@blamejs/blamejs-shop 0.1.6 → 0.1.8

package/lib/order.js

@@ -45,6 +45,23 @@ function _b() {
 // ---- FSM definition -----------------------------------------------------
 
 var _orderFsm = null;
+// The order lifecycle, as edges of the FSM. Single source of truth: the
+// FSM definition below is built from it, and the operator console derives
+// the available actions for an order from it (so a new edge here lights up
+// a button in /admin/orders with no separate map to keep in sync).
+var ORDER_TRANSITIONS = Object.freeze([
+  { from: "pending",    to: "paid",       on: "mark_paid",         label: "Mark paid" },
+  { from: "paid",       to: "fulfilling", on: "start_fulfillment", label: "Start fulfilment" },
+  { from: "fulfilling", to: "shipped",    on: "mark_shipped",      label: "Mark shipped" },
+  { from: "shipped",    to: "delivered",  on: "mark_delivered",    label: "Mark delivered" },
+  { from: "pending",    to: "cancelled",  on: "cancel",            label: "Cancel" },
+  { from: "paid",       to: "cancelled",  on: "cancel",            label: "Cancel" },
+  { from: "paid",       to: "refunded",   on: "refund",            label: "Refund" },
+  { from: "fulfilling", to: "refunded",   on: "refund",            label: "Refund" },
+  { from: "shipped",    to: "refunded",   on: "refund",            label: "Refund" },
+  { from: "delivered",  to: "refunded",   on: "refund",            label: "Refund" },
+]);
+
 function _getOrderFsm() {
   if (_orderFsm) return _orderFsm;
   // b.fsm emits audit events under the 'fsm' namespace —
@@ -63,24 +80,21 @@ function _getOrderFsm() {
       refunded:   {},
       cancelled:  {},
     },
-    transitions: [
-      { from: "pending",    to: "paid",       on: "mark_paid" },
-      { from: "paid",       to: "fulfilling", on: "start_fulfillment" },
-      { from: "fulfilling", to: "shipped",    on: "mark_shipped" },
-      { from: "shipped",    to: "delivered",  on: "mark_delivered" },
-      { from: "pending",    to: "cancelled",  on: "cancel" },
-      { from: "paid",       to: "cancelled",  on: "cancel" },
-      { from: "paid",       to: "refunded",   on: "refund" },
-      { from: "fulfilling", to: "refunded",   on: "refund" },
-      { from: "shipped",    to: "refunded",   on: "refund" },
-      { from: "delivered",  to: "refunded",   on: "refund" },
-    ],
+    transitions: ORDER_TRANSITIONS.map(function (t) {
+      return { from: t.from, to: t.to, on: t.on };
+    }),
   });
   return _orderFsm;
 }
 
 var TERMINAL_STATES = Object.freeze(["refunded", "cancelled", "delivered"]);
 
+// Every state the order FSM can occupy — the allowed values for the
+// `status` filter on the operator-facing recent-orders list.
+var ORDER_STATES = Object.freeze([
+  "pending", "paid", "fulfilling", "shipped", "delivered", "refunded", "cancelled",
+]);
+
 // Cursor key for listForCustomer — paginates by (updated_at DESC, id
 // DESC) so a newly transitioned order surfaces at the top of the
 // customer's order history without a stable-id tie-break flake.
@@ -356,6 +370,50 @@ function create(opts) {
       return { rows: rows, next_cursor: next };
     },
 
+    // Operator-facing recent-orders list across ALL customers (guest
+    // orders included), newest first. Unlike listForCustomer this is an
+    // admin view, so it's capped + uncursored: the console shows the most
+    // recent N, optionally filtered to one status. ship_to + lines are
+    // hydrated so the table renders without a trip per row.
+    listRecent: async function (listOpts) {
+      listOpts = listOpts || {};
+      var limit = listOpts.limit == null ? 50 : listOpts.limit;
+      if (!Number.isInteger(limit) || limit <= 0 || limit > MAX_LIST_LIMIT) {
+        throw new TypeError("order.listRecent: limit must be 1..." + MAX_LIST_LIMIT);
+      }
+      var status = listOpts.status == null ? null : listOpts.status;
+      if (status !== null) {
+        if (typeof status !== "string" || ORDER_STATES.indexOf(status) === -1) {
+          throw new TypeError("order.listRecent: status must be one of " + ORDER_STATES.join(", "));
+        }
+      }
+      var sql, params;
+      if (status) {
+        sql = "SELECT * FROM orders WHERE status = ?1 ORDER BY created_at DESC, id DESC LIMIT ?2";
+        params = [status, limit];
+      } else {
+        sql = "SELECT * FROM orders ORDER BY created_at DESC, id DESC LIMIT ?1";
+        params = [limit];
+      }
+      var rows = (await query(sql, params)).rows;
+      for (var i = 0; i < rows.length; i += 1) {
+        rows[i].ship_to = JSON.parse(rows[i].ship_to_json);
+        rows[i].lines   = (await query(
+          "SELECT * FROM order_lines WHERE order_id = ?1 ORDER BY id ASC",
+          [rows[i].id],
+        )).rows;
+      }
+      return { rows: rows };
+    },
+
+    // The actions available from a given status, as {on, to, label} —
+    // drives the transition buttons on the operator order-detail page.
+    // A terminal status returns []. Synchronous (pure lookup).
+    transitionsFrom: function (status) {
+      return ORDER_TRANSITIONS.filter(function (t) { return t.from === status; })
+        .map(function (t) { return { on: t.on, to: t.to, label: t.label }; });
+    },
+
     setPaymentIntent: async function (orderId, paymentIntentId) {
       _uuid(orderId, "order id");
       if (typeof paymentIntentId !== "string" || !paymentIntentId.length) {

package/lib/vendor/MANIFEST.json

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
   "_about": "blamejs.shop vendors a single framework — blamejs — which itself bundles every server-side crypto/identity dependency. The transitive packages blamejs ships are surfaced in its own MANIFEST.json at lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/vendor/MANIFEST.json — Trivy / Grype rely on that nested data for CVE attribution.",
   "packages": {
     "blamejs": {
-      "version": "0.12.49",
-      "tag": "v0.12.49",
+      "version": "0.12.50",
+      "tag": "v0.12.50",
       "license": "Apache-2.0",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "source": "https://github.com/blamejs/blamejs",

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ upgrading across more than a few patches at a time.
 
