@bevel-software/platform-core-backend 0.14.0 → 0.19.0

package/src/modules/access/user-access-removal.service.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,711 @@
+/**
+ * Removing a deleted account's ADDRESS from the knowledge base's access
+ * files — the optional half of account deletion ("Also remove them from
+ * roles, groups and access rules").
+ *
+ * Erasure (`AccountErasureService`) cleans the database; the address itself
+ * also sits in files: `roles.yaml` members, group files, `access.md` entries
+ * under any verb, and node-frontmatter grants. This service counts those
+ * places (for the confirmation dialog) and removes them in ONE commit on the
+ * default branch, authored by the acting admin, with a message that names the
+ * erased account by its anonymised id — never the email. Git history keeps
+ * the old entries, by policy (see AccountErasureService).
+ *
+ * Guards (the ones the roles admin already enforces stay in force here): the
+ * deployment owner (`ADMIN_EMAIL`) and the Admin role's last direct email
+ * member are never removed this way.
+ *
+ * `synced-groups.yaml` is machine-owned (only the directory-sync bot may
+ * write it), so it is counted but never written — its entries go away when
+ * the identity provider stops sending the person, and until then the file is
+ * reported as still naming them.
+ *
+ * The cleanup is NOT all-or-nothing across files the acting admin cannot
+ * write. A subfolder may exclude Admin, and the lock gate refuses per file, so
+ * one such grant would otherwise abort everything and leave the address in
+ * `roles.yaml`, the group file and every other `access.md` too. Those files
+ * are skipped, reported in `stillNamedIn`, and named in the confirmation
+ * dialog beforehand (`UserReferenceReport.unwritable`). A folder that cannot
+ * be LISTED remains a hard refusal: an incomplete scan would commit a partial
+ * cleanup that looks complete.
+ *
+ * That write pre-check is an optimisation over the lock gate, never a second
+ * authority. When it cannot be run at all, the dialog says so (`unwritable:
+ * null`, never `[]`) and the removal attempts every file: the gate still
+ * refuses what the admin may not write, and skipping files on a hunch could
+ * only clean less.
+ */
+
+import { workspaceIdForBranch } from '../../shared/workspace-id.js';
+import type { WorkflowEventBus } from '../workflow/event-bus.js';
+import type { AuthUser, IWorkspaceService, IWorkflowService } from '@bevel-software/platform-shared';
+import { PushNeedsAgentResolutionError, WorkflowDomainError } from '../../shared/domain-errors.js';
+import type { IAccessControl } from './access-control.interface.js';
+import {
+  ADMIN_CANONICAL,
+  KNOWN_VERBS,
+  accessMdDeclaresBodyRules,
+  canonicalEmail,
+  canonicalRoleName,
+  hasAccessFrontmatterExtension,
+  isAccessMdPath,
+  parseAccessEntry,
+  parseAccessFile,
+  parseOwnAccessEntries,
+  stripComment,
+  type ParsedEntry,
+  type Verb,
+} from '../access-model/access-grammar.js';
+import { spliceRevoke } from '../access-model/access-splice.js';
+import { scanFrontmatter } from '../access-model/frontmatter-lines.js';
+import { GROUPS_YAML, SYNCED_GROUPS_YAML, validateGroupsFile } from '../access-model/group-files.js';
+import { makeRolesYamlWriteValidator } from '../access-model/roles-yaml-guard.js';
+import { emitRolesModel, isGroupRefMember, parseRolesModel } from './roles-edit.js';
+import { emitGroupsModel, parseGroupsModel } from './groups-edit.js';
+import { AdminLockedCommits, type LockedWrite } from './admin-locked-commit.js';
+import { logger } from '../../shared/logging.js';
+import { printable } from '../../shared/printable.js';
+import type { ITreeWalker } from '../../shared/fs.contract.js';
+
+const log = logger('user-access-removal');
+
+const ROLES_YAML = 'roles.yaml';
+
+/**
+ * How many access files are read at once. A knowledge base holds thousands of
+ * `.md`/`.tool` files and the scan runs three times per deletion (dialog,
+ * plan, re-scan); an unbounded `Promise.all` over that set opens every file
+ * simultaneously and trips EMFILE on a large base.
