@blamejs/blamejs-shop 0.0.127 → 0.0.128

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ upgrading across more than a few patches at a time.
 
 ## v0.0.x
 
+- v0.0.128 (2026-05-25) — **Collections — browse curated and smart product lists at /collections.** The storefront now has real collection pages. `/collections` lists the shop's active collections, and `/collections/:slug` shows a collection's products as a grid — resolving both operator-curated manual collections (hand-picked members) and smart collections (rule-matched against the catalog). The footer links to it from every page, so collections are a first-class browse entry point rather than a search query. Unknown or malformed collection slugs return 404, never a 500. **Added:** *Collection browse pages* — `GET /collections` renders the active collections as cards (title, description, hero); `GET /collections/:slug` renders the collection's product grid, reusing the standard product card (image, title, price, link to the PDP). Public pages — no sign-in. · *Manual + smart resolution* — Manual collections list their hand-picked members; smart collections evaluate their stored rules against the active catalog and apply the collection's sort strategy. The page resolves each product fresh, so archived products drop out of the grid. · *Footer entry point* — The footer's Shop column links to `/collections` on every storefront page (edge- and container-rendered alike), making collections a real browse path. A bad or unknown slug is a 404.
+
 - v0.0.127 (2026-05-24) — **Self-serve returns — customers request RMAs on their orders, operators approve and refund.** Signed-in customers can request a return against one of their own orders — pick the items and a reason at the order, then track status at /account/returns. Operators work the queue at /admin/returns: approve (with a refund amount), mark received, refund, or reject with a reason, following the pending → approved → received → refunded lifecycle. The customer request route loads the order and confirms it belongs to the signed-in customer before showing it, and builds the return lines from the order's own records, so a foreign or guessed order id returns 404 and a client can't return items it never bought. **Added:** *Customer return requests + status* — `/account/orders/:order_id/return` shows the order's items with a reason picker; `/account/returns` lists the customer's RMAs with status (pending / approved / received / refunded / rejected) and any rejection reason. The account dashboard links to it. Empty selection or a bad reason re-renders the form with the message. · *Operator return queue* — `GET /admin/returns?status=pending` lists the queue across all orders; `GET /admin/returns/:id` reads one; `POST /admin/returns/:id/approve` (with refund amount), `/received`, `/refund`, and `/reject` (with reason) walk the lifecycle. Bearer-token-gated; an illegal transition is a 409 and a bad id a 404, never a 500. · *`returns.listByStatus(status, opts)`* — Lists return authorizations across all orders by status, newest first, with the same opaque cursor as `listForCustomer`. Backs the operator queue.
 
 - v0.0.126 (2026-05-24) — **Address book — saved shipping and billing addresses on the account page.** Signed-in customers can now keep a book of addresses at /account/addresses: add, edit, set a default shipping or billing address, and remove. Addresses are per-customer; every action that targets a specific address first confirms it belongs to the signed-in customer, so a guessed id can't read or change someone else's address. **Added:** *Address book at `/account/addresses`* — List, add, and edit saved addresses (recipient, company, two street lines, city, region, postal code, ISO country, phone). The account dashboard links to it. A blank product catalog isn't required — this is account surface only. · *Default shipping / billing* — Mark one address as the default shipping and one as the default billing; promoting a new default clears the previous one. Surfaced as badges on each card. · *Ownership-checked mutations* — Edit, update, set-default, and remove all resolve the address by id and verify it belongs to the signed-in customer before acting — a foreign or guessed id returns 404, never another customer's data. Add/edit re-render the form with the validation message on bad input.

package/README.md

@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ Every primitive is composed on the vendored blamejs surface — no npm runtime d
 | **`lib/save-for-later.js`** | Per-customer cart holding list. Each cart line gets a login-gated "Save for later" control (`POST /cart/lines/:id/save` → `moveFromCart`); `/account/saved` lists items with Move-to-cart / Remove. `moveToCart` reprices to the current catalog price and stock-gates (out-of-stock + non-backorderable is refused). Composes `catalog.inventory` + `catalog.prices` + `catalog.variants`. |
 | **`lib/addresses.js`** | Per-customer address book at `/account/addresses` — add / edit / set default shipping or billing / remove. One-default-per-role invariant (promoting clears the prior). Every by-id route confirms the address belongs to the signed-in customer before acting (a guessed id returns 404). `b.guardUuid` ids, 2-char ISO country. |
 | **`lib/returns.js`** | Self-serve RMAs. Customer requests a return against their own order at `/account/orders/:id/return` (items + reason, ownership-checked, lines built from the order's own records) and tracks status at `/account/returns`. Operators work `/admin/returns` — approve (refund amount) / mark received / refund / reject — over the pending → approved → received → refunded FSM; illegal transitions are 409, bad ids 404. |
+| **`lib/collections.js`** | Curated + smart product groupings. `GET /collections` lists the shop's active collections; `GET /collections/:slug` renders the grid — manual collections list hand-picked members, smart collections evaluate stored rules against the active catalog and apply the collection's sort strategy. Each product resolves fresh, so archived products drop out. Public, no sign-in; a bad or unknown slug is a 404 (never a 500). Linked from the footer on every page. |
 | **`lib/subscriptions.js`** | Stripe-backed recurring billing — `subscription_plans` (interval / amount / trial) + `subscriptions` (mirrors Stripe's object byte-for-byte). `subscriptions.create` POSTs to Stripe via the payment dep, then persists the returned object locally. `handleStripeEvent` replays `customer.subscription.*` events into the local row so the shop has an authoritative view without round-tripping. |
 | **`lib/newsletter.js`** | Operator-collected email broadcast list — `signup({ email, source })` composes `b.guardEmail` for shape validation, `b.crypto.namespaceHash` for the dedup key, and `INSERT OR IGNORE` for idempotency. Storefront POST `/newsletter` route renders a designed thank-you card with separate copy for the `new` vs `dedup` branches. |
 | **`lib/admin.js`** | Bearer-token-gated CRUD over catalog + orders + refunds + bulk CSV import + subscription plans + review moderation + return moderation. Token compared via `b.crypto.timingSafeEqual`. Errors as RFC 9457 problem documents via `b.problemDetails`. Audit emission on every mutation. |
@@ -90,6 +91,7 @@ Every primitive is composed on the vendored blamejs surface — no npm runtime d
 - `migrations-d1/0041_save_for_later.sql` — per-customer cart holding list (price snapshot + source line)
 - `migrations-d1/0026_customer_addresses.sql` — per-customer address book (default shipping/billing flags)
 - `migrations-d1/0023_returns.sql` — return authorizations + lines (RMA lifecycle FSM)
+- `migrations-d1/0043_collections.sql` — manual + smart product collections (members + rules + sort strategy)
 
