@ballkidz/defifa 0.0.40 → 0.0.42

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-# Cryptoeconomics of Defifa
-
-**Claude Opus 4.6 (Anthropic) in coordination with Jango from the Defifa Team.**
-*This analysis was generated by Claude Opus 4.6 based on its study of the Defifa V6 codebase and the [Revnet Whitepaper](https://cryptoeconlab.com/paper/pub-0?paper=https%253A%252F%252Fstorage.googleapis.com%252Fcel-public-resources%252FRevnet-Whitepaper.pdf) by CryptoEconLab.*
-
-*March 2026*
-
----
-
-## Abstract
-
-Defifa is a prediction-game protocol built on Juicebox V6 that transforms NFT minting into a parimutuel wagering mechanism with governance-ratified outcomes. Players purchase ERC-721 game pieces representing competing tiers (teams, candidates, outcomes), forming a shared treasury. After the event concludes, a decentralized attestation process ratifies a scorecard that assigns weights to each tier, redistributing the treasury proportionally. This paper formalizes the cryptoeconomic mechanics of Defifa games: the prize distribution formula, the attestation governance model, the fee extraction pipeline, the protocol-token incentive layer, and the rational actor strategies that emerge. We derive solvency guarantees, characterize equilibrium behavior under various participation profiles, analyze the game-theoretic properties of the scorecard ratification process, and identify the parameter regimes that maximize game integrity and participant welfare.
-
-Throughout, we illustrate the mechanics with a running example: a **FIFA World Cup game with 32 tiers** — one per national team — priced at 0.01 ETH each.
-
----
-
-## Contents
-
-1. [Introduction](#1-introduction)
-   1. [What is Defifa?](#11-what-is-defifa)
-   2. [How a Defifa Game Works (at a glance)](#12-how-a-defifa-game-works-at-a-glance)
-   3. [The Design Parameters](#13-the-design-parameters)
-2. [Mathematical Model of Defifa Economics](#2-mathematical-model-of-defifa-economics)
-   1. [Parameters and State Variables](#21-parameters-and-state-variables)
-   2. [Minting — Pot Formation](#22-minting--pot-formation)
-   3. [Refund — Optionality Window](#23-refund--optionality-window)
-   4. [Prize Distribution — The Scorecard Formula](#24-prize-distribution--the-scorecard-formula)
-   5. [Fee Extraction Pipeline](#25-fee-extraction-pipeline)
-   6. [Protocol Token Allocation](#26-protocol-token-allocation)
-3. [Attestation Governance and Scorecard Ratification](#3-attestation-governance-and-scorecard-ratification)
-   1. [Voting Power Model](#31-voting-power-model)
-   2. [Quorum and Ratification Conditions](#32-quorum-and-ratification-conditions)
-   3. [Scorecard Lifecycle](#33-scorecard-lifecycle)
-   4. [Resistance to Strategic Manipulation](#34-resistance-to-strategic-manipulation)
-4. [Price Dynamics and Value Flows](#4-price-dynamics-and-value-flows)
-   1. [NFT Intrinsic Value During Minting](#41-nft-intrinsic-value-during-minting)
-   2. [Post-Scorecard Valuation](#42-post-scorecard-valuation)
-   3. [Secondary Market Implications](#43-secondary-market-implications)
-5. [Rational Actor Analysis](#5-rational-actor-analysis)
-   1. [Mint-Phase Strategy: Entry Timing](#51-mint-phase-strategy-entry-timing)
-   2. [Refund-Phase Strategy: Option Exercise](#52-refund-phase-strategy-option-exercise)
-   3. [Scoring-Phase Strategy: Attestation Delegation](#53-scoring-phase-strategy-attestation-delegation)
-   4. [Complete-Phase Strategy: Claim vs Hold](#54-complete-phase-strategy-claim-vs-hold)
-6. [Solvency and Conservation Laws](#6-solvency-and-conservation-laws)
-   1. [The Conservation Guarantee](#61-the-conservation-guarantee)
-   2. [Solvency Under Sequential Cash-Outs](#62-solvency-under-sequential-cash-outs)
-   3. [Fee Impact on Total Claimable Value](#63-fee-impact-on-total-claimable-value)
-7. [Game-Theoretic Properties](#7-game-theoretic-properties)
-   1. [Defifa as a Parimutuel Mechanism](#71-defifa-as-a-parimutuel-mechanism)
-   2. [Information Aggregation](#72-information-aggregation)
-   3. [Multi-Game Dynamics and Protocol Flywheel](#73-multi-game-dynamics-and-protocol-flywheel)
-8. [Parameter Design Space](#8-parameter-design-space)
-   1. [Tier Count and Price Calibration](#81-tier-count-and-price-calibration)
-   2. [Timing Parameters](#82-timing-parameters)
-   3. [Fee Calibration and Protocol Sustainability](#83-fee-calibration-and-protocol-sustainability)
-9. [Safety Mechanisms](#9-safety-mechanisms)
-   1. [The No-Contest System](#91-the-no-contest-system)
-   2. [Governance Attack Economics](#92-governance-attack-economics)
-   3. [Resilient Game Design](#93-resilient-game-design)
-   4. [Governance Hardening](#94-governance-hardening)
-   5. [Governance Deadlock Analysis](#95-governance-deadlock-analysis)
-10. [Conclusions and Practical Implications](#10-conclusions-and-practical-implications)
-
----
-
-## 1 Introduction
-
-### 1.1 What is Defifa?
-
-Defifa is a prediction-game protocol that transforms the act of purchasing an NFT into a wager on the outcome of a real-world event. It is deployed using the Juicebox V6 protocol and governed by a combination of immutable smart-contract rules and a minimal, time-bounded governance process for outcome resolution.
-
-A Defifa game is a *tokenized parimutuel pool*: money goes in via NFT purchases, forming a shared pot; after the event concludes, a governance process assigns weights to each tier (team, outcome, candidate), and the pot is distributed proportionally. The game pieces are ERC-721 tokens organized into tiers, where each tier represents a distinct prediction. The purchase price is uniform across all tiers — enforced at the protocol level — and the payout is determined by post-event scorecard ratification.
-
-**Running example: World Cup 2026.** Imagine a Defifa game for the FIFA World Cup with 32 tiers — one for each national team — priced at 0.01 ETH each. Argentina is Tier 1, France is Tier 2, Brazil is Tier 3, ..., and Saudi Arabia is Tier 32. Anyone can mint NFTs for the team they believe will win (or perform well), and after the tournament, a scorecard assigns weights reflecting the actual results.
-
-Defifa games are:
-
-- **Deterministic in structure**: all phases, durations, tier prices, and fee schedules are fixed at deployment.
-- **Governance-minimal**: the only human input is the scorecard — a mapping from tiers to weights — ratified through an attestation process.
-- **Self-custodial**: all funds remain in the Juicebox treasury; no operator can access them outside the protocol rules.
-- **Composable**: games are standard Juicebox projects, inheriting the full protocol's accounting, terminal, and hook infrastructure.
-
-### 1.2 How a Defifa Game Works (at a glance)
-
-1. **Mint (pot formation).** During the mint phase, anyone can purchase NFTs representing tiers at the game's uniform price. All payments flow into a shared treasury — the *pot*. Players may delegate their attestation power to a chosen delegate at mint time.
-
-2. **Refund (optional exit window).** If configured, a refund phase follows minting. During this period, players may burn their NFTs to reclaim the original mint price, allowing a risk-free exit for those who change their minds. No new mints are accepted.
-
-3. **Score (outcome resolution).** Once the real-world event concludes, anyone may propose a *scorecard* — a vector of weights summing to $W_{\text{total}} = 10^{18}$ — assigning each tier its share of the pot. NFT holders attest to the scorecard they believe reflects the correct outcome. Once a scorecard achieves quorum, it can be ratified. Scorecard submission is restricted to the SCORING phase — no pre-scoring submissions are allowed.
-
-4. **Complete (prize distribution).** After ratification, protocol fees are extracted, and the remaining pot is available for claims. Each NFT holder burns their token to receive their proportional share, plus any accrued protocol tokens ($\text{DEFIFA}$ and $\text{NANA}$).
-
-5. **No contest (safety fallback).** If the game fails to attract sufficient participation or the scorecard is not ratified within the configured timeout, the game enters a NO_CONTEST state where all players can reclaim their original mint prices.
-
-**World Cup example.** The World Cup game mints for 30 days before the tournament. Fans buy Argentina NFTs, France NFTs, etc. After the final, someone submits a scorecard: the champion's tier gets 40% of the weight, the runner-up gets 20%, semifinalists get 10% each, and quarterfinalists share the remaining 20%. Holders attest, the scorecard is ratified, fees are extracted, and holders of the champion's NFTs receive their proportional share of a now-concentrated prize pool.
-
-### 1.3 The Design Parameters
-
-A Defifa game is fully specified at deployment by a parameter tuple:
-
-$$\mathcal{G} = \left( \{T_i\}_{i=1}^{N}, \; p, \; t_{\text{mint}}, \; t_{\text{refund}}, \; t_{\text{start}}, \; \phi_{\text{defifa}}, \; \phi_{\text{base}}, \; \mathcal{S}, \; \tau_{\text{attest}}, \; \tau_{\text{grace}}, \; m_{\text{min}}, \; \tau_{\text{timeout}} \right) \tag{1}$$
-
-Where:
-
-1. **Tier configuration** $\{T_i\}_{i=1}^{N}$: For each of the $N$ tiers (maximum 128), an optional reserved rate $\rho_i$, a reserved-token beneficiary address, a name, and an optional IPFS URI. The initial supply per tier is set to $999{,}999{,}999$ (effectively unlimited).
-
-2. **Uniform tier price** ($p$): A single fixed price applied to all tiers, denominated in the game's base asset (e.g., ETH). Uniform pricing is enforced at the protocol level via the `tierPrice` parameter in `DefifaLaunchProjectData`, ensuring that price-based voting power is equal across tiers.
-
-3. **Mint period duration** ($t_{\text{mint}}$): How long the minting window stays open, in seconds.
-
-4. **Refund period duration** ($t_{\text{refund}}$): How long the refund window stays open after minting closes. May be zero (no refund phase).
-
-5. **Game start time** ($t_{\text{start}}$): When the scoring phase begins — typically aligned with the real-world event's conclusion.
-
-6. **Defifa fee divisor** ($\phi_{\text{defifa}}$): The fraction $1/\phi_{\text{defifa}}$ of the pot sent to the Defifa protocol project. Default: $\phi_{\text{defifa}} = 20$ (5%).
-
-7. **Base protocol fee divisor** ($\phi_{\text{base}}$): The fraction $1/\phi_{\text{base}}$ of the pot sent to the base protocol project (Juicebox / NANA). Default: $\phi_{\text{base}} = 40$ (2.5%).
-
-8. **Splits** ($\mathcal{S}$): Additional payout splits configured at deployment (e.g., for game organizers, charities).
-
-9. **Attestation start time** ($\tau_{\text{attest}}$): The earliest time at which attestation voting opens on submitted scorecards.
-
-10. **Attestation grace period** ($\tau_{\text{grace}}$): Minimum duration attestations must remain open after $\tau_{\text{attest}}$, even if quorum is already met. Protocol-enforced minimum: 1 day.
-
-11. **Minimum participation** ($m_{\text{min}}$): The minimum treasury balance required for the game to proceed to scoring. If the balance is below this threshold when SCORING would begin, the game enters NO_CONTEST. Set to 0 to disable.
-
-12. **Scorecard timeout** ($\tau_{\text{timeout}}$): The maximum time (in seconds) after the scoring phase begins for a scorecard to be ratified. If exceeded without ratification, the game enters NO_CONTEST. Set to 0 to disable.
-
-Once set, the tuple $\mathcal{G}$ is immutable. Phase transitions occur automatically by timestamp, with the scoring phase having infinite duration (duration = 0) until the scorecard is ratified or the timeout elapses.
-
-**World Cup example parameters:**
-
-$$\mathcal{G}_{\text{WC}} = \left( \{T_i\}_{i=1}^{32}, \; 0.01\text{ ETH}, \; 30\text{ days}, \; 7\text{ days}, \; \text{July 19 2026}, \; 20, \; 40, \; \emptyset, \; \text{start}, \; 3\text{ days}, \; 1\text{ ETH}, \; 90\text{ days} \right)$$
-
----
-
-## 2 Mathematical Model of Defifa Economics
-
-### 2.1 Parameters and State Variables
-
-The economic behavior of a Defifa game is determined jointly by:
-
-1. The immutable game parameters $\mathcal{G}$ (cf. Section 1.3), fixed at deployment;
-2. The evolving state variables, which track the pot, token supplies, and claim status over time.
