@backblaze-labs/b2-sdk 0.1.0 → 0.2.0

package/dist/notifications/webhook.cjs

@@ -1,106 +1,216 @@
-"use strict";
-Object.defineProperty(exports, Symbol.toStringTag, { value: "Module" });
-const textCodec = require("../util/text-codec.cjs");
-const B2_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_HEADER = "x-bz-event-notification-signature";
-const SIGNATURE_VERSION_PREFIX = "v1=";
+const require_text_codec = require("../util/text-codec.cjs");
+const require_crypto = require("../util/crypto.cjs");
+//#region src/notifications/webhook.ts
+/**
+* The HTTP header B2 attaches to every event-notification webhook delivery.
+* The value is a versioned HMAC-SHA256 signature of the raw request body:
+* `v1=<lowercase-hex>`.
+*
+* The lowercase form matches Node's `req.headers` normalisation and most
+* server-framework conventions. Producers must compare case-insensitively.
+*/
+var B2_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_HEADER = "x-bz-event-notification-signature";
+/** Current B2 event-notification signature scheme prefix. */
+var SIGNATURE_VERSION_PREFIX = "v1=";
+/**
+* Constant-time comparison of two equal-length byte sequences.
+*
+* Web Crypto exposes no native timing-safe compare, so we do the standard
+* XOR-and-OR pattern ourselves. The early-out on length mismatch is fine
+* here because the signature length is publicly fixed (32 bytes for
+* HMAC-SHA256), so a length-mismatch branch leaks nothing about the secret.
+*
+* @param a - First byte sequence.
+* @param b - Second byte sequence.
+*
+* @returns `true` if the byte sequences are byte-for-byte equal.
+*/
 function timingSafeEqual(a, b) {
-  if (a.byteLength !== b.byteLength) return false;
-  let diff = 0;
-  for (let i = 0; i < a.byteLength; i++) {
-    diff |= a[i] ^ b[i];
-  }
-  return diff === 0;
+	if (a.byteLength !== b.byteLength) return false;
+	let diff = 0;
+	for (let i = 0; i < a.byteLength; i++) diff |= a[i] ^ b[i];
+	return diff === 0;
 }
+/**
+* Decode a lowercase hex string into bytes. Returns `null` on any malformed
+* input (odd length, non-hex characters). We don't surface a thrown error
+* because all malformed signatures should land in the same
+* `reason: 'bad signature format'` bucket on the verifier's caller,
+* regardless of which specific malformation triggered it.
+*
+* @param hex - The lowercase hex string to decode.
+*
+* @returns The decoded bytes, or `null` if the input was not valid hex.
+*/
 function hexToBytes(hex) {
-  if (hex.length % 2 !== 0) return null;
-  const out = new Uint8Array(hex.length / 2);
-  for (let i = 0; i < out.byteLength; i++) {
-    const byte = Number.parseInt(hex.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);
-    if (Number.isNaN(byte)) return null;
-    out[i] = byte;
-  }
-  return out;
+	if (hex.length % 2 !== 0) return null;
+	const out = new Uint8Array(hex.length / 2);
+	for (let i = 0; i < out.byteLength; i++) {
+		const byte = Number.parseInt(hex.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);
+		if (Number.isNaN(byte)) return null;
+		out[i] = byte;
+	}
+	return out;
 }
+/**
+* Pick the single signature string from {@link VerifyWebhookOptions.signature}.
+* Returns `null` if absent, empty, or supplied as an empty array.
+*
+* @param raw - The signature value as supplied by the caller.
+*
+* @returns The chosen signature string, or `null` if no candidate was usable.
+*/
 function pickSignature(raw) {
-  if (raw === void 0) return null;
-  if (Array.isArray(raw)) {
-    for (const v of raw) {
-      if (typeof v === "string" && v.length > 0) return v;
-    }
-    return null;
-  }
-  return typeof raw === "string" && raw.length > 0 ? raw : null;
+	if (raw === void 0) return null;
+	if (Array.isArray(raw)) {
+		for (const v of raw) if (typeof v === "string" && v.length > 0) return v;
+		return null;
+	}
+	return typeof raw === "string" && raw.length > 0 ? raw : null;
 }
+/**
+* Encode a UTF-8 string into bytes using a shared encoder.