 ## v0.12.x
 
+- v0.12.50 (2026-05-25) — **`b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyChain` — validate a DNSSEC delegation chain to a pinned root anchor.** Completes local DNSSEC verification: validate a full delegation chain from the root down to a zone against a pinned trust anchor (RFC 4035 §5), instead of trusting any single resolver. For each link, the zone's DNSKEY RRset must be self-signed by one of its keys, and that key must be vouched for either by a pinned anchor (at the root) or by a DS record served + signed by the already-trusted parent — so trust flows root → TLD → zone with no gap. The IANA root KSKs (KSK-2017 tag 20326, KSK-2024 tag 38696) ship as the default anchors; override with opts.trustAnchors for a private root. verifyChain returns the leaf zone's trusted DNSKEY set, which you then hand to verifyRrset / verifyDenial for the actual answer. Composes verifyRrset + verifyDs + the key tag; verified end-to-end against a live root→org chain. **Added:** *`b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyChain(opts)`* — Walks an ordered, root-first list of `links` ({ zone, dnskeys, dnskeyRrsig, dsRdatas?, dsRrsig? }). At each link it verifies the DNSKEY RRset's self-signature (composing `verifyRrset`), then establishes trust in the signing key: at the root by matching a pinned anchor's DS digest (`verifyDs`), at every delegation by verifying the parent-served DS RRset's signature with the already-trusted parent key and confirming the signing KSK matches one of those DS records. Returns `{ ok, zone, keys, path }` with the leaf zone's trusted DNSKEY set. Refuses a root key that matches no anchor (`dnssec/chain-anchor-mismatch`), a KSK that matches no parent DS (`dnssec/chain-ds-mismatch`), and a missing parent key (`dnssec/chain-no-parent-key`). The default `DEFAULT_ROOT_ANCHORS` are the published IANA root KSK DS records; `opts.trustAnchors` overrides them for a private or test root.
+
 - v0.12.49 (2026-05-25) — **`b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyDenial` — NSEC / NSEC3 denial-of-existence.** Prove a DNS name does not exist, or has no records of a given type, from the signed NSEC (RFC 4034 §4) or NSEC3 (RFC 5155) records a server returns. This is the other half of local DNSSEC verification: verifyRrset proves a positive answer, verifyDenial proves a negative — so a resolver client can confirm an NXDOMAIN / NODATA itself instead of trusting the upstream resolver. NSEC3 proofs run the closest-encloser / next-closer / covering-range logic over iterated-SHA-1 hashes, with the iteration count capped (default 500) to bound the work an attacker can force, and an Opt-Out NXDOMAIN refused unless explicitly accepted (opt-out only proves 'no signed records', not non-existence). The companion b.network.dns.dnssec.nsec3Hash computes the RFC 5155 §5 hash directly. NSEC verifyRrset support is also enabled: per RFC 6840 §5.1 the NSEC Next Domain Name is not downcased, so its RDATA is verbatim-canonical. **Added:** *`b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyDenial(opts)`* — Proves NXDOMAIN or NODATA from already-verified NSEC / NSEC3 records (supply one of `opts.nsec3` or `opts.nsec`). Like `verifyDs`, it checks the denial RELATION — closest-encloser matching, covering ranges, and type-bitmap absence — not the record signatures, which the caller verifies with `verifyRrset` first. NSEC3 supports name-error proofs (matching closest encloser + covered next-closer + covered wildcard), NODATA (matching record with the type and CNAME absent from the bitmap), Opt-Out DS NODATA, and wildcard NODATA. The iterated-SHA-1 count is capped by `opts.maxIterations` (default 500); an NXDOMAIN proof that depends on an Opt-Out NSEC3 is refused unless `opts.allowOptOut` is set. NSEC supports covering-name NXDOMAIN (with the source-of-synthesis wildcard) and matching-name NODATA. Verified end-to-end against a live iana.org NXDOMAIN proof. · *`b.network.dns.dnssec.nsec3Hash(name, opts)`* — Computes the RFC 5155 §5 NSEC3 hash of a name — iterated SHA-1 over the canonical (lowercased, root-terminated) wire form with the zone salt. The base32hex encoding of the result is the NSEC3 owner label. SHA-1 is the only hash IANA registers for NSEC3, so this is a wire-protocol constant rather than a cryptographic default. Useful for checking an owner label or analyzing a zone's hashing parameters. **Changed:** *`verifyRrset` now accepts NSEC and NSEC3 RRsets* — NSEC (type 47) and NSEC3 (type 50) are no longer refused as uncanonicalizable: NSEC3's next-owner is a hash, and per RFC 6840 §5.1 the NSEC Next Domain Name field is not downcased for DNSSEC canonical form, so both RDATAs are verbatim-canonical. This lets a caller verify the signatures on the records that `verifyDenial` then reasons over.
 
