@bitkyc08/opencodex 2.100.3 → 2.100.5-preview.20261118.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/AGENTS_INSTALL.md +23 -1
- package/bin/ocx.mjs +8 -1
- package/gui/dist/assets/{App-Dnb6VMsP.js → App-BiOGtxDS.js} +21 -20
- package/gui/dist/assets/{Tray-BV4ms9U9.js → Tray-BwsMejUO.js} +1 -1
- package/gui/dist/assets/brand-mark-BY1dgACL.js +1 -0
- package/gui/dist/assets/{index-DCdXsMyZ.js → index-CwHSKMdG.js} +46 -13
- package/gui/dist/assets/index-DJxM-imn.css +2 -0
- package/gui/dist/assets/{segment-thumb-features-DXSidY6D.js → segment-thumb-features-Bds9Hb_7.js} +1 -1
- package/gui/dist/classic/assets/{App-DA-scMPq.js → App-CGLOiqQL.js} +20 -19
- package/gui/dist/classic/assets/{Tray-BrHaVRAq.js → Tray-Da4r2O70.js} +1 -1
- package/gui/dist/classic/assets/{index-BqOaGLf5.js → index-CvoKXKL9.js} +46 -13
- package/gui/dist/classic/assets/quota-summary-DvqzfCmr.js +1 -0
- package/gui/dist/classic/index.html +1 -1
- package/gui/dist/index.html +2 -2
- package/native/ocx-child/src/cli.rs +5 -3
- package/native/ocx-child/src/codex_home.rs +1 -0
- package/native/ocx-child/src/link_ws.rs +24 -19
- package/native/ocx-child/src/link_ws_frame.rs +136 -50
- package/package.json +3 -3
- package/src/adapters/anthropic/per-message-effort.ts +296 -0
- package/src/adapters/anthropic-input-schema.ts +270 -0
- package/src/adapters/anthropic.ts +4 -63
- package/src/adapters/claude-cli/adapter.ts +1 -0
- package/src/adapters/command-code-tool-text.ts +9 -1
- package/src/adapters/command-code.ts +18 -2
- package/src/adapters/devin/cloud-direct/chat.ts +95 -14
- package/src/adapters/devin/live-models.ts +11 -1
- package/src/adapters/google-errors.ts +14 -2
- package/src/adapters/kiro/reasoning.ts +3 -0
- package/src/adapters/kiro-tools.ts +14 -9
- package/src/adapters/openai-responses/passthrough.ts +3 -1
- package/src/adapters/openai-responses/request-strips.ts +1 -0
- package/src/adapters/qoder/adapter.ts +9 -1
- package/src/adapters/tool-catalog-nudge.ts +1 -1
- package/src/adapters/zed.ts +4 -2
- package/src/claude/chat-tool-dispatch.ts +4 -1
- package/src/claude/desktop-remote-store.ts +60 -10
- package/src/cli/account-api.ts +4 -0
- package/src/cli/account-auth.ts +30 -2
- package/src/cli/account-extended.ts +33 -2
- package/src/cli/capabilities-access-remote.ts +3 -3
- package/src/cli/capabilities-accounts.ts +3 -3
- package/src/cli/capabilities-base.ts +11 -6
- package/src/cli/capabilities-observe-system.ts +2 -2
- package/src/cli/claude.ts +3 -3
- package/src/cli/disconnect-runtime.ts +16 -6
- package/src/cli/dispatch.ts +7 -1
- package/src/cli/index.ts +2 -2
- package/src/cli/link-apply-restart.ts +4 -2
- package/src/cli/link-routes.ts +4 -1
- package/src/cli/link.ts +5 -4
- package/src/cli/logout-command.ts +23 -4
- package/src/cli/preflight-exemptions.ts +3 -0
- package/src/cli/provider.ts +3 -2
- package/src/cli/registry.ts +5 -2
- package/src/cli/resolve.ts +23 -8
- package/src/cli/restart-failure.ts +11 -1
- package/src/cli/runtime-api.ts +4 -0
- package/src/cli/status.ts +4 -1
- package/src/cli/system-command.ts +1 -1
- package/src/cli/system-restart-client.ts +9 -3
- package/src/cli/system-settings-parity.ts +2 -1
- package/src/client/connect.ts +73 -11
- package/src/client/desktop-refusal.ts +38 -0
- package/src/client/lifecycle-lock.ts +29 -4
- package/src/client/runtime-restart.ts +27 -15
- package/src/client/runtime.ts +4 -2
- package/src/client/state.ts +14 -0
- package/src/clients/config-export.ts +12 -7
- package/src/codex/account-lifecycle.ts +3 -1
- package/src/codex/account-pause.ts +4 -0
- package/src/codex/account-runtime-state.ts +4 -0
- package/src/codex/auth-api/main-account-probe.ts +3 -1
- package/src/codex/auth-api/main-hard-lock-refusal-read.ts +172 -0
- package/src/codex/auth-context.ts +40 -2
- package/src/codex/catalog/build-entries.ts +10 -0
- package/src/codex/catalog/derive-entry.ts +7 -0
- package/src/codex/catalog/metadata.ts +8 -0
- package/src/codex/catalog/native-models.ts +16 -6
- package/src/codex/catalog/pinned-models.ts +1 -0
- package/src/codex/catalog/provider-models.ts +5 -5
- package/src/codex/catalog/reserve-warn.ts +7 -5
- package/src/codex/catalog/reserve.ts +4 -3
- package/src/codex/catalog/retained-sync.ts +2 -0
- package/src/codex/catalog/routed-defaults.ts +35 -0
- package/src/codex/catalog-auto-refresh.ts +13 -2
- package/src/codex/config-drift-heal.ts +40 -12
- package/src/codex/config-write-lock.ts +39 -1
- package/src/codex/convergence.ts +2 -0
- package/src/codex/data/roster-pinned-models.json +346 -1
- package/src/codex/inject/config-write-section.ts +39 -1
- package/src/codex/inject/plan.ts +10 -8
- package/src/codex/inject/remove.ts +21 -19
- package/src/codex/inject/restore.ts +5 -1
- package/src/codex/inject-coordination.ts +58 -7
- package/src/codex/inject.ts +10 -12
- package/src/codex/journal-config-restore.ts +42 -0
- package/src/codex/journal.ts +62 -8
- package/src/codex/loopback-target.ts +22 -8
- package/src/codex/main-account.ts +94 -30
- package/src/codex/native-main-auth-file.ts +14 -0
- package/src/codex/native-main-credentials.ts +276 -0
- package/src/codex/native-main-owner.ts +3 -0
- package/src/codex/native-main-refresh-mode.ts +14 -1
- package/src/codex/quota.ts +63 -14
- package/src/combos/failover.ts +195 -1
- package/src/combos/index.ts +5 -0
- package/src/combos/resolve.ts +115 -19
- package/src/config/diagnostics.ts +3 -0
- package/src/config/live-reconcile.ts +6 -3
- package/src/config/load-degrade.ts +2 -0
- package/src/config/persisted-mutation.ts +2 -2
- package/src/config/persisted-projections.ts +18 -0
- package/src/config/process-state.ts +4 -3
- package/src/config/reserve-capability.ts +96 -0
- package/src/config/schema/config-schema.ts +6 -0
- package/src/config/schema/leaf-validators.ts +2 -0
- package/src/config/schema/routed-catalog-defaults.ts +49 -0
- package/src/config/subagent-models.ts +20 -12
- package/src/config.ts +7 -7
- package/src/desktop-update/acquire.ts +202 -0
- package/src/desktop-update/cli.ts +168 -0
- package/src/desktop-update/drain.ts +40 -0
