@bitkyc08/opencodex 2.55.0 → 2.57.0

package/src/server/responses/core-auth.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,529 @@
+import type { OcxProviderConfig, OcxConfig } from "../../types";
+import { isCanonicalOpenAiForwardProvider } from "../../providers/openai-tiers";
+import type { CodexAuthContext } from "../../codex/auth-context";
+import type { RouteResult } from "../../router";
+import type { HandleResponsesOptions } from "./core-options";
+import {
+  hasForwardableCodexBearer,
+  validateForwardAdmissionCredential,
+  isProxyAdmissionSecret,
+  ForwardAdmissionCredentialError,
+} from "../auth-cors";
+import {
+  providerConsumesCallerAuthorization,
+  captureCallerDirectAuth,
+} from "../../providers/caller-authorization";
+import { inspectChatGptDomainClaim } from "../../oauth/chatgpt";
+import {
+  resolveCodexAuthContext,
+  CodexMainProfileDrainingError,
+  materializeCodexUpstreamAuthAsync,
+  headersForCodexAuthContext,
+  isCodexAuthContextUsable,
+  releaseCodexAuthContextProbeLease,
+  CodexAuthContextError,
+  applyCodexAuthContextToProvider,
+  stripCodexRuntimeProviderFields,
+} from "../../codex/auth-context";
+import { codexAccountSelectionForTurn, tryClaimNativeMainProfileForTurn } from "../lifecycle";
+import { isNativeMainTrafficBlocked } from "../../codex/native-profile-startup";
+import { formatErrorResponse } from "../../bridge";
+import { clientCancelledResponse } from "./core-errors";
+import { formatCodexProviderForLog, handOffThreadAffinityGeneration } from "../../codex/routing";
+import { mapCodexAuthContextErrorToResponse, nativeMainRefreshFailureResponse } from "./codex-auth-error";
+import {
+  isTerminalCodexPoolRefreshFailure,
+  forceRefreshCodexPoolToken,
+  capturePoolQuotaWriter,
+} from "../../codex/account-store";
+import type { RequestLogContext } from "../request-log";
+import { markLocalRequestLogRefusal } from "../request-log";
+import { CODEX_POOL_REFRESH_INCOMPLETE_LOG_REASON } from "../../codex/pool-refresh-backoff";
+import { codexAuthContextLogLabel } from "../../codex/account-label";
+import { forceRefreshMainAccountToken } from "../../codex/main-account";
+
+/** Keep synthesized Claude identity out of request headers reused by policy/combo fallback. */
+export function withClaudeNativeSession(headers: Headers, provider: OcxProviderConfig, sessionId?: string): Headers {
+  if (!sessionId || !isCanonicalOpenAiForwardProvider(provider)
+    || headers.has("session_id") || headers.has("session-id") || headers.has("thread-id")) return headers;
+  const forwarded = new Headers(headers);
+  forwarded.set("session_id", sessionId);
+  return forwarded;
+}
+
+
+export type ResponsesAuthResolution =
+  | { ok: true; authCtx: CodexAuthContext; headers: Headers; callerAuthHeaders: Headers; substituteMainCredential: boolean }
+  | { ok: false; response: Response };
+
+
+/**
+ * The caller credential the final Codex auth resolution will be given, as far as the ROUTE
+ * decides it: a route change that may cross a credential domain drops the raw caller credential,
+ * and a trusted Claude-main handoff replaces it.
+ *
+ * Shared with the lineage preview in `handleResponsesInner`, which has to read a conversation's
+ * family under the same authenticated scope the resolution will record it under -- that scope is
+ * an HMAC of exactly this Authorization header. Two copies of this rule would put preview and
+ * final auth in different scopes the first time one of them changed.
+ */
+export function codexRouteCredentialDomainHeaders(
+  req: Request,
+  route: RouteResult,
+  options: HandleResponsesOptions,
+  credentialDomainWasRewritten: boolean,
+): Headers {
+  const trustedClaudeMainForFinalRoute = options.stripClaudeMainAuthForNoncanonicalForward === true
+    && isCanonicalOpenAiForwardProvider(route.provider)
+    ? options.trustedClaudeMainAuth : undefined;
+  if (trustedClaudeMainForFinalRoute) {
+    const claudeMainHeaders = new Headers(req.headers);
+    claudeMainHeaders.set("authorization", trustedClaudeMainForFinalRoute.authorization);
+    if (trustedClaudeMainForFinalRoute.chatgptAccountId) {
+      claudeMainHeaders.set("chatgpt-account-id", trustedClaudeMainForFinalRoute.chatgptAccountId);
+    } else {
+      claudeMainHeaders.delete("chatgpt-account-id");
+    }
+    return claudeMainHeaders;
+  }
+  // Route-changing recursion retains typed admission, never an unscoped raw
+  // caller credential. Bearer admission is substituted or stripped below.