 - v0.12.48 (2026-05-25) — **`b.network.dns.dnssec` — local DNSSEC signature verification (RFC 4035).** Verify a DNS answer's RRSIG signature yourself instead of trusting the upstream resolver's AD bit. b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyRrset reconstructs the RFC 4034 §3.1.8.1 signed data — the RRSIG RDATA without the signature, followed by the RRset in canonical form (owner names lowercased, RRs ordered by canonical RDATA, the RRSIG's Original TTL) — and checks the signature against the DNSKEY, enforcing the inception / expiration window. Supports RSA/SHA-256 (alg 8), ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 (13), ECDSA P-384/SHA-384 (14), and Ed25519 (15) — the modern deployed set. verifyDs checks a delegation-signer digest against a DNSKEY (SHA-256 / SHA-384) and keyTag computes the RFC 4034 Appendix B key tag. The verification core is what a chain-walker composes; it defends against a compromised or on-path resolver that lies about authentication. **Added:** *`b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyRrset(opts)`* — Verifies an RRSIG over a canonicalised RRset against a DNSKEY. `opts` carries the owner `name`, the RR `type`, the wire-format `rdatas`, the parsed `rrsig` (algorithm / labels / originalTtl / inception / expiration / keyTag / signerName / signature), and the `dnskey` (algorithm + raw public key). The signed data is rebuilt per RFC 4034 §3.1.8.1: the RRSIG prefix (type covered | algorithm | labels | original TTL | expiration | inception | key tag | canonical signer name) followed by each RR in canonical form (lowercased owner | type | class | original TTL | rdlen | rdata), sorted by `Buffer.compare` on the RDATA. The validity window is enforced against `opts.at` (defaults to now; an invalid Date is refused, not treated as now). An RRSIG whose algorithm disagrees with the DNSKEY is refused before any key is built. RR types that embed domain names in their RDATA (NS, CNAME, SOA, MX, SRV, …) need RDATA-internal name-lowercasing this version does not perform, so they are refused with `dnssec/uncanonicalizable-type` rather than mis-validated; the security-critical DNSKEY / DS and the name-free address / text types (A, AAAA, TXT, CAA, TLSA, …) are fully supported. · *`b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyDs(opts)` / `b.network.dns.dnssec.keyTag(dnskeyRdata)`* — `verifyDs` confirms a delegation-signer record matches a DNSKEY: it checks the key tag, then compares the DS digest (SHA-256 type 2 / SHA-384 type 4) against the digest computed over the canonical owner name and the DNSKEY RDATA, constant-time. `keyTag` computes the RFC 4034 Appendix B 16-bit key tag from a DNSKEY's full RDATA — the identifier an RRSIG or DS uses to select the signing key. Together with `verifyRrset` these are the per-RRset building blocks a recursive chain-walk (root → TLD → zone) composes; the chain-walk itself, NSEC / NSEC3 denial-of-existence, and the bundled IANA root trust anchor are not part of this core.

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/README.md

@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ The framework bundles the surface a typical Node app reaches for. Every primitiv
   - In-process CIDR fence (`b.middleware.networkAllowlist`)
   - `Cache-Control: no-store` on every 401 from `requireAuth` / `requireAal` / `requireStepUp` per RFC 9111 §5.2.2.5
 - **Outbound HTTP client** — HTTP/1.1 + HTTP/2 with SSRF gate (cloud-metadata IPs hard-denied; private / loopback / link-local overridable per call); scheme + userinfo + per-host destination allowlist; redirects, multipart, interceptors, progress, encrypted cookie jar (`b.httpClient`, `b.ssrfGuard`, `b.safeUrl`)
-- **Network configurability (`b.network`)** — env-driven NTP / NTS (RFC 8915), IPv4/IPv6 NTP, DNS with IPv6 / DoH / DoT (private-CA pinning) / cache / lookup timeout; local DNSSEC signature verification (RFC 4035 — `b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyRrset` over a canonicalised RRset against RSA / ECDSA P-256·P-384 / Ed25519 DNSKEYs, plus DS-digest + key-tag, plus `verifyDenial` for NSEC / NSEC3 (RFC 5155) NXDOMAIN / NODATA proofs with iteration caps + Opt-Out handling) so a resolver client can verify both positive and negative answers instead of trusting the upstream AD bit; outbound HTTP proxy (`HTTP_PROXY` / `HTTPS_PROXY` / `NO_PROXY`); runtime DPI trust-store CA additions; application-level heartbeats; TCP socket defaults
+- **Network configurability (`b.network`)** — env-driven NTP / NTS (RFC 8915), IPv4/IPv6 NTP, DNS with IPv6 / DoH / DoT (private-CA pinning) / cache / lookup timeout; local DNSSEC signature verification (RFC 4035 — `b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyRrset` over a canonicalised RRset against RSA / ECDSA P-256·P-384 / Ed25519 DNSKEYs, plus DS-digest + key-tag, plus `verifyDenial` for NSEC / NSEC3 (RFC 5155) NXDOMAIN / NODATA proofs with iteration caps + Opt-Out handling, plus `verifyChain` to validate a full root→TLD→zone delegation chain against the pinned IANA root anchors) so a resolver client can verify both positive and negative answers instead of trusting the upstream AD bit; outbound HTTP proxy (`HTTP_PROXY` / `HTTPS_PROXY` / `NO_PROXY`); runtime DPI trust-store CA additions; application-level heartbeats; TCP socket defaults
 - **Error pages** — operator-rendered, no app-frame leakage (`b.errorPage`)
 ### Defensive parsers
 

