@blamejs/blamejs-shop 0.0.44

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/ws-client.js

@@ -0,0 +1,978 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * b.wsClient — outbound WebSocket client (RFC 6455).
+ *
+ * Companion to b.websocket (server-side). Operators dial out to peer
+ * WebSocket endpoints from Node — webhooks, pubsub bridges, integration
+ * with external realtime services — without reaching for `ws` from
+ * npm.
+ *
+ *   var client = b.wsClient.connect("wss://stream.example.com/v1", {
+ *     subprotocols: ["json-stream-v1"],
+ *     headers:      { "Authorization": "Bearer " + token },
+ *     reconnect:    { maxAttempts: 10, baseMs: 500, maxMs: 30000 },
+ *     pingMs:       30000,
+ *     pongMs:       60000,
+ *     maxMessageBytes: b.constants.BYTES.mib(8),
+ *   });
+ *
+ *   client.on("open",    function () { client.send({ subscribe: ["orders"] }); });
+ *   client.on("message", function (data, isBinary) { ... });
+ *   client.on("close",   function (code, reason) { ... });
+ *   client.on("error",   function (err) { ... });
+ *
+ *   client.send("text frame");
+ *   client.send(Buffer.from("binary frame"));
+ *   client.close(1000, "bye");
+ *
+ * Frame layer is the same RFC 6455 implementation b.websocket already
+ * ships — we reuse `FrameParser` and `serializeFrame` from
+ * lib/websocket.js. The client adds:
+ *
+ *   - Outbound HTTP/1.1 Upgrade with Sec-WebSocket-Key generation.
+ *   - Sec-WebSocket-Accept verification (rejects on hash mismatch).
+ *   - Subprotocol + permessage-deflate negotiation.
+ *   - Client-side frame masking (RFC 6455 §5.3 — required for outbound).
+ *   - TLS via b.network.tls.pqc (X25519MLKEM768 hybrid handshake).
+ *   - Heartbeat: ping every `pingMs`, drop the connection if pong not
+ *     received within `pongMs`.
+ *   - Auto-reconnect with exponential backoff + jitter.
+ *
+ * Per the validation-tier policy: connect() throws on bad opts at
+ * config time; runtime errors flow through 'error' events.
+ *
+ * Per the security-defaults stance: TLS verification ON by default
+ * (operator opts in to mTLS via tlsOpts). HSTS-style, no soft-fail.
+ */
+
+var net          = require("node:net");
+var nodeUrl      = require("node:url");
+var nodeCrypto   = require("node:crypto");
+var { EventEmitter } = require("node:events");
+
+var lazyRequire    = require("./lazy-require");
+var validateOpts   = require("./validate-opts");
+var safeAsync      = require("./safe-async");
+var safeBuffer     = require("./safe-buffer");
+var bCrypto        = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./crypto"); });
+var websocket      = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./websocket"); });
+var audit          = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./audit"); });
+var networkTls     = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./network-tls"); });
+var safeJson       = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./safe-json"); });
+var ssrfGuard      = require("./ssrf-guard");
+var C              = require("./constants");
+var { defineClass } = require("./framework-error");
+
+var WsClientError = defineClass("WsClientError", { alwaysPermanent: true });
+
+var WS_GUID = "258EAFA5-E914-47DA-95CA-C5AB0DC85B11";   // RFC 6455 §1.3
+
+var DEFAULT_PING_MS    = C.TIME.seconds(30);
+var DEFAULT_PONG_MS    = C.TIME.seconds(60);
+var DEFAULT_MAX_BYTES  = C.BYTES.mib(8);
+var DEFAULT_MAX_FRAME  = C.BYTES.mib(8);
+var DEFAULT_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_MS = C.TIME.seconds(15);
+var DEFAULT_RECONNECT_BASE_MS    = C.TIME.seconds(1) / 2;
+var DEFAULT_RECONNECT_MAX_MS     = C.TIME.seconds(30);
+var DEFAULT_RECONNECT_MAX_ATTEMPTS = 10;
+
+var OPCODE_CONT   = 0x00;                                // allow:raw-byte-literal — RFC 6455 opcode
+var OPCODE_TEXT   = 0x01;                                // allow:raw-byte-literal — RFC 6455 opcode
+var OPCODE_BINARY = 0x02;                                // allow:raw-byte-literal — RFC 6455 opcode
+var OPCODE_CLOSE  = 0x08;                                // allow:raw-byte-literal — RFC 6455 opcode
+var OPCODE_PING   = 0x09;                                // allow:raw-byte-literal — RFC 6455 opcode
+var OPCODE_PONG   = 0x0A;                                // allow:raw-byte-literal — RFC 6455 opcode
+
+var CLOSE_NORMAL          = 1000;                        // allow:raw-byte-literal — RFC 6455 close code
+var CLOSE_GOING_AWAY      = 1001;                        // allow:raw-byte-literal — RFC 6455 close code
+var CLOSE_ABNORMAL        = 1006;                        // allow:raw-byte-literal — RFC 6455 close code (synthetic — never on wire)
+
+// Permanent vs transient error classifier — used by reconnect logic
+// so client doesn't hammer the server on credentials / handshake
+// errors that won't resolve by retrying.
