@bitsocial/pubsub-votes 0.0.2

package/dist/client/voter.js

@@ -0,0 +1,1195 @@
+import pLimit from "p-limit";
+import { CriteriaSchema } from "../schema/criteria.js";
+import { VotesBundleSchema } from "../schema/votes.js";
+import { makeBucketMath } from "../chain/bucket.js";
+import { tickerForRef } from "../chain/ticker.js";
+import { requireHeliaServices } from "../transport/helia.js";
+import { makeBlockstoreBundleStore } from "../transport/bundle-store.js";
+import { makeRateLimiter } from "../transport/rate-limit.js";
+import { makeGossipGate } from "../transport/gossip-validator.js";
+import { makeVoteTransport } from "../transport/transport.js";
+import { decodeVoteMessage, decodeRootRecord, encodeRootRecord, maxBundleMessageBytes, rootFetchKey, MAX_ROOT_MESSAGE_BYTES, ROOT_FETCH_KEY_SUFFIX, ROOT_RECORD_VERSION } from "../transport/messages.js";
+import { makeRootChaser } from "../transport/chase.js";
+import { encodeBundle, decodeBundle, bundleCidForBytes } from "../crdt/codec.js";
+import { resolveRegistry, validateCriteriaRules } from "../rules/registry.js";
+import { makeVoteCrdt } from "../crdt/crdt.js";
+import { makeBundleVerifier } from "../verify/bundle.js";
+import { makeVerdictCache } from "../verify/cache.js";
+import { makePersistentGateResultCache, purgeExpiredGateResults } from "../verify/gate-result-cache.js";
+import { makeNameResolutionCache } from "../verify/name-resolution-cache.js";
+import { makeStorage } from "../storage/node.js";
+import { encode as encodeDagCbor } from "@ipld/dag-cbor";
+import { sha256 } from "viem";
+import { makeBackgroundVerifier } from "../verify/background.js";
+import { makeAcceptedDedup } from "../transport/accepted-dedup.js";
+import { encodeCheckpoint } from "../checkpoint/codec.js";
+import { CID } from "multiformats/cid";
+import { makeTally } from "../tally/tally.js";
+import { ballotTypedData } from "../signer/eip712.js";
+import { criteriaCid, TOPIC_PREFIX } from "../topic.js";
+import { ReadOnlyError, UnknownRuleError, VoterDestroyedError } from "../errors.js";
+/**
+ * The recommended cadence, in buckets, at which a client should re-publish a live vote to keep
+ * it alive: half its expiry window, rounded up. A bundle is valid for `voteExpiryBuckets` after
+ * its `blockNumber` (see DESIGN.md "Passive expiry"), so re-signing at the halfway point leaves
+ * one full missed cycle of slack before the vote decays. Derived per-contest from the criteria —
+ * there is no global interval.
+ *
+ * This library does NOT re-publish on its own: deciding when (or whether) to refresh a vote is
+ * the consuming client's job (see DESIGN.md "Republishing is the client's job"). This helper, the
+ * `blockNumber` on a published `VotesBundle`, and `criteria.voteExpiryBuckets` /
+ * `criteria.blocksPerBucket` are what a client uses to schedule its own refreshes: a vote sampled
+ * at bucket `b` expires once the current bucket exceeds `b + voteExpiryBuckets`; refresh by
+ * calling `createContestVote({ criteria, votes }).publish()` again before then.
+ */
+export function republishIntervalBuckets(criteria) {
+    return Math.ceil(criteria.voteExpiryBuckets / 2);
+}
+/**
+ * LRU bound for the voter's persisted gate results (all contests share the store; entries are a
+ * short key + a decimal score, so this is single-digit MB at worst). Deliberately far above the
+ * name cache's pkc-js-parity 5000: one directory join can write `boards × wallets` entries in a
+ * bucket, and the deterministic sample-block purge (not this bound) is the intended eviction.
+ */
+const GATE_RESULTS_MAX_ITEMS = 50_000;
+/** LRU bound for persisted name resolutions — pkc-js's `CACHE_MAX_ITEMS` for the same cache. */
+const NAME_RESOLUTIONS_MAX_ITEMS = 5_000;
+/** Hard per-message validation deadline (ms): the 10s budget for the verify pipeline in the gate. */
+const GATE_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;
+/** Concurrent in-flight verifications across the gate (chain reads + name resolution are RPC). */
+const GATE_CONCURRENCY = 8;
+/** Per-peer rate window for bundle-kind messages: how many one peer may make us validate per interval. */
+const GATE_RATE = { limit: 256, intervalMs: 10_000 };
+/**
+ * Per-peer rate window for root-kind messages. An honest heartbeat is ~1 per 10 minutes (plus a
+ * divergence response), so 4/min is ≫ any honest rate while flattening a root spray.
+ */
+const GATE_ROOT_RATE = { limit: 4, intervalMs: 60_000 };
+/** Cold-join fan-out: how many peers (per discovery source) we ask for their root record on start. */
+const COLD_START_PEERS = 4;
+/**
+ * Deadline (ms) for the cold-join HTTP content-router lookup. `findProviders` over a delegated
+ * router is a network call that can stall; on expiry the abort ends it and cold-start falls back to
+ * whatever the gossipsub-subscriber source and live gossip provide.
+ */
+const COLD_START_ROUTER_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;
+/**
+ * Root-record heartbeat interval (ms): 10 minutes — the IPNS-over-pubsub rebroadcast default
+ * (`go-libp2p-pubsub-router`) — jittered ±25% per firing, with suppression on top (skip when a
+ * matching root was heard this interval) so a converged topic stays near-silent. See DESIGN.md
+ * "Checkpoints" and "Transport constants (v1)".
+ */
+const HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS = 600_000;
+/**
+ * Cold-join fetch retry. A shared seeder registers `@libp2p/fetch` with libp2p's default per-protocol
+ * `maxInboundStreams` (32 in libp2p 3.3.4), so when a cold peer joins a whole directory at once — one
+ * root-record fetch per contest, fired concurrently — the node serves the first 32 and *resets* the
+ * rest, and libp2p surfaces the reset as a thrown fetch. Without a retry those boards silently never
+ * pull their checkpoint (measured: a naive 63-board join converges only 32/63).
+ *
+ * The cap is not just briefly exceeded — while more boards want to fetch than the node has slots, it
+ * stays *saturated*: every freed slot is instantly retaken, so a fixed handful of retries can lose the
+ * race and still strand a board (measured: 5 attempts → 53/63). So we retry a THROWN fetch until a
+ * **deadline**, with full-jittered exponential backoff: the jitter spreads retries across the freeing
+ * slots and the deadline guarantees a board keeps trying until it wins one, while still bounding a
+ * genuinely unreachable peer (cold-start is best-effort — live gossip and the heartbeat converge it
+ * regardless). Only a throw retries; a value or a definitive `undefined`/`null` ("no record") is
+ * returned as-is. See DESIGN.md "Deferred pkc-js work".
