
+// Validate a TLSA enum field: it must be an actual integer that is an
+// OWN key of the lookup table. Rejecting non-numbers stops a string like
+// "1" (which coerces on key lookup but then fails the strict-=== usage
+// checks below), and the own-property test stops prototype keys such as
+// "__proto__" that `in` / `[x] !== undefined` would wrongly accept.
+function _enumField(v, table, code, label, i) {
+  if (typeof v !== "number" || !Number.isInteger(v) || !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(table, v)) {
+    throw new DaneError(code, "dane: tlsa[" + i + "] " + label + " must be a numeric " + Object.keys(table).join(" / ") + " (got " + JSON.stringify(v) + ")");
+  }
+}
+function _normaliseTlsa(rec, i) {
+  if (!rec || typeof rec !== "object") throw new DaneError("dane/bad-tlsa", "dane: tlsa[" + i + "] must be an object");
+  _enumField(rec.usage, USAGES, "dane/unsupported-usage", "certificate usage", i);
+  _enumField(rec.selector, SELECTORS, "dane/unsupported-selector", "selector", i);
+  _enumField(rec.matchingType, MATCHING, "dane/unsupported-matching", "matching type", i);
+  return { usage: rec.usage, selector: rec.selector, matchingType: rec.matchingType, data: _bytes(rec.data, "tlsa[" + i + "].data") };
+}
+
+/**
+ * @primitive b.network.dns.dane.matchCertificate
+ * @signature b.network.dns.dane.matchCertificate(opts)
+ * @since     0.12.51
+ * @status    stable
+ * @compliance soc2
+ * @related   b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyChain, b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyRrset
+ *
+ * Match a server certificate against a set of (DNSSEC-verified) TLSA
+ * records (RFC 6698 / 7671). For each record the selected data — the
+ * full certificate DER (selector 0) or its subjectPublicKeyInfo
+ * (selector 1) — is hashed per the matching type (exact / SHA-256 /
+ * SHA-512) and compared, constant-time, to the record's association
+ * data. End-entity usages (PKIX-EE 1, DANE-EE 3) are matched against the
+ * leaf certificate; trust-anchor usages (PKIX-TA 0, DANE-TA 2) are
+ * matched against the leaf and any supplied <code>chain</code>.
+ *
+ * Returns the matching record plus what the caller must still do: a
+ * DANE-EE match is self-sufficient (the TLSA pins the key); a DANE-TA
+ * match still needs chain-to-anchor verification; PKIX usages still need
+ * full PKIX validation. Throws <code>dane/no-match</code> if nothing
+ * matches. Verify the TLSA RRset with <code>b.network.dns.dnssec</code>
+ * before trusting the records — an unauthenticated TLSA proves nothing.
+ *
+ * @opts
+ *   {
+ *     tlsa: [ { usage, selector, matchingType, data: Buffer|hex } ],  // the TLSA RRset
+ *     certificate: Buffer,   // leaf certificate (DER)
+ *     chain?:      Buffer[],  // intermediate / CA certs (DER), for TA usages
+ *   }
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var r = b.network.dns.dane.matchCertificate({ tlsa: records, certificate: leafDer });
+ *   // → { ok: true, matched: { usage: 3, selector: 1, matchingType: 1 }, daneAuthenticated: true, pkixRequired: false }
+ */
+function matchCertificate(opts) {
+  validateOpts.requireObject(opts, "dane.matchCertificate", DaneError);
+  validateOpts(opts, ["tlsa", "certificate", "chain"], "dane.matchCertificate");
+  if (!Array.isArray(opts.tlsa) || opts.tlsa.length === 0) throw new DaneError("dane/bad-arg", "dane.matchCertificate: opts.tlsa must be a non-empty array");
+  var records = opts.tlsa.map(_normaliseTlsa);
+  var leaf = _parseCert(opts.certificate, "certificate");
+  var chain = Array.isArray(opts.chain) ? opts.chain.map(function (c, i) { return _parseCert(c, "chain[" + i + "]"); }) : [];
+
+  for (var i = 0; i < records.length; i++) {
+    var rec = records[i];
+    var eeUsage = rec.usage === 1 || rec.usage === 3;       // PKIX-EE / DANE-EE → leaf only
+    var certs = eeUsage ? [leaf] : [leaf].concat(chain);    // TA usages may match a chain cert
+    for (var c = 0; c < certs.length; c++) {
+      var assoc = _associationOf(_selectedData(certs[c], rec.selector), rec.matchingType);
+      if (bCrypto.timingSafeEqual(assoc, rec.data)) {
+        return {
+          ok: true,
+          matched: { usage: rec.usage, usageName: USAGES[rec.usage], selector: rec.selector, matchingType: rec.matchingType },
+          matchedCertIndex: c,                              // 0 = leaf, >0 = chain[c-1]
+          daneAuthenticated: rec.usage === 3,               // DANE-EE: TLSA pins the key, no CA path needed
+          trustAnchorMatch: rec.usage === 0 || rec.usage === 2,
+          pkixRequired: rec.usage === 0 || rec.usage === 1,
+        };
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  throw new DaneError("dane/no-match", "dane.matchCertificate: no TLSA record matched the certificate" + (chain.length ? " or chain" : ""));
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  matchCertificate: matchCertificate,
+  USAGES:           USAGES,
+  SELECTORS:        SELECTORS,
+  DaneError:        DaneError,
+};

