@bananapus/nana-sdk-core 3.5.2 → 5.0.0

package/dist/esm/review/relayrSend.js

@@ -0,0 +1,787 @@
+import { concat, decodeFunctionData, decodeFunctionResult, encodeFunctionData, } from "viem";
+import { generatePrivateKey, privateKeyToAccount } from "viem/accounts";
+import { erc2771ForwarderAbi, jbV6ContractAddress, } from "../generated/juicebox.js";
+import { multiSendCallsOf } from "../safe.js";
+import { findPendingSafeAppProposal, hasSafeService, SAFE_EXEC_ABI, } from "../safeService.js";
+import { promptReview } from "./confirm.js";
+import { SubmittedContractWriteError, submitReviewedContractWrite, } from "./contractWrite.js";
+import { decodeReviewCall } from "./decodeCall.js";
+import { buildReviewModel } from "./model.js";
+import { spendPlan, spendPlannedRelayrRound, } from "./plan.js";
+import { heldReceipt, waitForTrackedReceipt } from "./receipt.js";
+import { bindRelayrQuote, FORWARD_REQUEST_TYPES, MAX_RELAYR_SENT_PAYMENTS, quoteExpired, readRelayrBundle, RELAYR_API, RELAYR_PAYMENT_ADDRESS, RELAYR_PAYMENT_GAS, RELAYR_PAYMENT_SELECTOR, relayrBundleRequest, relayrForwarder, relayrForwarderDeadline, relayrForwardRequest, relayrPaymentChains, relayrPaymentDetails, relayrPaymentOptions, RelayrPaymentNotSentError, RelayrProofError, RelayrProofUnavailableError, relayrWalletPaymentError, relayrStateIsFailed, relayrStateIsSuccess, relayrSupportsChains, requireRelayrBundleUnpaid, requireRelayrPaymentRuntime, requireRelayrRetry, sentRelayrPayment, simulateRelayrPayment, TRUSTED_FORWARDER_ABI, verifyRelayrPayment, } from "./relayr.js";
+import { ReviewedCallRevertedError } from "./lineError.js";
+import { prepareSignature, signPrepared, } from "./sign.js";
+import { simulateStateChangingTransaction } from "./simulation.js";
+import { unsupportedWalletRequest, walletReady, } from "./wallet.js";
+import { openStepHold, WriteHeldError } from "./writeHold.js";
+import { browserLocks } from "./writeRecovery.js";
+import { pause, timeout } from "../pause.js";
+import { FOLLOW_MS, RECEIPT_RETRY_MS } from "./heldWrite.js";
+/**
+ * The margin over an estimated Relayr fee that the review shows as its cap,
+ * in basis points (11,000 = the estimate plus 10%). Identical requests quoted
+ * minutes apart on every Relayr chain differed by at most 1.4%, so a signed
+ * quote above the cap, which asks again, should be rare.
+ */
+export const RELAYR_FEE_MARGIN_BPS = 11000n;
+/**
+ * Relayr's fee over a request's gas limit at the chain's gas price, in basis
+ * points, for bounding a fee when no stand-in quote can be had: the highest
+ * ratio measured on a Relayr chain (7.95, Ethereum at 100,000 gas), rounded
+ * up. Most of a fee is fixed per chain, so the ratio falls as gas rises.