- package/src/desktop-update/headless.ts +285 -0
- package/src/desktop-update/image.ts +85 -0
- package/src/desktop-update/install.ts +53 -0
- package/src/desktop-update/msi.ts +72 -0
- package/src/desktop-update/release.ts +128 -0
- package/src/desktop-update/runtime.ts +155 -0
- package/src/desktop-update/staging.ts +118 -0
- package/src/desktop-update/trust.ts +45 -0
- package/src/generated/compatibility-version.json +327 -195
- package/src/generated/model-metadata.ts +3 -3
- package/src/images/fulfill-video.ts +3 -3
- package/src/images/loop.ts +6 -2
- package/src/images/plan.ts +147 -11
- package/src/images/types.ts +13 -4
- package/src/images/xai-video-client.ts +72 -10
- package/src/lib/client-error-body.ts +6 -0
- package/src/lib/developer-role-rejection.ts +15 -0
- package/src/lib/gcp-adc.ts +48 -4
- package/src/lib/offline-resend.ts +150 -0
- package/src/lib/paced-stream.ts +3 -3
- package/src/lib/provider-outbound.ts +17 -6
- package/src/lib/request-failure-model.ts +2 -0
- package/src/lib/response-body-inactivity.ts +23 -1
- package/src/lib/upstream-retry.ts +39 -6
- package/src/link/explicit-route.ts +4 -4
- package/src/link/remote-windows.ts +79 -31
- package/src/link/residual-recovery.ts +20 -8
- package/src/messaging/budget.ts +23 -5
- package/src/messaging/remote-ports.ts +22 -10
- package/src/messaging/rpc.ts +4 -4
- package/src/oauth/antigravity-risk.ts +126 -0
- package/src/oauth/credential-siblings.ts +32 -0
- package/src/oauth/generic-account-failover.ts +113 -30
- package/src/oauth/generic-session-affinity.ts +10 -3
- package/src/oauth/index.ts +22 -14
- package/src/oauth/login-cli.ts +35 -1
- package/src/oauth/pool-kernel.ts +3 -3
- package/src/oauth/store.ts +38 -7
- package/src/providers/anthropic-billing-refusal.ts +27 -3
- package/src/providers/anthropic-reset-grants.ts +4 -0
- package/src/providers/claude-cli-usage.ts +2 -0
- package/src/providers/codebuddy-models.ts +11 -0
- package/src/providers/google-vertex-model-discovery.ts +49 -15
- package/src/providers/kiro-models.ts +5 -0
- package/src/providers/model-rename-fields.ts +2 -0
- package/src/providers/quota/workbuddy.ts +6 -2
- package/src/providers/registry/entries-core.ts +9 -3
- package/src/providers/registry/entries-extended.ts +20 -9
- package/src/providers/registry/model-seeds.ts +4 -1
- package/src/providers/stale-context-window-migration.ts +2 -0
- package/src/providers/workbuddy-credit-balance.ts +125 -16
- package/src/responses/citation-markers.ts +26 -23
- package/src/responses/effort-history.ts +732 -0
- package/src/routing/history/integrity.ts +41 -4
- package/src/server/auth-cors.ts +13 -3
- package/src/server/codex-model-list.ts +2 -1
- package/src/server/direct-local-http.ts +26 -3
- package/src/server/index/link-listener.ts +20 -14
- package/src/server/index/serve-options.ts +1 -0
- package/src/server/index.ts +3 -2
- package/src/server/link-turn.ts +17 -5
- package/src/server/management/config-routes.ts +39 -3
- package/src/server/management/link-child-preflight.ts +1 -1
- package/src/server/management/link-enrollment.ts +3 -3
- package/src/server/management/link-route-edit.ts +20 -1
- package/src/server/management/link-route-request.ts +11 -5
- package/src/server/management/oauth-account-routes.ts +43 -13
- package/src/server/management/provider-credential-release.ts +44 -0
- package/src/server/management/provider-overwrite-carry.ts +3 -0
- package/src/server/management/provider-routes.ts +12 -12
- package/src/server/management/static-catalog-probe.ts +33 -0
- package/src/server/management/usage-aggregate-cache.ts +6 -3
- package/src/server/messages-native.ts +16 -2
- package/src/server/proxy-liveness.ts +54 -9
- package/src/server/relay.ts +6 -1
- package/src/server/request-log-conversation.ts +8 -4
- package/src/server/request-log-failure-detail.ts +26 -9
- package/src/server/request-log.ts +5 -1
- package/src/server/reserve-capability-startup.ts +32 -0
- package/src/server/responses/adapter-continuation.ts +59 -25
- package/src/server/responses/adapter-delivery.ts +2 -0
- package/src/server/responses/adapter-dispatch.ts +39 -18
- package/src/server/responses/antigravity-fault-rotation.ts +24 -0
- package/src/server/responses/antigravity-validation-refusal.ts +43 -6
- package/src/server/responses/codex-tool-catalog.ts +47 -10
- package/src/server/responses/combo-selection-keepalive.ts +254 -0
- package/src/server/responses/combo-session-recall.ts +26 -1
- package/src/server/responses/combo-stream-preflight.ts +35 -26
- package/src/server/responses/core-combo-failure.ts +6 -0
- package/src/server/responses/core-combo-native.ts +2 -1
- package/src/server/responses/core-combo.ts +67 -28
- package/src/server/responses/core-errors.ts +9 -6
- package/src/server/responses/core-options.ts +10 -0
- package/src/server/responses/core.ts +21 -0
- package/src/server/responses/estimated-usage.ts +115 -0
- package/src/server/responses/input-admission.ts +41 -3
- package/src/server/responses/jev-model-invoke.ts +7 -2
- package/src/server/responses/passthrough-completion.ts +6 -3
- package/src/server/responses/passthrough-delivery.ts +47 -8
- package/src/server/responses/passthrough-dispatch.ts +3 -0
- package/src/server/responses/request-prepare.ts +9 -5
- package/src/server/responses/request-send-budget.ts +1 -1
- package/src/server/responses/request-transport.ts +10 -2
- package/src/server/responses/sidecar-execution.ts +11 -4
- package/src/service/desktop-supervision.d.mts +2 -0
- package/src/service/desktop-supervision.mjs +5 -0
- package/src/service/windows-checked-stop-live.ts +28 -5
- package/src/stall-timeout.ts +11 -0
- package/src/types/config.ts +15 -92
- package/src/types/provider.ts +13 -0
- package/src/types/request.ts +23 -3
- package/src/types/routed-catalog-defaults.ts +17 -0
- package/src/types/routing-profile.ts +90 -0
- package/src/types.ts +1 -0
- package/src/update/index.ts +1 -1
- package/src/usage/expected-prices.ts +35 -0
- package/src/usage/ledger-scanner.ts +44 -10
- package/src/usage/log.ts +14 -4
