@beaconlabs-io/evidence 1.1.3 → 1.1.4

package/dist/content/evidence.js

@@ -349,72 +349,102 @@ export const evidence = {
         "content": "\n## Key Points\n\nThe funding allocation in Filecoin’s first RetroPGF round showed a very flat distribution compared to Optimism’s RetroPGF3. This means there was not a large gap in funding amounts between high-impact projects and mid-tier projects.\n\n## Background\n\nHow resources are allocated in retrospective public goods funding reflects the values and evaluation mechanisms of the ecosystem. By comparing the results of Filecoin’s first round with the more mature Optimism round, we can highlight their characteristics.\n\n## Analysis Method\n\n### Dataset\n\nAllocation data for 99 projects from Filecoin RetroPGF 1 and allocation data from Optimism RetroPGF3\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\nType of funding program (Filecoin RetroPGF 1 vs. Optimism RetroPGF3)\n\n### Dependent Variable\n\nDistribution of funding amounts across projects\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\nVisualizing the distribution of funding amounts in both rounds and comparing their shapes (flatness)\n\n## Results\n\n- In Filecoin, the top project (GLIF Nodes & RPC API) received 4,365 FIL, which was only about twice as much as the median project (Filemarket), which received 1,925 FIL.\n- This allocation is described as a relatively even “peanut butter spread” distribution.\n- This distribution was much flatter than Optimism’s RetroPGF3.\n- In Filecoin, there was also little difference in funding amounts across categories. Although the “Infrastructure” category was generally favored, the distribution within that category was just as flat as in other categories. In contrast, Optimism showed more pronounced differences by theme.\n",
         "raw": "---\nevidence_id: \"20\"\nresults:\n  - intervention: \"Type of retrospective public goods funding program\"\n    outcome_variable: \"Distribution of funding amounts across projects\"\n    outcome: \"N/A\"\nstrength: \"1\"\nmethodologies:\n  - \"Visualizing the distribution of funding amounts in both rounds and comparing their shapes (flatness)\"\nversion: \"2.0.0\"\ndatasets:\n  - \"Allocation data for 99 projects from Filecoin RetroPGF 1 and allocation data from Optimism RetroPGF3\"\ntitle: \"Comparison of Funding Allocation Distribution in Filecoin and Optimism’s RetroPGF\"\ndate: \"2024-05-30\"\ncitation:\n  - name: \"Reflections on Filecoin's first round of RetroPGF\"\n    src: \"https://docs.oso.xyz/blog/fil-retropgf-1/\"\n    type: \"link\"\nauthor: \"Carl Cervone\"\n---\n\n## Key Points\n\nThe funding allocation in Filecoin’s first RetroPGF round showed a very flat distribution compared to Optimism’s RetroPGF3. This means there was not a large gap in funding amounts between high-impact projects and mid-tier projects.\n\n## Background\n\nHow resources are allocated in retrospective public goods funding reflects the values and evaluation mechanisms of the ecosystem. By comparing the results of Filecoin’s first round with the more mature Optimism round, we can highlight their characteristics.\n\n## Analysis Method\n\n### Dataset\n\nAllocation data for 99 projects from Filecoin RetroPGF 1 and allocation data from Optimism RetroPGF3\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\nType of funding program (Filecoin RetroPGF 1 vs. Optimism RetroPGF3)\n\n### Dependent Variable\n\nDistribution of funding amounts across projects\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\nVisualizing the distribution of funding amounts in both rounds and comparing their shapes (flatness)\n\n## Results\n\n- In Filecoin, the top project (GLIF Nodes & RPC API) received 4,365 FIL, which was only about twice as much as the median project (Filemarket), which received 1,925 FIL.\n- This allocation is described as a relatively even “peanut butter spread” distribution.\n- This distribution was much flatter than Optimism’s RetroPGF3.\n- In Filecoin, there was also little difference in funding amounts across categories. Although the “Infrastructure” category was generally favored, the distribution within that category was just as flat as in other categories. In contrast, Optimism showed more pronounced differences by theme.\n"
     },
-    "08": {
+    "02": {
         "frontmatter": {
-            "evidence_id": "08",
-            "title": "How Platform Owner Entry Affects OSS Contributions by Existing and New Contributors: An Experiment with AWS Elasticsearch",
-            "author": "Yuping Li",
-            "date": "2024-06-20",
+            "evidence_id": "02",
+            "title": "Effect of a Grant Program on Developer Activity ",
+            "author": "Carl Cervone",
+            "date": "2024-11-18",
             "citation": [
                 {
-                    "name": "How Platform Owner Entry Affects Open Source Contribution? Evidence from GitHub Developers",
+                    "name": "Early experiments with synthetic controls and causal inference",
                     "type": "link",
-                    "src": "https://questromworld.bu.edu/platformstrategy/wp-content/uploads/sites/49/2024/06/PlatStrat2024_paper_100.pdf"
+                    "src": "https://docs.oso.xyz/blog/synthetic-controls/"
                 }
             ],
             "results": [
                 {
-                    "intervention": "Platform owner market entry using complementary firm's OSS",
-                    "outcome_variable": "Overall OSS contributions (existing + new)",
-                    "outcome": "+"
+                    "intervention": "Whether grants were received or token incentives were provided",
+                    "outcome_variable": "Developer retention, user activity, TVL",
+                    "outcome": "+-"
                 }
             ],
             "strength": "3",
             "methodologies": [
-                "DID"
+                "Synthetic Control Method"
             ],
-            "version": "1.0.0",
+            "version": "2.0.0",
             "datasets": [
-                ""
+                "https://github.com/opensource-observer/insights/tree/main/analysis/optimism/syncon"
+            ],
+            "tags": [
+                "oss",
+                "public goods funding"
             ]
         },
-        "content": "\n## Key Points\n\nThis study explores how a platform owner’s market entry—by leveraging a complementary firm’s open-source technology—affects the external knowledge sourcing of the complementary firm, focusing on the willingness of GitHub developers to contribute. Using the staggered rollout of Amazon AWS’s Elasticsearch as a natural experiment, the analysis shows that the platform owner’s entry reduces contributions from existing contributors but substantially increases contributions from new contributors, leading to an overall increase in contributions to the open-source technology. This finding provides a new perspective: contrary to common concerns that platform owners’ entry harms open-source startups, from a technology development standpoint, such entry may not necessarily be detrimental.\n\n## Background\n\nGiven the opposing effects of reduced contributions by existing contributors and increased contributions by new contributors, it was an important question to assess how the platform owner’s entry affects total contributions to the open-source project.\n\n## Analysis Method\n\n### Dataset\n\nWeekly contributions from all cloud developers were aggregated at the country level and analyzed at the country-week level.\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\n- AWS’s market entry with Amazon Elasticsearch Service.\n  - Entry is a dummy variable equal to 1 if AWS entered the country where the contributor resides, and 0 otherwise.\n  - After is a dummy variable equal to 1 if AWS had already entered the contributor’s country during or before a given period, and 0 otherwise.\n  - The interaction term Entry × After was used to measure the treatment effect.\n\n### Dependent Variable\n\n- Overall OSS contributions by combining both existing and new contributors(the number of commits, lines of code changed/added, and files of code changed/added)\n  - Overall contributions were measured as the natural logarithm of the total number of commits by all contributors.\n  - Robustness checks also included the natural logarithm of lines of code and files changed/added.\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- After aggregating data from both existing and new contributors, stacked difference-in-differences analysis was applied at the country-week level.\n\n## Results\n\n- The analysis shows that the platform owner’s entry increases overall contributions to the open-source software project by cloud developers.\n- This result suggests that, contrary to concerns that platform owners' entry harms open-source startups or communities, such entry may actually enhance the complementary firm's ability to attract external knowledge contributions.\n",
-        "raw": "---\nevidence_id: \"08\"\nresults:\n  - intervention: \"Platform owner market entry using complementary firm's OSS\"\n    outcome_variable: \"Overall OSS contributions (existing + new)\"\n    outcome: \"+\"\nstrength: \"3\"\nmethodologies:\n  - \"DID\"\nversion: \"1.0.0\"\ndatasets:\n  - \"\"\ntitle: \"How Platform Owner Entry Affects OSS Contributions by Existing and New Contributors: An Experiment with AWS Elasticsearch\"\ndate: \"2024-06-20\"\n\ncitation:\n  - name: \"How Platform Owner Entry Affects Open Source Contribution? Evidence from GitHub Developers\"\n    src: \"https://questromworld.bu.edu/platformstrategy/wp-content/uploads/sites/49/2024/06/PlatStrat2024_paper_100.pdf\"\n    type: \"link\"\nauthor: \"Yuping Li\"\n---\n\n## Key Points\n\nThis study explores how a platform owner’s market entry—by leveraging a complementary firm’s open-source technology—affects the external knowledge sourcing of the complementary firm, focusing on the willingness of GitHub developers to contribute. Using the staggered rollout of Amazon AWS’s Elasticsearch as a natural experiment, the analysis shows that the platform owner’s entry reduces contributions from existing contributors but substantially increases contributions from new contributors, leading to an overall increase in contributions to the open-source technology. This finding provides a new perspective: contrary to common concerns that platform owners’ entry harms open-source startups, from a technology development standpoint, such entry may not necessarily be detrimental.\n\n## Background\n\nGiven the opposing effects of reduced contributions by existing contributors and increased contributions by new contributors, it was an important question to assess how the platform owner’s entry affects total contributions to the open-source project.\n\n## Analysis Method\n\n### Dataset\n\nWeekly contributions from all cloud developers were aggregated at the country level and analyzed at the country-week level.\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\n- AWS’s market entry with Amazon Elasticsearch Service.\n  - Entry is a dummy variable equal to 1 if AWS entered the country where the contributor resides, and 0 otherwise.\n  - After is a dummy variable equal to 1 if AWS had already entered the contributor’s country during or before a given period, and 0 otherwise.\n  - The interaction term Entry × After was used to measure the treatment effect.\n\n### Dependent Variable\n\n- Overall OSS contributions by combining both existing and new contributors(the number of commits, lines of code changed/added, and files of code changed/added)\n  - Overall contributions were measured as the natural logarithm of the total number of commits by all contributors.\n  - Robustness checks also included the natural logarithm of lines of code and files changed/added.\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- After aggregating data from both existing and new contributors, stacked difference-in-differences analysis was applied at the country-week level.\n\n## Results\n\n- The analysis shows that the platform owner’s entry increases overall contributions to the open-source software project by cloud developers.\n- This result suggests that, contrary to concerns that platform owners' entry harms open-source startups or communities, such entry may actually enhance the complementary firm's ability to attract external knowledge contributions.\n"
+        "content": "\n## Key Points\n\nOn average, there was an observed increase of approximately 150 to 200 monthly active developers.\n\n## Background\n\n- Open Source Observer (OSO) is exploring advanced metrics to better measure the impact of certain types of interventions on public goods ecosystems.\n- For example, it aims to compare the performance of projects or users who received token incentives against those who did not.\n- However, in real-world economies, it is impossible to randomly assign treatment and control groups like in controlled A/B tests.\n- Therefore, advanced statistical techniques must be employed to estimate the causal effect of a treatment on a target cohort, while controlling for other factors such as market conditions, competing incentives, and geopolitical events.\n\n## Analysis Method\n\n### Dataset\n\n- The synthetic control work is part of a broader initiative to build a flexible analytics engine capable of analyzing virtually all metrics over time.\n- OSO is currently rolling out a suite of timeseries metrics. These models allow metrics to be computed for any cohort over any time period, enabling \"time travel\" to evaluate past performance.\n- Most timeseries metrics are computed using a rolling window with daily buckets. For example, rather than measuring monthly active developers as a static monthly count, OSO uses 30-day and 90-day rolling windows to provide a more detailed view of cohort performance.\n- Sample SQL queries show the use of tables such as `timeseries_metrics_by_collection_v0`, `metrics_v0`, and `collections_v1`.\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\n- OSO is interested in measuring the impact of specific types of interventions on public goods ecosystems.\n- Specifically, it seeks to assess how grants and incentives affect outcomes such as developer retention, user activity, and network TVL (Total Value Locked).\n- The initial experiment evaluates an intervention targeting a cohort of projects that received Optimism Retro Funding in January 2024.\n- The explanatory variable is `new_contributors_over_90_day` (new contributors over 90 days), `commits_over_90_day` (commits over 90 days), and `issues_opened_over_90_day` (issues opened over 90 days).\n\n### Dependent Variable\n\n- The dependent variable is `active_developers_over_90_day` (90-day active developers)\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- As an early experiment in crypto network economics, OSO is exploring methods such as synthetic controls and causal inference.\n- Synthetic control methods are widely used to assess the impact of interventions in complex systems.\n- In this approach, a synthetic control is a weighted average of several units, constructed to replicate the trajectory that the treated unit would have followed in the absence of the intervention.\n- Weights are selected in a data-driven way so that the resulting synthetic control closely resembles the treated unit with respect to key predictors of the outcome variable.\n- Unlike difference-in-differences approaches, this method allows for adjustments for time-varying confounders by weighting the control group to better match the treatment group in the pre-intervention period.\n- Economists frequently use synthetic controls to evaluate policy impacts in non-experimental settings (e.g., Abadie and Gardeazabal’s study on the economic impact of the Basque separatist conflict).\n- One key advantage of synthetic controls is the ability to systematically select comparison groups. In OSO’s case, this means comparing grant recipients to similar non-recipient projects.\n- Inspired by work from Counterfactual Labs, OSO uses the pysyncon package to estimate treatment effects across the range of timeseries metrics available within OSO.\n- Each analysis request includes a pre-period start and end date, an optimization period start and end date, a dependent variable, treatment identifier, control identifiers, and predictor variables.\n\n## Results\n\n- In early findings, OSO analyzed monthly active developers over a 90-day rolling window for a cohort of projects that received Optimism Retro Funding in January 2024.\n- The results indicate that the gap between the treated group and the synthetic control group reflects the treatment effect, with an average increase of approximately 150 to 200 monthly active developers.\n- OSO is in the early stages of applying advanced metrics like synthetic control to measure the impact of incentives in crypto networks and plans to share further insights in the future.\n",