+ */
+const COLD_START_FETCH_DEADLINE_MS = 30_000;
+const COLD_START_FETCH_BACKOFF_MS = 400;
+const COLD_START_FETCH_BACKOFF_CAP_MS = 4_000;
+/**
+ * Per-peer budget for concurrent cold-start root fetches, shared across ALL contests on one
+ * voter (see {@link ResolvedDeps.fetchBudget}). The retry above rides out a saturated responder,
+ * but a directory-wide join should not be the one saturating it: this budget caps how many fetch
+ * streams *we* hold open to any single peer, under libp2p's default per-protocol caps (32 inbound
+ * on the responder, 64 outbound on us — both enforced PER CONNECTION per direction, so one
+ * connection's budget is exactly the scope of the remote cap; other users of a shared seeder
+ * arrive on their own connections and do not eat these slots). 24 rather than the full 32
+ * because running at the cliff still resets: our slot frees when the response lands, but the
+ * responder only decrements its count when it sees the stream *close*, so back-to-back reuse
+ * races that bookkeeping — and the same connection can carry fetch streams this budget cannot
+ * see (the host's own IPNS-over-pubsub record fetches ride the same protocol; so would a second
+ * voter on the shared node). The retry covers those residuals. Excess contests queue per peer
+ * instead of getting reset — and because cold-start also shuffles which peers it asks (see the
+ * shuffle in `#coldStart`), a multi-peer topic spreads a directory join across serving peers
+ * instead of funnelling every contest through the same first-listed peer's cap while the
+ * others idle.
+ */
+const COLD_START_PEER_FETCH_LIMIT = 24;
+/** Per-root chase deadline (ms): a multi-block directed-bitswap pull, coarser than one message. */
+const CHASE_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000;
+/** Concurrent root chases; a spray of divergent roots queues, never floods. */
+const CHASE_CONCURRENCY = 2;
+/**
+ * How long a gating-chain head read stays fresh (ms) for the gate's freshness guard. Steady-
+ * state votes cost no read (they resolve against the cached bucket); only a look-ahead bundle
+ * consults the head, and this TTL caps that to ≤1 `getBlockNumber` per window under a flood of
+ * future-dated bundles.
+ */
+const HEAD_BUCKET_TTL_MS = 1_000;
+/**
+ * The {@link ResolvedDeps.fetchBudget} factory: one `pLimit(limitPerPeer)` per peer id, created on
+ * first use and dropped once its queue drains, so a long-lived voter does not accumulate limiters
+ * for every peer it ever cold-started against.
+ */
+function makePerPeerBudget(limitPerPeer) {
+    const limiters = new Map();
+    return async (peerId, task) => {
+        let limiter = limiters.get(peerId);
+        if (limiter === undefined) {
+            limiter = pLimit(limitPerPeer);
+            limiters.set(peerId, limiter);
+        }
+        try {
+            return await limiter(task);
+        }
+        finally {
+            if (limiter.activeCount === 0 && limiter.pendingCount === 0)
+                limiters.delete(peerId);
+        }
+    };
+}
+/** Fisher–Yates copy-shuffle (cold-start peer selection; see `#coldStart`). */
+function shuffled(items) {
+    const out = [...items];
+    for (let i = out.length - 1; i > 0; i--) {
+        const j = Math.floor(Math.random() * (i + 1));
+        const swap = out[i];
+        out[i] = out[j];
+        out[j] = swap;
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+/** Lowercase `0x`-hex to bytes (for the bucket boundary block hash). */
+function hexToBytes(hex) {
+    const body = hex.startsWith("0x") ? hex.slice(2) : hex;
+    const out = new Uint8Array(body.length / 2);
+    for (let i = 0; i < out.length; i++)
+        out[i] = parseInt(body.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);
+    return out;
+}
+/**
+ * One contest's engine: joins the topic behind the validate-before-forward gate, keeps the CRDT in
+ * sync (live gossip + cold-start + chase + heartbeat), computes the tally, and signs/broadcasts this
+ * wallet's ballots. Internal — the public {@link Contest} and {@link ContestVote} are thin views
+ * over one shared engine per topic. It does NOT keep votes alive: publishing is one-shot and the
+ * client decides when to refresh (see DESIGN.md "Republishing is the client's job").
+ */
+class ContestEngine {
+    criteria;
+    topic;
+    readOnly;
+    #deps;
+    /** Chain clients for this contest, built from `criteria.requires.chains` via the factory. */
+    #chainClients;
+    #criteriaCid;
+    /** The gating (`rule`) chain's numeric chainId, bound into every ballot signature. */
+    #chainId;
+    /** The gating (`rule`) chain client, also the seed chain for the tally's tie-break block hash. */
+    #ruleChain;
+    #bucketMath;
+    #crdt;
+    #tally;
+    /** Live once joined; the gate + gossip wiring for this topic. */
+    #transport;
+    /** True between `join()` and `leave()`; makes both idempotent so views and ballots compose. */
+    #joined = false;
+    /**
+     * True once the owning voter was `destroy()`ed. Terminal: {@link join} then throws, so no view
+     * or publication over this engine can go live again (see DESIGN.md / `VoterDestroyedError`).
+     */
+    #destroyed = false;
+    /** Subscribers to state changes; a Contest view registers one of each. Tally recompute is gated on these. */
+    #updateListeners = [];
+    #errorListeners = [];
+    /** The last computed tally, exposed as `Contest.tally`. */
+    #cachedTally;
+    /** Coalescing flags for the background tally recompute (one recompute per gossip burst). */
+    #tallyDirty = true;
+    #tallyRefreshing = false;
+    /**
+     * Last-known current bucket on the gating chain, refreshed by {@link #refreshBucket} on
+     * every chain read the engine already does (join, publish, tally). The CRDT's read-time
+     * expiry filter (`current`) reads it, so decayed votes drop without a per-read chain call.
+     */
+    #currentBucketCache = 0;
+    /**
+     * The on-demand checkpoint cache: the last encoded root record and the bucket it was encoded
+     * at. Invalidated by {@link #markStateChanged} (any merge/publish/chase admit) and by a bucket
+     * advance (expiry changes the winner set without any message). See DESIGN.md "Checkpoints".
+     */
+    #rootRecordCache = undefined;
+    /** True when the winner-set changed since the last encode; the next `rootRecord()` re-encodes. */
+    #checkpointDirty = true;
+    /** Live once joined; chases advertised roots that differ from our own. */
+    #chaser;
+    /** The armed heartbeat timer (jittered; see {@link #armHeartbeat}), cleared by `leave()`. */
+    #heartbeatTimer;
+    /** True when a heartbeat matching our own root was heard this interval (suppression). */
+    #heardMatchingRoot = false;
+    /** True once we published our record this interval (heartbeat OR divergence response). */
+    #publishedRootThisInterval = false;
+    constructor(criteria, topic, criteriaCidBytes, deps) {
+        this.criteria = criteria;
+        this.topic = topic;
+        this.readOnly = deps.signer === undefined;
+        this.#deps = deps;
+        this.#criteriaCid = criteriaCidBytes;
+        this.#chainClients = Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(criteria.requires.chains).map(([chain, config]) => [chain, deps.chains({ chain, config })]));
+        // The gating (`rule`) chain fixes the ballot's chainId and the tie-break seed chain.