- package/src/usage/telemetry-contract.ts +1 -0
- package/src/web-search/loop.ts +20 -2
- package/src/web-search/parse.ts +2 -12
- package/src/web-search/passthrough-bridge.ts +7 -0
- package/src/web-search/sources.ts +13 -0
- package/gui/dist/assets/brand-mark-XOLJbomA.js +0 -1
- package/gui/dist/assets/index-DQtCRNAw.css +0 -2
- package/gui/dist/classic/assets/quota-summary-Dy5_wfTT.js +0 -1
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* The submit call uses a 60 s timeout (it only returns an ID); the poll call uses 30 s.
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import {
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} from "../lib/provider-outbound";
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/**
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* Destination and credential of one video provider. `providerName` and the destination fields are
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export interface VideoProviderAuth {
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}
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/** Test seam for DNS resolution and the pinned transport; production passes nothing. */
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export type VideoOutboundDependencies = Pick<ProviderOutboundDependencies, "resolveAddresses" | "pinnedGet" | "pinnedPost">;
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export interface XaiVideoSubmitRequest {
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156
|
try { await resp.body?.cancel(); } catch { /* ignore */ }
|
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@@ -111,20 +174,19 @@ export async function submitVideoJob(
|
|
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111
174
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*/
|
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175
|
export async function pollVideoJob(
|
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requestId: string,
|
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-
auth:
|
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+
auth: VideoProviderAuth,
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|
signal?: AbortSignal,
|
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+
dependencies: VideoOutboundDependencies = {},
|
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|
): Promise<XaiVideoPollResult> {
|
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|
const timeout = AbortSignal.timeout(POLL_TIMEOUT_MS);
|
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|
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|
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|
|
|
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|
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const resp = await
|
|
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-
method: "GET",
|
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-
redirect: "manual",
|
|
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|
+
const resp = await providerOutboundGet(auth.providerName, outboundConfig(auth), `${auth.baseUrl}/videos/${encodeURIComponent(requestId)}`, {
|
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|
headers: {
|
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|
"Authorization": `Bearer ${auth.token}`,
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|
},
|
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|
signal: linkedSignal,
|
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|
-
});
|
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|
+
}, outboundDependencies(dependencies));
|
|
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190
|
|
|
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|
if (!resp.ok) {
|
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|
try { await resp.body?.cancel(); } catch { /* ignore */ }
|
|
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
import { CYBER_POLICY_FALLBACK_MESSAGE, classifyError } from "./errors";
|
|
2
2
|
import { classifyUpstreamCondition, upstreamConditionMessage, type UpstreamConditionEvidence } from "./upstream-condition";
|
|
3
|
+
import { isDeveloperRoleRejection } from "./developer-role-rejection";
|
|
3
4
|
|
|
4
5
|
const openaiTypes = ["invalid_request_error", "authentication_error", "permission_error", "not_found_error", "rate_limit_error", "server_error", "upstream_error", "insufficient_quota", "client_cancelled", "cyber_policy", "model_not_allowed_for_key", "api_error", "overloaded_error"] as const;
|
|
5
6
|
const openaiCodes = [
|
|
@@ -42,6 +43,8 @@ export const CLIENT_ERROR_CONTRACTS = {
|
|
|
42
43
|
stream_incomplete: "The provider stream ended before the request completed.",
|
|
43
44
|
} as const;
|
|
44
45
|
export type ClientErrorContract = keyof typeof CLIENT_ERROR_CONTRACTS;
|
|
46
|
+
/** A provider rejected the `developer` role (#8864); the proxy's own wording, never the provider's. */
|
|
47
|
+
export const DEVELOPER_ROLE_REFUSAL_MESSAGE = "The provider does not accept the developer message role. Send these instructions as a system message, or set foldDeveloperRoleToSystem: true on this provider; retrying this request unchanged will not succeed.";
|
|
45
48
|
export const UNDECLARED_TOOL_CALL_MESSAGE = "routed provider emitted undeclared client tool; only request-declared tools may be called";
|
|
46
49
|
/** Only producers of synthetic incomplete events register these process-local origins. */
|
|
47
50
|
type ProxyIncompleteReason = "adapter_eof" | "upstream_stall_timeout" | "missing_terminal_event";
|
|
@@ -138,6 +141,9 @@ export function actionableRefusalMessage(
|
|
|
138
141
|
const structured = typeof evidence.code === "string" && evidence.code.length <= 64
|
|
139
142
|
? evidence.code.trim().toUpperCase().replaceAll("-", "_") : undefined;
|
|
140
143
|
if (structured !== undefined && ACTIONABLE_REFUSALS.has(structured)) return ACTIONABLE_REFUSALS.get(structured);
|
|
144
|
+
// A role rejection travels as a plain invalid request, so it is read before the carrier gate.
