@babylonlabs-io/ts-sdk 3.0.2 → 3.1.1

package/dist/tbv/core/services/index.cjs

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-"use strict";Object.defineProperty(exports,Symbol.toStringTag,{value:"Module"});const a=require("../../../PayoutManager-B6GFbG3X.cjs"),t=require("../../../buildAndBroadcastReclaim-B8aFMGf-.cjs"),i=require("../wasm/index.cjs"),e=require("../../../peginState-DUv10EJR.cjs"),r=require("../../../state-C4WoNCy1.cjs");exports.computeHashlock=a.computeHashlock;exports.validateSecretAgainstHashlock=a.validateSecretAgainstHashlock;exports.ApplicationEntryPointMismatchError=t.ApplicationEntryPointMismatchError;exports.ArtifactsVaultMismatchError=t.ArtifactsVaultMismatchError;exports.BIP68NotMatureError=t.BIP68NotMatureError;exports.ChallengerSetMismatchError=t.ChallengerSetMismatchError;exports.DELEGATED_CLAIM_TX_GRAPH_VERSION=t.DELEGATED_CLAIM_TX_GRAPH_VERSION;exports.GraphFingerprintError=t.GraphFingerprintError;exports.PEGIN_ETH_CONFIRMATIONS=t.PEGIN_ETH_CONFIRMATIONS;exports.ParticipantKeyDriftError=t.ParticipantKeyDriftError;exports.PayoutDestinationError=t.PayoutDestinationError;exports.PeginRegistrationMissingError=t.PeginRegistrationMissingError;exports.PeginRegistrationNotFinalError=t.PeginRegistrationNotFinalError;exports.RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_DENOMINATOR=t.RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_DENOMINATOR;exports.RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR=t.RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR;exports.RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_RATE_SATS_VB=t.RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_RATE_SATS_VB;exports.RECLAIM_WARN_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR=t.RECLAIM_WARN_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR;exports.REFUND_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_DENOMINATOR=t.REFUND_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_DENOMINATOR;exports.REFUND_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR=t.REFUND_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR;exports.REFUND_MAX_FEE_RATE_SATS_VB=t.REFUND_MAX_FEE_RATE_SATS_VB;exports.REFUND_VSIZE=t.REFUND_VSIZE;exports.ReclaimUneconomicalError=t.ReclaimUneconomicalError;exports.RegisteredVaultVersionMismatchError=t.RegisteredVaultVersionMismatchError;exports.VaultIdBindingError=t.VaultIdBindingError;exports.activateVault=t.activateVault;exports.activateVaultAndRedeem=t.activateVaultAndRedeem;exports.assembleWatchtowerArtifacts=t.assembleWatchtowerArtifacts;exports.assertArtifactsUsableForVault=t.assertArtifactsUsableForVault;exports.assertChallengerSetMatchesVault=t.assertChallengerSetMatchesVault;exports.assertClaimSpendsVault=t.assertClaimSpendsVault;exports.assertPayoutPaysRegisteredScript=t.assertPayoutPaysRegisteredScript;exports.assertReturnedGraphMatchesFingerprint=t.assertReturnedGraphMatchesFingerprint;exports.assertVaultProviderHintAccepted=t.assertVaultProviderHintAccepted;exports.buildAndBroadcastReclaim=t.buildAndBroadcastReclaim;exports.buildAndBroadcastRefund=t.buildAndBroadcastRefund;exports.deriveClaimerWotsKeypair=t.deriveClaimerWotsKeypair;exports.estimateRefundFeeSats=t.estimateRefundFeeSats;exports.fingerprintReturnedGraph=t.fingerprintReturnedGraph;exports.isApplicationEntryPointMismatchError=t.isApplicationEntryPointMismatchError;exports.isDepositAmountValid=t.isDepositAmountValid;exports.isHintAccepted=t.isHintAccepted;exports.isParticipantKeyDriftError=t.isParticipantKeyDriftError;exports.isPeginRegistrationMissingError=t.isPeginRegistrationMissingError;exports.isPeginRegistrationNotFinalError=t.isPeginRegistrationNotFinalError;exports.isRegisteredVaultVersionMismatchError=t.isRegisteredVaultVersionMismatchError;exports.matchKeyHint=t.matchKeyHint;exports.matchKeySetHint=t.matchKeySetHint;exports.resolveCurrentParticipantKeys=t.resolveCurrentParticipantKeys;exports.resolveParticipantKeysAtEpochs=t.resolveParticipantKeysAtEpochs;exports.runDepositorPresignFlow=t.runDepositorPresignFlow;exports.signDepositorGraph=t.signDepositorGraph;exports.submitWotsPublicKey=t.submitWotsPublicKey;exports.summarizeWatchtowerArtifacts=t.summarizeWatchtowerArtifacts;exports.validateDepositAmount=t.validateDepositAmount;exports.validateMultiVaultDepositInputs=t.validateMultiVaultDepositInputs;exports.validateOnChainParticipantKeys=t.validateOnChainParticipantKeys;exports.validateProviderSelection=t.validateProviderSelection;exports.validateRemainingCapacity=t.validateRemainingCapacity;exports.validateVaultAmounts=t.validateVaultAmounts;exports.validateVaultProviderPubkey=t.validateVaultProviderPubkey;exports.verifyRegisteredParticipantKeys=t.verifyRegisteredParticipantKeys;exports.verifyRegisteredVaultVersions=t.verifyRegisteredVaultVersions;exports.waitForPeginRegistrationDepth=t.waitForPeginRegistrationDepth;exports.waitForPeginStatus=t.waitForPeginStatus;exports.attachFinalizedAssert=i.attachFinalizedAssert;exports.finalizePayout=i.finalizePayout;exports.finalizeWronglyChallenged=i.finalizeWronglyChallenged;exports.pinPegoutProof=i.pinPegoutProof;exports.ContractStatus=e.ContractStatus;exports.PeginAction=e.PeginAction;exports.activationDeadlineBlocksRemaining=e.activationDeadlineBlocksRemaining;exports.canPerformAction=e.canPerformAction;exports.getPeginProtocolState=e.getPeginProtocolState;exports.isActivationDeadlinePassedOnChain=e.isActivationDeadlinePassedOnChain;exports.ClaimerPegoutStatusValue=r.ClaimerPegoutStatusValue;exports.isPegoutTerminalStatus=r.isPegoutTerminalStatus;exports.isRecognizedPegoutStatus=r.isRecognizedPegoutStatus;