+ */
+export const RELAYR_FEE_MARKUP_BPS = 80000n;
+/** The gas a forwarder's `execute` adds around the request's own. */
+const FORWARDER_OVERHEAD_GAS = 100000n;
+const QUOTE_TIMEOUT_MS = 45_000;
+/** How long the review waits on a stand-in quote before it bounds the fee locally. */
+const STAND_IN_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;
+const POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 2_500;
+const POLL_TIMEOUT_MS = 5 * 60_000;
+const BALANCE_OF_ABI = [
+    {
+        type: "function",
+        name: "balanceOf",
+        stateMutability: "view",
+        inputs: [{ name: "owner", type: "address" }],
+        outputs: [{ type: "uint256" }],
+    },
+];
+const RELAYR_PAYMENT_ABI = [
+    {
+        type: "function",
+        name: "prepayment",
+        stateMutability: "payable",
+        inputs: [
+            { name: "payment_uuid", type: "bytes16" },
+            { name: "deadline", type: "uint40" },
+        ],
+        outputs: [],
+    },
+];
+const ACCOUNT_CHANGED = "The connected account changed. Review again.";
+const ORDINARY_WALLET = "Pay for relayed transactions from an ordinary wallet. Nothing was sent.";
+/** The quote's payment deadline passed before the wallet opened. */
+class QuoteExpiredError extends Error {
+    constructor() {
+        super("This Relayr quote expired. Review the action again for a new quote.");
+    }
+}
+function forwarderOn(chainId) {
+    const forwarder = relayrForwarder(chainId);
+    if (!forwarder) {
+        throw new Error(`There is no Juicebox forwarder on chain ${chainId}.`);
+    }
+    return forwarder;
+}
+/** The connected wallet, as long as it is an ordinary one on `account` (or, with `safe`, a Safe app). */
+async function requireOrdinaryWallet(adapter, account, safe = false) {
+    await walletReady(adapter);
+    if (adapter.kind !== "wallet")
+        throw unsupportedWalletRequest();
+    const connected = adapter.account();
+    if (!connected)
+        throw new Error("Connect a wallet first.");
+    if (connected.toLowerCase() !== account.toLowerCase()) {
+        throw new Error(ACCOUNT_CHANGED);
+    }
+    // Signed requests and their proof need an ordinary wallet's own transaction.
+    if (adapter.isSafe() && !safe)
+        throw new Error(ORDINARY_WALLET);
+}
+/** Whether `target` on `chainId` trusts the chain's canonical forwarder, so the real sender is kept. */
+async function trustsForwarder(client, chainId, target) {
+    const forwarder = relayrForwarder(chainId);
+    if (!forwarder)
+        return false;
+    try {
+        const data = await simulateStateChangingTransaction(client, {
+            from: forwarder,
+            to: target,
+            data: encodeFunctionData({
+                abi: TRUSTED_FORWARDER_ABI,
+                functionName: "isTrustedForwarder",
+                args: [forwarder],
+            }),
+            gas: 100000n,
+        });
+        return decodeFunctionResult({
+            abi: TRUSTED_FORWARDER_ABI,
+            functionName: "isTrustedForwarder",
+            data,
+        });
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * The forward request each call is signed as: from `account`, with the
+ * forwarder nonce read now and the default deadline. Refuses more than one
+ * call per chain, chains outside one Relayr network family, a gas limit that
+ * is not positive, and a destination that does not trust the forwarder.
+ */
+async function forwardRequests(calls, account, clientFor) {
+    const read = [...calls].map(({ chainId, target, data, value, gas }) => ({
+        chainId,
+        target,
+        data,
+        value: value ?? 0n,
+        gas,
+    }));
+    if (!read.length)
+        throw new Error("Choose at least one chain.");
+    const chainIds = read.map((call) => call.chainId);
+    if (!relayrSupportsChains(chainIds)) {
+        throw new Error("Relayr runs one call per supported destination, all mainnets or all testnets.");
+    }
+    if (read.some((call) => typeof call.gas !== "bigint" || call.gas <= 0n)) {
+        throw new Error("Each relayed call needs a positive gas limit.");
+    }
+    const deadline = relayrForwarderDeadline();
+    return Promise.all(read.map(async (call) => {
+        const client = clientFor(call.chainId);
+        if (!(await trustsForwarder(client, call.chainId, call.target))) {
+            throw new Error(`The target on chain ${call.chainId} does not trust the canonical forwarder. Send this action directly.`);
+        }
+        const nonce = await client.readContract({
+            address: forwarderOn(call.chainId),
+            abi: erc2771ForwarderAbi,
+            functionName: "nonces",
+            args: [account],
+        });
+        return {
+            chainId: call.chainId,
+            request: {