+ */
+const READ_CONCURRENCY = 16;
+
+/** `items.map(fn)` with at most `limit` in flight, results in input order. */
+async function mapPooled<T, R>(items: readonly T[], limit: number, fn: (item: T) => Promise<R>): Promise<R[]> {
+  const out = new Array<R>(items.length);
+  let next = 0;
+  const worker = async (): Promise<void> => {
+    for (;;) {
+      const i = next++;
+      if (i >= items.length) return;
+      out[i] = await fn(items[i]);
+    }
+  };
+  await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: Math.min(limit, items.length) }, worker));
+  return out;
+}
+
+/** A removal this service refuses (guard) or cannot run. */
+export class UserAccessRemovalError extends WorkflowDomainError {
+  constructor(message: string, status = 422, payload?: Record<string, unknown>) {
+    super(message, status, payload);
+    this.name = 'UserAccessRemovalError';
+  }
+}
+
+/** How many places in the knowledge base name one address, by kind. */
+export interface UserReferenceCounts {
+  /** Roles in `roles.yaml` listing the address as a member. */
+  roles: number;
+  /** Groups (manual and synced) listing the address. */
+  groups: number;
+  /** Entries in `access.md` files, any verb, frontmatter and body. */
+  accessRules: number;
+  /** Entries in other files' own frontmatter (`.md`, `.tool`). */
+  fileGrants: number;
+  total: number;
+  /** Repo-relative paths of every file that names the address, sorted. */
+  files: string[];
+}
+
+/** The confirmation dialog's view: counts plus whether removal may run. */
+export interface UserReferenceReport extends UserReferenceCounts {
+  removable: boolean;
+  /** Why removal is refused, in words the dialog shows; null when removable. */
+  blockedReason: string | null;
+  /**
+   * Of `files`, the ones the ACTING ADMIN may not write (a folder that
+   * excludes Admin, or the machine-owned `synced-groups.yaml`). The cleanup
+   * skips these and reports them; the dialog says so before the delete.
+   * `null` when write access could not be judged at all — never read as
+   * "none", same convention as {@link UserAccessRemovalResult.stillNamedIn}.
+   */
+  unwritable: string[] | null;
+}
+
+/** The outcome of a committed removal. */
+export interface UserAccessRemovalResult {
+  /** Files the commit changed. */
+  removedFrom: string[];
+  /**
+   * Files that still name the address afterwards (e.g. synced-groups.yaml);
+   * null when they could not be checked — never read as "none".
+   */
+  stillNamedIn: string[] | null;
+  /** The commit landed but its push did not; publishing is retried. */
+  publishPending?: boolean;
+}
+
+function matchingUserEntries(entries: Record<Verb, ParsedEntry[]> | null, email: string): number {
+  if (!entries) return 0;
+  let n = 0;
+  for (const verb of KNOWN_VERBS) {
+    for (const e of entries[verb]) if (e.kind === 'user' && e.email === email) n++;
+  }
+  return n;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Entries naming `email` in one access-frontmatter file: its own frontmatter,
+ * plus — for a body-governed `access.md` — the body's folder rules. The
+ * resolver's own parsers, so the count is what is actually enforced.
+ */
+export function countUserEntriesInAccessText(text: string, repoRel: string, email: string): number {
+  const target = canonicalEmail(email);
+  let n = matchingUserEntries(parseOwnAccessEntries(text), target);
+  if (isAccessMdPath(repoRel) && accessMdDeclaresBodyRules(text)) {
+    const parsed = parseAccessFile(text, repoRel);
+    if (parsed.ok) n += matchingUserEntries(parsed.file.entries, target);
+  }
+  return n;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Remove every entry naming `email` from one access-frontmatter file, under
+ * every verb. Uses the share dialog's revoke splice, so comments, ordering
+ * and prose bodies stay byte-for-byte. A file the splice cannot edit safely
+ * (unterminated frontmatter) is returned unchanged.