 ### Demo seed
 

package/lib/storefront.js

@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ var LAYOUT =
   "        <h4>Shop</h4>\n" +
   "        <ul>\n" +
   "          <li><a href=\"/\">All products</a></li>\n" +
+  "          <li><a href=\"/collections\">Collections</a></li>\n" +
   "          <li><a href=\"/?sort=new\">New arrivals</a></li>\n" +
   "          <li><a href=\"/?sort=sale\">On sale</a></li>\n" +
   "          <li><a href=\"/cart\">Cart</a></li>\n" +
@@ -1134,6 +1135,70 @@ function renderAddresses(opts) {
   });
 }
 
+// Storefront collection index — operator-curated + smart product lists.
+function renderCollectionList(opts) {
+  var esc = _b().template.escapeHtml;
+  var cols = opts.collections || [];
+  var cardsHtml = "";
+  for (var i = 0; i < cols.length; i += 1) {
+    var c = cols[i];
+    var media = c.hero_image_url
+      ? "<figure class=\"collection-index-card__media\"><img src=\"" + esc((opts.asset_prefix || "/assets/") + c.hero_image_url) + "\" alt=\"" + esc(c.title) + "\" loading=\"lazy\"></figure>"
+      : "<figure class=\"collection-index-card__media collection-index-card__media--empty\" aria-hidden=\"true\"></figure>";
+    cardsHtml +=
+      "<a class=\"collection-index-card\" href=\"/collections/" + esc(c.slug) + "\">" +
+        media +
+        "<div class=\"collection-index-card__meta\">" +
+          "<h2 class=\"collection-index-card__title\">" + esc(c.title) + "</h2>" +
+          (c.description ? "<p class=\"collection-index-card__desc\">" + esc(c.description) + "</p>" : "") +
+        "</div>" +
+      "</a>";
+  }
+  var inner = cardsHtml
+    ? "<div class=\"collection-index-grid\">" + cardsHtml + "</div>"
+    : "<p class=\"collection-empty\">No collections yet.</p>";
+  var body =
+    "<section class=\"collection-index\">" +
+      "<header class=\"section-head\"><p class=\"eyebrow\">Browse</p>" +
+        "<h1 class=\"section-head__title\">Collections</h1></header>" +
+      inner +
+    "</section>";
+  return _wrap({
+    title: "Collections", shop_name: opts.shop_name || "blamejs.shop",
+    cart_count: opts.cart_count == null ? 0 : opts.cart_count, theme_css: opts.theme_css, body: body,
+  });
+}
+
+// A single collection's page — title + description + product grid. The
+// route resolves each member product into the { slug, title, price,
+// image_url } shape `_buildProductCard` expects.
+function renderCollection(opts) {
+  var esc = _b().template.escapeHtml;
+  var col = opts.collection;
+  var products = opts.products || [];
+  var cards = products.map(function (p) { return _buildProductCard(p); }).join("");
+  var grid = cards
+    ? "<div class=\"catalog-grid collection-grid\">" + cards + "</div>"
+    : "<p class=\"collection-empty\">No products in this collection yet.</p>";
+  var body =
+    "<section class=\"collection-page\">" +
+      "<nav class=\"breadcrumb\" aria-label=\"Breadcrumb\"><ol>" +
+        "<li><a href=\"/\">Shop</a></li>" +
+        "<li><a href=\"/collections\">Collections</a></li>" +
+        "<li aria-current=\"page\">" + esc(col.title) + "</li>" +
+      "</ol></nav>" +
+      "<header class=\"collection-page__head\">" +
+        "<h1 class=\"collection-page__title\">" + esc(col.title) + "</h1>" +
+        (col.description ? "<p class=\"collection-page__desc\">" + esc(col.description) + "</p>" : "") +
+      "</header>" +
+      grid +
+    "</section>";
+  return _wrap({
+    title: col.title, shop_name: opts.shop_name || "blamejs.shop",
+    cart_count: opts.cart_count == null ? 0 : opts.cart_count, theme_css: opts.theme_css, body: body,
+  });
+}
+
 var RETURN_REASONS = [
   ["defective", "Defective / doesn't work"],
   ["wrong-item", "Wrong item received"],
@@ -2471,6 +2536,69 @@ function mount(router, deps) {
     _send(res, 200, html);
   });
 