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/network.js

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ var nts      = require("./network-nts");
 var networkDns = require("./network-dns");
 networkDns.resolver = require("./network-dns-resolver");
 networkDns.dnssec = require("./network-dnssec");
+networkDns.dane = require("./network-dane");
 var networkProxy = require("./network-proxy");
 var networkTls = require("./network-tls");
 var heartbeat = require("./network-heartbeat");

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/core",
-  "version": "0.12.50",
+  "version": "0.12.51",
   "description": "The Node framework that owns its stack.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/release-notes/v0.12.51.json

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "../scripts/release-notes-schema.json",
+  "version": "0.12.51",
+  "date": "2026-05-25",
+  "headline": "`b.network.dns.dane.matchCertificate` — DANE / TLSA certificate matching (RFC 6698 / 7671)",
+  "summary": "Pin a service's certificate through DNS instead of a public CA. matchCertificate checks a server certificate against a set of TLSA records: the selected data — the full certificate (selector 0) or its subjectPublicKeyInfo (selector 1) — is hashed per the matching type (exact / SHA-256 / SHA-512) and compared in constant time to the record's association data. For a DANE-EE (usage 3) record a match is self-authenticating — the TLSA pins the key, so no public-CA path is needed (the common SMTP-DANE case, RFC 7672); for the PKIX usages a match is reported as necessary-but-not-sufficient so the caller still runs PKIX. This is the payoff of the DNSSEC verifier: verify the TLSA RRset with b.network.dns.dnssec, then match the certificate. Verified against a live DNSSEC-signed TLSA record and the matching server certificate.",
+  "sections": [
+    {
+      "heading": "Added",
+      "items": [
+        {
+          "title": "`b.network.dns.dane.matchCertificate(opts)`",
+          "body": "Matches a leaf certificate (and optional `chain`) against a TLSA RRset (`{ usage, selector, matchingType, data }`). Selector 0 hashes the full certificate DER, selector 1 the subjectPublicKeyInfo; matching type 0 is an exact comparison, 1 SHA-256, 2 SHA-512 (SHA-1 and any other type are refused, not guessed). End-entity usages (PKIX-EE 1, DANE-EE 3) match the leaf; trust-anchor usages (PKIX-TA 0, DANE-TA 2) match the leaf or any supplied chain certificate. Returns `{ ok, matched, daneAuthenticated, trustAnchorMatch, pkixRequired, matchedCertIndex }` — `daneAuthenticated` is true only for a DANE-EE match (the key is pinned, no CA needed); `pkixRequired` flags the PKIX usages. Throws `dane/no-match` when nothing matches, and refuses unknown usage / selector / matching values and unparseable certificates. Verify the TLSA RRset with `b.network.dns.dnssec` first — an unauthenticated TLSA record proves nothing."
+        }
+      ]
+    }
+  ]
+}

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/layer-0-primitives/codebase-patterns.test.js