-
-**Game parameters.** For reference, the parameter tuple is:
-
-$$\mathcal{G} = \left( \{T_i\}_{i=1}^{N}, \; p, \; t_{\text{mint}}, \; t_{\text{refund}}, \; t_{\text{start}}, \; \phi_{\text{defifa}}, \; \phi_{\text{base}}, \; \mathcal{S}, \; \tau_{\text{attest}}, \; \tau_{\text{grace}}, \; m_{\text{min}}, \; \tau_{\text{timeout}} \right)$$
-
-**State variables.** The core dynamic variables are listed in Table 1.
-
-| Variable | Description |
-|----------|-------------|
-| $B(t)$ | Pot (treasury balance) at time $t$ |
-| $n_i(t)$ | Number of NFTs minted in tier $i$ at time $t$ |
-| $N_{\text{total}}(t)$ | Total NFTs outstanding across all tiers: $\sum_i n_i(t)$ |
-| $M(t)$ | Total mint cost accumulated: $\sum_i n_i(t) \cdot p$ |
-| $w_i$ | Scorecard weight assigned to tier $i$ (set at ratification, $\sum_i w_i = W_{\text{total}}$) |
-| $d_i(t)$ | Number of NFTs redeemed (burned for prize) from tier $i$ after ratification |
-| $B_{\text{prize}}$ | Net prize pool after fee extraction |
-
-*Table 1: Core state variables of a Defifa game.*
-
-Note that because all tiers share a uniform price $p$, the total mint cost simplifies to $M(t) = N_{\text{total}}(t) \cdot p$ and the pot composition is $B(t) = M(t)$. This uniformity is a deliberate design choice that ensures fair parimutuel dynamics — the pot fraction in each tier reflects only the *count* of mints, not differential pricing.
-
-At any time $t$, the state of the game is fully determined by the pair $\left(\mathcal{G}, \; \{B(t), n_i(t), w_i, d_i(t)\}\right)$, where $\mathcal{G}$ is the fixed game configuration and the second component evolves endogenously as players interact with the game. The next subsections formalize how each mechanism updates these variables.
-
-### 2.2 Minting — Pot Formation
-
-During the mint phase $[t_{\text{mint\_start}}, \; t_{\text{mint\_start}} + t_{\text{mint}})$, any participant may purchase NFTs from any tier $i$ at the uniform price $p$ per token (denominated in the game's base asset).
-
-**Minted quantity.** For a payment amount $x$ of base asset directed at tier $i$:
-
-$$q_i = \left\lfloor \frac{x}{p} \right\rfloor \tag{2}$$
-
-The discrete nature of NFTs means that fractional tokens are not issued; any remainder is refunded.
-
-**Reserved minting.** If tier $i$ has a reserved rate $\rho_i > 0$, then for every $\rho_i$ tokens minted by paying players, one additional token is minted to the reserved-token beneficiary. Reserved tokens are *not* paid for, but their cost is counted toward $M(t)$ for purposes of protocol-token distribution (cf. Section 2.6).
-
-**State updates.** At the instant of a mint event where player $j$ purchases $q$ tokens of tier $i$:
-
-$$B(t^+) = B(t^-) + q \cdot p \tag{3}$$
-
-$$n_i(t^+) = n_i(t^-) + q \tag{4}$$
-
-$$M(t^+) = M(t^-) + q \cdot p \tag{5}$$
-
-These update rules define a monotonically increasing pot $B(t)$ during the mint phase, with the pot serving as a *fully-backed prize pool* — every unit of base asset entering the treasury corresponds to exactly $1/p$ NFTs issued to the payer.
-
-**Pot composition.** At the end of the mint phase, the pot is:
-
-$$B_{\text{mint}} = \sum_{i=1}^{N} n_i \cdot p = N_{\text{total}} \cdot p \tag{6}$$
-
-This is the total capital at risk in the game, and represents the complete prize pool before fee extraction.
-
-**World Cup example.** Suppose the World Cup game attracts the following minting activity (after 30 days):
-
-| Tier | Team | Mints ($n_i$) | Pot share |
-|------|------|------:|-------:|
-| 1 | Argentina | 2,000 | 13.3% |
-| 2 | France | 1,800 | 12.0% |
-| 3 | Brazil | 1,500 | 10.0% |
-| 4 | England | 1,200 | 8.0% |
-| 5 | Germany | 1,100 | 7.3% |
-| ... | ... | ... | ... |
-| 31 | New Zealand | 20 | 0.13% |
-| 32 | Saudi Arabia | 10 | 0.07% |
-| **Total** | | **15,000** | **100%** |
-
-Total pot: $15{,}000 \times 0.01 = 150$ ETH. The pot fractions reveal the crowd's consensus probabilities — Argentina at 13.3% and Saudi Arabia at 0.07% mirror real-world expectations.
-
-### 2.3 Refund — Optionality Window
-
-If $t_{\text{refund}} > 0$, a refund phase follows minting. During $[t_{\text{mint\_end}}, \; t_{\text{mint\_end}} + t_{\text{refund}})$:
-
-- No new mints are accepted ($\texttt{pausePay} = \text{true}$).
-- Any NFT holder may burn their token to reclaim its mint price.
-
-**Refund mechanics.** A player burning $q$ tokens of tier $i$ receives exactly $q \cdot p$ base asset from the treasury:
-
-$$R_{\text{refund}} = q \cdot p \tag{7}$$
-
-**State updates.** After a refund:
-
-$$B(t^+) = B(t^-) - q \cdot p \tag{8}$$
-
-$$n_i(t^+) = n_i(t^-) - q \tag{9}$$
-
-$$M(t^+) = M(t^-) - q \cdot p \tag{10}$$
-
-The refund phase creates a *free option* for participants: they can observe late-breaking information (injury reports, market movements, team changes) and exit at zero cost. This option has value and we analyze its implications in Section 5.2.
-
-**Key property.** The refund is dollar-for-dollar: every token refunded removes exactly its mint price from the pot. Because all tiers share the uniform price $p$, the per-NFT backing ratio $B(t) / N_{\text{total}}(t) = p$ is always preserved. Reserve-minted tokens are excluded from refund eligibility — only tokens that were paid for contribute to (and may withdraw from) the pot.
-
-**World Cup example.** Two days before the tournament, a star player for Brazil suffers an injury. 300 Brazil holders refund their NFTs, reducing Brazil's count from 1,500 to 1,200 and the pot from 150 ETH to 147 ETH. The refund activity itself signals the belief shift — other participants observe the on-chain refund volume and update their expectations accordingly.
-
-### 2.4 Prize Distribution — The Scorecard Formula
-
-After the real-world event concludes and a scorecard is ratified, the game enters the COMPLETE phase. Players may burn their NFTs to claim their share of the prize pool.
-
-**The scorecard.** A scorecard is a vector of weights $\mathbf{w} = (w_1, w_2, \ldots, w_N)$ satisfying:
-
-$$\sum_{i=1}^{N} w_i = W_{\text{total}} = 10^{18} \tag{11}$$
-
-Each $w_i \in [0, W_{\text{total}}]$ represents the fraction of the prize pool allocated to tier $i$'s holders. The exact-sum constraint is enforced on-chain — the `validateAndBuildWeights` function in `DefifaHookLib` reverts if the cumulative weight does not equal `TOTAL_CASHOUT_WEIGHT` exactly. This guarantees that 100% of the prize pool is allocated with zero residual.
-
-**Per-token weight.** The weight assigned to a single NFT in tier $i$ is:
-
-$$w_i^{\text{token}} = \frac{w_i}{\hat{n}_i} \tag{12}$$
-
-where $\hat{n}_i$ is the *effective* number of tokens eligible for redemption in tier $i$ at the time the scorecard is ratified:
-
-$$\hat{n}_i = n_i^{\text{minted}} - n_i^{\text{remaining}} - (n_i^{\text{burned}} - d_i) + n_i^{\text{pendingReserves}} \tag{13}$$
-
-Here $n_i^{\text{minted}}$ is the initial supply, $n_i^{\text{remaining}}$ is the unminted supply, $n_i^{\text{burned}}$ is the total burned count, $d_i$ is the number of tokens redeemed *in the complete phase specifically*, and $n_i^{\text{pendingReserves}}$ is the number of unminted reserved tokens for the tier. Including pending reserves in the denominator prevents paid holders from front-running reserve mints to extract disproportionate value.
-
-**Cash-out value.** When a player burns a set of token IDs $\{k_1, k_2, \ldots, k_m\}$, the total claim is computed as:
-
-$$C(\{k_j\}) = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{m} w_{i(k_j)}^{\text{token}}}{W_{\text{total}}} \cdot (B_{\text{prize}} + A_{\text{redeemed}}) \tag{14}$$
-
-where:
-- $i(k_j)$ is the tier of token $k_j$,
-- $B_{\text{prize}}$ is the current treasury balance (post-fee),
-- $A_{\text{redeemed}}$ is the cumulative amount already redeemed by prior players.
-
-The term $(B_{\text{prize}} + A_{\text{redeemed}})$ reconstructs the *original* post-fee pot, ensuring that the order of redemptions does not affect the payout per token. This is a critical design property: it makes Defifa a *path-independent* mechanism. The actual surplus from which the payout is drawn is the current treasury balance $B_{\text{prize}}$ — the formula normalizes against the full original pot to compute the correct fraction, then pays out from what remains.
-
-**Special cases:**
-
-- **Winner-take-all:** $w_j = W_{\text{total}}$ for a single tier $j$, all others zero.
-- **Proportional split:** $w_i = W_{\text{total}} \cdot n_i / N_{\text{total}}$ weights by participation count (effectively a full refund for all).
-- **Graded outcome:** Different tiers receive weight proportional to their real-world performance (e.g., tournament placement).
-
-**World Cup example.** Argentina wins the final, France finishes runner-up, Germany and Brazil reach the semifinals. A scorecard is submitted:
-
-| Tier | Team | Weight $w_i$ | Share |
-|------|------|------:|-------:|
-| 1 | Argentina | $4 \times 10^{17}$ | 40% |
-| 2 | France | $2 \times 10^{17}$ | 20% |
-| 3 | Brazil | $1 \times 10^{17}$ | 10% |
-| 5 | Germany | $1 \times 10^{17}$ | 10% |
-| 4, 6–8 | QF losers (4 teams) | $5 \times 10^{16}$ each | 5% each |
-| 9–32 | Others | 0 | 0% |
-| **Total** | | $10^{18}$ | **100%** |
-
-Post-fee pot (at 7.5% default fees): $B_{\text{prize}} = 147 \times 0.925 = 135.975$ ETH.
-
-An Argentina holder with 1 NFT receives: $\frac{4 \times 10^{17} / 2{,}000}{10^{18}} \times 135.975 \approx 0.0272$ ETH — a 2.72x return on their 0.01 ETH mint. A Saudi Arabia holder receives nothing from the prize pool (weight = 0) but still receives protocol tokens when burning.
-
-### 2.5 Fee Extraction Pipeline
-
-Before prize distribution begins, the Deployer contract extracts protocol fees by calling `fulfillCommitmentsOf`. This function computes the fee amount and sends only the fee portion as payouts via `sendPayoutsOf`, while the remaining balance stays in the treasury as surplus for player cash-outs.