|
|
145
|
+
if (contract === undefined && (code === null || code === "invalid_request_error")
|
|
146
|
+
&& isDeveloperRoleRejection(evidence.status, evidence.message)) return DEVELOPER_ROLE_REFUSAL_MESSAGE;
|
|
141
147
|
if (code === null || !REFUSAL_CARRIER_CODES.has(code) || typeof evidence.message !== "string") return undefined;
|
|
142
148
|
const scanned = evidence.message.slice(0, REFUSAL_TOKEN_SCAN);
|
|
143
149
|
for (const [token, message] of ACTIONABLE_REFUSALS) {
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
/**
|
|
2
|
+
* Whether an upstream 4xx says the provider rejects the `developer` message role (#8864).
|
|
3
|
+
*
|
|
4
|
+
* Read only through fixed lowercase phrases that name the role itself; nothing from the message is
|
|
5
|
+
* returned or stored. Each phrase is a provider's own wording: DashScope compatible-mode (#5664),
|
|
6
|
+
* Moonshot (#7583) and serde-based gateways. Any other 400 stays a plain request rejection.
|
|
7
|
+
*/
|
|
8
|
+
const MAX_SCAN = 4096;
|
|
9
|
+
const PHRASES = ["developer is not one of", "role 'developer' is not allowed", "unknown variant `developer`"] as const;
|
|
10
|
+
|
|
11
|
+
export function isDeveloperRoleRejection(status: number | undefined, message: unknown): boolean {
|
|
12
|
+
if (typeof status !== "number" || status < 400 || status >= 500 || typeof message !== "string") return false;
|
|
13
|
+
const scanned = message.slice(0, MAX_SCAN).toLowerCase();
|
|
14
|
+
return PHRASES.some(phrase => scanned.includes(phrase));
|
|
15
|
+
}
|
package/src/lib/gcp-adc.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -60,6 +60,19 @@ export function gcpCredentialMarkerAccount(value: string | undefined): string |
|
|
|
60
60
|
return account;
|
|
61
61
|
}
|
|
62
62
|
|
|
63
|
+
export type VertexConfiguredCredentialKind = "marker" | "ambient" | "reference" | "api-key";
|
|
64
|
+
|
|
65
|
+
/**
|
|
66
|
+
* Classify a Vertex row's configured `apiKey` text without resolving it, so no caller has to read a
|
|
67
|
+
* keychain or the environment just to learn which kind of credential the row names. The management
|
|
68
|
+
* DTO and the static-catalog connection test share this one rule.
|
|
69
|
+
*/
|
|
70
|
+
export function vertexConfiguredCredentialKind(key: string | undefined): VertexConfiguredCredentialKind {
|
|
71
|
+
if (key?.startsWith(GCP_CREDENTIAL_MARKER_PREFIX)) return "marker";
|
|
72
|
+
if (!key?.trim() || key === "N/A" || key.startsWith("<")) return "ambient";
|
|
73
|
+
return key.startsWith("keychain:") || /^\$\{?\w+\}?$/.test(key) ? "reference" : "api-key";
|
|
74
|
+
}
|
|
75
|
+
|
|
63
76
|
/**
|
|
64
77
|
* Whether a pasted API-key value is in fact a GCP credential JSON. Used by the save path to
|
|
65
78
|
* divert JSON material out of the literal-key flow before it reaches `config.json`. Deliberately
|
|
@@ -125,6 +138,18 @@ const sourceObservations = new Map<string, { source: string; generation: number
|
|
|
125
138
|
let sourceEpoch = 0;
|
|
126
139
|
let lastReconciledGeneration = 0;
|
|
127
140
|
let liveSources = new Set<string>();
|
|
141
|
+
// Last token exchange that succeeded, per credential scope. Proof the dashboard can show without a
|
|
142
|
+
// network call; it lapses on its own once the source the next resolve would use changes.
|
|
143
|
+
const verifiedSources = new Map<string, { source: string; generation: number }>();
|
|
144
|
+
const adcScope = (markerAccount: string | undefined) => markerAccount ? `marker:${markerAccount}` : "host";
|
|
145
|
+
|
|
146
|
+
/** True when this process minted a token from the credential source the next request would use. */
|
|
147
|
+
export function vertexAdcCredentialVerified(markerAccount?: string): boolean {
|
|
148
|
+
const verified = verifiedSources.get(adcScope(markerAccount));
|
|
149
|
+
if (!verified) return false;
|
|
150
|
+
const current = observeAdcSource(markerAccount);
|
|
151
|
+
return current.source === verified.source && current.generation === verified.generation;
|
|
152
|
+
}
|
|
128
153
|
|
|
129
154
|
export function sweepExpiredGcpAdcTokens(now = Date.now()): number {
|
|
130
155
|
const skew = getRefreshSkewMs();
|
|
@@ -244,7 +269,7 @@ function currentAdcSourceKey(markerAccount: string | undefined): string {
|
|
|
244
269
|
|
|
245
270
|
/** Every observed source transition gets a fresh incarnation, including A→B→A. */
|
|
246
271
|
function observeAdcSource(markerAccount: string | undefined): { source: string; generation: number } {
|
|
247
|
-
const scope = markerAccount
|
|
272
|
+
const scope = adcScope(markerAccount);
|
|
248
273
|
const source = currentAdcSourceKey(markerAccount);
|
|
249
274
|
const previous = sourceObservations.get(scope);
|
|
250
275
|
if (previous?.source === source) return previous;
|
|
@@ -394,8 +419,13 @@ async function resolveAccessTokenUncached(markerAccount: string | undefined, sig
|
|
|
394
419
|
);
|
|
395
420
|
}
|
|
396
421
|
|
|
397
|
-
/**
|
|
398
|
-
|
|
422
|
+
/**
|
|
423
|
+
* Returns a Bearer access token for the `Authorization` header on Vertex AI calls (cached + refreshed).
|
|
424
|
+
* `forceExchange` skips the completed-token cache so the caller observes a real exchange: the
|
|
425
|
+
* connection test uses it, because a cached token outlives a revoked refresh credential. It still
|
|
426
|
+
* joins an exchange already in flight and refreshes the cache on success; other callers keep the cache.