+ */
+export function removeUserFromAccessText(text: string, repoRel: string, email: string): string {
+  const principal = { kind: 'user' as const, email, displayName: 'x' };
+  const targets = isAccessMdPath(repoRel) ? (['node', 'folder'] as const) : (['node'] as const);
+  let out = text;
+  try {
+    for (const target of targets) {
+      for (const verb of KNOWN_VERBS) out = spliceRevoke(out, verb, principal, { target }).text;
+    }
+  } catch {
+    return text;
+  }
+  // The splice reads plain entries only; the frontmatter parser also accepts
+  // quoted scalars and flow lists, so a grant in those forms is still there.
+  if (matchingUserEntries(parseOwnAccessEntries(out), canonicalEmail(email)) > 0) {
+    out = removeQuotedOrFlowFrontmatterEntries(out, canonicalEmail(email));
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+/** A YAML scalar without its surrounding quotes (`''` and `\"` unescaped). */
+function unquoteYaml(raw: string): string {
+  const t = raw.trim();
+  if (t.length >= 2 && t.startsWith('"') && t.endsWith('"')) return t.slice(1, -1).replace(/\\(["\\])/g, '$1');
+  if (t.length >= 2 && t.startsWith("'") && t.endsWith("'")) return t.slice(1, -1).replace(/''/g, "'");
+  return t;
+}
+
+function namesUser(raw: string, email: string): boolean {
+  const r = parseAccessEntry(unquoteYaml(raw));
+  return r.ok && r.entry.kind === 'user' && r.entry.email === email;
+}
+
+/** The items of a one-line flow list's inner text, split on commas outside quotes. */
+function splitFlowItems(inner: string): string[] {
+  const items: string[] = [];
+  let quote: string | null = null;
+  let start = 0;
+  for (let i = 0; i < inner.length; i++) {
+    const ch = inner[i];
+    if (quote) {
+      if (ch === '\\' && quote === '"') i++;
+      else if (ch === quote) quote = null;
+    } else if (ch === '"' || ch === "'") quote = ch;
+    else if (ch === ',') {
+      items.push(inner.slice(start, i));
+      start = i + 1;
+    }
+  }
+  items.push(inner.slice(start));
+  return items.map((item) => item.trim()).filter((item) => item !== '');
+}
+
+/**
+ * Remove `email` from the top-level verb keys of a file's own frontmatter in
+ * the forms the splice does not edit: a quoted scalar (`read: "A <a@x>"`), a
+ * one-line flow list (`read: [A <a@x>, "B <b@x>"]`) and quoted list items.
+ * Other lines stay byte-for-byte; a verb left empty becomes `verb: []`.
+ */
+export function removeQuotedOrFlowFrontmatterEntries(text: string, email: string): string {
+  const scan = scanFrontmatter(text);
+  if (scan.kind !== 'frontmatter') return text;
+  const fm = [...scan.fm];
+  const out: string[] = [];
+  let verbKey: { index: number; verb: string; items: number; removed: number } | null = null;
+  const closeVerb = () => {
+    if (verbKey && verbKey.removed > 0 && verbKey.items === verbKey.removed) out[verbKey.index] = `${verbKey.verb}: []`;
+    verbKey = null;
+  };
+  for (const line of fm) {
+    const content = stripComment(line).replace(/\s+$/, '');
+    const key = /^([A-Za-z]+):\s*(.*)$/.exec(content);
+    if (key) {
+      closeVerb();
+      const [, name, value] = key;
+      if (!(KNOWN_VERBS as readonly string[]).includes(name)) {
+        out.push(line);
+        continue;
+      }
+      if (value === '') {
+        verbKey = { index: out.length, verb: name, items: 0, removed: 0 };
+        out.push(line);
+        continue;
+      }
+      if (value.startsWith('[') && value.endsWith(']')) {
+        const items = splitFlowItems(value.slice(1, -1));
+        const kept = items.filter((item) => !namesUser(item, email));
+        out.push(kept.length === items.length ? line : `${name}: [${kept.join(', ')}]`);
+        continue;
+      }
+      out.push(namesUser(value, email) ? `${name}: []` : line);
+      continue;
+    }
+    const item = /^\s+-\s+(.*)$/.exec(content);
+    if (item && verbKey) {
+      verbKey.items++;
+      if (namesUser(item[1], email)) {
+        verbKey.removed++;
+        continue;
+      }
+    }
+    out.push(line);
+  }
+  closeVerb();
+  return [...scan.open, ...out, ...scan.post].join(scan.eol);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Remove `email` from every member list of a roles/groups file by deleting
+ * its list lines in place — comments, the header and ordering survive. A key
+ * left with no items becomes `Key: []`. Callers check the result parses to
+ * the model they expect and fall back to a canonical re-emit otherwise.