+"use strict";Object.defineProperty(exports,Symbol.toStringTag,{value:"Module"});const r=require("../../../PayoutManager-DOdsgcUR.cjs"),t=require("../../../buildAndBroadcastReclaim-DjX7wVb2.cjs"),i=require("../wasm/index.cjs"),e=require("../../../peginState-DUv10EJR.cjs"),a=require("../../../state-C4WoNCy1.cjs");exports.computeHashlock=r.computeHashlock;exports.validateSecretAgainstHashlock=r.validateSecretAgainstHashlock;exports.ApplicationEntryPointMismatchError=t.ApplicationEntryPointMismatchError;exports.ArtifactsVaultMismatchError=t.ArtifactsVaultMismatchError;exports.AssertBindingError=t.AssertBindingError;exports.BABE_SESSION_PLACEHOLDER_DECRYPTOR_HEX=t.BABE_SESSION_PLACEHOLDER_DECRYPTOR_HEX;exports.BIP68NotMatureError=t.BIP68NotMatureError;exports.ChallengerSetMismatchError=t.ChallengerSetMismatchError;exports.DELEGATED_CLAIM_TX_GRAPH_VERSION=t.DELEGATED_CLAIM_TX_GRAPH_VERSION;exports.DelegatedClaimSigningIncompleteError=t.DelegatedClaimSigningIncompleteError;exports.GraphFingerprintError=t.GraphFingerprintError;exports.PEGIN_ETH_CONFIRMATIONS=t.PEGIN_ETH_CONFIRMATIONS;exports.ParticipantKeyDriftError=t.ParticipantKeyDriftError;exports.PayoutDestinationError=t.PayoutDestinationError;exports.PayoutInputLeafError=t.PayoutInputLeafError;exports.PeginRegistrationMissingError=t.PeginRegistrationMissingError;exports.PeginRegistrationNotFinalError=t.PeginRegistrationNotFinalError;exports.RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_DENOMINATOR=t.RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_DENOMINATOR;exports.RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR=t.RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR;exports.RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_RATE_SATS_VB=t.RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_RATE_SATS_VB;exports.RECLAIM_WARN_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR=t.RECLAIM_WARN_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR;exports.REFUND_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_DENOMINATOR=t.REFUND_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_DENOMINATOR;exports.REFUND_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR=t.REFUND_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR;exports.REFUND_MAX_FEE_RATE_SATS_VB=t.REFUND_MAX_FEE_RATE_SATS_VB;exports.REFUND_VSIZE=t.REFUND_VSIZE;exports.ReclaimUneconomicalError=t.ReclaimUneconomicalError;exports.RegisteredVaultVersionMismatchError=t.RegisteredVaultVersionMismatchError;exports.SigningPlanMismatchError=t.SigningPlanMismatchError;exports.VaultIdBindingError=t.VaultIdBindingError;exports.activateVault=t.activateVault;exports.activateVaultAndRedeem=t.activateVaultAndRedeem;exports.assembleWatchtowerArtifacts=t.assembleWatchtowerArtifacts;exports.assembleWatchtowerArtifactsFromSignatures=t.assembleWatchtowerArtifactsFromSignatures;exports.assertArtifactsUsableForVault=t.assertArtifactsUsableForVault;exports.assertAssertBindsClaimAndPayout=t.assertAssertBindsClaimAndPayout;exports.assertChallengerSetMatchesVault=t.assertChallengerSetMatchesVault;exports.assertClaimSpendsVault=t.assertClaimSpendsVault;exports.assertPayoutPaysRegisteredScript=t.assertPayoutPaysRegisteredScript;exports.assertReturnedGraphMatchesFingerprint=t.assertReturnedGraphMatchesFingerprint;exports.assertTermsMatchVault=t.assertTermsMatchVault;exports.assertVaultProviderHintAccepted=t.assertVaultProviderHintAccepted;exports.buildAndBroadcastReclaim=t.buildAndBroadcastReclaim;exports.buildAndBroadcastRefund=t.buildAndBroadcastRefund;exports.copyAssertConnectorLeaf=t.copyAssertConnectorLeaf;exports.deriveClaimerWotsKeypair=t.deriveClaimerWotsKeypair;exports.estimateRefundFeeSats=t.estimateRefundFeeSats;exports.fingerprintReturnedGraph=t.fingerprintReturnedGraph;exports.isApplicationEntryPointMismatchError=t.isApplicationEntryPointMismatchError;exports.isDepositAmountValid=t.isDepositAmountValid;exports.isHintAccepted=t.isHintAccepted;exports.isParticipantKeyDriftError=t.isParticipantKeyDriftError;exports.isPeginRegistrationMissingError=t.isPeginRegistrationMissingError;exports.isPeginRegistrationNotFinalError=t.isPeginRegistrationNotFinalError;exports.isRegisteredVaultVersionMismatchError=t.isRegisteredVaultVersionMismatchError;exports.matchKeyHint=t.matchKeyHint;exports.matchKeySetHint=t.matchKeySetHint;exports.planDelegatedClaimSigning=t.planDelegatedClaimSigning;exports.readDelegatedClaimVaultContext=t.readDelegatedClaimVaultContext;exports.readStampedParticipantKeys=t.readStampedParticipantKeys;exports.resolveCurrentParticipantKeys=t.resolveCurrentParticipantKeys;exports.resolveParticipantKeysAtEpochs=t.resolveParticipantKeysAtEpochs;exports.runDepositorPresignFlow=t.runDepositorPresignFlow;exports.signDelegatedClaimPlan=t.signDelegatedClaimPlan;exports.signDepositorGraph=t.signDepositorGraph;exports.submitWotsPublicKey=t.submitWotsPublicKey;exports.summarizeWatchtowerArtifacts=t.summarizeWatchtowerArtifacts;exports.validateDepositAmount=t.validateDepositAmount;exports.validateMultiVaultDepositInputs=t.validateMultiVaultDepositInputs;exports.validateOnChainParticipantKeys=t.validateOnChainParticipantKeys;exports.validateProviderSelection=t.validateProviderSelection;exports.validateRemainingCapacity=t.validateRemainingCapacity;exports.validateVaultAmounts=t.validateVaultAmounts;exports.validateVaultProviderPubkey=t.validateVaultProviderPubkey;exports.verifyRegisteredParticipantKeys=t.verifyRegisteredParticipantKeys;exports.verifyRegisteredVaultVersions=t.verifyRegisteredVaultVersions;exports.waitForPeginRegistrationDepth=t.waitForPeginRegistrationDepth;exports.waitForPeginStatus=t.waitForPeginStatus;exports.attachFinalizedAssert=i.attachFinalizedAssert;exports.finalizePayout=i.finalizePayout;exports.finalizeWronglyChallenged=i.finalizeWronglyChallenged;exports.pinPegoutProof=i.pinPegoutProof;exports.ContractStatus=e.ContractStatus;exports.PeginAction=e.PeginAction;exports.activationDeadlineBlocksRemaining=e.activationDeadlineBlocksRemaining;exports.canPerformAction=e.canPerformAction;exports.getPeginProtocolState=e.getPeginProtocolState;exports.isActivationDeadlinePassedOnChain=e.isActivationDeadlinePassedOnChain;exports.ClaimerPegoutStatusValue=a.ClaimerPegoutStatusValue;exports.isPegoutTerminalStatus=a.isPegoutTerminalStatus;exports.isRecognizedPegoutStatus=a.isRecognizedPegoutStatus;
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.cjs.map