+  // Collections — operator-curated + smart product lists. Public browse
+  // pages; mounted when the collections primitive is wired.
+  if (deps.collections) {
+    var _collAssetPrefix = deps.asset_prefix || "/assets/";
+
+    // Decorate a product id into the { slug, title, price, image_url }
+    // shape _buildProductCard expects. Returns null for an archived /
+    // missing product so it drops out of the grid.
+    async function _decorateCollectionProduct(pid) {
+      var product = await deps.catalog.products.get(pid);
+      if (!product || product.status !== "active") return null;
+      var priceStr = "—";
+      var variants = await deps.catalog.variants.listForProduct(pid);
+      if (variants.length) {
+        var pr = await deps.catalog.prices.current(variants[0].id, "USD");
+        if (pr) priceStr = pricing.format(pr.amount_minor, pr.currency);
+      }
+      var media = await deps.catalog.media.listForProduct(pid);
+      var hero = media.length ? media[0] : null;
+      return {
+        slug:      product.slug,
+        title:     product.title,
+        price:     priceStr,
+        image_url: hero ? (_collAssetPrefix + hero.r2_key) : null,
+        image_alt: hero ? (hero.alt_text || product.title) : null,
+      };
+    }
+
+    router.get("/collections", async function (req, res) {
+      var cols = await deps.collections.list({ active_only: true });
+      var cartCount = await _cartCountForReq(req);
+      _send(res, 200, renderCollectionList({
+        collections: cols, shop_name: shopName, cart_count: cartCount, asset_prefix: _collAssetPrefix,
+      }));
+    });
+
+    router.get("/collections/:slug", async function (req, res) {
+      var slug = req.params && req.params.slug;
+      // get() and productsIn() both throw on a malformed slug (the
+      // primitive validates shape). A bad path segment is a 404, not a
+      // 500 — the route is a defensive request-shape reader.
+      var col, result;
+      try {
+        col = slug ? await deps.collections.get(slug) : null;
+        if (!col || col.archived_at != null) return _send(res, 404, renderNotFound({ shop_name: shopName, theme: theme }));
+        result = await deps.collections.productsIn({ slug: slug, limit: 24 });
+      } catch (e) {
+        if (e instanceof TypeError) return _send(res, 404, renderNotFound({ shop_name: shopName, theme: theme }));
+        throw e;
+      }
+      var products = [];
+      for (var i = 0; i < result.rows.length; i += 1) {
+        var pid = result.rows[i].product_id || result.rows[i].id;
+        var card = await _decorateCollectionProduct(pid);
+        if (card) products.push(card);
+      }
+      var cartCount = await _cartCountForReq(req);
+      _send(res, 200, renderCollection({
+        collection: col, products: products, shop_name: shopName, cart_count: cartCount,
+      }));
+    });
+  }
+
   router.get("/cart", async function (req, res) {
     var sid = _readSidCookie(req);
     if (!sid) {

package/lib/vendor/MANIFEST.json

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
   "_about": "blamejs.shop vendors a single framework — blamejs — which itself bundles every server-side crypto/identity dependency. The transitive packages blamejs ships are surfaced in its own MANIFEST.json at lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/vendor/MANIFEST.json — Trivy / Grype rely on that nested data for CVE attribution.",
   "packages": {
     "blamejs": {
-      "version": "0.12.33",
-      "tag": "v0.12.33",
+      "version": "0.12.39",
+      "tag": "v0.12.39",
       "license": "Apache-2.0",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "source": "https://github.com/blamejs/blamejs",
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
         "server": "lib/vendor/blamejs/"
       },
       "bundler": "shallow git clone of release tag from github.com/blamejs/blamejs",
-      "bundledAt": "2026-05-24"
+      "bundledAt": "2026-05-25"
     }
   }
 }

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -8,6 +8,18 @@ upgrading across more than a few patches at a time.
 