+*
+* @param s - The string to encode.
+*
+* @returns The UTF-8 encoded bytes.
+*/
 function bytes(s) {
-  return textCodec.utf8Encoder.encode(s);
+	return require_text_codec.utf8Encoder.encode(s);
 }
+/**
+* Normalise the body parameter to a `Uint8Array` view of its raw bytes.
+*
+* Strings are UTF-8 encoded. `Uint8Array` inputs pass through untouched.
+*
+* @param body - The raw request body as supplied by the caller.
+*
+* @returns The body as a byte sequence ready for HMAC computation.
+*/
 function bodyBytes(body) {
-  return typeof body === "string" ? bytes(body) : body;
-}
-async function hmacSha256(secret, body) {
-  const secretBytes = bytes(secret);
-  const key = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.importKey(
-    "raw",
-    secretBytes.buffer.slice(
-      secretBytes.byteOffset,
-      secretBytes.byteOffset + secretBytes.byteLength
-    ),
-    { name: "HMAC", hash: "SHA-256" },
-    false,
-    ["sign"]
-  );
-  const sig = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.sign(
-    "HMAC",
-    key,
-    body.buffer.slice(body.byteOffset, body.byteOffset + body.byteLength)
-  );
-  return new Uint8Array(sig);
+	return typeof body === "string" ? bytes(body) : body;
 }
+/**
+* Best-effort JSON parse that returns `null` on failure. We accept partial
+* structural mismatches (no `events` array etc.) at the caller's discretion.
+*
+* @param raw - The decoded request body string.
+*
+* @returns The parsed payload, or `null` if `raw` is not valid JSON.
+*/
 function tryParse(raw) {
-  try {
-    return JSON.parse(raw);
-  } catch {
-    return null;
-  }
+	try {
+		return JSON.parse(raw);
+	} catch {
+		return null;
+	}
 }
+/**
+* Narrow `value` to {@link WebhookPayload}. Currently only checks that
+* `events` is an array; per-event validation is the caller's responsibility
+* since B2 may add new optional fields and we don't want to reject deliveries
+* that include them.
+*
+* @param value - The parsed JSON value to validate.
+*
+* @returns `true` if the value matches the {@link WebhookPayload} shape.
+*/
 function looksLikePayload(value) {
-  return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && Array.isArray(value.events);
+	return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && Array.isArray(value.events);
 }
+/**
+* Verify the HMAC-SHA256 signature B2 attaches to event-notification webhooks
+* and parse the body on success.
+*
+* Never throws: returns a discriminated {@link VerifyWebhookResult}. Use this
+* when you want a single, explicit place to branch on `valid` and log the
+* `reason` on rejection.
+*
+* @param opts - The body, signature header, and signing secret. See {@link VerifyWebhookOptions}.
+*
+* @returns Verification result with optional parsed payload and failure reason.