+        const rule = deps.registry[criteria.rule.type];
+        if (!rule)
+            throw new UnknownRuleError("rule", criteria.rule.type);
+        const ruleTicker = tickerForRef(criteria, criteria.rule, rule.optionsSchema.parse(criteria.rule));
+        const ruleChain = this.#chainClients[ruleTicker];
+        if (!ruleChain)
+            throw new Error(`no chain client for gating (\`rule\`) chain "${ruleTicker}"`);
+        this.#ruleChain = ruleChain;
+        this.#chainId = criteria.requires.chains[ruleTicker].chainId;
+        this.#bucketMath = makeBucketMath(criteria.blocksPerBucket);
+        const store = makeBlockstoreBundleStore(deps.blockstore);
+        // The CRDT keeps a superseded bundle alive while its superseder's deferred checks are
+        // pending — the fallback winner if the background verifier evicts the newer bundle.
+        this.#crdt = makeVoteCrdt({
+            store,
+            bucketMath: this.#bucketMath,
+            voteExpiryBuckets: criteria.voteExpiryBuckets,
+            isProvisional: (cid) => this.#isPending(cid)
+        });
+        // One gate-result cache shared between the inline forward-gate verifier and the
+        // background chain verifier, so neither re-reads a (wallet, sampleBlock) the other
+        // settled — layered over the voter's persistent store, keyed under this contest's rule
+        // hash: the gate score is a pure function of (rule, chainId, wallet, sampleBlock), so
+        // hashing the canonical rule document + chainId is exactly the sharing boundary (two
+        // contests over one gate share reads; different gates cannot collide).
+        this.#ruleHash = sha256(encodeDagCbor({ chainId: this.#chainId, rule: criteria.rule }));
+        const gateResultCache = makePersistentGateResultCache({ store: deps.gateStore, ruleHash: this.#ruleHash });
+        const verifier = makeBundleVerifier({
+            criteria,
+            criteriaCid: criteriaCidBytes,
+            chainId: this.#chainId,
+            registry: deps.registry,
+            chainFor: (ticker) => this.#chainFor(ticker),
+            bucketMath: this.#bucketMath,
+            nameResolvers: deps.nameResolvers,
+            gateResultCache,
+            nameResolutionCache: deps.nameResolutionCache
+        });
+        // The gate/transport are (re)built on join(); the store, crdt, caches, verifier, and
+        // background verifier are stable per contest, so they survive re-joins of the topic.
+        this.#store = store;
+        this.#cache = makeVerdictCache();
+        this.#acceptedDedup = makeAcceptedDedup(this.#bucketMath);
+        this.#verifier = verifier;
+        this.#background = makeBackgroundVerifier({
+            criteria,
+            registry: deps.registry,
+            chainFor: (ticker) => this.#chainFor(ticker),
+            bucketMath: this.#bucketMath,
+            nameResolvers: deps.nameResolvers,
+            gateResultCache,
+            nameResolutionCache: deps.nameResolutionCache,
+            cache: this.#cache,
+            onGateVerified: (cid) => this.#settleCheck(cid, "chainVerified"),
+            onNameResolved: (cid) => this.#settleCheck(cid, "nameResolved"),
+            onEvict: (cid) => this.#evictBundle(cid),
+            onError: (error) => this.#emitError(error),
+            limit: (fn) => this.#backgroundLimit(fn)
+        });
+        this.#tally = makeTally({
+            criteria,
+            registry: deps.registry,
+            chainFor: (ticker) => this.#chainFor(ticker),
+            bucketMath: this.#bucketMath,
+            current: () => this.#crdt
+                .currentEntries(this.#currentBucketCache)
+                .map(({ cid, bundle }) => ({ bundle, checks: this.#checksFor(cid, bundle) })),
+            bucketBlockHash: () => this.#bucketBlockHash()
+        });
+    }
+    #store;
+    /** Hash of the canonical gate rule + chainId — this contest's keyspace in the shared gate store. */
+    #ruleHash;
+    #cache;
+    #acceptedDedup;
+    #verifier;
+    /** Deferred network checks for provisionally admitted bundles (see verify/background.ts). */
+    #background;
+    /** Bounds the background verifier's un-batched RPC fallbacks (per-wallet reads, name lookups). */
+    #backgroundLimit = pLimit(GATE_CONCURRENCY);
+    /**
+     * Per-bundle deferred-check state, keyed by bundle CID string. Written at every admit
+     * (settled for a gate-verified live bundle or a cached-verdict hit; pending for a chased
+     * checkpoint bundle or this wallet's own publish), flipped by the background verifier's
+     * settlements, dropped on evict/prune. The tally folds it into each row's
+     * `chainVerified` / `nameResolved`, and the checkpoint encoder serves only fully
+     * settled bundles (never re-serve what we have not verified).
+     */
+    #checks = new Map();
+    /** Does any vote in the bundle carry a `community.name` claim (needing resolution)? */
+    #carriesName(bundle) {
+        return bundle.votes.some((v) => v.community.name !== undefined);
+    }
+    /** Record a bundle's deferred-check state at admit: fully settled, or pending both checks. */
+    #recordChecks(cid, bundle, settled) {
+        this.#checks.set(cid.toString(), this.#carriesName(bundle) ? { chainVerified: settled, nameResolved: settled } : { chainVerified: settled });
+    }
+    /** The bundle's check state, pessimistic (all pending) if somehow unrecorded. */
+    #checksFor(cid, bundle) {
+        return (this.#checks.get(cid.toString()) ??
+            (this.#carriesName(bundle) ? { chainVerified: false, nameResolved: false } : { chainVerified: false }));
+    }
+    /** Admitted but at least one deferred network check unsettled (the CRDT's prune shield). */
+    #isPending(cid) {
+        const checks = this.#checks.get(cid.toString());
+        return checks !== undefined && (!checks.chainVerified || checks.nameResolved === false);
+    }
+    /** Every deferred check settled — the bundle may be served in our checkpoint. */
+    #isFullyVerified(cid) {
+        const checks = this.#checks.get(cid.toString());
+        return checks !== undefined && checks.chainVerified && checks.nameResolved !== false;
+    }
+    /** A background check confirmed: flip the flag, re-encode the checkpoint, recount the tally. */
+    #settleCheck(cid, key) {
+        const checks = this.#checks.get(cid.toString());
+        if (!checks)
+            return; // evicted or pruned while its check was in flight
+        checks[key] = true;
+        this.#onStateChanged();
+    }
+    /** A deferred check failed: drop the bundle (its verified predecessor, if any, wins again). */
+    #evictBundle(cid) {
+        this.#crdt.remove(cid);
+        this.#checks.delete(cid.toString());
+        this.#onStateChanged();
+    }
+    #emitError(error) {
+        for (const cb of [...this.#errorListeners])
+            cb(error);
+    }
+    #chainFor(ticker) {
+        const client = this.#chainClients[ticker];
+        if (!client)
+            throw new Error(`no chain client configured for chain "${ticker}"`);
+        return client;
+    }
+    /** Read the gating-chain head and update {@link #currentBucketCache}; returns the bucket. */
+    async #refreshBucket() {
+        const head = await this.#ruleChain.getBlockNumber();
+        this.#currentBucketCache = this.#bucketMath.bucketForBlock(Number(head));
+        this.#headReadMs = Date.now();
+        this.#maybePurgeGateResults();
+        return this.#currentBucketCache;
+    }
+    /** The last purge's expiry boundary (oldest admissible sample block); 0 = never purged. */
+    #purgedSampleBlock = 0;
+    /**
+     * Drop this rule's persisted gate results older than the oldest admissible sample block —
+     * provably dead: a score at bucket B is only ever consulted while bundles from B are within
+     * `voteExpiryBuckets` of head (see verify/gate-result-cache.ts `purgeExpiredGateResults`).