 ## v0.12.x
 
+- v0.12.39 (2026-05-24) — **`b.vc` — W3C Verifiable Credentials 2.0 (issue / verify, JOSE + COSE securing).** Issue and verify W3C Verifiable Credentials (VC Data Model 2.0, a W3C Recommendation) secured per Securing Verifiable Credentials using JOSE and COSE (VC-JOSE-COSE, also a W3C Recommendation, May 2025). A verifiable credential is a tamper-evident, signed set of claims an issuer makes about a subject — a diploma, a membership, a license, an age assertion. Two securing mechanisms are supported, both signing the credential itself (no JWT/CWT claims wrapper): JOSE produces a compact JWS with the vc+jwt media type, signed with ES256/384/512 or EdDSA; COSE produces a COSE_Sign1 (application/vc+cose) over b.cose, which also accepts ML-DSA-87 for PQC-forward deployments. b.vc.verify auto-detects the form from the input, requires an algorithm allowlist, always refuses the JOSE none algorithm, re-checks the VCDM 2.0 structural rules, and enforces the validFrom / validUntil window. This is the W3C credential model, distinct from the IETF SD-JWT VC already at b.auth.sdJwtVc. Composes b.cose; no new runtime dependency. **Added:** *`b.vc.issue(credential, opts)` / `b.vc.verify(secured, opts)`* — `issue` validates the credential against the VCDM 2.0 structural rules (the `credentials/v2` context first, a `VerifiableCredential` type, an issuer, a credential subject) and signs it: `securing: "jose"` returns a compact JWS string (`typ` header `vc+jwt`), `securing: "cose"` returns COSE_Sign1 bytes (`typ` header `application/vc+cose`, content type `application/vc`) via `b.cose`. The credential is the exact signed payload — no JWT/CWT claims are injected. `verify` auto-detects the securing form from the input (compact-JWS string vs. COSE_Sign1 bytes), verifies the signature against the mandatory `opts.algorithms` allowlist (the JOSE `none` algorithm is always refused), re-checks the structural rules, enforces the `validFrom` / `validUntil` window against `opts.at` (default now; must be a valid Date), and optionally matches `opts.expectedIssuer` against the credential issuer id. Returns `{ credential, securing, alg, issuer }`.
+
+- v0.12.38 (2026-05-24) — **`b.tsa` — RFC 3161 trusted timestamping client (build / parse / verify).** A timestamp authority binds a hash of your data to a trusted time, producing a token that proves the data existed at that instant — timestamp a release artifact, an audit-log checkpoint, a b.scitt signed statement, or a contract. b.tsa is the requester/verifier side of RFC 3161: buildRequest produces the DER TimeStampReq (the message imprint plus an optional nonce and a cert request), parseResponse reads the TimeStampResp (PKIStatus, failure-info bits, and the token), and verifyToken checks a token against your data and returns the asserted time. Verification is done in full per §2.4.2 / §2.3: the token is a CMS SignedData (b.cms) whose eContentType must be id-ct-TSTInfo; the message imprint must equal the hash of your data (constant-time); a sent nonce must round-trip; the signer certificate's extendedKeyUsage must be a critical, sole id-kp-timeStamping; and the CMS signature over the signed attributes must verify after the messageDigest attribute is matched to the recomputed eContent digest. An optional trust-anchor set verifies the certificate chain and validity at the asserted time. The HTTP transport to the TSA is the operator's to make. Composes b.cms and the in-tree ASN.1 DER codec; no new runtime dependency. **Added:** *`b.tsa.buildRequest(data, opts?)` / `b.tsa.parseResponse(der)` / `b.tsa.verifyToken(token, opts)`* — `buildRequest` returns `{ der, nonce, hashAlg, messageImprint }`; the imprint hash defaults to SHA-512 and may be SHA-256/384/512 or SHA3-256/512, a random 64-bit nonce and a certificate request are included by default, and a pre-hashed input is accepted with `hashed: true`. `parseResponse` returns `{ granted, status, statusString, failInfo, token }`, decoding the PKIFailureInfo bits for a non-granted response rather than throwing. `verifyToken` enforces the imprint match (`opts.data` or `opts.hash`), the nonce round-trip, the critical/sole `id-kp-timeStamping` EKU, and the CMS signature, returning `{ genTime, policy, serialHex, accuracy, hashAlg, signerCertPem }`; pass `opts.trustAnchorsPem` to also verify the certificate chain and validity at the asserted time. Timestamp tokens are third-party artifacts, so verification accepts the classical RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS) and ECDSA-over-SHA-2 signatures that public TSAs emit — the same consume-what-exists posture as `b.cose` verification, not a framework signing default.
+
+- v0.12.37 (2026-05-24) — **`b.scitt.signStatement` / `b.scitt.verifyStatement` — SCITT signed statements over COSE (RFC 9052 + RFC 9597).** A SCITT signed statement is a signed, attributable claim about an artifact — a signed SBOM, a build attestation, a release approval. It is a COSE_Sign1 (b.cose) whose integrity-protected CWT_Claims header (label 15, RFC 9597) binds the issuer (who makes the statement) and the subject (the artifact it is about); the artifact, or a hash/reference to it, is the payload. signStatement places iss/sub in the protected header and declares the payload media type; verifyStatement checks the COSE signature (the algorithm allowlist is mandatory) and refuses any statement that lacks the iss/sub binding, with optional expected-issuer/subject matching. Signing uses the same algorithms as b.cose — classical ES256/384/512 + EdDSA (final COSE ids, interoperable today) plus ML-DSA-87 (PQC-forward). This is the issuer side of SCITT, buildable today on finalized RFCs; the transparency receipt (an inclusion proof from a transparency service, the COSE Receipts draft) is not yet shipped — a statement produced here is the input a transparency service registers, and the receipt format is the part still in flux. It opts in when COSE Receipts publishes. **Added:** *`b.scitt.signStatement(payload, opts)` / `b.scitt.verifyStatement(statement, opts)`* — `signStatement` produces a COSE_Sign1 whose protected CWT_Claims header (label 15) carries `iss` (`opts.issuer`) and `sub` (`opts.subject`), with the payload media type declared via `opts.contentType` and extra CWT claims allowed by integer label (iss/sub cannot be overridden through `opts.claims`). `verifyStatement` verifies the signature through `b.cose.verify` (passing `opts.algorithms` as the mandatory allowlist), then requires a CWT_Claims header with both `iss` and `sub` — a bare COSE_Sign1 with no such binding is refused with `scitt/missing-cwt-claims` — and enforces `expectedIssuer` / `expectedSubject` when given. Returns `{ payload, issuer, subject, cwtClaims, alg, protectedHeaders, unprotectedHeaders }`. Because the identity binding lives in the integrity-protected header it is covered by the signature and cannot be substituted without detection. **Changed:** *`b.cose.sign` accepts `protectedHeaders` and a media-type-string `contentType`* — `opts.protectedHeaders` (a numeric-keyed object or Map) adds extra integrity-protected header parameters — the CWT_Claims map (label 15) is the SCITT case. Label 1 (alg) is reserved and managed via `opts.alg`; setting it through `protectedHeaders` is refused with `cose/reserved-header`. `opts.contentType` now accepts a media-type string (RFC 9052 §3.1 tstr form, e.g. `"application/spdx+json"`) in addition to a CoAP Content-Format uint; a string was previously dropped.
+