+*
+* @example
+* ```ts
+* import { verifyWebhookSignature, B2_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_HEADER } from '@backblaze-labs/b2-sdk/notifications'
+*
+* app.post('/webhook', async (req, res) => {
+*   const raw = await readRawBody(req) // raw bytes, NOT json
+*   const result = await verifyWebhookSignature({
+*     body: raw,
+*     signature: req.headers[B2_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_HEADER],
+*     secret: process.env.B2_WEBHOOK_SECRET,
+*   })
+*   if (!result.valid) return res.status(401).send(result.reason)
+*   for (const event of result.payload.events) handleEvent(event)
+*   res.status(204).end()
+* })
+* ```
+*
+*/
 async function verifyWebhookSignature(opts) {
-  if (typeof opts.secret !== "string" || opts.secret.length === 0) {
-    return { valid: false, payload: null, reason: "missing signing secret" };
-  }
-  const signature = pickSignature(opts.signature);
-  if (signature === null) {
-    return { valid: false, payload: null, reason: "missing signature header" };
-  }
-  if (!signature.startsWith(SIGNATURE_VERSION_PREFIX)) {
-    return { valid: false, payload: null, reason: "unsupported signature version" };
-  }
-  const claimed = hexToBytes(signature.slice(SIGNATURE_VERSION_PREFIX.length).toLowerCase());
-  if (claimed === null) {
-    return { valid: false, payload: null, reason: "bad signature format" };
-  }
-  const raw = bodyBytes(opts.body);
-  const expected = await hmacSha256(opts.secret, raw);
-  if (!timingSafeEqual(claimed, expected)) {
-    return { valid: false, payload: null, reason: "signature mismatch" };
-  }
-  const decoded = typeof opts.body === "string" ? opts.body : textCodec.utf8Decoder.decode(raw);
-  const parsed = tryParse(decoded);
-  if (!looksLikePayload(parsed)) {
-    return { valid: false, payload: null, reason: "invalid payload shape" };
-  }
-  return { valid: true, payload: parsed, reason: null };
+	if (typeof opts.secret !== "string" || opts.secret.length === 0) return {
+		valid: false,
+		payload: null,
+		reason: "missing signing secret"
+	};
+	const signature = pickSignature(opts.signature);
+	if (signature === null) return {
+		valid: false,
+		payload: null,
+		reason: "missing signature header"
+	};
+	if (!signature.startsWith(SIGNATURE_VERSION_PREFIX)) return {
+		valid: false,
+		payload: null,
+		reason: "unsupported signature version"
+	};
+	const claimed = hexToBytes(signature.slice(3).toLowerCase());
+	if (claimed === null) return {
+		valid: false,
+		payload: null,
+		reason: "bad signature format"
+	};
+	const raw = bodyBytes(opts.body);
+	if (!timingSafeEqual(claimed, await require_crypto.hmacSha256(opts.secret, raw))) return {
+		valid: false,
+		payload: null,
+		reason: "signature mismatch"
+	};
+	const parsed = tryParse(typeof opts.body === "string" ? opts.body : require_text_codec.utf8Decoder.decode(raw));
+	if (!looksLikePayload(parsed)) return {
+		valid: false,
+		payload: null,
+		reason: "invalid payload shape"
+	};
+	return {
+		valid: true,
+		payload: parsed,
+		reason: null
+	};
 }
+/**
+* Throwing wrapper around {@link verifyWebhookSignature}. Returns the parsed
+* payload on success; throws an `Error` whose message is the verifier's
+* `reason` string on any failure.
+*
+* Useful when you want the verification to integrate with your framework's
+* existing error-handling middleware rather than handling the result inline.
+*
+* @param opts - The body, signature header, and signing secret. See {@link VerifyWebhookOptions}.
+*
+* @returns The parsed webhook payload.
+*
+* @throws When verification fails for any reason.
+*/
 async function requireValidWebhook(opts) {
-  const result = await verifyWebhookSignature(opts);
-  if (!result.valid || result.payload === null) {
-    throw new Error(`B2 webhook verification failed: ${result.reason ?? "unknown"}`);
-  }
-  return result.payload;
+	const result = await verifyWebhookSignature(opts);
+	if (!result.valid || result.payload === null) throw new Error(`B2 webhook verification failed: ${result.reason ?? "unknown"}`);
+	return result.payload;
 }
+//#endregion
 exports.B2_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_HEADER = B2_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_HEADER;
 exports.requireValidWebhook = requireValidWebhook;