-
-**Fee computation.** At game creation, the deployer computes and stores the total absolute split percent (the sum of all fee and custom split percentages out of `SPLITS_TOTAL_PERCENT`). At commitment fulfillment, the fee amount is:
-
-$$F_{\text{total}} = B_{\text{pot}} \cdot \frac{\text{totalAbsolutePercent}}{\text{SPLITS\_TOTAL\_PERCENT}} \tag{15}$$
-
-**Split structure.** The splits configured at game launch allocate fees as follows:
-
-1. **Defifa fee:** $\frac{1}{\phi_{\text{defifa}}}$ of the pot to the Defifa project (default: $\phi_{\text{defifa}} = 20$, i.e., 5%)
-2. **Base protocol fee:** $\frac{1}{\phi_{\text{base}}}$ of the pot to the base protocol (NANA) project (default: $\phi_{\text{base}} = 40$, i.e., 2.5%)
-3. **Custom splits** ($\mathcal{S}$): Any additional game-creator-defined splits
-4. **Remainder:** Stays in the game's treasury as surplus for player cash-outs
-
-**Fee formulas.** Let $B_{\text{pot}}$ be the treasury balance at commitment fulfillment. The individual fee amounts are:
-
-$$F_{\text{defifa}} = \frac{B_{\text{pot}}}{\phi_{\text{defifa}}} = \frac{B_{\text{pot}}}{20} = 0.05 \cdot B_{\text{pot}} \tag{16}$$
-
-$$F_{\text{base}} = \frac{B_{\text{pot}}}{\phi_{\text{base}}} = \frac{B_{\text{pot}}}{40} = 0.025 \cdot B_{\text{pot}} \tag{17}$$
-
-$$F_{\text{custom}} = \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} \frac{B_{\text{pot}} \cdot \text{percent}_s}{\text{SPLITS\_TOTAL\_PERCENT}} \tag{18}$$
-
-The prize pool available for player claims is:
-
-$$B_{\text{prize}} = B_{\text{pot}} - F_{\text{defifa}} - F_{\text{base}} - F_{\text{custom}} \tag{19}$$
-
-With default parameters ($\phi_{\text{defifa}} = 20$, $\phi_{\text{base}} = 40$, no custom splits), the total fee rate is **7.5%** and the prize pool is:
-
-$$B_{\text{prize}} = B_{\text{pot}} \cdot \left(1 - \frac{1}{20} - \frac{1}{40}\right) = B_{\text{pot}} \cdot \left(1 - 0.05 - 0.025\right) = 0.925 \cdot B_{\text{pot}} \tag{20}$$
-
-**Resilient fee handling.** The `sendPayoutsOf` call is wrapped in a try-catch. If the payout fails for any reason (e.g., a split target is a reverting contract), the `CommitmentPayoutFailed` event is emitted, the fulfilled commitments value is set to a sentinel (1), and the final ruleset is still queued. Players can cash out immediately — the fee amount stays in the pot, slightly benefiting cash-out recipients. This ensures the game always reaches completion regardless of fee-collection failures.
-
-**Fee recycling.** The fees paid to the Defifa and base protocol projects are processed as standard Juicebox payments, which mint project tokens (e.g., $\text{DEFIFA}$, $\text{NANA}$) to the beneficiary — in this case, the game's hook contract. These tokens are later distributed to players upon claim (Section 2.6).
-
-**World Cup example.** With a 147 ETH pot and default fees:
-- Defifa fee: $147 / 20 = 7.35$ ETH (5%)
-- Base protocol fee: $147 / 40 = 3.675$ ETH (2.5%)
-- Total fees: $11.025$ ETH (7.5%)
-- Prize pool: $147 - 11.025 = 135.975$ ETH (92.5%)
-
-The 7.35 ETH paid to the Defifa project mints $\text{DEFIFA}$ tokens to the game hook. The 3.675 ETH paid to the base protocol mints $\text{NANA}$ tokens. Both accrue to players.
-
-### 2.6 Protocol Token Allocation
-
-When fees are paid to the Defifa and base protocol projects, those projects mint their respective tokens to the game hook's address. The hook contract accumulates these tokens and distributes them proportionally when players burn their NFTs in the COMPLETE phase.
-
-**Token allocation per player.** For a player burning tokens with cumulative mint cost $c$:
-
-$$X_{\text{defifa}} = \frac{c}{M} \cdot D_{\text{total}} \tag{21}$$
-
-$$X_{\text{nana}} = \frac{c}{M} \cdot P_{\text{total}} \tag{22}$$
-
-where:
-- $M = $ total mint cost of all tokens ever minted in the game ($\texttt{\_totalMintCost}$),
-- $D_{\text{total}} = $ total $\text{DEFIFA}$ tokens held by the hook contract,
-- $P_{\text{total}} = $ total $\text{NANA}$ tokens held by the hook contract.
-
-The computation uses `mulDiv` for precision: `mulDiv(tokenBalance, cumulativeMintPrice, totalMintCost)`.
-
-**Key property.** Protocol token distribution is proportional to *original mint cost*, not to scorecard weight. This means that even holders of losing tiers (weight = 0) receive protocol tokens when burning their NFTs, creating a partial consolation mechanism that rewards participation regardless of outcome.
-
-**Incentive alignment.** This design ensures that:
-- *All participants* have an incentive to burn their NFTs even in losing tiers (to claim protocol tokens),
-- Since all tiers share the same price $p$, each NFT generates the same protocol-token claim regardless of tier,
-- The protocol *captures value* from every game through its fee-token flywheel.
-
-**World Cup example.** A Saudi Arabia holder (Tier 32) with 1 NFT paid 0.01 ETH. The total mint cost is 150 ETH (15,000 mints at 0.01 ETH). Their share of protocol tokens is $0.01 / 150 = 0.0067\%$. If the hook holds 1,000 $\text{DEFIFA}$ tokens, this holder receives $0.067$ $\text{DEFIFA}$. Small, but non-zero — a reason to burn even a losing ticket.
-
----
-
-## 3 Attestation Governance and Scorecard Ratification
-
-### 3.1 Voting Power Model
-
-The attestation mechanism uses a *per-tier proportional representation* model rather than a simple one-token-one-vote system. This design prevents any single tier's holders from dominating the governance process.
-
-**Attestation units.** Each tier $i$ carries a maximum attestation power of:
-
-$$V_{\text{max}} = 10^9 \quad \text{(MAX\_ATTESTATION\_POWER\_TIER)} \tag{23}$$
-
-This maximum is shared among all holders of tier $i$. A holder's attestation weight for tier $i$ is:
-
-$$v_i^{\text{holder}} = V_{\text{max}} \cdot \frac{n_i^{\text{holder}}}{n_i^{\text{total}}} \tag{24}$$
-
-where $n_i^{\text{holder}}$ is the number of tier-$i$ tokens delegated to (or held by) the attestor, and $n_i^{\text{total}}$ is the total minted supply of tier $i$ at the attestation snapshot timestamp.
-
-**Total attestation weight.** A holder's total attestation power across all tiers is:
-
-$$v^{\text{holder}} = \sum_{i : n_i^{\text{holder}} > 0} V_{\text{max}} \cdot \frac{n_i^{\text{holder}}}{n_i^{\text{total}}} \tag{25}$$
-
-**Checkpoint-based snapshots.** Attestation power is measured at the scorecard's `attestationsBegin - 1` timestamp (one second before the attestation window opens). This prevents same-block transfer manipulation: acquiring tokens at or after `attestationsBegin` provides zero additional voting power. Additionally, pending reserve counts are snapshotted per tier at submission time (`_pendingReservesSnapshotOf`), so minting reserves after submission cannot inflate attestation power by removing the pending-reserve dilution. All attestors' weights are measured at the same point in time with a fixed pending reserve baseline, ensuring fairness.
-
-**Delegation.** During the mint phase only, holders may delegate their attestation units to a chosen delegate address per tier. Delegation is:
-- Per-tier (a holder can delegate different tiers to different delegates),
-- Snapshot-locked (only the delegation state at `attestationsBegin - 1` counts),
-- Mint-phase-only (no delegation changes after minting closes — the `_update` function enforces `DELEGATE_CHANGES_UNAVAILABLE_IN_THIS_PHASE`).
-
-**World Cup example.** Argentina (Tier 1) has 2,000 NFTs. A fan holding 100 Argentina NFTs has attestation power: $10^9 \times 100/2{,}000 = 50{,}000{,}000$ from Tier 1. If they also hold 50 France NFTs (out of 1,800): $10^9 \times 50/1{,}800 \approx 27{,}778{,}000$ from Tier 2. Total: $\sim 77.8$ million attestation units. Note that despite Argentina having more total mints, each *tier* contributes equally to governance weight — the per-tier cap ensures that Argentina's 2,000 holders collectively have the same maximum power ($10^9$) as Saudi Arabia's 10 holders.
-
-### 3.2 Quorum and Ratification Conditions
-
-**Quorum calculation.** The quorum required for scorecard ratification is:
-
-$$Q = \frac{N_{\text{minted\_tiers}}}{2} \cdot V_{\text{max}} \tag{26}$$
-
-where $N_{\text{minted\_tiers}}$ is the number of tiers that have at least one minted token. This means a scorecard must achieve attestation weight equivalent to *half of all minted tiers voting unanimously* to pass.
-
-Quorum is computed from the live supply (`currentSupplyOfTier`) rather than a snapshot. This means the quorum threshold can shift if tokens are burned after attestation — but since attestation weights are snapshotted, this only makes ratification easier (lower threshold), not harder.
-
-**World Cup example.** All 32 tiers have minted tokens, so:
-
-$$Q = \frac{32}{2} \cdot 10^9 = 16 \times 10^9$$
-
-This requires the equivalent of 16 full tiers' worth of unanimous attestation. If the default delegate holds delegated power from a majority of minters across 16+ tiers, they can single-handedly meet quorum — which is exactly the intended fast path for games with trusted organizers.
-
-**Ratification conditions.** A scorecard can be ratified when all three conditions are met:
-1. The scorecard's grace period has expired ($\texttt{gracePeriodEnds} \leq \texttt{block.timestamp}$),
-2. The attestation count meets or exceeds quorum ($\texttt{attestations.count} \geq Q$),
-3. No other scorecard has been ratified for this game.
-
-### 3.3 Scorecard Lifecycle
-
-Each submitted scorecard passes through five states:
-
-| State | Condition |
-|-------|-----------|
-| **PENDING** | $\texttt{attestationsBegin} > \texttt{block.timestamp}$ |
-| **ACTIVE** | $\texttt{attestationsBegin} \leq \texttt{now}$ and ($\texttt{gracePeriodEnds} > \texttt{now}$ or quorum not met) |
-| **SUCCEEDED** | Grace period expired AND attestations $\geq$ quorum |
-| **DEFEATED** | A different scorecard was ratified |
-| **RATIFIED** | This scorecard was ratified |
-
-Multiple scorecards may coexist in ACTIVE or SUCCEEDED state simultaneously, but only one can ever be ratified. Scorecards that fail to reach quorum remain ACTIVE indefinitely — there is no expiry on individual scorecards. The game's `scorecardTimeout` provides the ultimate backstop (see Section 9.1).
-
-The grace period is computed relative to `attestationsBegin`, not submission time: $t_{\text{grace\_end}} = t_{\text{attest\_begin}} + \tau_{\text{grace}}$. This prevents the grace period from expiring before attestations even start when a scorecard is submitted early in the scoring phase.
-
-### 3.4 Resistance to Strategic Manipulation
-
-The attestation model incorporates several defenses against strategic manipulation:
-
-**Defense 1: Per-tier cap.** No single tier's holders can contribute more than $V_{\text{max}}$ attestation units, regardless of how many tokens they hold. A whale who buys the entire supply of one tier has exactly $V_{\text{max}}$ power — the same as if any single holder held the tier.
-
-**Defense 2: Checkpoint snapshots.** Attestation power is computed at a fixed historical timestamp (`attestationsBegin - 1`). Acquiring tokens after the snapshot provides zero additional voting power for that scorecard. Pending reserve counts are snapshotted at submission time, preventing reserve minting from inflating attestation power.
-
-**Defense 3: Mint-phase-only delegation.** Delegation is locked after the mint phase, preventing last-minute delegation changes during the scoring phase.
-
-**Defense 4: 50% quorum across tiers.** Requiring half of all minted tiers' worth of attestation power means that no coalition controlling fewer than half the minted tiers can unilaterally ratify a fraudulent scorecard — even with 100% participation within their controlled tiers.
-
-**Defense 5: Scoring-phase-only submission.** Scorecard submission is restricted to the SCORING phase. This prevents pre-accumulation of attestations during minting, which could otherwise allow a coordinated group to achieve SUCCEEDED status before the real-world event even occurs.
-
-**Remaining attack surface.** A coalition controlling sufficient attestation power across $\lceil N_{\text{minted}}/2 \rceil$ tiers can ratify an arbitrary scorecard. The critical insight is that attestation power within a tier is *proportional to token holdings*, not absolute. An attacker holding 100% of a tier's supply — even just 1 token — receives the full $V_{\text{max}} = 10^9$ attestation power for that tier.