+var PERMANENT_CODES = {
+  "ws-client/bad-url":              true,
+  "ws-client/bad-status":           true,           // HTTP 4xx during handshake
+  "ws-client/accept-mismatch":      true,
+  "ws-client/bad-upgrade":          true,
+  "ws-client/bad-status-line":      true,
+  "ws-client/bad-subprotocol":      true,
+  "ws-client/bad-header":           true,
+  "ws-client/handshake-too-large":  true,
+  "ws-client/control-too-big":      true,
+  "ws-client/control-fragmented":   true,
+  "ws-client/protocol-error":       true,
+  "ws-client/invalid-utf8":         true,
+  "ws-client/rsv1-on-continuation": true,
+  "ws-client/message-too-big":      true,
+  "ws-client/deflate-error":        true,
+  "ws-client/payload-too-big":      true,
+};
+
+function _isPermanentError(err) {
+  if (!err) return false;
+  if (err.permanent === true) return true;            // defineClass-marked
+  if (err.code && PERMANENT_CODES[err.code]) return true;
+  return false;
+}
+
+// Synchronous bounded inflate — runs zlib.inflateRawSync with
+// `maxOutputLength` set to maxBytes + 1, so Node aborts the inflate
+// when the output would exceed the cap. Defends against a malicious
+// server sending a tiny compressed frame that expands to GBs.
+function _inflateRawCappedSync(zlib, compressed, maxBytes, windowBits) {
+  try {
+    return zlib.inflateRawSync(compressed, {
+      maxOutputLength: maxBytes + 1,
+      windowBits:      windowBits,
+    });
+  } catch (e) {
+    if (e && (e.code === "ERR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE" ||
+              /maxOutputLength|maxOutput/.test(String(e.message)))) {
+      throw new WsClientError("ws-client/decompression-bomb",
+        "decompression-bomb defense: inflated output > " + maxBytes + " bytes");
+    }
+    throw e;
+  }
+}
+
+function _generateKey() {
+  return bCrypto().generateBytes(C.BYTES.bytes(16)).toString("base64");
+}
+
+function _expectedAccept(secKey, handshakeGuid) {
+  return nodeCrypto.createHash("sha1").update(secKey + (handshakeGuid || WS_GUID)).digest("base64");
+}
+
+function _parseUrl(target) {
+  var parsed;
+  try { parsed = new nodeUrl.URL(target); }
+  catch (e) {
+    throw new WsClientError("ws-client/bad-url",
+      "wsClient.connect: url is malformed - " + e.message);
+  }
+  var proto = parsed.protocol;
+  if (proto !== "ws:" && proto !== "wss:") {
+    throw new WsClientError("ws-client/bad-url",
+      "wsClient.connect: url must start with ws:// or wss:// - got " + JSON.stringify(proto));
+  }
+  return parsed;
+}
+
+function connect(target, opts) {
+  opts = opts || {};
+  validateOpts(opts, [
+    "subprotocols", "headers", "tlsOpts", "pingMs", "pongMs",
+    "maxMessageBytes", "maxFrameBytes",
+    "handshakeTimeoutMs", "reconnect",
+    "permessageDeflate", "audit", "origin",
+    "handshakeGuid", "allowInternal",
+    "parse", "parser",
+    "urlFor", "tlsOptsFor",
+  ], "wsClient.connect");
+
+  // Per-dial state-injection callbacks. Both fire on every connect
+  // attempt (initial + each reconnect) so operators can rotate
+  // bearer tokens, DNS targets, or TLS material between hops without
+  // tearing the client down.
+  //   urlFor(attempt) -> string                — overrides target URL
+  //   tlsOptsFor(attempt) -> object            — overrides TLS opts
+  // attempt is a 0-based hop index; 0 is the initial dial.
+  if (opts.urlFor != null && typeof opts.urlFor !== "function") {
+    throw new WsClientError("ws-client/bad-url-for",
+      "wsClient.connect: urlFor must be a function");
+  }
+  if (opts.tlsOptsFor != null && typeof opts.tlsOptsFor !== "function") {
+    throw new WsClientError("ws-client/bad-tls-opts-for",
+      "wsClient.connect: tlsOptsFor must be a function");
+  }
+
+  // Operators with a non-RFC-6455 GUID (private protocols on top of
+  // the WebSocket framing layer, framework-specific handshake variants)
+  // pass a custom handshakeGuid. The server-side b.websocket already
+  // supports it; this is the symmetric client-side knob. Defaults to
+  // the RFC 6455 §1.3 GUID `258EAFA5-E914-47DA-95CA-C5AB0DC85B11`.