+     * Piggybacks on the head reads the engine does anyway (join-with-state, publish, tally)
+     * and re-runs only when the boundary advances past the last purged one — so an idle
+     * engine costs no chain read and no purge, and a steady head costs no key scan, but a
+     * long-lived engine still sheds entries as they expire instead of leaving them to the
+     * LRU backstop. Fire-and-forget by design.
+     */
+    #maybePurgeGateResults() {
+        const oldestBucket = this.#currentBucketCache - this.criteria.voteExpiryBuckets;
+        if (oldestBucket <= 0)
+            return;
+        const oldestSampleBlock = this.#bucketMath.sampleBlockForBucket(oldestBucket);
+        if (oldestSampleBlock <= this.#purgedSampleBlock)
+            return;
+        this.#purgedSampleBlock = oldestSampleBlock;
+        void purgeExpiredGateResults({
+            store: this.#deps.gateStore,
+            ruleHash: this.#ruleHash,
+            oldestSampleBlock
+        });
+    }
+    /** `Date.now()` of the last gating-chain head read, memoizing {@link #nowBucket}. */
+    #headReadMs = 0;
+    /** The current gating-chain head bucket, memoized for {@link HEAD_BUCKET_TTL_MS}. */
+    async #nowBucket() {
+        if (this.#headReadMs !== 0 && Date.now() - this.#headReadMs < HEAD_BUCKET_TTL_MS) {
+            return this.#currentBucketCache;
+        }
+        return this.#refreshBucket();
+    }
+    /**
+     * Is this bundle's bucket sample block already reachable from our gating-chain head? A
+     * bundle dated to a future bucket (the voter's head ahead of ours, clock skew, or an absurd
+     * `blockNumber`) is transiently not-yet-evaluable, so the gate `ignore`s it (no penalty,
+     * uncached) until our head advances.
+     */
+    async #isEvaluableNow(bundle) {
+        const sampleBucket = this.#bucketMath.bucketForBlock(bundle.blockNumber);
+        if (sampleBucket <= this.#currentBucketCache)
+            return true;
+        return sampleBucket <= (await this.#nowBucket());
+    }
+    /** Hash of the current bucket boundary block on the gating (`rule`) chain (rolling tie seed). */
+    async #bucketBlockHash() {
+        const head = await this.#ruleChain.getBlockNumber();
+        const boundary = this.#bucketMath.sampleBlockForBucket(this.#bucketMath.bucketForBlock(Number(head)));
+        const block = await this.#ruleChain.getBlock({ blockNumber: BigInt(boundary) });
+        if (!block.hash)
+            throw new Error(`bucket boundary block ${boundary} has no hash`);
+        return hexToBytes(block.hash);
+    }
+    // ---- tally cache + reactive update/error listeners (drive the Contest view) ----
+    /** The last computed tally, or `undefined` before the first compute. */
+    get cachedTally() {
+        return this.#cachedTally;
+    }
+    addUpdateListener(cb) {
+        this.#updateListeners.push(cb);
+    }
+    removeUpdateListener(cb) {
+        const i = this.#updateListeners.indexOf(cb);
+        if (i >= 0)
+            this.#updateListeners.splice(i, 1);
+    }
+    addErrorListener(cb) {
+        this.#errorListeners.push(cb);
+    }
+    removeErrorListener(cb) {
+        const i = this.#errorListeners.indexOf(cb);
+        if (i >= 0)
+            this.#errorListeners.splice(i, 1);
+    }
+    /** Compute the current ranking fresh (refreshing the bucket + pruning when state is present). */
+    async computeTally() {
+        // With state present, refresh the bucket so the tally's `current()` filters expiry against
+        // the live block, then prune the now-decayed nodes (dropping their check state with them).
+        // Empty state needs neither, so an empty tally reads no chain (the constant-weight "zero
+        // chain reads" property).
+        if (this.#crdt.nodeCount() > 0) {
+            await this.#refreshBucket();
+            for (const removed of await this.#crdt.prune(this.#currentBucketCache)) {
+                this.#checks.delete(removed.toString());
+            }
+        }
+        return this.#tally.compute();
+    }
+    /** Compute the tally once, cache it, and emit `update`; on failure emit `error` instead. */
+    async #computeAndEmit() {
+        this.#tallyDirty = false;
+        let tally;
+        try {
+            tally = await this.computeTally();
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            this.#emitError(error);
+            return;
+        }
+        this.#cachedTally = tally;
+        for (const cb of [...this.#updateListeners])
+            cb();
+    }
+    /** Force one recompute + emit now (used by a view's `update()` for the initial tally). */
+    async refreshTallyNow() {
+        await this.#computeAndEmit();
+    }
+    /**
+     * Kick a coalesced background tally recompute. Only runs while a Contest view is subscribed, so
+     * an unobserved contest (or `start()` with no read views) does no tally chain reads; the burst
+     * loop collapses many state changes into as few recomputes as the compute latency allows.
+     */
+    #kickTallyRefresh() {
+        this.#tallyDirty = true;
+        if (this.#tallyRefreshing || this.#updateListeners.length === 0)
+            return;
+        this.#tallyRefreshing = true;
+        void (async () => {
+            try {
+                while (this.#tallyDirty && this.#updateListeners.length > 0)
+                    await this.#computeAndEmit();
+            }
+            finally {
+                this.#tallyRefreshing = false;
+            }
+        })();
+    }
+    /** True while joined to the topic (between `join()` and `leave()`); gates the fetch responder. */
+    get joined() {
+        return this.#joined;
+    }
+    /** Any admit (gossip accept, chase merge, local publish) changed the winner set. */
+    #onStateChanged() {
+        this.#markStateChanged();
+        this.#kickTallyRefresh();
+    }
+    /** Mark this engine terminal: a subsequent {@link join} (update/publish) throws. Sync; leave separately. */
+    markDestroyed() {
+        this.#destroyed = true;
+    }
+    async join() {
+        if (this.#destroyed)
+            throw new VoterDestroyedError();
+        if (this.#joined)
+            return;
+        const limit = pLimit(GATE_CONCURRENCY);
+        const gate = makeGossipGate({
+            decodeMessage: decodeVoteMessage,
+            parseBundle: async (blockBytes) => ({
+                cid: await bundleCidForBytes(blockBytes),
+                bundle: decodeBundle(blockBytes)
+            }),
+            verifier: this.#verifier,
+            isEvaluableNow: (bundle) => this.#isEvaluableNow(bundle),
+            cache: this.#cache,
+            acceptedDedup: this.#acceptedDedup,
+            // Store the sender's exact block bytes (byte-identity with its CID), then merge.
+            // The forward-gate ran the FULL pipeline inline, so the checks arrive settled.