 exports.verifyWebhookSignature = verifyWebhookSignature;
-//# sourceMappingURL=webhook.cjs.map
+
+//# sourceMappingURL=webhook.cjs.map

package/dist/notifications/webhook.cjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"webhook.cjs","sources":["../../src/notifications/webhook.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { EventType } from '../types/notifications.ts'\nimport { utf8Decoder, utf8Encoder } from '../util/text-codec.ts'\n\n/**\n * The HTTP header B2 attaches to every event-notification webhook delivery.\n * The value is a versioned HMAC-SHA256 signature of the raw request body:\n * `v1=<lowercase-hex>`.\n *\n * The lowercase form matches Node's `req.headers` normalisation and most\n * server-framework conventions. Producers must compare case-insensitively.\n */\nexport const B2_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_HEADER = 'x-bz-event-notification-signature'\n\n/** Current B2 event-notification signature scheme prefix. */\nconst SIGNATURE_VERSION_PREFIX = 'v1='\n\n/**\n * A single event entry inside a B2 webhook payload.\n *\n * The `events` array on the parsed body contains zero or more of these. Most\n * deliveries hold a single event, but B2 may coalesce multiple events from the\n * same bucket into one delivery for efficiency, so callers should iterate.\n *\n * @see https://www.backblaze.com/apidocs/event-notifications-overview\n */\nexport interface WebhookEvent {\n  /** Account that owns the bucket the event fired on. */\n  readonly accountId: string\n  /** Bucket ID the event fired on. */\n  readonly bucketId: string\n  /** Bucket name at the moment the event fired. */\n  readonly bucketName: string\n  /** Globally unique event identifier (useful for idempotency on the receiver). */\n  readonly eventId: string\n  /** Event time in UNIX milliseconds (UTC). */\n  readonly eventTimestamp: number\n  /** Specific event type, e.g. `'b2:ObjectCreated:Upload'`. */\n  readonly eventType: EventType\n  /** Schema version of the event payload. Currently `1`. */\n  readonly eventVersion: number\n  /** Name of the `EventNotificationRule` on the bucket that matched. */\n  readonly matchedRuleName: string\n  /** B2 file name of the affected object. */\n  readonly objectName: string\n  /** Affected object's size in bytes, when present (absent for some delete events). */\n  readonly objectSize?: number\n  /** Specific file version ID, when applicable. */\n  readonly objectVersionId?: string\n}\n\n/**\n * The complete JSON body B2 POSTs to a webhook endpoint after signature\n * verification succeeds. See {@link verifyWebhookSignature}.\n */\nexport interface WebhookPayload {\n  /** One or more event entries. Always non-empty on real deliveries. */\n  readonly events: readonly WebhookEvent[]\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link verifyWebhookSignature} and {@link requireValidWebhook}.\n */\nexport interface VerifyWebhookOptions {\n  /**\n   * The raw request body B2 sent. MUST be the exact bytes received: any\n   * JSON re-serialisation or whitespace normalisation will break the HMAC.\n   *\n   * Pass a `Uint8Array` whenever the surrounding framework gives you raw\n   * bytes (e.g. `req.rawBody` in fastify, `req.arrayBuffer()` in Hono /\n   * Workers). The string overload is provided for convenience when a\n   * framework already decoded the body as UTF-8.\n   */\n  readonly body: string | Uint8Array\n  /**\n   * Value of the {@link B2_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_HEADER} header.\n   *\n   * Accepts a single string or an array (Node's `req.headers` returns\n   * `string | string[] | undefined`). When an array is supplied, the first\n   * non-empty element is used: B2 only ever sends one value, and rejecting\n   * the multi-value case prevents callers from accidentally trusting a\n   * spoofed second header injected by a buggy reverse proxy.\n   */\n  readonly signature: string | readonly string[] | undefined\n  /**\n   * The signing secret from `EventNotificationRule.targetConfiguration.hmacSha256SigningSecret`.\n   *\n   * This is the exact string B2 returned in the `b2_set_bucket_notification_rules`\n   * response. Do NOT base64-decode or otherwise transform it.\n   */\n  readonly secret: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Outcome of {@link verifyWebhookSignature}.