+                from: account,
+                to: call.target,
+                value: call.value,
+                gas: call.gas,
+                nonce,
+                deadline,
+                data: call.data,
+            },
+        };
+    }));
+}
+/** The bundle entry that runs `request` with `signature` through the chain's forwarder. */
+function entryOf(chainId, request, signature) {
+    const { from, to, value, gas, deadline, data } = request;
+    return {
+        chain: chainId,
+        target: forwarderOn(chainId),
+        data: encodeFunctionData({
+            abi: erc2771ForwarderAbi,
+            functionName: "execute",
+            args: [{ from, to, value, gas, deadline, data, signature }],
+        }),
+        value: value.toString(),
+    };
+}
+/** Post `entries` to Relayr and bind its quote to them (see {@link bindRelayrQuote}). */
+async function postBundle(entries) {
+    const request = relayrBundleRequest(entries);
+    const response = await globalThis.fetch(`${RELAYR_API}/v1/bundle/prepaid`, {
+        method: "POST",
+        headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
+        body: JSON.stringify(request),
+        signal: AbortSignal.timeout(QUOTE_TIMEOUT_MS),
+    });
+    return bindRelayrQuote(response, request);
+}
+/** Refuses while a payment held under `intent` may still land, or, for `paidOnce`, once one succeeded. */
+function requireIntentClear(deps, account, intent) {
+    for (const chainId of intent.funding) {
+        const state = openStepHold(deps.hold, account, false, {
+            chainId,
+            to: RELAYR_PAYMENT_ADDRESS,
+            data: "0x",
+            intent: intent.key,
+        }).peek();
+        if (state.status !== "clear")
+            throw new WriteHeldError(state);
+        if (intent.paidOnce && state.settled?.result === "success") {
+            throw new Error("This Relayr payment already succeeded. Do not pay again.");
+        }
+    }
+}
+/** The quote's authenticated payment on `chainId`. */
+function paymentOn(quote, chainId) {
+    const destinationChainIds = quote.expectedTransactions.map((binding) => binding.chain);
+    const option = relayrPaymentOptions(quote, destinationChainIds).find((payment) => payment.chain === chainId);
+    if (!option &&
+        relayrPaymentOptions(quote, destinationChainIds, 0).some((payment) => payment.chain === chainId)) {
+        // Offered, but already too close to its deadline to pay.
+        throw new QuoteExpiredError();
+    }
+    if (!option) {
+        throw new Error(`Relayr returned no payment option on chain ${chainId}. Nothing was paid.`);
+    }
+    return relayrPaymentDetails(option, {
+        bundleUuid: quote.bundle_uuid,
+        destinationChainIds,
+        expectedTransactions: quote.expectedTransactions,
+    });
+}
+/** The calls a quote's bundle runs, as a plan holds them; a raw value that can't be read matches none. */
+function quotedCalls(quote) {
+    return quote.expectedTransactions.map(({ chain, entry }) => {
+        const request = relayrForwardRequest(entry);
+        if (request) {
+            const { from, to, data, value, gas } = request;
+            return { chainId: chain, from, to, data, value, gas };
+        }
+        return {
+            chainId: chain,
+            from: "relayr",
+            to: entry.target,
+            data: entry.data,
+            value: /^\d+$/u.test(entry.value) ? BigInt(entry.value) : -1n,
+        };
+    });
+}
+function withMargin(fee) {
+    return (fee * RELAYR_FEE_MARGIN_BPS + 9999n) / 10000n;
+}
+/**
+ * Relayr's fee for `calls` signed by a key made for this quote alone: the
+ * same chains, gas limits and values, so Relayr prices the same work. The key
+ * lives only in memory for this call and leaves it only inside the requests'
+ * signatures.
+ */
+async function standInFee(calls, paymentChainId, deadline) {
+    const signer = privateKeyToAccount(generatePrivateKey());
+    const entries = await Promise.all(calls.map(async ({ chainId, target, data, value, gas, raw }) => {
+        // Anyone may run a raw call: it is its own stand-in.
+        if (raw)
+            return { chain: chainId, target, data, value: value.toString() };
+        const request = {
+            from: signer.address,
+            to: target,
+            value,
+            gas,
+            deadline,
+            data,
+        };
+        const signature = await signer.signTypedData({
+            domain: {
+                name: "Juicebox",
+                version: "1",
+                chainId,
+                verifyingContract: forwarderOn(chainId),
+            },
+            types: FORWARD_REQUEST_TYPES,
+            primaryType: "ForwardRequest",
+            // A key made now has used no forwarder nonce.