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/SECURITY.md

@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ This is the minimum-viable security posture for a production deployment. The fra
 - [ ] At boot, before any outbound socket opens: call `b.network.bootFromEnv({ env: process.env, audit: b.audit })` so operator-supplied NTP / DNS / proxy / DPI-trust / TCP socket settings (`BLAMEJS_NTP_*`, `BLAMEJS_DNS_*`, `HTTP_PROXY` / `HTTPS_PROXY` / `NO_PROXY`, `BLAMEJS_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`, `BLAMEJS_SOCKET_*`) apply uniformly
 - [ ] If the deployment sits behind a deep-packet-inspection proxy with its own re-signing CA: install the CA via `b.network.tls.addCa("/path/to/corp-ca.pem", { label: "corp-mitm" })` and pass `allowDpiTrust: true` to `b.security.assertProduction` — every CA addition audits with subject + fingerprint so a forensic review can reconstruct the trust path
 - [ ] For authenticated time (HIPAA / PCI / FIPS shops): use `b.network.ntp.nts.query({ host: ntsKeServer })` (RFC 8915) instead of plain SNTP; set `BLAMEJS_NTS_REQUIRE=1` to fail closed on negotiation failure
-- [ ] When a DNS answer drives a trust decision (DANE / TLSA pinning, SSHFP, CAA enforcement, OPENPGPKEY lookup) and the upstream resolver isn't itself trusted: verify the answer's DNSSEC signature with `b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyRrset(...)` rather than trusting the resolver's AD bit — an on-path or compromised resolver can set AD on a forged answer, but cannot forge the RRSIG. Validate the DNSKEY against the parent's DS with `b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyDs(...)` up the chain to a trust anchor you pin. For a negative answer that drives a fail-closed decision (an allowlist lookup, a revocation check), verify the NSEC / NSEC3 proof with `b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyDenial(...)` so a forged NXDOMAIN cannot suppress a record; keep the default Opt-Out refusal unless the zone's opt-out spans are acceptable for that decision
+- [ ] When a DNS answer drives a trust decision (DANE / TLSA pinning, SSHFP, CAA enforcement, OPENPGPKEY lookup) and the upstream resolver isn't itself trusted: verify the answer's DNSSEC signature with `b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyRrset(...)` rather than trusting the resolver's AD bit — an on-path or compromised resolver can set AD on a forged answer, but cannot forge the RRSIG. Validate the whole delegation chain root→TLD→zone with `b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyChain(...)` (default-pinned to the IANA root KSKs, or `trustAnchors` for a private root) so trust is anchored, not borrowed from the resolver. For a negative answer that drives a fail-closed decision (an allowlist lookup, a revocation check), verify the NSEC / NSEC3 proof with `b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyDenial(...)` so a forged NXDOMAIN cannot suppress a record; keep the default Opt-Out refusal unless the zone's opt-out spans are acceptable for that decision
 - [ ] At boot in production: call `await b.security.assertProduction({ vault: "wrapped", dbAtRest: "encrypted", auditSigning: "wrapped", ntpStrict: true, requireEnv: ["BLAMEJS_VAULT_PASSPHRASE"], dataDir: "./data" })` to refuse to start on weak posture instead of warning
 - [ ] At boot: call `await b.configDrift.create({ dataDir, audit }).checkpoint({ allowedOrigins, csp, vaultMode, ... })` so the next boot detects + audits any silent runtime config change
 - [ ] At boot, before any listener opens: call `b.configDrift.verifyVendorIntegrity({ manifestPath: "./lib/vendor/MANIFEST.json", audit: b.audit })` so a tampered `lib/vendor/*.cjs` artifact aborts start instead of running with a swapped crypto bundle

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/api-snapshot.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "version": 1,
-  "frameworkVersion": "0.12.49",
-  "createdAt": "2026-05-25T12:28:18.912Z",
+  "frameworkVersion": "0.12.50",
+  "createdAt": "2026-05-25T13:31:06.521Z",
   "exports": {
     "a2a": {
       "type": "object",
@@ -41674,6 +41674,10 @@
                     }
                   }
                 },
+                "DEFAULT_ROOT_ANCHORS": {
+                  "type": "instance",
+                  "ctorName": "Array"
+                },
                 "DnssecError": {
                   "type": "function",
                   "arity": 4
@@ -41686,6 +41690,10 @@
                   "type": "function",
                   "arity": 2
                 },
+                "verifyChain": {
+                  "type": "function",
+                  "arity": 1
+                },
                 "verifyDenial": {
                   "type": "function",
                   "arity": 1