|
|
427
|
+
*/
|
|
428
|
+
export async function getVertexAccessTokenWithAuthority(options?: { signal?: AbortSignal; fetch?: FetchImpl; markerAccount?: string; beforeSend?: () => void; forceExchange?: boolean }): Promise<VertexTokenAuthority> {
|
|
399
429
|
// The marker travels as an argument, never as process-global state: a module-level "active
|
|
400
430
|
// marker" written by the router would race across concurrent requests for different providers
|
|
401
431
|
// and could resolve one provider's Vertex call with another provider's service account. The
|
|
@@ -418,7 +448,7 @@ export async function getVertexAccessTokenWithAuthority(options?: { signal?: Abo
|
|
|
418
448
|
}
|
|
419
449
|
const writerGeneration = captureConfigGeneration();
|
|
420
450
|
for (const [source, cached] of tokenCache) {
|
|
421
|
-
if (source === expectedSource && cached.generation === expected.generation && cached.expiresAtMs - skew > now) {
|
|
451
|
+
if (!options?.forceExchange && source === expectedSource && cached.generation === expected.generation && cached.expiresAtMs - skew > now) {
|
|
422
452
|
return { token: cached.token, source, generation: expected.generation, markerAccount };
|
|
423
453
|
}
|
|
424
454
|
if (cached.expiresAtMs - skew <= now) tokenCache.delete(source);
|
|
@@ -449,12 +479,25 @@ export async function getVertexAccessTokenWithAuthority(options?: { signal?: Abo
|
|
|
449
479
|
if (source !== expectedSource || current.source !== source || current.generation !== expected.generation) {
|
|
450
480
|
throw new Error("Vertex ADC source changed during token exchange");
|
|
451
481
|
}
|
|
482
|
+
if (typeof token.access_token !== "string" || !token.access_token) {
|
|
483
|
+
throw new Error("Google OAuth token response has no access_token");
|
|
484
|
+
}
|
|
452
485
|
const expiresAtMs = Date.now() + Math.max(0, token.expires_in * 1000);
|
|
453
486
|
if (writerGeneration >= lastReconciledGeneration || liveSources.has(source)) {
|
|
454
487
|
tokenCache.set(source, { token: token.access_token, expiresAtMs, generation: expected.generation });
|
|
455
488
|
sweepExpiredOnWrite(Date.now());
|
|
456
489
|
}
|
|
490
|
+
verifiedSources.set(adcScope(markerAccount), { source, generation: expected.generation });
|
|
457
491
|
return { token: token.access_token, source, generation: expected.generation, markerAccount };
|
|
492
|
+
} catch (error) {
|
|
493
|
+
// Drop only this exchange's own proof: a newer exchange for a changed source may already
|
|
494
|
+
// have recorded its success under the same scope, and that proof still holds.
|
|
495
|
+
const scope = adcScope(markerAccount);
|
|
496
|
+
const verified = verifiedSources.get(scope);
|
|
497
|
+
if (!controller.signal.aborted && verified?.source === expectedSource && verified.generation === expected.generation) {
|
|
498
|
+
verifiedSources.delete(scope);
|
|
499
|
+
}
|
|
500
|
+
throw error;
|
|
458
501
|
} finally {
|
|
459
502
|
owned.settled = true;
|
|
460
503
|
if (inflight.get(cacheKey) === owned) inflight.delete(cacheKey);
|
|
@@ -538,6 +581,7 @@ export function vertexRequestAuthorityIsCurrent(request: object, target?: string
|
|
|
538
581
|
|
|
539
582
|
/** Test seam: restores complete process-local token and reconciliation state. */
|
|
540
583
|
export function __resetVertexTokenCache(): void {
|
|
584
|
+
verifiedSources.clear();
|
|
541
585
|
tokenCache.clear();
|
|
542
586
|
for (const entry of inflight.values()) entry.controller.abort();
|
|
543
587
|
inflight.clear();
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import { lookup } from "node:dns/promises";
|
|
2
|
+
import { isIP } from "node:net";
|
|
3
|
+
import type { OcxProviderConfig } from "../types";
|
|
4
|
+
import { isEgressTransparentExecutor, resolveProviderEgress } from "./provider-egress";
|
|
5
|
+
import { effectiveProxyFor, noProxyMatches } from "./proxy-env";
|
|
6
|
+
import { UpstreamRetryEvidenceError } from "./upstream-retry";
|
|
7
|
+
|
|
8
|
+
/** Longest configurable offline wait (#7958): five minutes, the span of a laptop sleep/Wi-Fi hop. */
|
|
9
|
+
export const MAX_OFFLINE_RESEND_WAIT_SEC = 300;
|
|
10
|
+
/** Interval between reachability probes while offline. */
|
|
11
|
+
export const OFFLINE_REACHABILITY_PROBE_INTERVAL_MS = 1_000;
|
|
12
|
+
|
|
13
|
+
/**
|
|
14
|
+
* Only a DNS resolution failure qualifies (#7958): DNS answering again is exactly the evidence that
|
|
15
|
+
* failure lacked. A refused or unreachable connection would resend into the same failure, and with
|
|
16
|
+
* an outbound proxy a direct reachability probe would not test the path the request takes.
|
|
17
|
+
*/
|
|
18
|
+
const DNS_FAILURE_CODES = new Set(["ENOTFOUND", "EAI_AGAIN"]);
|
|
19
|
+
const MAX_CAUSE_DEPTH = 3;
|
|
20
|
+
|
|
21
|
+
/** A DNS resolution failure, read from `code` through a bounded cause chain; never from message text. */
|
|
22
|
+
export function isDnsResolutionFailure(error: unknown): boolean {
|
|
23
|
+
let current: unknown = error instanceof UpstreamRetryEvidenceError ? undefined : error;
|
|
24
|
+
for (let depth = 0; depth < MAX_CAUSE_DEPTH && current instanceof Error; depth++) {
|
|
25
|
+
const code = (current as { code?: unknown }).code;
|
|
26
|
+
if (typeof code === "string" && DNS_FAILURE_CODES.has(code)) return true;
|
|
27
|
+
current = current.cause;
|
|
28
|
+
}
|
|
29
|
+
return false;
|
|
30
|
+
}
|
|
31
|
+
|
|
32
|
+
/**
|
|
33
|
+
* Decides, at most once per logical request, whether a pre-connect failure may be resent after
|
|
34
|
+
* the destination became reachable again. Returns false for every later call, and never rejects
|
|
35
|
+
* with the abort reason: a cancelled wait answers false so the caller keeps the original failure.
