@bitkyc08/opencodex 2.55.0 → 2.56.0

package/src/server/responses/core-replay.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
+import type {
+  OcxProviderContinuationOwner,
+  OcxProviderContinuationState,
+  OcxParsedRequest,
+  OcxProviderConfig,
+  OcxReasoningReplayIdentity,
+  AdapterEvent,
+} from "../../types";
+import {
+  isValidProviderContinuationOwner,
+  sameProviderContinuationOwner,
+  providerContinuationOwnerFromReplayIdentity,
+  providerContinuationRouteScope,
+} from "../../responses/provider-continuation";
+import {
+  reasoningReplayDestinationIdentity,
+  reasoningReplayOAuthCredentialIdentity,
+  durableReplayCredentialIdentity,
+  reasoningReplayCodexCredentialIdentity,
+  reasoningReplayKeyCredentialIdentity,
+  durableReplayDestinationIdentity,
+  bindReasoningReplayScope,
+  reasoningReplayServingIdentityChanged,
+  reasoningReplayOpaqueBlobRejectionMemoized,
+} from "../../responses/reasoning-replay-cache";
+import type { OAuthAccessSnapshot } from "../../oauth";
+import type { CodexAuthContext } from "../../codex/auth-context";
+import { thoughtSignatureReplaySalt } from "../../responses/thought-signature-replay";
+import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
+
+/**
+ * Adapters whose continuation state must survive Codex's store:false requests.
+ */
+export function adapterNeedsForcedContinuation(name: string): boolean {
+  return name === "kiro" || name === "cursor";
+}
+
+
+export type ContinuationOwnerRead =
+  | { kind: "missing" }
+  | { kind: "invalid" }
+  | { kind: "valid"; owner: OcxProviderContinuationOwner };
+
+
+export function readProviderContinuationOwner(
+  state: OcxProviderContinuationState | undefined,
+): ContinuationOwnerRead {
+  if (!state || state.__ocxOwner === undefined) return { kind: "missing" };
+  const owner = state.__ocxOwner;
+  if (!isValidProviderContinuationOwner(owner)) return { kind: "invalid" };
+  return { kind: "valid", owner: { ...owner } };
+}
+
+
+export function providerContinuationPayload(
+  state: OcxProviderContinuationState | undefined,
+): OcxProviderContinuationState | undefined {
+  if (!state) return undefined;
+  const cloned = structuredClone(state);
+  delete cloned.__ocxOwner;
+  return Object.keys(cloned).length > 0 ? cloned : undefined;
+}
+
+
+export function bindProviderContinuationForRoute(
+  parsed: OcxParsedRequest,
+  currentOwner: OcxProviderContinuationOwner | undefined,
+): void {
+  const candidate = parsed._providerContinuationCandidate;
+  const storedOwner = readProviderContinuationOwner(candidate);
+  const mayRestore = storedOwner.kind === "valid"
+    && !!currentOwner
+    && sameProviderContinuationOwner(storedOwner.owner, currentOwner);
+  const restored = mayRestore ? providerContinuationPayload(candidate) : undefined;
+  if (restored) parsed._providerContinuation = restored;
+  else delete parsed._providerContinuation;
+  const cursorConversationId = restored?.cursor?.conversationId;
+  if (cursorConversationId) parsed._cursorConversationId = cursorConversationId;
+  else delete parsed._cursorConversationId;
+  if (currentOwner) parsed._providerContinuationOwner = { ...currentOwner };
+  else delete parsed._providerContinuationOwner;
+}
+
+
+export function providerContinuationDestinationIdentity(
+  parsed: OcxParsedRequest,
+  provider: OcxProviderConfig,
+): string | undefined {
+  const kiroContext = parsed._kiroAuthContext;
+  return reasoningReplayDestinationIdentity(JSON.stringify([
+    provider.baseUrl.trim().replace(/\/+$/, ""),
+    provider.responsesPath ?? "",
+    kiroContext?.profileArn ?? "",
+    kiroContext?.apiRegion ?? "",
+    kiroContext?.ssoRegion ?? "",
+  ]));
+}
+
+
+export function bindRouteReasoningReplayScope(args: {
+  parsed: OcxParsedRequest;
+  providerName: string;
+  provider: OcxProviderConfig;
+  adapterName: string;
+  oauthCredentialSnapshot?: Pick<OAuthAccessSnapshot, "accountId" | "generation">;
+  codexAuthContext?: CodexAuthContext;
+  forwardHeaders?: Headers;
+}): void {
+  const { parsed, providerName, provider, adapterName } = args;
+  let credentialIdentity: string | undefined;
+  let credentialDurableIdentity: string | undefined;
+  const durableSalt = thoughtSignatureReplaySalt();
+  if (provider.authMode === "oauth") {
+    credentialIdentity = reasoningReplayOAuthCredentialIdentity(
+      args.oauthCredentialSnapshot,
+      provider.headers,
+    );
+    // The persisted account-slot id survives token refresh and restarts; the rotating
+    // generation deliberately does NOT participate (#1926 design: rotation-safe).