+        "raw": "---\nevidence_id: \"02\"\nresults:\n  - intervention: \"Whether grants were received or token incentives were provided\"\n    outcome_variable: \"Developer retention, user activity, TVL\"\n    outcome: \"+-\"\nstrength: \"3\"\nmethodologies:\n  - \"Synthetic Control Method\"\nversion: \"2.0.0\"\ndatasets:\n  - \"https://github.com/opensource-observer/insights/tree/main/analysis/optimism/syncon\"\ntitle: \"Effect of a Grant Program on Developer Activity \"\ndate: \"2024-11-18\"\ntags:\n  - \"oss\"\n  - \"public goods funding\"\ncitation:\n  - name: \"Early experiments with synthetic controls and causal inference\"\n    src: \"https://docs.oso.xyz/blog/synthetic-controls/\"\n    type: \"link\"\nauthor: \"Carl Cervone\"\n---\n\n## Key Points\n\nOn average, there was an observed increase of approximately 150 to 200 monthly active developers.\n\n## Background\n\n- Open Source Observer (OSO) is exploring advanced metrics to better measure the impact of certain types of interventions on public goods ecosystems.\n- For example, it aims to compare the performance of projects or users who received token incentives against those who did not.\n- However, in real-world economies, it is impossible to randomly assign treatment and control groups like in controlled A/B tests.\n- Therefore, advanced statistical techniques must be employed to estimate the causal effect of a treatment on a target cohort, while controlling for other factors such as market conditions, competing incentives, and geopolitical events.\n\n## Analysis Method\n\n### Dataset\n\n- The synthetic control work is part of a broader initiative to build a flexible analytics engine capable of analyzing virtually all metrics over time.\n- OSO is currently rolling out a suite of timeseries metrics. These models allow metrics to be computed for any cohort over any time period, enabling \"time travel\" to evaluate past performance.\n- Most timeseries metrics are computed using a rolling window with daily buckets. For example, rather than measuring monthly active developers as a static monthly count, OSO uses 30-day and 90-day rolling windows to provide a more detailed view of cohort performance.\n- Sample SQL queries show the use of tables such as `timeseries_metrics_by_collection_v0`, `metrics_v0`, and `collections_v1`.\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\n- OSO is interested in measuring the impact of specific types of interventions on public goods ecosystems.\n- Specifically, it seeks to assess how grants and incentives affect outcomes such as developer retention, user activity, and network TVL (Total Value Locked).\n- The initial experiment evaluates an intervention targeting a cohort of projects that received Optimism Retro Funding in January 2024.\n- The explanatory variable is `new_contributors_over_90_day` (new contributors over 90 days), `commits_over_90_day` (commits over 90 days), and `issues_opened_over_90_day` (issues opened over 90 days).\n\n### Dependent Variable\n\n- The dependent variable is `active_developers_over_90_day` (90-day active developers)\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- As an early experiment in crypto network economics, OSO is exploring methods such as synthetic controls and causal inference.\n- Synthetic control methods are widely used to assess the impact of interventions in complex systems.\n- In this approach, a synthetic control is a weighted average of several units, constructed to replicate the trajectory that the treated unit would have followed in the absence of the intervention.\n- Weights are selected in a data-driven way so that the resulting synthetic control closely resembles the treated unit with respect to key predictors of the outcome variable.\n- Unlike difference-in-differences approaches, this method allows for adjustments for time-varying confounders by weighting the control group to better match the treatment group in the pre-intervention period.\n- Economists frequently use synthetic controls to evaluate policy impacts in non-experimental settings (e.g., Abadie and Gardeazabal’s study on the economic impact of the Basque separatist conflict).\n- One key advantage of synthetic controls is the ability to systematically select comparison groups. In OSO’s case, this means comparing grant recipients to similar non-recipient projects.\n- Inspired by work from Counterfactual Labs, OSO uses the pysyncon package to estimate treatment effects across the range of timeseries metrics available within OSO.\n- Each analysis request includes a pre-period start and end date, an optimization period start and end date, a dependent variable, treatment identifier, control identifiers, and predictor variables.\n\n## Results\n\n- In early findings, OSO analyzed monthly active developers over a 90-day rolling window for a cohort of projects that received Optimism Retro Funding in January 2024.\n- The results indicate that the gap between the treated group and the synthetic control group reflects the treatment effect, with an average increase of approximately 150 to 200 monthly active developers.\n- OSO is in the early stages of applying advanced metrics like synthetic control to measure the impact of incentives in crypto networks and plans to share further insights in the future.\n"
     },
-    "00": {
+    "04": {
         "frontmatter": {
-            "evidence_id": "00",
-            "title": "Effect of Pull Request Submission by listing individual OSS contributors on GitHub Sponsors",
-            "author": "Poonacha K. Medappa, Murat M. Tunc, Xitong Li",
-            "date": "2023-06-25",
+            "evidence_id": "04",
+            "title": "SuperStacks increase TVL",
+            "author": "Optimism Collective",
+            "date": "2025-08-15",
             "citation": [
                 {
-                    "name": "Sponsorship Funding in Open-Source Software: Incentivize or Crowd-Out Motivations to Create, Maintain and Share?",
+                    "name": "SuperStacks Impact Analysis - Accountability",
                     "type": "link",
-                    "src": "https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4484403"
+                    "src": "https://gov.optimism.io/t/superstacks-impact-analysis/10225"
                 }
             ],
             "results": [
                 {
-                    "intervention": "Listing individual OSS contributors on sponsorship platform",
-                    "outcome_variable": "Submitting Pull Requests (PRs)",
-                    "outcome": "+-"
+                    "intervention": "DeFi liquidity program with supply-side and demand-side incentives",
+                    "outcome_variable": "Growth and retention of TVL",
+                    "outcome": "+"
                 }
             ],
             "strength": "3",
             "methodologies": [
-                "DID、Coarsened Exact Matching(CEM) technique、Robustness Tests"
+                "Pro-rata model, One-sided t-tests"
+            ],
+            "version": "1.0.0"
+        },
+        "content": "\n## Key Points\n\n- The SuperStacks program achieved **$58.0M in net TVL inflows** during its implementation period, with **$53.7M retained 30 days after the program concluded**. This translates to **$23.2/OP and $21.5/OP** after costs, respectively.\n- Findings supported the theory that strong demand-side activity can lift post-incentive equilibrium levels, though a more rigorous analysis is still needed.\n- **Incentivized lending pools generally demonstrated higher liquidity retention**.\n- However, TVL retention in DEXs appeared **inflated by Uniswap's concurrent Gauntlet campaign**. Specifically, when the two co-incentivized DEX pools were excluded, retained TVL inflows dropped to $48.2M, revealing a significant divergence between the lending and DEX verticals.\n- Metrics for measuring demand-side traction included trading volume per TVL for DEX pools and utilization rate for lending pools. For DEX pools, a moderate correlation was observed between peak net TVL inflows and trading volume per TVL, hinting at possible synergistic effects.\n- A key limitation was that isolating the program's causal effect alone was extremely difficult due to numerous confounding variables, such as external co-incentives and broader market volatility.\n\n## Background\n\nSuperStacks was the **Optimism Foundation's first proactive DeFi incentive pilot program**. It was designed with the goal of **increasing liquidity for interoperable assets (e.g., USD₮0) across the Superchain**. At its core, the program aimed to help these assets overcome the cold start problem and **test new mechanisms for establishing sustainable DeFi growth loops**.\n\nThe program's design was based on a theoretical framework suggesting that a two-pronged approach, focusing on both supply-side and demand-side activity, could initiate a sustainable flywheel effect for interoperable assets on the Superchain, ultimately catalyzing lasting liquidity growth.\n\nThis theory is broken down into three phases:\n\n1.  **Supply-Side Growth**: Available incentives attract deposits into DEX pools, which creates deeper liquidity and improves the execution quality for trades. On the lending side, an increase in lending supply reduces the borrow rate.\n2.  **Demand-Side Growth**: Improved trading conditions draw in more trades that are routed through the incentivized DEX pools, which increases trading volumes and generates more fees for LPs. Similarly, more competitive borrow rates attract more borrowers, which raises utilization rates and generates a higher yield for lenders.\n3.  **Sustainable Traction**: Once incentives are switched off, a portion of the TVL (Total Value Locked) and net liquidity leaves the incentivized pools, but due to higher fee and yield generation for LPs and lenders, liquidity settles at higher baseline levels compared to the pre-incentives period.\n\n## Analysis Method\n\n### Dataset\n\nThe datasets and methods used for the SuperStacks analysis were:\n\n- Period: 76-day incentive period (April 16 – June 30) and a 30-day retention evaluation period after program end (through July 30).\n- Data sources: 25 pools and vaults targeted by SuperStacks incentives.\n- Metrics:\n  - TVL (Total Value Locked): Net TVL inflows during the program and retained inflows after program end.\n  - Trading volume: Indicator of demand-side activity in DEX pools.\n  - Utilization: Indicator of demand-side activity in lending pools.\n  - Cost efficiency: Net TVL inflows per OP token ($/OP).\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\nSuperStacks Program:\n\nSuperStacks was the Optimism Foundation’s first attempt at a “proactive DeFi incentive,” designed as a pilot program to increase liquidity of interoperable assets across the Superchain. The program was built on a two-pronged approach targeting both supply-side and demand-side activities. Specifically, incentives were provided to encourage supply-side actions (deposits into DEX pools, increased lending supply), which in turn aimed to stimulate demand-side activities (higher trading volume, increased utilization).\n\n### Dependent Variable\n\nGrowth and retention of TVL (Total Value Locked): Measuring both the increase in TVL through incentives and the extent to which that TVL was maintained after incentives ended. The analysis centered on “retained TVL inflows.”\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- A pro-rata model was applied to disentangle the complexity of overlapping incentive programs, attributing impact based on each program’s share of total USD incentives.\n- To evaluate pool-level performance, incentivized pools (treatment group) were paired with comparable non-incentivized pools (control group) on the same chain and protocol. One-sided t-tests were conducted on changes in TVL and trading volume.\n- The analysis focused on DEX pools (9 pairs) that passed statistical filtering.\n\n## Results\n\n- Overall TVL Inflow and Retention:\n  - During the program, the SuperStacks initiative achieved $58M in net TVL inflows, with $53.7M retained 30 days after the program ended.\n  - Considering costs, this corresponds to $23.2 net TVL per 1 OP during the program, and $21.5 per 1 OP after the program.\n  - Across all incentivized pools and vaults, $87.7M of TVL was retained 30 days after incentives ended.\n  - Net TVL inflows peaked before the program ended, at $15.7M in DEXs and $70M in lending markets.\n- DEX vs. Lending Markets:\n  - Of the net TVL inflows during the program, DEXs accounted for 31.6% and lending markets 68.4%.\n  - Lending markets showed stronger liquidity retention compared to DEXs. Lending pools, especially deposit-only vaults such as Morpho’s, often showed growth.\n  - DEX TVL retention appeared inflated by concurrent incentive programs run by the Uniswap Foundation and Gauntlet. Excluding the two DEX pools covered by these joint incentives, retained TVL inflows fell to $48.2M, revealing a notable divergence between lending and DEX outcomes.\n",
+        "raw": "---\nevidence_id: \"04\"\nresults:\n  - intervention: \"DeFi liquidity program with supply-side and demand-side incentives\"\n    outcome_variable: \"Growth and retention of TVL\"\n    outcome: \"+\"\nstrength: \"3\"\nmethodologies:\n  - \"Pro-rata model, One-sided t-tests\"\nversion: \"1.0.0\"\ntitle: \"SuperStacks increase TVL\"\ndate: \"2025-08-15\"\ncitation:\n  - name: \"SuperStacks Impact Analysis - Accountability\"\n    src: \"https://gov.optimism.io/t/superstacks-impact-analysis/10225\"\n    type: \"link\"\nauthor: \"Optimism Collective\"\n---\n\n## Key Points\n\n- The SuperStacks program achieved **$58.0M in net TVL inflows** during its implementation period, with **$53.7M retained 30 days after the program concluded**. This translates to **$23.2/OP and $21.5/OP** after costs, respectively.\n- Findings supported the theory that strong demand-side activity can lift post-incentive equilibrium levels, though a more rigorous analysis is still needed.\n- **Incentivized lending pools generally demonstrated higher liquidity retention**.\n- However, TVL retention in DEXs appeared **inflated by Uniswap's concurrent Gauntlet campaign**. Specifically, when the two co-incentivized DEX pools were excluded, retained TVL inflows dropped to $48.2M, revealing a significant divergence between the lending and DEX verticals.\n- Metrics for measuring demand-side traction included trading volume per TVL for DEX pools and utilization rate for lending pools. For DEX pools, a moderate correlation was observed between peak net TVL inflows and trading volume per TVL, hinting at possible synergistic effects.\n- A key limitation was that isolating the program's causal effect alone was extremely difficult due to numerous confounding variables, such as external co-incentives and broader market volatility.\n\n## Background\n\nSuperStacks was the **Optimism Foundation's first proactive DeFi incentive pilot program**. It was designed with the goal of **increasing liquidity for interoperable assets (e.g., USD₮0) across the Superchain**. At its core, the program aimed to help these assets overcome the cold start problem and **test new mechanisms for establishing sustainable DeFi growth loops**.\n\nThe program's design was based on a theoretical framework suggesting that a two-pronged approach, focusing on both supply-side and demand-side activity, could initiate a sustainable flywheel effect for interoperable assets on the Superchain, ultimately catalyzing lasting liquidity growth.\n\nThis theory is broken down into three phases:\n\n1.  **Supply-Side Growth**: Available incentives attract deposits into DEX pools, which creates deeper liquidity and improves the execution quality for trades. On the lending side, an increase in lending supply reduces the borrow rate.\n2.  **Demand-Side Growth**: Improved trading conditions draw in more trades that are routed through the incentivized DEX pools, which increases trading volumes and generates more fees for LPs. Similarly, more competitive borrow rates attract more borrowers, which raises utilization rates and generates a higher yield for lenders.\n3.  **Sustainable Traction**: Once incentives are switched off, a portion of the TVL (Total Value Locked) and net liquidity leaves the incentivized pools, but due to higher fee and yield generation for LPs and lenders, liquidity settles at higher baseline levels compared to the pre-incentives period.\n\n## Analysis Method\n\n### Dataset\n\nThe datasets and methods used for the SuperStacks analysis were:\n\n- Period: 76-day incentive period (April 16 – June 30) and a 30-day retention evaluation period after program end (through July 30).\n- Data sources: 25 pools and vaults targeted by SuperStacks incentives.\n- Metrics:\n  - TVL (Total Value Locked): Net TVL inflows during the program and retained inflows after program end.\n  - Trading volume: Indicator of demand-side activity in DEX pools.\n  - Utilization: Indicator of demand-side activity in lending pools.\n  - Cost efficiency: Net TVL inflows per OP token ($/OP).\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\nSuperStacks Program:\n\nSuperStacks was the Optimism Foundation’s first attempt at a “proactive DeFi incentive,” designed as a pilot program to increase liquidity of interoperable assets across the Superchain. The program was built on a two-pronged approach targeting both supply-side and demand-side activities. Specifically, incentives were provided to encourage supply-side actions (deposits into DEX pools, increased lending supply), which in turn aimed to stimulate demand-side activities (higher trading volume, increased utilization).\n\n### Dependent Variable\n\nGrowth and retention of TVL (Total Value Locked): Measuring both the increase in TVL through incentives and the extent to which that TVL was maintained after incentives ended. The analysis centered on “retained TVL inflows.”\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- A pro-rata model was applied to disentangle the complexity of overlapping incentive programs, attributing impact based on each program’s share of total USD incentives.\n- To evaluate pool-level performance, incentivized pools (treatment group) were paired with comparable non-incentivized pools (control group) on the same chain and protocol. One-sided t-tests were conducted on changes in TVL and trading volume.\n- The analysis focused on DEX pools (9 pairs) that passed statistical filtering.\n\n## Results\n\n- Overall TVL Inflow and Retention:\n  - During the program, the SuperStacks initiative achieved $58M in net TVL inflows, with $53.7M retained 30 days after the program ended.\n  - Considering costs, this corresponds to $23.2 net TVL per 1 OP during the program, and $21.5 per 1 OP after the program.\n  - Across all incentivized pools and vaults, $87.7M of TVL was retained 30 days after incentives ended.\n  - Net TVL inflows peaked before the program ended, at $15.7M in DEXs and $70M in lending markets.\n- DEX vs. Lending Markets:\n  - Of the net TVL inflows during the program, DEXs accounted for 31.6% and lending markets 68.4%.\n  - Lending markets showed stronger liquidity retention compared to DEXs. Lending pools, especially deposit-only vaults such as Morpho’s, often showed growth.\n  - DEX TVL retention appeared inflated by concurrent incentive programs run by the Uniswap Foundation and Gauntlet. Excluding the two DEX pools covered by these joint incentives, retained TVL inflows fell to $48.2M, revealing a notable divergence between lending and DEX outcomes.\n"
+    },
+    "06": {
+        "frontmatter": {
+            "evidence_id": "06",
+            "title": "How Platform Owner Entry Affects OSS Contributions by Existing Contributors: An Experiment with AWS Elasticsearch",
+            "author": "Yuping Li",
+            "date": "2024-06-20",
+            "citation": [
+                {
+                    "name": "How Platform Owner Entry Affects Open Source Contribution? Evidence from GitHub Developers",
+                    "type": "link",
+                    "src": "https://questromworld.bu.edu/platformstrategy/wp-content/uploads/sites/49/2024/06/PlatStrat2024_paper_100.pdf"
+                }
+            ],
+            "results": [
+                {
+                    "intervention": "Platform owner market entry using complementary firm's OSS",
+                    "outcome_variable": "OSS contributions by existing contributors",
+                    "outcome": "-"
+                }
+            ],
+            "strength": "3",
+            "methodologies": [
+                "DID, PSE"
             ],
             "version": "1.0.0",
             "datasets": [
-                "A dataset based on the activities of contributors active on both the GitHub and Stack Overflow platforms."