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/network-dnssec.js

@@ -721,12 +721,163 @@ function _commonSuffixLen(a, b) {
   return n;
 }
 
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Chain validation (RFC 4035 §5) — walk a delegation chain root → … → zone,
+// anchoring at a pinned trust anchor.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// IANA root zone trust anchors (DS / SHA-256). KSK-2017 (tag 20326) and
+// KSK-2024 (tag 38696), published at data.iana.org/root-anchors. An
+// operator pins their own via opts.trustAnchors.
+var DEFAULT_ROOT_ANCHORS = [
+  { keyTag: 20326, algorithm: 8, digestType: 2, digest: Buffer.from("E06D44B80B8F1D39A95C0B0D7C65D08458E880409BBC683457104237C7F8EC8D", "hex") },   // allow:raw-byte-literal — IANA root KSK-2017 DS
+  { keyTag: 38696, algorithm: 8, digestType: 2, digest: Buffer.from("683D2D0ACB8C9B712A1948B27F741219298D0A450D612C483AF444A4C0FB2B16", "hex") },   // allow:raw-byte-literal — IANA root KSK-2024 DS
+];
+
+function _dnskeyParts(rdata, what) {
+  var rd = _bytes(rdata, what || "dnskey rdata");
+  if (rd.length < 4) throw new DnssecError("dnssec/bad-key", "dnssec: DNSKEY RDATA too short");   // allow:raw-byte-literal — DNSKEY fixed header octets
+  return { flags: rd.readUInt16BE(0), algorithm: rd[3], publicKey: rd.slice(4) };
+}
+function _parseDsRdata(rd) {
+  if (rd.length < 5) throw new DnssecError("dnssec/bad-ds", "dnssec: DS RDATA too short");   // allow:raw-byte-literal — DS fixed header octets
+  return { keyTag: rd.readUInt16BE(0), algorithm: rd[2], digestType: rd[3], digest: rd.slice(4) };
+}
+// ALL DNSKEYs whose key tag matches — 16-bit key tags collide (RFC 4034
+// App B), so a verifier must try every candidate, not just the first.
+function _keysByTag(dnskeys, tag) {
+  var out = [];
+  for (var i = 0; i < dnskeys.length; i++) if (keyTag(dnskeys[i]) === tag) out.push(dnskeys[i]);
+  return out;
+}
+
+// Verify an RRset against EVERY DNSKEY whose tag matches the RRSIG,
+// returning the key that validated. A wrong colliding key yields
+// `dnssec/bad-signature` — that is not terminal, the next candidate is
+// tried; any other error (expired, alg) is terminal. RFC 4035 §5.3.1.
+function _verifyRrsetWithAnyKey(rrsetBase, rrsig, candidates, noKeyCode, noKeyMsg) {
+  if (candidates.length === 0) throw new DnssecError(noKeyCode, noKeyMsg);
+  var lastErr = null;
+  for (var i = 0; i < candidates.length; i++) {
+    var kp = _dnskeyParts(candidates[i]);
+    if (kp.algorithm !== rrsig.algorithm) { lastErr = new DnssecError("dnssec/alg-mismatch", "dnssec.verifyChain: candidate key algorithm does not match the RRSIG"); continue; }
+    try {
+      verifyRrset(Object.assign({}, rrsetBase, { rrsig: rrsig, dnskey: { algorithm: kp.algorithm, publicKey: kp.publicKey } }));
+      return candidates[i];
+    } catch (e) {
+      if (e && e.code === "dnssec/bad-signature") { lastErr = e; continue; }   // colliding non-signing key — try the next
+      throw e;
+    }
+  }
+  throw lastErr;
+}
+
+/**
+ * @primitive b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyChain
+ * @signature b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyChain(opts)
+ * @since     0.12.50
+ * @status    stable
+ * @compliance soc2
+ * @related   b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyRrset, b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyDs
+ *
+ * Validate a DNSSEC delegation chain from the root down to a zone, against
+ * a pinned trust anchor (RFC 4035 §5). For each link, the zone's DNSKEY
+ * RRset must be self-signed by one of its keys; that signing key must be
+ * vouched for either by a pinned anchor (root) or by a DS record served by
+ * the already-trusted parent. The DS RRset itself is verified against the
+ * parent's keys, so trust flows root → TLD → zone with no gap. The default
+ * anchors are the IANA root KSKs; override with <code>opts.trustAnchors</code>.
+ *
+ * This composes <code>verifyRrset</code> + <code>verifyDs</code> + the key
+ * tag; it returns the leaf zone's trusted DNSKEY set, which the caller then
+ * passes to <code>verifyRrset</code> / <code>verifyDenial</code> for the
+ * actual answer.
+ *
+ * @opts
+ *   {
+ *     links: [ {                        // ordered root-first
+ *       zone:        string,
+ *       dnskeys:     Buffer[],          // the zone's DNSKEY RRset RDATAs
+ *       dnskeyRrsig: { algorithm, labels, originalTtl, expiration, inception, keyTag, signerName, signature },
+ *       dsRdatas?:   Buffer[],          // DS RRset for this zone (served by parent; omit for root)
+ *       dsRrsig?:    { ... },           // RRSIG over the DS RRset (signed by parent; omit for root)
+ *     } ],
+ *     trustAnchors?: [ { keyTag, algorithm, digestType, digest: Buffer } ],  // default IANA root
+ *     at?:           Date,             // validity instant (default now)
+ *   }
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var trusted = b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyChain({ links: [rootLink, orgLink] });
+ *   // → { ok: true, zone: "org.", keys: [ ...trusted org DNSKEY rdatas ] }
+ */
+function verifyChain(opts) {
+  validateOpts.requireObject(opts, "dnssec.verifyChain", DnssecError);
+  validateOpts(opts, ["links", "trustAnchors", "at"], "dnssec.verifyChain");
+  if (!Array.isArray(opts.links) || opts.links.length === 0) throw new DnssecError("dnssec/bad-arg", "dnssec.verifyChain: opts.links must be a non-empty array");
+  var anchors = opts.trustAnchors !== undefined ? opts.trustAnchors : DEFAULT_ROOT_ANCHORS;
+  if (!Array.isArray(anchors) || anchors.length === 0) throw new DnssecError("dnssec/bad-arg", "dnssec.verifyChain: opts.trustAnchors must be a non-empty array");
+
+  var trustedKeys = null, path = [];
+  for (var i = 0; i < opts.links.length; i++) {
+    var link = opts.links[i];
+    if (!link || typeof link.zone !== "string" || link.zone === "") throw new DnssecError("dnssec/bad-link", "dnssec.verifyChain: links[" + i + "].zone is required");
+    if (!Array.isArray(link.dnskeys) || link.dnskeys.length === 0) throw new DnssecError("dnssec/bad-link", "dnssec.verifyChain: links[" + i + "].dnskeys must be a non-empty array");
+    if (!link.dnskeyRrsig || typeof link.dnskeyRrsig !== "object") throw new DnssecError("dnssec/bad-link", "dnssec.verifyChain: links[" + i + "].dnskeyRrsig is required");
+
+    // 1. The DNSKEY RRset is self-signed by one of its own keys (trying
+    //    every key whose tag matches, since tags collide).
+    var signer = _verifyRrsetWithAnyKey(
+      { name: link.zone, type: "DNSKEY", rdatas: link.dnskeys, at: opts.at },
+      link.dnskeyRrsig,
+      _keysByTag(link.dnskeys, link.dnskeyRrsig.keyTag),
+      "dnssec/chain-no-signing-key", "dnssec.verifyChain: no DNSKEY in '" + link.zone + "' verifies the DNSKEY RRSIG"
+    );
+
+    // 2. Establish trust in the signing key.
+    var signerTag = keyTag(signer);
+    if (i === 0) {
+      // Root: the signing key must match a pinned anchor's DS digest.
+      var matched = false;
+      for (var a = 0; a < anchors.length; a++) {
+        if (anchors[a].keyTag !== signerTag) continue;
+        try { verifyDs({ ownerName: link.zone, dnskeyRdata: signer, ds: anchors[a] }); matched = true; break; } catch (_e) { /* try the next anchor */ }
+      }
+      if (!matched) throw new DnssecError("dnssec/chain-anchor-mismatch", "dnssec.verifyChain: root DNSKEY does not match any pinned trust anchor");
+    } else {
+      // Delegation: the parent (already trusted) signed a DS RRset for this
+      // zone, and the signing KSK matches one of those DS records.
+      if (!Array.isArray(link.dsRdatas) || link.dsRdatas.length === 0 || !link.dsRrsig || typeof link.dsRrsig !== "object") {
+        throw new DnssecError("dnssec/bad-link", "dnssec.verifyChain: links[" + i + "] needs dsRdatas + dsRrsig (DS served by the parent)");
+      }
+      _verifyRrsetWithAnyKey(
+        { name: link.zone, type: "DS", rdatas: link.dsRdatas, at: opts.at },
+        link.dsRrsig,
+        _keysByTag(trustedKeys, link.dsRrsig.keyTag),
+        "dnssec/chain-no-parent-key", "dnssec.verifyChain: no trusted parent key verifies the DS RRSIG for '" + link.zone + "'"
+      );
+      var dsMatched = false;
+      for (var d = 0; d < link.dsRdatas.length; d++) {
+        var dsObj = _parseDsRdata(_bytes(link.dsRdatas[d], "dsRdatas[" + d + "]"));
+        if (dsObj.keyTag !== signerTag) continue;
+        try { verifyDs({ ownerName: link.zone, dnskeyRdata: signer, ds: dsObj }); dsMatched = true; break; } catch (_e) { /* try the next DS */ }
+      }
+      if (!dsMatched) throw new DnssecError("dnssec/chain-ds-mismatch", "dnssec.verifyChain: the signing KSK of '" + link.zone + "' matches no parent-signed DS");
+    }
+
+    trustedKeys = link.dnskeys;
+    path.push(link.zone);
+  }
+  return { ok: true, zone: opts.links[opts.links.length - 1].zone, keys: trustedKeys, path: path };
+}
+
 module.exports = {
-  verifyRrset:  verifyRrset,
-  verifyDs:     verifyDs,
-  verifyDenial: verifyDenial,
-  nsec3Hash:    nsec3Hash,
-  keyTag:       keyTag,
-  ALGORITHMS:   ALGS,
-  DnssecError:  DnssecError,
+  verifyRrset:        verifyRrset,
+  verifyDs:           verifyDs,
+  verifyDenial:       verifyDenial,
+  verifyChain:        verifyChain,
+  nsec3Hash:          nsec3Hash,
+  keyTag:             keyTag,
+  ALGORITHMS:         ALGS,
+  DEFAULT_ROOT_ANCHORS: DEFAULT_ROOT_ANCHORS,
+  DnssecError:        DnssecError,
 };