\n *\n * The verifier never throws; instead it returns a discriminated result so\n * callers can branch on `valid` and log `reason` without try/catch noise.\n * Use {@link requireValidWebhook} when an exception-based control flow is\n * more convenient.\n */\nexport interface VerifyWebhookResult {\n  /** `true` only when the HMAC matched and the body parsed as a valid payload. */\n  readonly valid: boolean\n  /** Parsed payload when {@link valid} is `true`; otherwise `null`. */\n  readonly payload: WebhookPayload | null\n  /** Short reason describing why verification failed, or `null` on success. */\n  readonly reason: string | null\n}\n\n/**\n * Constant-time comparison of two equal-length byte sequences.\n *\n * Web Crypto exposes no native timing-safe compare, so we do the standard\n * XOR-and-OR pattern ourselves. The early-out on length mismatch is fine\n * here because the signature length is publicly fixed (32 bytes for\n * HMAC-SHA256), so a length-mismatch branch leaks nothing about the secret.\n *\n * @param a - First byte sequence.\n * @param b - Second byte sequence.\n *\n * @returns `true` if the byte sequences are byte-for-byte equal.\n */\nfunction timingSafeEqual(a: Uint8Array, b: Uint8Array): boolean {\n  if (a.byteLength !== b.byteLength) return false\n  let diff = 0\n  for (let i = 0; i < a.byteLength; i++) {\n    // Non-null asserted: `a` and `b` have the same length and `i` is in range.\n    diff |= (a[i] as number) ^ (b[i] as number)\n  }\n  return diff === 0\n}\n\n/**\n * Decode a lowercase hex string into bytes. Returns `null` on any malformed\n * input (odd length, non-hex characters). We don't surface a thrown error\n * because all malformed signatures should land in the same\n * `reason: 'bad signature format'` bucket on the verifier's caller,\n * regardless of which specific malformation triggered it.\n *\n * @param hex - The lowercase hex string to decode.\n *\n * @returns The decoded bytes, or `null` if the input was not valid hex.\n */\nfunction hexToBytes(hex: string): Uint8Array | null {\n  if (hex.length % 2 !== 0) return null\n  const out = new Uint8Array(hex.length / 2)\n  for (let i = 0; i < out.byteLength; i++) {\n    const byte = Number.parseInt(hex.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16)\n    if (Number.isNaN(byte)) return null\n    out[i] = byte\n  }\n  return out\n}\n\n/**\n * Pick the single signature string from {@link VerifyWebhookOptions.signature}.\n * Returns `null` if absent, empty, or supplied as an empty array.\n *\n * @param raw - The signature value as supplied by the caller.\n *\n * @returns The chosen signature string, or `null` if no candidate was usable.\n */\nfunction pickSignature(raw: VerifyWebhookOptions['signature']): string | null {\n  if (raw === undefined) return null\n  if (Array.isArray(raw)) {\n    for (const v of raw) {\n      if (typeof v === 'string' && v.length > 0) return v\n    }\n    return null\n  }\n  return typeof raw === 'string' && raw.length > 0 ? raw : null\n}\n\n/**\n * Encode a UTF-8 string into bytes using a shared encoder.\n *\n * @param s - The string to encode.\n *\n * @returns The UTF-8 encoded bytes.\n */\nfunction bytes(s: string): Uint8Array {\n  return utf8Encoder.encode(s)\n}\n\n/**\n * Normalise the body parameter to a `Uint8Array` view of its raw bytes.\n *\n * Strings are UTF-8 encoded. `Uint8Array` inputs pass through untouched.\n *\n * @param body - The raw request body as supplied by the caller.\n *\n * @returns The body as a byte sequence ready for HMAC computation.\n */\nfunction bodyBytes(body: string | Uint8Array): Uint8Array {\n  return typeof body === 'string' ? bytes(body) : body\n}\n\n/**\n * Compute the HMAC-SHA256 of `body` under `secret` using the isomorphic Web\n * Crypto API. Works in Node 22+, browsers, Bun, Deno, and Cloudflare Workers\n * without any platform-specific code.\n *\n * @param secret - The HMAC signing secret.\n * @param body - The bytes to sign.\n *\n * @returns The 32-byte HMAC-SHA256 digest.\n */\nasync function hmacSha256(secret: string, body: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  // The explicit `slice(byteOffset, byteOffset + byteLength)` defends against\n  // a Uint8Array view that points at a subset of a larger buffer. Casting to\n  // `ArrayBuffer` is needed because TS 5.7+ types Uint8Array's buffer as\n  // `ArrayBufferLike`, which includes `SharedArrayBuffer`. Web Crypto's\n  // signatures only accept the plain `ArrayBuffer` variant.