-            ],
-            "tags": [
-                "oss"
+                ""
             ]
         },
-        "content": "\n## Key Points\n\nThe submission of pull requests experienced a temporary short-term increase, but eventually returned to pre-treatment levels, with a crowding-out effect emerging over time. Among contributors with a high level of community engagement (e.g., frequent contributions to others’ projects, large follower count), a negative impact on knowledge creation activities (i.e., the crowding-out effect) was observed. For contributors who set higher active funding goals, sponsorship appeared to have a positive effect on their knowledge creation activities.\n\n## Background\n\nThe world’s digital infrastructure is built on open-source software (OSS) developed on platforms like GitHub (GH), and supported by complementary knowledge-sharing platforms like Stack Overflow (SO). On these platforms, numerous programmers, maintainers, and researchers devote their efforts to building and maintaining code, as well as supporting users. Contributors play a crucial role not only in knowledge creation activities, such as contributing code and adding new features, but also in knowledge maintenance activities, such as reviewing and integrating community-submitted code.\n\nHowever, it has been pointed out that OSS projects are increasingly burdened by the need to maintain existing code rather than create new code, and that many projects fail due to the lack of intrinsic motivation for maintenance work. Maintenance is often seen as “mundane but necessary,” and tends to lack intrinsic appeal. For example, the 2020 Linux Foundation OSS Contributor Survey highlighted that, although participants showed minimal interest in spending significant time on maintenance-related tasks, they emphasized that the most crucial support OSS projects need is for maintenance work—especially related to security improvements.\n\nIn this context, there is a growing trend to provide financial support to encourage and sustain volunteer contributors. In May 2019, GH launched GitHub Sponsors, a feature allowing individual OSS developers to receive donations from the community. Unlike traditional project- or activity-specific funding, GitHub Sponsors focuses on individual contributors, offering them the flexibility to reallocate their efforts not only within the host platform but also across other complementary platforms in which they participate. This study investigates the impact of such sponsorship-based funding on OSS contributors’ behavior—specifically, its effect on knowledge creation and maintenance activities on GH and the spillover effects on SO, a complementary knowledge-sharing platform.\n\n## Analytical Methods\n\n### Dataset\n\n- **Data Collection**: The dataset is based on the behavior of contributors active on both GitHub (GH) and Stack Overflow (SO), obtained via APIs provided by both platforms. The panel data spans four years, from January 2018 to December 2021.\n  - During the initial data collection period, GH Sponsors was available in 30 countries that supported STRIPE payments. The sample is therefore limited to GH contributors from these countries.\n  - To select GH contributors, the following criteria were applied: owning at least 5 repositories, having more than 10 followers, and having joined GH before 2018. This resulted in a sample of 20,841 GH contributors.\n  - SO profiles were identified using names, email addresses, and login IDs listed on GH, and only included if a GH URL matched on the SO profile. Ultimately, 5,910 GH contributors who had joined both platforms prior to the observation period were identified, of whom 1,467 were listed for sponsorship during the observation period.\n  - Activity-related data were aggregated on a monthly basis.\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\n- The intervention in this study is the contributor being listed on GitHub Sponsors (Sponsor listing).\n- The primary explanatory variable of interest in this study is a binary indicator that equals 1 starting from the month the contributor is listed for sponsorship (Sponsor Listed).\n- This variable is used to capture the effect starting from the point at which the contributor is listed on GitHub Sponsors.\n\n### Dependent Variables\n\n- **Knowledge Creation Activity on GitHub**:\n  - **Number of Pull Requests (PRs) Submitted** per month.\n    - Proposals for changes to the codebase, including new features, bug fixes, and improvements.\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- **A Difference-in-Differences (DID)** estimation was used to measure changes in pull request submission due to sponsorship.\n- **Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM)** was applied to match contributors based on their activity levels prior to being listed for sponsorship.\n\n### Robustness Test\n\n- The following supplemental analyses on PR submissions were conducted:\n  - Use of **alternative dependent variables for PR submissions**.\n  - Controlling for **PR characteristics (e.g., size, number of files, number of commits, time to merge)**.\n  - Considering **self-merged PRs**.\n  - Considering **PRs related to issues**.\n\n## Results\n\n- **No significant overall effect of sponsorship on knowledge creation activity (PR submissions) on GitHub.**。\n  - A temporary increase is observed in the short term, but a **crowding-out effect** appears over time.\n  - In the long term, the effect on PR submissions disappears due to a decline in intrinsic motivation.\n\n- For **contributors with high community engagement** or **those who set higher funding goals**, a stronger negative effect (reduction in PR submissions) was observed.\n- There is a tendency **to see an increase in PR submissions to less popular projects**.\n",
-        "raw": "---\nevidence_id: \"00\"\nresults:\n  - intervention: \"Listing individual OSS contributors on sponsorship platform\"\n    outcome_variable: \"Submitting Pull Requests (PRs)\"\n    outcome: \"+-\"\nstrength: \"3\"\nmethodologies:\n  - \"DID、Coarsened Exact Matching(CEM) technique、Robustness Tests\"\nversion: \"1.0.0\"\ndatasets:\n  - \"A dataset based on the activities of contributors active on both the GitHub and Stack Overflow platforms.\"\ntitle: \"Effect of Pull Request Submission by listing individual OSS contributors on GitHub Sponsors\"\ndate: \"2023-06-25\"\ntags:\n  - \"oss\"\ncitation:\n  - type: \"link\"\n    name: \"Sponsorship Funding in Open-Source Software: Incentivize or Crowd-Out Motivations to Create, Maintain and Share?\"\n    src: \"https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4484403\"\nauthor: \"Poonacha K. Medappa, Murat M. Tunc, Xitong Li\"\n---\n\n## Key Points\n\nThe submission of pull requests experienced a temporary short-term increase, but eventually returned to pre-treatment levels, with a crowding-out effect emerging over time. Among contributors with a high level of community engagement (e.g., frequent contributions to others’ projects, large follower count), a negative impact on knowledge creation activities (i.e., the crowding-out effect) was observed. For contributors who set higher active funding goals, sponsorship appeared to have a positive effect on their knowledge creation activities.\n\n## Background\n\nThe world’s digital infrastructure is built on open-source software (OSS) developed on platforms like GitHub (GH), and supported by complementary knowledge-sharing platforms like Stack Overflow (SO). On these platforms, numerous programmers, maintainers, and researchers devote their efforts to building and maintaining code, as well as supporting users. Contributors play a crucial role not only in knowledge creation activities, such as contributing code and adding new features, but also in knowledge maintenance activities, such as reviewing and integrating community-submitted code.\n\nHowever, it has been pointed out that OSS projects are increasingly burdened by the need to maintain existing code rather than create new code, and that many projects fail due to the lack of intrinsic motivation for maintenance work. Maintenance is often seen as “mundane but necessary,” and tends to lack intrinsic appeal. For example, the 2020 Linux Foundation OSS Contributor Survey highlighted that, although participants showed minimal interest in spending significant time on maintenance-related tasks, they emphasized that the most crucial support OSS projects need is for maintenance work—especially related to security improvements.\n\nIn this context, there is a growing trend to provide financial support to encourage and sustain volunteer contributors. In May 2019, GH launched GitHub Sponsors, a feature allowing individual OSS developers to receive donations from the community. Unlike traditional project- or activity-specific funding, GitHub Sponsors focuses on individual contributors, offering them the flexibility to reallocate their efforts not only within the host platform but also across other complementary platforms in which they participate. This study investigates the impact of such sponsorship-based funding on OSS contributors’ behavior—specifically, its effect on knowledge creation and maintenance activities on GH and the spillover effects on SO, a complementary knowledge-sharing platform.\n\n## Analytical Methods\n\n### Dataset\n\n- **Data Collection**: The dataset is based on the behavior of contributors active on both GitHub (GH) and Stack Overflow (SO), obtained via APIs provided by both platforms. The panel data spans four years, from January 2018 to December 2021.\n  - During the initial data collection period, GH Sponsors was available in 30 countries that supported STRIPE payments. The sample is therefore limited to GH contributors from these countries.\n  - To select GH contributors, the following criteria were applied: owning at least 5 repositories, having more than 10 followers, and having joined GH before 2018. This resulted in a sample of 20,841 GH contributors.\n  - SO profiles were identified using names, email addresses, and login IDs listed on GH, and only included if a GH URL matched on the SO profile. Ultimately, 5,910 GH contributors who had joined both platforms prior to the observation period were identified, of whom 1,467 were listed for sponsorship during the observation period.\n  - Activity-related data were aggregated on a monthly basis.\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\n- The intervention in this study is the contributor being listed on GitHub Sponsors (Sponsor listing).\n- The primary explanatory variable of interest in this study is a binary indicator that equals 1 starting from the month the contributor is listed for sponsorship (Sponsor Listed).\n- This variable is used to capture the effect starting from the point at which the contributor is listed on GitHub Sponsors.\n\n### Dependent Variables\n\n- **Knowledge Creation Activity on GitHub**:\n  - **Number of Pull Requests (PRs) Submitted** per month.\n    - Proposals for changes to the codebase, including new features, bug fixes, and improvements.\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- **A Difference-in-Differences (DID)** estimation was used to measure changes in pull request submission due to sponsorship.\n- **Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM)** was applied to match contributors based on their activity levels prior to being listed for sponsorship.\n\n### Robustness Test\n\n- The following supplemental analyses on PR submissions were conducted:\n  - Use of **alternative dependent variables for PR submissions**.\n  - Controlling for **PR characteristics (e.g., size, number of files, number of commits, time to merge)**.\n  - Considering **self-merged PRs**.\n  - Considering **PRs related to issues**.\n\n## Results\n\n- **No significant overall effect of sponsorship on knowledge creation activity (PR submissions) on GitHub.**。\n  - A temporary increase is observed in the short term, but a **crowding-out effect** appears over time.\n  - In the long term, the effect on PR submissions disappears due to a decline in intrinsic motivation.\n\n- For **contributors with high community engagement** or **those who set higher funding goals**, a stronger negative effect (reduction in PR submissions) was observed.\n- There is a tendency **to see an increase in PR submissions to less popular projects**.\n"
+        "content": "\n## Key Points\n\nThis study explores how a platform owner’s market entry—by leveraging a complementary firm’s open-source technology—affects the external knowledge sourcing of the complementary firm, focusing on the willingness of GitHub developers to contribute. Using the staggered rollout of Amazon AWS’s Elasticsearch as a natural experiment, the analysis shows that the platform owner’s entry reduces contributions from existing contributors but substantially increases contributions from new contributors, leading to an overall increase in contributions to the open-source technology. This finding provides a new perspective: contrary to common concerns that platform owners’ entry harms open-source startups, from a technology development standpoint, such entry may not necessarily be detrimental.\n\n## Background\n\nExisting contributors are individuals who had begun contributing to the complementary firm’s open-source project before the platform owner’s entry. Based on prospect theory, they are likely to perceive strong potential losses to their existing “endowments,” such as their commitment to open-source philosophy, community interactions, and established reputation, as a result of the platform owner’s entry. Thus, it was hypothesized that they might reduce their involvement due to concerns about their contributions being exploited by the platform owner and about threats to community sustainability.\n\n## Analysis Method\n\n### Dataset\n\nData was collected from AWS and GitHub. Specifically, AWS official announcements provided information about the date and location of the Amazon Elasticsearch Service launch, while GitHub data provided developers’ contributions to Elasticsearch (contribution volume, personal GitHub experience, popularity, etc.). Commits by Elastic employees were excluded to focus on external developers’ contributions.\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\n- AWS’s market entry with Amazon Elasticsearch Service.\n  - Entry is a dummy variable equal to 1 if AWS entered the country where the contributor resides, and 0 otherwise.\n  - After is a dummy variable equal to 1 if AWS had already entered the contributor’s country during or before a given period, and 0 otherwise.\n  - The interaction term Entry × After was used to measure the treatment effect.\n\n### Dependent Variable\n\n- OSS contributions by existing contributors(the number of commits, lines of code changed/added, and files of code changed/added)\n  - Contributions by existing contributors were measured as the natural logarithm of the number of commits to Elasticsearch.\n  - As robustness checks, the natural logarithm of lines of code changed/added and files changed/added were also used.\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- AWS’s staggered introduction of managed Elasticsearch services across countries/regions was treated as a natural experiment, and stacked difference-in-differences analysis was applied.\n- This method addresses the “forbidden comparison problem” in staggered interventions and strengthens analytical robustness.\n- The treatment group consisted of contributors in countries where AWS launched Elasticsearch services; the control group consisted of contributors in countries where AWS had not yet launched or never launched the service.\n- Propensity score matching (PSM) was used to align contributors across groups. The analysis was conducted at the contributor-week level, with 110,249 observations across 459 contributors.\n\n## Results\n\n- The analysis provides empirical evidence that the platform owner’s entry reduces contributions by existing contributors.\n- On average, the number of commits decreased by about 4.33%. Notably, contributors with stronger intrinsic motivations reduced their contributions more sharply after the platform owner’s entry, while contributors with stronger extrinsic motivations showed a significantly smaller decline.\n- These results support the prospect theory–based hypothesis that existing contributors decrease participation due to concerns over losses to their \"endowments,\" such as community attachment and identity.\n",
+        "raw": "---\nevidence_id: \"06\"\nresults:\n  - intervention: \"Platform owner market entry using complementary firm's OSS\"\n    outcome_variable: \"OSS contributions by existing contributors\"\n    outcome: \"-\"\nstrength: \"3\"\nmethodologies:\n  - \"DID, PSE\"\nversion: \"1.0.0\"\ndatasets:\n  - \"\"\ntitle: \"How Platform Owner Entry Affects OSS Contributions by Existing Contributors: An Experiment with AWS Elasticsearch\"\ndate: \"2024-06-20\"\n\ncitation:\n  - name: \"How Platform Owner Entry Affects Open Source Contribution? Evidence from GitHub Developers\"\n    src: \"https://questromworld.bu.edu/platformstrategy/wp-content/uploads/sites/49/2024/06/PlatStrat2024_paper_100.pdf\"\n    type: \"link\"\nauthor: \"Yuping Li\"\n---\n\n## Key Points\n\nThis study explores how a platform owner’s market entry—by leveraging a complementary firm’s open-source technology—affects the external knowledge sourcing of the complementary firm, focusing on the willingness of GitHub developers to contribute. Using the staggered rollout of Amazon AWS’s Elasticsearch as a natural experiment, the analysis shows that the platform owner’s entry reduces contributions from existing contributors but substantially increases contributions from new contributors, leading to an overall increase in contributions to the open-source technology. This finding provides a new perspective: contrary to common concerns that platform owners’ entry harms open-source startups, from a technology development standpoint, such entry may not necessarily be detrimental.\n\n## Background\n\nExisting contributors are individuals who had begun contributing to the complementary firm’s open-source project before the platform owner’s entry. Based on prospect theory, they are likely to perceive strong potential losses to their existing “endowments,” such as their commitment to open-source philosophy, community interactions, and established reputation, as a result of the platform owner’s entry. Thus, it was hypothesized that they might reduce their involvement due to concerns about their contributions being exploited by the platform owner and about threats to community sustainability.\n\n## Analysis Method\n\n### Dataset\n\nData was collected from AWS and GitHub. Specifically, AWS official announcements provided information about the date and location of the Amazon Elasticsearch Service launch, while GitHub data provided developers’ contributions to Elasticsearch (contribution volume, personal GitHub experience, popularity, etc.). Commits by Elastic employees were excluded to focus on external developers’ contributions.\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\n- AWS’s market entry with Amazon Elasticsearch Service.\n  - Entry is a dummy variable equal to 1 if AWS entered the country where the contributor resides, and 0 otherwise.\n  - After is a dummy variable equal to 1 if AWS had already entered the contributor’s country during or before a given period, and 0 otherwise.\n  - The interaction term Entry × After was used to measure the treatment effect.\n\n### Dependent Variable\n\n- OSS contributions by existing contributors(the number of commits, lines of code changed/added, and files of code changed/added)\n  - Contributions by existing contributors were measured as the natural logarithm of the number of commits to Elasticsearch.\n  - As robustness checks, the natural logarithm of lines of code changed/added and files changed/added were also used.\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- AWS’s staggered introduction of managed Elasticsearch services across countries/regions was treated as a natural experiment, and stacked difference-in-differences analysis was applied.\n- This method addresses the “forbidden comparison problem” in staggered interventions and strengthens analytical robustness.\n- The treatment group consisted of contributors in countries where AWS launched Elasticsearch services; the control group consisted of contributors in countries where AWS had not yet launched or never launched the service.\n- Propensity score matching (PSM) was used to align contributors across groups. The analysis was conducted at the contributor-week level, with 110,249 observations across 459 contributors.\n\n## Results\n\n- The analysis provides empirical evidence that the platform owner’s entry reduces contributions by existing contributors.\n- On average, the number of commits decreased by about 4.33%. Notably, contributors with stronger intrinsic motivations reduced their contributions more sharply after the platform owner’s entry, while contributors with stronger extrinsic motivations showed a significantly smaller decline.\n- These results support the prospect theory–based hypothesis that existing contributors decrease participation due to concerns over losses to their \"endowments,\" such as community attachment and identity.\n"
     },
     "05": {
         "frontmatter": {
@@ -448,10 +478,42 @@ export const evidence = {