package/dist/tbv/core/services/index.js

@@ -1,85 +1,98 @@
-import { c as s, v as e } from "../../../PayoutManager-BSwbUQeF.js";
-import { t as r, A as o, X as n, C as l, D as c, G as E, i as A, I as R, P as u, j as d, k as g, a4 as p, a5 as P, a6 as _, a7 as m, _ as M, $ as F, a0 as h, a1 as C, a2 as N, R as V, V as f, a as v, b as y, c as S, e as I, f as D, h as T, g as O, n as K, O as U, a3 as H, Y as b, d as B, Z as G, o as X, u as L, x as W, Q as w, J as x, l as z, m as k, L as Z, S as j, T as q, U as J, W as Q, r as Y, p as $, q as aa, s as ta, y as sa, z as ea, v as ia, B as ra, E as oa, F as na, H as la, K as ca, M as Ea, w as Aa, N as Ra } from "../../../buildAndBroadcastReclaim-D5520lbL.js";
-import { attachFinalizedAssert as da, finalizePayout as ga, finalizeWronglyChallenged as pa, pinPegoutProof as Pa } from "../wasm/index.js";
-import { C as ma, P as Ma, a as Fa, c as ha, g as Ca, i as Na } from "../../../peginState-BU2ONFXF.js";
-import { C as fa, g as va, f as ya } from "../../../state-CFn1rT74.js";
+import { c as s, v as e } from "../../../PayoutManager-BZ212yml.js";
+import { J as r, k as n, A as o, B as l, a8 as c, C as E, D as A, m as g, G as d, t as u, W as R, P, i as m, u as p, v as _, ah as C, ai as M, aj as h, ak as S, ab as F, ac as f, ad as y, ae as D, af as N, Z as V, S as I, V as v, a as T, b as O, c as B, d as K, l as H, e as L, f as b, q as U, h as X, z as G, n as W, a1 as w, ag as x, a9 as k, j as z, g as j, aa as Y, E as Z, K as q, M as J, a2 as Q, X as $, w as aa, x as ta, _ as sa, a3 as ea, a4 as ia, p as ra, r as na, a5 as oa, a6 as la, a7 as ca, F as Ea, o as Aa, H as ga, I as da, s as ua, N as Ra, O as Pa, L as ma, Q as pa, R as _a, T as Ca, U as Ma, Y as ha, $ as Sa, y as Fa, a0 as fa } from "../../../buildAndBroadcastReclaim-DoprHX7o.js";
+import { attachFinalizedAssert as Da, finalizePayout as Na, finalizeWronglyChallenged as Va, pinPegoutProof as Ia } from "../wasm/index.js";
+import { C as Ta, P as Oa, a as Ba, c as Ka, g as Ha, i as La } from "../../../peginState-BU2ONFXF.js";
+import { C as Ua, g as Xa, f as Ga } from "../../../state-CFn1rT74.js";
 export {
   r as ApplicationEntryPointMismatchError,
-  o as ArtifactsVaultMismatchError,
-  n as BIP68NotMatureError,
-  l as ChallengerSetMismatchError,
-  fa as ClaimerPegoutStatusValue,
-  ma as ContractStatus,
-  c as DELEGATED_CLAIM_TX_GRAPH_VERSION,
-  E as GraphFingerprintError,
-  A as PEGIN_ETH_CONFIRMATIONS,
+  n as ArtifactsVaultMismatchError,
+  o as AssertBindingError,
+  l as BABE_SESSION_PLACEHOLDER_DECRYPTOR_HEX,
+  c as BIP68NotMatureError,
+  E as ChallengerSetMismatchError,
+  Ua as ClaimerPegoutStatusValue,
+  Ta as ContractStatus,
+  A as DELEGATED_CLAIM_TX_GRAPH_VERSION,
+  g as DelegatedClaimSigningIncompleteError,
+  d as GraphFingerprintError,
+  u as PEGIN_ETH_CONFIRMATIONS,
   R as ParticipantKeyDriftError,
-  u as PayoutDestinationError,
-  Ma as PeginAction,
-  d as PeginRegistrationMissingError,
-  g as PeginRegistrationNotFinalError,
-  p as RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_DENOMINATOR,
-  P as RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR,
-  _ as RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_RATE_SATS_VB,
-  m as RECLAIM_WARN_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR,
-  M as REFUND_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_DENOMINATOR,
-  F as REFUND_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR,
-  h as REFUND_MAX_FEE_RATE_SATS_VB,
-  C as REFUND_VSIZE,
+  P as PayoutDestinationError,
+  m as PayoutInputLeafError,
+  Oa as PeginAction,
+  p as PeginRegistrationMissingError,
+  _ as PeginRegistrationNotFinalError,
+  C as RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_DENOMINATOR,
+  M as RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR,
+  h as RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_RATE_SATS_VB,
+  S as RECLAIM_WARN_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR,
+  F as REFUND_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_DENOMINATOR,
+  f as REFUND_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR,
+  y as REFUND_MAX_FEE_RATE_SATS_VB,
+  D as REFUND_VSIZE,
   N as ReclaimUneconomicalError,
   V as RegisteredVaultVersionMismatchError,
-  f as VaultIdBindingError,
-  v as activateVault,
-  y as activateVaultAndRedeem,
-  Fa as activationDeadlineBlocksRemaining,
-  S as assembleWatchtowerArtifacts,
-  I as assertArtifactsUsableForVault,
-  D as assertChallengerSetMatchesVault,
-  T as assertClaimSpendsVault,
-  O as assertPayoutPaysRegisteredScript,
-  K as assertReturnedGraphMatchesFingerprint,
-  U as assertVaultProviderHintAccepted,
-  da as attachFinalizedAssert,
-  H as buildAndBroadcastReclaim,
-  b as buildAndBroadcastRefund,
-  ha as canPerformAction,
+  I as SigningPlanMismatchError,
+  v as VaultIdBindingError,
+  T as activateVault,
+  O as activateVaultAndRedeem,
+  Ba as activationDeadlineBlocksRemaining,
+  B as assembleWatchtowerArtifacts,
+  K as assembleWatchtowerArtifactsFromSignatures,
+  H as assertArtifactsUsableForVault,
+  L as assertAssertBindsClaimAndPayout,
+  b as assertChallengerSetMatchesVault,
+  U as assertClaimSpendsVault,
+  X as assertPayoutPaysRegisteredScript,
+  G as assertReturnedGraphMatchesFingerprint,
+  W as assertTermsMatchVault,
+  w as assertVaultProviderHintAccepted,
+  Da as attachFinalizedAssert,
+  x as buildAndBroadcastReclaim,
+  k as buildAndBroadcastRefund,
+  Ka as canPerformAction,
   s as computeHashlock,
-  B as deriveClaimerWotsKeypair,
-  G as estimateRefundFeeSats,
-  ga as finalizePayout,
-  pa as finalizeWronglyChallenged,
-  X as fingerprintReturnedGraph,
-  Ca as getPeginProtocolState,
-  Na as isActivationDeadlinePassedOnChain,
-  L as isApplicationEntryPointMismatchError,
-  W as isDepositAmountValid,
-  w as isHintAccepted,
-  x as isParticipantKeyDriftError,
-  z as isPeginRegistrationMissingError,
-  k as isPeginRegistrationNotFinalError,
-  va as isPegoutTerminalStatus,
-  ya as isRecognizedPegoutStatus,
-  Z as isRegisteredVaultVersionMismatchError,
-  j as matchKeyHint,
-  q as matchKeySetHint,
-  Pa as pinPegoutProof,
-  J as resolveCurrentParticipantKeys,
-  Q as resolveParticipantKeysAtEpochs,
-  Y as runDepositorPresignFlow,
-  $ as signDepositorGraph,
-  aa as submitWotsPublicKey,
-  ta as summarizeWatchtowerArtifacts,
-  sa as validateDepositAmount,
-  ea as validateMultiVaultDepositInputs,
-  ia as validateOnChainParticipantKeys,
-  ra as validateProviderSelection,
-  oa as validateRemainingCapacity,
+  z as copyAssertConnectorLeaf,
+  j as deriveClaimerWotsKeypair,
+  Y as estimateRefundFeeSats,
+  Na as finalizePayout,
+  Va as finalizeWronglyChallenged,
+  Z as fingerprintReturnedGraph,
+  Ha as getPeginProtocolState,
+  La as isActivationDeadlinePassedOnChain,
+  q as isApplicationEntryPointMismatchError,
+  J as isDepositAmountValid,
+  Q as isHintAccepted,
+  $ as isParticipantKeyDriftError,
+  aa as isPeginRegistrationMissingError,
+  ta as isPeginRegistrationNotFinalError,
+  Xa as isPegoutTerminalStatus,
+  Ga as isRecognizedPegoutStatus,
+  sa as isRegisteredVaultVersionMismatchError,
+  ea as matchKeyHint,
+  ia as matchKeySetHint,
+  Ia as pinPegoutProof,
+  ra as planDelegatedClaimSigning,
+  na as readDelegatedClaimVaultContext,
+  oa as readStampedParticipantKeys,
+  la as resolveCurrentParticipantKeys,
+  ca as resolveParticipantKeysAtEpochs,
+  Ea as runDepositorPresignFlow,
+  Aa as signDelegatedClaimPlan,
+  ga as signDepositorGraph,
+  da as submitWotsPublicKey,
+  ua as summarizeWatchtowerArtifacts,
+  Ra as validateDepositAmount,
+  Pa as validateMultiVaultDepositInputs,
+  ma as validateOnChainParticipantKeys,
+  pa as validateProviderSelection,
+  _a as validateRemainingCapacity,
   e as validateSecretAgainstHashlock,
-  na as validateVaultAmounts,
-  la as validateVaultProviderPubkey,
-  ca as verifyRegisteredParticipantKeys,
-  Ea as verifyRegisteredVaultVersions,
-  Aa as waitForPeginRegistrationDepth,
-  Ra as waitForPeginStatus
+  Ca as validateVaultAmounts,
+  Ma as validateVaultProviderPubkey,
+  ha as verifyRegisteredParticipantKeys,
+  Sa as verifyRegisteredVaultVersions,
+  Fa as waitForPeginRegistrationDepth,
+  fa as waitForPeginStatus
 };
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map

package/dist/tbv/core/services/participants/__tests__/readStampedParticipantKeys.test.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=readStampedParticipantKeys.test.d.ts.map

package/dist/tbv/core/services/participants/__tests__/readStampedParticipantKeys.test.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"readStampedParticipantKeys.test.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../../src/tbv/core/services/participants/__tests__/readStampedParticipantKeys.test.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":""}