+  var handshakeGuid = WS_GUID;
+  if (opts.handshakeGuid != null) {
+    validateOpts.requireNonEmptyString(opts.handshakeGuid,
+      "wsClient.connect: handshakeGuid", WsClientError, "ws-client/bad-handshake-guid");
+    handshakeGuid = opts.handshakeGuid;
+  }
+
+  var parsed = _parseUrl(target);
+
+  var subprotocols = Array.isArray(opts.subprotocols) ? opts.subprotocols.slice() : [];
+  for (var sp = 0; sp < subprotocols.length; sp += 1) {
+    if (typeof subprotocols[sp] !== "string" || subprotocols[sp].length === 0) {
+      throw new WsClientError("ws-client/bad-subprotocol",
+        "wsClient.connect: subprotocols[" + sp + "] must be a non-empty string");
+    }
+  }
+  var pingMs = (typeof opts.pingMs === "number" && opts.pingMs > 0)              // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity
+    ? opts.pingMs : DEFAULT_PING_MS;
+  var pongMs = (typeof opts.pongMs === "number" && opts.pongMs > 0)              // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity
+    ? opts.pongMs : DEFAULT_PONG_MS;
+  var maxMessageBytes = (typeof opts.maxMessageBytes === "number" && opts.maxMessageBytes > 0)   // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity
+    ? opts.maxMessageBytes : DEFAULT_MAX_BYTES;
+  var maxFrameBytes = (typeof opts.maxFrameBytes === "number" && opts.maxFrameBytes > 0)         // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity
+    ? opts.maxFrameBytes : DEFAULT_MAX_FRAME;
+  var handshakeTimeoutMs = (typeof opts.handshakeTimeoutMs === "number" && opts.handshakeTimeoutMs > 0)  // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity
+    ? opts.handshakeTimeoutMs : DEFAULT_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_MS;
+
+  var reconnectOpts = _normaliseReconnect(opts.reconnect);
+  var permessageDeflate = opts.permessageDeflate !== false;
+  var auditOn = opts.audit !== false;
+
+  var client = new WsClient({
+    target:             target,
+    parsedUrl:          parsed,
+    subprotocols:       subprotocols,
+    headers:            opts.headers || {},
+    tlsOpts:            opts.tlsOpts || null,
+    origin:             opts.origin || null,
+    pingMs:             pingMs,
+    pongMs:             pongMs,
+    maxMessageBytes:    maxMessageBytes,
+    maxFrameBytes:      maxFrameBytes,
+    handshakeTimeoutMs: handshakeTimeoutMs,
+    reconnectOpts:      reconnectOpts,
+    permessageDeflate:  permessageDeflate,
+    auditOn:            auditOn,
+    handshakeGuid:      handshakeGuid,
+    allowInternal:      opts.allowInternal,
+    parse:              opts.parse || null,
+    parser:             typeof opts.parser === "function" ? opts.parser : null,
+    urlFor:             typeof opts.urlFor === "function" ? opts.urlFor : null,
+    tlsOptsFor:         typeof opts.tlsOptsFor === "function" ? opts.tlsOptsFor : null,
+  });
+  // SSRF gate — refuse private / loopback / link-local / cloud-metadata /
+  // reserved IP destinations by default. Symmetric to b.httpClient. The
+  // returned `ips` are pinned through tls.connect / net.connect so the
+  // actual TCP connect targets the validated address (closes the DNS-
+  // rebinding TOCTOU window). Cloud-metadata IPs are unconditional
+  // hard-deny — `allowInternal: true` does not bypass them.
+  var hostnameForUrl = parsed.protocol === "wss:" ? "https:" : "http:";
+  var probeUrl = new nodeUrl.URL(hostnameForUrl + "//" + parsed.host + parsed.pathname + parsed.search);
+  ssrfGuard.checkUrl(probeUrl, {
+    allowInternal: opts.allowInternal,
+    errorClass:    WsClientError,
+  }).then(function (result) {
+    client._ssrfPinnedIps = result && result.ips;
+    client._dial();
+  }).catch(function (e) {
+    setImmediate(function () { client._handleSocketError(e); });
+  });
+  return client;
+}
+
+function _normaliseReconnect(input) {
+  if (input === false || input == null) {
+    return { enabled: false, maxAttempts: 0,
+             baseMs: DEFAULT_RECONNECT_BASE_MS,
+             maxMs:  DEFAULT_RECONNECT_MAX_MS };
+  }
+  if (typeof input !== "object") {
+    throw new WsClientError("ws-client/bad-reconnect",
+      "wsClient.connect: reconnect must be false / null / object");
+  }
+  validateOpts(input, ["maxAttempts", "baseMs", "maxMs", "enabled"], "wsClient.connect.reconnect");
+  return {
+    enabled:     input.enabled !== false,
+    maxAttempts: (typeof input.maxAttempts === "number" && input.maxAttempts >= 0)            // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity
+      ? input.maxAttempts : DEFAULT_RECONNECT_MAX_ATTEMPTS,
+    baseMs:      (typeof input.baseMs === "number" && input.baseMs > 0)                       // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity
+      ? input.baseMs : DEFAULT_RECONNECT_BASE_MS,
+    maxMs:       (typeof input.maxMs === "number" && input.maxMs > 0)                         // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity
+      ? input.maxMs : DEFAULT_RECONNECT_MAX_MS,
+  };
+}
+
+class WsClient extends EventEmitter {
+  constructor(opts) {
+    super();
+    this._opts            = opts;
+    this._socket          = null;
+    this._parser          = null;
+    this._readyState      = "connecting";
+    this._reconnectAttempt = 0;
+    this._reconnectTimer   = null;
+    this._handshakeTimer   = null;
+    this._pingTimer        = null;
+    this._pongDeadline     = 0;
+    this._fragmentChunks   = [];
+    this._fragmentOpcode   = null;
+    this._fragmentRsv1     = false;
+    this._closed           = false;
+    this._negotiatedSubprotocol = null;
+    this._negotiatedDeflate = false;
+    this._negotiatedWindowBits = 15;                    // RFC 7692 default
+    this._bytesSent        = 0;
+    this._bytesReceived    = 0;
+  }
+
+  get readyState()             { return this._readyState; }
+  get subprotocol()            { return this._negotiatedSubprotocol; }
+  get url()                    { return this._opts.target; }
+
+  _dial() {
+    var self = this;
+    var opts = this._opts;
+    this._readyState = "connecting";
+
+    // Per-dial overrides — urlFor swaps the target URL, tlsOptsFor
+    // overrides TLS material. Both fire every dial including reconnects
+    // so callers can rotate state. urlFor's result is re-validated
+    // through ssrfGuard so a hostile upstream can't direct the client
+    // at a private address mid-reconnect.
