@bgicli/bgicli 2.2.8 → 2.2.10

package/data/skills/trailofbits-sharp-edges/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: sharp-edges
+description: "Identifies error-prone APIs, dangerous configurations, and footgun designs that enable security mistakes. Use when reviewing API designs, configuration schemas, cryptographic library ergonomics, or evaluating whether code follows 'secure by default' and 'pit of success' principles. Triggers: footgun, misuse-resistant, secure defaults, API usability, dangerous configuration."
+allowed-tools:
+  - Read
+  - Grep
+  - Glob
+---
+
+# Sharp Edges Analysis
+
+Evaluates whether APIs, configurations, and interfaces are resistant to developer misuse. Identifies designs where the "easy path" leads to insecurity.
+
+## When to Use
+
+- Reviewing API or library design decisions
+- Auditing configuration schemas for dangerous options
+- Evaluating cryptographic API ergonomics
+- Assessing authentication/authorization interfaces
+- Reviewing any code that exposes security-relevant choices to developers
+
+## When NOT to Use
+
+- Implementation bugs (use standard code review)
+- Business logic flaws (use domain-specific analysis)
+- Performance optimization (different concern)
+
+## Core Principle
+
+**The pit of success**: Secure usage should be the path of least resistance. If developers must understand cryptography, read documentation carefully, or remember special rules to avoid vulnerabilities, the API has failed.
+
+## Rationalizations to Reject
+
+| Rationalization | Why It's Wrong | Required Action |
+|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|
+| "It's documented" | Developers don't read docs under deadline pressure | Make the secure choice the default or only option |
+| "Advanced users need flexibility" | Flexibility creates footguns; most "advanced" usage is copy-paste | Provide safe high-level APIs; hide primitives |
+| "It's the developer's responsibility" | Blame-shifting; you designed the footgun | Remove the footgun or make it impossible to misuse |
+| "Nobody would actually do that" | Developers do everything imaginable under pressure | Assume maximum developer confusion |
+| "It's just a configuration option" | Config is code; wrong configs ship to production | Validate configs; reject dangerous combinations |
+| "We need backwards compatibility" | Insecure defaults can't be grandfather-claused | Deprecate loudly; force migration |
+
+## Sharp Edge Categories
+
+### 1. Algorithm/Mode Selection Footguns
+
+APIs that let developers choose algorithms invite choosing wrong ones.
+
+**The JWT Pattern** (canonical example):
+- Header specifies algorithm: attacker can set `"alg": "none"` to bypass signatures
+- Algorithm confusion: RSA public key used as HMAC secret when switching RS256→HS256
+- Root cause: Letting untrusted input control security-critical decisions
+
+**Detection patterns:**
+- Function parameters like `algorithm`, `mode`, `cipher`, `hash_type`
+- Enums/strings selecting cryptographic primitives
+- Configuration options for security mechanisms
+
+**Example - PHP password_hash allowing weak algorithms:**
+```php
+// DANGEROUS: allows crc32, md5, sha1
+password_hash($password, PASSWORD_DEFAULT); // Good - no choice
+hash($algorithm, $password); // BAD: accepts "crc32"
+```
+
+### 2. Dangerous Defaults
+
+Defaults that are insecure, or zero/empty values that disable security.
+
+**The OTP Lifetime Pattern:**
+```python
+# What happens when lifetime=0?
+def verify_otp(code, lifetime=300):  # 300 seconds default
+    if lifetime == 0:
+        return True  # OOPS: 0 means "accept all"?
+        # Or does it mean "expired immediately"?
+```
+
+**Detection patterns:**
+- Timeouts/lifetimes that accept 0 (infinite? immediate expiry?)
+- Empty strings that bypass checks
+- Null values that skip validation
+- Boolean defaults that disable security features
+- Negative values with undefined semantics
+
+**Questions to ask:**
+- What happens with `timeout=0`? `max_attempts=0`? `key=""`?
+- Is the default the most secure option?
+- Can any default value disable security entirely?
+
+### 3. Primitive vs. Semantic APIs
+
+APIs that expose raw bytes instead of meaningful types invite type confusion.