package/dist/tbv/core/services/participants/index.d.ts

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
  */
 export { assertVaultProviderHintAccepted, isHintAccepted, matchKeyHint, matchKeySetHint, } from './indexerKeyHint';
 export type { AssertVaultProviderHintAcceptedParams, HintMatch, } from './indexerKeyHint';
+export { readStampedParticipantKeys, type ReadStampedParticipantKeysParams, type StampedParticipantKeyReaders, } from './readStampedParticipantKeys';
 export { resolveCurrentParticipantKeys, resolveParticipantKeysAtEpochs, } from './resolveParticipantKeys';
 export type { KeyResolutionMode, ParticipantKeySet, ResolvedParticipant, } from './types';
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.d.ts.map

package/dist/tbv/core/services/participants/index.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/tbv/core/services/participants/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;GAIG;AAEH,OAAO,EACL,+BAA+B,EAC/B,cAAc,EACd,YAAY,EACZ,eAAe,GAChB,MAAM,kBAAkB,CAAC;AAC1B,YAAY,EACV,qCAAqC,EACrC,SAAS,GACV,MAAM,kBAAkB,CAAC;AAC1B,OAAO,EACL,0BAA0B,EAC1B,KAAK,gCAAgC,EACrC,KAAK,4BAA4B,GAClC,MAAM,8BAA8B,CAAC;AACtC,OAAO,EACL,6BAA6B,EAC7B,8BAA8B,GAC/B,MAAM,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAClC,YAAY,EACV,iBAAiB,EACjB,iBAAiB,EACjB,mBAAmB,GACpB,MAAM,SAAS,CAAC"}

package/dist/tbv/core/services/participants/readStampedParticipantKeys.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+import { Hex } from 'viem';
+import { OperationKeyReader, UniversalChallengerReader, VaultData, VaultKeeperReader, VaultRegistryReader } from '../../clients/eth/types';
+import { ParticipantKeySet } from './types';
+/**
+ * The reads this needs, as `Pick`s so a caller can pass the SDK's viem readers
+ * or a narrower implementation.
+ *
+ * @experimental
+ */
+export interface StampedParticipantKeyReaders {
+    registryReader: Pick<VaultRegistryReader, "getVaultProviderGenesisBtcPubKey" | "getVaultKeyEpochs">;
+    vaultKeeperReader: Pick<VaultKeeperReader, "getVaultKeepersByVersion">;
+    universalChallengerReader: Pick<UniversalChallengerReader, "getUniversalChallengersByVersion">;
+    operationKeyReader: Pick<OperationKeyReader, "getOperationKeysAtEpochs">;
+}
+/** @experimental */
+export interface ReadStampedParticipantKeysParams {
+    vaultId: Hex;
+    /** The vault's on-chain record, as `VaultRegistryReader.getVaultData` returns it. */
+    vault: VaultData;
+    readers: StampedParticipantKeyReaders;
+}
+/**
+ * @throws When either stamped roster is empty, or key resolution fails
+ *         (`resolveParticipantKeysAtEpochs`).
+ * @experimental
+ */
+export declare function readStampedParticipantKeys(params: ReadStampedParticipantKeysParams): Promise<ParticipantKeySet>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=readStampedParticipantKeys.d.ts.map

package/dist/tbv/core/services/participants/readStampedParticipantKeys.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/tbv/core/services/participants/resolveParticipantKeys.d.ts

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ export declare function resolveCurrentParticipantKeys(params: {
  * back to.
  */
 export declare function resolveParticipantKeysAtEpochs(params: {
-    operationKeyReader: OperationKeyReader;
+    operationKeyReader: Pick<OperationKeyReader, "getOperationKeysAtEpochs">;
     query: OperationKeyQuery;
     epochs: KeyEpochs;
 }): Promise<ParticipantKeySet>;

package/dist/tbv/core/services/participants/resolveParticipantKeys.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"resolveParticipantKeys.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/tbv/core/services/participants/resolveParticipantKeys.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAmBG;AAGH,OAAO,KAAK,EACV,SAAS,EACT,iBAAiB,EACjB,kBAAkB,EAEnB,MAAM,yBAAyB,CAAC;AACjC,OAAO,KAAK,EAEV,iBAAiB,EAElB,MAAM,SAAS,CAAC;AAmHjB;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG;AACH,wBAAsB,6BAA6B,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE;IAC1D,kBAAkB,EAAE,kBAAkB,CAAC;IACvC,KAAK,EAAE,iBAAiB,CAAC;IACzB,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACrB,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,iBAAiB,CAAC,CAM7B;AAED;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,wBAAsB,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE;IAG3D,kBAAkB,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,kBAAkB,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,CAAC;IACzE,KAAK,EAAE,iBAAiB,CAAC;IACzB,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC;CACnB,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,iBAAiB,CAAC,CAS7B"}

package/dist/tbv/core/utils/eth/index.cjs

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-"use strict";Object.defineProperty(exports,Symbol.toStringTag,{value:"Module"});const f={1:"https://safe-transaction-mainnet.safe.global",11155111:"https://safe-transaction-sepolia.safe.global"},w=5e3,d=14400*1e3,T=1e4,h="/api/v1/multisig-transactions",p=404,A=500,m=2,_="0xef0100",R=20,g=_.length+m*R;function I(e){return e.length===g&&e.toLowerCase().startsWith(_)}async function F(e){const{publicClient:t,walletAddress:a,hash:r,confirmations:i,timeout:c,safePollTimeoutMs:l=d,safePollIntervalMs:u=w}=e,s=await t.getCode({address:a});if(!(s!==void 0&&s!=="0x"&&!I(s)))return t.waitForTransactionReceipt({hash:r,confirmations:i,timeout:c});const o=await t.getChainId(),n=await L({chainId:o,publicClient:t,safeTxHash:r,pollIntervalMs:u,timeoutMs:l});return n.kind==="not-a-proposal"?t.waitForTransactionReceipt({hash:r,confirmations:i,timeout:c}):t.waitForTransactionReceipt({hash:n.transactionHash,confirmations:i})}async function C(e,t){return await e.getTransaction({hash:t}).catch(()=>null)!==null}async function L({chainId:e,publicClient:t,safeTxHash:a,pollIntervalMs:r,timeoutMs:i}){const c=f[e];if(!c)throw new Error(`Safe Transaction Service not configured for chainId ${e}. Connected wallet appears to be a smart-contract account, but this chain is not in the supported list. Either connect an EOA or extend SAFE_TX_SERVICE_BASE_URLS in waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware.ts.`);const l=`${c}${h}/${a}/`,u=Date.now()+i;for(;Date.now()<u;){const s=new AbortController,E=setTimeout(()=>s.abort(),T);let o;try{o=await fetch(l,{signal:s.signal})}catch(n){console.warn(`Safe Transaction Service request failed (will retry in ${r}ms): `+(n instanceof Error?n.message:String(n))),await S(r);continue}finally{clearTimeout(E)}if(o.ok){const n=await o.json();if(n.isExecuted){if(n.isSuccessful===!1)throw new Error(`Safe transaction ${a} was executed on chain but reverted. Check the Safe queue UI for details.`);if(n.transactionHash)return{kind:"executed",transactionHash:n.transactionHash}}}else if(o.status===p){if(await C(t,a))return console.warn(`${a} is a real transaction, not a Safe proposal — the connected wallet submits its own transactions despite reporting contract bytecode. Waiting for its receipt directly.`),{kind:"not-a-proposal"}}else if(o.status>=A)console.warn(`Safe Transaction Service returned ${o.status} for ${a}; retrying in ${r}ms.`);else throw new Error(`Safe Transaction Service returned ${o.status} for ${a}.`);await S(r)}throw new Error(`Timed out after ${i}ms waiting for Safe transaction ${a} to reach quorum and execute. The proposal is still pending in the Safe queue — co-signers must sign and execute it before the dApp can proceed.`)}function S(e){return new Promise(t=>{setTimeout(t,e)})}exports.waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware=F;
+"use strict";Object.defineProperty(exports,Symbol.toStringTag,{value:"Module"});const f={1:"https://safe-transaction-mainnet.safe.global",11155111:"https://safe-transaction-sepolia.safe.global"},d=5e3,w=14400*1e3,T=1e4,h="/api/v1/multisig-transactions",p=404,A=500,m=2,_="0xef0100",R=20,g=_.length+m*R;function I(e){return e.length===g&&e.toLowerCase().startsWith(_)}async function F(e){const{publicClient:t,walletAddress:a,hash:i,confirmations:r,timeout:c,safePollTimeoutMs:l=w,safePollIntervalMs:u=d}=e,s=await t.getCode({address:a});if(!(s!==void 0&&s!=="0x"&&!I(s)))return t.waitForTransactionReceipt({hash:i,confirmations:r,timeout:c});const o=t.chain===void 0?await t.getChainId():t.chain.id,n=await L({chainId:o,publicClient:t,safeTxHash:i,pollIntervalMs:u,timeoutMs:l});return n.kind==="not-a-proposal"?t.waitForTransactionReceipt({hash:i,confirmations:r,timeout:c}):t.waitForTransactionReceipt({hash:n.transactionHash,confirmations:r})}async function C(e,t){return await e.getTransaction({hash:t}).catch(()=>null)!==null}async function L({chainId:e,publicClient:t,safeTxHash:a,pollIntervalMs:i,timeoutMs:r}){const c=f[e];if(!c)throw new Error(`Safe Transaction Service not configured for chainId ${e}. Connected wallet appears to be a smart-contract account, but this chain is not in the supported list. Either connect an EOA or extend SAFE_TX_SERVICE_BASE_URLS in waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware.ts.`);const l=`${c}${h}/${a}/`,u=Date.now()+r;for(;Date.now()<u;){const s=new AbortController,E=setTimeout(()=>s.abort(),T);let o;try{o=await fetch(l,{signal:s.signal})}catch(n){console.warn(`Safe Transaction Service request failed (will retry in ${i}ms): `+(n instanceof Error?n.message:String(n))),await S(i);continue}finally{clearTimeout(E)}if(o.ok){const n=await o.json();if(n.isExecuted){if(n.isSuccessful===!1)throw new Error(`Safe transaction ${a} was executed on chain but reverted. Check the Safe queue UI for details.`);if(n.transactionHash)return{kind:"executed",transactionHash:n.transactionHash}}}else if(o.status===p){if(await C(t,a))return console.warn(`${a} is a real transaction, not a Safe proposal — the connected wallet submits its own transactions despite reporting contract bytecode. Waiting for its receipt directly.`),{kind:"not-a-proposal"}}else if(o.status>=A)console.warn(`Safe Transaction Service returned ${o.status} for ${a}; retrying in ${i}ms.`);else throw new Error(`Safe Transaction Service returned ${o.status} for ${a}.`);await S(i)}throw new Error(`Timed out after ${r}ms waiting for Safe transaction ${a} to reach quorum and execute. The proposal is still pending in the Safe queue — co-signers must sign and execute it before the dApp can proceed.`)}function S(e){return new Promise(t=>{setTimeout(t,e)})}exports.waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware=F;
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.cjs.map