+    var attempt = this._reconnectAttempt || 0;
+    var dialTarget = opts.target;
+    var dialParsed = opts.parsedUrl;
+    if (typeof opts.urlFor === "function") {
+      try {
+        var nextTarget = opts.urlFor(attempt);
+        if (typeof nextTarget === "string" && nextTarget.length > 0 && nextTarget !== dialTarget) {
+          dialParsed = _parseUrl(nextTarget);
+          dialTarget = nextTarget;
+          var probeProto = dialParsed.protocol === "wss:" ? "https:" : "http:";
+          var probeUrl = new nodeUrl.URL(probeProto + "//" + dialParsed.host + dialParsed.pathname + dialParsed.search);
+          var probe = ssrfGuard.checkUrl(probeUrl, {
+            allowInternal: opts.allowInternal,
+            errorClass:    WsClientError,
+          });
+          this._ssrfPinnedIps = probe && probe.ips ? probe.ips : null;
+        }
+      } catch (e) {
+        return self._handleSocketError(e);
+      }
+    }
+
+    var dialTlsOpts = opts.tlsOpts;
+    if (typeof opts.tlsOptsFor === "function") {
+      try {
+        var override = opts.tlsOptsFor(attempt);
+        if (override && typeof override === "object") {
+          dialTlsOpts = Object.assign({}, opts.tlsOpts || {}, override);
+        }
+      } catch (e) {
+        return self._handleSocketError(e);
+      }
+    }
+
+    var parsed = dialParsed;
+    var port = parsed.port ? parseInt(parsed.port, 10) :
+               (parsed.protocol === "wss:" ? 443 : 80);                                  // allow:raw-byte-literal — TLS / HTTP default port
+    var host = parsed.hostname;
+
+    function _onError(err) { self._handleSocketError(err); }
+
+    // Pin the connect to the SSRF-validated IPs returned by
+    // ssrfGuard.checkUrl — closes the DNS-rebinding TOCTOU window where
+    // the gate resolves a public IP and the kernel re-resolves to a
+    // private one between the check and the connect.
+    var pinnedIps = self._ssrfPinnedIps || null;
+    var lookup = null;
+    if (pinnedIps && pinnedIps.length > 0) {
+      lookup = function (h, lookupOpts, cb) {
+        // Node's lookup callback signatures:
+        //   (err, address, family) for legacy { all: false } (default)
+        //   (err, addresses)        for { all: true }
+        if (typeof lookupOpts === "function") { cb = lookupOpts; lookupOpts = {}; }
+        var first = pinnedIps[0];
+        if (lookupOpts && lookupOpts.all) {
+          return cb(null, pinnedIps.map(function (ip) {
+            return { address: ip.address, family: ip.family };
+          }));
+        }
+        return cb(null, first.address, first.family);
+      };
+    }
+
+    var socket;
+    if (parsed.protocol === "wss:") {
+      var tls = require("node:tls");                                                          // allow:inline-require — node:tls only on TLS path
+      var tlsOpts = Object.assign({
+        host:         host,
+        port:         port,
+        servername:   host,
+        rejectUnauthorized: true,
+        minVersion:   "TLSv1.3",
+      }, dialTlsOpts || {});
+      if (lookup) tlsOpts.lookup = lookup;
+      try {
+        var pqcShares = networkTls().pqc.getKeyShares();
+        if (Array.isArray(pqcShares) && pqcShares.length > 0 && !tlsOpts.curves) {
+          tlsOpts.curves = pqcShares.join(":");
+        }
+      } catch (_e) { /* drop-silent — tls module pre-init or non-Node */ }
+      socket = tls.connect(tlsOpts);
+    } else {
+      var netOpts = { host: host, port: port };
+      if (lookup) netOpts.lookup = lookup;
+      socket = net.connect(netOpts);
+    }
+    this._socket = socket;
+    socket.on("error", _onError);
+
+    var connectEvent = parsed.protocol === "wss:" ? "secureConnect" : "connect";
+    socket.once(connectEvent, function () {
+      try { self._sendHandshake(); }
+      catch (e) { self._handleSocketError(e); }
+    });
+
+    this._handshakeTimer = setTimeout(function () {
+      self._handleSocketError(new WsClientError("ws-client/handshake-timeout",
+        "Handshake exceeded " + opts.handshakeTimeoutMs + "ms"));
+    }, opts.handshakeTimeoutMs);
+    if (typeof this._handshakeTimer.unref === "function") this._handshakeTimer.unref();
+  }
+
+  _sendHandshake() {
+    var opts = this._opts;
+    var self = this;
+    var parsed = opts.parsedUrl;
+    var key = _generateKey();
+    this._secKey = key;
+
+    var hostHeader = parsed.host;
+    var pathStr = parsed.pathname + (parsed.search || "");
+    if (!pathStr) pathStr = "/";
+
+    var lines = [
+      "GET " + pathStr + " HTTP/1.1",
+      "Host: " + hostHeader,
+      "Upgrade: websocket",
+      "Connection: Upgrade",
+      "Sec-WebSocket-Key: " + key,
+      "Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13",                                                       // allow:raw-byte-literal — RFC 6455 §1.9
+    ];
+    if (opts.origin) {
+      if (safeBuffer.hasCrlf(opts.origin)) {
+        throw new WsClientError("ws-client/bad-header",
+          "Origin header value contains CR/LF (injection refused)");
+      }
+      lines.push("Origin: " + opts.origin);
+    }
+    if (opts.subprotocols.length > 0) {
+      lines.push("Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: " + opts.subprotocols.join(", "));
+    }
+    if (opts.permessageDeflate) {