+    credentialDurableIdentity = durableReplayCredentialIdentity(
+      "oauth",
+      args.oauthCredentialSnapshot?.accountId,
+      provider.headers,
+      durableSalt,
+    );
+  } else if (provider.authMode === "forward") {
+    const poolContext = args.codexAuthContext?.kind === "pool"
+      || args.codexAuthContext?.kind === "main-pool"
+      ? args.codexAuthContext
+      : undefined;
+    credentialIdentity = reasoningReplayCodexCredentialIdentity({
+      authorization: poolContext
+        ? `Bearer ${poolContext.accessToken}`
+        : args.forwardHeaders?.get("authorization"),
+      chatgptAccountId: poolContext?.chatgptAccountId
+        ?? args.forwardHeaders?.get("chatgpt-account-id"),
+      accountId: poolContext?.accountId,
+      credentialGeneration: poolContext?.kind === "pool"
+        ? poolContext.generation
+        : undefined,
+      writerGeneration: poolContext?.writerGeneration,
+      headers: provider.headers,
+    });
+    // Durable identity requires a STABLE, TRUSTED account handle. Pool context comes from
+    // our own account store; a client-supplied chatgpt-account-id header is attacker
+    // -influenceable bucket selection and a bearer alone is rotating material — both are
+    // refused, so direct-forward turns get no durable scope (fail closed; the in-process
+    // cache still covers same-process replay).
+    const codexDurableHandle = poolContext?.accountId
+      ?? poolContext?.chatgptAccountId
+      ?? undefined;
+    credentialDurableIdentity = durableReplayCredentialIdentity(
+      "codex",
+      codexDurableHandle ?? undefined,
+      provider.headers,
+      durableSalt,
+    );
+  } else if (provider.authMode !== "local") {
+    credentialIdentity = reasoningReplayKeyCredentialIdentity(provider);
+    credentialDurableIdentity = durableReplayCredentialIdentity(
+      "key",
+      nonEmptyProviderApiKey(provider),
+      provider.headers,
+      durableSalt,
+    );
+  }
+  const providerDestinationIdentity = reasoningReplayDestinationIdentity(provider.baseUrl);
+  const replayIdentity: OcxReasoningReplayIdentity | undefined = credentialIdentity && providerDestinationIdentity
+    ? {
+        providerName,
+        providerDestinationIdentity,
+        providerDestinationDurableIdentity: durableReplayDestinationIdentity(provider.baseUrl),
+        adapterName,
+        modelId: parsed.modelId,
+        credentialIdentity,
+        ...(credentialDurableIdentity ? { credentialDurableIdentity } : {}),
+      }
+    : undefined;
+  const continuationDestinationIdentity = providerContinuationDestinationIdentity(parsed, provider);
+  const continuationOwner = providerContinuationOwnerFromReplayIdentity(
+    replayIdentity && continuationDestinationIdentity
+      ? { ...replayIdentity, providerDestinationIdentity: continuationDestinationIdentity }
+      : undefined,
+  );
+  if (adapterName === "cursor") {
+    // The final route owner is authoritative for Cursor and supersedes the account-derived
+    // seed assigned before route binding. A Cursor conversation must be scoped to the exact
+    // provider/destination/adapter/model/credential that serves it.
+    if (continuationOwner) parsed._cursorIdentityScope = providerContinuationRouteScope(continuationOwner);
+    else if (!parsed._cursorIdentityScope?.startsWith("cursor-unowned:")) {
+      // Prevent the adapter's token-only fallback from recreating a provider-private id after the
+      // route owner failed closed. The sentinel is per parsed request and contains no credential.
+      parsed._cursorIdentityScope = `cursor-unowned:${randomUUID()}`;
+    }
+  }
+  bindReasoningReplayScope(
+    parsed._reasoningReplayScope,
+    replayIdentity,
+  );
+  // Keep this sticky for the whole outbound request: a later auth/key rebind may compare equal
+  // after the first mismatch, but it cannot make history minted by the prior route decodable.
+  if (reasoningReplayServingIdentityChanged(parsed._reasoningReplayScope)) {
+    parsed._stripReasoningEncryptedContent = true;
+  }
+  if (reasoningReplayOpaqueBlobRejectionMemoized(parsed._reasoningReplayScope)) {
+    parsed._stripReasoningEncryptedContent = true;
+  }
+  bindProviderContinuationForRoute(parsed, continuationOwner);
+}
+
+
+export function adapterResponseReachedServingTerminal(
+  events: readonly AdapterEvent[],
+  response: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>,
+): boolean {
+  return (response.status === "completed" || response.status === "incomplete")
+    && events.some(event => event.type === "done" || event.type === "incomplete");
+}
+
+
+export function nonEmptyProviderApiKey(provider: OcxProviderConfig): string | undefined {
+  return typeof provider.apiKey === "string" && provider.apiKey.trim().length > 0
+    ? provider.apiKey
+    : undefined;
+}