package/dist/tbv/core/utils/eth/index.cjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"index.cjs","sources":["../../../../../src/tbv/core/utils/eth/waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Smart-account-aware wrapper around viem's `waitForTransactionReceipt`.\n *\n * Externally Owned Accounts (EOAs) — wallets controlled by a single private\n * key, e.g. MetaMask or a hardware wallet. `eth_sendTransaction` returns a real\n * Ethereum tx hash, which viem can poll directly. This wrapper delegates\n * unchanged for them.\n *\n * Smart-contract accounts (e.g. Safe multisigs) — the wallet address is a\n * deployed contract that decides whether to accept a transaction. WalletConnect's\n * `eth_sendTransaction` returns a `safeTxHash` (an EIP-712 hash of the\n * *proposal*) rather than a real tx hash, and the proposal is held in Safe's\n * off-chain Transaction Service until quorum signs and executes it. We poll\n * that service for the proposal until execution, then wait for receipt on the\n * real Ethereum tx hash exposed in the service's response.\n *\n * The two are told apart by `eth_getCode`, but NOT by \"empty vs non-empty\":\n * an EIP-7702 delegated EOA reports `0xef0100 ‖ <delegate address>` and is\n * still an EOA — it signs and submits its own transactions, so\n * `eth_sendTransaction` returns a real tx hash. MetaMask upgrades accounts to\n * smart accounts this way by default, and treating one as a Safe means polling\n * the Transaction Service for a hash that is not a `safeTxHash`: a permanent\n * 404 that reads as \"proposal not yet indexed\" and hangs for the full poll\n * budget on a transaction that already succeeded. Delegation designators are\n * therefore classified as EOAs. As a backstop for any wallet that behaves this\n * way in future, a 404 from the Transaction Service is also checked against the\n * node: if it knows the hash as a real transaction, we were never waiting on a\n * proposal and switch to waiting for that transaction's receipt.\n *\n * @module utils/eth\n */\n\nimport type { Address, Hash, PublicClient, TransactionReceipt } from \"viem\";\n\n/**\n * Chains where the Safe Transaction Service is supported by this utility.\n * Extend the map as more Safe-enabled chains are needed.\n */\nconst SAFE_TX_SERVICE_BASE_URLS: Record<number, string> = {\n  1: \"https://safe-transaction-mainnet.safe.global\",\n  11155111: \"https://safe-transaction-sepolia.safe.global\",\n};\n\nconst DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 5_000;\nconst DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_TIMEOUT_MS = 4 * 60 * 60 * 1_000;\nconst SAFE_TX_SERVICE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;\n\n/** Safe Transaction Service route for one multisig-transaction proposal. */\nconst SAFE_MULTISIG_TX_PATH = \"/api/v1/multisig-transactions\";\n/** The service answers 404 both for an unindexed proposal and an unknown Safe. */\nconst SAFE_TX_SERVICE_NOT_FOUND = 404;\n/** Statuses at or above this are server-side, so worth retrying. */\nconst SAFE_TX_SERVICE_SERVER_ERROR = 500;\n\n/** Two hex characters encode one byte in an `eth_getCode` result. */\nconst HEX_CHARS_PER_BYTE = 2;\n\n/**\n * EIP-7702 delegation designator: an EOA that has delegated its code to a\n * contract reports exactly `0xef0100 ‖ <20-byte delegate address>` from\n * `eth_getCode` (EIP-7702 §\"Delegation Designation\"). Both the prefix and the\n * exact length are checked so ordinary contract bytecode that merely happens to\n * start with these bytes is not mistaken for a delegation.\n */\nconst EIP_7702_DELEGATION_PREFIX = \"0xef0100\";\nconst EIP_7702_DELEGATION_ADDRESS_BYTES = 20;\nconst EIP_7702_DELEGATION_CODE_LENGTH =\n  EIP_7702_DELEGATION_PREFIX.length +\n  HEX_CHARS_PER_BYTE * EIP_7702_DELEGATION_ADDRESS_BYTES;\n\n/**\n * True when `eth_getCode` reports an EIP-7702 delegation designator rather than\n * a deployed contract. Such an account is still an EOA for our purposes: it\n * signs and submits its own transactions, so the hash we hold is a real tx hash.\n */\nfunction isEip7702DelegatedEoa(code: string): boolean {\n  return (\n    code.length === EIP_7702_DELEGATION_CODE_LENGTH &&\n    code.toLowerCase().startsWith(EIP_7702_DELEGATION_PREFIX)\n  );\n}\n\nexport interface WaitForTransactionReceiptSmartAwareParams {\n  publicClient: PublicClient;\n  walletAddress: Address;\n  hash: Hash;\n  /**\n   * Forwarded to viem verbatim.\n   *\n   * MUST NOT be used as a finality/reorg gate. viem fetches the receipt once\n   * and then only compares block numbers against that cached copy — it never\n   * re-checks that the receipt's block is still canonical, so it resolves\n   * happily for a transaction that has been reorged out. Setting this buys a\n   * delay, not a guarantee. For peg-in registration finality use\n   * `waitForPeginRegistrationDepth`, which re-reads live contract state on\n   * every poll.\n   */\n  confirmations?: number;\n  /**\n   * Forwarded to viem on the EOA (externally owned account) path, and on the\n   * fallback where a supposed smart account turns out to submit its own\n   * transactions — that is the EOA case too, however we arrived at it.\n   *\n   * Ignored only while waiting on a genuine Safe proposal, whose budget is\n   * safePollTimeoutMs. It is not forwarded to the receipt wait that follows a\n   * proposal's execution either: viem's own default applies there (180s as of\n   * viem 2.38.2), so that wait is bounded too — a sufficiently slow node still\n   * raises WaitForTransactionReceiptTimeoutError, just on viem's uniform bound\n   * rather than on a caller's shorter one.\n   */\n  timeout?: number;\n  /** Total budget for waiting on Safe quorum + execution. Default 4h. */\n  safePollTimeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Poll cadence against the Safe Transaction Service. Default 5s. */\n  safePollIntervalMs?: number;\n}\n\nexport async function waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware(\n  params: WaitForTransactionReceiptSmartAwareParams,\n): Promise<TransactionReceipt> {\n  const {\n    publicClient,\n    walletAddress,\n    hash,\n    confirmations,\n    timeout,\n    safePollTimeoutMs = DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_TIMEOUT_MS,\n    safePollIntervalMs = DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_INTERVAL_MS,\n  } = params;\n\n  const code = await publicClient.getCode({ address: walletAddress });\n  // An EIP-7702 delegated EOA has non-empty code but still submits its own\n  // transactions, so it belongs on the EOA path — see the module docblock.\n  const isSmartAccount =\n    code !