+            admit: async ({ cid, bytes, bundle }) => {
+                await this.#deps.blockstore.put(cid, bytes);
+                await this.#crdt.merge([cid]);
+                this.#recordChecks(cid, bundle, true);
+            },
+            limit: (fn) => limit(fn),
+            allowBundlePeer: makeRateLimiter(GATE_RATE),
+            allowRootPeer: makeRateLimiter(GATE_ROOT_RATE),
+            onAccept: () => this.#onStateChanged(),
+            // Root records surface as unverifiable hints: compare to our own root, chase a
+            // divergence lazily, answer it once per interval. Never awaited by the validator.
+            onRootRecord: (record) => {
+                void this.#handleRootRecord(record).catch(() => { });
+            },
+            maxBundleMessageBytes: maxBundleMessageBytes(this.criteria),
+            maxRootMessageBytes: MAX_ROOT_MESSAGE_BYTES,
+            timeoutMs: GATE_TIMEOUT_MS
+        });
+        const chaseLimit = pLimit(CHASE_CONCURRENCY);
+        this.#chaser = makeRootChaser({
+            getBlock: async (cid, signal) => {
+                try {
+                    // Blockstore + bitswap: the advertisers are connected topic peers that
+                    // provably hold these blocks, so the want resolves against them directly.
+                    return await this.#deps.blockstore.get(cid, { signal });
+                }
+                catch {
+                    return undefined;
+                }
+            },
+            verifyOffline: (bundle) => this.#verifier.verifyOffline(bundle),
+            cache: this.#cache,
+            isEvaluableNow: (bundle) => this.#isEvaluableNow(bundle),
+            hasBundle: (cid) => this.#store.has(cid),
+            // `verified: false` is a provisional admit (offline checks only) whose deferred gate
+            // read + name resolution ride `deferVerify`; `true` means a cached terminal verdict
+            // already covers the full pipeline.
+            admit: async ({ cid, bytes, bundle, verified }) => {
+                await this.#deps.blockstore.put(cid, bytes);
+                await this.#crdt.merge([cid]);
+                this.#recordChecks(cid, bundle, verified);
+                this.#markStateChanged();
+            },
+            deferVerify: (entries) => this.#background.enqueue(entries),
+            onMerged: () => this.#onStateChanged(),
+            limit: (fn) => chaseLimit(fn),
+            timeoutMs: CHASE_TIMEOUT_MS
+        });
+        this.#transport = makeVoteTransport({
+            pubsub: this.#deps.pubsub,
+            topic: this.topic,
+            gate
+        });
+        await this.#transport.start();
+        this.#joined = true;
+        // Re-kick any deferred checks a previous leave() paused (their bundles are still pending).
+        this.#background.resume();
+        // Notify the voter of the real join transition (drives lazy responder registration):
+        // a node that participates in a topic serves its root record, symmetric with the
+        // heartbeat it broadcasts there.
+        this.#deps.onTopicJoined();
+        this.#armHeartbeat();
+        // Cold-start / reconnect pull: ask connected topic peers for their root records and
+        // chase any divergence. Fire-and-forget — joining must not block on slow peers, and
+        // live gossip plus the heartbeat converge regardless; this only shortens the gap.
+        void this.#coldStart().catch(() => { });
+        // If a re-join left state behind, refresh the bucket and prune the decayed nodes. Gated
+        // on non-empty state so an empty join stays network-free (no getBlockNumber read),
+        // preserving the "zero chain reads for a constant-weight tally" property.
+        if (this.#crdt.nodeCount() > 0) {
+            await this.#refreshBucket();
+            await this.#crdt.prune(this.#currentBucketCache);
+        }
+    }
+    /**
+     * The cold-join pull (DESIGN.md "Checkpoints"): ask up to {@link COLD_START_PEERS} peers, over
+     * the libp2p **fetch protocol**, for their current root record, and chase every root that
+     * differs from our own. Peers come from **two sources raced concurrently, neither blocking the
+     * other**: a random {@link COLD_START_PEERS} of the gossipsub subscribers of this topic, and
+     * the providers of the criteria CID from the host's HTTP content router. Roots are **unioned,
+     * never quorum'd** — a record served by a single peer is still chased, so a colluding majority
+     * cannot hide a vote.
+     */
+    async #coldStart() {
+        const seen = new Set();
+        const selfId = this.#deps.helia.libp2p.peerId?.toString();
+        // Encode our own root only when a peer actually returns one to compare against, so an empty
+        // join (no subscribers, no providers) does no checkpoint work.
+        let ownRoot;
+        const pull = async (peer) => {
+            const id = peer.toString();
+            if (id === selfId || seen.has(id))
+                return; // skip self and any peer already asked
+            seen.add(id);
+            try {
+                const value = await this.#fetchRootWithRetry(peer);
+                if (value === undefined || value === null)
+                    return;
+                const record = decodeRootRecord(value); // throws on garbage — caught, contributes nothing
+                const own = await (ownRoot ??= this.rootRecord());
+                // Hand the piggybacked chunk index to the chase: verified against `record.root`, it
+                // skips the root-manifest bitswap round-trip (see DESIGN.md "Block pull").
+                if (!record.root.equals(own.root))
+                    this.#chaser?.chase(record.root, record.chunks);
+            }
+            catch {
+                // Peer offline, no record, or malformed answer — best-effort; the other source and
+                // live gossip still converge.
+            }
+        };
+        // Shuffle before slicing: a deterministic first-N pick would funnel a whole directory
+        // join through the same peers' stream caps while other subscribers idle; a random N
+        // spreads contests across the topic's serving peers (see COLD_START_PEER_FETCH_LIMIT).
+        const fromSubscribers = shuffled(this.#deps.pubsub.getSubscribers(this.topic)).slice(0, COLD_START_PEERS).map(pull);
+        await Promise.allSettled([...fromSubscribers, this.#discoverProviders(pull)]);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Pull one peer's root record over the fetch protocol, retrying a THROWN fetch with full-jittered
+     * exponential backoff until {@link COLD_START_FETCH_DEADLINE_MS} (see the constant's note for the
+     * measured seeder-reset failure this rides out). A *definitive* answer never retries; bails if the
+     * contest was left mid-retry (`#chaser` is cleared by `leave()`). Each attempt — not the whole
+     * retry loop, so a backoff sleep never holds a slot — passes through the voter-wide per-peer
+     * budget, which keeps our own concurrent streams to this peer under its inbound cap; queue wait
+     * counts against the same deadline.
+     */
+    async #fetchRootWithRetry(peer) {
+        const deadline = Date.now() + COLD_START_FETCH_DEADLINE_MS;
+        let lastError;
+        for (let attempt = 0;; attempt++) {
+            if (attempt > 0) {
+                if (this.#chaser === undefined || Date.now() >= deadline)
+                    break; // left or out of time
+                const ceiling = Math.min(COLD_START_FETCH_BACKOFF_CAP_MS, COLD_START_FETCH_BACKOFF_MS * 2 ** (attempt - 1));
+                await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, Math.random() * ceiling));
+                if (this.#chaser === undefined)
+                    return undefined; // left mid-backoff — abandon quietly
+            }
+            try {
+                return await this.#deps.fetchBudget(peer.toString(), () => this.#deps.fetch.fetch(peer, rootFetchKey(this.topic)));
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                lastError = error; // transient (e.g. seeder over its inbound-stream cap) — back off and retry
+            }
+        }
+        throw lastError;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Cold-join discovery source 2: ask the injected node's HTTP content router(s) who provides the
+     * criteria CID (`libp2p.contentRouting.findProviders`), dial each provider, and hand it to
+     * `pull`. This is the pkc-js peer-discovery pattern — delegated Routing V1 over HTTP, no DHT.