\n  const secretBytes = bytes(secret)\n  const key = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    secretBytes.buffer.slice(\n      secretBytes.byteOffset,\n      secretBytes.byteOffset + secretBytes.byteLength,\n    ) as ArrayBuffer,\n    { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' },\n    false,\n    ['sign'],\n  )\n  const sig = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.sign(\n    'HMAC',\n    key,\n    body.buffer.slice(body.byteOffset, body.byteOffset + body.byteLength) as ArrayBuffer,\n  )\n  return new Uint8Array(sig)\n}\n\n/**\n * Best-effort JSON parse that returns `null` on failure. We accept partial\n * structural mismatches (no `events` array etc.) at the caller's discretion.\n *\n * @param raw - The decoded request body string.\n *\n * @returns The parsed payload, or `null` if `raw` is not valid JSON.\n */\nfunction tryParse(raw: string): unknown {\n  try {\n    return JSON.parse(raw) as unknown\n  } catch {\n    return null\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Narrow `value` to {@link WebhookPayload}. Currently only checks that\n * `events` is an array; per-event validation is the caller's responsibility\n * since B2 may add new optional fields and we don't want to reject deliveries\n * that include them.\n *\n * @param value - The parsed JSON value to validate.\n *\n * @returns `true` if the value matches the {@link WebhookPayload} shape.\n */\nfunction looksLikePayload(value: unknown): value is WebhookPayload {\n  return (\n    typeof value === 'object' &&\n    value !== null &&\n    Array.isArray((value as { events?: unknown }).events)\n  )\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify the HMAC-SHA256 signature B2 attaches to event-notification webhooks\n * and parse the body on success.\n *\n * Never throws: returns a discriminated {@link VerifyWebhookResult}. Use this\n * when you want a single, explicit place to branch on `valid` and log the\n * `reason` on rejection.\n *\n * @param opts - The body, signature header, and signing secret. See {@link VerifyWebhookOptions}.\n *\n * @returns Verification result with optional parsed payload and failure reason.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * import { verifyWebhookSignature, B2_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_HEADER } from '@backblaze-labs/b2-sdk/notifications'\n *\n * app.post('/webhook', async (req, res) => {\n *   const raw = await readRawBody(req) // raw bytes, NOT json\n *   const result = await verifyWebhookSignature({\n *     body: raw,\n *     signature: req.headers[B2_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_HEADER],\n *     secret: process.env.B2_WEBHOOK_SECRET,\n *   })\n *   if (!result.valid) return res.status(401).send(result.reason)\n *   for (const event of result.payload.events) handleEvent(event)\n *   res.status(204).end()\n * })\n * ```\n *\n */\nexport async function verifyWebhookSignature(\n  opts: VerifyWebhookOptions,\n): Promise<VerifyWebhookResult> {\n  if (typeof opts.secret !== 'string' || opts.secret.length === 0) {\n    return { valid: false, payload: null, reason: 'missing signing secret' }\n  }\n\n  const signature = pickSignature(opts.signature)\n  if (signature === null) {\n    return { valid: false, payload: null, reason: 'missing signature header' }\n  }\n\n  if (!signature.startsWith(SIGNATURE_VERSION_PREFIX)) {\n    return { valid: false, payload: null, reason: 'unsupported signature version' }\n  }\n\n  const claimed = hexToBytes(signature.slice(SIGNATURE_VERSION_PREFIX.length).toLowerCase())\n  if (claimed === null) {\n    return { valid: false, payload: null, reason: 'bad signature format' }\n  }\n\n  const raw = bodyBytes(opts.body)\n  const expected = await hmacSha256(opts.secret, raw)\n\n  if (!timingSafeEqual(claimed, expected)) {\n    return { valid: false, payload: null, reason: 'signature mismatch' }\n  }\n\n  const decoded = typeof opts.body === 'string' ? opts.body : utf8Decoder.decode(raw)\n  const parsed = tryParse(decoded)\n  if (!looksLikePayload(parsed)) {\n    return { valid: false, payload: null, reason: 'invalid payload shape' }\n  }\n\n  return { valid: true, payload: parsed, reason: null }\n}\n\n/**\n * Throwing wrapper around {@link verifyWebhookSignature}. Returns the parsed\n * payload on success; throws an `Error` whose message is the verifier's\n * `reason` string on any failure.