+
+**The Libsodium vs. Halite Pattern:**
+
+```php
+// Libsodium (primitives): bytes are bytes
+sodium_crypto_box($message, $nonce, $keypair);
+// Easy to: swap nonce/keypair, reuse nonces, use wrong key type
+
+// Halite (semantic): types enforce correct usage
+Crypto::seal($message, new EncryptionPublicKey($key));
+// Wrong key type = type error, not silent failure
+```
+
+**Detection patterns:**
+- Functions taking `bytes`, `string`, `[]byte` for distinct security concepts
+- Parameters that could be swapped without type errors
+- Same type used for keys, nonces, ciphertexts, signatures
+
+**The comparison footgun:**
+```go
+// Timing-safe comparison looks identical to unsafe
+if hmac == expected { }           // BAD: timing attack
+if hmac.Equal(mac, expected) { }  // Good: constant-time
+// Same types, different security properties
+```
+
+### 4. Configuration Cliffs
+
+One wrong setting creates catastrophic failure, with no warning.
+
+**Detection patterns:**
+- Boolean flags that disable security entirely
+- String configs that aren't validated
+- Combinations of settings that interact dangerously
+- Environment variables that override security settings
+- Constructor parameters with sensible defaults but no validation (callers can override with insecure values)
+
+**Examples:**
+```yaml
+# One typo = disaster
+verify_ssl: fasle  # Typo silently accepted as truthy?
+
+# Magic values
+session_timeout: -1  # Does this mean "never expire"?
+
+# Dangerous combinations accepted silently
+auth_required: true
+bypass_auth_for_health_checks: true
+health_check_path: "/"  # Oops
+```
+
+```php
+// Sensible default doesn't protect against bad callers
+public function __construct(
+    public string $hashAlgo = 'sha256',  // Good default...
+    public int $otpLifetime = 120,       // ...but accepts md5, 0, etc.
+) {}
+```
+
+See [config-patterns.md](references/config-patterns.md#unvalidated-constructor-parameters) for detailed patterns.
+
+### 5. Silent Failures
+
+Errors that don't surface, or success that masks failure.
+
+**Detection patterns:**
+- Functions returning booleans instead of throwing on security failures
+- Empty catch blocks around security operations
+- Default values substituted on parse errors
+- Verification functions that "succeed" on malformed input
+
+**Examples:**
+```python
+# Silent bypass
+def verify_signature(sig, data, key):
+    if not key:
+        return True  # No key = skip verification?!
+
+# Return value ignored
+signature.verify(data, sig)  # Throws on failure
+crypto.verify(data, sig)     # Returns False on failure
+# Developer forgets to check return value
+```
+
+### 6. Stringly-Typed Security
+
+Security-critical values as plain strings enable injection and confusion.
+
+**Detection patterns:**
+- SQL/commands built from string concatenation
+- Permissions as comma-separated strings
+- Roles/scopes as arbitrary strings instead of enums
+- URLs constructed by joining strings
+
+**The permission accumulation footgun:**
+```python
+permissions = "read,write"
+permissions += ",admin"  # Too easy to escalate
+
+# vs. type-safe
+permissions = {Permission.READ, Permission.WRITE}
+permissions.add(Permission.ADMIN)  # At least it's explicit
+```
+
+## Analysis Workflow
+
+### Phase 1: Surface Identification
+
+1. **Map security-relevant APIs**: authentication, authorization, cryptography, session management, input validation
+2. **Identify developer choice points**: Where can developers select algorithms, configure timeouts, choose modes?
+3. **Find configuration schemas**: Environment variables, config files, constructor parameters
+
+### Phase 2: Edge Case Probing
+
+For each choice point, ask:
+- **Zero/empty/null**: What happens with `0`, `""`, `null`, `[]`?
+- **Negative values**: What does `-1` mean? Infinite? Error?
+- **Type confusion**: Can different security concepts be swapped?
+- **Default values**: Is the default secure? Is it documented?
+- **Error paths**: What happens on invalid input? Silent acceptance?
+
+### Phase 3: Threat Modeling
+
+Consider three adversaries:
+
+1. **The Scoundrel**: Actively malicious developer or attacker controlling config
+   - Can they disable security via configuration?
+   - Can they downgrade algorithms?
+   - Can they inject malicious values?
+
+2. **The Lazy Developer**: Copy-pastes examples, skips documentation
+   - Will the first example they find be secure?
+   - Is the path of least resistance secure?
+   - Do error messages guide toward secure usage?
+
+3. **The Confused Developer**: Misunderstands the API
+   - Can they swap parameters without type errors?
+   - Can they use the wrong key/algorithm/mode by accident?