+     * Best-effort and bounded: a node with no content router, a router error, or an undialable
+     * provider contributes nothing and never throws.
+     */
+    async #discoverProviders(pull) {
+        const libp2p = this.#deps.helia.libp2p;
+        const contentRouting = libp2p.contentRouting;
+        if (contentRouting === undefined)
+            return; // the injected node carries no content router
+        let cid;
+        try {
+            cid = CID.decode(this.#criteriaCid);
+        }
+        catch {
+            return;
+        }
+        const controller = new AbortController();
+        const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), COLD_START_ROUTER_TIMEOUT_MS);
+        timer.unref?.();
+        // `@libp2p/interface` bundles its own multiformats copy, so its `CID` is nominally distinct
+        // from ours despite identical bytes; bridge the two at this one boundary call.
+        const routingCid = cid;
+        try {
+            const dials = [];
+            let count = 0;
+            for await (const provider of contentRouting.findProviders(routingCid, { signal: controller.signal })) {
+                if (count >= COLD_START_PEERS)
+                    break;
+                count += 1;
+                dials.push((async () => {
+                    try {
+                        if (provider.multiaddrs.length > 0) {
+                            await libp2p.dial(provider.multiaddrs, { signal: controller.signal });
+                        }
+                    }
+                    catch {
+                        // Undialable via its advertised addrs — `pull` still tries (it may be connected).
+                    }
+                    await pull(provider.id);
+                })());
+            }
+            await Promise.allSettled(dials);
+        }
+        catch {
+            // Router error or abort — treated as "no providers", mirroring pkc-js's findProviders wrap.
+        }
+        finally {
+            clearTimeout(timer);
+        }
+    }
+    async leave() {
+        if (this.#heartbeatTimer !== undefined)
+            clearTimeout(this.#heartbeatTimer);
+        this.#heartbeatTimer = undefined;
+        // Pause the background verifier's retry timer; pending state survives for a re-join.
+        this.#background.stop();
+        this.#heardMatchingRoot = false;
+        this.#publishedRootThisInterval = false;
+        this.#chaser = undefined;
+        const wasJoined = this.#joined;
+        this.#joined = false;
+        await this.#transport?.stop();
+        this.#transport = undefined;
+        // Fire once per real transition only: `leave()` is idempotent and also runs on engines
+        // that never joined, so the voter's joined-count must not underflow.
+        if (wasJoined)
+            this.#deps.onTopicLeft();
+    }
+    /**
+     * Sign the votes into a bundle for the current bucket boundary block (the block every verifier
+     * reads at), add it to the CRDT, and return the bundle plus its encoded block bytes for
+     * broadcast. Throws `ReadOnlyError` with no signer.
+     */
+    async signVote(votes) {
+        const signer = this.#deps.signer;
+        if (signer === undefined)
+            throw new ReadOnlyError();
+        const head = await this.#ruleChain.getBlockNumber();
+        const bucket = this.#bucketMath.bucketForBlock(Number(head));
+        this.#currentBucketCache = bucket;
+        const blockNumber = this.#bucketMath.sampleBlockForBucket(bucket);
+        const typedData = ballotTypedData({ criteriaCid: this.#criteriaCid, chainId: this.#chainId, votes, blockNumber });
+        const signature = await signer.signBallot(typedData);
+        const address = await signer.address();
+        const bundle = VotesBundleSchema.parse({ address, votes, blockNumber, signature });
+        const cid = await this.#crdt.add(bundle);
+        // Own bundles take the same deferred path as a chased checkpoint's: admitted
+        // provisionally, then confirmed (or evicted) by the background gate read — so an
+        // ineligible wallet's local tally does not silently disagree with the network's, and
+        // our checkpoint never serves a vote we have not verified (even our own).
+        this.#recordChecks(cid, bundle, false);
+        this.#background.enqueue([{ cid, bundle }]);
+        this.#onStateChanged();
+        return { bundle, encoded: encodeBundle(bundle) };
+    }
+    /**
+     * Broadcast an encoded bundle inline as a live delta (this wallet's own delta, never the set).
+     * Returns how many peers gossipsub sent it directly to (0 if there is no live transport).
+     */
+    async broadcastBundle(encoded) {
+        return (await this.#transport?.publishBundle(encoded)) ?? { recipientCount: 0 };
+    }
+    /** Invalidate the on-demand checkpoint cache: the winner-set changed (publish/merge/chase). */
+    #markStateChanged() {
+        this.#checkpointDirty = true;
+    }
+    /**
+     * The contest's current root record, encoded **on demand** and cached until the winner-set
+     * changes ({@link #markStateChanged}) or the bucket advances (expiry changes the set with no
+     * message). Each encode writes its blocks to the blockstore — content-addressed and
+     * idempotent — so directed bitswap can serve them to a chasing peer. Served by the fetch
+     * responder and heartbeated on the topic; there is NO cut cadence (see DESIGN.md
+     * "Checkpoints", "On-demand encode").
+     */
+    async rootRecord() {
+        const bucket = this.#currentBucketCache;
+        const cached = this.#rootRecordCache;
+        if (!this.#checkpointDirty && cached !== undefined && cached.bucket === bucket)
+            return cached.record;
+        // Serve only fully verified bundles: a provisional admit must not propagate through our
+        // checkpoint, and the eligibility-filtered LWW reduction falls back to a wallet's newest
+        // VERIFIED bundle when its newest overall is still pending (see crdt/types.ts).
+        //
+        // Consume the dirty flag HERE, in the same synchronous window as the winner snapshot —
+        // not after the encode. The encode below awaits, and a state change landing mid-encode
+        // (e.g. a background settlement) re-dirties the flag; clearing it after the awaits would
+        // silently clobber that invalidation and pin this record until the next state change.
+        this.#checkpointDirty = false;
+        const winners = this.#crdt.currentEntries(bucket, (cid) => this.#isFullyVerified(cid)).map((e) => e.bundle);
+        const { root, chunks, blocks } = await encodeCheckpoint(winners);
+        for (const block of blocks)
+            await this.#deps.blockstore.put(block.cid, block.bytes);
+        const record = {
+            version: ROOT_RECORD_VERSION,
+            root,
+            // The chunk-CID index rides the fetch-protocol response so a cold joiner skips the
+            // root-manifest bitswap round-trip (see DESIGN.md "Block pull"). Stripped from the
+            // pubsub heartbeat by `encodeRootMessage`, which keeps that message constant-size.
+            chunks,
+            count: winners.length,
+            sizeBytes: blocks.reduce((total, block) => total + block.bytes.length, 0)
+        };
+        this.#rootRecordCache = { record, bucket };
+        return record;
+    }
+    /**
+     * The root CID of this contest's current checkpoint, or `undefined` before the first
+     * encode. The blocks it references are in the blockstore.