+  const routeMayChangeCredentialDomain = options.comboAttempt === true
+    || route.routeKind === "policy"
+    || credentialDomainWasRewritten;
+  if (routeMayChangeCredentialDomain && options.admission?.source !== "bearer") {
+    const scoped = new Headers(req.headers);
+    scoped.delete("authorization");
+    scoped.delete("chatgpt-account-id");
+    return scoped;
+  }
+  return req.headers;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Does this route substitute OUR stored main credential, and does the caller own the credential
+ * this request will authenticate with?
+ *
+ * Both answers are needed twice: by the resolution below, and by the lineage preview, which must
+ * not follow a Pool family binding for a request whose credential never enters Pool state. One
+ * implementation, because two copies of this predicate disagreeing is the divergence the preview
+ * gate exists to prevent. The reasoning behind the substitution test itself is at its use site
+ * below (#1686, #2132).
+ */
+export function codexRouteCredentialOwnership(
+  authInputHeaders: Headers,
+  config: OcxConfig,
+  route: RouteResult,
+  options: HandleResponsesOptions,
+): { substituteMainCredential: boolean; requestScopedMainCredential: boolean } {
+  const substituteMainCredential = options.admission?.source === "bearer"
+    && (route.codexAccountMode !== undefined || isCanonicalOpenAiForwardProvider(route.provider));
+  return {
+    substituteMainCredential,
+    requestScopedMainCredential: route.codexAccountMode !== undefined
+      && !substituteMainCredential
+      && hasForwardableCodexBearer(authInputHeaders, config),
+  };
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Resolve Codex auth for a route. On unusable contexts, releases any probe lease
+ * before returning the 401 (nothing reaches upstream).
+ */
+export async function resolveResponsesCodexAuth(
+  req: Request,
+  config: OcxConfig,
+  route: RouteResult,
+  options: HandleResponsesOptions,
+  credentialDomainWasRewritten = false,
+  retainAccountForUploadedFiles = false,
+): Promise<ResponsesAuthResolution> {
+  try {
+    let authInputHeaders = codexRouteCredentialDomainHeaders(
+      req,
+      route,
+      options,
+      credentialDomainWasRewritten,
+    );
+    // A caller-auth transport that is not canonical OpenAI (keyless Cursor) consumes the
+    // caller's Authorization as its own upstream token. Keep that contract only for a clean
+    // single bearer with NO ChatGPT-domain marker. A bearer marked for the ChatGPT domain —
+    // whether its marker is valid or malformed/conflicting — a combined/malformed value, or
+    // the captured explicit OpenAI pair is never a Cursor token; a foreign JWT carrying only
+    // a generic organizations claim is not ChatGPT-marked and keeps the legacy contract.
+    // chatgpt-account-id has no meaning outside the ChatGPT domain.
+    if (!isCanonicalOpenAiForwardProvider(route.provider)
+      && providerConsumesCallerAuthorization(route.provider)) {
+      const rawAuth = authInputHeaders.get("authorization")?.trim();
+      const singleBearer = /^Bearer[\t ]+([^\s,]+)$/i.exec(rawAuth ?? "")?.[1];
+      const domainClaim = singleBearer ? inspectChatGptDomainClaim(singleBearer) : { kind: "absent" as const };
+      const dropBearer = options.nativeCallerAuth != null || domainClaim.kind !== "absent"
+        || (rawAuth !== undefined && singleBearer === undefined);
+      if (dropBearer || authInputHeaders.has("chatgpt-account-id")) {
+        const scoped = new Headers(authInputHeaders);
+        if (dropBearer) scoped.delete("authorization");
+        scoped.delete("chatgpt-account-id");
+        authInputHeaders = scoped;
+      }
+    }
+    // The caller's own Direct credential may cross an internal route change only to the
+    // canonical OpenAI transport, under a predicate deliberately STRICTER than plain
+    // unchanged-route Direct forwarding: a clean non-proxy bearer whose ChatGPT-domain
+    // marker is valid, with any explicit account header matching that marker. Unchanged
+    // routes keep their legacy rules; sidecar enrichment grants no primary authority.