|
|
36
|
+
*/
|
|
37
|
+
export type OfflineResendWait = (error: unknown, signal?: AbortSignal) => Promise<boolean>;
|
|
38
|
+
|
|
39
|
+
export interface OfflineResendDependencies {
|
|
40
|
+
/** Resolves when the host resolves; rejects while it does not. */
|
|
41
|
+
resolveHost?: (hostname: string) => Promise<unknown>;
|
|
42
|
+
/** Abortable delay between probes. */
|
|
43
|
+
delay?: (ms: number, signal?: AbortSignal) => Promise<void>;
|
|
44
|
+
/** Abortable timer that ends a probe still pending when the wait runs out. */
|
|
45
|
+
expire?: (ms: number, signal?: AbortSignal) => Promise<void>;
|
|
46
|
+
now?: () => number;
|
|
47
|
+
}
|
|
48
|
+
|
|
49
|
+
let testDependencies: OfflineResendDependencies | undefined;
|
|
50
|
+
|
|
51
|
+
/** Test-only seam for the DNS probe, delay and clock; `undefined` restores the real ones. */
|
|
52
|
+
export function setOfflineResendDependenciesForTests(dependencies: OfflineResendDependencies | undefined): void {
|
|
53
|
+
testDependencies = dependencies;
|
|
54
|
+
}
|
|
55
|
+
|
|
56
|
+
/** The configured wait in milliseconds, or 0 when the opt-in is off or malformed. */
|
|
57
|
+
export function resolveOfflineResendWaitMs(configuredSec: unknown): number {
|
|
58
|
+
if (typeof configuredSec !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(configuredSec) || configuredSec <= 0) return 0;
|
|
59
|
+
return Math.ceil(Math.min(configuredSec, MAX_OFFLINE_RESEND_WAIT_SEC) * 1_000);
|
|
60
|
+
}
|
|
61
|
+
|
|
62
|
+
/**
|
|
63
|
+
* Opt-in offline wait for one request (#7958). After a send fails because the destination's name
|
|
64
|
+
* did not resolve (`isDnsResolutionFailure`), poll its DNS until it resolves or `maxWaitMs` passes,
|
|
65
|
+
* then allow one resend. An IP-literal destination never qualifies: DNS proves nothing about it.
|
|
66
|
+
* Nothing was delivered, so the resend cannot repeat an upstream effect; the caller's send budget
|
|
67
|
+
* still counts it. A rejection that is not pre-connect, a second failure, an exhausted wait or a
|
|
68
|
+
* client abort returns the original failure. A client abort answers false rather than throwing:
|
|
69
|
+
* the abort reason would replace the DNS error, and a Codex pool send would then classify a
|
|
70
|
+
* host-wide `connect_neutral` failure as account-attributed `connect_error`.
|
|
71
|
+
*/
|
|
72
|
+
export function createOfflineResendWait(url: string, maxWaitMs: number): OfflineResendWait | undefined {
|
|
73
|
+
if (!(maxWaitMs > 0)) return undefined;
|
|
74
|
+
let hostname: string;
|
|
75
|
+
try { hostname = new URL(url).hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, ""); } catch { return undefined; }
|
|
76
|
+
if (isIP(hostname) !== 0) return undefined;
|
|
77
|
+
let claimed = false;
|
|
78
|
+
return async (error, signal) => {
|
|
79
|
+
if (claimed || !isDnsResolutionFailure(error)) return false;
|
|
80
|
+
claimed = true;
|
|
81
|
+
const deps = testDependencies ?? {};
|
|
82
|
+
const resolveHost = deps.resolveHost ?? ((host: string) => lookup(host));
|
|
83
|
+
const delay = deps.delay ?? abortableDelay;
|
|
84
|
+
const expire = deps.expire ?? abortableDelay;
|
|
85
|
+
const now = deps.now ?? Date.now;
|
|
86
|
+
const deadline = now() + maxWaitMs;
|
|
87
|
+
for (;;) {
|
|
88
|
+
if (signal?.aborted) return false;
|
|
89
|
+
let remaining = deadline - now();
|
|
90
|
+
if (remaining <= 0) return false;
|
|
91
|
+
// A stalled system resolver must not outlive the wait or the client: race each probe against
|
|
92
|
+
// the remaining budget and cancellation, and accept a success only inside the budget. An
|
|
93
|
+
// expiry that rejects (cancellation) ends the wait the same way as one that fires.
|
|
94
|
+
const settle = new AbortController();
|
|
95
|
+
const raceSignal = signal ? AbortSignal.any([signal, settle.signal]) : settle.signal;
|
|
96
|
+
const expiry = new Promise<void>(resolve => resolve(expire(remaining, raceSignal)))
|
|
97
|
+
.then(() => "expired" as const, () => "expired" as const);
|
|
98
|
+
const probe = new Promise(resolve => resolve(resolveHost(hostname))).then(() => true, () => false);
|
|
99
|
+
let outcome: boolean | "expired";
|
|
100
|
+
try { outcome = await Promise.race([probe, expiry]); } finally { settle.abort(); }
|
|
101
|
+
if (outcome === "expired" || signal?.aborted) return false;
|
|
102
|
+
if (outcome) return now() <= deadline;
|
|
103
|
+
remaining = deadline - now();
|
|
104
|
+
if (remaining <= 0) return false;
|
|
105
|
+
try { await delay(Math.min(OFFLINE_REACHABILITY_PROBE_INTERVAL_MS, remaining), signal); } catch { return false; }
|
|
106
|
+
}
|
|
107
|
+
};
|
|
108
|
+
}
|
|
109
|
+
|
|
110
|
+
function abortableDelay(ms: number, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<void> {
|
|
111
|
+
if (signal?.aborted) return Promise.reject(signal.reason);
|
|
112
|
+
return new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
|
|
113
|
+
const onAbort = () => { clearTimeout(timer); reject(signal?.reason); };
|
|
114
|
+
const timer = setTimeout(() => { signal?.removeEventListener("abort", onAbort); resolve(); }, ms);
|
|
115
|
+
signal?.addEventListener("abort", onAbort, { once: true });
|
|
116
|
+
});
|
|
117
|
+
}
|
|
118
|
+
|
|
119
|
+
/**
|
|
120
|
+
* The URL whose name the provider's send actually resolves, or `undefined` when that is unknown.