+            message: { ...request, nonce: 0n },
+        });
+        return entryOf(chainId, request, signature);
+    }));
+    return paymentOn(await postBundle(entries), paymentChainId).amount;
+}
+/**
+ * The fee cap the review shows: Relayr's quote for stand-ins of `calls`, plus
+ * {@link RELAYR_FEE_MARGIN_BPS}. A call that runs only for the real sender
+ * (an owner's action) can't be stood in, so a call with the same chain, gas
+ * and calldata length that anyone can run (JBProjects' `balanceOf`) is quoted
+ * instead, with the calls' values added. Without either quote in time, the
+ * fee is bounded locally: each call's gas estimate through the forwarder as
+ * `account`, at the chain's gas price, times {@link RELAYR_FEE_MARKUP_BPS}.
+ */
+export async function relayrFeeCap(calls, account, paymentChainId, clientFor) {
+    const read = calls.map((call) => ({ ...call, value: call.value ?? 0n }));
+    const deadline = relayrForwarderDeadline();
+    const values = read.reduce((sum, call) => sum + call.value, 0n);
+    const quoted = await timeout(standInFee(read, paymentChainId, deadline).catch(async () => {
+        const filler = privateKeyToAccount(generatePrivateKey()).address;
+        return ((await standInFee(read.map((call) => {
+            const probe = encodeFunctionData({
+                abi: BALANCE_OF_ABI,
+                functionName: "balanceOf",
+                args: [filler],
+            });
+            const bytes = Math.max((call.data.length - probe.length) / 2, 0);
+            return {
+                ...call,
+                raw: false,
+                target: jbV6ContractAddress.JBProjects[call.chainId],
+                data: `${probe}${"00".repeat(bytes)}`,
+                value: 0n,
+            };
+        }), paymentChainId, deadline)) + values);
+    }), STAND_IN_TIMEOUT_MS).catch(() => null);
+    if (quoted !== null)
+        return withMargin(quoted);
+    let bound = values;
+    for (const call of read) {
+        const client = clientFor(call.chainId);
+        const estimate = await client
+            .estimateGas(call.raw
+            ? { to: call.target, data: call.data, value: call.value }
+            : {
+                account: forwarderOn(call.chainId),
+                to: call.target,
+                // ERC-2771: the forwarder appends the real sender.
+                data: concat([call.data, account]),
+                value: call.value,
+            })
+            .catch(() => call.gas);
+        const gas = (estimate > call.gas ? estimate : call.gas) +
+            (call.raw ? 0n : FORWARDER_OVERHEAD_GAS);
+        bound +=
+            (gas * (await client.getGasPrice()) * RELAYR_FEE_MARKUP_BPS) / 10000n;
+    }
+    return withMargin(bound);
+}
+/** The payment as the review shows it: one call to Relayr's pinned payment contract. */
+function paymentReviewCall(details, account, safe = false) {
+    const { functionName, args } = decodeFunctionData({
+        abi: RELAYR_PAYMENT_ABI,
+        data: details.calldata,
+    });
+    return {
+        chainId: details.chainId,
+        from: account,
+        to: RELAYR_PAYMENT_ADDRESS,
+        data: details.calldata,
+        value: details.amount,
+        // A Safe signs the sent gas as safeTxGas; 0 makes a failed payment revert.
+        ...(safe ? { safeTxGas: 0n } : { gas: RELAYR_PAYMENT_GAS }),
+        abi: RELAYR_PAYMENT_ABI,
+        functionName,
+        args,
+        label: "Pay network fee",
+        contractName: "Relayr payment",
+    };
+}
+async function reviewPayment(details, account, action, safe = false) {
+    const model = buildReviewModel({
+        calls: [paymentReviewCall(details, account, safe)],
+        title: action.title ?? "Review network fee",
+        ...(action.context ? { context: action.context } : {}),
+    });
+    await promptReview(model, Promise.resolve({ status: "passed" }), Promise.resolve(model));
+}
+/**
+ * Send one reviewed payment without asking again: Relayr's pinned contract
+ * and selector only, from `account`, after the runtime and simulation checks,
+ * under the payment's write hold (or `intent`'s). The payment must be proven
+ * from the chain before the hash it was mined under comes back.