         "content": "\n## Key Points\n\n- The SuperStacks program achieved **$58.0M in net TVL inflows** during its implementation period, with **$53.7M retained 30 days after the program concluded**. This translates to **$23.2/OP and $21.5/OP** after costs, respectively.\n- Findings supported the theory that strong demand-side activity can lift post-incentive equilibrium levels, though a more rigorous analysis is still needed.\n- **Incentivized lending pools generally demonstrated higher liquidity retention**.\n- However, TVL retention in DEXs appeared **inflated by Uniswap's concurrent Gauntlet campaign**. Specifically, when the two co-incentivized DEX pools were excluded, retained TVL inflows dropped to $48.2M, revealing a significant divergence between the lending and DEX verticals.\n- Metrics for measuring demand-side traction included trading volume per TVL for DEX pools and utilization rate for lending pools. For DEX pools, a moderate correlation was observed between peak net TVL inflows and trading volume per TVL, hinting at possible synergistic effects.\n- A key limitation was that isolating the program's causal effect alone was extremely difficult due to numerous confounding variables, such as external co-incentives and broader market volatility.\n\n## Background\n\nSuperStacks was the **Optimism Foundation's first proactive DeFi incentive pilot program**. It was designed with the goal of **increasing liquidity for interoperable assets (e.g., USD₮0) across the Superchain**. At its core, the program aimed to help these assets overcome the cold start problem and **test new mechanisms for establishing sustainable DeFi growth loops**.\n\nThe program's design was based on a theoretical framework suggesting that a two-pronged approach, focusing on both supply-side and demand-side activity, could initiate a sustainable flywheel effect for interoperable assets on the Superchain, ultimately catalyzing lasting liquidity growth.\n\nThis theory is broken down into three phases:\n\n1.  **Supply-Side Growth**: Available incentives attract deposits into DEX pools, which creates deeper liquidity and improves the execution quality for trades. On the lending side, an increase in lending supply reduces the borrow rate.\n2.  **Demand-Side Growth**: Improved trading conditions draw in more trades that are routed through the incentivized DEX pools, which increases trading volumes and generates more fees for LPs. Similarly, more competitive borrow rates attract more borrowers, which raises utilization rates and generates a higher yield for lenders.\n3.  **Sustainable Traction**: Once incentives are switched off, a portion of the TVL (Total Value Locked) and net liquidity leaves the incentivized pools, but due to higher fee and yield generation for LPs and lenders, liquidity settles at higher baseline levels compared to the pre-incentives period.\n\n## Analysis Method\n\n### Dataset\n\nThe datasets and methods used for the SuperStacks analysis were:\n\n- Period: 76-day incentive period (April 16 – June 30) and a 30-day retention evaluation period after program end (through July 30).\n- Data sources: 25 pools and vaults targeted by SuperStacks incentives.\n- Metrics:\n  - TVL (Total Value Locked): Net TVL inflows during the program and retained inflows after program end.\n  - Trading volume: Indicator of demand-side activity in DEX pools.\n  - Utilization: Indicator of demand-side activity in lending pools.\n  - Cost efficiency: Net TVL inflows per OP token ($/OP).\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\nSuperStacks Program:\n\nSuperStacks was the Optimism Foundation’s first attempt at a “proactive DeFi incentive,” designed as a pilot program to increase liquidity of interoperable assets across the Superchain. The program was built on a two-pronged approach targeting both supply-side and demand-side activities. Specifically, incentives were provided to encourage supply-side actions (deposits into DEX pools, increased lending supply), which in turn aimed to stimulate demand-side activities (higher trading volume, increased utilization).\n\n### Dependent Variable\n\nTrading volume and utilization: Determining whether TVL growth led to higher demand-side trading volume and lending utilization, and whether these metrics remained at elevated equilibrium levels after incentives stopped.\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- A pro-rata model was applied to disentangle the complexity of overlapping incentive programs, attributing impact based on each program’s share of total USD incentives.\n- To evaluate pool-level performance, incentivized pools (treatment group) were paired with comparable non-incentivized pools (control group) on the same chain and protocol. One-sided t-tests were conducted on changes in TVL and trading volume.\n- The analysis focused on DEX pools (9 pairs) that passed statistical filtering.\n\n## Results\n\n- DEX Trading Volume:\n  - In DEX pools, trading volume per TVL was used as a measure of liquidity “productivity.”\n  - CL100-USD₮0/kBTC on OP Mainnet: Alongside rapid TVL growth, trading volume increased by 126.7% during the program, and remained 42.7% above baseline after incentives ended (p < 0.01).\n  - CL1-USD₮0/USDC on OP Mainnet: TVL rose, while trading volume saw a modest 2.5% increase during the program. However, after incentives ended, volume accelerated and stabilized 25.1% above baseline (p < 0.01).\n  - BV-WETH/weETH on OP Mainnet: Beyond TVL growth, trading volume rose even more sharply, increasing 123.8% during the program and remaining 49.4% above baseline afterward (p < 0.01).\n- Lending Market Utilization:\n  - In lending pools, utilization rate was used as the demand-side traction metric.\n  - The lending pool with the highest performance at peak net TVL inflow showed a healthy 60.2% utilization rate, but the relationship between supply and demand momentum was less clear than in DEXs. Theoretically, competitive borrowing rates were expected to attract more borrowers, boost utilization, and deliver higher yields to lenders.\n",
         "raw": "---\nevidence_id: \"05\"\nresults:\n  - intervention: \"DeFi liquidity program with supply-side and demand-side incentives\"\n    outcome_variable: \"Trading volume and utilization\"\n    outcome: \"+\"\nstrength: \"4\"\nmethodologies:\n  - \"Pro-rata model, One-sided t-tests\"\nversion: \"1.0.0\"\ndatasets:\n  - \"\"\ntitle: \"Trading Volume and Utilization Outcomes of SuperStacks\"\ndate: \"2025-08-15\"\n\ncitation:\n  - name: \"SuperStacks Impact Analysis - Accountability\"\n    src: \"https://gov.optimism.io/t/superstacks-impact-analysis/10225\"\n    type: \"link\"\nauthor: \"Optimism Collective\"\n---\n\n## Key Points\n\n- The SuperStacks program achieved **$58.0M in net TVL inflows** during its implementation period, with **$53.7M retained 30 days after the program concluded**. This translates to **$23.2/OP and $21.5/OP** after costs, respectively.\n- Findings supported the theory that strong demand-side activity can lift post-incentive equilibrium levels, though a more rigorous analysis is still needed.\n- **Incentivized lending pools generally demonstrated higher liquidity retention**.\n- However, TVL retention in DEXs appeared **inflated by Uniswap's concurrent Gauntlet campaign**. Specifically, when the two co-incentivized DEX pools were excluded, retained TVL inflows dropped to $48.2M, revealing a significant divergence between the lending and DEX verticals.\n- Metrics for measuring demand-side traction included trading volume per TVL for DEX pools and utilization rate for lending pools. For DEX pools, a moderate correlation was observed between peak net TVL inflows and trading volume per TVL, hinting at possible synergistic effects.\n- A key limitation was that isolating the program's causal effect alone was extremely difficult due to numerous confounding variables, such as external co-incentives and broader market volatility.\n\n## Background\n\nSuperStacks was the **Optimism Foundation's first proactive DeFi incentive pilot program**. It was designed with the goal of **increasing liquidity for interoperable assets (e.g., USD₮0) across the Superchain**. At its core, the program aimed to help these assets overcome the cold start problem and **test new mechanisms for establishing sustainable DeFi growth loops**.\n\nThe program's design was based on a theoretical framework suggesting that a two-pronged approach, focusing on both supply-side and demand-side activity, could initiate a sustainable flywheel effect for interoperable assets on the Superchain, ultimately catalyzing lasting liquidity growth.\n\nThis theory is broken down into three phases:\n\n1.  **Supply-Side Growth**: Available incentives attract deposits into DEX pools, which creates deeper liquidity and improves the execution quality for trades. On the lending side, an increase in lending supply reduces the borrow rate.\n2.  **Demand-Side Growth**: Improved trading conditions draw in more trades that are routed through the incentivized DEX pools, which increases trading volumes and generates more fees for LPs. Similarly, more competitive borrow rates attract more borrowers, which raises utilization rates and generates a higher yield for lenders.\n3.  **Sustainable Traction**: Once incentives are switched off, a portion of the TVL (Total Value Locked) and net liquidity leaves the incentivized pools, but due to higher fee and yield generation for LPs and lenders, liquidity settles at higher baseline levels compared to the pre-incentives period.\n\n## Analysis Method\n\n### Dataset\n\nThe datasets and methods used for the SuperStacks analysis were:\n\n- Period: 76-day incentive period (April 16 – June 30) and a 30-day retention evaluation period after program end (through July 30).\n- Data sources: 25 pools and vaults targeted by SuperStacks incentives.\n- Metrics:\n  - TVL (Total Value Locked): Net TVL inflows during the program and retained inflows after program end.\n  - Trading volume: Indicator of demand-side activity in DEX pools.\n  - Utilization: Indicator of demand-side activity in lending pools.\n  - Cost efficiency: Net TVL inflows per OP token ($/OP).\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\nSuperStacks Program:\n\nSuperStacks was the Optimism Foundation’s first attempt at a “proactive DeFi incentive,” designed as a pilot program to increase liquidity of interoperable assets across the Superchain. The program was built on a two-pronged approach targeting both supply-side and demand-side activities. Specifically, incentives were provided to encourage supply-side actions (deposits into DEX pools, increased lending supply), which in turn aimed to stimulate demand-side activities (higher trading volume, increased utilization).\n\n### Dependent Variable\n\nTrading volume and utilization: Determining whether TVL growth led to higher demand-side trading volume and lending utilization, and whether these metrics remained at elevated equilibrium levels after incentives stopped.\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- A pro-rata model was applied to disentangle the complexity of overlapping incentive programs, attributing impact based on each program’s share of total USD incentives.\n- To evaluate pool-level performance, incentivized pools (treatment group) were paired with comparable non-incentivized pools (control group) on the same chain and protocol. One-sided t-tests were conducted on changes in TVL and trading volume.\n- The analysis focused on DEX pools (9 pairs) that passed statistical filtering.\n\n## Results\n\n- DEX Trading Volume:\n  - In DEX pools, trading volume per TVL was used as a measure of liquidity “productivity.”\n  - CL100-USD₮0/kBTC on OP Mainnet: Alongside rapid TVL growth, trading volume increased by 126.7% during the program, and remained 42.7% above baseline after incentives ended (p < 0.01).\n  - CL1-USD₮0/USDC on OP Mainnet: TVL rose, while trading volume saw a modest 2.5% increase during the program. However, after incentives ended, volume accelerated and stabilized 25.1% above baseline (p < 0.01).\n  - BV-WETH/weETH on OP Mainnet: Beyond TVL growth, trading volume rose even more sharply, increasing 123.8% during the program and remaining 49.4% above baseline afterward (p < 0.01).\n- Lending Market Utilization:\n  - In lending pools, utilization rate was used as the demand-side traction metric.\n  - The lending pool with the highest performance at peak net TVL inflow showed a healthy 60.2% utilization rate, but the relationship between supply and demand momentum was less clear than in DEXs. Theoretically, competitive borrowing rates were expected to attract more borrowers, boost utilization, and deliver higher yields to lenders.\n"
     },
-    "07": {
+    "09": {
         "frontmatter": {
-            "evidence_id": "07",
-            "title": "How Platform Owner Entry Affects OSS Contributions by New Contributors: An Experiment with AWS Elasticsearch",
+            "evidence_id": "09",
+            "title": "How Wikipedia Offline Meetings Shape Participants’ Editing Activity: An Empirical Analysis of the German-Language Community",
+            "author": "N. Schwitter",
+            "date": "2024-11-05",
+            "citation": [
+                {
+                    "name": "How offline meetings affect online activities: the case of Wikipedia",
+                    "type": "link",
+                    "src": "https://epjdatascience.springeropen.com/articles/10.1140/epjds/s13688-024-00506-w"
+                }
+            ],
+            "results": [
+                {
+                    "intervention": "Participation in online community offline meetings",
+                    "outcome_variable": "Wikipedia editing activity",
+                    "outcome": "+"
+                }
+            ],
+            "strength": "3",
+            "methodologies": [
+                "DID, Covariate matching"
+            ],
+            "version": "1.0.0",
+            "datasets": [
+                ""
+            ]
+        },
+        "content": "\n## Key Points\n\n- Participation in offline meetings exerts a positive, statistically significant effect on users’ contribution behavior over the short term (1 week), medium term (1 month), and long term (1 year).\n- The magnitude of decline in editing activity among participants is significantly smaller than the decline observed among comparable non-participants.\n- Notably, users attending their first meeting were observed to increase their editing thereafter.\n\n## Background\n\nOpen-source communities and peer-production projects face challenges in long-term sustainability, and offline gatherings are increasingly recognized for promoting community resilience. Although Wikipedia struggles with declining activity and retention of new users, the German-language Wikipedia hosts regular offline meetings. These meetings provide opportunities to form personal ties, and face-to-face interaction is thought to strengthen commitment to the project and reinforce identity.\n\n## Analysis Method\n\n### Dataset\n\n- We combine a comprehensive dataset on informal offline meetings in the German-language Wikipedia community from 2001 to 2020 with large-scale online activity data.\n- The dataset includes information on 4,408 small-scale meetings and 4,013 participating users.\n- All online actions on Wikipedia are recorded, and users’ editing activities are measured from metadata dumps.\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\n- The intervention for this outcome is participation in offline meetings.\n- The analysis examines whether a user attended a meeting, and in particular whether it was their first meeting.\n\n### Dependent Variable\n\n- The outcome variable is the volume of a user’s editing activity on Wikipedia (number of edits).\n- This is measured separately as the total number of edits across all namespaces and edits in the article main namespace.\n- Activity is analyzed over windows of 1 week (7 days), 1 month (28 days), and 1 year (364 days) before and after the meeting.\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- Quasi-experimental approach: We employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) design comparing meeting participants (treatment group) with comparable non-participants selected via matching (control group).\n- Covariate matching: From a pool of non-participants, we construct a control group most similar to participants based on five features (days since registration; cumulative activity in mainspace and outside mainspace from registration to the meeting; and recent activity in mainspace and outside mainspace over the 7-day, 1-month, 2-month, and 1-year periods prior to the meeting). This aims to minimize pre-existing differences between groups.\n- Statistical models: For the binary outcome of resuming activity, we use a multilevel linear probability model (LPM); for changes in activity volume, we use multilevel negative binomial models. Control variables (prior activity level, tenure, administrator status, and meeting year) are included.\n\n## Results\n\n- Compared to the control group, participants’ contributions increased significantly over the short, medium, and long terms.\n- Among users inactive before the meeting, the probability of resuming editing after the meeting increased substantially relative to the control group (e.g., the probability of resuming edits in mainspace rose from 16.7% in the control group to 33.4% among participants).\n- While the control group tended to reduce their editing, the decline among participants was significantly smaller, suggesting that offline interaction helps mitigate the broader decline of online communities.\n- Attending a first meeting showed a particularly strong positive effect, increasing editing activity more than attending other meetings.\n",
+        "raw": "---\nevidence_id: \"09\"\nresults:\n  - intervention: \"Participation in online community offline meetings\"\n    outcome_variable: \"Wikipedia editing activity\"\n    outcome: \"+\"\nstrength: \"3\"\nmethodologies:\n  - \"DID, Covariate matching\"\nversion: \"1.0.0\"\ndatasets:\n  - \"\"\ntitle: \"How Wikipedia Offline Meetings Shape Participants’ Editing Activity: An Empirical Analysis of the German-Language Community\"\ndate: \"2024-11-05\"\n\ncitation:\n  - name: \"How offline meetings affect online activities: the case of Wikipedia\"\n    src: \"https://epjdatascience.springeropen.com/articles/10.1140/epjds/s13688-024-00506-w\"\n    type: \"link\"\nauthor: \"N. Schwitter\"\n---\n\n## Key Points\n\n- Participation in offline meetings exerts a positive, statistically significant effect on users’ contribution behavior over the short term (1 week), medium term (1 month), and long term (1 year).\n- The magnitude of decline in editing activity among participants is significantly smaller than the decline observed among comparable non-participants.\n- Notably, users attending their first meeting were observed to increase their editing thereafter.\n\n## Background\n\nOpen-source communities and peer-production projects face challenges in long-term sustainability, and offline gatherings are increasingly recognized for promoting community resilience. Although Wikipedia struggles with declining activity and retention of new users, the German-language Wikipedia hosts regular offline meetings. These meetings provide opportunities to form personal ties, and face-to-face interaction is thought to strengthen commitment to the project and reinforce identity.\n\n## Analysis Method\n\n### Dataset\n\n- We combine a comprehensive dataset on informal offline meetings in the German-language Wikipedia community from 2001 to 2020 with large-scale online activity data.\n- The dataset includes information on 4,408 small-scale meetings and 4,013 participating users.\n- All online actions on Wikipedia are recorded, and users’ editing activities are measured from metadata dumps.\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\n- The intervention for this outcome is participation in offline meetings.\n- The analysis examines whether a user attended a meeting, and in particular whether it was their first meeting.\n\n### Dependent Variable\n\n- The outcome variable is the volume of a user’s editing activity on Wikipedia (number of edits).\n- This is measured separately as the total number of edits across all namespaces and edits in the article main namespace.\n- Activity is analyzed over windows of 1 week (7 days), 1 month (28 days), and 1 year (364 days) before and after the meeting.\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- Quasi-experimental approach: We employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) design comparing meeting participants (treatment group) with comparable non-participants selected via matching (control group).\n- Covariate matching: From a pool of non-participants, we construct a control group most similar to participants based on five features (days since registration; cumulative activity in mainspace and outside mainspace from registration to the meeting; and recent activity in mainspace and outside mainspace over the 7-day, 1-month, 2-month, and 1-year periods prior to the meeting). This aims to minimize pre-existing differences between groups.\n- Statistical models: For the binary outcome of resuming activity, we use a multilevel linear probability model (LPM); for changes in activity volume, we use multilevel negative binomial models. Control variables (prior activity level, tenure, administrator status, and meeting year) are included.\n\n## Results\n\n- Compared to the control group, participants’ contributions increased significantly over the short, medium, and long terms.\n- Among users inactive before the meeting, the probability of resuming editing after the meeting increased substantially relative to the control group (e.g., the probability of resuming edits in mainspace rose from 16.7% in the control group to 33.4% among participants).\n- While the control group tended to reduce their editing, the decline among participants was significantly smaller, suggesting that offline interaction helps mitigate the broader decline of online communities.\n- Attending a first meeting showed a particularly strong positive effect, increasing editing activity more than attending other meetings.\n"
+    },
+    "08": {
+        "frontmatter": {
+            "evidence_id": "08",
+            "title": "How Platform Owner Entry Affects OSS Contributions by Existing and New Contributors: An Experiment with AWS Elasticsearch",
             "author": "Yuping Li",
             "date": "2024-06-20",
             "citation": [
@@ -464,21 +526,21 @@ export const evidence = {
             "results": [
                 {
                     "intervention": "Platform owner market entry using complementary firm's OSS",
-                    "outcome_variable": "OSS contributions by new contributors",
+                    "outcome_variable": "Overall OSS contributions (existing + new)",
                     "outcome": "+"
                 }
             ],
             "strength": "3",
             "methodologies": [
-                "DID, PSE"
+                "DID"
             ],
             "version": "1.0.0",
             "datasets": [
                 ""
             ]
         },
-        "content": "\n## Key Points\n\nThis study explores how a platform owner’s market entry—by leveraging a complementary firm’s open-source technology—affects the external knowledge sourcing of the complementary firm, focusing on the willingness of GitHub developers to contribute. Using the staggered rollout of Amazon AWS’s Elasticsearch as a natural experiment, the analysis shows that the platform owner’s entry reduces contributions from existing contributors but substantially increases contributions from new contributors, leading to an overall increase in contributions to the open-source technology. This finding provides a new perspective: contrary to common concerns that platform owners’ entry harms open-source startups, from a technology development standpoint, such entry may not necessarily be detrimental.\n\n## Background\n\nNew contributors are individuals who made their first contribution to the open-source project in a given period. Unlike existing contributors, they have no prior investments or ties to the project, and thus hold different reference points. From a prospect theory perspective, it was hypothesized that new contributors may perceive the platform owner’s entry as an opportunity for potential gains—such as enhanced professional reputation or career opportunities through increased visibility of the technology.\n\n## Analysis Method\n\n### Dataset\n\nData was collected from AWS and GitHub. Specifically, AWS official announcements provided information about the date and location of the Amazon Elasticsearch Service launch, while GitHub data provided developers’ contributions to Elasticsearch (contribution volume, personal GitHub experience, popularity, etc.). Commits by Elastic employees were excluded to focus on external developers’ contributions.\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\n- AWS’s market entry with Amazon Elasticsearch Service.\n  - Entry is a dummy variable equal to 1 if AWS entered the country where the contributor resides, and 0 otherwise.\n  - After is a dummy variable equal to 1 if AWS had already entered the contributor’s country during or before a given period, and 0 otherwise.\n  - The interaction term Entry × After was used to measure the treatment effect.\n\n### Dependent Variable\n\n- OSS contributions by new contributors(the number of commits, lines of code changed/added, and files of code changed/added)\n  - Contributions by new contributors were measured as the natural logarithm of the total number of commits by all new contributors in each period.\n  - Additionally, the natural logarithm of the number of new contributors (extensive margin) and the average contribution per new contributor (intensive margin) were measured.\n  - As robustness checks, the natural logarithm of lines of code and files changed/added was also included.\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- AWS’s staggered market entry was treated as a natural experiment and stacked difference-in-differences analysis was applied.\n- The analysis was conducted at the country-week level with 5,635 observations across 16 treatment countries and 13 control countries.\n- Control countries were matched to treatment countries using PSM.\n\n## Results\n\n- The analysis strongly supports the hypothesis that the platform owner’s entry increases contributions by new contributors.\n- On average, the number of commits increased by about 7.27%.\n- This increase was driven by both a rise in the number of new contributors (awareness effect) and an increase in the average contribution per new contributor (reward effect). Moreover, after the platform owner's entry, new contributors tended to show stronger extrinsic motivations, suggesting a selection effect in the types of new contributors.\n",