+    if (options.callerDirectAuth && isCanonicalOpenAiForwardProvider(route.provider)) {
+      const directHeaders = new Headers({
+        authorization: options.callerDirectAuth.authorization,
+        ...(options.callerDirectAuth.chatgptAccountId
+          ? { "chatgpt-account-id": options.callerDirectAuth.chatgptAccountId } : {}),
+      });
+      if (captureCallerDirectAuth(directHeaders, config)) {
+        authInputHeaders = new Headers(authInputHeaders);
+        authInputHeaders.set("authorization", options.callerDirectAuth.authorization);
+        if (options.callerDirectAuth.chatgptAccountId) {
+          authInputHeaders.set("chatgpt-account-id", options.callerDirectAuth.chatgptAccountId);
+        } else {
+          authInputHeaders.delete("chatgpt-account-id");
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    // #1686: a caller that proved admission with a BEARER presented one of our own secrets.
+    // Refusing it here is what made the codex-cli `env_key` contract unusable against Direct.
+    // Admitting it is only safe because the stored main credential is substituted below, so
+    // the admission secret still never leaves this process.
+    //
+    // #2132: substitution answers "does THIS ROUTE need our stored ChatGPT credential", not
+    // "how did the caller authenticate". Only a native Codex route reaches the ChatGPT backend
+    // and can consume that credential; a key-authenticated routed provider carries its own and
+    // never touches it. Keying on the caller alone made an install that deliberately never
+    // logged into ChatGPT fail every routed request with "No usable Codex main credential".
+    //
+    // But ask that question the way the ADAPTER asks it. `codexAccountMode` is derived from the
+    // provider NAME (`providerCodexAccountMode`), while the passthrough adapter decides whether
+    // to forward caller credentials from the TRANSPORT — adapter, auth mode, and base URL
+    // (`isCanonicalOpenAiForwardProvider`). A row the operator named anything other than
+    // `openai`, pointed at the canonical ChatGPT backend with `authMode: "forward"`, satisfies
+    // the adapter's test and fails this one, so substitution was skipped and the adapter then
+    // forwarded our own admission secret upstream. Two predicates answering one question is the
+    // bug; the transport is the authority, because the transport is what actually carries the
+    // header. A key-authenticated routed provider is still not canonical-forward, so #2132's
+    // no-ChatGPT-login install keeps working.
+    const { substituteMainCredential, requestScopedMainCredential } = codexRouteCredentialOwnership(
+      authInputHeaders,
+      config,
+      route,
+      options,
+    );
+    const stripAuthorization = options.admission?.source === "bearer" && !substituteMainCredential;
+    if (route.codexAccountMode === "direct" && !substituteMainCredential) {
+      validateForwardAdmissionCredential(authInputHeaders, config);
+    }
+    let authCtx: CodexAuthContext;
+    if (route.codexAccountMode) {
+      authCtx = await resolveCodexAuthContext(authInputHeaders, config, route.codexAccountMode, {
+        admission: options.admission,
+        codexAuthPolicy: options.codexAuthPolicy,
+        accountId: route.codexAccountId,
+        modelId: route.modelId,
+        substituteMainCredentialForDirect: substituteMainCredential,
+        requestScopedMainCredential,
+        beginCodexAccountSelection: codexAccountSelectionForTurn(options.turnAdmissionLease),
+        resolveCodexModelEntitlements: options.resolveCodexModelEntitlements,
+        signal: options.abortSignal,
+        nativeMainRefreshDependencies: options.nativeMainRefreshDependencies,
+        retainAccountForUploadedFiles,
+      });
+      options.onCodexAuthContextResolved?.(authCtx);
+    } else {
+      // A custom-named canonical-forward provider has no Codex account mode, but an
+      // admission bearer still substitutes the stored main credential below. Claim the
+      // same physical profile before synthesizing the main context so transport-based
+      // substitution cannot bypass a switch drain.