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/core",
-  "version": "0.12.49",
+  "version": "0.12.50",
   "description": "The Node framework that owns its stack.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/release-notes/v0.12.50.json

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "../scripts/release-notes-schema.json",
+  "version": "0.12.50",
+  "date": "2026-05-25",
+  "headline": "`b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyChain` — validate a DNSSEC delegation chain to a pinned root anchor",
+  "summary": "Completes local DNSSEC verification: validate a full delegation chain from the root down to a zone against a pinned trust anchor (RFC 4035 §5), instead of trusting any single resolver. For each link, the zone's DNSKEY RRset must be self-signed by one of its keys, and that key must be vouched for either by a pinned anchor (at the root) or by a DS record served + signed by the already-trusted parent — so trust flows root → TLD → zone with no gap. The IANA root KSKs (KSK-2017 tag 20326, KSK-2024 tag 38696) ship as the default anchors; override with opts.trustAnchors for a private root. verifyChain returns the leaf zone's trusted DNSKEY set, which you then hand to verifyRrset / verifyDenial for the actual answer. Composes verifyRrset + verifyDs + the key tag; verified end-to-end against a live root→org chain.",
+  "sections": [
+    {
+      "heading": "Added",
+      "items": [
+        {
+          "title": "`b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyChain(opts)`",
+          "body": "Walks an ordered, root-first list of `links` ({ zone, dnskeys, dnskeyRrsig, dsRdatas?, dsRrsig? }). At each link it verifies the DNSKEY RRset's self-signature (composing `verifyRrset`), then establishes trust in the signing key: at the root by matching a pinned anchor's DS digest (`verifyDs`), at every delegation by verifying the parent-served DS RRset's signature with the already-trusted parent key and confirming the signing KSK matches one of those DS records. Returns `{ ok, zone, keys, path }` with the leaf zone's trusted DNSKEY set. Refuses a root key that matches no anchor (`dnssec/chain-anchor-mismatch`), a KSK that matches no parent DS (`dnssec/chain-ds-mismatch`), and a missing parent key (`dnssec/chain-no-parent-key`). The default `DEFAULT_ROOT_ANCHORS` are the published IANA root KSK DS records; `opts.trustAnchors` overrides them for a private or test root."
+        }
+      ]
+    }
+  ]
+}

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/layer-0-primitives/codebase-patterns.test.js

@@ -6277,6 +6277,19 @@ var KNOWN_ANTIPATTERNS = [
     allowlist: [],
     reason: "DNSSEC NXDOMAIN over-acceptance — for a Name Error proof the source-of-synthesis wildcard must be COVERED (proven absent). A matching wildcard owner means the wildcard exists and the query should have been answered by expansion, so a response claiming NXDOMAIN is forged. The `!findCover(x) && !findMatch(x)` gate accepts a matching wildcard as proof and must never appear; the correct gate is `!findCover(x)`. Detection is precise: only the cover-OR-match denial gate matches. Wildcard-NODATA (which legitimately needs a MATCHING wildcard with the type absent) uses `findMatch(...)` standalone with a type-bitmap check, not this gate, so it does not match.",
   },
+  {
+    // DNSSEC key selection: 16-bit key tags collide (RFC 4034 App B), so
+    // selecting a SINGLE DNSKEY by tag and verifying only against it
+    // yields a false `bad-signature` when a colliding non-signing key
+    // appears first in the RRset. A verifier must try EVERY key whose
+    // tag (and algorithm) match (RFC 4035 §5.3.1) — `_keysByTag` +
+    // `_verifyRrsetWithAnyKey`, never a `_findKeyByTag`-style single pick.
+    id: "dnssec-single-key-by-tag",
+    primitive: "_keysByTag(...) + try-every-candidate — never a single-result _findKeyByTag for signature verification",
+    regex: /_findKeyByTag\s*\(/,
+    allowlist: [],
+    reason: "DNSSEC key-tag collision false-negative — a 16-bit DNSKEY tag is not unique within an RRset (RFC 4034 Appendix B explicitly permits collisions). Picking the first key with a matching tag and verifying only against it rejects an otherwise-valid chain when a colliding non-signing key sorts earlier. RFC 4035 §5.3.1 requires trying every key whose tag and algorithm match until one validates; the framework does this via `_keysByTag` + `_verifyRrsetWithAnyKey`. The single-result `_findKeyByTag` helper must not be (re)introduced for signature key selection.",
+  },
   {
     // CVE-2026-23552 — cross-realm JWT acceptance via non-CT iss
     // compare. `payload.iss !== expectedIssuer` (or claims.iss / token.iss)