+     */
+    latestCheckpointRoot() {
+        return this.#rootRecordCache?.record.root;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Handle a heard root record (an unverifiable hint, surfaced by the gate at layer 1):
+     * matching our own root ⇒ note it for heartbeat suppression; differing ⇒ chase it lazily and
+     * answer with our own record at most once per interval. See DESIGN.md "Checkpoints".
+     */
+    async #handleRootRecord(record) {
+        const own = await this.rootRecord();
+        if (own.root.equals(record.root)) {
+            this.#heardMatchingRoot = true;
+            return;
+        }
+        this.#chaser?.chase(record.root);
+        if (!this.#publishedRootThisInterval) {
+            this.#publishedRootThisInterval = true;
+            await this.#transport?.publishRootRecord(own);
+        }
+    }
+    /**
+     * Arm the next heartbeat firing: {@link HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS} jittered ±25%, re-armed
+     * after each tick. The tick publishes our root record UNLESS this interval already carried
+     * it — either a matching heartbeat was heard (suppression) or we already published (the
+     * one-per-interval cap, shared with the divergence response).
+     */
+    #armHeartbeat() {
+        const delay = HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS * (0.75 + Math.random() * 0.5);
+        const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+            void this.#heartbeatTick()
+                .catch(() => { }) // transient publish/encode failure — next interval retries
+                .finally(() => {
+                if (this.#heartbeatTimer !== undefined)
+                    this.#armHeartbeat();
+            });
+        }, delay);
+        // Don't hold a Node process open; no-op in the browser.
+        timer.unref?.();
+        this.#heartbeatTimer = timer;
+    }
+    async #heartbeatTick() {
+        const suppressed = this.#heardMatchingRoot || this.#publishedRootThisInterval;
+        this.#heardMatchingRoot = false;
+        this.#publishedRootThisInterval = false;
+        if (suppressed)
+            return;
+        await this.#transport?.publishRootRecord(await this.rootRecord());
+    }
+}
+/** The reactive read view over one contest engine ({@link Contest}). */
+class ContestView {
+    #engine;
+    #updateCbs = [];
+    #errorCbs = [];
+    /** True between `update()` and `stop()`: our engine listeners are registered. */
+    #subscribed = false;
+    #onEngineUpdate = () => {
+        for (const cb of [...this.#updateCbs])
+            cb();
+    };
+    #onEngineError = (error) => {
+        for (const cb of [...this.#errorCbs])
+            cb(error);
+    };
+    constructor(engine) {
+        this.#engine = engine;
+    }
+    get criteria() {
+        return this.#engine.criteria;
+    }
+    get topic() {
+        return this.#engine.topic;
+    }
+    get tally() {
+        return this.#engine.cachedTally;
+    }
+    async update() {
+        if (this.#subscribed)
+            return;
+        await this.#engine.join();
+        this.#engine.addUpdateListener(this.#onEngineUpdate);
+        this.#engine.addErrorListener(this.#onEngineError);
+        this.#subscribed = true;
+        // Populate `tally` and fire an initial `update` for the current state.
+        await this.#engine.refreshTallyNow();
+    }
+    async stop() {
+        if (this.#subscribed) {
+            this.#engine.removeUpdateListener(this.#onEngineUpdate);
+            this.#engine.removeErrorListener(this.#onEngineError);
+            this.#subscribed = false;
+        }
+        await this.#engine.leave();
+    }
+    getTally() {
+        return this.#engine.computeTally();
+    }
+    /**
+     * Internal hook (not part of the {@link Contest} interface): this contest's current checkpoint
+     * root record, encoded on demand. The fetch responder and heartbeat use the engine directly;
+     * this delegate exists so hosts/tests can inspect the checkpoint through the view.
+     */
+    rootRecord() {
+        return this.#engine.rootRecord();
+    }
+    /** Internal hook: the root CID of the last-encoded checkpoint, or `undefined` before the first. */
+    latestCheckpointRoot() {
+        return this.#engine.latestCheckpointRoot();
+    }
+    on(event, cb) {
+        if (event === "update")
+            this.#updateCbs.push(cb);
+        else if (event === "error")
+            this.#errorCbs.push(cb);
+    }
+}
+/** One publishable ballot over a contest engine ({@link ContestVote}). */
+class ContestVotePublication {
+    contestId;
+    votes;
+    #engine;
+    #stateCbs = [];
+    #errorCbs = [];
+    #state = "stopped";
+    #bundle;
+    constructor(engine, votes) {
+        this.#engine = engine;
+        this.contestId = engine.criteria.contestId;
+        this.votes = votes;
+    }
+    get topic() {
+        return this.#engine.topic;
+    }
+    get publishingState() {
+        return this.#state;
+    }
+    get bundle() {
+        return this.#bundle;
+    }
+    #setState(state) {
+        this.#state = state;
+        for (const cb of [...this.#stateCbs])
+            cb(state);
+    }
+    #fail(error) {
+        this.#setState("failed");
+        for (const cb of [...this.#errorCbs])
+            cb(error);
+    }
+    async publish() {
+        // Fail before joining a read-only voter needlessly to the topic.
+        if (this.#engine.readOnly) {
+            const error = new ReadOnlyError();
+            this.#fail(error);
+            throw error;
+        }
+        try {
+            await this.#engine.join();
+            this.#setState("signing");
+            const { bundle, encoded } = await this.#engine.signVote([...this.votes]);
+            this.#bundle = bundle;
+            this.#setState("publishing");
+            const { recipientCount } = await this.#engine.broadcastBundle(encoded);
+            this.#setState("succeeded");
+            return { bundle, recipientCount };
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            this.#fail(error);
+            throw error;
+        }
+    }
+    on(event, cb) {
+        if (event === "publishingstatechange")
+            this.#stateCbs.push(cb);
+        else if (event === "error")
+            this.#errorCbs.push(cb);
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * The default `VoteClient`. Construct with the host-injected seams: a `helia` node (must carry a
+ * gossipsub service, a blockstore, and a libp2p fetch service), a `chains` factory, an optional
+ * `signer`, and optional `nameResolvers` (needed once votes carry community names). Contests are
+ * addressed by their full criteria document at `createContest` / `createContestVote`; the library
+ * has no knowledge of pkc-js or any other host: a host passes its own running Helia node in
+ * directly. Republishing a live vote is the client's concern — see
+ * {@link republishIntervalBuckets} and DESIGN.md "Republishing is the client's job".
+ */
+export class PubsubVoter {
+    #deps;
+    /** One engine per contest, keyed by topic so byte-identical criteria share one CRDT/transport. */
+    #engines = new Map();
+    /** Cached read views, one per topic (stable per-contest object). */
+    #views = new Map();
+    /** True while the fetch responder is registered, making register/unregister idempotent. */
+    #responderRegistered = false;
+    /**
+     * How many engines are currently joined to their topic. The fetch responder is registered
+     * lazily while this is > 0 (see {@link ResolvedDeps.onTopicJoined}): no constructor work, no
+     * public API — a node serves root records for exactly the contests it participates in.