+ */
+async function sendPayment(details, account, deps, hooks = {}) {
+    const { adapter } = deps;
+    const safe = hooks.safe ?? false;
+    await requireOrdinaryWallet(adapter, account, safe);
+    const client = deps.clientFor(details.chainId);
+    const call = {
+        chainId: details.chainId,
+        to: RELAYR_PAYMENT_ADDRESS,
+        data: details.calldata,
+        value: details.amount,
+        ...(hooks.intent ? { intent: hooks.intent.key } : {}),
+    };
+    const handle = openStepHold(deps.hold, account, safe, call);
+    /** The attempt is saved (`onSending`), and the wallet not yet asked. */
+    let saved = false;
+    let invoked = false;
+    /** The reservation this payment's send took. */
+    let reserved;
+    /** A proposal of exactly this payment its Safe already queued, sent in its place. */
+    let queued = null;
+    const attempt = () => {
+        const held = handle.peek();
+        if (held.status !== "clear")
+            throw new WriteHeldError(held);
+        return handle.send(client, (gate) => submitReviewedContractWrite({
+            request: call,
+            expectedAccount: account,
+            review: () => Promise.resolve(),
+            switchChain: async (chainId) => {
+                if (adapter.chainId() !== chainId)
+                    await adapter.switchChain(chainId);
+            },
+            currentAccount: () => adapter.account(),
+            reverify: async () => {
+                await hooks.recheck?.();
+                // A lapsed payment would only revert in simulation.
+                if (quoteExpired(details.deadline))
+                    throw new QuoteExpiredError();
+                await requireRelayrPaymentRuntime(client);
+            },
+            simulate: async () => {
+                const [, found] = await Promise.all([
+                    simulateRelayrPayment(client, {
+                        from: account,
+                        payment: details,
+                    }),
+                    // A Safe never proposes again a payment it already queued exactly.
+                    safe && hasSafeService(details.chainId)
+                        ? findPendingSafeAppProposal(client, details.chainId, account, {
+                            to: RELAYR_PAYMENT_ADDRESS,
+                            data: details.calldata,
+                            value: details.amount,
+                        }, deps.hold.safeService, true)
+                        : null,
+                ]);
+                queued = found;
+                return details;
+            },
+            beforeWrite: async () => {
+                const { intent } = hooks;
+                // Only the check and the reservation are under the lock: never a
+                // chain switch, simulation or wallet that might not answer.
+                await (intent
+                    ? browserLocks().request(`nana-sdk:relayr-payment:${account.toLowerCase()}:${intent.key}`, { mode: "exclusive" }, async () => {
+                        requireIntentClear(deps, account, intent);
+                        await gate.beforeSend();
+                    })
+                    : gate.beforeSend());
+                reserved = handle.peek().reservation;
+                try {
+                    await hooks.onSending?.();
+                }
+                catch (error) {
+                    gate.onRejected();
+                    throw error;
+                }
+                saved = true;
+            },
+            beforeSend: () => {
+                try {
+                    if (details.target.toLowerCase() !== RELAYR_PAYMENT_ADDRESS ||
+                        details.calldata.slice(0, 10).toLowerCase() !==
+                            RELAYR_PAYMENT_SELECTOR) {
+                        throw new Error("The Relayr payment is not to its pinned contract.");
+                    }
+                    if (quoteExpired(details.deadline))
+                        throw new QuoteExpiredError();
+                    if (adapter.isSafe() !== safe)
+                        throw new Error(safe
+                            ? "Wallet connection changed. Review the payment again."
+                            : ORDINARY_WALLET);
+                    if (adapter.chainId() !== details.chainId) {
+                        throw new Error("Your wallet changed networks. Review the payment again.");
+                    }
+                    // Last, after every callback above could have run.
+                    if (adapter.account()?.toLowerCase() !== account.toLowerCase()) {
+                        throw new Error(ACCOUNT_CHANGED);
+                    }
+                }
+                catch (error) {
+                    throw new RelayrPaymentNotSentError(error);
+                }
+            },
+            onBeforeWriteAborted: () => gate.onRejected(),
+            onWriteRejected: () => gate.onRejected(),
+            onWriteSubmitted: async (submitted) => {
+                gate.afterSubmit(submitted, queued?.tx);
+                await hooks.onSent?.(submitted);
+            },
+            // The pinned contract and gas, never the quote's word.