+- v0.12.36 (2026-05-24) — **`b.cose.encrypt0` / `b.cose.decrypt0` — COSE_Encrypt0 single-recipient AEAD (RFC 9052 §5.2).** Completes the COSE family with encryption alongside the v0.12.33 signing: COSE_Encrypt0 is the single-recipient AEAD container where the recipient already holds the symmetric key (direct mode). The default algorithm is ChaCha20/Poly1305 (COSE alg 24) — AES-GCM stays opt-in, since hard-rule #2 forbids AES-GCM as a default. The Enc_structure (`["Encrypt0", protected, external_aad]`) is bound as the AEAD associated data so the algorithm + any external context are authenticated, and the authentication tag is appended to the ciphertext per COSE. Composes the in-tree `b.cbor` codec and `node:crypto` AEAD. **Added:** *`b.cose.encrypt0(plaintext, opts)` / `b.cose.decrypt0(coseEncrypt0, opts)`* — `encrypt0` produces a tagged COSE_Encrypt0 with `alg` in the protected header and a random 12-byte IV in the unprotected header (label 5); `alg` is `"ChaCha20-Poly1305"` (default), `"A256GCM"`, or `"A128GCM"`, with the key length enforced (32 / 16 bytes). `decrypt0` reads the algorithm from the protected header (must be in the required `opts.algorithms` allowlist), reconstructs the Enc_structure as the AEAD AAD, and returns `{ plaintext, alg, protectedHeaders, unprotectedHeaders }`; a wrong key, tampered ciphertext, or `external_aad` mismatch fails AEAD authentication and is refused with `cose/decrypt-failed`. `external_aad` binds request context into the tag.
+
+- v0.12.35 (2026-05-24) — **`b.eat` — Entity Attestation Token (RFC 9711) over `b.cwt`.** An EAT is the token a Relying Party asks a device or software entity to produce to prove what it is and what state it is in — a freshness nonce, a Universal Entity ID, OEM / hardware identifiers, debug status, software measurements, and nested submodule attestations. `b.eat` is the RFC 9711 profile over the v0.12.34 `b.cwt`: it maps the EAT claim names to their IANA CWT claim-key integer labels and adds the attestation-specific verification on top of the CWT signature + time checks. The central control is the verifier-nonce binding: when the Relying Party supplies a fresh `expectedNonce`, the token's `eat_nonce` (claim 10) must match it (constant-time compare) — without it a captured attestation replays forever. `verify` also enforces a debug-status policy (`requireDebugDisabled` refuses an `enabled` or absent `dbgstat`) and pins the `eat_profile`. RFC 9711 is a finalized standard; signing follows `b.cwt` / `b.cose` (ES256/384/512 + EdDSA interoperable today, ML-DSA-87 PQC-forward). **Added:** *`b.eat.sign(claims, opts)` / `b.eat.verify(eat, opts)`* — `sign` maps EAT claim names (`nonce`, `ueid`, `oemid`, `hwmodel`, `dbgstat`, `eat_profile`, `swname`/`swversion`, `measurements`, `submods`, …) to their RFC 9711 integer labels and accepts the `dbgstat` enum by name (`disabled-since-boot` → 2); standard CWT claims (`iss` / `exp` / …) pass through. `verify` returns `{ claims, raw, alg, protectedHeaders }` with the labels mapped back to friendly names and `dbgstat` decoded to its enum name. Attestation enforcement: `expectedNonce` requires a matching `eat_nonce` (refused `eat/nonce-mismatch`, missing `eat/nonce-missing` — `eat_nonce` may be a single byte string or an array for multiple verifiers), `requireDebugDisabled` refuses a non-disabled `dbgstat` (`eat/debug-not-disabled`), and `expectedProfile` pins `eat_profile`. The signature, algorithm allowlist, and `exp`/`nbf` checks delegate to `b.cwt` / `b.cose`. · *`b.cwt.sign` accepts a `Map`* — `b.cwt.sign` now takes either a plain object (string keys, standard claims mapped by name) or a `Map`, which preserves integer claim keys verbatim — profiles like `b.eat` resolve their claim names to integer labels and pass them through without the keys being stringified. The plain-object path is unchanged.
+
+- v0.12.34 (2026-05-24) — **`b.cwt` — CBOR Web Token (RFC 8392) sign / verify over `b.cose`.** A CWT is the CBOR-native counterpart to JWT — a signed claims set for constrained / IoT, FIDO attestation, and verifiable-credential contexts. `b.cwt` composes the v0.12.33 `b.cose` (COSE_Sign1 signature + mandatory algorithm allowlist) and v0.12.32 `b.cbor` (deterministic claims encoding) and layers the standard-claim handling on top: `sign` takes a friendly claims object, maps the standard claims to their RFC 8392 §3.1.1 integer labels (iss=1, sub=2, aud=3, exp=4, nbf=5, iat=6, cti=7), and signs; `verify` checks the COSE signature, decodes the claims, and enforces the time + identity claims — a passed `exp` (with clock-skew tolerance), a future `nbf`, and an `iss` / `aud` mismatch against the expected values are each refused. Signing algorithms follow `b.cose`: classical ES256/384/512 + EdDSA (final COSE ids, interoperable today) and ML-DSA-87 (PQC-forward). RFC 8392 is a finalized standard, so CWTs produced here interoperate with other COSE/CWT implementations. **Added:** *`b.cwt.sign(claims, opts)` / `b.cwt.verify(cwt, opts)`* — `sign` maps standard claim names to integer labels and keeps custom claims verbatim; `exp` / `nbf` / `iat` must be non-negative integer NumericDates. `opts.tagged` wraps the COSE_Sign1 in the CWT CBOR tag 61 (RFC 8392 §6); `verify` accepts tagged or bare input. `verify` returns `{ claims, raw, alg, protectedHeaders }` — `claims` is the friendly object (labels mapped back to names), `raw` the integer-keyed Map. Standard-claim enforcement: `exp` past `now + clockSkewSec` (default 60s) is refused with `cwt/expired`, `nbf` beyond `now - skew` with `cwt/not-yet-valid`, and `expectedIssuer` / `expectedAudience` mismatches with `cwt/issuer-mismatch` / `cwt/audience-mismatch` (aud may be a single value or an array). `opts.now` overrides the clock for testing. The signature itself is verified by `b.cose.verify`, so a tampered token fails there.
+
 - v0.12.33 (2026-05-24) — **`b.cose` — COSE_Sign1 sign / verify (RFC 9052) over the in-tree CBOR codec.** COSE is the signed-statement substrate under SCITT, CWT, and C2PA — the CBOR-native counterpart to JWS. `b.cose` ships COSE_Sign1 signing and verification composing the v0.12.32 `b.cbor` codec for the deterministic Sig_structure encoding. It signs with the classical COSE algorithms that interoperate today — ES256 / ES384 / ES512 (ECDSA) and EdDSA (Ed25519), all with final IANA algorithm ids (RFC 9053) — and with ML-DSA-87 (FIPS 204) for PQC-forward deployments. Verification accepts the same set, so the framework both produces COSE other implementations read today and consumes third-party COSE. There is no classical default: the caller names the algorithm and supplies the key. **Added:** *`b.cose.sign(payload, opts)` / `b.cose.verify(coseSign1, opts)`* — `sign` produces a tagged COSE_Sign1 with `alg` in the integrity-protected header; `verify` returns `{ payload, alg, protectedHeaders, unprotectedHeaders }`. The Sig_structure (`["Signature1", protected, external_aad, payload]`) is deterministically CBOR-encoded; ECDSA signatures use the IEEE-P1363 fixed-width encoding COSE mandates (RFC 9053 §2.1), not ASN.1 DER. `external_aad` is bound into the signature. v1 is single-signer with an attached payload; detached payload, COSE_Sign (multi-signer), COSE_Mac0, and COSE_Encrypt are deferred-with-condition (operator demand). **Security:** *Bounded, alg-allowlisted, crit-checked verification* — `verify` decodes the COSE_Sign1 bytes AND the protected-header bstr through the bounded `b.cbor.decode` (depth + size caps, indefinite-length / tag / duplicate-key refusal). `opts.algorithms` is a required allowlist (no defaults — name the accepted algorithms). A `crit` header (label 2) listing a header label the verifier does not understand is refused (RFC 9052 §3.1 crit-bypass defense), as is a `crit` label absent from the protected header. The COSE algorithm switch refuses any unrecognized id at the default branch. · *ML-DSA-87 COSE algorithm id is a non-final draft* — ML-DSA-87 uses COSE algorithm id `-50`, a requested (non-final) IANA assignment from draft-ietf-cose-dilithium — an ML-DSA-87 COSE_Sign1 is not yet broadly interoperable and the id may change; it is pinned deliberately with the re-open condition being IANA finalization. SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f has no registered COSE algorithm id at all and cannot be represented in COSE. The COSE_Sign1 mechanism and the classical algorithms are stable; ML-DSA-87 is the forward-looking opt-in.
 