== undefined && code !== \"0x\" && !isEip7702DelegatedEoa(code);\n\n  if (!isSmartAccount) {\n    return publicClient.waitForTransactionReceipt({\n      hash,\n      confirmations,\n      timeout,\n    });\n  }\n\n  const chainId = await publicClient.getChainId();\n  const outcome = await pollSafeTransactionServiceUntilExecuted({\n    chainId,\n    publicClient,\n    safeTxHash: hash,\n    pollIntervalMs: safePollIntervalMs,\n    timeoutMs: safePollTimeoutMs,\n  });\n\n  // The wallet turned out to submit its own transactions, so this is the EOA\n  // case after all — including the caller's `timeout`, which only ever meant to\n  // be ignored while waiting on a genuine Safe proposal.\n  if (outcome.kind === \"not-a-proposal\") {\n    return publicClient.waitForTransactionReceipt({\n      hash,\n      confirmations,\n      timeout,\n    });\n  }\n\n  return publicClient.waitForTransactionReceipt({\n    hash: outcome.transactionHash,\n    confirmations,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * How the Safe path ended. The two outcomes are not interchangeable, so they are\n * distinguished rather than both collapsing to a bare hash: `executed` is a real\n * Safe proposal that reached quorum, while `not-a-proposal` means the wallet was\n * never a Safe and we are really on the EOA path — which decides whether the\n * caller's `timeout` applies to the receipt wait that follows.\n */\ntype SafePollOutcome =\n  | { kind: \"executed\"; transactionHash: Hash }\n  | { kind: \"not-a-proposal\" };\n\ninterface SafeMultisigTransaction {\n  isExecuted: boolean;\n  isSuccessful: boolean | null;\n  transactionHash: Hash | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Decide whether a 404 from the Transaction Service means \"proposal not indexed\n * yet\" or \"this hash was never a proposal at all\".\n *\n * The Safe indexer cannot answer that: a genuine Safe and its freshly-submitted\n * proposal are both absent from it for a while, so its 404 proves nothing. The\n * NODE can. A `safeTxHash` is an EIP-712 digest of a proposal and is never a\n * transaction on chain, so if the node knows the hash as a real transaction then\n * this was never a proposal and we are on the wrong path entirely.\n *\n * Returns true only on that positive identification. Anything else — the node\n * has not seen it yet, or the lookup fails — is inconclusive and leaves the\n * caller polling, which is the correct behaviour for a Safe that is simply\n * still being indexed.\n */\nasync function hashIsRealTransaction(\n  publicClient: PublicClient,\n  hash: Hash,\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  const transaction = await publicClient\n    .getTransaction({ hash })\n    .catch(() => null);\n  return transaction !== null;\n}\n\nasync function pollSafeTransactionServiceUntilExecuted({\n  chainId,\n  publicClient,\n  safeTxHash,\n  pollIntervalMs,\n  timeoutMs,\n}: {\n  chainId: number;\n  publicClient: PublicClient;\n  safeTxHash: Hash;\n  pollIntervalMs: number;\n  timeoutMs: number;\n}): Promise<SafePollOutcome> {\n  const baseUrl = SAFE_TX_SERVICE_BASE_URLS[chainId];\n  if (!baseUrl) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Safe Transaction Service not configured for chainId ${chainId}. ` +\n        `Connected wallet appears to be a smart-contract account, but this ` +\n        `chain is not in the supported list. Either connect an EOA or extend ` +\n        `SAFE_TX_SERVICE_BASE_URLS in waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware.ts.`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const url = `${baseUrl}${SAFE_MULTISIG_TX_PATH}/${safeTxHash}/`;\n  const deadline = Date.now() + timeoutMs;\n\n  while (Date.now() < deadline) {\n    const controller = new AbortController();\n    const fetchTimeoutId = setTimeout(\n      () => controller.abort(),\n      SAFE_TX_SERVICE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS,\n    );\n\n    let response: Response;\n    try {\n      response = await fetch(url, { signal: controller.signal });\n    } catch (err) {\n      // Transient failure (AbortError on per-request timeout, DNS hiccup,\n      // connection reset, etc.). Log and continue to the next poll iteration\n      // instead of consuming the entire safePollTimeoutMs budget on one blip.\n      // The outer `while (Date.now() < deadline)` is what enforces the overall\n      // budget; this catch deliberately preserves it.\n      console.warn(\n        `Safe Transaction Service request failed (will retry in ${pollIntervalMs}ms): ` +\n          (err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)),\n      );\n      await sleep(pollIntervalMs);\n      continue;\n    } finally {\n      clearTimeout(fetchTimeoutId);\n    }\n\n    if (response.ok) {\n      const data = (await response.json()) as SafeMultisigTransaction;\n      if (data.isExecuted) {\n        if (data.isSuccessful === false) {\n          throw new Error(\n            `Safe transaction ${safeTxHash} was executed on chain but reverted. ` +\n              `Check the Safe queue UI for details.`,\n          );\n        }\n        if (data.transactionHash) {\n          return { kind: \"executed\", transactionHash: data.transactionHash };\n        }\n      }\n    } else if (response.status === SAFE_TX_SERVICE_NOT_FOUND) {\n      // Usually \"proposal not indexed yet\", so keep polling. But the very same\n      // 404 appears when the hash is not a safeTxHash at all — the case that\n      // used to burn the whole budget on an already-mined transaction. Ask the\n      // node: if it knows this hash, it is a real transaction, so stop treating\n      // it as a proposal and let the caller wait on it directly.\n      if (await hashIsRealTransaction(publicClient, safeTxHash)) {\n        console.warn(\n          `${safeTxHash} is a real transaction, not a Safe proposal — the ` +\n            `connected wallet submits its own transactions despite reporting ` +\n            `contract bytecode. Waiting for its receipt directly.`,\n        );\n        return { kind: \"not-a-proposal\" };\n      }\n    } else if (response.status >= SAFE_TX_SERVICE_SERVER_ERROR) {\n      // Transient server error — same treatment as a hung connection: log and retry.\n      console.warn(\n        `Safe Transaction Service returned ${response.status} for ${safeTxHash}; retrying in ${pollIntervalMs}ms.`,\n      );\n    } else {\n      // Other 4xx (403, 410, etc.) is likely permanent — surface immediately.\n      throw new Error(\n        `Safe Transaction Service returned ${response.status} for ${safeTxHash}.