+      lines.push("Sec-WebSocket-Extensions: permessage-deflate; client_max_window_bits");
+    }
+    var customHeaders = opts.headers || {};
+    var forbidden = ["host", "upgrade", "connection", "sec-websocket-key",
+                     "sec-websocket-version", "sec-websocket-protocol",
+                     "sec-websocket-extensions", "sec-websocket-accept"];
+    for (var hkey in customHeaders) {
+      if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(customHeaders, hkey)) continue;
+      if (forbidden.indexOf(hkey.toLowerCase()) !== -1) continue;
+      var v = customHeaders[hkey];
+      if (typeof v !== "string") continue;
+      if (safeBuffer.hasCrlf(v)) {
+        throw new WsClientError("ws-client/bad-header",
+          "header " + JSON.stringify(hkey) + ": value contains CR/LF (injection refused)");
+      }
+      lines.push(hkey + ": " + v);
+    }
+    lines.push("");
+    lines.push("");
+    var request = lines.join("\r\n");
+    this._handshakeBuf = Buffer.alloc(0);
+    this._socket.write(request);
+    this._socket.on("data", function (chunk) {
+      if (self._readyState === "connecting") {
+        self._consumeHandshake(chunk);
+      } else {
+        self._consumeFrames(chunk);
+      }
+    });
+  }
+
+  _consumeHandshake(chunk) {
+    // allow:handrolled-buffer-collect — handshake header capped at 64 KiB below; once handshake parses we switch to FrameParser
+    this._handshakeBuf = Buffer.concat([this._handshakeBuf, chunk]);
+    var headerEnd = this._handshakeBuf.indexOf("\r\n\r\n");
+    if (headerEnd === -1) {
+      if (this._handshakeBuf.length > C.BYTES.kib(64)) {
+        this._handleSocketError(new WsClientError("ws-client/handshake-too-large",
+          "handshake response exceeded 64 KiB before CRLFCRLF"));
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+    var headerSection = this._handshakeBuf.subarray(0, headerEnd).toString("utf8");
+    var rest = this._handshakeBuf.subarray(headerEnd + 4);
+
+    var lines = headerSection.split("\r\n");
+    var statusLine = lines[0] || "";
+    var match = statusLine.match(/^HTTP\/1\.\d (\d{3})/);
+    if (!match) {
+      this._handleSocketError(new WsClientError("ws-client/bad-status-line",
+        "handshake response status line malformed: " + JSON.stringify(statusLine)));
+      return;
+    }
+    var status = parseInt(match[1], 10);
+    if (status !== 101) {                                                                 // allow:raw-byte-literal — HTTP 101
+      // Body bytes after the header section are the server's
+      // explanation. Surface them on the error so callers can branch
+      // on the status code and inspect the body without re-parsing
+      // the message string.
+      var bodyText = "";
+      try { bodyText = rest.toString("utf8"); } catch (_e) { /* drop-silent */ }
+      var statusErr = new WsClientError("ws-client/bad-status",
+        "handshake response status was " + status + " (expected 101 Switching Protocols)");
+      statusErr.status = status;
+      statusErr.body = bodyText;
+      this._handleSocketError(statusErr);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    var headers = Object.create(null);
+    for (var i = 1; i < lines.length; i += 1) {
+      var idx = lines[i].indexOf(":");
+      if (idx === -1) continue;
+      var hkey = lines[i].slice(0, idx).trim().toLowerCase();
+      var hval = lines[i].slice(idx + 1).trim();
+      headers[hkey] = hval;
+    }
+
+    if ((headers["upgrade"] || "").toLowerCase() !== "websocket" ||
+        (headers["connection"] || "").toLowerCase().indexOf("upgrade") === -1) {
+      this._handleSocketError(new WsClientError("ws-client/bad-upgrade",
+        "handshake response missing Upgrade: websocket / Connection: Upgrade"));
+      return;
+    }
+
+    var accept = headers["sec-websocket-accept"] || "";
+    var expected = _expectedAccept(this._secKey, this._opts.handshakeGuid);
+    if (accept !== expected) {
+      this._handleSocketError(new WsClientError("ws-client/accept-mismatch",
+        "handshake response Sec-WebSocket-Accept mismatch: peer responded with a key " +
+        "that does not match the SHA-1(key+RFC-6455-GUID) hash"));
+      return;
+    }
+
+    var negotiatedSubprotocol = headers["sec-websocket-protocol"] || null;
+    if (negotiatedSubprotocol && this._opts.subprotocols.indexOf(negotiatedSubprotocol) === -1) {
+      this._handleSocketError(new WsClientError("ws-client/bad-subprotocol",
+        "server selected subprotocol " + JSON.stringify(negotiatedSubprotocol) +
+        " not in client offer"));
+      return;
+    }
+    this._negotiatedSubprotocol = negotiatedSubprotocol;
+
+    this._negotiatedDeflate = false;
+    this._negotiatedWindowBits = 15;                                                      // allow:raw-byte-literal — RFC 7692 default windowBits
+    if (this._opts.permessageDeflate &&
+        (headers["sec-websocket-extensions"] || "").indexOf("permessage-deflate") !== -1) {
+      this._negotiatedDeflate = true;
+      // Parse server_max_window_bits from the response — server may
+      // narrow the window vs the default 15. We honour anything in
+      // [8, 15]; outside that range we treat the response as malformed
+      // and refuse the extension (RFC 7692 §7.1.2.1).