 - v0.12.32 (2026-05-24) — **`b.cbor` — bounded, deterministic in-tree CBOR codec (RFC 8949).** CBOR is the binary serialization underneath COSE (RFC 9052), CWT, SCITT, and WebAuthn attestation — a foundational substrate the framework needs in-tree to build signed-statement primitives without a third-party parser. `b.cbor` is that codec, bounded by default like every parser the framework ships: a binary decoder is attack surface, so the defaults refuse the shapes a hostile encoder uses to exhaust memory or stack. The encoder emits Deterministically Encoded CBOR (RFC 8949 §4.2) — shortest-form heads, definite lengths, map keys sorted by encoded bytes, no indefinite-length items — so two semantically-equal values encode to byte-identical output, the property COSE signatures and SCITT receipts depend on. **Added:** *`b.cbor.encode(value, opts?)` / `b.cbor.decode(buffer, opts?)` / `b.cbor.Tag`* — `encode` produces deterministic CBOR from numbers (integers + float64), bigint (64-bit range), strings, `Buffer` / `Uint8Array`, arrays, `Map` or plain objects, `b.cbor.Tag`, and the simple values. `decode` returns the value with maps decoded to a `Map` (CBOR keys may be integers — COSE header labels are) and byte strings to `Buffer`. `b.cbor.Tag(tag, value)` carries a major-type-6 tagged item. `decode(buf, { requireDeterministic: true })` additionally asserts the input was itself canonically encoded (decode → re-encode → byte-compare), refusing a non-canonical re-encoding on a signature-verify path where it would be a malleability vector. **Security:** *Bounded-by-default decoder* — `maxDepth` (default 64, ceiling 256) caps nesting against stack exhaustion; `maxBytes` (default 16 MiB, ceiling 64 MiB) caps total input, and a declared string / array / map length exceeding the remaining bytes is refused before any allocation (no length-prefix memory bomb). Indefinite-length items (additional-info 31) are refused — a streaming-complexity / DoS vector forbidden by deterministic encoding. Reserved additional-info (28–30) is refused. Tags are refused unless allowlisted via `allowedTags` (a tag triggers semantic reprocessing — an un-vetted tag is a confused-deputy vector). Duplicate map keys (RFC 8949 §5.6) and trailing bytes after the data item are refused.