@@ -2267,10 +2267,13 @@ async function testNoDuplicateCodeBlocks() {
       mode:  "family-subset",
       files: [
         "lib/cose.js:_coseKeyBytes",
+        "lib/cose.js:_bstr",
         "lib/mdoc.js:_bytes",
         "lib/network-dnssec.js:_bytes",
+        "lib/network-dane.js:_bytes",
+        "lib/tsa.js:_bytes",
       ],
-      reason: "v0.12.48 — Buffer-coercion guard (`if (Buffer.isBuffer(x)) return x; if (x instanceof Uint8Array) return Buffer.from(x); throw <Error>`) repeats across three byte-string-consuming primitives. Each throws a MODULE-LOCAL typed error code (cose/bad-cose-key, mdoc/bad-input, dnssec/bad-bytes) naming the local argument; the duplicated three-line shape is the symptom, the cause is that JS can't throw a caller-namespaced ErrorClass without the local closure. Same documented exception as the v0.12.7 require-non-empty-string cluster — the typed-error CODE is the divergence the dup detector can't see.",
+      reason: "v0.12.48 / v0.12.51 — Buffer-coercion guard (`if (Buffer.isBuffer(x)) return x; if (x instanceof Uint8Array) return Buffer.from(x); throw <Error>`) repeats across byte-string-consuming primitives. Each throws a MODULE-LOCAL typed error code (cose/bad-cose-key, mdoc/bad-input, dnssec/bad-bytes, dane/bad-bytes, tsa/bad-input) naming the local argument; network-dane additionally coerces a hex string. The duplicated three-line shape is the symptom, the cause is that JS can't throw a caller-namespaced ErrorClass without the local closure. Same documented exception as the v0.12.7 require-non-empty-string cluster — the typed-error CODE is the divergence the dup detector can't see.",
     },
     {
       mode:  "family-subset",
@@ -6290,6 +6293,20 @@ var KNOWN_ANTIPATTERNS = [
     allowlist: [],
     reason: "DNSSEC key-tag collision false-negative — a 16-bit DNSKEY tag is not unique within an RRset (RFC 4034 Appendix B explicitly permits collisions). Picking the first key with a matching tag and verifying only against it rejects an otherwise-valid chain when a colliding non-signing key sorts earlier. RFC 4035 §5.3.1 requires trying every key whose tag and algorithm match until one validates; the framework does this via `_keysByTag` + `_verifyRrsetWithAnyKey`. The single-result `_findKeyByTag` helper must not be (re)introduced for signature key selection.",
   },
+  {
+    // Wire-enum validation against a lookup table must use an integer +
+    // own-property check, never `key in TABLE` or `TABLE[key] !==
+    // undefined`: `in` / member access walk the prototype chain, so an
+    // attacker-supplied `"__proto__"` (or a string `"1"` that coerces on
+    // lookup but then fails strict-=== comparisons) slips past. The
+    // dane TLSA usage / selector / matching-type enums are validated via
+    // `_enumField` (typeof number + Number.isInteger + hasOwnProperty).
+    id: "dane-enum-unsafe-membership",
+    primitive: "_enumField(v, TABLE, ...) — integer + Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty, never `v in TABLE` / `TABLE[v] === undefined`",
+    regex: /\b(?:in\s+(?:USAGES|SELECTORS|MATCHING)\b|(?:USAGES|SELECTORS|MATCHING)\s*\[[^\]]+\]\s*===?\s*undefined)/,
+    allowlist: [],
+    reason: "Prototype-key / string-coercion bypass — validating an untrusted wire enum with `key in TABLE` or `TABLE[key] !== undefined` accepts inherited keys such as `__proto__` (and string keys like `\"1\"` that coerce on lookup but break later strict-=== branches). The DANE TLSA enums (certificate usage / selector / matching type) must be validated with a numeric + integer + own-property test (`_enumField`). The unsafe membership forms must not appear for these tables.",
+  },
   {
     // CVE-2026-23552 — cross-realm JWT acceptance via non-CT iss
     // compare. `payload.iss !== expectedIssuer` (or claims.iss / token.iss)