+ */
+export function removeEmailListLines(text: string, email: string): string {
+  const eol = text.includes('\r\n') ? '\r\n' : '\n';
+  const lines = text.split(eol);
+  const out: string[] = [];
+  let removed = false;
+  for (const line of lines) {
+    const m = /^(\s*)-\s+(.*)$/.exec(stripComment(line).replace(/\s+$/, ''));
+    if (m && canonicalEmail(m[2]) === email) {
+      removed = true;
+      continue;
+    }
+    out.push(line);
+  }
+  if (!removed) return text;
+  // A mapping key whose list is now empty: `  Name:` with no deeper item next.
+  const indentOf = (l: string) => /^( *)/.exec(l)![1].length;
+  for (let i = 0; i < out.length; i++) {
+    const content = stripComment(out[i]).replace(/\s+$/, '');
+    if (!/^\s*[^\s-][^:]*:$/.test(content)) continue;
+    let j = i + 1;
+    while (j < out.length && !stripComment(out[j]).trim()) j++;
+    const next = j < out.length ? stripComment(out[j]).replace(/\s+$/, '') : '';
+    const opensChild = next !== '' && indentOf(next) > indentOf(content);
+    const opensList = next !== '' && indentOf(next) === indentOf(content) && /^\s*-(\s|$)/.test(next);
+    if (!opensChild && !opensList && indentOf(content) > 0) {
+      out[i] = `${content} []${out[i].slice(content.length)}`;
+    }
+  }
+  return out.join(eol);
+}
+
+function sameModel(a: { displayName: string; members: string[] }[], b: { displayName: string; members: string[] }[]): boolean {
+  return JSON.stringify(a) === JSON.stringify(b);
+}
+
+/** Roles listing `email` as a direct member; null when roles.yaml won't parse. */
+function rolesNaming(text: string, email: string): string[] | null {
+  try {
+    return parseRolesModel(text)
+      .filter((r) => r.members.includes(email))
+      .map((r) => r.displayName);
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+function groupsNaming(text: string, email: string): number {
+  try {
+    return parseGroupsModel(text).filter((g) => g.members.includes(email)).length;
+  } catch {
+    return 0;
+  }
+}
+
+export class UserAccessRemovalService {
+  private readonly locked: AdminLockedCommits;
+
+  constructor(
+    private readonly workspaceService: IWorkspaceService,
+    workflowService: IWorkflowService,
+    private readonly accessControl: IAccessControl,
+    /**
+     * The resolver's own walk. NOT `workspaceService.listFiles`: that honours
+     * `.bevelignore`, and the seeded template hides every `access.md` — a
+     * scan built on it finds no access rule at all.