-
-**Worst-case attack cost (heavily minted tiers).** When all tiers are well-populated, the attacker must acquire majority holdings in at least $\lceil N/2 \rceil$ tiers:
-
-$$C_{\text{attack}}^{\text{worst}} \geq \sum_{i \in \text{majority set}} \left\lceil \frac{n_i + 1}{2} \right\rceil \cdot p \tag{27}$$
-
-**Best-case attack cost (sparse tiers).** When some tiers have zero or minimal mints, the attacker can buy 1 token in each unminted tier, becoming the sole holder and receiving full attestation power:
-
-$$C_{\text{attack}}^{\text{best}} = \sum_{i \in \text{cheapest } \lceil N/2 \rceil \text{ unminted tiers}} p = \lceil N/2 \rceil \cdot p \tag{27a}$$
-
-This is potentially orders of magnitude cheaper than Eq. 27. We analyze this vulnerability in depth in Section 9.2.
-
-**World Cup example.** In our 32-team game, all tiers are minted (even Saudi Arabia has 10 tokens). To control 16 tiers by buying majority positions: even the cheapest approach requires $16 \times \lceil 11/2 \rceil \times 0.01 = 0.96$ ETH to control the 16 least-popular tiers. The return (135.975 ETH) vastly exceeds the cost. However, the `minParticipation` threshold and the social pressure of a well-publicized game make this attack visible and reputationally costly. See Section 9.2 for mitigations.
-
----
-
-## 4 Price Dynamics and Value Flows
-
-### 4.1 NFT Intrinsic Value During Minting
-
-During the mint phase, the intrinsic value of a tier-$i$ NFT depends on the holder's subjective probability assessment of the outcomes.
-
-**Expected value at mint.** Let $\pi_i$ be a player's subjective probability that tier $i$ receives scorecard weight $w_i$. The expected post-fee payout for one tier-$i$ NFT is:
-
-$$\mathbb{E}[V_i] = B_{\text{prize}} \cdot \frac{\mathbb{E}[w_i^{\text{token}}]}{W_{\text{total}}} + X_i^{\text{protocol}} \tag{28}$$
-
-where $X_i^{\text{protocol}}$ is the expected protocol token value from burning.
-
-For a binary game (winner-take-all, $N = 2$), this simplifies to:
-
-$$\mathbb{E}[V_i] = \pi_i \cdot \frac{B_{\text{prize}}}{n_i} + X_i^{\text{protocol}} \tag{29}$$
-
-A rational risk-neutral player mints tier $i$ when:
-
-$$\mathbb{E}[V_i] > p \tag{30}$$
-
-Substituting:
-
-$$\pi_i > \frac{p - X_i^{\text{protocol}}}{B_{\text{prize}} / n_i} \tag{31}$$
-
-This threshold probability decreases as the pot grows (more participants in other tiers create larger prizes for a given probability) and increases as more tokens of tier $i$ are minted (diluting the per-token payout within the tier).
-
-**World Cup example.** Argentina has 2,000 mints and a 147 ETH pot (135.975 ETH post-fee). If the scorecard assigns 40% to the winner, an Argentina holder's expected value is $\pi_A \times 0.4 \times 135.975 / 2{,}000$. For this to exceed 0.01 ETH: $\pi_A > 0.01 / (0.4 \times 135.975 / 2{,}000) = 0.01 / 0.02720 \approx 36.8\%$. If you believe Argentina has a $>37\%$ chance of winning, minting is positive expected value.
-
-### 4.2 Post-Scorecard Valuation
-
-After the scorecard is ratified and fees are extracted, each NFT has a deterministic value:
-
-**Tier-$i$ token value.** For a single token in tier $i$:
-
-$$V_i^{\text{token}} = \frac{w_i}{\hat{n}_i \cdot W_{\text{total}}} \cdot (B_{\text{prize}} + A_{\text{redeemed}}) + V_i^{\text{protocol}} \tag{32}$$
-
-where $V_i^{\text{protocol}} = \frac{p}{M} \cdot (D_{\text{total}} \cdot P_D + P_{\text{total}} \cdot P_P)$ is the protocol-token value, with $P_D$ and $P_P$ being the market prices of $\text{DEFIFA}$ and $\text{NANA}$ tokens respectively.
-
-**Winning tier (full weight).** In a winner-take-all game with $w_j = W_{\text{total}}$:
-
-$$V_j^{\text{token}} = \frac{B_{\text{prize}} + A_{\text{redeemed}}}{\hat{n}_j} + V_j^{\text{protocol}} \tag{33}$$
-
-The winning-tier payout per token is the entire post-fee pot divided by the number of winning-tier tokens.
-
-**Losing tier (zero weight).** When $w_i = 0$:
-
-$$V_i^{\text{token}} = V_i^{\text{protocol}} \tag{34}$$
-
-Losing-tier tokens have zero prize value but retain protocol-token value, providing a non-zero incentive to burn.
-
-### 4.3 Secondary Market Implications
-
-The deterministic valuation after scorecard ratification creates clear secondary-market dynamics:
-
-**Pre-ratification.** NFT value is driven by subjective outcome probabilities. Prices reflect the market's consensus probability-weighted expected payout, analogous to prediction-market shares.
-
-**Post-ratification.** NFT value is deterministic and publicly computable. Any secondary-market price deviating from the redemption value creates an arbitrage:
-- If $P_{\text{market}} < V_i^{\text{token}}$: buy on the market, burn for profit.
-- If $P_{\text{market}} > V_i^{\text{token}}$: never occurs rationally (burn dominates holding).
-
-This means post-ratification secondary markets should converge immediately to redemption value, eliminating any residual price discovery.
-
----
-
-## 5 Rational Actor Analysis
-
-### 5.1 Mint-Phase Strategy: Entry Timing
-
-**Early minting advantage.** In a uniform-price game, there is no direct price advantage to minting early vs. late within the mint phase. However, early minters benefit from:
-
-1. **Information asymmetry**: later minters may have better information about the likely outcome, concentrating on winning tiers and diluting per-token payouts within those tiers.
-
-2. **Delegation coordination**: early minters can establish delegation networks, securing attestation influence.
-
-**Late minting advantage.** Late minters benefit from:
-
-1. **Pot observability**: the total pot size and tier distribution are observable on-chain, allowing more informed expected-value calculations.
-
-2. **Implied probability extraction**: the distribution of mints across tiers reveals collective sentiment, analogous to odds in a betting market.
-
-**Equilibrium.** In a Nash equilibrium of the minting game with risk-neutral players, each player mints the tier maximizing their expected payoff. Denoting by $\pi_i$ the true probability of tier $i$ winning and by $f_i = n_i / N_{\text{total}}$ the fraction of NFTs allocated to tier $i$ (which equals the pot fraction since all prices are uniform):
-
-$$\mathbb{E}[\text{return}_i] = \frac{\pi_i}{f_i} \cdot (1 - \phi) - 1 \tag{35}$$
-
-where $\phi = 1/\phi_{\text{defifa}} + 1/\phi_{\text{base}} + \phi_{\text{custom}}$ is the total fee rate (default: 7.5%).
-
-In equilibrium, expected returns equalize across tiers: $\mathbb{E}[\text{return}_i] = \mathbb{E}[\text{return}_j]$ for all $i, j$ with non-zero minting, which implies:
-
-$$\frac{\pi_i}{f_i} = \frac{\pi_j}{f_j} \quad \Rightarrow \quad f_i = \frac{\pi_i}{\sum_k \pi_k} = \pi_i \tag{36}$$
-
-**Result.** In equilibrium, the fraction of NFTs in each tier equals the market's consensus probability of that tier winning. This is the classical parimutuel result: the mint distribution *reveals* the collective probability assessment.
-
-**World Cup example.** Argentina's 2,000 mints out of 15,000 total = 13.3% share. In equilibrium, this implies the crowd assigns Argentina a 13.3% probability of winning — approximately matching real-world bookmaker odds. The on-chain mint distribution functions as a decentralized prediction market.
-
-### 5.2 Refund-Phase Strategy: Option Exercise
-
-The refund phase creates a *free put option* on each minted NFT, struck at the mint price.
-
-**Option value.** Let $V_i(t_{\text{refund\_end}})$ be the expected value of a tier-$i$ token at the end of the refund phase. The refund option has value:
-
-$$O_i = \max\left(p - V_i(t_{\text{refund\_end}}), \; 0\right) \tag{37}$$
-
-A rational player exercises (refunds) when $V_i(t_{\text{refund\_end}}) < p$, which occurs when new information shifts the expected outcome against their chosen tier.
-
-**Strategic implications.** The refund phase serves three purposes:
-
-1. **Risk reduction**: allows players to participate speculatively during the mint phase, with a guaranteed exit if conditions change.
-
-2. **Information revelation**: refund activity signals belief updates. Tiers experiencing heavy refunds are perceived as less likely to win, reinforcing the signal.
-
-3. **Adverse selection mitigation**: the refund phase partially solves the "winner's curse" problem, where early minters in popular tiers may overpay relative to their per-token payout.
-
-**Pot contraction.** Refunds shrink the pot proportionally. If a fraction $\alpha$ of tier-$i$ tokens are refunded, the pot decreases by $\alpha \cdot n_i \cdot p$ and tier $i$'s outstanding supply decreases by $\alpha \cdot n_i$. The per-token expected value for remaining tier-$i$ holders *increases* (fewer tokens sharing the same weight), partially offsetting the information content of the refund signal.
-
-### 5.3 Scoring-Phase Strategy: Attestation Delegation
-
-During the scoring phase, the key strategic variable is attestation. Rational players attest to the scorecard that maximizes their expected payout.
-
-**Default delegation.** Games may specify a `defaultAttestationDelegate` — a trusted address (e.g., the game organizer) whose scorecard proposals are flagged. Players delegating to this address at mint time reduce coordination costs.
-
-**Strategic delegation.** A player holding tokens in tier $i$ has an incentive to attest to scorecards assigning high weight to tier $i$. However, the quorum requirement (50% of minted tiers) means that no single tier's strategy can unilaterally determine the outcome. Scorecards that deviate from the true outcome face the collective opposition of all other tiers' holders.
-
-**Equilibrium.** In the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of the attestation game (assuming common knowledge of the event outcome):
-
-1. All holders attest to the *truthful* scorecard — the one reflecting the actual event outcome.
-2. The truthful scorecard achieves quorum, as holders of winning tiers have the strongest incentive to attest (they benefit from high weight) and holders of losing tiers are indifferent between truthful scorecards (their weight is zero regardless).
-
-### 5.4 Complete-Phase Strategy: Claim vs Hold
-
-After ratification, holding an NFT rather than burning it has the following payoff profile:
-
-**Burn immediately.** Receive $V_i^{\text{token}} = w_i^{\text{token}} / W_{\text{total}} \cdot (B_{\text{prize}} + A_{\text{redeemed}}) + V_i^{\text{protocol}}$.
-
-**Hold.** The NFT retains the same deterministic value $V_i^{\text{token}}$ indefinitely (the contract imposes no time decay on claims). The only reason to delay is if the player expects the protocol tokens ($\text{DEFIFA}$, $\text{NANA}$) to appreciate in value before claiming.
-
-**Dominant strategy.** For risk-neutral players with positive time preference, burning immediately weakly dominates holding. The claim value does not depreciate (the path-independent formula ensures later claimants receive the same amount), but the time value of money favors immediate realization. Holding is justified only by expected protocol-token appreciation exceeding the discount rate:
-
-$$\frac{dP_D}{dt} \cdot \frac{p}{M} \cdot D_{\text{total}} > r \cdot V_i^{\text{token}} \tag{38}$$
-
-where $r$ is the player's discount rate.
-
----
-
-## 6 Solvency and Conservation Laws
-
-### 6.1 The Conservation Guarantee
-
-A Defifa game satisfies a fundamental conservation property: the total claims available to all NFT holders exactly equal the prize pool, regardless of the order or timing of redemptions.
-
-**Theorem 6.1 (Prize Pool Conservation).** For any scorecard $\mathbf{w}$ with $\sum_i w_i = W_{\text{total}}$ and any sequence of redemptions, the total amount paid out to all NFT holders equals $B_{\text{prize}}$.