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/layer-0-primitives/dnssec.test.js

@@ -59,6 +59,10 @@ function testSurface() {
   check("b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyRrset is a function", typeof b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyRrset === "function");
   check("b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyDs is a function", typeof b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyDs === "function");
   check("b.network.dns.dnssec.keyTag is a function", typeof b.network.dns.dnssec.keyTag === "function");
+  check("b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyDenial is a function", typeof b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyDenial === "function");
+  check("b.network.dns.dnssec.nsec3Hash is a function", typeof b.network.dns.dnssec.nsec3Hash === "function");
+  check("b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyChain is a function", typeof b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyChain === "function");
+  check("b.network.dns.dnssec.DEFAULT_ROOT_ANCHORS includes the IANA KSK tags", Array.isArray(b.network.dns.dnssec.DEFAULT_ROOT_ANCHORS) && b.network.dns.dnssec.DEFAULT_ROOT_ANCHORS.some(function (a) { return a.keyTag === 20326; }));
 }
 
 function testRealVectors() {
@@ -270,11 +274,128 @@ function testDenialArgs() {
   check("verifyDenial: nodata without qtype refused", code(function () { b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyDenial({ qname: "iana.org", proof: "nodata", zone: "iana.org", nsec3: ianaRecords() }); }) === "dnssec/bad-arg");
 }
 