+      var extLine = headers["sec-websocket-extensions"];
+      var smwbMatch = extLine.match(/server_max_window_bits\s*=\s*"?(\d+)"?/);             // allow:regex-no-length-cap — bounded by header line + RFC 7692 §7.1
+      if (smwbMatch) {
+        var smwb = parseInt(smwbMatch[1], 10);
+        if (smwb < 8 || smwb > 15) {                                                      // allow:raw-byte-literal — RFC 7692 windowBits range
+          this._handleSocketError(new WsClientError("ws-client/deflate-error",
+            "server_max_window_bits=" + smwb + " is outside RFC 7692 range [8, 15]"));
+          return;
+        }
+        this._negotiatedWindowBits = smwb;
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (this._handshakeTimer) {
+      clearTimeout(this._handshakeTimer);
+      this._handshakeTimer = null;
+    }
+
+    var fp = websocket().FrameParser;
+    this._parser = new fp({ maxFrameBytes: this._opts.maxFrameBytes });
+    this._readyState = "open";
+    this._reconnectAttempt = 0;
+    this._fragmentChunks = [];
+    this._fragmentOpcode = null;
+
+    this._startHeartbeat();
+    if (this._opts.auditOn) {
+      try {
+        audit().safeEmit({
+          action:  "wsclient.connected",
+          outcome: "success",
+          actor:   null,
+          metadata: {
+            host:               this._opts.parsedUrl.host,
+            subprotocol:        negotiatedSubprotocol,
+            deflate:            this._negotiatedDeflate,
+            serverWindowBits:   this._negotiatedWindowBits,
+            tls:                this._opts.parsedUrl.protocol === "wss:",
+            attempt:            this._reconnectAttempt,
+            peerCertFingerprint: this._captureCertFingerprint(),
+          },
+        });
+      } catch (_e) { /* drop-silent */ }
+    }
+    this.emit("open");
+
+    if (rest.length > 0) this._consumeFrames(rest);
+  }
+
+  _consumeFrames(chunk) {
+    if (!this._parser) return;
+    try {
+      var frames = this._parser.push(chunk) || [];
+      for (var fi = 0; fi < frames.length; fi += 1) {
+        this._handleFrame(frames[fi]);
+      }
+    } catch (e) {
+      this._handleSocketError(e);
+    }
+  }
+
+  _handleFrame(frame) {
+    // RFC 6455 §5.5: control frames MUST be <= 125 bytes AND non-fragmented.
+    var isControl = frame.opcode === OPCODE_PING ||
+                    frame.opcode === OPCODE_PONG ||
+                    frame.opcode === OPCODE_CLOSE;
+    if (isControl) {
+      if (frame.payload.length > 125) {                                                   // allow:raw-byte-literal — RFC 6455 §5.5 control-frame cap
+        this._handleSocketError(new WsClientError("ws-client/control-too-big",
+          "control-frame payload exceeds 125 bytes (RFC 6455 §5.5)"));
+        return;
+      }
+      if (frame.fin === false) {
+        this._handleSocketError(new WsClientError("ws-client/control-fragmented",
+          "control frame must have FIN=1 (RFC 6455 §5.5)"));
+        return;
+      }
+    }
+    // Continuation frames MUST NOT carry rsv1 (RFC 7692 §6.1) — only
+    // the first frame of a compressed message sets rsv1.
+    if (frame.opcode === OPCODE_CONT && frame.rsv1) {
+      this._handleSocketError(new WsClientError("ws-client/rsv1-on-continuation",
+        "RSV1 set on continuation frame (RFC 7692 §6.1)"));
+      return;
+    }
+    if (frame.opcode === OPCODE_PING) {
+      this._sendFrame(OPCODE_PONG, frame.payload, { fin: true });
+      return;
+    }
+    if (frame.opcode === OPCODE_PONG) {
+      this._pongDeadline = Date.now() + this._opts.pongMs;
+      return;
+    }
+    if (frame.opcode === OPCODE_CLOSE) {
+      var code = CLOSE_NORMAL, reason = "";
+      if (frame.payload.length >= 2) {
+        code = frame.payload.readUInt16BE(0);
+        var reasonBytes = frame.payload.subarray(2);                                      // allow:raw-byte-literal — RFC 6455 close-frame layout
+        try {
+          reason = new TextDecoder("utf-8", { fatal: true }).decode(reasonBytes);
+        } catch (_e) {
+          this._handleSocketError(new WsClientError("ws-client/invalid-utf8",
+            "close-frame reason is not valid UTF-8 (RFC 6455 §5.6 + §7.4.1)"));
+          return;
+        }
+      }
+      this._readyState = "closing";
+      this._sendFrame(OPCODE_CLOSE, frame.payload, { fin: true });
+      this._teardown(code, reason, false);
+      return;
+    }
+    if (frame.opcode === OPCODE_TEXT || frame.opcode === OPCODE_BINARY) {
+      if (this._fragmentOpcode != null) {
+        this._handleSocketError(new WsClientError("ws-client/protocol-error",
+          "received non-continuation opcode mid-fragmented-message"));
+        return;
+      }
+      this._fragmentOpcode = frame.opcode;
+      this._fragmentRsv1   = frame.rsv1 === true;
+      this._fragmentChunks = [frame.payload];
+    } else if (frame.opcode === OPCODE_CONT) {
+      if (this._fragmentOpcode == null) {
+        this._handleSocketError(new WsClientError("ws-client/protocol-error",
+          "received continuation opcode with no prior text/binary frame"));
+        return;
+      }
+      this._fragmentChunks.push(frame.payload);
+    }
+    if (frame.fin) {
+      var fullPayload = Buffer.concat(this._fragmentChunks);                              // allow:handrolled-buffer-collect — bounded by maxMessageBytes below
+      if (fullPayload.length > this._opts.maxMessageBytes) {
+        this._handleSocketError(new WsClientError("ws-client/message-too-big",
+          "incoming message exceeds maxMessageBytes (" + this._opts.maxMessageBytes + ")"));
+        return;
+      }
+      var isBinary = this._fragmentOpcode === OPCODE_BINARY;
+      var firstFrameRsv1 = this._fragmentRsv1 === true;
+      this._fragmentChunks = [];
+      this._fragmentOpcode = null;
+      this._fragmentRsv1 = false;
+      if (this._negotiatedDeflate && firstFrameRsv1) {
+        try {
+          var zlib = require("node:zlib");                                                     // allow:inline-require — zlib only on deflate-negotiated path
+          var compressed = Buffer.concat([fullPayload, Buffer.from([0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff])]); // allow:raw-byte-literal — RFC 7692 §7.2.2 deflate trailer
+          // Decompression-bomb defense: zlib.inflateRawSync's
+          // `maxOutputLength` aborts the inflate the moment the
+          // output would exceed maxMessageBytes — never decode GBs
+          // from a 100-byte compressed frame.