|
|
121
|
+
* A proxied send resolves the proxy's name, and its DNS failure is the proxy's, so the wait probes
|
|
122
|
+
* the proxy; probing the provider instead could resend into a proxy that still fails, or wait out
|
|
123
|
+
* a provider name only the proxy can resolve. The route follows `configuredOutboundFetch`: the
|
|
124
|
+
* provider's own `proxy`/`noProxy` first, then the global proxy unless `NO_PROXY` exempts the URL.
|
|
125
|
+
* A caller-supplied executor picks its own transport, so it gets no probe; OpenCodex's own wrappers
|
|
126
|
+
* (xAI, Mistral Chat) carry the egress-transparent mark because they send through that same route.
|
|
127
|
+
* A malformed route fails the send anyway.
|
|
128
|
+
*/
|
|
129
|
+
export function offlineResendProbeUrl(providerName: string, provider: OcxProviderConfig, url: string): string | undefined {
|
|
130
|
+
const executor = (provider as { fetch?: unknown }).fetch;
|
|
131
|
+
if (typeof executor === "function" && !isEgressTransparentExecutor(executor)) return undefined;
|
|
132
|
+
let target: URL;
|
|
133
|
+
try { target = new URL(url); } catch { return undefined; }
|
|
134
|
+
let egress: ReturnType<typeof resolveProviderEgress>;
|
|
135
|
+
try { egress = resolveProviderEgress({ providerName, provider, url: target }); } catch { return undefined; }
|
|
136
|
+
if (egress.kind === "proxy") return egress.proxyUrl;
|
|
137
|
+
if (egress.kind === "direct") return url;
|
|
138
|
+
const globalProxy = effectiveProxyFor(target);
|
|
139
|
+
return globalProxy !== null && !noProxyMatches(target) ? globalProxy : url;
|
|
140
|
+
}
|
|
141
|
+
|
|
142
|
+
/** The request's offline waiter (#7958), probing the name its send resolves; `undefined` when off. */
|
|
143
|
+
export function createProviderOfflineResendWait(
|
|
144
|
+
providerName: string, provider: OcxProviderConfig, url: string, configuredSec: unknown,
|
|
145
|
+
): OfflineResendWait | undefined {
|
|
146
|
+
const maxWaitMs = resolveOfflineResendWaitMs(configuredSec);
|
|
147
|
+
if (maxWaitMs <= 0) return undefined;
|
|
148
|
+
const probeUrl = offlineResendProbeUrl(providerName, provider, url);
|
|
149
|
+
return probeUrl === undefined ? undefined : createOfflineResendWait(probeUrl, maxWaitMs);
|
|
150
|
+
}
|
package/src/lib/paced-stream.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
/**
|
|
2
2
|
* Pacing that travels with a stream (#8601).
|
|
3
3
|
*
|
|
4
|
-
*
|
|
5
|
-
* relay stage between the upstream and the client normally keeps one chunk queued ahead of its reader; a
|
|
6
|
-
* source is paced queues none instead and marks its own output, so the whole chain pulls on demand. Streams that were
|
|
4
|
+
* Every relayed Remote Link turn reads its upstream body only as its client drains, with or without the link WebSocket
|
|
5
|
+
* feature. Each relay stage between the upstream and the client normally keeps one chunk queued ahead of its reader; a
|
|
6
|
+
* stage whose source is paced queues none instead and marks its own output, so the whole chain pulls on demand. Streams that were
|
|
7
7
|
* never marked keep their default queue: every other request is unchanged.
|
|
8
8
|
*/
|
|
9
9
|
const paced = new WeakSet<ReadableStream<Uint8Array>>();
|
|
@@ -32,7 +32,8 @@ export interface ProviderOutboundDependencies {
|
|
|
32
32
|
/** Recheck caller-owned credential authority after DNS and immediately before transport. */
|
|
33
33
|
beforeSend?: () => boolean;
|
|
34
34
|
/**
|
|
35
|
-
* Caller opt-in for a cleartext `http:` POST
|
|
35
|
+
* Caller opt-in for a cleartext `http:` POST (or credentialed GET, see `cleartextPolicy`) to a
|
|
36
|
+
* self-hosted service. Honoured only when the
|
|
36
37
|
* URL host is exactly `localhost` or an address literal in the narrow local allowlist
|
|
37
38
|
* (`localCleartextAddressAllowed`) AND the provider row itself sets `allowPrivateNetwork: true`
|
|
38
39
|
* (a registry default does not count). Every resolved answer must stay inside the same
|
|
@@ -40,6 +41,13 @@ export interface ProviderOutboundDependencies {
|
|
|
40
41
|
* LAN. Every other destination keeps the HTTPS-only POST gate. Defaults to refusing.
|
|
41
42
|
*/
|
|
42
43
|
allowLocalCleartextPost?: boolean;
|
|
44
|
+
/**
|
|
45
|
+
* Which requests the cleartext rules above bind. A POST always obeys them. `"credentialed"`
|
|
46
|
+
* also holds a GET to them, for a caller whose GET carries the same credential as its POST (the
|
|
47
|
+
* video poll): HTTPS, or the local cleartext opt-in with its allowlisted answers and direct
|
|
48
|
+
* route. Without it a GET keeps the discovery behaviour, which admits `http:`.
|
|
49
|
+
*/
|
|
50
|
+
cleartextPolicy?: "credentialed";
|
|
43
51
|
}
|
|
44
52
|
|
|
45
53
|
function ipv4Octets(address: string): number[] | null {
|
|
@@ -234,10 +242,13 @@ async function providerOutboundRequest(
|
|
|
234
242
|
const assertSendAllowed = () => {
|
|
235
243
|
if (dependencies.beforeSend?.() === false) throw new ProviderOutboundSendCancelledError("provider credential changed before send");
|
|
236
244
|
};
|
|
237
|
-
|
|
245
|
+
// A POST, and a GET whose caller declared it carries the POST's credential, must not cross the
|
|
246
|
+
// network in cleartext. The messages name a GET explicitly so a refusal says which call failed.