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/README.md

@@ -126,7 +126,12 @@ The framework bundles the surface a typical Node app reaches for. Every primitiv
 - **JSON / SQL / schema** — `b.safeJson` (with `maxKeys` cap defending CVE-2026-21717 V8 HashDoS), `b.safeBuffer`, `b.safeSql`, `b.safeSchema`
 - **URL + path** — `b.safeUrl` (IDN mixed-script / homograph refuse); `b.safeJsonPath` (refuses filter `?(...)`, deep-scan `$..`, script-shape `(@.x)` for safe Postgres JSONB ops)
 - **Binary codec** — `b.cbor` bounded deterministic CBOR (RFC 8949 §4.2): depth/size caps, indefinite-length + reserved-info + tag + duplicate-key refusal, `requireDeterministic` canonical-form check; the in-tree substrate under COSE / CWT / SCITT / WebAuthn attestation
-- **COSE signing** — `b.cose` COSE_Sign1 sign/verify (RFC 9052) over `b.cbor`: classical ES256/384/512 + EdDSA (final COSE ids, interoperable today) plus ML-DSA-87 (PQC-forward, draft id); bounded + alg-allowlisted + crit-bypass-checked verification; the signed-statement substrate under SCITT / CWT / C2PA
+- **COSE signing + encryption** — `b.cose` COSE_Sign1 sign/verify + COSE_Encrypt0 (RFC 9052) over `b.cbor`: classical ES256/384/512 + EdDSA (final COSE ids, interoperable today) plus ML-DSA-87 (PQC-forward, draft id); bounded + alg-allowlisted + crit-bypass-checked verification; single-recipient AEAD (ChaCha20/Poly1305 default, AES-GCM opt-in) with Enc_structure-bound AAD; the signed-statement substrate under SCITT / CWT / C2PA
+- **CBOR Web Token** — `b.cwt` CWT sign/verify (RFC 8392) over `b.cose`: standard-claim mapping (iss/sub/aud/exp/nbf/iat/cti) + `exp`/`nbf` clock-skew enforcement + `iss`/`aud` matching; the CBOR-native JWT for constrained / IoT / FIDO / verifiable-credential contexts
+- **Entity Attestation Token** — `b.eat` EAT sign/verify (RFC 9711) over `b.cwt`: device + software attestation claims (ueid / oemid / hwmodel / measurements / submods) with verifier-nonce freshness binding, `dbgstat` debug-status policy, and `eat_profile` pinning
+- **SCITT signed statements** — `b.scitt` sign/verify a signed, attributable claim about an artifact (signed SBOM, build attestation, release approval) over `b.cose`: the issuer + subject bind in the integrity-protected CWT_Claims header (RFC 9597); verification refuses any statement missing the iss/sub binding. The issuer side, on finalized RFCs; the transparency receipt (COSE Receipts draft) opts in on publication
+- **Trusted timestamping** — `b.tsa` RFC 3161 timestamp client: `buildRequest` a TimeStampReq, `parseResponse`, and `verifyToken` against your data — the message imprint, sent nonce, critical/sole `id-kp-timeStamping` EKU, and CMS signature are all checked, with optional certificate-chain verification. Timestamp a release artifact, audit checkpoint, or signed statement against any RFC 3161 TSA. Composes `b.cms` + the in-tree ASN.1 DER codec
+- **Verifiable Credentials** — `b.vc` W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model 2.0 (VC-JOSE-COSE): `issue` / `verify` a signed credential as a compact JWS (`vc+jwt`, ES256/384/512 + EdDSA) or a COSE_Sign1 (`vc+cose`, + ML-DSA-87) over `b.cose`. VCDM structural + `validFrom`/`validUntil` checks; the JOSE `none` algorithm is always refused. The W3C model, distinct from the IETF SD-JWT VC at `b.auth.sdJwtVc`
 - **Document parsers** — `b.parsers` (XML / TOML / YAML / .env); `b.config` (schema-validated env)
 - **File-type detection** — `b.fileType` magic-byte content classification with deny-on-upload categories (image / document / archive / executable / etc.)
 ### Content-safety gates