+      if (
+        substituteMainCredential
+        && (
+          isNativeMainTrafficBlocked()
+          || !tryClaimNativeMainProfileForTurn(options.turnAdmissionLease)
+          || isNativeMainTrafficBlocked()
+        )
+      ) {
+        throw new CodexMainProfileDrainingError();
+      }
+      authCtx = { kind: "main", accountId: null };
+      options.onCodexAuthContextResolved?.(undefined);
+    }
+    // This resolver also builds a synthetic main context for unrelated keyed routes. Only
+    // the actual Codex-forward transport consumes main quota; provider names are not proof
+    // (custom-named canonical-forward providers must retain the same protection).
+    const mainPolicyConfig = isCanonicalOpenAiForwardProvider(route.provider)
+      ? options.codexAuthPolicy ?? config : undefined;
+    const headers = await materializeCodexUpstreamAuthAsync(authInputHeaders, authCtx, {
+      admission: options.admission,
+      config: mainPolicyConfig,
+      modelId: route.modelId,
+      beginCodexAccountSelection: codexAccountSelectionForTurn(options.turnAdmissionLease),
+      substituteMainCredential,
+      signal: options.abortSignal,
+      nativeMainRefreshDependencies: options.nativeMainRefreshDependencies,
+    });
+    // Awaiting even a cached materialization yields. Preserve the policy error if the live
+    // quota/config changed during that yield, before usability could mislabel it as reauth.
+    headersForCodexAuthContext(headers, authCtx, mainPolicyConfig, route.modelId, options.admission);
+    if (!isCodexAuthContextUsable(authCtx, config)) {
+      releaseCodexAuthContextProbeLease(authCtx);
+      return {
+        ok: false,
+        response: formatErrorResponse(401, "authentication_error", "Selected Codex account needs reauthentication"),
+      };
+    }
+    if (stripAuthorization) {
+      headers.delete("authorization");
+      headers.delete("chatgpt-account-id");
+    }
+    if (providerConsumesCallerAuthorization(route.provider) && options.admission?.source !== undefined
+      && options.admission.source !== "loopback") {
+      validateForwardAdmissionCredential(headers, config);
+    } else {
+      // Even adapters that ignore caller auth must not retain a proxy secret for
+      // a later internal hop or a future transport change.
+      const bearer = headers.get("authorization")?.replace(/^Bearer\s+/i, "").trim();
+      if (bearer && isProxyAdmissionSecret(bearer, config)) {
+        headers.delete("authorization");
+        headers.delete("chatgpt-account-id");
+      }
+    }
+    return {
+      ok: true,
+      authCtx,
+      headers,
+      callerAuthHeaders: new Headers(authInputHeaders),
+      substituteMainCredential,
+    };
+  } catch (err) {
+    if (options.abortSignal?.aborted || req.signal.aborted) {
+      return { ok: false, response: clientCancelledResponse() };
+    }
+    if (err instanceof CodexAuthContextError) {
+      const safeAccountLabel = route.codexAccountNamespace
+        ? `${route.providerName}-${route.codexAccountNamespace}`
+        : formatCodexProviderForLog(route.providerName, err.accountId, config);
+      console.error(`[codex-auth] Pool account ${safeAccountLabel} token failed; reauthentication required`);
+    }
+    if (err instanceof ForwardAdmissionCredentialError) {
+      return { ok: false, response: formatErrorResponse(401, "authentication_error", err.message) };
+    }
+    const response = mapCodexAuthContextErrorToResponse(err, {
+      accountSelector: route.codexAccountNamespace,
+      now: Date.now(),
+    });
+    if (response) return { ok: false, response };
+    throw err;
+  }
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Terminal means the grant itself is dead and no retry can help. Everything else —
+ * an untyped network failure, a token-endpoint 5xx surfacing as `unknown`, an abort,
+ * refresh capacity, lock contention, a superseded flight — is transient, and treating
+ * it as terminal would quarantine a healthy account on an upstream blip, which is the
+ * defect this path exists to fix (#2887).
+ */
+export function isTerminalPoolRefreshFailure(error: unknown): boolean {
+  // Delegated so "terminal" has ONE definition. A missing record or a missing refresh-grant
+  // fingerprint is permanent -- retrying cannot conjure a credential -- and used to be a bare
+  // Error, which fell through to the retryable 503 and told the operator to keep retrying a
+  // request that could never succeed.
+  return isTerminalCodexPoolRefreshFailure(error);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * The refusal an operator meets when a stored pool credential's forced refresh does not complete.