+     */
+    private readonly disk: ITreeWalker,
+    private readonly kbDirName: string,
+    /** Live-binding thunk — DEFAULT_BRANCH stays empty until setup. */
+    private readonly defaultBranchOf: () => string,
+    private readonly eventBus?: WorkflowEventBus,
+    /** The deployment owner(s) (`ADMIN_EMAIL`) — never removed this way. */
+    private readonly deploymentOwners: readonly string[] = [],
+  ) {
+    this.locked = new AdminLockedCommits({
+      workspaceService,
+      workflowService,
+      kbDirName,
+      defaultBranchOf,
+      makeError: (message, status, payload) => new UserAccessRemovalError(message, status, payload),
+      logTag: 'user-access-removal',
+      contendedSubject: 'Roles, groups or access rules',
+      validateWrite: makeRolesYamlWriteValidator(kbDirName),
+    });
+  }
+
+  private get defaultBranch(): string {
+    return this.defaultBranchOf();
+  }
+
+  private async ensureWorkspace(): Promise<string> {
+    await this.workspaceService.getOrCreateForBranch(this.defaultBranch);
+    return workspaceIdForBranch(this.defaultBranch);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Every `access.md` and access-frontmatter file (`.md`, `.tool`) in the
+   * checkout, repo-relative — the walk the access resolver itself does, with
+   * `.bevelignore` NOT honoured, plus the folders that could not be listed.
+   */
+  private async accessFiles(workspaceId: string): Promise<{ files: string[]; holes: string[] }> {
+    const wsDir = await this.workspaceService.getWorkspacePath(workspaceId);
+    const repoDir = `${wsDir}/${this.kbDirName}`;
+    const out: string[] = [];
+    const { holes } = await this.disk.walkKb(repoDir, [
+      {
+        onFile(dir, name) {
+          if (hasAccessFrontmatterExtension(name)) out.push(dir ? `${dir}/${name}` : name);
+        },
+      },
+    ]);
+    if (holes.length > 0) {
+      log.warn(`folders that could not be listed are not scanned: ${holes.map((h) => printable(h)).join(', ')}`);
+    }
+    return { files: out, holes };
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Read every file that could name `email`: roles, both group files, and the
+   * access files whose text actually contains the address. Reads run through a
+   * bounded pool, and a candidate the address does not even appear in is
+   * dropped before either parser sees it — the parsers only ever confirm and
+   * count entries for this one address, so a file without the substring can
+   * hold none. The roster files are always kept: `blockedReason` reads
+   * `roles.yaml` whether or not the address is in it.
+   */
+  private async readAll(workspaceId: string, email: string): Promise<{ texts: Map<string, string>; holes: string[] }> {
+    const { files: candidates, holes } = await this.accessFiles(workspaceId);
+    const roster = [ROLES_YAML, GROUPS_YAML, SYNCED_GROUPS_YAML];
+    const out = new Map<string, string>();
+    const rosterTexts = await mapPooled(roster, READ_CONCURRENCY, (p) => this.locked.readKbFile(workspaceId, p));
+    roster.forEach((p, i) => {
+      const text = rosterTexts[i];
+      if (text !== null) out.set(p, text);
+    });
+    const needle = email.toLowerCase();
+    const hits = await mapPooled(candidates, READ_CONCURRENCY, async (p) => {
+      const text = await this.locked.readKbFile(workspaceId, p);
+      return text !== null && text.toLowerCase().includes(needle) ? ([p, text] as const) : null;
+    });
+    for (const hit of hits) if (hit) out.set(hit[0], hit[1]);
+    return { texts: out, holes };
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Of `files`, the ones `actorEmail` may not write on the default branch —
+   * or `null` when the question could not be ASKED (the lookup threw), which
+   * is not the same as "none".
+   *
+   * Since #210 a subfolder may exclude Admin, and the lock gate refuses per
+   * file: without this split ONE such grant would abort the whole cleanup —
+   * nothing committed, and the address left in `roles.yaml`, the group file
+   * and every other `access.md` too, with the admin learning it only from the
+   * outcome.
+   *
+   * A `null` VERDICT is a real answer, not uncertainty: it means no usable
+   * access config resolves at the ref, and `GitService.assertCanWriteAtRef`
+   * default-ALLOWS on exactly that signal (bootstrap — you cannot create
+   * `roles.yaml` if writing it needs `roles.yaml`). Reporting `[]` there
+   * matches the gate that will actually run. A THROWN lookup is different:
+   * nothing is known, so say so rather than claim "none".