+// --- Chain validation (verifyChain) ---
+
+// Real root→org DNSSEC chain captured via Cloudflare DoH: the root DNSKEY
+// RRset (signed by the IANA KSK), the org DS RRset (served + signed by the
+// root), and the org DNSKEY RRset (signed by org's KSK).
+var ROOT_DNSKEY_HEX = "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";
+var ORG_DS_HEX = "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";
+var ORG_DNSKEY_HEX = "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";
+
+function _readN(buf, off) {
+  var ls = [], jumped = false, end = off, g = 0;
+  for (;;) { if (++g > 128) throw new Error("name guard"); var len = buf[off]; if (len === 0) { off++; if (!jumped) end = off; break; } if ((len & 0xc0) === 0xc0) { if (!jumped) end = off + 2; off = ((len & 0x3f) << 8) | buf[off + 1]; jumped = true; continue; } off++; ls.push(buf.slice(off, off + len).toString("ascii")); off += len; }
+  return { name: ls.join(".") + (ls.length ? "." : "."), end: end };
+}
+function parseAnswer(hex) {
+  var buf = Buffer.from(hex, "hex");
+  var qd = buf.readUInt16BE(4), an = buf.readUInt16BE(6), off = 12;
+  for (var i = 0; i < qd; i++) off = _readN(buf, off).end + 4;
+  var out = { dnskeys: [], ds: [], rrsig: {} };
+  for (var j = 0; j < an; j++) {
+    off = _readN(buf, off).end;
+    var type = buf.readUInt16BE(off), rdlen = buf.readUInt16BE(off + 8); off += 10;
+    var rd = buf.slice(off, off + rdlen); off += rdlen;
+    if (type === 48) out.dnskeys.push(rd);
+    else if (type === 43) out.ds.push(rd);
+    else if (type === 46) { var sn = _readN(rd, 18); out.rrsig[rd.readUInt16BE(0)] = { algorithm: rd[2], labels: rd[3], originalTtl: rd.readUInt32BE(4), expiration: rd.readUInt32BE(8), inception: rd.readUInt32BE(12), keyTag: rd.readUInt16BE(16), signerName: sn.name, signature: rd.slice(sn.end) }; }
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+function testVerifyChain() {
+  var root = parseAnswer(ROOT_DNSKEY_HEX), orgDs = parseAnswer(ORG_DS_HEX), orgDk = parseAnswer(ORG_DNSKEY_HEX);
+  var maxInc = Math.max(root.rrsig[48].inception, orgDs.rrsig[43].inception, orgDk.rrsig[48].inception);
+  var at = new Date((maxInc + 60) * 1000);
+  function rootLink() { return { zone: ".", dnskeys: root.dnskeys, dnskeyRrsig: root.rrsig[48] }; }
+  function orgLink() { return { zone: "org.", dnskeys: orgDk.dnskeys, dnskeyRrsig: orgDk.rrsig[48], dsRdatas: orgDs.ds, dsRrsig: orgDs.rrsig[43] }; }
+
+  var out = b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyChain({ links: [rootLink(), orgLink()], at: at });
+  check("verifyChain: real root→org chain validates to the pinned IANA anchor", out.ok && out.zone === "org." && out.path.join(",") === ".,org." && out.keys.length === 3);
+
+  // Root link alone validates against the default anchor.
+  var rootOnly = b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyChain({ links: [rootLink()], at: at });
+  check("verifyChain: root DNSKEY alone validates against the default anchor", rootOnly.ok && rootOnly.zone === ".");
+
+  function code(fn) { try { fn(); return "NO-THROW"; } catch (e) { return e.code; } }
+  // A bogus trust anchor breaks the chain at the root.
+  var badAnchor = [{ keyTag: 20326, algorithm: 8, digestType: 2, digest: Buffer.alloc(32, 0xff) }];
+  check("verifyChain: wrong trust anchor refused", code(function () { b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyChain({ links: [rootLink()], at: at, trustAnchors: badAnchor }); }) === "dnssec/chain-anchor-mismatch");
+  // A tampered org DS digest breaks the DS RRset signature.
+  check("verifyChain: tampered DS RRset refused", code(function () {
+    var bad = orgLink(); bad.dsRdatas = [Buffer.from(orgDs.ds[0])]; bad.dsRdatas[0][bad.dsRdatas[0].length - 1] ^= 0xff;
+    b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyChain({ links: [rootLink(), bad], at: at });
+  }) === "dnssec/bad-signature");
+  // Expired (at past every window).
+  check("verifyChain: expired link refused", code(function () { b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyChain({ links: [rootLink()], at: new Date((root.rrsig[48].expiration + 86400) * 1000) }); }) === "dnssec/expired");
+  // Empty links refused.
+  check("verifyChain: empty links refused", code(function () { b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyChain({ links: [] }); }) === "dnssec/bad-arg");
+
+  // Key-tag collision: two keys in the SIGNED DNSKEY RRset share a tag
+  // (16-bit tags collide, RFC 4034 App B). The non-signing one sorts
+  // first; verifyChain must try every matching key (RFC 4035 §5.3.1) and
+  // not return a false bad-signature.
+  testKeyTagCollision();
+}
+
+var nodeCrypto = require("node:crypto");
+function _ecDnskey(pubKey) {
+  var jwk = pubKey.export({ format: "jwk" });
+  var x = Buffer.from(jwk.x, "base64url"), y = Buffer.from(jwk.y, "base64url");
+  return Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([0x01, 0x01, 3, 13]), x, y]); // flags 257 (KSK/SEP), proto 3, alg 13 (ECDSAP256SHA256)
+}
+function _canonName(name) {
+  var n = name.replace(/\.$/, ""), parts = [];
+  if (n !== "") n.split(".").forEach(function (l) { var bb = Buffer.from(l.toLowerCase(), "ascii"); parts.push(Buffer.from([bb.length]), bb); });
+  parts.push(Buffer.from([0]));
+  return Buffer.concat(parts);
+}
+function _u16b(n) { return Buffer.from([(n >> 8) & 0xff, n & 0xff]); }
+function _u32b(n) { var b2 = Buffer.alloc(4); b2.writeUInt32BE(n >>> 0, 0); return b2; }
+// Build an RRSIG over a DNSKEY RRset signed by an EC P-256 key (mirrors
+// the RFC 4034 §3.1.8.1 signed-data form verifyRrset reconstructs).
+function _signDnskeyRrset(zone, rdatas, priv, signerRdata, inc, exp) {
+  var owner = _canonName(zone), ttl = _u32b(3600), labels = zone.replace(/\.$/, "") === "" ? 0 : zone.replace(/\.$/, "").split(".").length;
+  var keyTag = b.network.dns.dnssec.keyTag(signerRdata);
+  var sorted = rdatas.slice().sort(Buffer.compare);
+  var rrs = [];
+  sorted.forEach(function (rd) { rrs.push(owner, _u16b(48), _u16b(1), ttl, _u16b(rd.length), rd); });
+  var prefix = Buffer.concat([_u16b(48), Buffer.from([13, labels]), ttl, _u32b(exp), _u32b(inc), _u16b(keyTag), _canonName(zone)]);
+  var signed = Buffer.concat([prefix].concat(rrs));
+  var signature = nodeCrypto.sign("sha256", signed, { key: priv, dsaEncoding: "ieee-p1363" });
+  return { algorithm: 13, labels: labels, originalTtl: 3600, expiration: exp, inception: inc, keyTag: keyTag, signerName: zone, signature: signature };
+}
+function testKeyTagCollision() {
+  // Generate EC P-256 keypairs until two DNSKEYs collide on key tag.
+  var byTag = {}, a = null, b2 = null;
+  for (var i = 0; i < 4000 && !b2; i++) {
+    var kp = nodeCrypto.generateKeyPairSync("ec", { namedCurve: "prime256v1" });
+    var rd = _ecDnskey(kp.publicKey);
+    var t = b.network.dns.dnssec.keyTag(rd);
+    if (byTag[t]) { a = byTag[t]; b2 = { rd: rd, priv: kp.privateKey }; } else byTag[t] = { rd: rd, priv: kp.privateKey };
+  }
+  check("test generated a key-tag collision", b2 !== null);
+  if (!b2) return;
+  // `a` is the signer; `b2` (same tag, different key) sorts into the set.
+  var rdatas = [a.rd, b2.rd];
+  var now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
+  var rrsig = _signDnskeyRrset("test.", rdatas, a.priv, a.rd, now - 60, now + 86400);
+  // Trust anchor = DS of the signer (SHA-256 over owner + DNSKEY rdata).
+  var digest = nodeCrypto.createHash("sha256").update(Buffer.concat([_canonName("test."), a.rd])).digest();
+  var anchor = { keyTag: b.network.dns.dnssec.keyTag(a.rd), algorithm: 13, digestType: 2, digest: digest };
+  // Order the set so the non-signing colliding key is tried first.
+  var ordered = (b.network.dns.dnssec.keyTag(rdatas[0]) === rrsig.keyTag && rdatas[0] !== a.rd) ? rdatas : [b2.rd, a.rd];
+  var out = b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyChain({ links: [{ zone: "test.", dnskeys: ordered, dnskeyRrsig: rrsig }], trustAnchors: [anchor], at: new Date((now) * 1000) });
+  check("verifyChain: validates despite a colliding-tag key in the signed set", out.ok === true);
+}
+
 async function run() {
   testSurface();
   testRealVectors();
   testRefusals();
   testVerifyDs();
+  testVerifyChain();
   testNsec3Real();
   testNsec3Caps();
   testNsec3OptOut();

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/blamejs-shop",
-  "version": "0.1.6",
+  "version": "0.1.8",
   "description": "Open-source framework built on blamejs. Vendored stack, zero npm runtime deps, PQC-first crypto, security-on by default.",
   "main": "lib/index.js",
   "scripts": {