\n *\n * Useful when you want the verification to integrate with your framework's\n * existing error-handling middleware rather than handling the result inline.\n *\n * @param opts - The body, signature header, and signing secret. See {@link VerifyWebhookOptions}.\n *\n * @returns The parsed webhook payload.\n *\n * @throws When verification fails for any reason.\n */\nexport async function requireValidWebhook(opts: VerifyWebhookOptions): Promise<WebhookPayload> {\n  const result = await verifyWebhookSignature(opts)\n  if (!result.valid || result.payload === null) {\n    throw new Error(`B2 webhook verification failed: ${result.reason ?? 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Most\n * deliveries hold a single event, but B2 may coalesce multiple events from the\n * same bucket into one delivery for efficiency, so callers should iterate.\n *\n * @see https://www.backblaze.com/apidocs/event-notifications-overview\n */\nexport interface WebhookEvent {\n  /** Account that owns the bucket the event fired on. */\n  readonly accountId: string\n  /** Bucket ID the event fired on. */\n  readonly bucketId: string\n  /** Bucket name at the moment the event fired. */\n  readonly bucketName: string\n  /** Globally unique event identifier (useful for idempotency on the receiver). */\n  readonly eventId: string\n  /** Event time in UNIX milliseconds (UTC). */\n  readonly eventTimestamp: number\n  /** Specific event type, e.g. `'b2:ObjectCreated:Upload'`. */\n  readonly eventType: EventType\n  /** Schema version of the event payload. Currently `1`. */\n  readonly eventVersion: number\n  /** Name of the `EventNotificationRule` on the bucket that matched. */\n  readonly matchedRuleName: string\n  /** B2 file name of the affected object. */\n  readonly objectName: string\n  /** Affected object's size in bytes, when present (absent for some delete events). */\n  readonly objectSize?: number\n  /** Specific file version ID, when applicable. */\n  readonly objectVersionId?: string\n}\n\n/**\n * The complete JSON body B2 POSTs to a webhook endpoint after signature\n * verification succeeds. See {@link verifyWebhookSignature}.\n */\nexport interface WebhookPayload {\n  /** One or more event entries. Always non-empty on real deliveries. */\n  readonly events: readonly WebhookEvent[]\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link verifyWebhookSignature} and {@link requireValidWebhook}.\n */\nexport interface VerifyWebhookOptions {\n  /**\n   * The raw request body B2 sent. MUST be the exact bytes received: any\n   * JSON re-serialisation or whitespace normalisation will break the HMAC.\n   *\n   * Pass a `Uint8Array` whenever the surrounding framework gives you raw\n   * bytes (e.g. `req.rawBody` in fastify, `req.arrayBuffer()` in Hono /\n   * Workers). The string overload is provided for convenience when a\n   * framework already decoded the body as UTF-8.\n   */\n  readonly body: string | Uint8Array\n  /**\n   * Value of the {@link B2_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_HEADER} header.\n   *\n   * Accepts a single string or an array (Node's `req.headers` returns\n   * `string | string[] | undefined`). When an array is supplied, the first\n   * non-empty element is used: B2 only ever sends one value, and rejecting\n   * the multi-value case prevents callers from accidentally trusting a\n   * spoofed second header injected by a buggy reverse proxy.\n   */\n  readonly signature: string | readonly string[] | undefined\n  /**\n   * The signing secret from `EventNotificationRule.targetConfiguration.hmacSha256SigningSecret`.\n   *\n   * This is the exact string B2 returned in the `b2_set_bucket_notification_rules`\n   * response. 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package/dist/notifications/webhook.d.cts.map

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package/dist/notifications/webhook.d.ts.map

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