-
-*Proof.* The total claim across all tokens is:
-
-$$\sum_{i=1}^{N} n_i^{\text{eligible}} \cdot \frac{w_i}{\hat{n}_i \cdot W_{\text{total}}} \cdot (B_{\text{prize}} + A_{\text{redeemed}})$$
-
-Since $n_i^{\text{eligible}} = \hat{n}_i$ at the start (before any complete-phase redemptions), and the term $(B_{\text{prize}} + A_{\text{redeemed}})$ is invariant (it reconstructs the original pot), this equals:
-
-$$\sum_{i=1}^{N} \frac{w_i}{W_{\text{total}}} \cdot B_{\text{prize}} = \frac{B_{\text{prize}}}{W_{\text{total}}} \sum_{i=1}^{N} w_i = B_{\text{prize}} \quad \square$$
-
-This guarantee is strengthened by the exact-sum validation on-chain: `validateAndBuildWeights` in `DefifaHookLib` reverts if $\sum_i w_i \neq W_{\text{total}}$. Under-allocated scorecards are rejected, ensuring that 100% of the prize pool is always distributed with zero residual.
-
-### 6.2 Solvency Under Sequential Cash-Outs
-
-**Corollary 6.2 (Order Independence).** The payout to any individual NFT holder is independent of the order in which other holders redeem their tokens.
-
-*Proof.* The per-token claim formula (Eq. 14) uses $(B_{\text{prize}} + A_{\text{redeemed}})$ as the reference pot, which is constant regardless of how many tokens have been redeemed. The denominator $\hat{n}_i$ adjusts via the $d_i$ (tokens redeemed from tier $i$) counter, but the per-token weight formula $w_i / \hat{n}_i$ uses the *original* eligible count (at scorecard ratification), not the current count. The Solidity implementation achieves this by tracking `tokensRedeemedFrom[tierId]` and subtracting from the denominator:
-
-$$\hat{n}_i = n_i^{\text{minted}} - n_i^{\text{remaining}} - (n_i^{\text{burned}} - d_i) + n_i^{\text{pendingReserves}} \tag{39}$$
-
-As each token is redeemed, both $n_i^{\text{burned}}$ and $d_i$ increment by 1, leaving $\hat{n}_i$ invariant. Therefore, each token receives the same payout regardless of when it is redeemed. $\square$
-
-### 6.3 Fee Impact on Total Claimable Value
-
-The total value available to players (prize + protocol tokens) is:
-
-$$V_{\text{total}} = B_{\text{prize}} + V_{\text{protocol}} = B_{\text{pot}} \cdot (1 - \phi) + V_{\text{protocol}} \tag{40}$$
-
-where $V_{\text{protocol}}$ is the market value of protocol tokens allocated to the game. With default fees ($\phi = 7.5\%$):
-
-$$V_{\text{total}} = 0.925 \cdot B_{\text{pot}} + V_{\text{protocol}} \tag{41}$$
-
-Whether the net present value exceeds the mint cost depends on whether $V_{\text{protocol}} > 0.075 \cdot B_{\text{pot}}$ — i.e., whether protocol token value compensates for the fee extraction. This creates a circular dependency: protocol token value derives from the aggregate fees across all games, which depends on game volume, which depends on expected player returns, which depends on protocol token value. We analyze this flywheel in Section 7.3.
-
----
-
-## 7 Game-Theoretic Properties
-
-### 7.1 Defifa as a Parimutuel Mechanism
-
-Defifa implements a *generalized parimutuel mechanism* with several distinctive features compared to traditional parimutuel systems:
-
-| Property | Traditional Parimutuel | Defifa |
-|----------|----------------------|--------|
-| Outcome resolution | Centralized oracle | Decentralized attestation |
-| Payout computation | House-computed odds | On-chain formula |
-| Fee structure | Fixed takeout rate | Split-based, configurable |
-| Asset type | Fungible bet tickets | Non-fungible ERC-721 tokens |
-| Secondary market | Typically none | Full ERC-721 transferability |
-| Refund option | Typically none | Configurable refund phase |
-| Token rewards | None | Protocol token distribution |
-| Safety fallback | None | NO_CONTEST with full refunds |
-
-**Parimutuel equivalence.** Under the following conditions, a Defifa game is equivalent to a classical parimutuel pool:
-- All tiers have the same price (enforced by protocol — always true),
-- The scorecard is binary (one winning tier gets $W_{\text{total}}$, all others get 0),
-- No refund phase.
-
-In this case, the odds implied by the pot distribution match classical parimutuel odds:
-
-$$\text{odds}_i = \frac{B_{\text{prize}}}{n_i \cdot p} = \frac{(1 - \phi) \cdot N_{\text{total}}}{n_i} \tag{42}$$
-
-**World Cup example (winner-take-all variant).** If the scorecard awards 100% to Argentina ($n_1 = 2{,}000$) out of 15,000 total mints:
-
-$$\text{odds}_{\text{Argentina}} = \frac{0.925 \times 15{,}000}{2{,}000} = 6.94\text{x}$$
-
-An Argentina holder's 0.01 ETH bet pays $0.069$ ETH — a $6.94\times$ return. These are precisely classical parimutuel odds with a 7.5% takeout rate.
-
-### 7.2 Information Aggregation
-
-The minting and refund dynamics of Defifa create a multi-round price-discovery mechanism:
-
-**Round 1 (Mint phase).** Players reveal information through tier selection. Under the equilibrium result from Section 5.1, the mint distribution converges to the collective probability distribution.
-
-**Round 2 (Refund phase).** Players who received new information can exit, and the refund pattern reveals belief updates. The post-refund mint distribution reflects updated probability assessments.
-
-**Round 3 (Secondary market).** If NFTs trade on secondary markets during the scoring phase, prices reflect the most current probability assessments, including information arriving after minting closes.
-
-This three-round structure is informationally richer than single-shot betting mechanisms, as it allows for belief revision without the sunk-cost problem (thanks to the refund option).
-
-### 7.3 Multi-Game Dynamics and Protocol Flywheel
-
-Defifa generates a *protocol-level flywheel* through its fee-token mechanism:
-
-1. **Game fees** → minted to protocol projects as payments,
-2. **Protocol tokens** are issued to the game hook,
-3. **Players claim protocol tokens** upon burning NFTs,
-4. **Protocol token value** reflects aggregate fee revenue across all games,
-5. **Higher token value** → higher expected returns for players → more game participation → more fees.
-
-**Flywheel dynamics.** Let $G$ be the number of active games, $\bar{B}$ the average pot size, and $\phi$ the fee rate (default: 7.5%). The aggregate fee revenue is:
-
-$$R = G \cdot \bar{B} \cdot \phi \tag{43}$$
-
-If protocol token value is a multiple $\mu$ of aggregate revenue: $V_{\text{token}} = \mu \cdot R$, then the protocol token allocation per game is approximately:
-
-$$V_{\text{protocol}}^{\text{game}} \approx \frac{\bar{B} \cdot \phi}{\bar{B}} \cdot V_{\text{token}} = \phi \cdot \mu \cdot G \cdot \bar{B} \cdot \phi \tag{44}$$
-
-The fraction of the pot recovered through protocol tokens is:
-
-$$\frac{V_{\text{protocol}}^{\text{game}}}{\bar{B}} = \phi^2 \cdot \mu \cdot G \tag{45}$$
-
-This shows that the protocol-token recovery rate increases linearly with the number of games $G$ and the revenue multiple $\mu$. For $\phi = 0.075$, $\mu = 10$, and $G = 100$:
-
-$$\frac{V_{\text{protocol}}^{\text{game}}}{\bar{B}} = 0.005625 \cdot 10 \cdot 100 = 5.625$$
-
-In this (illustrative) regime, protocol tokens would be worth 5.6x the pot — making Defifa games a *net-positive expected value* activity. While this extreme scenario is unlikely at scale, it demonstrates the directional incentive: more games create more protocol token value, which attracts more players.
-
----
-
-## 8 Parameter Design Space
-
-### 8.1 Tier Count and Price Calibration
-
-**Tier count.** The number of tiers $N$ affects (maximum: 128):
-
-- **Quorum difficulty**: $Q = (N_{\text{minted}} / 2) \cdot V_{\text{max}}$. More tiers require more attestation weight, increasing governance robustness but potentially slowing ratification.
-- **Per-tier dilution**: In a winner-take-all game, the winning tier's payout is diluted only by the number of tokens in that tier, not by total tiers. However, more tiers spread the pot thinner in proportional-split scorecards.
-- **Attack cost**: More tiers increase the cost of majority control (Eq. 27), but also increase the number of potentially sparse tiers vulnerable to cheap capture (Section 9.2).
-
-**Optimal regime**: $4 \leq N \leq 32$ tiers balances governance tractability with outcome granularity. Beyond 32 tiers, quorum coordination becomes challenging; below 4, the game reduces to a coin flip with limited appeal.
-
-**Price calibration.** Since all tiers share a uniform price $p$ (enforced by the protocol), the price affects:
-
-- **Accessibility**: Lower prices attract more participants but increase gas costs relative to the bet size.
-- **Pot size per capita**: Higher prices create bigger pots from fewer participants. A 32-team game at 0.01 ETH needs 10,000 mints for a 100 ETH pot; at 0.1 ETH, only 1,000 mints.
-- **Attack economics**: Higher prices increase the cost of acquiring positions for attestation manipulation (Section 9.2).
-
-**Recommendation**: Uniform pricing between 0.01 and 0.1 ETH per NFT provides a balance between accessibility, gas efficiency, and attack resistance for most games.
-
-### 8.2 Timing Parameters
-
-**Mint duration** ($t_{\text{mint}}$): Should be long enough for information dissemination and participation growth, but short enough to maintain urgency. For event-based games:
-
-$$t_{\text{mint}} \approx \min(\text{time until event}, \; 30 \text{ days}) \tag{46}$$
-
-**Refund duration** ($t_{\text{refund}}$): Creates optionality value. Longer refund periods increase the option value for minters but may reduce pot stability (more uncertainty about final pot size). A refund period of 1–7 days provides meaningful optionality without excessive uncertainty.
-
-**Attestation start time** ($\tau_{\text{attest}}$): The earliest time at which attestation voting opens. Longer delays give more holders time to review scorecards. Recommended: set to a time shortly after the event concludes.
-
-**Attestation grace period** ($\tau_{\text{grace}}$): Minimum duration of the voting window after attestation opens. Must be long enough for broad participation but short enough to deliver results promptly. Protocol-enforced minimum: 1 day. Recommended: 3–7 days.
-
-**Scorecard timeout** ($\tau_{\text{timeout}}$): Maximum time for governance resolution. Longer timeouts reduce deadline pressure but extend the period during which funds are locked. Recommended: 90–180 days for permissionless games, 30 days for trusted-organizer games.
-
-### 8.3 Fee Calibration and Protocol Sustainability
-
-The default fee structure (5% Defifa + 2.5% base protocol = 7.5% total) is competitive with:
-
-| Platform | Takeout Rate |
-|----------|-------------|
-| Horse racing (parimutuel) | 15–25% |
-| Sports betting (vig) | 4–10% |
-| Prediction markets (fees) | 1–5% |
-| **Defifa (default)** | **7.5%** |
-
-The 7.5% rate positions Defifa between traditional parimutuel systems and modern prediction markets. The key differentiation is the *protocol token rebate*: while 7.5% is extracted as fees, a portion returns to players as protocol tokens, making the effective fee rate lower than the nominal rate.
-
-**Effective fee rate.** If protocol tokens retain $\alpha$ fraction of their fee value:
-
-$$\phi_{\text{eff}} = \phi \cdot (1 - \alpha) \tag{47}$$
-
-For $\alpha = 0.5$ (protocol tokens retain 50% of their minting value): $\phi_{\text{eff}} = 0.075 \cdot 0.5 = 3.75\%$, highly competitive with low-fee prediction markets.
-
----
-
-## 9 Safety Mechanisms
-
-### 9.1 The No-Contest System
-
-Defifa includes a comprehensive safety system — the **NO_CONTEST** mechanism — that prevents funds from being permanently locked when governance fails or the game is non-viable. NO_CONTEST is a first-class game phase (defined in the `DefifaGamePhase` enum) with three complementary triggers.
-
-#### 9.1.1 Trigger 1: Minimum Participation Threshold
-
-**Mechanism.** At game creation, the organizer sets `minParticipation` — a minimum cumulative NFT mint cost required for the game to proceed to scoring. The `currentGamePhaseOf()` function checks the hook's `totalMintCost()` against this threshold before returning SCORING. If the mint cost is below the threshold, it returns NO_CONTEST. `totalMintCost` tracks only actual paid mint value and is decremented on refunds/burns — it cannot be inflated by `addToBalanceOf` top-ups.
-
-**What it solves.** Ghost games with negligible participation skip directly to refundability without requiring any governance action. A 32-team World Cup game with `minParticipation = 1 ETH` won't enter scoring if only 50 people mint (0.5 ETH pot).