+   */
+  private async unwritableAmong(
+    workspaceId: string,
+    actorEmail: string,
+    files: string[],
+  ): Promise<string[] | null> {
+    if (files.length === 0 || !actorEmail) return [];
+    let verdicts: Map<string, boolean> | null;
+    try {
+      verdicts = await this.accessControl.canWriteBatchAtRef(workspaceId, 'HEAD', actorEmail, files);
+    } catch (err) {
+      log.warn(`could not judge write access to the files naming the account: ${printable(err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err))}`);
+      return null;
+    }
+    // null verdict = bootstrap default-allow, matching the commit gate.
+    if (!verdicts) return [];
+    return files.filter((f) => verdicts.get(f) === false);
+  }
+
+  private countIn(texts: Map<string, string>, email: string): UserReferenceCounts {
+    const counts: UserReferenceCounts = { roles: 0, groups: 0, accessRules: 0, fileGrants: 0, total: 0, files: [] };
+    for (const [repoRel, text] of texts) {
+      let n = 0;
+      if (repoRel === ROLES_YAML) {
+        n = rolesNaming(text, email)?.length ?? 0;
+        counts.roles += n;
+      } else if (repoRel === GROUPS_YAML || repoRel === SYNCED_GROUPS_YAML) {
+        n = groupsNaming(text, email);
+        counts.groups += n;
+      } else {
+        n = countUserEntriesInAccessText(text, repoRel, email);
+        if (isAccessMdPath(repoRel)) counts.accessRules += n;
+        else counts.fileGrants += n;
+      }
+      if (n > 0) counts.files.push(repoRel);
+    }
+    counts.total = counts.roles + counts.groups + counts.accessRules + counts.fileGrants;
+    counts.files.sort();
+    return counts;
+  }
+
+  /** Why `email` may not be removed from access files, or null when it may. */
+  private blockedReason(rolesText: string | undefined, email: string): string | null {
+    if (this.deploymentOwners.some((o) => canonicalEmail(o) === email)) {
+      return 'This is the deployment owner (ADMIN_EMAIL); their access cannot be removed here.';
+    }
+    const admin = rolesText
+      ? (() => {
+          try {
+            return parseRolesModel(rolesText).find((r) => canonicalRoleName(r.displayName) === ADMIN_CANONICAL);
+          } catch {
+            return undefined;
+          }
+        })()
+      : undefined;
+    const direct = (admin?.members ?? []).filter((m) => !isGroupRefMember(m));
+    if (direct.includes(email) && direct.length <= 1) {
+      return 'This is the last Admin; the Admin role must keep at least one direct email member.';
+    }
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Counts + guard verdict for the delete confirmation. `actorEmail` is the
+   * ADMIN doing the deleting (not the account being deleted): the same write
+   * check `remove` applies, so the dialog can say up front which files will
+   * keep the address because this admin may not write them.
+   */
+  async report(rawEmail: string, actorEmail = ''): Promise<UserReferenceReport> {
+    const email = canonicalEmail(rawEmail);
+    const workspaceId = await this.ensureWorkspace();
+    const { texts } = await this.readAll(workspaceId, email);
+    const blockedReason = this.blockedReason(texts.get(ROLES_YAML), email);
+    const counts = this.countIn(texts, email);
+    const unwritable = await this.unwritableAmong(workspaceId, canonicalEmail(actorEmail), counts.files);
+    return { ...counts, removable: blockedReason === null, blockedReason, unwritable };
+  }
+
+  /** Throws a 409 when the guards refuse removing `email`. */
+  async assertRemovable(rawEmail: string): Promise<void> {
+    const email = canonicalEmail(rawEmail);
+    const workspaceId = await this.ensureWorkspace();
+    const rolesText = await this.locked.readKbFile(workspaceId, ROLES_YAML);
+    const reason = this.blockedReason(rolesText ?? undefined, email);
+    if (reason) throw new UserAccessRemovalError(reason, 409, { kind: 'access-removal-blocked' });
+  }
+
+  /** Files that still name `email` right now (best-effort reporting). */
+  async filesNaming(rawEmail: string): Promise<string[]> {
+    const email = canonicalEmail(rawEmail);
+    const workspaceId = await this.ensureWorkspace();
+    return this.countIn((await this.readAll(workspaceId, email)).texts, email).files;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Remove `email` from roles.yaml, groups.yaml and every access file the
+   * ACTING ADMIN may write, in ONE commit. `erasedId` names the account in the
+   * commit message. A file naming the address that this admin may not write is
+   * skipped rather than aborting the cleanup, and comes back in
+   * `stillNamedIn`. Throws on any failure BEFORE the commit (guard, a folder
+   * that cannot be listed, lock contention, invalid candidate, commit) with
+   * nothing committed. Once the commit has landed it never throws: a push that
+   * needs resolution is reported as `publishPending`, and a failed re-scan as
+   * `stillNamedIn: null`.