+ *
+ * A bare "retry this request" reads as a transient fault in the proxy, which is how #4212's
+ * reporter spent an afternoon concluding OpenCodex had broken while one of their own accounts was
+ * the thing that needed them. It stays a retryable 503 and stays non-quarantining, because the
+ * refresh genuinely may succeed and a token-endpoint 5xx must not retire a healthy account
+ * (#2887). What it adds is the account and the exit: when retrying stops helping, that account
+ * has to be signed in again.
+ *
+ * The label is a public account selector when the request carried one, otherwise the durable
+ * `p`-prefixed log label — never the raw pool id and never the email. Those are the identifiers
+ * `responses-compaction-routing.test.ts` and `codex-auth-context.test.ts` already assert must not
+ * reach an operator-facing surface, and an error body travels further than a log line, not less.
+ * When neither is resolvable the sentence degrades to "the selected Codex pool account" rather
+ * than naming something opaque, because a wrong name is worse than no name.
+ *
+ * The wording says "sign in to that account again" and deliberately does NOT say
+ * "reauthentication". `classifyError` runs `isAuthenticationMessage` before it reaches the
+ * `status === 503` arm, and that check is status-blind on the bare substring "authentication",
+ * which "reauthentication" contains. A body carrying that word is reclassified to
+ * `authentication_error` / `invalid_api_key` even though the HTTP status stays 503 — and Codex
+ * applies retry-after backoff only for `server_is_overloaded`, so the friendlier sentence would
+ * have quietly disabled the retry this refusal exists to ask for. `options.code` cannot buy the
+ * classification back; only the wording can.
+ */
+export function poolCredentialRefreshIncompleteResponse(args: {
+  authCtx: CodexAuthContext;
+  config: Pick<OcxConfig, "codexAccounts">;
+  accountSelector?: string;
+  logCtx?: RequestLogContext;
+}): Response {
+  // The wire contract below is unchanged on purpose, so the record has to carry the origin
+  // instead. Without it an operator reads this sentence under a field named "Upstream reason"
+  // and goes looking at the provider's status page for a refusal that never left this process.
+  if (args.logCtx) markLocalRequestLogRefusal(args.logCtx, CODEX_POOL_REFRESH_INCOMPLETE_LOG_REASON);
+  const label = args.accountSelector ?? codexAuthContextLogLabel(args.authCtx, args.config);
+  const account = label ? `Codex pool account ${label}` : "the selected Codex pool account";
+  const response = formatErrorResponse(
+    503,
+    "server_busy",
+    `Codex credential refresh did not complete for ${account}; retry this request. `
+      + "If it keeps failing, sign in to that account again.",
+  );
+  const headers = new Headers(response.headers);
+  headers.set("Retry-After", "1");
+  return new Response(response.body, { status: response.status, headers });
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * One forced refresh and one same-account rebuild for a stored pool credential that
+ * upstream rejected with a pre-stream 401. `quarantine` distinguishes a dead grant,
+ * which must retire the account, from a transient failure, which must not.
+ */
+export async function refreshPoolForwardAuth(args: {
+  logCtx?: RequestLogContext;
+  req: Request;
+  config: OcxConfig;
+  route: RouteResult;
+  authCtx: CodexAuthContext & { kind: "pool" };
+  substituteMainCredential: boolean;
+  options: HandleResponsesOptions;
+}): Promise<
+  | { ok: true; authCtx: CodexAuthContext; provider: OcxProviderConfig; headers: Headers }
+  | { ok: false; response: Response; quarantine: boolean; quarantineGeneration?: number }
+> {
+  const { req, config, route, authCtx, substituteMainCredential, options } = args;
+  try {
+    const refreshed = await forceRefreshCodexPoolToken(authCtx.accountId, {
+      rejectedGeneration: authCtx.generation,
+      rejectedAccessToken: authCtx.accessToken,
+      signal: options.abortSignal,
+    });
+    if (!refreshed.rotated) {
+      // The store resolved to the same bearer upstream just rejected. Replaying it
+      // would spend another upstream call to earn the identical 401. Upstream can do
+      // this on a SUCCESSFUL response by rotating only the refresh grant, so the
+      // credential generation may already have moved — quarantine has to be fenced on
+      // where the credential actually is, not on the generation we started from.