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/SECURITY.md

@@ -377,6 +377,9 @@ This is the minimum-viable security posture for a production deployment. The fra
 - [ ] For long-running daemons exposing live metrics — use `b.metrics.snapshot.startWriter({ path, intervalMs, fields })` to flush an atomic JSON snapshot to disk; let a CLI/sidecar consume it via `b.metrics.snapshot.read(path)` + `b.metrics.snapshot.render(snap, { format: "prometheus" | "text" })`. Avoids opening an HTTP port for scrape access. Snapshot read uses `b.safeJson.parse` with a 4 MiB ceiling so a hostile writer with disk-write access can't OOM the reader
 - [ ] For decoding CBOR from untrusted sources (COSE / CWT / WebAuthn attestation objects, IoT payloads): use `b.cbor.decode(buffer, opts)` — bounded by default (depth + total-size caps, indefinite-length + reserved-info refusal), never a raw streaming parser. Allowlist only the tags you process via `allowedTags` (an un-vetted tag triggers semantic reprocessing — a confused-deputy vector), and on a signature-verify path pass `requireDeterministic: true` so a non-canonical re-encoding can't slip a malleable representation past the verifier
 - [ ] For verifying COSE_Sign1 (RFC 9052) signed statements (SCITT receipts, CWT, C2PA manifests): use `b.cose.verify(coseSign1, { algorithms, publicKey })` — `algorithms` is a required allowlist (no defaults, the alg-confusion defense), the COSE bytes + protected header decode through the bounded `b.cbor`, and a `crit` header naming a label the verifier doesn't understand is refused (§3.1 crit-bypass). Bind request context with `externalAad`. ML-DSA-87's COSE id is a non-final draft — prefer the classical ES256 / EdDSA ids for interoperable signing today
+- [ ] For COSE_Encrypt0 (RFC 9052 §5.2 single-recipient AEAD): use `b.cose.encrypt0` / `b.cose.decrypt0` — the default is ChaCha20/Poly1305 (AES-GCM is opt-in), the IV is generated fresh per call (never reuse an IV with the same key), and `decrypt0` requires an `algorithms` allowlist + reconstructs the Enc_structure as AAD so a wrong key / tampered ciphertext / AAD mismatch fails authentication. Pass `externalAad` to bind the ciphertext to its context
+- [ ] For CBOR Web Tokens (RFC 8392 — constrained / IoT / FIDO auth): verify with `b.cwt.verify(cwt, { algorithms, publicKey, expectedIssuer, expectedAudience })` — it enforces the COSE alg allowlist (via `b.cose.verify`), refuses an expired `exp` or future `nbf` (with a bounded `clockSkewSec`, default 60s), and refuses an `iss` / `aud` mismatch. Always pass `expectedIssuer` + `expectedAudience` for tokens you consume so a token minted for a different service or issuer can't be replayed against yours
+- [ ] For device / software attestation (RFC 9711 EAT): send the attester a fresh random nonce and verify the returned token with `b.eat.verify(eat, { algorithms, publicKey, expectedNonce, requireDebugDisabled: true })` — the `expectedNonce` binding is the freshness / anti-replay control (without it a captured attestation replays forever), and `requireDebugDisabled` refuses a device whose `dbgstat` is enabled or absent. Pin `expectedProfile` to the EAT profile you understand so a token built to a different profile's semantics isn't misinterpreted
 - [ ] For install-pipeline contexts that run BEFORE the framework is installed (Dockerfile build stages, `install.sh`, `update.sh`, SEA bundle verification) — use `b.selfUpdate.standaloneVerifier` (since v0.9.13). It's a zero-dep verifier (only `node:crypto` + `node:fs`) for ECDSA P-384 / Ed25519 / ML-DSA-87 signatures. Operators physically copy the file via `cp "$(node -p "require('@blamejs/core').selfUpdate.standaloneVerifier.path")" install/standalone-verifier.js` into their install pipeline alongside an operator-owned pubkey
 - [ ] For daemons that rotate TLS posture without restarting (pinset reload / certificate refresh / `C.TLS_GROUP_PREFERENCE` updates) — call `b.pqcAgent.reload()` after the posture change so the next `b.pqcAgent.agent` access rebuilds against current TLS state. Existing in-flight sockets complete naturally; idle keep-alive sockets are torn down
 - [ ] For SBOM regeneration / vendor-data integrity sweeps / release-asset bundling — use `b.crypto.hashFilesParallel(filePaths, { algorithms, concurrency, onProgress })` to hash N files in parallel in a single-pass per file. Operator-tunable concurrency cap (default `min(8, paths.length)`, range 1..256) + tunable algorithms list (default `["sha256", "sha3-512"]` for PQC-first + legacy compat). Returns rows in input order