`,\n      );\n    }\n\n    await sleep(pollIntervalMs);\n  }\n\n  throw new Error(\n    `Timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms waiting for Safe transaction ${safeTxHash} ` +\n      `to reach quorum and execute. The proposal is still pending in the Safe ` +\n      `queue — co-signers must sign and execute it before the dApp can proceed.`,\n  );\n}\n\nfunction sleep(ms: number): Promise<void> {\n  return new Promise((resolve) => {\n    setTimeout(resolve, ms);\n  });\n}\n"],"names":["SAFE_TX_SERVICE_BASE_URLS","DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_INTERVAL_MS","DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_TIMEOUT_MS","SAFE_TX_SERVICE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS","SAFE_MULTISIG_TX_PATH","SAFE_TX_SERVICE_NOT_FOUND","SAFE_TX_SERVICE_SERVER_ERROR","HEX_CHARS_PER_BYTE","EIP_7702_DELEGATION_PREFIX","EIP_7702_DELEGATION_ADDRESS_BYTES","EIP_7702_DELEGATION_CODE_LENGTH","isEip7702DelegatedEoa","code","waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware","params","publicClient","walletAddress","hash","confirmations","timeout","safePollTimeoutMs","safePollIntervalMs","chainId","outcome","pollSafeTransactionServiceUntilExecuted","hashIsRealTransaction","safeTxHash","pollIntervalMs","timeoutMs","baseUrl","url","deadline","controller","fetchTimeoutId","response","err","sleep","data","ms","resolve"],"mappings":"gFAsCA,MAAMA,EAAoD,CACxD,EAAG,+CACH,SAAU,8CACZ,EAEMC,EAAgC,IAChCC,EAA+B,MAAc,IAC7CC,EAAmC,IAGnCC,EAAwB,gCAExBC,EAA4B,IAE5BC,EAA+B,IAG/BC,EAAqB,EASrBC,EAA6B,WAC7BC,EAAoC,GACpCC,EACJF,EAA2B,OAC3BD,EAAqBE,EAOvB,SAASE,EAAsBC,EAAuB,CACpD,OACEA,EAAK,SAAWF,GAChBE,EAAK,YAAA,EAAc,WAAWJ,CAA0B,CAE5D,CAqCA,eAAsBK,EACpBC,EAC6B,CAC7B,KAAM,CACJ,aAAAC,EACA,cAAAC,EACA,KAAAC,EACA,cAAAC,EACA,QAAAC,EACA,kBAAAC,EAAoBlB,EACpB,mBAAAmB,EAAqBpB,CAAA,EACnBa,EAEEF,EAAO,MAAMG,EAAa,QAAQ,CAAE,QAASC,EAAe,EAMlE,GAAI,EAFFJ,IAAS,QAAaA,IAAS,MAAQ,CAACD,EAAsBC,CAAI,GAGlE,OAAOG,EAAa,0BAA0B,CAC5C,KAAAE,EACA,cAAAC,EACA,QAAAC,CAAA,CACD,EAGH,MAAMG,EAAU,MAAMP,EAAa,WAAA,EAC7BQ,EAAU,MAAMC,EAAwC,CAC5D,QAAAF,EACA,aAAAP,EACA,WAAYE,EACZ,eAAgBI,EAChB,UAAWD,CAAA,CACZ,EAKD,OAAIG,EAAQ,OAAS,iBACZR,EAAa,0BAA0B,CAC5C,KAAAE,EACA,cAAAC,EACA,QAAAC,CAAA,CACD,EAGIJ,EAAa,0BAA0B,CAC5C,KAAMQ,EAAQ,gBACd,cAAAL,CAAA,CACD,CACH,CAkCA,eAAeO,EACbV,EACAE,EACkB,CAIlB,OAHoB,MAAMF,EACvB,eAAe,CAAE,KAAAE,EAAM,EACvB,MAAM,IAAM,IAAI,IACI,IACzB,CAEA,eAAeO,EAAwC,CACrD,QAAAF,EACA,aAAAP,EACA,WAAAW,EACA,eAAAC,EACA,UAAAC,CACF,EAM6B,CAC3B,MAAMC,EAAU7B,EAA0BsB,CAAO,EACjD,GAAI,CAACO,EACH,MAAM,IAAI,MACR,uDAAuDP,CAAO,8MAAA,EAOlE,MAAMQ,EAAM,GAAGD,CAAO,GAAGzB,CAAqB,IAAIsB,CAAU,IACtDK,EAAW,KAAK,IAAA,EAAQH,EAE9B,KAAO,KAAK,IAAA,EAAQG,GAAU,CAC5B,MAAMC,EAAa,IAAI,gBACjBC,EAAiB,WACrB,IAAMD,EAAW,MAAA,EACjB7B,CAAA,EAGF,IAAI+B,EACJ,GAAI,CACFA,EAAW,MAAM,MAAMJ,EAAK,CAAE,OAAQE,EAAW,OAAQ,CAC3D,OAASG,EAAK,CAMZ,QAAQ,KACN,0DAA0DR,CAAc,SACrEQ,aAAe,MAAQA,EAAI,QAAU,OAAOA,CAAG,EAAA,EAEpD,MAAMC,EAAMT,CAAc,EAC1B,QACF,QAAA,CACE,aAAaM,CAAc,CAC7B,CAEA,GAAIC,EAAS,GAAI,CACf,MAAMG,EAAQ,MAAMH,EAAS,KAAA,EAC7B,GAAIG,EAAK,WAAY,CACnB,GAAIA,EAAK,eAAiB,GACxB,MAAM,IAAI,MACR,oBAAoBX,CAAU,2EAAA,EAIlC,GAAIW,EAAK,gBACP,MAAO,CAAE,KAAM,WAAY,gBAAiBA,EAAK,eAAA,CAErD,CACF,SAAWH,EAAS,SAAW7B,GAM7B,GAAI,MAAMoB,EAAsBV,EAAcW,CAAU,EACtD,eAAQ,KACN,GAAGA,CAAU,wKAAA,EAIR,CAAE,KAAM,gBAAA,UAERQ,EAAS,QAAU5B,EAE5B,QAAQ,KACN,qCAAqC4B,EAAS,MAAM,QAAQR,CAAU,iBAAiBC,CAAc,KAAA,MAIvG,OAAM,IAAI,MACR,qCAAqCO,EAAS,MAAM,QAAQR,CAAU,GAAA,EAI1E,MAAMU,EAAMT,CAAc,CAC5B,CAEA,MAAM,IAAI,MACR,mBAAmBC,CAAS,mCAAmCF,CAAU,kJAAA,CAI7E,CAEA,SAASU,EAAME,EAA2B,CACxC,OAAO,IAAI,QAASC,GAAY,CAC9B,WAAWA,EAASD,CAAE,CACxB,CAAC,CACH"}
+{"version":3,"file":"index.cjs","sources":["../../../../../src/tbv/core/utils/eth/waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Smart-account-aware wrapper around viem's `waitForTransactionReceipt`.\n *\n * Externally Owned Accounts (EOAs) — wallets controlled by a single private\n * key, e.g. MetaMask or a hardware wallet. `eth_sendTransaction` returns a real\n * Ethereum tx hash, which viem can poll directly. This wrapper delegates\n * unchanged for them.\n *\n * Smart-contract accounts (e.g. Safe multisigs) — the wallet address is a\n * deployed contract that decides whether to accept a transaction. WalletConnect's\n * `eth_sendTransaction` returns a `safeTxHash` (an EIP-712 hash of the\n * *proposal*) rather than a real tx hash, and the proposal is held in Safe's\n * off-chain Transaction Service until quorum signs and executes it. We poll\n * that service for the proposal until execution, then wait for receipt on the\n * real Ethereum tx hash exposed in the service's response.\n *\n * The two are told apart by `eth_getCode`, but NOT by \"empty vs non-empty\":\n * an EIP-7702 delegated EOA reports `0xef0100 ‖ <delegate address>` and is\n * still an EOA — it signs and submits its own transactions, so\n * `eth_sendTransaction` returns a real tx hash. MetaMask upgrades accounts to\n * smart accounts this way by default, and treating one as a Safe means polling\n * the Transaction Service for a hash that is not a `safeTxHash`: a permanent\n * 404 that reads as \"proposal not yet indexed\" and hangs for the full poll\n * budget on a transaction that already succeeded. Delegation designators are\n * therefore classified as EOAs. As a backstop for any wallet that behaves this\n * way in future, a 404 from the Transaction Service is also checked against the\n * node: if it knows the hash as a real transaction, we were never waiting on a\n * proposal and switch to waiting for that transaction's receipt.\n *\n * @module utils/eth\n */\n\nimport type { Address, Hash, PublicClient, TransactionReceipt } from \"viem\";\n\n/**\n * Chains where the Safe Transaction Service is supported by this utility.\n * Extend the map as more Safe-enabled chains are needed.\n */\nconst SAFE_TX_SERVICE_BASE_URLS: Record<number, string> = {\n  1: \"https://safe-transaction-mainnet.safe.global\",\n  11155111: \"https://safe-transaction-sepolia.safe.global\",\n};\n\nconst DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 5_000;\nconst DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_TIMEOUT_MS = 4 * 60 * 60 * 1_000;\nconst SAFE_TX_SERVICE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;\n\n/** Safe Transaction Service route for one multisig-transaction proposal. */\nconst SAFE_MULTISIG_TX_PATH = \"/api/v1/multisig-transactions\";\n/** The service answers 404 both for an unindexed proposal and an unknown Safe. */\nconst SAFE_TX_SERVICE_NOT_FOUND = 404;\n/** Statuses at or above this are server-side, so worth retrying. */\nconst SAFE_TX_SERVICE_SERVER_ERROR = 500;\n\n/** Two hex characters encode one byte in an `eth_getCode` result. */\nconst HEX_CHARS_PER_BYTE = 2;\n\n/**\n * EIP-7702 delegation designator: an EOA that has delegated its code to a\n * contract reports exactly `0xef0100 ‖ <20-byte delegate address>` from\n * `eth_getCode` (EIP-7702 §\"Delegation Designation\"). Both the prefix and the\n * exact length are checked so ordinary contract bytecode that merely happens to\n * start with these bytes is not mistaken for a delegation.