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/layer-0-primitives/dane.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * Layer 0 — b.network.dns.dane (DANE / TLSA certificate matching).
+ * The oracle is a REAL DNSSEC-signed TLSA record for dane.sys4.de plus
+ * that server's actual leaf certificate (captured via `openssl s_client
+ * -connect dane.sys4.de:443`): the SHA-256 of the certificate's
+ * subjectPublicKeyInfo equals the record's association data, so a wrong
+ * SPKI extraction or hash would fail this match.
+ */
+
+var b = require("../../index");
+var helpers = require("../helpers");
+var check = helpers.check;
+
+// Real `_443._tcp.dane.sys4.de` TLSA: usage 3 (DANE-EE), selector 1
+// (SPKI), matching 1 (SHA-256).
+var TLSA_DANE_EE = { usage: 3, selector: 1, matchingType: 1, data: "eb74fe41c51d2876a50f0fe95ba6441119a38597a177e1ba54d68acb9a91efa3" };
+// dane.sys4.de's real leaf certificate (DER).
+var CERT_HEX = "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";
+
+function cert() { return Buffer.from(CERT_HEX, "hex"); }
+function code(fn) { try { fn(); return "NO-THROW"; } catch (e) { return e.code; } }
+
+function testSurface() {
+  check("b.network.dns.dane.matchCertificate is a function", typeof b.network.dns.dane.matchCertificate === "function");
+  check("b.network.dns.dane.USAGES maps 3 to DANE-EE", b.network.dns.dane.USAGES[3] === "DANE-EE");
+}
+
+function testRealVector() {
+  var out = b.network.dns.dane.matchCertificate({ tlsa: [TLSA_DANE_EE], certificate: cert() });
+  check("matchCertificate: real dane.sys4.de DANE-EE TLSA matches the real cert (SPKI/SHA-256)", out.ok && out.matched.usage === 3);
+  check("matchCertificate: DANE-EE is self-authenticating (no PKIX required)", out.daneAuthenticated === true && out.pkixRequired === false);
+
+  // The same cert matched by a full-cert (selector 0) exact (matching 0)
+  // record — derive the association from the cert DER itself.
+  var full = { usage: 3, selector: 0, matchingType: 0, data: cert() };
+  var out2 = b.network.dns.dane.matchCertificate({ tlsa: [full], certificate: cert() });
+  check("matchCertificate: full-cert exact selector matches", out2.ok && out2.matched.selector === 0 && out2.matched.matchingType === 0);
+}
+
+function testRefusals() {
+  // A flipped association byte no longer matches.
+  var bad = { usage: 3, selector: 1, matchingType: 1, data: TLSA_DANE_EE.data.replace(/^eb/, "ec") };
+  check("matchCertificate: wrong association refused", code(function () { b.network.dns.dane.matchCertificate({ tlsa: [bad], certificate: cert() }); }) === "dane/no-match");
+  // Unknown usage / selector / matching are refused, not guessed.
+  check("matchCertificate: unsupported usage refused", code(function () { b.network.dns.dane.matchCertificate({ tlsa: [{ usage: 9, selector: 1, matchingType: 1, data: TLSA_DANE_EE.data }], certificate: cert() }); }) === "dane/unsupported-usage");
+  check("matchCertificate: unsupported selector refused", code(function () { b.network.dns.dane.matchCertificate({ tlsa: [{ usage: 3, selector: 9, matchingType: 1, data: TLSA_DANE_EE.data }], certificate: cert() }); }) === "dane/unsupported-selector");
+  check("matchCertificate: unsupported matching type (e.g. SHA-1) refused", code(function () { b.network.dns.dane.matchCertificate({ tlsa: [{ usage: 3, selector: 1, matchingType: 3, data: TLSA_DANE_EE.data }], certificate: cert() }); }) === "dane/unsupported-matching");
+  // Garbage certificate refused.
+  check("matchCertificate: bad certificate refused", code(function () { b.network.dns.dane.matchCertificate({ tlsa: [TLSA_DANE_EE], certificate: Buffer.from("not a cert") }); }) === "dane/bad-certificate");
+  // Empty TLSA set refused.
+  check("matchCertificate: empty TLSA set refused", code(function () { b.network.dns.dane.matchCertificate({ tlsa: [], certificate: cert() }); }) === "dane/bad-arg");
+  // String enum values are refused (they coerce on key lookup but break
+  // the strict-=== usage logic), not silently accepted.
+  check("matchCertificate: string usage refused", code(function () { b.network.dns.dane.matchCertificate({ tlsa: [{ usage: "3", selector: 1, matchingType: 1, data: TLSA_DANE_EE.data }], certificate: cert() }); }) === "dane/unsupported-usage");
+  // Prototype-chain keys must not slip past the enum check.
+  check("matchCertificate: __proto__ matchingType refused", code(function () { b.network.dns.dane.matchCertificate({ tlsa: [{ usage: 3, selector: 1, matchingType: "__proto__", data: TLSA_DANE_EE.data }], certificate: cert() }); }) === "dane/unsupported-matching");
+  check("matchCertificate: __proto__ selector refused", code(function () { b.network.dns.dane.matchCertificate({ tlsa: [{ usage: 3, selector: "__proto__", matchingType: 1, data: TLSA_DANE_EE.data }], certificate: cert() }); }) === "dane/unsupported-selector");
+}
+
+function testPkixUsage() {
+  // A PKIX-EE(1) match flags that PKIX validation is still required.
+  var pkixEe = { usage: 1, selector: 1, matchingType: 1, data: TLSA_DANE_EE.data };
+  var out = b.network.dns.dane.matchCertificate({ tlsa: [pkixEe], certificate: cert() });
+  check("matchCertificate: PKIX-EE match flags pkixRequired", out.ok && out.matched.usage === 1 && out.pkixRequired === true && out.daneAuthenticated === false);
+}
+
+async function run() {
+  testSurface();
+  testRealVector();
+  testRefusals();
+  testPkixUsage();
+}
+
+module.exports = { run: run };
+
+if (require.main === module) {
+  run().then(
+    function () { console.log("[dane] OK — " + helpers.getChecks() + " checks passed"); },
+    function (e) { console.error("FAIL:", e && e.stack || e); process.exit(1); }
+  );
+}

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/blamejs-shop",
-  "version": "0.1.8",
+  "version": "0.1.10",
   "description": "Open-source framework built on blamejs. Vendored stack, zero npm runtime deps, PQC-first crypto, security-on by default.",
   "main": "lib/index.js",
   "scripts": {