@baselane/packs 0.1.4 → 0.1.6

package/packs/security-review/rendered/.claude/skills/security-review/cloud-infrastructure-security.md

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+# Cloud & infrastructure security
+
+Use when deploying to cloud platforms, configuring infrastructure, managing IAM policies, setting up logging/monitoring, or implementing CI/CD pipelines.
+
+## When to activate
+
+- Deploying applications to cloud platforms
+- Configuring IAM roles and permissions
+- Setting up CI/CD pipelines
+- Implementing infrastructure as code (Terraform, CloudFormation)
+- Configuring logging and monitoring
+- Managing secrets in cloud environments
+- Setting up CDN and edge security
+- Implementing disaster recovery and backup strategies
+
+## IAM & access control
+
+Principle of least privilege:
+
+```yaml
+# PASS
+iam_role:
+  permissions: [s3:GetObject, s3:ListBucket]
+  resources: [arn:aws:s3:::my-bucket/*]
+
+# FAIL
+iam_role:
+  permissions: [s3:*]
+  resources: ["*"]
+```
+
+Verify: no root account usage in production · MFA enabled for all privileged accounts · service accounts use roles, not long-lived credentials · IAM policies follow least privilege · regular access reviews · unused credentials rotated or removed.
+
+## Secrets management
+
+```typescript
+// PASS — cloud secrets manager
+import { SecretsManager } from '@aws-sdk/client-secrets-manager'
+const client = new SecretsManager({ region: 'us-east-1' })
+const secret = await client.getSecretValue({ SecretId: 'prod/api-key' })
+
+// FAIL — env var only, not rotated, not audited, for a long-lived production credential
+const apiKey = process.env.API_KEY
+```
+
+Verify: secrets in a cloud secrets manager · automatic rotation for database credentials · API keys rotated at least quarterly · no secrets in code, logs, or error messages · audit logging on secret access.
+
+## Network security
+
+```terraform
+# PASS — restricted security group
+resource "aws_security_group" "app" {
+  ingress { from_port = 443; to_port = 443; protocol = "tcp"; cidr_blocks = ["10.0.0.0/16"] }
+  egress  { from_port = 443; to_port = 443; protocol = "tcp"; cidr_blocks = ["0.0.0.0/0"] }
+}
+
+# FAIL — open to the internet
+resource "aws_security_group" "bad" {
+  ingress { from_port = 0; to_port = 65535; protocol = "tcp"; cidr_blocks = ["0.0.0.0/0"] }
+}
+```
+
+Verify: database not publicly accessible · SSH/RDP restricted to VPN/bastion · security groups follow least privilege · network ACLs configured · VPC flow logs enabled.
+
+## Logging & monitoring
+
+Log security events with enough structure to alert on, never with sensitive payloads:
+
+```typescript
+const logSecurityEvent = async (event: SecurityEvent) => {
+  await cloudwatch.putLogEvents({
+    logGroupName: '/aws/security/events',
+    logStreamName: 'authentication',
+    logEvents: [{ timestamp: Date.now(), message: JSON.stringify({
+      type: event.type, userId: event.userId, ip: event.ip, result: event.result
+      // never log sensitive data
+    }) }]
+  })
+}
+```
+
+Verify: logging enabled for all services · failed auth attempts logged · admin actions audited · retention configured (90+ days for compliance) · alerts on suspicious activity · logs centralized and tamper-proof.
+
+## CI/CD pipeline security
+
+```yaml
+name: Deploy
+on: { push: { branches: [main] } }
+jobs:
+  deploy:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions: { contents: read }   # minimal permissions
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - name: Secret scanning
+        uses: trufflesecurity/trufflehog@main
+      - name: Audit dependencies
+        run: npm audit --audit-level=high
+      - name: Configure AWS credentials   # OIDC, not long-lived tokens
+        uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4
+        with: { role-to-assume: "arn:aws:iam::123456789:role/GitHubActionsRole", aws-region: us-east-1 }
+```
+
+Verify: OIDC instead of long-lived credentials · secrets scanning in the pipeline · dependency vulnerability scanning · container image scanning where applicable · branch protection enforced · review required before merge · signed commits enforced where the project requires it.
+
+## CDN & edge security
+
+```typescript
+export default {
+  async fetch(request: Request): Promise<Response> {
+    const response = await fetch(request)
+    const headers = new Headers(response.headers)
+    headers.set('X-Frame-Options', 'DENY')
+    headers.set('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff')
+    headers.set('Referrer-Policy', 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin')
+    headers.set('Permissions-Policy', 'geolocation=(), microphone=()')
+    return new Response(response.body, { status: response.status, headers })
+  }
+}
+```
+
+Verify: WAF enabled with a managed ruleset · rate limiting configured at the edge · bot protection active · DDoS protection enabled · security headers configured · TLS strict mode enabled.
+
+## Backup & disaster recovery
+
+```terraform
+resource "aws_db_instance" "main" {
+  backup_retention_period = 30
+  backup_window           = "03:00-04:00"
+  deletion_protection     = true
+}
+```
+
+Verify: automated daily backups · retention meets compliance requirements · point-in-time recovery enabled · backup restore tested quarterly · disaster recovery plan documented · RPO/RTO defined and tested.
+
+## Common cloud misconfigurations
+
+```bash
+# FAIL — public bucket
+aws s3api put-bucket-acl --bucket my-bucket --acl public-read
+# PASS — private bucket, explicit policy
+aws s3api put-bucket-acl --bucket my-bucket --acl private
+```
+
+```terraform
+# FAIL
+resource "aws_db_instance" "bad" { publicly_accessible = true }
+# PASS
+resource "aws_db_instance" "good" { publicly_accessible = false }
+```
+
+## Pre-deployment cloud checklist
+
+- [ ] IAM: root unused, MFA enabled, least-privilege policies
+- [ ] Secrets: cloud secrets manager with rotation
+- [ ] Network: security groups restricted, no public databases
+- [ ] Logging: enabled with retention
+- [ ] Monitoring: alerts configured for anomalies
+- [ ] CI/CD: OIDC auth, secrets scanning, dependency audits
+- [ ] CDN/WAF: enabled with a managed ruleset
+- [ ] Encryption: data encrypted at rest and in transit
+- [ ] Backups: automated with tested recovery
+- [ ] Compliance: applicable requirements (GDPR/HIPAA/etc.) met
+- [ ] Documentation: infrastructure documented, runbooks created
+- [ ] Incident response plan in place
+
+## Resources
+
+- [AWS Security Best Practices](https://aws.amazon.com/security/best-practices/)
+- [CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark](https://www.cisecurity.org/benchmark/amazon_web_services)
+- [OWASP Cloud Security](https://owasp.org/www-project-cloud-security/)