+   - Are failure modes obvious or silent?
+
+### Phase 4: Validate Findings
+
+For each identified sharp edge:
+
+1. **Reproduce the misuse**: Write minimal code demonstrating the footgun
+2. **Verify exploitability**: Does the misuse create a real vulnerability?
+3. **Check documentation**: Is the danger documented? (Documentation doesn't excuse bad design, but affects severity)
+4. **Test mitigations**: Can the API be used safely with reasonable effort?
+
+If a finding seems questionable, return to Phase 2 and probe more edge cases.
+
+## Severity Classification
+
+| Severity | Criteria | Examples |
+|----------|----------|----------|
+| Critical | Default or obvious usage is insecure | `verify: false` default; empty password allowed |
+| High | Easy misconfiguration breaks security | Algorithm parameter accepts "none" |
+| Medium | Unusual but possible misconfiguration | Negative timeout has unexpected meaning |
+| Low | Requires deliberate misuse | Obscure parameter combination |
+
+## References
+
+**By category:**
+
+- **Cryptographic APIs**: See [references/crypto-apis.md](references/crypto-apis.md)
+- **Configuration Patterns**: See [references/config-patterns.md](references/config-patterns.md)
+- **Authentication/Session**: See [references/auth-patterns.md](references/auth-patterns.md)
+- **Real-World Case Studies**: See [references/case-studies.md](references/case-studies.md) (OpenSSL, GMP, etc.)
+
+**By language** (general footguns, not crypto-specific):
+
+| Language | Guide |
+|----------|-------|
+| C/C++ | [references/lang-c.md](references/lang-c.md) |
+| Go | [references/lang-go.md](references/lang-go.md) |
+| Rust | [references/lang-rust.md](references/lang-rust.md) |
+| Swift | [references/lang-swift.md](references/lang-swift.md) |
+| Java | [references/lang-java.md](references/lang-java.md) |
+| Kotlin | [references/lang-kotlin.md](references/lang-kotlin.md) |
+| C# | [references/lang-csharp.md](references/lang-csharp.md) |
+| PHP | [references/lang-php.md](references/lang-php.md) |
+| JavaScript/TypeScript | [references/lang-javascript.md](references/lang-javascript.md) |
+| Python | [references/lang-python.md](references/lang-python.md) |
+| Ruby | [references/lang-ruby.md](references/lang-ruby.md) |
+
+See also [references/language-specific.md](references/language-specific.md) for a combined quick reference.
+
+## Quality Checklist
+
+Before concluding analysis:
+
+- [ ] Probed all zero/empty/null edge cases
+- [ ] Verified defaults are secure
+- [ ] Checked for algorithm/mode selection footguns
+- [ ] Tested type confusion between security concepts
+- [ ] Considered all three adversary types
+- [ ] Verified error paths don't bypass security
+- [ ] Checked configuration validation
+- [ ] Constructor params validated (not just defaulted) - see [config-patterns.md](references/config-patterns.md#unvalidated-constructor-parameters)

package/data/skills/trailofbits-variant-analysis/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: variant-analysis
+description: Find similar vulnerabilities and bugs across codebases using pattern-based analysis. Use when hunting bug variants, building CodeQL/Semgrep queries, analyzing security vulnerabilities, or performing systematic code audits after finding an initial issue.
+---
+
+# Variant Analysis
+
+You are a variant analysis expert. Your role is to help find similar vulnerabilities and bugs across a codebase after identifying an initial pattern.
+
+## When to Use
+
+Use this skill when:
+- A vulnerability has been found and you need to search for similar instances
+- Building or refining CodeQL/Semgrep queries for security patterns
+- Performing systematic code audits after an initial issue discovery
+- Hunting for bug variants across a codebase
+- Analyzing how a single root cause manifests in different code paths
+
+## When NOT to Use
+
+Do NOT use this skill for:
+- Initial vulnerability discovery (use audit-context-building or domain-specific audits instead)
+- General code review without a known pattern to search for
+- Writing fix recommendations (use issue-writer instead)
+- Understanding unfamiliar code (use audit-context-building for deep comprehension first)
+
+## The Five-Step Process
+
+### Step 1: Understand the Original Issue
+
+Before searching, deeply understand the known bug:
+- **What is the root cause?** Not the symptom, but WHY it's vulnerable
+- **What conditions are required?** Control flow, data flow, state
+- **What makes it exploitable?** User control, missing validation, etc.