|
|
247
|
+
const label = method === "POST" ? "POST" : "credentialed GET";
|
|
248
|
+
const postUrl = method === "POST" || dependencies.cleartextPolicy === "credentialed" ? new URL(url) : undefined;
|
|
238
249
|
if (postUrl?.protocol !== undefined && postUrl.protocol !== "https:"
|
|
239
250
|
&& !localCleartextPostAllowed(provider, postUrl, dependencies)) {
|
|
240
|
-
throw new ProviderOutboundPolicyError(
|
|
251
|
+
throw new ProviderOutboundPolicyError(`provider ${label} URL must use HTTPS`);
|
|
241
252
|
}
|
|
242
253
|
// Only reachable after the narrow opt-in above admitted it.
|
|
243
254
|
const localCleartextPost = postUrl?.protocol === "http:";
|
|
@@ -248,7 +259,7 @@ async function providerOutboundRequest(
|
|
|
248
259
|
if (typeof provider.fetch === "function") {
|
|
249
260
|
// An executor resolves names itself, so a cleartext POST through one must name an address.
|
|
250
261
|
if (localCleartextPost && !isIP(unbracketedHostname(postUrl!))) {
|
|
251
|
-
throw new ProviderOutboundPolicyError(
|
|
262
|
+
throw new ProviderOutboundPolicyError(`a cleartext provider ${label} through a caller-supplied executor must use an address literal`);
|
|
252
263
|
}
|
|
253
264
|
// A caller-owned executor decides its own transport, so a provider egress route cannot be
|
|
254
265
|
// applied to it. Refusing is the only honest answer: running the executor anyway would send
|
|
@@ -310,7 +321,7 @@ async function providerOutboundRequest(
|
|
|
310
321
|
// the DNS-failure proxy degradation below, which needs one) would carry it off-host unencrypted.
|
|
311
322
|
if (localCleartextPost && proxyApplies) {
|
|
312
323
|
throw new ProviderOutboundPolicyError(
|
|
313
|
-
`a cleartext provider
|
|
324
|
+
`a cleartext provider ${label} cannot use an outbound proxy; add ${normalizeProxyHostname(parsed.hostname)} to NO_PROXY`,
|
|
314
325
|
);
|
|
315
326
|
}
|
|
316
327
|
const isCanonicalUrl = dependencies.isCanonicalUrl ?? (() => false);
|
|
@@ -390,7 +401,7 @@ async function providerOutboundRequest(
|
|
|
390
401
|
}
|
|
391
402
|
if (localCleartextPost
|
|
392
403
|
&& !resolved.addresses.every(answer => localCleartextAddressAllowed(answer.address))) {
|
|
393
|
-
throw new ProviderOutboundPolicyError(
|
|
404
|
+
throw new ProviderOutboundPolicyError(`a cleartext provider ${label} resolved outside the local address allowlist`);
|
|
394
405
|
}
|
|
395
406
|
const requestOptions = {
|
|
396
407
|
headers: init.headers,
|
|
@@ -216,6 +216,8 @@ const RECOVERY_KIND_CAUSE = {
|
|
|
216
216
|
// turn. One kind cannot say both, so it says the weaker thing.
|
|
217
217
|
"transient-5xx": "upstream-fault",
|
|
218
218
|
"connection-reset": "transport-ambiguous",
|
|
219
|
+
// The send it replaced failed DNS resolution, so those bytes provably never left (#7958).
|
|
220
|
+
"offline-resend": "transport-unsent",
|
|
219
221
|
"oauth-401": "credential-rejected",
|
|
220
222
|
"oauth-account-403": "credential-rejected",
|
|
221
223
|
"key-401": "credential-rejected",
|
|
@@ -11,6 +11,25 @@ export class ResponseBodyInactivityError extends DOMException {
|
|
|
11
11
|
}
|
|
12
12
|
}
|
|
13
13
|
|
|
14
|
+
/**
|
|
15
|
+
* The same expiry from a guard armed by the operator's explicit `stallTimeoutSec` (#8206). Only this
|
|
16
|
+
* one reaches clients as `upstream_stall_timeout`; a guard on a default budget keeps its old terminal.
|
|
17
|
+
*/
|
|
18
|
+
export class ExplicitBodyStallError extends ResponseBodyInactivityError {}
|
|
19
|
+
|
|
20
|
+
// Published responses whose upstream reads already run under a positive inactivity guard.
|
|
21
|
+
const guardedResponses = new WeakSet<Response>();
|
|
22
|
+
|
|
23
|
+
/** Record that `response` relays bytes from guarded upstream reads, so no second clock is armed. */
|
|
24
|
+
export function markResponseBodyInactivityGuarded(response: Response): Response {
|
|
25
|
+
guardedResponses.add(response);
|
|
26
|
+
return response;
|
|
27
|
+
}
|
|
28
|
+
|
|
29
|
+
export function isResponseBodyInactivityGuarded(response: Response): boolean {
|
|
30
|
+
return guardedResponses.has(response);
|
|
31
|
+
}
|
|
32
|
+
|
|
14
33
|
/**
|
|
15
34
|
* Bound silence only while the consumer is waiting for upstream bytes.
|
|
16
35
|
*
|
|
@@ -23,13 +42,16 @@ export function guardResponseBodyInactivity(
|
|
|
23
42
|
response: Response,
|
|
24
43
|
signal: AbortSignal | undefined,
|
|
25
44
|
timeoutMs: number,
|
|
45
|
+
options: { explicitBudget?: boolean } = {},
|
|
26
46
|
): ResponseBodyInactivityGuard {
|
|
27
47
|
const source = response.body;
|
|
28
48
|
if (!source) return { response, dispose: () => {} };
|
|
29
49
|
|
|
30
50
|
const reader = source.getReader();
|
|
31
51
|
const timeoutEnabled = Number.isFinite(timeoutMs) && timeoutMs > 0;
|
|
32
|
-
const timeoutError =
|
|
52
|
+
const timeoutError = options.explicitBudget === true
|
|
53
|
+
? new ExplicitBodyStallError(timeoutMs)
|
|
54
|
+
: new ResponseBodyInactivityError(timeoutMs);
|
|
33
55
|
let output!: ReadableStreamDefaultController<Uint8Array>;
|
|
34
56
|
let settled = false;
|
|
35
57
|
let timer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined;
|