+            write: async ({ chainId, calldata, amount }) => {
+                // An adopted proposal is already with the Safe: never "not sent".
+                invoked = true;
+                if (queued)
+                    return queued.proposalHash;
+                try {
+                    return await adapter.sendTransaction({
+                        chainId,
+                        to: RELAYR_PAYMENT_ADDRESS,
+                        data: calldata,
+                        value: amount,
+                        gas: safe ? 0n : RELAYR_PAYMENT_GAS,
+                    });
+                }
+                catch (error) {
+                    // Only the wallet's own 4001 says it declined.
+                    throw relayrWalletPaymentError(error);
+                }
+            },
+        }));
+    };
+    let hash;
+    try {
+        if (hooks.intent)
+            requireIntentClear(deps, account, hooks.intent);
+        hash = await attempt();
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        // Saved as sending, refused by a final gate, never given to the wallet.
+        if (saved && !invoked && !(error instanceof RelayrPaymentNotSentError)) {
+            throw new RelayrPaymentNotSentError(error);
+        }
+        throw error;
+    }
+    // A proposal: its hold follows it to the Safe's execution.
+    if (safe)
+        return hash;
+    // From here the payment was sent: it ends proven, reverted or
+    // contradicted as the chain shows it, or unreadable with its hash, never
+    // as a bare read failure.
+    try {
+        // The watcher's receipt only says when to ask the hold: the hold checks
+        // the receipt itself and settles, so a reverted payment can be reviewed
+        // and sent again without waiting on a view. Its settlement is the only
+        // word on a revert; a success is proven below either way.
+        const seen = await waitForTrackedReceipt(client, hash);
+        const state = await handle.state(client).catch(() => undefined);
+        const settled = state?.status === "clear" &&
+            reserved !== undefined &&
+            state.reservation === reserved &&
+            state.settled &&
+            "hash" in state.settled
+            ? state.settled
+            : undefined;
+        // A wallet that sped the payment up mined it under another hash.
+        const mined = settled?.hash ?? seen.transactionHash;
+        if (mined.toLowerCase() !== hash.toLowerCase()) {
+            try {
+                await hooks.onSent?.(mined);
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw new SubmittedContractWriteError(mined, error);
+            }
+        }
+        if (settled?.result === "failed")
+            throw new ReviewedCallRevertedError(0, mined, await heldReceipt(settled, client, seen));
+        if (!settled && seen.status === "reverted")
+            throw new RelayrProofUnavailableError(`Could not read Relayr payment ${mined} on chain ${details.chainId}. Do not pay again; check it later.`);
+        // A proof the node can't read yet is read again, as long as `follow` would
+        // follow a step, a read that stalls included; a contradicting proof is
+        // never retried. Past that, it is unreadable, its hash kept in the line.
+        const deadline = Date.now() + FOLLOW_MS;
+        let unread;
+        for (;;) {
+            const left = deadline - Date.now();
+            let timer;
+            try {
+                const proven = await Promise.race([
+                    verifyRelayrPayment(client, {
+                        hash: mined,
+                        from: account,
+                        payment: details,
+                    }).then(() => true),
+                    new Promise((resolve) => {
+                        timer = setTimeout(() => resolve(false), Math.max(left, 0));
+                    }),
+                ]);
+                if (proven)
+                    return mined;
+                throw Object.assign(new RelayrProofUnavailableError(`Could not read Relayr payment ${mined} on chain ${details.chainId}. Do not pay again; check it later.`), { cause: unread });
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                if (!(error instanceof RelayrProofUnavailableError) ||
+                    deadline - Date.now() <= 0)
+                    throw error;
+                unread = error;
+                await pause(Math.min(RECEIPT_RETRY_MS, deadline - Date.now()), undefined, () => null);
+            }
+            finally {
+                clearTimeout(timer);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        if (error instanceof ReviewedCallRevertedError ||
+            error instanceof RelayrProofError ||
+            error instanceof RelayrProofUnavailableError ||
+            error instanceof SubmittedContractWriteError)
+            throw error;
+        throw Object.assign(new RelayrProofUnavailableError(`Could not read Relayr payment ${hash} on chain ${details.chainId}. Do not pay again; check it later.`), { cause: error });
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Signs `calls` as ERC-2771 forward requests after one review of the
+ * requests, decoded, and returns the Relayr bundle entries that run them.