+
+### Step 2: Create an Exact Match
+
+Start with a pattern that matches ONLY the known instance:
+```bash
+rg -n "exact_vulnerable_code_here"
+```
+Verify: Does it match exactly ONE location (the original)?
+
+### Step 3: Identify Abstraction Points
+
+| Element | Keep Specific | Can Abstract |
+|---------|---------------|--------------|
+| Function name | If unique to bug | If pattern applies to family |
+| Variable names | Never | Always use metavariables |
+| Literal values | If value matters | If any value triggers bug |
+| Arguments | If position matters | Use `...` wildcards |
+
+### Step 4: Iteratively Generalize
+
+**Change ONE element at a time:**
+1. Run the pattern
+2. Review ALL new matches
+3. Classify: true positive or false positive?
+4. If FP rate acceptable, generalize next element
+5. If FP rate too high, revert and try different abstraction
+
+**Stop when false positive rate exceeds ~50%**
+
+### Step 5: Analyze and Triage Results
+
+For each match, document:
+- **Location**: File, line, function
+- **Confidence**: High/Medium/Low
+- **Exploitability**: Reachable? Controllable inputs?
+- **Priority**: Based on impact and exploitability
+
+For deeper strategic guidance, see [METHODOLOGY.md](METHODOLOGY.md).
+
+## Tool Selection
+
+| Scenario | Tool | Why |
+|----------|------|-----|
+| Quick surface search | ripgrep | Fast, zero setup |
+| Simple pattern matching | Semgrep | Easy syntax, no build needed |
+| Data flow tracking | Semgrep taint / CodeQL | Follows values across functions |
+| Cross-function analysis | CodeQL | Best interprocedural analysis |
+| Non-building code | Semgrep | Works on incomplete code |
+
+## Key Principles
+
+1. **Root cause first**: Understand WHY before searching for WHERE
+2. **Start specific**: First pattern should match exactly the known bug
+3. **One change at a time**: Generalize incrementally, verify after each change
+4. **Know when to stop**: 50%+ FP rate means you've gone too generic
+5. **Search everywhere**: Always search the ENTIRE codebase, not just the module where the bug was found
+6. **Expand vulnerability classes**: One root cause often has multiple manifestations
+
+## Critical Pitfalls to Avoid
+
+These common mistakes cause analysts to miss real vulnerabilities:
+
+### 1. Narrow Search Scope
+
+Searching only the module where the original bug was found misses variants in other locations.
+
+**Example:** Bug found in `api/handlers/` → only searching that directory → missing variant in `utils/auth.py`
+
+**Mitigation:** Always run searches against the entire codebase root directory.
+
+### 2. Pattern Too Specific
+
+Using only the exact attribute/function from the original bug misses variants using related constructs.
+
+**Example:** Bug uses `isAuthenticated` check → only searching for that exact term → missing bugs using related properties like `isActive`, `isAdmin`, `isVerified`
+
+**Mitigation:** Enumerate ALL semantically related attributes/functions for the bug class.
+
+### 3. Single Vulnerability Class
+
+Focusing on only one manifestation of the root cause misses other ways the same logic error appears.
+
+**Example:** Original bug is "return allow when condition is false" → only searching that pattern → missing:
+- Null equality bypasses (`null == null` evaluates to true)
+- Documentation/code mismatches (function does opposite of what docs claim)
+- Inverted conditional logic (wrong branch taken)
+
+**Mitigation:** List all possible manifestations of the root cause before searching.
+
+### 4. Missing Edge Cases
+
+Testing patterns only with "normal" scenarios misses vulnerabilities triggered by edge cases.
+
+**Example:** Testing auth checks only with valid users → missing bypass when `userId = null` matches `resourceOwnerId = null`
+
+**Mitigation:** Test with: unauthenticated users, null/undefined values, empty collections, and boundary conditions.
+
+## Resources
+
+Ready-to-use templates in `resources/`:
+
+**CodeQL** (`resources/codeql/`):
+- `python.ql`, `javascript.ql`, `java.ql`, `go.ql`, `cpp.ql`
+
+**Semgrep** (`resources/semgrep/`):
+- `python.yaml`, `javascript.yaml`, `java.yaml`, `go.yaml`, `cpp.yaml`
+
+**Report**: `resources/variant-report-template.md`