-
-**Attack surface.** An adversary who wants to force no-contest can refund enough NFTs during the refund phase to push `totalMintCost` below the threshold. Direct balance top-ups (via `addToBalanceOf`) cannot inflate participation since the check uses `totalMintCost`, not treasury balance. Mitigation: set the threshold conservatively low relative to expected participation.
-
-**Configuration.** Set to 0 to disable. The threshold is set at launch before any minting occurs, so calibration depends on organizer judgment.
-
-#### 9.1.2 Trigger 2: Scorecard Ratification Timeout
-
-**Mechanism.** At game creation, the organizer sets `scorecardTimeout` — a duration (in seconds) after the SCORING phase begins. The `currentGamePhaseOf()` function checks `block.timestamp > scoringRulesetStart + scorecardTimeout`. If the timeout has elapsed and no scorecard has been ratified, it returns NO_CONTEST.
-
-**What it solves.** All governance deadlock scenarios:
-- No scorecard submitted
-- Scorecard submitted but quorum unreachable (fragmented attestation)
-- Default attestation delegate is inaccessible (lost keys, dead multisig)
-- Attestation power locked in dead addresses
-
-This is the only mechanism that provides a hard, trustless, time-bounded guarantee that funds cannot be locked permanently.
-
-**Configuration.** Set to 0 to disable. Recommended: 90 days for permissionless games.
-
-#### 9.1.3 Trigger 3: Explicit No-Contest Activation
-
-**Mechanism.** Once `currentGamePhaseOf()` returns NO_CONTEST (from either trigger above), anyone can call `triggerNoContestFor(gameId)`. This function:
-
-1. Verifies the game is in NO_CONTEST phase
-2. Sets `noContestTriggeredFor[gameId] = true` (permanent flag)
-3. Queues a new ruleset with no payout limits, making surplus equal to balance
-4. Enables full-refund cash-outs at mint price
-
-The explicit trigger is necessary because the NO_CONTEST phase is initially a *computed* state (the view function returns it based on conditions), but the on-chain ruleset still has the scoring-phase configuration. The trigger queues a new ruleset that enables the actual cash-out mechanics.
-
-**Cash-out behavior.** During NO_CONTEST, the `computeCashOutCount` function in `DefifaHookLib` returns `cumulativeMintPrice` — the same amount the player originally paid. This is identical to the MINT/REFUND phase behavior, implementing a complete refund. Reserve-minted tokens (those created via tier `reserveFrequency` rather than paid for) are excluded from refund calculations: their `isReserveMint` flag is set at mint time, and `beforeCashOutRecordedWith` subtracts their tier price from `cumulativeMintPrice` during MINT, REFUND, and NO_CONTEST phases. This prevents reserve beneficiaries from draining the pot by cashing out tokens they never paid for.
-
-#### 9.1.4 Priority Rules
-
-The phase resolution follows strict priority:
-
-1. **COMPLETE takes priority over NO_CONTEST.** If a scorecard has been ratified (`cashOutWeightIsSet == true`), the game is COMPLETE regardless of timeout or participation thresholds. A ratified scorecard is final.
-
-2. **Explicit trigger is sticky.** Once `noContestTriggeredFor[gameId]` is set, the game stays in NO_CONTEST permanently (cannot transition to SCORING even if conditions change).
-
-3. **Both thresholds are checked independently.** A game can enter NO_CONTEST from either `minParticipation` (cumulative mint cost too low) or `scorecardTimeout` (time elapsed) — whichever condition is met first.
-
-#### 9.1.5 The Default Attestation Delegate
-
-Beyond the automated NO_CONTEST triggers, the `defaultAttestationDelegate` provides a social fast-path for governance resolution. When set, every minter who does not specify a custom delegate has their attestation units delegated to this address. If no minter re-delegates, the delegate holds 100% of attestation power across all minted tiers — easily exceeding the 50% quorum.
-
-The delegate can submit a scorecard, attest to it, and once quorum is met, anyone can ratify. This resolves most governance deadlocks in practice. However, it depends on:
-1. The delegate being set (optional parameter; `address(0)` is valid),
-2. The delegate remaining operational (multi-sigs lose keys; DAOs cease operating),
-3. The delegate acting honestly (a delegate could submit a self-serving scorecard),
-4. Minters not re-delegating away during MINT phase.
-
-**Defense in depth.** The combination of `defaultAttestationDelegate` (fast-path social resolution) + `scorecardTimeout` (hard backstop) + `minParticipation` (early exit for ghost games) provides layered safety where each mechanism covers the failure modes of the others.
-
-### 9.2 Governance Attack Economics
-
-**All governance systems are manipulatable with sufficient capital.** The relevant question is not *whether* an attack is possible, but whether the **mechanism structurally prevents profit** regardless of how much the attacker spends. Making attacks "more expensive" is insufficient — a sufficiently capitalized adversary will pay any price. The defense must be structural, not economic.
-
-#### The Scaling Problem (Current Design)
-
-The per-tier attestation power cap assigns equal $V_{\text{max}} = 10^9$ to every tier regardless of supply. Quorum counts any tier with nonzero supply as eligible:
-
-$$Q = \frac{N_{\text{minted}}}{2} \cdot V_{\text{max}}$$
-
-An adversary buys 1 token in each of $\lceil N/2 \rceil$ sparse tiers, becoming the sole holder and receiving full attestation power per tier. Their cost:
-
-$$C_{\text{attack}} = \lceil N/2 \rceil \cdot p$$
-
-Meanwhile the pot scales with total participation: $B_{\text{pot}} = \sum_i n_i \cdot p$. The **return on investment**:
-
-$$\text{ROI} \approx \frac{2 \cdot N_{\text{total}}}{N}$$
-
-Attack cost is $O(N)$ while the pot is $O(N_{\text{total}})$, so ROI grows linearly with participation. For our 32-team World Cup at 0.01 ETH, an attacker spends 0.16 ETH to capture a 138.75 ETH pot — an 867× return. No amount of threshold-tuning fixes this: any defense based on "make it cost more" fails against an adversary with unlimited capital.
-
-#### Benefit-Weighted Attestation: The Structural Fix
-
-The insight: **the beneficiaries of a scorecard should not be the ones who ratify it.** The more a tier receives from a scorecard, the less that tier's attestation power counts toward ratifying it.
-
-For a scorecard $S$ with weights $\{w_1, \ldots, w_N\}$, tier $i$'s effective attestation power toward ratifying $S$:
-
-$$V_i^{\text{eff}}(S) = V_{\text{max}} \cdot \left(1 - \frac{w_i}{W_{\text{total}}}\right) \tag{BWA}$$
-
-This is the **perfect proportion**: a pure linear reduction where benefit and governance power are complementary. The function has a critical mathematical invariant: the total available attestation power is *constant* for every valid scorecard:
-
-$$\sum_{i=1}^{N} V_i^{\text{eff}}(S) = V_{\text{max}} \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{N}\left(1 - \frac{w_i}{W_{\text{total}}}\right) = V_{\text{max}} \cdot (N - 1)$$
-
-since $\sum w_i = W_{\text{total}}$. This invariant means the mechanism doesn't favor concentrated scorecards over distributed ones in terms of *how much* attestation power exists — it only changes *who* holds it. The difficulty of ratification is identical for every valid scorecard; what differs is the coalition required.
-
-**Why linear is optimal.** Stronger-than-linear functions (e.g., quadratic $(1-x)^2$) reduce total available power for distributed scorecards relative to concentrated ones — the opposite of what's desired. Weaker-than-linear functions leave too much power with beneficiaries. The linear form uniquely preserves the $(N-1) \cdot V_{\text{max}}$ invariant while providing maximal separation between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.
-
-#### Why This Kills the Attack
-
-**Fraudulent scorecard** (100% to attacker's monopoly tier):
-
-| Tier | Scorecard weight | Effective attestation |
-|:-----|:----------------|:---------------------|
-| Attacker's tier | 100% | $V_{\text{max}} \times 0 = 0$ |
-| Each of 31 other tiers | 0% | $V_{\text{max}} \times 1.0$ |
-
-The attacker has **zero** attestation power for their own scorecard. No amount of capital changes this — buying more tokens in a tier that gets 100% weight still yields 0 effective power. The fraudulent scorecard accumulates 0 attestation and dies.
-
-**Truthful scorecard** (Argentina wins 40%, runner-up 20%, etc.):
-
-| Tier | Weight | Effective power |
-|:-----|:-------|:---------------|
-| Argentina | 40% | $0.6 \times V_{\text{max}}$ |
-| Runner-up | 20% | $0.8 \times V_{\text{max}}$ |
-| Semi-finalists (×2) | 10% each | $0.9 \times V_{\text{max}}$ each |
-| Other 28 tiers | ≈0% | $\approx V_{\text{max}}$ each |
-| **Total available** | | **$31 \times V_{\text{max}}$** |
-| **Quorum** | | **$16 \times V_{\text{max}}$** |
-
-The truthful scorecard has nearly 2× the attestation power needed. It passes easily — the delegate marshals power from non-winning tiers (which have full attestation strength), and even the winning tiers retain 60–90% of their power.
-
-#### Scaling Against Unlimited Capital
-
-The attacker's fallback: buy into *non-winning* tiers to accumulate attestation power, then push a fraudulent scorecard. Let's trace this:
-
-**Attacker buys 1 token in 16 sparse tiers, submits 100%-to-their-tier scorecard:**
-
-- Winning tier (100% weight): $0 \times V_{\text{max}} = 0$
-- 15 other sparse tiers (0% weight): $15 \times V_{\text{max}}$
-- 16 honest tiers (tiny share): $\approx 0.03 \times V_{\text{max}}$
-- **Total: 15.03 × $V_{\text{max}}$ < 16 × $V_{\text{max}}$ = quorum.** Fails.
-
-One tier short, because the winning tier contributes zero.
-
-**Attacker buys massively into honest tiers to compensate (500 tokens each, 80 ETH):**
-
-- Winning tier: still 0
-- 15 sparse tiers: $15 \times V_{\text{max}}$
-- 16 honest tiers (50% share): $8 \times V_{\text{max}}$
-- **Total: 23 × $V_{\text{max}}$ > quorum.** Passes.
-
-But the attacker invested **80 ETH** to attack an 80 ETH pot. Their tokens went *into* the pot (doubling it to 160 ETH). Net extraction = honest holders' original 80 ETH. Compare to the current design: 0.16 ETH to steal 138.75 ETH. **The mechanism forced attack cost to scale linearly with the pot.**
-
-The self-balancing property: to gain attestation power (from non-winning tiers), the attacker must buy tokens that don't benefit from their fraudulent scorecard. That capital goes into the treasury and benefits honest holders. The more the attacker invests in governance power, the more they enrich the pot they're trying to steal.
-
-#### Dead Token Economics: The Attack Tax
-
-The key insight making governance manipulation structurally unprofitable: **tokens purchased for governance power in non-winning tiers are dead money under a fraudulent scorecard.**
-
-Under BWA, an attacker needs tokens in non-winning tiers (where they have full governance power) to ratify a scorecard that benefits their winning tiers (where they have zero power). But under the fraudulent scorecard, those non-winning tiers receive 0% of the pot. The attacker's non-winning tokens are a sunk cost — capital destroyed in the act of governance manipulation.
-
-Combined with the 7.5% fee extraction (5% Defifa + 2.5% base protocol), this creates a formal profitability condition.
-
-**Theorem (Attack Profitability Threshold).** In a Defifa game with $N$ tiers, fee rate $\phi = 7.5\%$, and BWA, an attacker controlling fraction $\alpha_w$ of winning-tier tokens and fraction $\alpha_v$ of non-winning (voting) tier tokens profits if and only if:
-
-$$\alpha_w > \alpha_v \cdot \frac{N-1}{(1-\phi)N - 1}$$
-
-For the default fee rate ($\phi = 0.075$):
-
-| $N$ (tiers) | Threshold $\alpha_w / \alpha_v$ | Interpretation |
-|:-----|:------|:------|
-| 2 | 1.176 | Must own 17.6% more of winning tiers |
-| 4 | 1.111 | Must own 11.1% more |
-| 8 | 1.094 | Must own 9.4% more |
-| 32 | 1.084 | Must own 8.4% more |
-| 128 | 1.082 | Converges to $1/(1-\phi) \approx 1.081$ |
-
-*Proof.* The attacker's cost is $C = \alpha_w \cdot n_w \cdot p + \alpha_v \cdot n_v \cdot p$ where $n_w$ and $n_v$ are the total supply in winning and non-winning tiers respectively. Their revenue under a fraudulent scorecard assigning all weight to winning tiers is $R = \alpha_w \cdot (1-\phi) \cdot \text{pot}$. Non-winning tokens return \$0. The attacker's net profit $R - C > 0$ simplifies (after accounting for the attacker's own contribution to the pot) to the stated threshold. $\square$
-
-**Corollary (Uniform Buyer Loss).** An attacker who buys uniformly across all tiers ($\alpha_w = \alpha_v$) always loses money. Their return is $(1-\phi) \cdot \alpha \cdot \text{pot}$ while their cost is $\alpha \cdot \text{pot}$, yielding a guaranteed $-7.5\%$ loss regardless of the scorecard submitted, the number of tiers, or the total pot size.