+ * Each destination must trust the chain's canonical forwarder. Nothing is
+ * posted or paid.
+ */
+export async function signReviewedForwardRequests(calls, action, deps) {
+    const { account } = action;
+    await requireOrdinaryWallet(deps.adapter, account);
+    const requests = await forwardRequests(calls, account, deps.clientFor);
+    const prepared = requests.map(({ chainId, request }) => prepareSignature({ kind: "forward-request", chainId, request }, account));
+    const model = buildReviewModel({
+        calls: [],
+        signatures: prepared.map(({ review }) => review),
+        title: action.title ?? "Review relayed transactions",
+        ...(action.context ? { context: action.context } : {}),
+    });
+    await promptReview(model, Promise.resolve({ status: "passed" }), Promise.resolve(model));
+    const signatures = await signPrepared(prepared, account, deps.adapter);
+    return requests.map(({ chainId, request }, index) => entryOf(chainId, request, signatures[index]));
+}
+/**
+ * Pays a Relayr quote after one review of the payment: the option on
+ * `chainId`, authenticated against the quote, sent to Relayr's pinned
+ * contract and proven from the chain. For a payment resumed apart from its
+ * signatures. A Safe app pays by proposal: `safeTxHash` comes back, held
+ * until the Safe runs it. `onSending` runs after the hold reserves, right
+ * before the wallet opens (a throw sends nothing); `onSent` gets every hash
+ * the payment is known by. With `plan` and `relayrRound`, a quote of exactly
+ * that round's calls spends the round's reviewed fee bound once: at most
+ * the bound pays with no prompt, and a higher fee, a spent round or another
+ * chain is asked.
+ */
+export async function payRelayrReviewed(quote, chainId, action, deps) {
+    const { account } = action;
+    await walletReady(deps.adapter);
+    const safe = deps.adapter.isSafe();
+    await requireOrdinaryWallet(deps.adapter, account, safe);
+    const details = paymentOn(quote, chainId);
+    const intent = {
+        key: `relayr:${details.bundleUuid}`,
+        funding: relayrPaymentChains(quote.expectedTransactions.map((binding) => binding.chain)),
+        paidOnce: true,
+    };
+    requireIntentClear(deps, account, intent);
+    if (action.plan && action.relayrRound !== undefined) {
+        const cap = spendPlannedRelayrRound(action.plan, account, action.relayrRound, quotedCalls(quote), details.chainId);
+        if (cap === undefined || details.amount > cap)
+            await reviewPayment(details, account, {
+                title: cap ? "The network fee went up" : "Review network fee",
+                ...(action.context ? { context: action.context } : {}),
+            }, safe);
+    }
+    else if (action.plan)
+        spendPlan(action.plan, account, [
+            {
+                chainId: details.chainId,
+                from: account,
+                to: RELAYR_PAYMENT_ADDRESS,
+                data: details.calldata,
+                value: details.amount,
+            },
+        ]);
+    else
+        await reviewPayment(details, account, action, safe);
+    const hash = await sendPayment(details, account, deps, {
+        intent,
+        // Relayr's own word too, whatever this browser kept of earlier payments.
+        recheck: () => requireRelayrBundleUnpaid(details.bundleUuid),
+        ...(action.onSending ? { onSending: action.onSending } : {}),
+        ...(action.onSent ? { onSent: action.onSent } : {}),
+        safe,
+    });
+    return safe ? { safeTxHash: hash } : { hash };
+}
+/**
+ * Relayr's bundle once every one of its `expectedCount` transactions reports
+ * success. Only `failed`, in any case, is final; every other state, and a
+ * read that fails, is polled again every 2.5 seconds, for up to 5 minutes.
+ * Relayr's word is not proof: verify the destinations from the chain.