package/packs/security-review/rendered/.claude/skills/security-scan-config/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: security-scan-config
+description: Scan this project's AI-harness configuration (settings, CLAUDE.md/AGENTS.md, MCP servers, hooks, agent definitions) for secrets, dangerous permission bypasses, and prompt-injection risk — before committing configuration changes.
+license: MIT
+---
+
+<!-- adapted from affaan-m/ECC (Everything Claude Code) (MIT) — https://github.com/affaan-m/ECC -->
+
+# Security scan (harness configuration)
+
+Scan this project's AI-harness configuration (`.claude/` or equivalent) for security misconfigurations and prompt-injection risk — a separate concern from application code, but part of the same trust boundary in an AI-assisted repo.
+
+## When to activate
+
+- Setting up a new AI-harness project configuration
+- After modifying `settings.json`, `CLAUDE.md`/`AGENTS.md`, or MCP server configs
+- Before committing configuration changes
+- When onboarding to a repo with an existing harness configuration
+- Periodic security hygiene checks
+
+## What to review
+
+| File | Checks |
+| --- | --- |
+| `CLAUDE.md` / `AGENTS.md` | Hardcoded secrets, auto-run instructions embedded in project docs, prompt-injection patterns |
+| `settings.json` | Overly permissive allow lists, missing deny lists, dangerous bypass flags (e.g. skip-permissions) |
+| MCP server config | Risky/unaudited servers, hardcoded secrets in server env, unpinned `npx`-style install-on-run entries |
+| hooks | Command injection via unescaped interpolation into a shell command, silent error suppression (`2>/dev/null`, `\|\| true`), unexplained outbound network calls |
+| agent definitions | Unrestricted tool access (e.g. unconditional Bash) where the task doesn't need it, missing model spec, prompt-injection surface from untrusted inputs |
+
+## Manual scan (portable, no extra tooling)
+
+```bash
+# hardcoded-looking secrets in harness config
+grep -rEn '(api[_-]?key|secret|token|password)\s*[:=]\s*["\x27][A-Za-z0-9/+=_-]{12,}' .claude/ CLAUDE.md AGENTS.md 2>/dev/null
+
+# unrestricted shell / dangerous bypass flags
+grep -rn 'Bash(\*)\|dangerously-skip-permissions\|--no-verify' .claude/settings*.json 2>/dev/null
+
+# hook commands that interpolate a file path or tool output directly into a shell string
+grep -rn '${.*}|$(.*)' .claude/settings*.json 2>/dev/null | grep -i hook
+
+# silent error suppression in hooks (hides a failing check rather than fixing it)
+grep -rn '2>/dev/null\|\|\| true' .claude/settings*.json 2>/dev/null
+```
+
+## Severity levels
+
+- **CRITICAL** — hardcoded API keys/tokens in config; `Bash(*)` (or equivalent unrestricted shell) in the allow list; command injection in a hook via unescaped interpolation; a shell-executing MCP server with no scoping.
+- **HIGH** — auto-run instructions embedded in project docs (a prompt-injection vector any collaborator's harness will read); missing deny lists on sensitive paths (`~/.ssh`, `~/.aws`, `.env*`); an agent with Bash access it doesn't need for its stated task.
+- **MEDIUM** — silent error suppression in hooks; missing a pre-tool-use security hook on Bash; unpinned install-on-run entries in MCP server config.
+- **INFO** — missing descriptions on MCP servers or agents; explicit prohibitive instructions correctly present (flag as good practice, not a finding).
+
+## Resources
+
+- [OWASP MCP Top 10](https://owasp.org/) — tool poisoning, prompt injection via contextual payloads, command injection, shadow MCP servers, secret exposure.