+          var inflated = _inflateRawCappedSync(zlib, compressed, this._opts.maxMessageBytes,
+            this._negotiatedWindowBits);
+          fullPayload = inflated;
+        } catch (e) {
+          this._handleSocketError(new WsClientError("ws-client/deflate-error",
+            "permessage-deflate inflate failed or exceeded maxMessageBytes: " + e.message));
+          return;
+        }
+      }
+      this._bytesReceived += fullPayload.length;
+      var data;
+      if (isBinary) {
+        data = fullPayload;
+      } else {
+        try {
+          data = new TextDecoder("utf-8", { fatal: true }).decode(fullPayload);
+        } catch (_e) {
+          this._handleSocketError(new WsClientError("ws-client/invalid-utf8",
+            "text frame is not valid UTF-8 (RFC 6455 §5.6)"));
+          return;
+        }
+      }
+      // Auto-parse text frames as JSON when the operator opted in via
+      // `parse: "json"` or supplied `parser: fn`. JSON-only protocols
+      // (most modern WS APIs) get a typed message argument without a
+      // wrapper layer; parse failures surface as 'error' events
+      // rather than crashing the message handler.
+      var parsed = data;
+      var parsedOk = true;
+      if (!isBinary && this._opts.parse === "json") {
+        try { parsed = safeJson().parse(data, { maxBytes: this._opts.maxMessageBytes }); }
+        catch (e) {
+          parsedOk = false;
+          this.emit("error", new WsClientError("ws-client/json-parse",
+            "text frame is not valid JSON: " + ((e && e.message) || String(e))));
+        }
+      } else if (!isBinary && typeof this._opts.parser === "function") {
+        try { parsed = this._opts.parser(data); }
+        catch (e) {
+          parsedOk = false;
+          this.emit("error", new WsClientError("ws-client/parser-failed",
+            "operator parser threw: " + ((e && e.message) || String(e))));
+        }
+      }
+      if (parsedOk) this.emit("message", parsed, isBinary);
+    }
+  }
+
+  _sendFrame(opcode, payload, opts) {
+    if (!this._socket || this._socket.destroyed) return;
+    var serialize = websocket().serializeFrame;
+    var frame = serialize(opcode, payload, Object.assign({ mask: true }, opts || {}));
+    this._bytesSent += frame.length;
+    this._socket.write(frame);
+  }
+
+  _captureCertFingerprint() {
+    try {
+      if (this._socket && typeof this._socket.getPeerCertificate === "function") {
+        var cert = this._socket.getPeerCertificate(false);
+        if (cert && cert.fingerprint256) return cert.fingerprint256;
+      }
+    } catch (_e) { /* drop-silent */ }
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  send(data, opts) {
+    if (this._readyState !== "open") {
+      throw new WsClientError("ws-client/not-open",
+        "send: socket is not open (readyState=" + this._readyState + ")");
+    }
+    opts = opts || {};
+    var isBinary = Buffer.isBuffer(data);
+    var payload;
+    if (isBinary) {
+      payload = data;
+    } else if (typeof data === "string") {
+      payload = Buffer.from(data, "utf8");
+    } else {
+      payload = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(data), "utf8");
+    }
+    if (payload.length > this._opts.maxMessageBytes) {
+      throw new WsClientError("ws-client/payload-too-big",
+        "send: payload exceeds maxMessageBytes (" + this._opts.maxMessageBytes + ")");
+    }
+    this._sendFrame(isBinary ? OPCODE_BINARY : OPCODE_TEXT, payload, { fin: true });
+  }
+
+  ping(payload) {
+    if (this._readyState !== "open") return;
+    this._sendFrame(OPCODE_PING, payload || Buffer.alloc(0), { fin: true });
+  }
+
+  close(code, reason) {
+    // Operator-initiated close cancels any pending reconnect — once
+    // close() is called, the operator wants this client retired.
+    this._cancelReconnect();
+    if (this._readyState === "closed" || this._readyState === "closing") {
+      // Even when already closed, ensure we mark as fully retired so
+      // a previously-scheduled reconnect can't fire after close().
+      this._closed = true;
+      return;
+    }
+    code = (typeof code === "number") ? code : CLOSE_NORMAL;
+    reason = (typeof reason === "string") ? reason : "";
+    // RFC 6455 §5.5: control frames must be <= 125 bytes total. The
+    // close payload is 2 status bytes + UTF-8 reason; that gives us
+    // 123 bytes for the reason. Truncate at the BYTE level rather
+    // than character level since a 123-byte UTF-8 sequence might end
+    // mid-codepoint — to be RFC-safe we truncate at code-point
+    // boundaries.
+    var rb = Buffer.from(reason, "utf8");
+    if (rb.length > 123) {                                                                // allow:raw-byte-literal — RFC 6455 §5.5 (125 - 2)
+      // Truncate at last complete codepoint within 123 bytes. Use a
+      // fatal TextDecoder to validate; back off one byte at a time
+      // until the slice decodes cleanly. Bounded by [123 - 3, 123]
+      // since a single UTF-8 codepoint is at most 4 bytes.