+ */
+export async function pollRelayrBundle(uuid, expectedCount, options = {}) {
+    if (!Number.isSafeInteger(expectedCount) || expectedCount < 1) {
+        throw new Error("Relayr polling requires the exact destination count.");
+    }
+    const { signal } = options;
+    const until = Date.now() + POLL_TIMEOUT_MS;
+    for (;;) {
+        signal?.throwIfAborted();
+        const bundle = await readRelayrBundle(uuid, {
+            ...(options.fetch ? { fetch: options.fetch } : {}),
+        }).catch(() => null);
+        const records = Array.isArray(bundle?.transactions)
+            ? bundle.transactions
+            : [];
+        const failed = records.filter((record) => relayrStateIsFailed(record?.status?.state)).length;
+        if (failed) {
+            throw new Error(`Relayr could not run this on ${failed} chain${failed === 1 ? "" : "s"}.`);
+        }
+        if (bundle &&
+            records.length === expectedCount &&
+            records.every((record) => relayrStateIsSuccess(record?.status?.state))) {
+            return bundle;
+        }
+        if (Date.now() >= until) {
+            throw new Error(`Relayr is still processing paid bundle ${uuid}. Do not submit this action again; check it later.`);
+        }
+        await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+            const timer = setTimeout(resolve, POLL_INTERVAL_MS);
+            signal?.addEventListener("abort", () => {
+                clearTimeout(timer);
+                reject(signal.reason);
+            }, { once: true });
+        });
+    }
+}
+/** A Safe execution as the review shows it: the Safe's `execTransaction`, with the call or MultiSend inside. */
+function safeExecutionCall(entry) {
+    const decoded = decodeFunctionData({ abi: SAFE_EXEC_ABI, data: entry.data });
+    if (decoded.functionName !== "execTransaction") {
+        throw new Error("The saved call is not a Safe execution.");
+    }
+    const [to, value, data, operation] = decoded.args;
+    const inner = multiSendCallsOf({ to, data, operation }) ?? [
+        { to, value, data },
+    ];
+    return {
+        chainId: entry.chain,
+        to: entry.target,
+        data: entry.data,
+        value: BigInt(entry.value),
+        abi: SAFE_EXEC_ABI,
+        functionName: "execTransaction",
+        args: decoded.args,
+        contractName: "Safe",
+        calls: inner.map((call) => decodeReviewCall({ chainId: entry.chain, from: entry.target, ...call })),
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * The wallet side of {@link createSafeRelayrController}: `review` shows the
+ * frozen Safe executions in core's review, and `sendPayment` reviews and
+ * sends the selected payment as {@link payRelayrReviewed} does, with the
+ * controller's checks and journal callbacks around the wallet. A quote paid
+ * before is paid again only when {@link requireRelayrRetry} clears every
+ * earlier payment.
+ */
+export function safeRelayrWalletDeps(deps) {
+    return {
+        review: async (executions, { resumed }) => {
+            const model = buildReviewModel({
+                calls: executions.map(({ entry }) => safeExecutionCall(entry)),
+                title: `Review ${executions.length} Safe execution${executions.length === 1 ? "" : "s"}`,
+                confirmLabel: resumed
+                    ? "Use saved quote"
+                    : "Review & get payment options",
+            });
+            await promptReview(model, Promise.resolve({ status: "passed" }), Promise.resolve(model));
+        },
+        sendPayment: async ({ session, payment, beforeSend, onSending, onSent, }) => {
+            const { account } = session;
+            await requireOrdinaryWallet(deps.adapter, account);
+            if (session.payments.length >= MAX_RELAYR_SENT_PAYMENTS) {
+                throw new Error("This Relayr quote was paid too many times to pay again. Keep it pending; do not pay again.");
+            }
+            if (!session.quote)
+                throw new Error("This Safe action has no quote to pay.");
+            const details = relayrPaymentDetails(payment, {
+                bundleUuid: session.quote.bundle_uuid,
+                destinationChainIds: session.executions.map(({ entry }) => entry.chain),
+            });
+            await reviewPayment(details, account, {});
+            const payments = [...session.payments];
+            const hash = await sendPayment(details, account, deps, {
+                recheck: async () => {
+                    await beforeSend();
+                    if (session.payments.length) {
+                        await requireRelayrRetry(deps.clientFor, {
+                            payments: session.payments,
+                            from: account,
+                            bundleUuid: details.bundleUuid,
+                        });
+                    }
+                },
+                onSending,
+                onSent: async (sent) => {
+                    payments.push(sentRelayrPayment(details, sent));
+                    await onSent([...payments]);
+                },
+            });
+            return { hash, payments };
+        },
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=relayrSend.js.map