+   */
+  async remove(actor: AuthUser, rawEmail: string, erasedId: string): Promise<UserAccessRemovalResult> {
+    const email = canonicalEmail(rawEmail);
+    await this.assertRemovable(email);
+    const workspaceId = await this.ensureWorkspace();
+    // Plan once to learn which files to lock, then re-read and re-plan UNDER
+    // those locks so a concurrent edit can't be overwritten.
+    const { texts, holes } = await this.readAll(workspaceId, email);
+    if (holes.length > 0) {
+      // A partial scan would commit a partial cleanup that looks complete.
+      throw new UserAccessRemovalError(
+        `Some folders could not be read (${holes.join(', ')}), so not every access rule can be found. Nothing was changed.`,
+        422,
+        { kind: 'access-removal-incomplete-scan' },
+      );
+    }
+    const named = this.countIn(texts, email).files.filter((f) => f !== SYNCED_GROUPS_YAML);
+    // Clean what this admin CAN write; the rest stay named and are reported.
+    // A scan hole is still a hard refusal above — not knowing what exists is
+    // not the same as knowing a file is out of reach.
+    const judged = await this.unwritableAmong(workspaceId, canonicalEmail(actor.email), named);
+    let planned = named;
+    if (judged === null) {
+      // The pre-check could not run. It is only an OPTIMISATION over the lock
+      // gate, so attempt every file: with nothing excluded a deployment that
+      // has no Admin-excluded folder — the overwhelmingly common case — is
+      // cleaned in full, and one that does aborts on the gate and reports
+      // `ok: false` with `stillNamedIn`, exactly what refusing here would
+      // achieve. Skipping files on a hunch could only clean LESS.
+      log.warn(
+        `erased account ${printable(erasedId)}: write access could not be judged, attempting every file naming them`,
+      );
+    } else if (judged.length > 0) {
+      const unwritable = new Set(judged);
+      log.warn(
+        `erased account ${printable(erasedId)}: ${unwritable.size} file(s) naming them are not writable by the acting admin and keep the address`,
+      );
+      planned = named.filter((f) => !unwritable.has(f));
+    }
+    let removedFrom: string[] = [];
+    let publishPending = false;
+    if (planned.length > 0) {
+      let attempted: string[] = [];
+      try {
+        await this.locked.withFileLocks(workspaceId, actor, planned, async () => {
+        const writes: LockedWrite[] = [];
+        for (const repoRel of planned) {
+          const original = await this.locked.readKbFile(workspaceId, repoRel);
+          if (original === null) continue;
+          const content = this.removeFrom(repoRel, original, email);
+          if (content !== original) writes.push({ repoRel, content, original });
+        }
+          if (writes.length === 0) return;
+          attempted = writes.map((w) => w.repoRel);
+          await this.locked.writeAndCommitLocked(
+            workspaceId,
+            actor,
+            writes,
+            `Remove erased account ${erasedId} from roles, groups and access rules`,
+          );
+          removedFrom = attempted;
+        });
+      } catch (err) {
+        // The commit landed; only its push needs help, which the pending-commit
+        // ladder retries. The removal IS done — never report it as undone.