+      var fatal = new TextDecoder("utf-8", { fatal: true });
+      var truncated = rb.subarray(0, 123);                                                // allow:raw-byte-literal — RFC 6455 §5.5
+      for (var bi = 0; bi < 4; bi += 1) {                                                 // allow:raw-byte-literal — max UTF-8 codepoint width
+        try { fatal.decode(truncated); break; }
+        catch (_e) { truncated = truncated.subarray(0, truncated.length - 1); }
+      }
+      rb = truncated;
+    }
+    var payload = Buffer.alloc(2 + rb.length);                                            // allow:raw-byte-literal — RFC 6455 close-frame layout
+    payload.writeUInt16BE(code, 0);
+    rb.copy(payload, 2);                                                                  // allow:raw-byte-literal — RFC 6455 close-frame layout
+    this._readyState = "closing";
+    this._sendFrame(OPCODE_CLOSE, payload, { fin: true });
+    var self = this;
+    setTimeout(function () { self._teardown(code, reason, false); }, 1000).unref();       // allow:raw-byte-literal — graceful close grace window
+  }
+
+  _teardown(code, reason, willReconnect) {
+    if (this._closed && !willReconnect) return;
+    this._closed = !willReconnect;
+    if (this._socket && !this._socket.destroyed) {
+      try { this._socket.destroy(); } catch (_e) { /* drop-silent */ }
+    }
+    if (this._pingTimer)      { try { this._pingTimer.stop(); } catch (_e) { /* drop-silent */ } this._pingTimer = null; }
+    if (this._handshakeTimer) { clearTimeout(this._handshakeTimer); this._handshakeTimer = null; }
+    this._readyState = "closed";
+    this._parser = null;
+    this._fragmentChunks = [];
+    this._fragmentOpcode = null;
+    if (this._opts.auditOn) {
+      try {
+        audit().safeEmit({
+          action:  "wsclient.closed",
+          outcome: "success",
+          actor:   null,
+          metadata: { code: code, reason: reason, host: this._opts.parsedUrl.host },
+        });
+      } catch (_e) { /* drop-silent */ }
+    }
+    this.emit("close", code, reason);
+    if (willReconnect) this._scheduleReconnect();
+  }
+
+  _handleSocketError(err) {
+    // Swallow post-close socket errors. After a consumer-initiated
+    // close() the framework waits for the server to send back its
+    // close frame; if the server tears down its end with an
+    // ECONNRESET / EPIPE / "premature close" instead of a graceful
+    // close frame, the underlying socket emits an error that bubbles
+    // up here. From the consumer's perspective the close already
+    // happened — surfacing a "socket error" event after `close` was
+    // called is noise that hides real bugs.
+    if (this._closed && err && (
+        err.code === "ECONNRESET" || err.code === "EPIPE" ||
+        err.code === "ECONNABORTED" || err.code === "ERR_STREAM_PREMATURE_CLOSE")) {
+      return;
+    }
+    var permanent = _isPermanentError(err);
+    if (this._opts.auditOn) {
+      try {
+        audit().safeEmit({
+          action:  "wsclient.error",
+          outcome: "failure",
+          actor:   null,
+          metadata: {
+            host:     this._opts.parsedUrl.host,
+            code:     err && err.code || "unknown",
+            message:  err && err.message || String(err),
+            attempt:  this._reconnectAttempt,
+            bytesSent:     this._bytesSent,
+            bytesReceived: this._bytesReceived,
+            permanent:     permanent,
+          },
+        });
+      } catch (_e) { /* drop-silent */ }
+    }
+    this.emit("error", err);
+    var rOpts = this._opts.reconnectOpts;
+    var willReconnect = rOpts.enabled &&
+                        !permanent &&
+                        this._reconnectAttempt < rOpts.maxAttempts &&
+                        !this._closed;
+    this._teardown(CLOSE_ABNORMAL, err.message || "error", willReconnect);
+  }
+
+  _scheduleReconnect() {
+    var rOpts = this._opts.reconnectOpts;
+    this._reconnectAttempt += 1;
+    var attempt = Math.min(this._reconnectAttempt, 30);                                   // allow:raw-byte-literal — clamp 2^attempt overflow
+    var ceiling = Math.min(rOpts.maxMs, rOpts.baseMs * Math.pow(2, attempt - 1));
+    var delay   = Math.floor(Math.random() * ceiling);                                    // allow:math-random-noncrypto — backoff jitter, not security
+    var self = this;
+    this._reconnectTimer = setTimeout(function () {
+      self._reconnectTimer = null;
+      if (self._closed) return;                                                           // operator-cancelled in flight
+      self._dial();
+    }, delay);
+    if (typeof this._reconnectTimer.unref === "function") this._reconnectTimer.unref();
+    this.emit("reconnecting", { attempt: this._reconnectAttempt, delayMs: delay });
+  }
+
+  _cancelReconnect() {
+    if (this._reconnectTimer) {
+      try { clearTimeout(this._reconnectTimer); } catch (_e) { /* drop-silent */ }
+      this._reconnectTimer = null;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Operator-facing API — cancel any pending reconnect AND mark the
+  // client closed so future scheduling is also blocked. Pairs with
+  // `close()` for "I want this client done, even mid-reconnect".
+  cancelReconnect() {
+    this._cancelReconnect();
+    this._closed = true;
+    return this;
+  }
+
+  _startHeartbeat() {
+    var self = this;
+    this._pongDeadline = Date.now() + this._opts.pongMs;
+    this._pingTimer = safeAsync.repeating(function () { self._heartbeat(); }, this._opts.pingMs);
+  }
+
+  _heartbeat() {
+    if (this._readyState !== "open") return;
+    if (Date.now() > this._pongDeadline) {
+      this._handleSocketError(new WsClientError("ws-client/pong-timeout",
+        "no pong received within " + this._opts.pongMs + "ms"));
+      return;
+    }
+    this._sendFrame(OPCODE_PING, Buffer.alloc(0), { fin: true });
+  }
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  connect:       connect,
+  WsClientError: WsClientError,
+  OPCODE_TEXT:   OPCODE_TEXT,
+  OPCODE_BINARY: OPCODE_BINARY,
+  CLOSE_NORMAL:  CLOSE_NORMAL,
+  CLOSE_GOING_AWAY: CLOSE_GOING_AWAY,
+  WS_GUID:       WS_GUID,
+};