-        "raw": "---\nevidence_id: \"07\"\nresults:\n  - intervention: \"Platform owner market entry using complementary firm's OSS\"\n    outcome_variable: \"OSS contributions by new contributors\"\n    outcome: \"+\"\nstrength: \"3\"\nmethodologies:\n  - \"DID, PSE\"\nversion: \"1.0.0\"\ndatasets:\n  - \"\"\ntitle: \"How Platform Owner Entry Affects OSS Contributions by New Contributors: An Experiment with AWS Elasticsearch\"\ndate: \"2024-06-20\"\n\ncitation:\n  - name: \"How Platform Owner Entry Affects Open Source Contribution? Evidence from GitHub Developers\"\n    src: \"https://questromworld.bu.edu/platformstrategy/wp-content/uploads/sites/49/2024/06/PlatStrat2024_paper_100.pdf\"\n    type: \"link\"\nauthor: \"Yuping Li\"\n---\n\n## Key Points\n\nThis study explores how a platform owner’s market entry—by leveraging a complementary firm’s open-source technology—affects the external knowledge sourcing of the complementary firm, focusing on the willingness of GitHub developers to contribute. Using the staggered rollout of Amazon AWS’s Elasticsearch as a natural experiment, the analysis shows that the platform owner’s entry reduces contributions from existing contributors but substantially increases contributions from new contributors, leading to an overall increase in contributions to the open-source technology. This finding provides a new perspective: contrary to common concerns that platform owners’ entry harms open-source startups, from a technology development standpoint, such entry may not necessarily be detrimental.\n\n## Background\n\nNew contributors are individuals who made their first contribution to the open-source project in a given period. Unlike existing contributors, they have no prior investments or ties to the project, and thus hold different reference points. From a prospect theory perspective, it was hypothesized that new contributors may perceive the platform owner’s entry as an opportunity for potential gains—such as enhanced professional reputation or career opportunities through increased visibility of the technology.\n\n## Analysis Method\n\n### Dataset\n\nData was collected from AWS and GitHub. Specifically, AWS official announcements provided information about the date and location of the Amazon Elasticsearch Service launch, while GitHub data provided developers’ contributions to Elasticsearch (contribution volume, personal GitHub experience, popularity, etc.). Commits by Elastic employees were excluded to focus on external developers’ contributions.\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\n- AWS’s market entry with Amazon Elasticsearch Service.\n  - Entry is a dummy variable equal to 1 if AWS entered the country where the contributor resides, and 0 otherwise.\n  - After is a dummy variable equal to 1 if AWS had already entered the contributor’s country during or before a given period, and 0 otherwise.\n  - The interaction term Entry × After was used to measure the treatment effect.\n\n### Dependent Variable\n\n- OSS contributions by new contributors(the number of commits, lines of code changed/added, and files of code changed/added)\n  - Contributions by new contributors were measured as the natural logarithm of the total number of commits by all new contributors in each period.\n  - Additionally, the natural logarithm of the number of new contributors (extensive margin) and the average contribution per new contributor (intensive margin) were measured.\n  - As robustness checks, the natural logarithm of lines of code and files changed/added was also included.\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- AWS’s staggered market entry was treated as a natural experiment and stacked difference-in-differences analysis was applied.\n- The analysis was conducted at the country-week level with 5,635 observations across 16 treatment countries and 13 control countries.\n- Control countries were matched to treatment countries using PSM.\n\n## Results\n\n- The analysis strongly supports the hypothesis that the platform owner’s entry increases contributions by new contributors.\n- On average, the number of commits increased by about 7.27%.\n- This increase was driven by both a rise in the number of new contributors (awareness effect) and an increase in the average contribution per new contributor (reward effect). Moreover, after the platform owner's entry, new contributors tended to show stronger extrinsic motivations, suggesting a selection effect in the types of new contributors.\n"
+        "content": "\n## Key Points\n\nThis study explores how a platform owner’s market entry—by leveraging a complementary firm’s open-source technology—affects the external knowledge sourcing of the complementary firm, focusing on the willingness of GitHub developers to contribute. Using the staggered rollout of Amazon AWS’s Elasticsearch as a natural experiment, the analysis shows that the platform owner’s entry reduces contributions from existing contributors but substantially increases contributions from new contributors, leading to an overall increase in contributions to the open-source technology. This finding provides a new perspective: contrary to common concerns that platform owners’ entry harms open-source startups, from a technology development standpoint, such entry may not necessarily be detrimental.\n\n## Background\n\nGiven the opposing effects of reduced contributions by existing contributors and increased contributions by new contributors, it was an important question to assess how the platform owner’s entry affects total contributions to the open-source project.\n\n## Analysis Method\n\n### Dataset\n\nWeekly contributions from all cloud developers were aggregated at the country level and analyzed at the country-week level.\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\n- AWS’s market entry with Amazon Elasticsearch Service.\n  - Entry is a dummy variable equal to 1 if AWS entered the country where the contributor resides, and 0 otherwise.\n  - After is a dummy variable equal to 1 if AWS had already entered the contributor’s country during or before a given period, and 0 otherwise.\n  - The interaction term Entry × After was used to measure the treatment effect.\n\n### Dependent Variable\n\n- Overall OSS contributions by combining both existing and new contributors(the number of commits, lines of code changed/added, and files of code changed/added)\n  - Overall contributions were measured as the natural logarithm of the total number of commits by all contributors.\n  - Robustness checks also included the natural logarithm of lines of code and files changed/added.\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- After aggregating data from both existing and new contributors, stacked difference-in-differences analysis was applied at the country-week level.\n\n## Results\n\n- The analysis shows that the platform owner’s entry increases overall contributions to the open-source software project by cloud developers.\n- This result suggests that, contrary to concerns that platform owners' entry harms open-source startups or communities, such entry may actually enhance the complementary firm's ability to attract external knowledge contributions.\n",
+        "raw": "---\nevidence_id: \"08\"\nresults:\n  - intervention: \"Platform owner market entry using complementary firm's OSS\"\n    outcome_variable: \"Overall OSS contributions (existing + new)\"\n    outcome: \"+\"\nstrength: \"3\"\nmethodologies:\n  - \"DID\"\nversion: \"1.0.0\"\ndatasets:\n  - \"\"\ntitle: \"How Platform Owner Entry Affects OSS Contributions by Existing and New Contributors: An Experiment with AWS Elasticsearch\"\ndate: \"2024-06-20\"\n\ncitation:\n  - name: \"How Platform Owner Entry Affects Open Source Contribution? Evidence from GitHub Developers\"\n    src: \"https://questromworld.bu.edu/platformstrategy/wp-content/uploads/sites/49/2024/06/PlatStrat2024_paper_100.pdf\"\n    type: \"link\"\nauthor: \"Yuping Li\"\n---\n\n## Key Points\n\nThis study explores how a platform owner’s market entry—by leveraging a complementary firm’s open-source technology—affects the external knowledge sourcing of the complementary firm, focusing on the willingness of GitHub developers to contribute. Using the staggered rollout of Amazon AWS’s Elasticsearch as a natural experiment, the analysis shows that the platform owner’s entry reduces contributions from existing contributors but substantially increases contributions from new contributors, leading to an overall increase in contributions to the open-source technology. This finding provides a new perspective: contrary to common concerns that platform owners’ entry harms open-source startups, from a technology development standpoint, such entry may not necessarily be detrimental.\n\n## Background\n\nGiven the opposing effects of reduced contributions by existing contributors and increased contributions by new contributors, it was an important question to assess how the platform owner’s entry affects total contributions to the open-source project.\n\n## Analysis Method\n\n### Dataset\n\nWeekly contributions from all cloud developers were aggregated at the country level and analyzed at the country-week level.\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\n- AWS’s market entry with Amazon Elasticsearch Service.\n  - Entry is a dummy variable equal to 1 if AWS entered the country where the contributor resides, and 0 otherwise.\n  - After is a dummy variable equal to 1 if AWS had already entered the contributor’s country during or before a given period, and 0 otherwise.\n  - The interaction term Entry × After was used to measure the treatment effect.\n\n### Dependent Variable\n\n- Overall OSS contributions by combining both existing and new contributors(the number of commits, lines of code changed/added, and files of code changed/added)\n  - Overall contributions were measured as the natural logarithm of the total number of commits by all contributors.\n  - Robustness checks also included the natural logarithm of lines of code and files changed/added.\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- After aggregating data from both existing and new contributors, stacked difference-in-differences analysis was applied at the country-week level.\n\n## Results\n\n- The analysis shows that the platform owner’s entry increases overall contributions to the open-source software project by cloud developers.\n- This result suggests that, contrary to concerns that platform owners' entry harms open-source startups or communities, such entry may actually enhance the complementary firm's ability to attract external knowledge contributions.\n"
     },
     "01": {
         "frontmatter": {
@@ -515,10 +577,10 @@ export const evidence = {
         "content": "\n## Key Points\n\nThe LocalWiki project saw significant progress during a single-day event, with 633 pages edited, 100 maps added, and 138 new photos uploaded.\n\n## Background\n\nCode for America (CfA) is a nonprofit organization based in San Francisco, with a mission to make city governments more efficient, transparent, and responsive to resident needs through technology.\n\nEach year, CfA organizes a fellowship program in which small teams of selected programmers, designers, and other technologists partner with local governments to build web and mobile applications that address community issues.\n\nHowever, in Fall 2011, CfA faced two major challenges:\n\n1. There was a lack of infrastructure to coordinate and manage volunteer contributions from outside the organization. Despite receiving over 550 fellowship applications and having more than 10,000 fans and followers on social media—an “enthusiasm surplus”—CfA was unable to effectively leverage this support.\n\n2. While CfA planned to significantly expand the fellowship program over the next 3–5 years, the current program structure was seen as unsuitable for scaling to smaller cities and towns.\n\nTo address these challenges, the foundation for a new initiative, “CFA Everywhere,” was laid in Fall 2011 as a class project in UC Berkeley’s ISSD course. The proposal received funding in early 2012 and was renamed Code for America Brigade, inspired by fire brigades, with the goal of transforming isolated civic hacker efforts into a broader, integrated movement. It aimed to be an open-source platform connecting CfA’s activities with the wider civic hacker community.\n\n## Analysis Methods\n\n### Dataset\n\n- Interview Data:\n  - Volunteers in open source development projects: Interviews were conducted with volunteers involved in both technical (open source development, hackathons) and non-technical (e.g., Habitat for Humanity) projects.\n  - Code for America fellows and staff: Interviews were conducted during the project's early stages.\n\n- Social Network Data:\n  - CfA fellowship applicants and Twitter followers: Analyzed to understand their skills and interests.\n  - Twitter stream data: Live tweets using the #codeacross hashtag during the “Code Across America” events and post-event tweets were used to generate a world map of activity.\n\n- Event Participant Data:\n  - Code Across America hackathon surveys: Surveys were developed and used to gather participant intentions and feedback.\n\n- Site Usage Data:\n  - Google Analytics: Provided insights on Brigade site traffic, visitor count, time-on-site, page views, bounce rates, return visitor ratios, and referrers.\n\n- User Feedback Data:\n  - Unofficial feedback: Gathered from users via the Brigade mailing list and other channels after launch.\n  - Official surveys: A brief open-ended survey was conducted after the launch of Brigade v.1 to collect user experience feedback from registered users.\n\n### Preliminary Research and Insight Extraction:\n\n- **Open Source Development Interviews**: Found that the top motivator for volunteers was “becoming part of a community of people with shared interests,” leading to the insight that the platform should be designed not as a project management tool but as a community organizing platform.\n- **Social Network Analysis**: Revealed that many CfA followers and applicants were interested in non-coding skills such as graphic design, UX, project management, and community work, indicating the platform should be designed not only for developers but for a diverse range of volunteers.\n- **Fellow and Staff Interviews**: Highlighted that CfA staff lacked bandwidth to manage external projects, leading to the insight that CfA should act as a “catalyst for unleashing the potential of supporters nationwide,” focusing on enabling self-organization and resource sharing.\n\n### Shift to Lean Startup and Agile Development:\n\n- Transitioning from an academic proposal to an actual development project required defining the requirements of a Lean Startup-style Minimum Viable Product (MVP).\n- Agile Inception Event: Held at the CfA office in January 2012, where stakeholders gathered to define MVP “user stories” using index card brainstorming and dot-voting techniques.\n\n### Post-Launch Evaluation and Improvements:\n\n- Analysis of Unofficial Feedback: Post-launch feedback helped identify areas for improvement (e.g., lack of content, unclear app status, absence of editing tools).\n- User Survey Analysis: Open-ended responses from a five-question survey were manually parsed, categorized, and visualized in bar charts. Key findings included user excitement about connecting with others, the need for better support for collaboration, and demands for documentation, case studies, and tutorials.\n- Google Analytics Analysis: Tracked post-launch traffic and engagement, revealing that most traffic was direct and engagement was low (approx. 90% stayed less than five minutes, 85% had fewer than five return visits).\n\n## Result\n\n- **Platform Status at Launch**:\n  - brigade.codeforamerica.org hosted 9 reusable civic apps and provided links and instructions for deploying local instances.\n  - Over 250 registered users, more than 80 locations, and approximately 40 Brigades were formed.\n  - MVP features included sign-up via email or GitHub, profile creation, joining/starting Brigades, viewing apps, Brigades, people, and location detail pages, submitting/viewing challenges, and sharing via social media.\n  - Based on an open design strategy—“don’t reinvent the wheel” and “don’t monopolize user interactions”—the platform integrated with third-party APIs like Civic Commons and Gravatar and recommended using existing tools like Google Groups.\n  - Brigades were designed as purely virtual associations, allowing users to freely form groups, though this information architecture proved confusing for new users.\n  - The app deployment checklist was simplified from its original concept due to documentation gaps and varied deployment processes, leading to increased burden on administrators.\n\n- **Launch and Early Impact at SXSW**:\n  - On March 14, 2012, the Brigade platform officially launched during the SXSW Interactive keynote.\n  - The launch was a significant success, with over 120 users from 45 locations signing up within the first 24 hours.\n  - The February “Code Across America” hackathon series spanned 16 cities, boosting existing civic tech projects. For example, in Raleigh, NC, the LocalWiki project saw ~50 volunteers contribute 633 page edits, 100 maps, and 138 new photos—nearly doubling six months’ worth of progress in a single day. The events also helped forge connections among civic technologists across cities and build a support community around open source software.\n\n- **Initial Feedback and Challenges**:\n  - Unofficial user feedback pointed out content gaps, unclear distinctions between \"deployable\" and \"deployed\" apps, and a lack of editing functionality.\n  - Most communication between Brigade staff and civic hackers continued through offline channels such as email, conference calls, and Google Hangouts—useful for forming new relationships, identifying partners, and addressing urgent issues. The Brigade director noted that during early platform development, staff were expected to bridge functionality gaps through direct interaction.\n  - The site wasn’t always the main driver of community activity. Instead, it functioned more as a symbolic record of connections between people, places, and projects.\n  - Notable challenges included the lack of task tracking (relying only on GitHub links) and inadequate support for outreach and organization by fledgling Brigades.\n\n- **Brigade v.1 Updates**:\n  - A site design update was deployed in early April 2012.\n  - Navigation was clarified and restructured around “Applications,” “Brigades,” and “People.”\n  - Due to resource constraints, the “Challenges” feature was temporarily shelved.\n  - Informational content was added to explain site terminology (apps, deploy, Brigade).\n  - A new “status” column was added to the list of deployed apps to better indicate progress.\n\n- **Survey and Google Analytics Evaluation**:\n  - Survey results showed that civic hackers were excited to connect via the platform but also desired more connection support (e.g., communication tools, wiki spaces, mailing list features).\n  - Feature limitations were found to contribute to reduced engagement among some users.\n  - High demand was expressed for content expansions like case studies, tutorials, and wiki/forum features.\n  - Google Analytics showed a major spike in traffic during the SXSW launch, followed by a slowdown and relatively low user engagement (short visit times, low repeat visits). There was also room for improvement in social media referrals.\n\nBased on these findings, recommendations for Brigade v.2 included enabling user-generated content (e.g., wiki-style app “recipes,” technical updates), enhancing content discovery via location-based features (e.g., Brigade maps, filtering by people), increasing visibility of social sharing features, and launching a Brigade blog.\n",