+        if (!(err instanceof PushNeedsAgentResolutionError) || attempted.length === 0) throw err;
+        removedFrom = attempted;
+        publishPending = true;
+      }
+    }
+    if (removedFrom.length > 0) {
+      // The commit has landed: a failed cache flush or client nudge must not
+      // turn a done removal into a reported failure.
+      try {
+        this.accessControl.invalidate(workspaceId);
+        this.emitWrites(workspaceId, actor, removedFrom);
+      } catch (err) {
+        log.warn(`erased account ${printable(erasedId)} was removed, but refreshing access and clients failed: ${printable(err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err))}`);
+      }
+    }
+    let stillNamedIn: string[] | null = null;
+    try {
+      stillNamedIn = await this.filesNaming(email);
+    } catch (err) {
+      log.warn(`could not re-scan the files naming erased account ${printable(erasedId)}: ${printable(err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err))}`);
+    }
+    return { removedFrom, stillNamedIn, ...(publishPending ? { publishPending } : {}) };
+  }
+
+  /** The candidate text for one file with `email` removed (validated). */
+  private removeFrom(repoRel: string, text: string, email: string): string {
+    if (repoRel === ROLES_YAML) {
+      const reason = this.blockedReason(text, email);
+      if (reason) throw new UserAccessRemovalError(reason, 409, { kind: 'access-removal-blocked' });
+      const model = parseRolesModel(text);
+      let changed = false;
+      for (const role of model) {
+        const idx = role.members.indexOf(email);
+        if (idx >= 0) {
+          role.members.splice(idx, 1);
+          changed = true;
+        }
+      }
+      if (!changed) return text;
+      const spliced = removeEmailListLines(text, email);
+      let candidate = emitRolesModel(model);
+      try {
+        if (sameModel(parseRolesModel(spliced), model)) candidate = spliced;
+      } catch {
+        // The in-place edit did not parse — the canonical re-emit stands.
+      }
+      const v = this.accessControl.validateRolesYaml(candidate);
+      if (!v.ok) throw new UserAccessRemovalError(`roles.yaml would be invalid: ${v.errors.join('; ')}`, 422);
+      return candidate;
+    }
+    if (repoRel === GROUPS_YAML) {
+      const model = parseGroupsModel(text);
+      let changed = false;
+      for (const group of model) {
+        const idx = group.members.indexOf(email);
+        if (idx >= 0) {
+          group.members.splice(idx, 1);
+          changed = true;
+        }
+      }
+      if (!changed) return text;
+      const spliced = removeEmailListLines(text, email);
+      let candidate = emitGroupsModel(model);
+      try {
+        if (sameModel(parseGroupsModel(spliced), model) && validateGroupsFile(spliced, GROUPS_YAML).ok) candidate = spliced;
+      } catch {
+        // The in-place edit did not parse — the canonical re-emit stands.
+      }
+      const v = validateGroupsFile(candidate, GROUPS_YAML);
+      if (!v.ok) throw new UserAccessRemovalError(`groups.yaml would be invalid: ${v.errors.join('; ')}`, 422);
+      return candidate;
+    }
+    return removeUserFromAccessText(text, repoRel, email);
+  }
+
+  /** Same nudge the roles/groups admins send: open clients refetch. */
+  private emitWrites(workspaceId: string, actor: AuthUser, repoRelPaths: string[]): void {
+    if (!this.eventBus) return;
+    for (const repoRel of repoRelPaths) {
+      this.eventBus.emit({
+        kind: 'file-changed',
+        workspaceId,
+        branch: this.defaultBranch,
+        path: `${this.kbDirName}/${repoRel}`,
+        newSha: null,
+        byUserId: actor.id,
+        byUserName: actor.name,
+      });
+    }
+    this.eventBus.emit({ kind: 'fs-tree-changed', workspaceId, branch: this.defaultBranch });
+  }
+}