-
-**Corollary (Dead Token Tax).** In a game with $N$ tiers where the attacker claims weight for 1 tier, $(N-1)/N$ of the attacker's governance tokens are dead — they cost money to buy but return nothing under the fraudulent scorecard. For the World Cup ($N = 32$), 96.9% of the attacker's governance investment is dead money.
-
-#### The Complete Defense Stack
-
-| Layer | Mechanism | Defends against |
-|:------|:----------|:---------------|
-| **Structural** | Benefit-weighted attestation | Self-interested scorecard manipulation |
-| **Economic** | Dead token tax + fee extraction | Profitability of residual attacks |
-| **Temporal** | Post-ratification timelock (Section 9.4) | Fraud that slips through BWA |
-| **Adaptive** | Graduated quorum by concentration (Section 9.4) | Concentrated fraudulent scorecards |
-| **Corrective** | Attestation withdrawal (Section 9.4) | Social engineering / phishing |
-| **Social** | Trusted delegate | Coordination failure among honest holders |
-| **Parametric** | `minParticipation` + `scorecardTimeout` | Ghost games and governance deadlock |
-| **Design** | Uniform participation (Section 9.3) | 51% ownership concentration |
-
-The delegate handles the common case. BWA makes self-interested scorecards structurally unratifiable. Dead token economics ensure that even attacks overcoming BWA are unprofitable. The timelock, graduated quorum, and attestation withdrawal (Section 9.4) provide defense-in-depth against residual attack vectors. Safety parameters provide the hard backstop. And resilient game design (Section 9.3) makes the 51% threshold prohibitively expensive.
-
-**The irreducible limit.** Like all proof-of-stake systems, Defifa has a 51% security threshold: an attacker who controls >50% of every tier's tokens can ratify any scorecard. This is the fundamental limit of all token-weighted governance and cannot be eliminated by mechanism design alone. The defense is *game design* — structuring games so that organic participation makes 51% ownership prohibitively expensive.
-
-**The bottom line:** Benefit-weighted attestation transforms Defifa governance from an economic arms race (who can spend more?) into a structural equilibrium (beneficiaries can't ratify their own winnings). The "perfect proportion" — linear reduction `power = 1 - benefit` — is the unique function that preserves constant total attestation across all valid scorecards while maximally separating beneficiary power from non-beneficiary power. Combined with dead token economics and fee extraction, self-serving governance is not just structurally difficult — it is provably unprofitable under the conditions identified in Section 9.3.
-
-### 9.3 Resilient Game Design
-
-The profitability threshold from Section 9.2 implies specific design principles that make Defifa games structurally resistant to governance attacks. This section derives the conditions under which attack profitability goes to zero and identifies the proven ideal game design.
-
-#### The Uniform Participation Theorem
-
-**Theorem.** In a Defifa game with BWA, if all $N$ tiers have equal supply ($n_i = n$ for all $i$), then no attacker controlling any fraction $\alpha$ of the total supply can profit from governance manipulation.
-
-*Proof.* Under uniform supply, any buyer's ownership fraction is identical across all tiers: $\alpha_w = \alpha_v = \alpha$. The profitability condition requires $\alpha_w > \alpha_v \cdot (N-1)/((1-\phi)N - 1)$, which reduces to $1 > (N-1)/((1-\phi)N - 1)$. Since $(1-\phi)N - 1 < N - 1$ for any $\phi > 0$, the right side exceeds 1 — the condition can never be satisfied. The attacker always loses exactly the fee fraction $\phi$. $\square$
-
-This theorem establishes that **participation uniformity is the fundamental design variable** for game security. The closer a game's tier supplies are to uniform, the harder it is for any attacker to achieve the $\alpha_w > 1.08 \times \alpha_v$ threshold needed for profit.
-
-The intuition: under uniform supply, any tokens the attacker buys in winning tiers to increase $\alpha_w$ also increase their ownership of the total supply, which means they're paying proportionally into the pot. Their revenue scales with $\alpha_w$ but so does their cost — the fees eat the margin.
-
-#### Design Principles
-
-**Principle 1: Choose events with balanced interest.** The single most important design decision is selecting an event where participants naturally spread their mints across tiers. Events with clear favorites and longshots concentrate supply, creating the imbalance attackers exploit.
-
-- **Ideal**: Tournament stages (World Cup groups, March Madness brackets) where multiple teams have genuine fanbases and win probability
-- **Good**: Multi-candidate elections, multi-outcome market predictions
-- **Risky**: "Favorite vs. field" structures where one tier attracts 90%+ of supply
-
-**Principle 2: More tiers, but only if they attract participation.** Additional tiers dilute the attacker's governance power across more dead tokens. However, adding tiers that attract zero organic participation creates cheap governance power for attackers. The optimal tier count $N^*$ maximizes the number of tiers with meaningful supply:
-
-$$N^* = \max \{ N : \forall i, \; n_i \geq n_{\min} \}$$
-
-where $n_{\min}$ is the supply level below which a tier becomes a governance attack vector. A tier with 1 token gives the attacker full governance power at cost $p$; a tier with 1,000 tokens requires the attacker to spend $501 \cdot p$ for majority control.
-
-**Principle 3: Reserve tokens as supply smoothing.** Configuring a reserved rate $\rho_i$ on every tier ensures that even tiers with low organic demand have tokens held by the delegate. These reserve tokens:
-- Count toward each tier's supply, diluting any attacker's ownership fraction
-- Are held by the delegate, who uses them to attest to the truthful scorecard
-- Push $\alpha_w$ and $\alpha_v$ closer together by adding supply the attacker doesn't control
-
-A reserved rate of $\rho = 1$ (one reserve token per paid mint) effectively halves the attacker's ownership fraction in any tier they haven't bought into, doubling the cost to achieve a given $\alpha_w / \alpha_v$ ratio.
-
-**Principle 4: Meaningful minimum participation.** Setting `minParticipation` to a threshold that ensures the pot is large enough to make attack capital requirements significant. If the pot is small, the attacker's token purchases represent a large fraction of total supply, making the $\alpha_w / \alpha_v$ ratio easier to manipulate.
-
-**Principle 5: Scorecard timeout as a hard backstop.** Always set `scorecardTimeout` for permissionless games. This ensures that even if all governance mechanisms fail, players recover their funds within a bounded time.
-
-#### Anti-Patterns
-
-**Anti-pattern 1: Extreme favorites.** A game where Tier 1 attracts 10,000 mints and Tiers 2–32 attract 10 each. The attacker buys 11 tokens in each of 16 sparse tiers (cost: 1.76 ETH), gaining majority control of those tiers at full governance power, while the pot holds 103.1 ETH. The imbalanced supply creates the $\alpha_w \gg \alpha_v$ condition the profitability theorem warns about.
-
-**Anti-pattern 2: Excess empty tiers.** Adding 128 tiers when only 8 attract organic interest. The remaining 120 tiers are free governance power — 1 token each at minimum cost gives the attacker 120 tiers of full attestation strength.
-
-**Anti-pattern 3: No safety parameters.** Running a permissionless game with `scorecardTimeout = 0` and `minParticipation = 0`. If governance fails for any reason, funds are permanently locked.
-
-#### The World Cup as Near-Ideal Design
-
-The 32-team FIFA World Cup game exemplifies resilient design:
-
-1. **Balanced interest**: All 32 teams have genuine fanbases, ensuring organic minting across all tiers. Even "longshot" teams (Saudi Arabia, Tunisia) attract nationalist buying.
-
-2. **High tier count**: $N = 32$ means the profitability threshold requires the attacker to own 8.4% more of winning tiers than voting tiers — and 96.9% of their governance tokens are dead money.
-
-3. **Natural uniformity**: Group-stage structure ensures at least 4 competitive teams per group, with 8 groups providing diverse entry points. Historical data shows World Cup fan interest is among the most evenly distributed of any sporting event.
-
-4. **Cultural event alignment**: The World Cup is a high-salience event that attracts large, globally distributed participation — making the pot large and any attacker's fraction small.
-
-5. **Clear resolution**: Tournament brackets provide unambiguous outcomes, reducing scorecard disputes to a mechanical verification.
-
-**Is there a proven ideal game design?** Yes, with qualification. The Uniform Participation Theorem proves that a game with perfectly uniform tier supply is impervious to profitable governance attacks regardless of attacker capital. The "ideal" is therefore any event structure that naturally produces uniform minting — and the World Cup is the canonical real-world example. The qualification: no mechanism can prevent a 51% attacker, just as no proof-of-stake protocol can. The defense is making 51% ownership prohibitively expensive through high, uniform participation.
-
-### 9.4 Governance Hardening
-
-The defense stack in Section 9.2 — BWA, dead token economics, and resilient game design — provides strong structural guarantees. This section describes four implemented mechanisms that provide defense-in-depth against residual attack vectors. These are additive: each one independently strengthens the system, and they compose without interference.
-
-#### 9.4.1 Post-Ratification Timelock
-
-**Problem.** Without a timelock, `ratifyScorecardFrom` executes the scorecard instantly — the moment quorum is met and the grace period expires, anyone can call it and the weights are permanently locked. There is zero time for the community to react to fraud that slips through BWA.
-
-**Mechanism.** A mandatory delay $\tau_{\text{lock}}$ exists between a scorecard reaching quorum (after grace period) and its execution becoming available. During this window:
-
-1. The scorecard enters the `QUEUED` state — visible but not yet executable.
-2. Multiple scorecards can reach `QUEUED` or `SUCCEEDED` simultaneously. The first to be ratified wins; others become `DEFEATED`.
-3. After $\tau_{\text{lock}}$ expires, the scorecard transitions to `SUCCEEDED` and can be ratified.
-
-**Why competing scorecards race fairly.** Multiple scorecards can coexist in `QUEUED`/`SUCCEEDED` simultaneously. The first `ratifyScorecardFrom` call wins. Under BWA + graduated quorum, marshaling enough attestation power for a fraudulent competing scorecard is extremely expensive.
-
-**Recommended parameters.** $\tau_{\text{lock}} = 3$–$7$ days. This is the same pattern used by Compound Governor, OpenZeppelin TimelockController, and Gnosis Safe — battle-tested in governance systems managing billions in TVL.
-
-**Implementation.** A `QUEUED` state exists between `ACTIVE` and `SUCCEEDED`. The `stateOf` function returns `QUEUED` when quorum is met, grace period has passed, and $\tau_{\text{lock}}$ has not yet elapsed. `ratifyScorecardFrom` only executes when the state is `SUCCEEDED` (timelock expired). The `timelockDuration` is configurable per game (set to 0 to disable).
-
-#### 9.4.2 Graduated Quorum by Scorecard Concentration
-
-**Problem.** Base quorum is flat: $Q_{\text{base}} = N_{\text{eligible}} \times V_{\text{max}} / 2$ regardless of the scorecard's weight distribution. A scorecard assigning 100% to one tier faces the same quorum as one distributing weight across 32 tiers. Concentrated fraudulent scorecards are not penalized.
-
-**Mechanism.** Apply a concentration penalty based on the largest tier weight's squared share, scaled by the *headroom* — the gap between the maximum achievable BWA attestation and the base quorum:
-
-$$\text{headroom} = Q_{\text{base}} - V_{\text{max}} - N = \frac{(N-2) \times V_{\text{max}}}{2} - N$$
-
-$$\text{maxShare} = \frac{\max_i(w_i)}{W_{\text{total}}}$$
-
-$$Q(S) = Q_{\text{base}} + \text{headroom} \times \text{maxShare}^2$$
-
-The $-N$ term accounts for per-tier integer rounding loss in the BWA computation (`mulDiv` truncation).