+      return {
+        ok: false,
+        quarantine: true,
+        quarantineGeneration: refreshed.generation,
+        response: formatErrorResponse(401, "authentication_error", "Selected Codex account needs reauthentication"),
+      };
+    }
+    // Only a CAS this request performed itself proves the new credential descends from
+    // the rejected one. Somebody else's replacement may be a different identity, and
+    // its affinity must be retired rather than inherited.
+    if (refreshed.selfRefreshed) {
+      handOffThreadAffinityGeneration(authCtx.accountId, authCtx.generation, refreshed.generation);
+    }
+    const refreshedAuthCtx: CodexAuthContext = {
+      ...authCtx,
+      accessToken: refreshed.accessToken,
+      chatgptAccountId: refreshed.chatgptAccountId,
+      generation: refreshed.generation,
+      poolQuotaWriter: capturePoolQuotaWriter(authCtx.accountId, refreshed),
+    };
+    const provider = applyCodexAuthContextToProvider(
+      stripCodexRuntimeProviderFields(route.provider),
+      refreshedAuthCtx,
+      route.codexAccountMode,
+    );
+    const headers = await materializeCodexUpstreamAuthAsync(req.headers, refreshedAuthCtx, {
+      admission: options.admission,
+      config: options.codexAuthPolicy ?? config,
+      modelId: route.modelId,
+      substituteMainCredential,
+      signal: options.abortSignal,
+      nativeMainRefreshDependencies: options.nativeMainRefreshDependencies,
+    });
+    return { ok: true, authCtx: refreshedAuthCtx, provider, headers };
+  } catch (error) {
+    if (isTerminalPoolRefreshFailure(error)) {
+      return {
+        ok: false,
+        quarantine: true,
+        response: formatErrorResponse(401, "authentication_error", "Selected Codex account needs reauthentication"),
+      };
+    }
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      quarantine: false,
+      response: poolCredentialRefreshIncompleteResponse({
+        authCtx,
+        config,
+        accountSelector: route.codexAccountNamespace,
+        logCtx: args.logCtx,
+      }),
+    };
+  }
+}
+
+
+export async function refreshNativeMainForwardAuth(args: {
+  req: Request;
+  config: OcxConfig;
+  route: RouteResult;
+  authCtx: CodexAuthContext;
+  substituteMainCredential: boolean;
+  options: HandleResponsesOptions;
+}): Promise<
+  | { ok: true; authCtx: CodexAuthContext; provider: OcxProviderConfig; headers: Headers }
+  | { ok: false; response: Response }
+> {
+  const { req, config, route, authCtx, substituteMainCredential, options } = args;
+  if (authCtx.kind !== "main-pool") {
+    return { ok: false, response: formatErrorResponse(401, "authentication_error", "No native main credential to refresh") };
+  }
+  try {
+    const refreshed = await forceRefreshMainAccountToken(authCtx.accessToken, {
+      signal: options.abortSignal,
+      ...(options.nativeMainRefreshDependencies ?? {}),
+    });
+    if (!refreshed) {
+      return { ok: false, response: formatErrorResponse(401, "authentication_error", "Codex main account needs reauthentication") };
+    }
+    const refreshedAuthCtx: CodexAuthContext = {
+      ...authCtx,
+      accessToken: refreshed.accessToken,
+      chatgptAccountId: refreshed.chatgptAccountId,
+    };
+    const provider = applyCodexAuthContextToProvider(
+      stripCodexRuntimeProviderFields(route.provider),
+      refreshedAuthCtx,
+      route.codexAccountMode,
+    );
+    const headers = await materializeCodexUpstreamAuthAsync(req.headers, refreshedAuthCtx, {
+      admission: options.admission,
+      config: options.codexAuthPolicy ?? config,
+      modelId: route.modelId,
+      substituteMainCredential,
+      signal: options.abortSignal,
+      nativeMainRefreshDependencies: options.nativeMainRefreshDependencies,
+    });
+    return { ok: true, authCtx: refreshedAuthCtx, provider, headers };
+  } catch (error) {
+    if (options.abortSignal?.aborted || req.signal.aborted) {
+      return { ok: false, response: clientCancelledResponse() };
+    }
+    return { ok: false, response: mapCodexAuthContextErrorToResponse(error, {
+      now: Date.now(), accountSelector: route.codexAccountNamespace,
+    }) ?? nativeMainRefreshFailureResponse(error) };
+  }
+}