         "raw": "---\nevidence_id: \"01\"\nresults:\n  - intervention: \"Construction and deployment of civic tech community\"\n    outcome_variable: \"Momentum in civic tech projects\"\n    outcome: \"+-\"\nstrength: \"0\"\nmethodologies:\n  - \"Interview, Survey, Google Analitics\"\nversion: \"1.0.0\"\ndatasets:\n  - \"Interview, Survey, Google Analitics\"\ntitle: \"Effect of Code for America Brigade for momentum of OSS activity\"\ndate: \"2016-10-07\"\ntags:\n  - \"oss\"\ncitation:\n  - name: \"Code for America Brigade: Connecting People, Places, and Apps within the Civic Hacker Community\"\n    src: \"https://www.ischool.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/student_projects/karimcglynn_codeforamericabrigade_finalreport.pdf\"\n    type: \"link\"\nauthor: \"Karim McGlynn\"\n---\n\n## Key Points\n\nThe LocalWiki project saw significant progress during a single-day event, with 633 pages edited, 100 maps added, and 138 new photos uploaded.\n\n## Background\n\nCode for America (CfA) is a nonprofit organization based in San Francisco, with a mission to make city governments more efficient, transparent, and responsive to resident needs through technology.\n\nEach year, CfA organizes a fellowship program in which small teams of selected programmers, designers, and other technologists partner with local governments to build web and mobile applications that address community issues.\n\nHowever, in Fall 2011, CfA faced two major challenges:\n\n1. There was a lack of infrastructure to coordinate and manage volunteer contributions from outside the organization. Despite receiving over 550 fellowship applications and having more than 10,000 fans and followers on social media—an “enthusiasm surplus”—CfA was unable to effectively leverage this support.\n\n2. While CfA planned to significantly expand the fellowship program over the next 3–5 years, the current program structure was seen as unsuitable for scaling to smaller cities and towns.\n\nTo address these challenges, the foundation for a new initiative, “CFA Everywhere,” was laid in Fall 2011 as a class project in UC Berkeley’s ISSD course. The proposal received funding in early 2012 and was renamed Code for America Brigade, inspired by fire brigades, with the goal of transforming isolated civic hacker efforts into a broader, integrated movement. It aimed to be an open-source platform connecting CfA’s activities with the wider civic hacker community.\n\n## Analysis Methods\n\n### Dataset\n\n- Interview Data:\n  - Volunteers in open source development projects: Interviews were conducted with volunteers involved in both technical (open source development, hackathons) and non-technical (e.g., Habitat for Humanity) projects.\n  - Code for America fellows and staff: Interviews were conducted during the project's early stages.\n\n- Social Network Data:\n  - CfA fellowship applicants and Twitter followers: Analyzed to understand their skills and interests.\n  - Twitter stream data: Live tweets using the #codeacross hashtag during the “Code Across America” events and post-event tweets were used to generate a world map of activity.\n\n- Event Participant Data:\n  - Code Across America hackathon surveys: Surveys were developed and used to gather participant intentions and feedback.\n\n- Site Usage Data:\n  - Google Analytics: Provided insights on Brigade site traffic, visitor count, time-on-site, page views, bounce rates, return visitor ratios, and referrers.\n\n- User Feedback Data:\n  - Unofficial feedback: Gathered from users via the Brigade mailing list and other channels after launch.\n  - Official surveys: A brief open-ended survey was conducted after the launch of Brigade v.1 to collect user experience feedback from registered users.\n\n### Preliminary Research and Insight Extraction:\n\n- **Open Source Development Interviews**: Found that the top motivator for volunteers was “becoming part of a community of people with shared interests,” leading to the insight that the platform should be designed not as a project management tool but as a community organizing platform.\n- **Social Network Analysis**: Revealed that many CfA followers and applicants were interested in non-coding skills such as graphic design, UX, project management, and community work, indicating the platform should be designed not only for developers but for a diverse range of volunteers.\n- **Fellow and Staff Interviews**: Highlighted that CfA staff lacked bandwidth to manage external projects, leading to the insight that CfA should act as a “catalyst for unleashing the potential of supporters nationwide,” focusing on enabling self-organization and resource sharing.\n\n### Shift to Lean Startup and Agile Development:\n\n- Transitioning from an academic proposal to an actual development project required defining the requirements of a Lean Startup-style Minimum Viable Product (MVP).\n- Agile Inception Event: Held at the CfA office in January 2012, where stakeholders gathered to define MVP “user stories” using index card brainstorming and dot-voting techniques.\n\n### Post-Launch Evaluation and Improvements:\n\n- Analysis of Unofficial Feedback: Post-launch feedback helped identify areas for improvement (e.g., lack of content, unclear app status, absence of editing tools).\n- User Survey Analysis: Open-ended responses from a five-question survey were manually parsed, categorized, and visualized in bar charts. Key findings included user excitement about connecting with others, the need for better support for collaboration, and demands for documentation, case studies, and tutorials.\n- Google Analytics Analysis: Tracked post-launch traffic and engagement, revealing that most traffic was direct and engagement was low (approx. 90% stayed less than five minutes, 85% had fewer than five return visits).\n\n## Result\n\n- **Platform Status at Launch**:\n  - brigade.codeforamerica.org hosted 9 reusable civic apps and provided links and instructions for deploying local instances.\n  - Over 250 registered users, more than 80 locations, and approximately 40 Brigades were formed.\n  - MVP features included sign-up via email or GitHub, profile creation, joining/starting Brigades, viewing apps, Brigades, people, and location detail pages, submitting/viewing challenges, and sharing via social media.\n  - Based on an open design strategy—“don’t reinvent the wheel” and “don’t monopolize user interactions”—the platform integrated with third-party APIs like Civic Commons and Gravatar and recommended using existing tools like Google Groups.\n  - Brigades were designed as purely virtual associations, allowing users to freely form groups, though this information architecture proved confusing for new users.\n  - The app deployment checklist was simplified from its original concept due to documentation gaps and varied deployment processes, leading to increased burden on administrators.\n\n- **Launch and Early Impact at SXSW**:\n  - On March 14, 2012, the Brigade platform officially launched during the SXSW Interactive keynote.\n  - The launch was a significant success, with over 120 users from 45 locations signing up within the first 24 hours.\n  - The February “Code Across America” hackathon series spanned 16 cities, boosting existing civic tech projects. For example, in Raleigh, NC, the LocalWiki project saw ~50 volunteers contribute 633 page edits, 100 maps, and 138 new photos—nearly doubling six months’ worth of progress in a single day. The events also helped forge connections among civic technologists across cities and build a support community around open source software.\n\n- **Initial Feedback and Challenges**:\n  - Unofficial user feedback pointed out content gaps, unclear distinctions between \"deployable\" and \"deployed\" apps, and a lack of editing functionality.\n  - Most communication between Brigade staff and civic hackers continued through offline channels such as email, conference calls, and Google Hangouts—useful for forming new relationships, identifying partners, and addressing urgent issues. The Brigade director noted that during early platform development, staff were expected to bridge functionality gaps through direct interaction.\n  - The site wasn’t always the main driver of community activity. Instead, it functioned more as a symbolic record of connections between people, places, and projects.\n  - Notable challenges included the lack of task tracking (relying only on GitHub links) and inadequate support for outreach and organization by fledgling Brigades.\n\n- **Brigade v.1 Updates**:\n  - A site design update was deployed in early April 2012.\n  - Navigation was clarified and restructured around “Applications,” “Brigades,” and “People.”\n  - Due to resource constraints, the “Challenges” feature was temporarily shelved.\n  - Informational content was added to explain site terminology (apps, deploy, Brigade).\n  - A new “status” column was added to the list of deployed apps to better indicate progress.\n\n- **Survey and Google Analytics Evaluation**:\n  - Survey results showed that civic hackers were excited to connect via the platform but also desired more connection support (e.g., communication tools, wiki spaces, mailing list features).\n  - Feature limitations were found to contribute to reduced engagement among some users.\n  - High demand was expressed for content expansions like case studies, tutorials, and wiki/forum features.\n  - Google Analytics showed a major spike in traffic during the SXSW launch, followed by a slowdown and relatively low user engagement (short visit times, low repeat visits). There was also room for improvement in social media referrals.\n\nBased on these findings, recommendations for Brigade v.2 included enabling user-generated content (e.g., wiki-style app “recipes,” technical updates), enhancing content discovery via location-based features (e.g., Brigade maps, filtering by people), increasing visibility of social sharing features, and launching a Brigade blog.\n"
     },
-    "06": {
+    "07": {
         "frontmatter": {
-            "evidence_id": "06",
-            "title": "How Platform Owner Entry Affects OSS Contributions by Existing Contributors: An Experiment with AWS Elasticsearch",
+            "evidence_id": "07",
+            "title": "How Platform Owner Entry Affects OSS Contributions by New Contributors: An Experiment with AWS Elasticsearch",
             "author": "Yuping Li",
             "date": "2024-06-20",
             "citation": [
@@ -531,8 +593,8 @@ export const evidence = {
             "results": [
                 {
                     "intervention": "Platform owner market entry using complementary firm's OSS",
-                    "outcome_variable": "OSS contributions by existing contributors",
-                    "outcome": "-"
+                    "outcome_variable": "OSS contributions by new contributors",
+                    "outcome": "+"
                 }
             ],
             "strength": "3",
@@ -544,105 +606,43 @@ export const evidence = {
                 ""
             ]
         },
-        "content": "\n## Key Points\n\nThis study explores how a platform owner’s market entry—by leveraging a complementary firm’s open-source technology—affects the external knowledge sourcing of the complementary firm, focusing on the willingness of GitHub developers to contribute. Using the staggered rollout of Amazon AWS’s Elasticsearch as a natural experiment, the analysis shows that the platform owner’s entry reduces contributions from existing contributors but substantially increases contributions from new contributors, leading to an overall increase in contributions to the open-source technology. This finding provides a new perspective: contrary to common concerns that platform owners’ entry harms open-source startups, from a technology development standpoint, such entry may not necessarily be detrimental.\n\n## Background\n\nExisting contributors are individuals who had begun contributing to the complementary firm’s open-source project before the platform owner’s entry. Based on prospect theory, they are likely to perceive strong potential losses to their existing “endowments,” such as their commitment to open-source philosophy, community interactions, and established reputation, as a result of the platform owner’s entry. Thus, it was hypothesized that they might reduce their involvement due to concerns about their contributions being exploited by the platform owner and about threats to community sustainability.\n\n## Analysis Method\n\n### Dataset\n\nData was collected from AWS and GitHub. Specifically, AWS official announcements provided information about the date and location of the Amazon Elasticsearch Service launch, while GitHub data provided developers’ contributions to Elasticsearch (contribution volume, personal GitHub experience, popularity, etc.). Commits by Elastic employees were excluded to focus on external developers’ contributions.\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\n- AWS’s market entry with Amazon Elasticsearch Service.\n  - Entry is a dummy variable equal to 1 if AWS entered the country where the contributor resides, and 0 otherwise.\n  - After is a dummy variable equal to 1 if AWS had already entered the contributor’s country during or before a given period, and 0 otherwise.\n  - The interaction term Entry × After was used to measure the treatment effect.\n\n### Dependent Variable\n\n- OSS contributions by existing contributors(the number of commits, lines of code changed/added, and files of code changed/added)\n  - Contributions by existing contributors were measured as the natural logarithm of the number of commits to Elasticsearch.\n  - As robustness checks, the natural logarithm of lines of code changed/added and files changed/added were also used.\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- AWS’s staggered introduction of managed Elasticsearch services across countries/regions was treated as a natural experiment, and stacked difference-in-differences analysis was applied.\n- This method addresses the “forbidden comparison problem” in staggered interventions and strengthens analytical robustness.\n- The treatment group consisted of contributors in countries where AWS launched Elasticsearch services; the control group consisted of contributors in countries where AWS had not yet launched or never launched the service.\n- Propensity score matching (PSM) was used to align contributors across groups. The analysis was conducted at the contributor-week level, with 110,249 observations across 459 contributors.\n\n## Results\n\n- The analysis provides empirical evidence that the platform owner’s entry reduces contributions by existing contributors.\n- On average, the number of commits decreased by about 4.33%. Notably, contributors with stronger intrinsic motivations reduced their contributions more sharply after the platform owner’s entry, while contributors with stronger extrinsic motivations showed a significantly smaller decline.\n- These results support the prospect theory–based hypothesis that existing contributors decrease participation due to concerns over losses to their \"endowments,\" such as community attachment and identity.\n",
-        "raw": "---\nevidence_id: \"06\"\nresults:\n  - intervention: \"Platform owner market entry using complementary firm's OSS\"\n    outcome_variable: \"OSS contributions by existing contributors\"\n    outcome: \"-\"\nstrength: \"3\"\nmethodologies:\n  - \"DID, PSE\"\nversion: \"1.0.0\"\ndatasets:\n  - \"\"\ntitle: \"How Platform Owner Entry Affects OSS Contributions by Existing Contributors: An Experiment with AWS Elasticsearch\"\ndate: \"2024-06-20\"\n\ncitation:\n  - name: \"How Platform Owner Entry Affects Open Source Contribution? Evidence from GitHub Developers\"\n    src: \"https://questromworld.bu.edu/platformstrategy/wp-content/uploads/sites/49/2024/06/PlatStrat2024_paper_100.pdf\"\n    type: \"link\"\nauthor: \"Yuping Li\"\n---\n\n## Key Points\n\nThis study explores how a platform owner’s market entry—by leveraging a complementary firm’s open-source technology—affects the external knowledge sourcing of the complementary firm, focusing on the willingness of GitHub developers to contribute. Using the staggered rollout of Amazon AWS’s Elasticsearch as a natural experiment, the analysis shows that the platform owner’s entry reduces contributions from existing contributors but substantially increases contributions from new contributors, leading to an overall increase in contributions to the open-source technology. This finding provides a new perspective: contrary to common concerns that platform owners’ entry harms open-source startups, from a technology development standpoint, such entry may not necessarily be detrimental.\n\n## Background\n\nExisting contributors are individuals who had begun contributing to the complementary firm’s open-source project before the platform owner’s entry. Based on prospect theory, they are likely to perceive strong potential losses to their existing “endowments,” such as their commitment to open-source philosophy, community interactions, and established reputation, as a result of the platform owner’s entry. Thus, it was hypothesized that they might reduce their involvement due to concerns about their contributions being exploited by the platform owner and about threats to community sustainability.\n\n## Analysis Method\n\n### Dataset\n\nData was collected from AWS and GitHub. Specifically, AWS official announcements provided information about the date and location of the Amazon Elasticsearch Service launch, while GitHub data provided developers’ contributions to Elasticsearch (contribution volume, personal GitHub experience, popularity, etc.). Commits by Elastic employees were excluded to focus on external developers’ contributions.\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\n- AWS’s market entry with Amazon Elasticsearch Service.\n  - Entry is a dummy variable equal to 1 if AWS entered the country where the contributor resides, and 0 otherwise.\n  - After is a dummy variable equal to 1 if AWS had already entered the contributor’s country during or before a given period, and 0 otherwise.\n  - The interaction term Entry × After was used to measure the treatment effect.\n\n### Dependent Variable\n\n- OSS contributions by existing contributors(the number of commits, lines of code changed/added, and files of code changed/added)\n  - Contributions by existing contributors were measured as the natural logarithm of the number of commits to Elasticsearch.\n  - As robustness checks, the natural logarithm of lines of code changed/added and files changed/added were also used.\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- AWS’s staggered introduction of managed Elasticsearch services across countries/regions was treated as a natural experiment, and stacked difference-in-differences analysis was applied.\n- This method addresses the “forbidden comparison problem” in staggered interventions and strengthens analytical robustness.\n- The treatment group consisted of contributors in countries where AWS launched Elasticsearch services; the control group consisted of contributors in countries where AWS had not yet launched or never launched the service.\n- Propensity score matching (PSM) was used to align contributors across groups. The analysis was conducted at the contributor-week level, with 110,249 observations across 459 contributors.\n\n## Results\n\n- The analysis provides empirical evidence that the platform owner’s entry reduces contributions by existing contributors.\n- On average, the number of commits decreased by about 4.33%. Notably, contributors with stronger intrinsic motivations reduced their contributions more sharply after the platform owner’s entry, while contributors with stronger extrinsic motivations showed a significantly smaller decline.\n- These results support the prospect theory–based hypothesis that existing contributors decrease participation due to concerns over losses to their \"endowments,\" such as community attachment and identity.\n"
-    },
-    "04": {
-        "frontmatter": {
-            "evidence_id": "04",
-            "title": "SuperStacks increase TVL",
-            "author": "Optimism Collective",
-            "date": "2025-08-15",
-            "citation": [
-                {
-                    "name": "SuperStacks Impact Analysis - Accountability",
-                    "type": "link",
-                    "src": "https://gov.optimism.io/t/superstacks-impact-analysis/10225"
-                }
-            ],
-            "results": [
-                {
-                    "intervention": "DeFi liquidity program with supply-side and demand-side incentives",
-                    "outcome_variable": "Growth and retention of TVL",
-                    "outcome": "+"
-                }
-            ],
-            "strength": "3",
-            "methodologies": [
-                "Pro-rata model, One-sided t-tests"
-            ],
-            "version": "1.0.0"
-        },
-        "content": "\n## Key Points\n\n- The SuperStacks program achieved **$58.0M in net TVL inflows** during its implementation period, with **$53.7M retained 30 days after the program concluded**. This translates to **$23.2/OP and $21.5/OP** after costs, respectively.\n- Findings supported the theory that strong demand-side activity can lift post-incentive equilibrium levels, though a more rigorous analysis is still needed.\n- **Incentivized lending pools generally demonstrated higher liquidity retention**.\n- However, TVL retention in DEXs appeared **inflated by Uniswap's concurrent Gauntlet campaign**. Specifically, when the two co-incentivized DEX pools were excluded, retained TVL inflows dropped to $48.2M, revealing a significant divergence between the lending and DEX verticals.\n- Metrics for measuring demand-side traction included trading volume per TVL for DEX pools and utilization rate for lending pools. For DEX pools, a moderate correlation was observed between peak net TVL inflows and trading volume per TVL, hinting at possible synergistic effects.\n- A key limitation was that isolating the program's causal effect alone was extremely difficult due to numerous confounding variables, such as external co-incentives and broader market volatility.\n\n## Background\n\nSuperStacks was the **Optimism Foundation's first proactive DeFi incentive pilot program**. It was designed with the goal of **increasing liquidity for interoperable assets (e.g., USD₮0) across the Superchain**. At its core, the program aimed to help these assets overcome the cold start problem and **test new mechanisms for establishing sustainable DeFi growth loops**.\n\nThe program's design was based on a theoretical framework suggesting that a two-pronged approach, focusing on both supply-side and demand-side activity, could initiate a sustainable flywheel effect for interoperable assets on the Superchain, ultimately catalyzing lasting liquidity growth.\n\nThis theory is broken down into three phases:\n\n1.  **Supply-Side Growth**: Available incentives attract deposits into DEX pools, which creates deeper liquidity and improves the execution quality for trades. On the lending side, an increase in lending supply reduces the borrow rate.\n2.  **Demand-Side Growth**: Improved trading conditions draw in more trades that are routed through the incentivized DEX pools, which increases trading volumes and generates more fees for LPs. Similarly, more competitive borrow rates attract more borrowers, which raises utilization rates and generates a higher yield for lenders.\n3.  **Sustainable Traction**: Once incentives are switched off, a portion of the TVL (Total Value Locked) and net liquidity leaves the incentivized pools, but due to higher fee and yield generation for LPs and lenders, liquidity settles at higher baseline levels compared to the pre-incentives period.\n\n## Analysis Method\n\n### Dataset\n\nThe datasets and methods used for the SuperStacks analysis were:\n\n- Period: 76-day incentive period (April 16 – June 30) and a 30-day retention evaluation period after program end (through July 30).\n- Data sources: 25 pools and vaults targeted by SuperStacks incentives.\n- Metrics:\n  - TVL (Total Value Locked): Net TVL inflows during the program and retained inflows after program end.\n  - Trading volume: Indicator of demand-side activity in DEX pools.\n  - Utilization: Indicator of demand-side activity in lending pools.\n  - Cost efficiency: Net TVL inflows per OP token ($/OP).\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\nSuperStacks Program:\n\nSuperStacks was the Optimism Foundation’s first attempt at a “proactive DeFi incentive,” designed as a pilot program to increase liquidity of interoperable assets across the Superchain. The program was built on a two-pronged approach targeting both supply-side and demand-side activities. Specifically, incentives were provided to encourage supply-side actions (deposits into DEX pools, increased lending supply), which in turn aimed to stimulate demand-side activities (higher trading volume, increased utilization).\n\n### Dependent Variable\n\nGrowth and retention of TVL (Total Value Locked): Measuring both the increase in TVL through incentives and the extent to which that TVL was maintained after incentives ended. The analysis centered on “retained TVL inflows.”\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- A pro-rata model was applied to disentangle the complexity of overlapping incentive programs, attributing impact based on each program’s share of total USD incentives.\n- To evaluate pool-level performance, incentivized pools (treatment group) were paired with comparable non-incentivized pools (control group) on the same chain and protocol. One-sided t-tests were conducted on changes in TVL and trading volume.\n- The analysis focused on DEX pools (9 pairs) that passed statistical filtering.\n\n## Results\n\n- Overall TVL Inflow and Retention:\n  - During the program, the SuperStacks initiative achieved $58M in net TVL inflows, with $53.7M retained 30 days after the program ended.\n  - Considering costs, this corresponds to $23.2 net TVL per 1 OP during the program, and $21.5 per 1 OP after the program.\n  - Across all incentivized pools and vaults, $87.7M of TVL was retained 30 days after incentives ended.\n  - Net TVL inflows peaked before the program ended, at $15.7M in DEXs and $70M in lending markets.\n- DEX vs. Lending Markets:\n  - Of the net TVL inflows during the program, DEXs accounted for 31.6% and lending markets 68.4%.\n  - Lending markets showed stronger liquidity retention compared to DEXs. Lending pools, especially deposit-only vaults such as Morpho’s, often showed growth.\n  - DEX TVL retention appeared inflated by concurrent incentive programs run by the Uniswap Foundation and Gauntlet. Excluding the two DEX pools covered by these joint incentives, retained TVL inflows fell to $48.2M, revealing a notable divergence between lending and DEX outcomes.\n",