-
-**Properties:**
-- **Self-capping.** The penalty can never exceed headroom, so the adjusted quorum is always reachable by non-beneficiary attestors.
-- **Nonlinear.** maxShare² is quadratic: gentle for moderate concentration (25% max → 6.25% of headroom), steep for extreme concentration (100% max → 100% of headroom).
-- **No magic constants.** The formula derives entirely from game parameters — no configurable penalty factor.
-
-| Scorecard distribution | maxShare | Penalty (fraction of headroom) |
-|:----|:----|:----|
-| Equal across 32 tiers | 3.1% | 0.1% (essentially unchanged) |
-| World Cup (40/20/10/10/...) | 40% | 16% |
-| Winner-take-all (100/0/...) | 100% | 100% (quorum = max achievable BWA) |
-
-**Effect.** Distributed scorecards reflecting real-world outcomes are barely affected. Concentrated fraudulent scorecards face quadratically increasing quorum requirements, up to the theoretical BWA maximum for winner-take-all.
-
-**Implementation.** At scorecard submission time, find the largest tier weight and compute the adjusted quorum. Store it in `quorumSnapshot` on the `DefifaScorecard` struct. The `stateOf` function uses this snapshot for the threshold check. The headroom guard (`baseQuorum >= MAX_ATTESTATION_POWER_TIER`) ensures the penalty is only applied when there are enough tiers for it to be meaningful.
-
-#### 9.4.3 Attestation Withdrawal
-
-**Problem.** Without withdrawal, attestation would be irreversible. If holders are tricked into attesting to a fraudulent scorecard (phishing, social engineering, UI spoofing), they cannot correct their mistake.
-
-**Mechanism.** Holders can revoke their attestation during the `ACTIVE` phase:
-
-1. Each attestor's BWA weight is stored: `attestedWeightOf[msg.sender]`.
-2. `revokeAttestationFrom(gameId, scorecardId)` subtracts the stored weight from the scorecard's attestation count and clears the record.
-3. Revocation is only available while the scorecard state is `ACTIVE`. Once a scorecard enters `QUEUED` (grace period ended + quorum met), revocations are disabled.
-
-**Why ACTIVE-only.** Restricting revocation to the `ACTIVE` phase prevents the griefing loop (attest/revoke cycling that could block ratification). During ACTIVE, the grace period is still running, giving honest holders time to correct mistakes. Once `QUEUED`, the community has already demonstrated consensus and the timelock provides the final safety window.
-
-**Effect.** This enables community self-correction during the debate window. If a fraudulent scorecard accumulates attestation through deception, honest holders can withdraw support before the grace period ends, causing it to drop below quorum. Combined with the timelock (Section 9.4.1), the overall correction window spans the grace period plus timelock duration.
-
-**Implementation.** The `DefifaAttestations` struct stores `mapping(address => uint256) attestedWeightOf` (zero = not attested). The `count` field is mutable in both directions. The BWA weight recorded at attestation time is deterministic (based on snapshot timestamp), so revocation recomputes the exact same weight that was added.
-
-#### 9.4.4 Scorecard-Aware Attestation Power (BWA Implementation)
-
-**Problem.** The raw `getAttestationWeight` function computes attestation power without regard to which scorecard is being attested to. For BWA to function, attestation power must be *scorecard-dependent*: each tier's contribution reduced by $(1 - w_i / W_{\text{total}})$.
-
-**Mechanism.** Modify the attestation flow to be scorecard-aware:
-
-1. When `attestToScorecardFrom` is called, retrieve the scorecard's tier weights.
-2. For each tier where the attestor has power, compute the BWA-reduced weight:
-   $$\text{power}_i^{\text{eff}} = \text{power}_i^{\text{raw}} \times \left(1 - \frac{w_i}{W_{\text{total}}}\right)$$
-3. Sum the effective power across all tiers and record this as the attestation count.
-
-**Storage approach.** The tier weights must be accessible during attestation. Two options:
-
-| Approach | Storage cost | Calldata cost | Complexity |
-|:---------|:------------|:-------------|:-----------|
-| **Store weights in scorecard** | $O(N)$ per scorecard (128 uint256s max) | None at attestation | Simple |
-| **Pass weights as calldata, verify hash** | None | $O(N)$ per attestation | Moderate |
-
-The storage approach is recommended: weights are written once at submission and read many times during attestation. The max storage is 128 uint256 slots per scorecard — approximately 400k gas at submission, amortized across all attestations.
-
-**Quorum adjustment.** Under BWA, the maximum possible attestation for any scorecard is $(N-1) \times V_{\text{max}}$ (the constant-total invariant). Base quorum is $N_{\text{eligible}} \times V_{\text{max}} / 2$, which represents 50% of raw power. The graduated quorum mechanism (Section 9.4.2) further adjusts this per-scorecard based on concentration, storing the result in `quorumSnapshot`.
-
-### 9.5 Governance Deadlock Analysis
-
-The following table summarizes all governance deadlock scenarios and their resolution mechanisms:
-
-| Scenario | Resolution |
-|:---------|:-----------|
-| No scorecard submitted | `scorecardTimeout` → NO_CONTEST → full refunds |
-| Scorecard submitted, quorum unreachable | `scorecardTimeout` → NO_CONTEST → full refunds |
-| Default delegate inaccessible | `scorecardTimeout` → NO_CONTEST → full refunds |
-| Attestation power in dead addresses | `scorecardTimeout` → NO_CONTEST → full refunds |
-| Split target reverts on ratification | try-catch in `fulfillCommitmentsOf` → fee stays in pot → game continues |
-| All minters refund | Treasury balance = 0 → nothing to recover |
-| Insufficient participation | `minParticipation` threshold → NO_CONTEST → full refunds |
-
-Every deadlock scenario that could previously lock funds permanently is now resolved by either `scorecardTimeout` (time-bounded) or `minParticipation` (condition-based), provided these optional parameters are set.
-
-A game with both safety parameters set to 0 functions exactly as a minimal governance game — relying on the delegate and community coordination. The safety mechanisms add optionality for risk-averse game designers without adding mandatory complexity.
-
----
-
-## 10 Conclusions and Practical Implications
-
-This paper has formalized the cryptoeconomic mechanisms of Defifa: a prediction-game protocol that transforms NFT minting into a parimutuel wagering mechanism with governance-ratified outcomes. Through mathematical analysis of the minting, refund, scorecard, and prize distribution operations, we have derived conservation guarantees, characterized equilibrium behavior, analyzed governance security, and mapped the parameter design space.
-
-### Prize Distribution Mechanics
-
-Defifa implements a *path-independent, weight-proportional* prize distribution through Equation 14. The key insight is the use of $(B_{\text{prize}} + A_{\text{redeemed}})$ as the reference pot: by reconstructing the original post-fee pot rather than using the current balance, the protocol ensures that every token holder receives the same payout regardless of redemption order. Theorem 6.1 proves that the total payout across all holders exactly exhausts the prize pool, with no residual or shortfall. The on-chain exact-sum validation ($\sum w_i = W_{\text{total}}$) provides a hard guarantee that no prize pool value is trapped.
-
-The scorecard weight system ($\sum w_i = 10^{18}$) provides a flexible framework for expressing arbitrary outcome distributions: winner-take-all, proportional splits, partial credit, or any mixture. The per-token weight formula (Eq. 12) correctly adjusts for tier size — including pending reserved tokens in the denominator — ensuring that a tier's total claim equals its weight fraction of the pot regardless of how many tokens were minted in that tier.
-
-### Governance Security
-
-The attestation model (Section 3) achieves a balance between decentralization and efficiency. The per-tier cap on attestation power ($V_{\text{max}} = 10^9$) prevents any single tier from dominating governance, while the 50% quorum across minted tiers ensures broad participation. The checkpoint-based snapshot (at `attestationsBegin - 1`, with pending reserves snapshotted at submission time) prevents vote-buying and reserve-minting manipulation, mint-phase-only delegation prevents last-minute manipulation, and scoring-phase-only submission prevents pre-accumulation of attestations.
-
-Section 9.2 introduces **benefit-weighted attestation** (BWA): the "perfect proportion" where a tier's governance power for a given scorecard equals $V_{\text{max}} \times (1 - w_i / W_{\text{total}})$. This structural mechanism makes self-serving scorecards unratifiable regardless of attacker capital — the beneficiaries of a scorecard cannot be the coalition that pushes it through. The dead token economics prove that even attacks overcoming BWA are unprofitable: tokens purchased for governance power in non-winning tiers return \$0 under the fraudulent scorecard, creating a guaranteed loss when combined with fee extraction. Section 9.3 formalizes the Uniform Participation Theorem, proving that games with equal tier supply are impervious to profitable governance attacks.
-
-### Safety Mechanisms
-
-The NO_CONTEST system (Section 9.1) provides comprehensive fund-recovery guarantees through three complementary mechanisms:
-- **Minimum participation threshold**: early exit for non-viable games
-- **Scorecard timeout**: hard, trustless, time-bounded backstop for all deadlock scenarios
-- **Default attestation delegate**: social fast-path for routine governance resolution
-
-These mechanisms are optional (disabled by setting to 0) and the game remains fully playable without them, preserving backward compatibility and supporting use cases where open-ended scoring is desired.
-
-### Market Efficiency
-
-The equilibrium analysis (Section 5.1) demonstrates that Defifa games converge to the classical parimutuel result: mint fractions equal consensus probabilities. The uniform pricing enforced by the protocol ensures clean parimutuel dynamics — the pot fraction in each tier reflects only mint *count*, not differential pricing. The three-round information structure (mint → refund → secondary) provides richer information aggregation than single-shot mechanisms, with the refund phase serving as a particularly elegant solution to the adverse-selection problem in prediction markets.
-
-### Protocol Sustainability
-
-The fee-token flywheel (Section 7.3) creates a positive feedback loop between game volume and protocol token value. The 7.5% default fee rate (5% Defifa + 2.5% base protocol) positions Defifa competitively with traditional parimutuel systems (15–25%) while the protocol token rebate further reduces the effective rate for participants.
-
-### Practical Recommendations
-
-For game designers deploying Defifa games:
-
-1. **Participation uniformity is paramount**: The Uniform Participation Theorem (Section 9.3) proves that games with equal tier supply are impervious to profitable governance attacks. Choose events where all tiers attract organic interest — this is the single most important design decision.
-2. **Tier count**: 4–32 tiers balances governance security with outcome expressiveness. Only add tiers that will attract meaningful participation; empty tiers are cheap governance power for attackers.
-3. **Reserve tokens**: Configure reserved rates on every tier to smooth supply and dilute attacker ownership in sparse tiers.
-4. **Pricing**: 0.01–0.1 ETH per NFT provides a balance between accessibility, gas efficiency, and attack resistance.
-5. **Refund phase**: 1–7 days gives meaningful optionality without excessive pot instability.
-6. **Attestation**: A trusted default delegate reduces coordination costs; 3–7 day grace period balances speed with security.
-7. **Fees**: The default 7.5% split (5% Defifa + 2.5% base protocol) is competitive; additional organizer splits should not exceed 5% to keep effective rates under 12.5%.
-8. **Safety parameters**: For permissionless games, always set `scorecardTimeout` (90–180 days) and `minParticipation`. For trusted-organizer games, the `defaultAttestationDelegate` is sufficient.
-
-### Synthesis
-
-Defifa implements a rigorous approach to prediction gaming through the composition of three well-understood mechanisms: parimutuel pooling for price formation, attestation governance for outcome resolution, and Juicebox V6 for treasury management. The mathematical analysis confirms that the system conserves value and converges to informationally efficient equilibria. The protocol token layer adds a novel incentive dimension that aligns participant, organizer, and protocol interests around game volume growth.
-
-The elegance of Defifa resides in its architectural composability: prediction games with arbitrary outcomes, arbitrary tier structures, and arbitrary payout distributions emerge from the same set of twelve parameters (Eq. 1), executed deterministically by immutable smart contracts with a single, time-bounded governance input. From a 4-team presidential election to a 32-team World Cup, the same protocol handles it all — and the safety mechanisms ensure that every game resolves, one way or another.
-
-The most significant result is the Uniform Participation Theorem: **a game with uniform tier supply is provably impervious to profitable governance attacks regardless of attacker capital.** This transforms game design from an art into an engineering discipline — the designer's job is to choose events and tier structures that naturally produce uniform participation, and the cryptoeconomics handle the rest.