+     */
+    #joinedEngines = 0;
+    /** True once `destroy()` ran. Terminal: every create path then throws (mirrors pkc-js). */
+    #destroyed = false;
+    /** The voter's persistent caches (see {@link PubsubVoterOptions.dataPath}); closed on destroy. */
+    #storage;
+    constructor(options) {
+        // Fail fast: the node must expose a gossipsub service, a blockstore, and a libp2p
+        // fetch service. Throws MissingPubsubError / MissingBlockstoreError / MissingFetchError
+        // at construction (not a lazy failure on the first publish/fetch) and narrows the handles.
+        const { pubsub, blockstore, fetch } = requireHeliaServices(options.helia);
+        // Persistent caches, opened lazily (no disk is touched until a contest verifies): the
+        // gate-result store and the name-resolution cache, both shared across every contest on
+        // this voter. sqlite under dataPath on Node, IndexedDB in the browser, in-memory for
+        // `dataPath: false` — see src/storage/.
+        this.#storage = makeStorage({ dataPath: options.dataPath });
+        this.#deps = {
+            helia: options.helia,
+            pubsub,
+            blockstore,
+            fetch,
+            chains: options.chains,
+            signer: options.signer,
+            registry: resolveRegistry(options.rules),
+            nameResolvers: options.nameResolvers ?? [],
+            onTopicJoined: this.#onTopicJoined,
+            onTopicLeft: this.#onTopicLeft,
+            fetchBudget: makePerPeerBudget(COLD_START_PEER_FETCH_LIMIT),
+            gateStore: this.#storage.openLru({ cacheName: "gate-results", maxItems: GATE_RESULTS_MAX_ITEMS }),
+            nameResolutionCache: makeNameResolutionCache(this.#storage.openLru({ cacheName: "name-resolutions", maxItems: NAME_RESOLUTIONS_MAX_ITEMS }))
+        };
+    }
+    get readOnly() {
+        return this.#deps.signer === undefined;
+    }
+    /** Guard the create paths after {@link destroy}: a destroyed voter is terminal. */
+    #assertLive() {
+        if (this.#destroyed)
+            throw new VoterDestroyedError();
+    }
+    async createContest(args) {
+        this.#assertLive();
+        const engine = await this.#engineFor(this.#validateCriteria(args.criteria));
+        const existing = this.#views.get(engine.topic);
+        if (existing)
+            return existing;
+        const view = new ContestView(engine);
+        this.#views.set(engine.topic, view);
+        return view;
+    }
+    async createContestVote(args) {
+        this.#assertLive();
+        const engine = await this.#engineFor(this.#validateCriteria(args.criteria));
+        return new ContestVotePublication(engine, args.votes);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Strictly validate one criteria document at the create seam: `CriteriaSchema` (shape,
+     * canonical encodability) plus the rule registry (an unimplemented rule must recuse, not
+     * miscount — `UnknownRuleError`). The parsed result is what gets encoded, so the engine and
+     * the topic always derive from a schema-clean document.
+     */
+    #validateCriteria(input) {
+        const criteria = CriteriaSchema.parse(input);
+        validateCriteriaRules(criteria, this.#deps.registry);
+        return criteria;
+    }
+    /** Build (or return the cached) engine for one already-validated criteria, keyed by topic. */
+    async #engineFor(criteria) {
+        const cid = await criteriaCid(criteria);
+        const topic = TOPIC_PREFIX + cid.toString();
+        const existing = this.#engines.get(topic);
+        if (existing)
+            return existing;
+        const engine = new ContestEngine(criteria, topic, cid.bytes, this.#deps);
+        this.#engines.set(topic, engine);
+        return engine;
+    }
+    /**
+     * The fetch-protocol responder: answer `"<topic>/root"` with that contest's current root
+     * record, encoded on demand (see DESIGN.md "Checkpoints"). Unauthenticated and tiny by
+     * design — a request can never compel blocks; those travel over directed bitswap. An
+     * unknown topic, foreign key shape, or encode failure answers nothing. So does a contest
+     * whose engine exists but is not joined (e.g. a ballot created but never published): this
+     * node holds no view of that contest, and an empty record would masquerade as one.
+     */
+    #rootLookup = async (keyBytes) => {
+        // `@libp2p/fetch` hands the lookup the requested key as raw bytes; decode the utf8 topic
+        // string the requester sent (`rootFetchKey(topic)`) before matching.
+        const key = new TextDecoder().decode(keyBytes);
+        if (!key.endsWith(ROOT_FETCH_KEY_SUFFIX))
+            return undefined;
+        const engine = this.#engines.get(key.slice(0, -ROOT_FETCH_KEY_SUFFIX.length));
+        if (!engine?.joined)
+            return undefined;
+        try {
+            return encodeRootRecord(await engine.rootRecord());
+        }
+        catch {
+            return undefined;
+        }
+    };
+    /**
+     * Lazy responder lifecycle, driven by the engines' real join/leave transitions: the first
+     * joined topic registers the fetch responder, the last left topic unregisters it. This is an
+     * invariant, not an opt-in — any node participating in a topic answers root-record fetches
+     * there, symmetric with the heartbeat it already broadcasts.
+     */
+    #onTopicJoined = () => {
+        this.#joinedEngines += 1;
+        if (this.#responderRegistered)
+            return;
+        this.#deps.fetch.registerLookupFunction(TOPIC_PREFIX, this.#rootLookup);
+        this.#responderRegistered = true;
+    };
+    #onTopicLeft = () => {
+        this.#joinedEngines -= 1;
+        if (this.#joinedEngines <= 0)
+            this.#unregisterResponder();
+    };
+    async stop() {
+        // Reset each read view (detach its engine listeners, clear `#subscribed`) so it can
+        // `update()` again — this is what keeps `stop()` reusable. Then leave any engine with no
+        // view (created via `createContestVote`); `leave()` is idempotent, so double-leaving a
+        // view's engine is a no-op. Each real leave notifies `#onTopicLeft`, so the responder
+        // unregisters exactly when the last joined topic is left.
+        await Promise.all([...this.#views.values()].map((view) => view.stop()));
+        await Promise.all([...this.#engines.values()].map((engine) => engine.leave()));
+    }
+    async destroy() {
+        // Terminal, mirroring pkc-js: mark the voter and every engine destroyed BEFORE tearing
+        // down, so any create path and any pre-existing view/publication (whose `update()` /
+        // `publish()` funnels through `engine.join()`) now throws `VoterDestroyedError`. `stop()`
+        // then resets the views and leaves every topic (unregistering the responder via the
+        // counted release); the explicit unregister first is the terminal-path safety net.
+        // Unlike `stop()`, the client does not come back.
+        this.#destroyed = true;
+        for (const engine of this.#engines.values())
+            engine.markDestroyed();
+        this.#unregisterResponder();
+        await this.stop();
+        // Close the persistent caches last (Node: the sqlite handles) — engines are already
+        // terminal, so nothing can race a write. `stop()` deliberately leaves them open: a
+        // stopped voter is reusable and its caches stay warm.
+        await this.#storage.destroy();
+    }
+    #unregisterResponder() {
+        if (!this.#responderRegistered)
+            return;
+        this.#deps.fetch.unregisterLookupFunction(TOPIC_PREFIX, this.#rootLookup);
+        this.#responderRegistered = false;
+    }
+}