-        "raw": "---\nevidence_id: \"04\"\nresults:\n  - intervention: \"DeFi liquidity program with supply-side and demand-side incentives\"\n    outcome_variable: \"Growth and retention of TVL\"\n    outcome: \"+\"\nstrength: \"3\"\nmethodologies:\n  - \"Pro-rata model, One-sided t-tests\"\nversion: \"1.0.0\"\ntitle: \"SuperStacks increase TVL\"\ndate: \"2025-08-15\"\ncitation:\n  - name: \"SuperStacks Impact Analysis - Accountability\"\n    src: \"https://gov.optimism.io/t/superstacks-impact-analysis/10225\"\n    type: \"link\"\nauthor: \"Optimism Collective\"\n---\n\n## Key Points\n\n- The SuperStacks program achieved **$58.0M in net TVL inflows** during its implementation period, with **$53.7M retained 30 days after the program concluded**. This translates to **$23.2/OP and $21.5/OP** after costs, respectively.\n- Findings supported the theory that strong demand-side activity can lift post-incentive equilibrium levels, though a more rigorous analysis is still needed.\n- **Incentivized lending pools generally demonstrated higher liquidity retention**.\n- However, TVL retention in DEXs appeared **inflated by Uniswap's concurrent Gauntlet campaign**. Specifically, when the two co-incentivized DEX pools were excluded, retained TVL inflows dropped to $48.2M, revealing a significant divergence between the lending and DEX verticals.\n- Metrics for measuring demand-side traction included trading volume per TVL for DEX pools and utilization rate for lending pools. For DEX pools, a moderate correlation was observed between peak net TVL inflows and trading volume per TVL, hinting at possible synergistic effects.\n- A key limitation was that isolating the program's causal effect alone was extremely difficult due to numerous confounding variables, such as external co-incentives and broader market volatility.\n\n## Background\n\nSuperStacks was the **Optimism Foundation's first proactive DeFi incentive pilot program**. It was designed with the goal of **increasing liquidity for interoperable assets (e.g., USD₮0) across the Superchain**. At its core, the program aimed to help these assets overcome the cold start problem and **test new mechanisms for establishing sustainable DeFi growth loops**.\n\nThe program's design was based on a theoretical framework suggesting that a two-pronged approach, focusing on both supply-side and demand-side activity, could initiate a sustainable flywheel effect for interoperable assets on the Superchain, ultimately catalyzing lasting liquidity growth.\n\nThis theory is broken down into three phases:\n\n1.  **Supply-Side Growth**: Available incentives attract deposits into DEX pools, which creates deeper liquidity and improves the execution quality for trades. On the lending side, an increase in lending supply reduces the borrow rate.\n2.  **Demand-Side Growth**: Improved trading conditions draw in more trades that are routed through the incentivized DEX pools, which increases trading volumes and generates more fees for LPs. Similarly, more competitive borrow rates attract more borrowers, which raises utilization rates and generates a higher yield for lenders.\n3.  **Sustainable Traction**: Once incentives are switched off, a portion of the TVL (Total Value Locked) and net liquidity leaves the incentivized pools, but due to higher fee and yield generation for LPs and lenders, liquidity settles at higher baseline levels compared to the pre-incentives period.\n\n## Analysis Method\n\n### Dataset\n\nThe datasets and methods used for the SuperStacks analysis were:\n\n- Period: 76-day incentive period (April 16 – June 30) and a 30-day retention evaluation period after program end (through July 30).\n- Data sources: 25 pools and vaults targeted by SuperStacks incentives.\n- Metrics:\n  - TVL (Total Value Locked): Net TVL inflows during the program and retained inflows after program end.\n  - Trading volume: Indicator of demand-side activity in DEX pools.\n  - Utilization: Indicator of demand-side activity in lending pools.\n  - Cost efficiency: Net TVL inflows per OP token ($/OP).\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\nSuperStacks Program:\n\nSuperStacks was the Optimism Foundation’s first attempt at a “proactive DeFi incentive,” designed as a pilot program to increase liquidity of interoperable assets across the Superchain. The program was built on a two-pronged approach targeting both supply-side and demand-side activities. Specifically, incentives were provided to encourage supply-side actions (deposits into DEX pools, increased lending supply), which in turn aimed to stimulate demand-side activities (higher trading volume, increased utilization).\n\n### Dependent Variable\n\nGrowth and retention of TVL (Total Value Locked): Measuring both the increase in TVL through incentives and the extent to which that TVL was maintained after incentives ended. The analysis centered on “retained TVL inflows.”\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- A pro-rata model was applied to disentangle the complexity of overlapping incentive programs, attributing impact based on each program’s share of total USD incentives.\n- To evaluate pool-level performance, incentivized pools (treatment group) were paired with comparable non-incentivized pools (control group) on the same chain and protocol. One-sided t-tests were conducted on changes in TVL and trading volume.\n- The analysis focused on DEX pools (9 pairs) that passed statistical filtering.\n\n## Results\n\n- Overall TVL Inflow and Retention:\n  - During the program, the SuperStacks initiative achieved $58M in net TVL inflows, with $53.7M retained 30 days after the program ended.\n  - Considering costs, this corresponds to $23.2 net TVL per 1 OP during the program, and $21.5 per 1 OP after the program.\n  - Across all incentivized pools and vaults, $87.7M of TVL was retained 30 days after incentives ended.\n  - Net TVL inflows peaked before the program ended, at $15.7M in DEXs and $70M in lending markets.\n- DEX vs. Lending Markets:\n  - Of the net TVL inflows during the program, DEXs accounted for 31.6% and lending markets 68.4%.\n  - Lending markets showed stronger liquidity retention compared to DEXs. Lending pools, especially deposit-only vaults such as Morpho’s, often showed growth.\n  - DEX TVL retention appeared inflated by concurrent incentive programs run by the Uniswap Foundation and Gauntlet. Excluding the two DEX pools covered by these joint incentives, retained TVL inflows fell to $48.2M, revealing a notable divergence between lending and DEX outcomes.\n"
+        "content": "\n## Key Points\n\nThis study explores how a platform owner’s market entry—by leveraging a complementary firm’s open-source technology—affects the external knowledge sourcing of the complementary firm, focusing on the willingness of GitHub developers to contribute. Using the staggered rollout of Amazon AWS’s Elasticsearch as a natural experiment, the analysis shows that the platform owner’s entry reduces contributions from existing contributors but substantially increases contributions from new contributors, leading to an overall increase in contributions to the open-source technology. This finding provides a new perspective: contrary to common concerns that platform owners’ entry harms open-source startups, from a technology development standpoint, such entry may not necessarily be detrimental.\n\n## Background\n\nNew contributors are individuals who made their first contribution to the open-source project in a given period. Unlike existing contributors, they have no prior investments or ties to the project, and thus hold different reference points. From a prospect theory perspective, it was hypothesized that new contributors may perceive the platform owner’s entry as an opportunity for potential gains—such as enhanced professional reputation or career opportunities through increased visibility of the technology.\n\n## Analysis Method\n\n### Dataset\n\nData was collected from AWS and GitHub. Specifically, AWS official announcements provided information about the date and location of the Amazon Elasticsearch Service launch, while GitHub data provided developers’ contributions to Elasticsearch (contribution volume, personal GitHub experience, popularity, etc.). Commits by Elastic employees were excluded to focus on external developers’ contributions.\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\n- AWS’s market entry with Amazon Elasticsearch Service.\n  - Entry is a dummy variable equal to 1 if AWS entered the country where the contributor resides, and 0 otherwise.\n  - After is a dummy variable equal to 1 if AWS had already entered the contributor’s country during or before a given period, and 0 otherwise.\n  - The interaction term Entry × After was used to measure the treatment effect.\n\n### Dependent Variable\n\n- OSS contributions by new contributors(the number of commits, lines of code changed/added, and files of code changed/added)\n  - Contributions by new contributors were measured as the natural logarithm of the total number of commits by all new contributors in each period.\n  - Additionally, the natural logarithm of the number of new contributors (extensive margin) and the average contribution per new contributor (intensive margin) were measured.\n  - As robustness checks, the natural logarithm of lines of code and files changed/added was also included.\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- AWS’s staggered market entry was treated as a natural experiment and stacked difference-in-differences analysis was applied.\n- The analysis was conducted at the country-week level with 5,635 observations across 16 treatment countries and 13 control countries.\n- Control countries were matched to treatment countries using PSM.\n\n## Results\n\n- The analysis strongly supports the hypothesis that the platform owner’s entry increases contributions by new contributors.\n- On average, the number of commits increased by about 7.27%.\n- This increase was driven by both a rise in the number of new contributors (awareness effect) and an increase in the average contribution per new contributor (reward effect). Moreover, after the platform owner's entry, new contributors tended to show stronger extrinsic motivations, suggesting a selection effect in the types of new contributors.\n",
+        "raw": "---\nevidence_id: \"07\"\nresults:\n  - intervention: \"Platform owner market entry using complementary firm's OSS\"\n    outcome_variable: \"OSS contributions by new contributors\"\n    outcome: \"+\"\nstrength: \"3\"\nmethodologies:\n  - \"DID, PSE\"\nversion: \"1.0.0\"\ndatasets:\n  - \"\"\ntitle: \"How Platform Owner Entry Affects OSS Contributions by New Contributors: An Experiment with AWS Elasticsearch\"\ndate: \"2024-06-20\"\n\ncitation:\n  - name: \"How Platform Owner Entry Affects Open Source Contribution? Evidence from GitHub Developers\"\n    src: \"https://questromworld.bu.edu/platformstrategy/wp-content/uploads/sites/49/2024/06/PlatStrat2024_paper_100.pdf\"\n    type: \"link\"\nauthor: \"Yuping Li\"\n---\n\n## Key Points\n\nThis study explores how a platform owner’s market entry—by leveraging a complementary firm’s open-source technology—affects the external knowledge sourcing of the complementary firm, focusing on the willingness of GitHub developers to contribute. Using the staggered rollout of Amazon AWS’s Elasticsearch as a natural experiment, the analysis shows that the platform owner’s entry reduces contributions from existing contributors but substantially increases contributions from new contributors, leading to an overall increase in contributions to the open-source technology. This finding provides a new perspective: contrary to common concerns that platform owners’ entry harms open-source startups, from a technology development standpoint, such entry may not necessarily be detrimental.\n\n## Background\n\nNew contributors are individuals who made their first contribution to the open-source project in a given period. Unlike existing contributors, they have no prior investments or ties to the project, and thus hold different reference points. From a prospect theory perspective, it was hypothesized that new contributors may perceive the platform owner’s entry as an opportunity for potential gains—such as enhanced professional reputation or career opportunities through increased visibility of the technology.\n\n## Analysis Method\n\n### Dataset\n\nData was collected from AWS and GitHub. Specifically, AWS official announcements provided information about the date and location of the Amazon Elasticsearch Service launch, while GitHub data provided developers’ contributions to Elasticsearch (contribution volume, personal GitHub experience, popularity, etc.). Commits by Elastic employees were excluded to focus on external developers’ contributions.\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\n- AWS’s market entry with Amazon Elasticsearch Service.\n  - Entry is a dummy variable equal to 1 if AWS entered the country where the contributor resides, and 0 otherwise.\n  - After is a dummy variable equal to 1 if AWS had already entered the contributor’s country during or before a given period, and 0 otherwise.\n  - The interaction term Entry × After was used to measure the treatment effect.\n\n### Dependent Variable\n\n- OSS contributions by new contributors(the number of commits, lines of code changed/added, and files of code changed/added)\n  - Contributions by new contributors were measured as the natural logarithm of the total number of commits by all new contributors in each period.\n  - Additionally, the natural logarithm of the number of new contributors (extensive margin) and the average contribution per new contributor (intensive margin) were measured.\n  - As robustness checks, the natural logarithm of lines of code and files changed/added was also included.\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- AWS’s staggered market entry was treated as a natural experiment and stacked difference-in-differences analysis was applied.\n- The analysis was conducted at the country-week level with 5,635 observations across 16 treatment countries and 13 control countries.\n- Control countries were matched to treatment countries using PSM.\n\n## Results\n\n- The analysis strongly supports the hypothesis that the platform owner’s entry increases contributions by new contributors.\n- On average, the number of commits increased by about 7.27%.\n- This increase was driven by both a rise in the number of new contributors (awareness effect) and an increase in the average contribution per new contributor (reward effect). Moreover, after the platform owner's entry, new contributors tended to show stronger extrinsic motivations, suggesting a selection effect in the types of new contributors.\n"
     },
-    "02": {
+    "00": {
         "frontmatter": {
-            "evidence_id": "02",
-            "title": "Effect of a Grant Program on Developer Activity ",
-            "author": "Carl Cervone",
-            "date": "2024-11-18",
+            "evidence_id": "00",
+            "title": "Effect of Pull Request Submission by listing individual OSS contributors on GitHub Sponsors",
+            "author": "Poonacha K. Medappa, Murat M. Tunc, Xitong Li",
+            "date": "2023-06-25",
             "citation": [
                 {
-                    "name": "Early experiments with synthetic controls and causal inference",
+                    "name": "Sponsorship Funding in Open-Source Software: Incentivize or Crowd-Out Motivations to Create, Maintain and Share?",
                     "type": "link",
-                    "src": "https://docs.oso.xyz/blog/synthetic-controls/"
+                    "src": "https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4484403"
                 }
             ],
             "results": [
                 {
-                    "intervention": "Whether grants were received or token incentives were provided",
-                    "outcome_variable": "Developer retention, user activity, TVL",
+                    "intervention": "Listing individual OSS contributors on sponsorship platform",
+                    "outcome_variable": "Submitting Pull Requests (PRs)",
                     "outcome": "+-"
                 }
             ],
             "strength": "3",
             "methodologies": [
-                "Synthetic Control Method"
+                "DID、Coarsened Exact Matching(CEM) technique、Robustness Tests"
             ],
-            "version": "2.0.0",
+            "version": "1.0.0",
             "datasets": [
-                "https://github.com/opensource-observer/insights/tree/main/analysis/optimism/syncon"
+                "A dataset based on the activities of contributors active on both the GitHub and Stack Overflow platforms."
             ],
             "tags": [
-                "oss",
-                "public goods funding"
-            ]
-        },
-        "content": "\n## Key Points\n\nOn average, there was an observed increase of approximately 150 to 200 monthly active developers.\n\n## Background\n\n- Open Source Observer (OSO) is exploring advanced metrics to better measure the impact of certain types of interventions on public goods ecosystems.\n- For example, it aims to compare the performance of projects or users who received token incentives against those who did not.\n- However, in real-world economies, it is impossible to randomly assign treatment and control groups like in controlled A/B tests.\n- Therefore, advanced statistical techniques must be employed to estimate the causal effect of a treatment on a target cohort, while controlling for other factors such as market conditions, competing incentives, and geopolitical events.\n\n## Analysis Method\n\n### Dataset\n\n- The synthetic control work is part of a broader initiative to build a flexible analytics engine capable of analyzing virtually all metrics over time.\n- OSO is currently rolling out a suite of timeseries metrics. These models allow metrics to be computed for any cohort over any time period, enabling \"time travel\" to evaluate past performance.\n- Most timeseries metrics are computed using a rolling window with daily buckets. For example, rather than measuring monthly active developers as a static monthly count, OSO uses 30-day and 90-day rolling windows to provide a more detailed view of cohort performance.\n- Sample SQL queries show the use of tables such as `timeseries_metrics_by_collection_v0`, `metrics_v0`, and `collections_v1`.\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\n- OSO is interested in measuring the impact of specific types of interventions on public goods ecosystems.\n- Specifically, it seeks to assess how grants and incentives affect outcomes such as developer retention, user activity, and network TVL (Total Value Locked).\n- The initial experiment evaluates an intervention targeting a cohort of projects that received Optimism Retro Funding in January 2024.\n- The explanatory variable is `new_contributors_over_90_day` (new contributors over 90 days), `commits_over_90_day` (commits over 90 days), and `issues_opened_over_90_day` (issues opened over 90 days).\n\n### Dependent Variable\n\n- The dependent variable is `active_developers_over_90_day` (90-day active developers)\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- As an early experiment in crypto network economics, OSO is exploring methods such as synthetic controls and causal inference.\n- Synthetic control methods are widely used to assess the impact of interventions in complex systems.\n- In this approach, a synthetic control is a weighted average of several units, constructed to replicate the trajectory that the treated unit would have followed in the absence of the intervention.\n- Weights are selected in a data-driven way so that the resulting synthetic control closely resembles the treated unit with respect to key predictors of the outcome variable.\n- Unlike difference-in-differences approaches, this method allows for adjustments for time-varying confounders by weighting the control group to better match the treatment group in the pre-intervention period.\n- Economists frequently use synthetic controls to evaluate policy impacts in non-experimental settings (e.g., Abadie and Gardeazabal’s study on the economic impact of the Basque separatist conflict).\n- One key advantage of synthetic controls is the ability to systematically select comparison groups. In OSO’s case, this means comparing grant recipients to similar non-recipient projects.\n- Inspired by work from Counterfactual Labs, OSO uses the pysyncon package to estimate treatment effects across the range of timeseries metrics available within OSO.\n- Each analysis request includes a pre-period start and end date, an optimization period start and end date, a dependent variable, treatment identifier, control identifiers, and predictor variables.\n\n## Results\n\n- In early findings, OSO analyzed monthly active developers over a 90-day rolling window for a cohort of projects that received Optimism Retro Funding in January 2024.\n- The results indicate that the gap between the treated group and the synthetic control group reflects the treatment effect, with an average increase of approximately 150 to 200 monthly active developers.\n- OSO is in the early stages of applying advanced metrics like synthetic control to measure the impact of incentives in crypto networks and plans to share further insights in the future.\n",
-        "raw": "---\nevidence_id: \"02\"\nresults:\n  - intervention: \"Whether grants were received or token incentives were provided\"\n    outcome_variable: \"Developer retention, user activity, TVL\"\n    outcome: \"+-\"\nstrength: \"3\"\nmethodologies:\n  - \"Synthetic Control Method\"\nversion: \"2.0.0\"\ndatasets:\n  - \"https://github.com/opensource-observer/insights/tree/main/analysis/optimism/syncon\"\ntitle: \"Effect of a Grant Program on Developer Activity \"\ndate: \"2024-11-18\"\ntags:\n  - \"oss\"\n  - \"public goods funding\"\ncitation:\n  - name: \"Early experiments with synthetic controls and causal inference\"\n    src: \"https://docs.oso.xyz/blog/synthetic-controls/\"\n    type: \"link\"\nauthor: \"Carl Cervone\"\n---\n\n## Key Points\n\nOn average, there was an observed increase of approximately 150 to 200 monthly active developers.\n\n## Background\n\n- Open Source Observer (OSO) is exploring advanced metrics to better measure the impact of certain types of interventions on public goods ecosystems.\n- For example, it aims to compare the performance of projects or users who received token incentives against those who did not.\n- However, in real-world economies, it is impossible to randomly assign treatment and control groups like in controlled A/B tests.\n- Therefore, advanced statistical techniques must be employed to estimate the causal effect of a treatment on a target cohort, while controlling for other factors such as market conditions, competing incentives, and geopolitical events.\n\n## Analysis Method\n\n### Dataset\n\n- The synthetic control work is part of a broader initiative to build a flexible analytics engine capable of analyzing virtually all metrics over time.\n- OSO is currently rolling out a suite of timeseries metrics. These models allow metrics to be computed for any cohort over any time period, enabling \"time travel\" to evaluate past performance.\n- Most timeseries metrics are computed using a rolling window with daily buckets. For example, rather than measuring monthly active developers as a static monthly count, OSO uses 30-day and 90-day rolling windows to provide a more detailed view of cohort performance.\n- Sample SQL queries show the use of tables such as `timeseries_metrics_by_collection_v0`, `metrics_v0`, and `collections_v1`.\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\n- OSO is interested in measuring the impact of specific types of interventions on public goods ecosystems.\n- Specifically, it seeks to assess how grants and incentives affect outcomes such as developer retention, user activity, and network TVL (Total Value Locked).\n- The initial experiment evaluates an intervention targeting a cohort of projects that received Optimism Retro Funding in January 2024.\n- The explanatory variable is `new_contributors_over_90_day` (new contributors over 90 days), `commits_over_90_day` (commits over 90 days), and `issues_opened_over_90_day` (issues opened over 90 days).\n\n### Dependent Variable\n\n- The dependent variable is `active_developers_over_90_day` (90-day active developers)\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- As an early experiment in crypto network economics, OSO is exploring methods such as synthetic controls and causal inference.\n- Synthetic control methods are widely used to assess the impact of interventions in complex systems.\n- In this approach, a synthetic control is a weighted average of several units, constructed to replicate the trajectory that the treated unit would have followed in the absence of the intervention.\n- Weights are selected in a data-driven way so that the resulting synthetic control closely resembles the treated unit with respect to key predictors of the outcome variable.\n- Unlike difference-in-differences approaches, this method allows for adjustments for time-varying confounders by weighting the control group to better match the treatment group in the pre-intervention period.\n- Economists frequently use synthetic controls to evaluate policy impacts in non-experimental settings (e.g., Abadie and Gardeazabal’s study on the economic impact of the Basque separatist conflict).\n- One key advantage of synthetic controls is the ability to systematically select comparison groups. In OSO’s case, this means comparing grant recipients to similar non-recipient projects.\n- Inspired by work from Counterfactual Labs, OSO uses the pysyncon package to estimate treatment effects across the range of timeseries metrics available within OSO.\n- Each analysis request includes a pre-period start and end date, an optimization period start and end date, a dependent variable, treatment identifier, control identifiers, and predictor variables.\n\n## Results\n\n- In early findings, OSO analyzed monthly active developers over a 90-day rolling window for a cohort of projects that received Optimism Retro Funding in January 2024.\n- The results indicate that the gap between the treated group and the synthetic control group reflects the treatment effect, with an average increase of approximately 150 to 200 monthly active developers.\n- OSO is in the early stages of applying advanced metrics like synthetic control to measure the impact of incentives in crypto networks and plans to share further insights in the future.\n"
-    },
-    "09": {
-        "frontmatter": {
-            "evidence_id": "09",
-            "title": "How Wikipedia Offline Meetings Shape Participants’ Editing Activity: An Empirical Analysis of the German-Language Community",
-            "author": "N. Schwitter",
-            "date": "2024-11-05",
-            "citation": [
-                {
-                    "name": "How offline meetings affect online activities: the case of Wikipedia",
-                    "type": "link",
-                    "src": "https://epjdatascience.springeropen.com/articles/10.1140/epjds/s13688-024-00506-w"
-                }
-            ],
-            "results": [
-                {
-                    "intervention": "Participation in online community offline meetings",
-                    "outcome_variable": "Wikipedia editing activity",
-                    "outcome": "+"
-                }
-            ],
-            "strength": "3",
-            "methodologies": [
-                "DID, Covariate matching"
-            ],
-            "version": "1.0.0",
-            "datasets": [
-                ""
+                "oss"
             ]
         },
-        "content": "\n## Key Points\n\n- Participation in offline meetings exerts a positive, statistically significant effect on users’ contribution behavior over the short term (1 week), medium term (1 month), and long term (1 year).\n- The magnitude of decline in editing activity among participants is significantly smaller than the decline observed among comparable non-participants.\n- Notably, users attending their first meeting were observed to increase their editing thereafter.\n\n## Background\n\nOpen-source communities and peer-production projects face challenges in long-term sustainability, and offline gatherings are increasingly recognized for promoting community resilience. Although Wikipedia struggles with declining activity and retention of new users, the German-language Wikipedia hosts regular offline meetings. These meetings provide opportunities to form personal ties, and face-to-face interaction is thought to strengthen commitment to the project and reinforce identity.\n\n## Analysis Method\n\n### Dataset\n\n- We combine a comprehensive dataset on informal offline meetings in the German-language Wikipedia community from 2001 to 2020 with large-scale online activity data.\n- The dataset includes information on 4,408 small-scale meetings and 4,013 participating users.\n- All online actions on Wikipedia are recorded, and users’ editing activities are measured from metadata dumps.\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\n- The intervention for this outcome is participation in offline meetings.\n- The analysis examines whether a user attended a meeting, and in particular whether it was their first meeting.\n\n### Dependent Variable\n\n- The outcome variable is the volume of a user’s editing activity on Wikipedia (number of edits).\n- This is measured separately as the total number of edits across all namespaces and edits in the article main namespace.\n- Activity is analyzed over windows of 1 week (7 days), 1 month (28 days), and 1 year (364 days) before and after the meeting.\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- Quasi-experimental approach: We employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) design comparing meeting participants (treatment group) with comparable non-participants selected via matching (control group).\n- Covariate matching: From a pool of non-participants, we construct a control group most similar to participants based on five features (days since registration; cumulative activity in mainspace and outside mainspace from registration to the meeting; and recent activity in mainspace and outside mainspace over the 7-day, 1-month, 2-month, and 1-year periods prior to the meeting). This aims to minimize pre-existing differences between groups.\n- Statistical models: For the binary outcome of resuming activity, we use a multilevel linear probability model (LPM); for changes in activity volume, we use multilevel negative binomial models. Control variables (prior activity level, tenure, administrator status, and meeting year) are included.\n\n## Results\n\n- Compared to the control group, participants’ contributions increased significantly over the short, medium, and long terms.\n- Among users inactive before the meeting, the probability of resuming editing after the meeting increased substantially relative to the control group (e.g., the probability of resuming edits in mainspace rose from 16.7% in the control group to 33.4% among participants).\n- While the control group tended to reduce their editing, the decline among participants was significantly smaller, suggesting that offline interaction helps mitigate the broader decline of online communities.\n- Attending a first meeting showed a particularly strong positive effect, increasing editing activity more than attending other meetings.\n",
-        "raw": "---\nevidence_id: \"09\"\nresults:\n  - intervention: \"Participation in online community offline meetings\"\n    outcome_variable: \"Wikipedia editing activity\"\n    outcome: \"+\"\nstrength: \"3\"\nmethodologies:\n  - \"DID, Covariate matching\"\nversion: \"1.0.0\"\ndatasets:\n  - \"\"\ntitle: \"How Wikipedia Offline Meetings Shape Participants’ Editing Activity: An Empirical Analysis of the German-Language Community\"\ndate: \"2024-11-05\"\n\ncitation:\n  - name: \"How offline meetings affect online activities: the case of Wikipedia\"\n    src: \"https://epjdatascience.springeropen.com/articles/10.1140/epjds/s13688-024-00506-w\"\n    type: \"link\"\nauthor: \"N. Schwitter\"\n---\n\n## Key Points\n\n- Participation in offline meetings exerts a positive, statistically significant effect on users’ contribution behavior over the short term (1 week), medium term (1 month), and long term (1 year).\n- The magnitude of decline in editing activity among participants is significantly smaller than the decline observed among comparable non-participants.\n- Notably, users attending their first meeting were observed to increase their editing thereafter.\n\n## Background\n\nOpen-source communities and peer-production projects face challenges in long-term sustainability, and offline gatherings are increasingly recognized for promoting community resilience. Although Wikipedia struggles with declining activity and retention of new users, the German-language Wikipedia hosts regular offline meetings. These meetings provide opportunities to form personal ties, and face-to-face interaction is thought to strengthen commitment to the project and reinforce identity.\n\n## Analysis Method\n\n### Dataset\n\n- We combine a comprehensive dataset on informal offline meetings in the German-language Wikipedia community from 2001 to 2020 with large-scale online activity data.\n- The dataset includes information on 4,408 small-scale meetings and 4,013 participating users.\n- All online actions on Wikipedia are recorded, and users’ editing activities are measured from metadata dumps.\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\n- The intervention for this outcome is participation in offline meetings.\n- The analysis examines whether a user attended a meeting, and in particular whether it was their first meeting.\n\n### Dependent Variable\n\n- The outcome variable is the volume of a user’s editing activity on Wikipedia (number of edits).\n- This is measured separately as the total number of edits across all namespaces and edits in the article main namespace.\n- Activity is analyzed over windows of 1 week (7 days), 1 month (28 days), and 1 year (364 days) before and after the meeting.\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- Quasi-experimental approach: We employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) design comparing meeting participants (treatment group) with comparable non-participants selected via matching (control group).\n- Covariate matching: From a pool of non-participants, we construct a control group most similar to participants based on five features (days since registration; cumulative activity in mainspace and outside mainspace from registration to the meeting; and recent activity in mainspace and outside mainspace over the 7-day, 1-month, 2-month, and 1-year periods prior to the meeting). This aims to minimize pre-existing differences between groups.\n- Statistical models: For the binary outcome of resuming activity, we use a multilevel linear probability model (LPM); for changes in activity volume, we use multilevel negative binomial models. Control variables (prior activity level, tenure, administrator status, and meeting year) are included.\n\n## Results\n\n- Compared to the control group, participants’ contributions increased significantly over the short, medium, and long terms.\n- Among users inactive before the meeting, the probability of resuming editing after the meeting increased substantially relative to the control group (e.g., the probability of resuming edits in mainspace rose from 16.7% in the control group to 33.4% among participants).\n- While the control group tended to reduce their editing, the decline among participants was significantly smaller, suggesting that offline interaction helps mitigate the broader decline of online communities.\n- Attending a first meeting showed a particularly strong positive effect, increasing editing activity more than attending other meetings.\n"
+        "content": "\n## Key Points\n\nThe submission of pull requests experienced a temporary short-term increase, but eventually returned to pre-treatment levels, with a crowding-out effect emerging over time. Among contributors with a high level of community engagement (e.g., frequent contributions to others’ projects, large follower count), a negative impact on knowledge creation activities (i.e., the crowding-out effect) was observed. For contributors who set higher active funding goals, sponsorship appeared to have a positive effect on their knowledge creation activities.\n\n## Background\n\nThe world’s digital infrastructure is built on open-source software (OSS) developed on platforms like GitHub (GH), and supported by complementary knowledge-sharing platforms like Stack Overflow (SO). On these platforms, numerous programmers, maintainers, and researchers devote their efforts to building and maintaining code, as well as supporting users. Contributors play a crucial role not only in knowledge creation activities, such as contributing code and adding new features, but also in knowledge maintenance activities, such as reviewing and integrating community-submitted code.\n\nHowever, it has been pointed out that OSS projects are increasingly burdened by the need to maintain existing code rather than create new code, and that many projects fail due to the lack of intrinsic motivation for maintenance work. Maintenance is often seen as “mundane but necessary,” and tends to lack intrinsic appeal. For example, the 2020 Linux Foundation OSS Contributor Survey highlighted that, although participants showed minimal interest in spending significant time on maintenance-related tasks, they emphasized that the most crucial support OSS projects need is for maintenance work—especially related to security improvements.\n\nIn this context, there is a growing trend to provide financial support to encourage and sustain volunteer contributors. In May 2019, GH launched GitHub Sponsors, a feature allowing individual OSS developers to receive donations from the community. Unlike traditional project- or activity-specific funding, GitHub Sponsors focuses on individual contributors, offering them the flexibility to reallocate their efforts not only within the host platform but also across other complementary platforms in which they participate. This study investigates the impact of such sponsorship-based funding on OSS contributors’ behavior—specifically, its effect on knowledge creation and maintenance activities on GH and the spillover effects on SO, a complementary knowledge-sharing platform.\n\n## Analytical Methods\n\n### Dataset\n\n- **Data Collection**: The dataset is based on the behavior of contributors active on both GitHub (GH) and Stack Overflow (SO), obtained via APIs provided by both platforms. The panel data spans four years, from January 2018 to December 2021.\n  - During the initial data collection period, GH Sponsors was available in 30 countries that supported STRIPE payments. The sample is therefore limited to GH contributors from these countries.\n  - To select GH contributors, the following criteria were applied: owning at least 5 repositories, having more than 10 followers, and having joined GH before 2018. This resulted in a sample of 20,841 GH contributors.\n  - SO profiles were identified using names, email addresses, and login IDs listed on GH, and only included if a GH URL matched on the SO profile. Ultimately, 5,910 GH contributors who had joined both platforms prior to the observation period were identified, of whom 1,467 were listed for sponsorship during the observation period.\n  - Activity-related data were aggregated on a monthly basis.\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\n- The intervention in this study is the contributor being listed on GitHub Sponsors (Sponsor listing).\n- The primary explanatory variable of interest in this study is a binary indicator that equals 1 starting from the month the contributor is listed for sponsorship (Sponsor Listed).\n- This variable is used to capture the effect starting from the point at which the contributor is listed on GitHub Sponsors.\n\n### Dependent Variables\n\n- **Knowledge Creation Activity on GitHub**:\n  - **Number of Pull Requests (PRs) Submitted** per month.\n    - Proposals for changes to the codebase, including new features, bug fixes, and improvements.\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- **A Difference-in-Differences (DID)** estimation was used to measure changes in pull request submission due to sponsorship.\n- **Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM)** was applied to match contributors based on their activity levels prior to being listed for sponsorship.\n\n### Robustness Test\n\n- The following supplemental analyses on PR submissions were conducted:\n  - Use of **alternative dependent variables for PR submissions**.\n  - Controlling for **PR characteristics (e.g., size, number of files, number of commits, time to merge)**.\n  - Considering **self-merged PRs**.\n  - Considering **PRs related to issues**.\n\n## Results\n\n- **No significant overall effect of sponsorship on knowledge creation activity (PR submissions) on GitHub.**。\n  - A temporary increase is observed in the short term, but a **crowding-out effect** appears over time.\n  - In the long term, the effect on PR submissions disappears due to a decline in intrinsic motivation.\n\n- For **contributors with high community engagement** or **those who set higher funding goals**, a stronger negative effect (reduction in PR submissions) was observed.\n- There is a tendency **to see an increase in PR submissions to less popular projects**.\n",
+        "raw": "---\nevidence_id: \"00\"\nresults:\n  - intervention: \"Listing individual OSS contributors on sponsorship platform\"\n    outcome_variable: \"Submitting Pull Requests (PRs)\"\n    outcome: \"+-\"\nstrength: \"3\"\nmethodologies:\n  - \"DID、Coarsened Exact Matching(CEM) technique、Robustness Tests\"\nversion: \"1.0.0\"\ndatasets:\n  - \"A dataset based on the activities of contributors active on both the GitHub and Stack Overflow platforms.\"\ntitle: \"Effect of Pull Request Submission by listing individual OSS contributors on GitHub Sponsors\"\ndate: \"2023-06-25\"\ntags:\n  - \"oss\"\ncitation:\n  - type: \"link\"\n    name: \"Sponsorship Funding in Open-Source Software: Incentivize or Crowd-Out Motivations to Create, Maintain and Share?\"\n    src: \"https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4484403\"\nauthor: \"Poonacha K. Medappa, Murat M. Tunc, Xitong Li\"\n---\n\n## Key Points\n\nThe submission of pull requests experienced a temporary short-term increase, but eventually returned to pre-treatment levels, with a crowding-out effect emerging over time. Among contributors with a high level of community engagement (e.g., frequent contributions to others’ projects, large follower count), a negative impact on knowledge creation activities (i.e., the crowding-out effect) was observed. For contributors who set higher active funding goals, sponsorship appeared to have a positive effect on their knowledge creation activities.\n\n## Background\n\nThe world’s digital infrastructure is built on open-source software (OSS) developed on platforms like GitHub (GH), and supported by complementary knowledge-sharing platforms like Stack Overflow (SO). On these platforms, numerous programmers, maintainers, and researchers devote their efforts to building and maintaining code, as well as supporting users. Contributors play a crucial role not only in knowledge creation activities, such as contributing code and adding new features, but also in knowledge maintenance activities, such as reviewing and integrating community-submitted code.\n\nHowever, it has been pointed out that OSS projects are increasingly burdened by the need to maintain existing code rather than create new code, and that many projects fail due to the lack of intrinsic motivation for maintenance work. Maintenance is often seen as “mundane but necessary,” and tends to lack intrinsic appeal. For example, the 2020 Linux Foundation OSS Contributor Survey highlighted that, although participants showed minimal interest in spending significant time on maintenance-related tasks, they emphasized that the most crucial support OSS projects need is for maintenance work—especially related to security improvements.\n\nIn this context, there is a growing trend to provide financial support to encourage and sustain volunteer contributors. In May 2019, GH launched GitHub Sponsors, a feature allowing individual OSS developers to receive donations from the community. Unlike traditional project- or activity-specific funding, GitHub Sponsors focuses on individual contributors, offering them the flexibility to reallocate their efforts not only within the host platform but also across other complementary platforms in which they participate. This study investigates the impact of such sponsorship-based funding on OSS contributors’ behavior—specifically, its effect on knowledge creation and maintenance activities on GH and the spillover effects on SO, a complementary knowledge-sharing platform.\n\n## Analytical Methods\n\n### Dataset\n\n- **Data Collection**: The dataset is based on the behavior of contributors active on both GitHub (GH) and Stack Overflow (SO), obtained via APIs provided by both platforms. The panel data spans four years, from January 2018 to December 2021.\n  - During the initial data collection period, GH Sponsors was available in 30 countries that supported STRIPE payments. The sample is therefore limited to GH contributors from these countries.\n  - To select GH contributors, the following criteria were applied: owning at least 5 repositories, having more than 10 followers, and having joined GH before 2018. This resulted in a sample of 20,841 GH contributors.\n  - SO profiles were identified using names, email addresses, and login IDs listed on GH, and only included if a GH URL matched on the SO profile. Ultimately, 5,910 GH contributors who had joined both platforms prior to the observation period were identified, of whom 1,467 were listed for sponsorship during the observation period.\n  - Activity-related data were aggregated on a monthly basis.\n\n### Intervation / Explanatory Variable\n\n- The intervention in this study is the contributor being listed on GitHub Sponsors (Sponsor listing).\n- The primary explanatory variable of interest in this study is a binary indicator that equals 1 starting from the month the contributor is listed for sponsorship (Sponsor Listed).\n- This variable is used to capture the effect starting from the point at which the contributor is listed on GitHub Sponsors.\n\n### Dependent Variables\n\n- **Knowledge Creation Activity on GitHub**:\n  - **Number of Pull Requests (PRs) Submitted** per month.\n    - Proposals for changes to the codebase, including new features, bug fixes, and improvements.\n\n### Identification Strategy\n\n- **A Difference-in-Differences (DID)** estimation was used to measure changes in pull request submission due to sponsorship.\n- **Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM)** was applied to match contributors based on their activity levels prior to being listed for sponsorship.\n\n### Robustness Test\n\n- The following supplemental analyses on PR submissions were conducted:\n  - Use of **alternative dependent variables for PR submissions**.\n  - Controlling for **PR characteristics (e.g., size, number of files, number of commits, time to merge)**.\n  - Considering **self-merged PRs**.\n  - Considering **PRs related to issues**.\n\n## Results\n\n- **No significant overall effect of sponsorship on knowledge creation activity (PR submissions) on GitHub.**。\n  - A temporary increase is observed in the short term, but a **crowding-out effect** appears over time.\n  - In the long term, the effect on PR submissions disappears due to a decline in intrinsic motivation.\n\n- For **contributors with high community engagement** or **those who set higher funding goals**, a stronger negative effect (reduction in PR submissions) was observed.\n- There is a tendency **to see an increase in PR submissions to less popular projects**.\n"
     },
     "03": {
         "frontmatter": {