\n */\nconst EIP_7702_DELEGATION_PREFIX = \"0xef0100\";\nconst EIP_7702_DELEGATION_ADDRESS_BYTES = 20;\nconst EIP_7702_DELEGATION_CODE_LENGTH =\n  EIP_7702_DELEGATION_PREFIX.length +\n  HEX_CHARS_PER_BYTE * EIP_7702_DELEGATION_ADDRESS_BYTES;\n\n/**\n * True when `eth_getCode` reports an EIP-7702 delegation designator rather than\n * a deployed contract. Such an account is still an EOA for our purposes: it\n * signs and submits its own transactions, so the hash we hold is a real tx hash.\n */\nfunction isEip7702DelegatedEoa(code: string): boolean {\n  return (\n    code.length === EIP_7702_DELEGATION_CODE_LENGTH &&\n    code.toLowerCase().startsWith(EIP_7702_DELEGATION_PREFIX)\n  );\n}\n\nexport interface WaitForTransactionReceiptSmartAwareParams {\n  publicClient: PublicClient;\n  walletAddress: Address;\n  hash: Hash;\n  /**\n   * Forwarded to viem verbatim.\n   *\n   * MUST NOT be used as a finality/reorg gate. viem fetches the receipt once\n   * and then only compares block numbers against that cached copy — it never\n   * re-checks that the receipt's block is still canonical, so it resolves\n   * happily for a transaction that has been reorged out. Setting this buys a\n   * delay, not a guarantee. For peg-in registration finality use\n   * `waitForPeginRegistrationDepth`, which re-reads live contract state on\n   * every poll.\n   */\n  confirmations?: number;\n  /**\n   * Forwarded to viem on the EOA (externally owned account) path, and on the\n   * fallback where a supposed smart account turns out to submit its own\n   * transactions — that is the EOA case too, however we arrived at it.\n   *\n   * Ignored only while waiting on a genuine Safe proposal, whose budget is\n   * safePollTimeoutMs. It is not forwarded to the receipt wait that follows a\n   * proposal's execution either: viem's own default applies there (180s as of\n   * viem 2.38.2), so that wait is bounded too — a sufficiently slow node still\n   * raises WaitForTransactionReceiptTimeoutError, just on viem's uniform bound\n   * rather than on a caller's shorter one.\n   */\n  timeout?: number;\n  /** Total budget for waiting on Safe quorum + execution. Default 4h. */\n  safePollTimeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Poll cadence against the Safe Transaction Service. Default 5s. */\n  safePollIntervalMs?: number;\n}\n\nexport async function waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware(\n  params: WaitForTransactionReceiptSmartAwareParams,\n): Promise<TransactionReceipt> {\n  const {\n    publicClient,\n    walletAddress,\n    hash,\n    confirmations,\n    timeout,\n    safePollTimeoutMs = DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_TIMEOUT_MS,\n    safePollIntervalMs = DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_INTERVAL_MS,\n  } = params;\n\n  const code = await publicClient.getCode({ address: walletAddress });\n  // An EIP-7702 delegated EOA has non-empty code but still submits its own\n  // transactions, so it belongs on the EOA path — see the module docblock.\n  const isSmartAccount =\n    code !== undefined && code !== \"0x\" && !isEip7702DelegatedEoa(code);\n\n  if (!isSmartAccount) {\n    return publicClient.waitForTransactionReceipt({\n      hash,\n      confirmations,\n      timeout,\n    });\n  }\n\n  const chainId =\n    publicClient.chain === undefined\n      ? await publicClient.getChainId()\n      : publicClient.chain.id;\n  const outcome = await pollSafeTransactionServiceUntilExecuted({\n    chainId,\n    publicClient,\n    safeTxHash: hash,\n    pollIntervalMs: safePollIntervalMs,\n    timeoutMs: safePollTimeoutMs,\n  });\n\n  // The wallet turned out to submit its own transactions, so this is the EOA\n  // case after all — including the caller's `timeout`, which only ever meant to\n  // be ignored while waiting on a genuine Safe proposal.\n  if (outcome.kind === \"not-a-proposal\") {\n    return publicClient.waitForTransactionReceipt({\n      hash,\n      confirmations,\n      timeout,\n    });\n  }\n\n  return publicClient.waitForTransactionReceipt({\n    hash: outcome.transactionHash,\n    confirmations,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * How the Safe path ended. The two outcomes are not interchangeable, so they are\n * distinguished rather than both collapsing to a bare hash: `executed` is a real\n * Safe proposal that reached quorum, while `not-a-proposal` means the wallet was\n * never a Safe and we are really on the EOA path — which decides whether the\n * caller's `timeout` applies to the receipt wait that follows.\n */\ntype SafePollOutcome =\n  | { kind: \"executed\"; transactionHash: Hash }\n  | { kind: \"not-a-proposal\" };\n\ninterface SafeMultisigTransaction {\n  isExecuted: boolean;\n  isSuccessful: boolean | null;\n  transactionHash: Hash | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Decide whether a 404 from the Transaction Service means \"proposal not indexed\n * yet\" or \"this hash was never a proposal at all\".\n *\n * The Safe indexer cannot answer that: a genuine Safe and its freshly-submitted\n * proposal are both absent from it for a while, so its 404 proves nothing. The\n * NODE can. A `safeTxHash` is an EIP-712 digest of a proposal and is never a\n * transaction on chain, so if the node knows the hash as a real transaction then\n * this was never a proposal and we are on the wrong path entirely.\n *\n * Returns true only on that positive identification. Anything else — the node\n * has not seen it yet, or the lookup fails — is inconclusive and leaves the\n * caller polling, which is the correct behaviour for a Safe that is simply\n * still being indexed.\n */\nasync function hashIsRealTransaction(\n  publicClient: PublicClient,\n  hash: Hash,\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  const transaction = await publicClient\n    .getTransaction({ hash })\n    .catch(() => null);\n  return transaction !== null;\n}\n\nasync function pollSafeTransactionServiceUntilExecuted({\n  chainId,\n  publicClient,\n  safeTxHash,\n  pollIntervalMs,\n  timeoutMs,\n}: {\n  chainId: number;\n  publicClient: PublicClient;\n  safeTxHash: Hash;\n  pollIntervalMs: number;\n  timeoutMs: number;\n}): Promise<SafePollOutcome> {\n  const baseUrl = SAFE_TX_SERVICE_BASE_URLS[chainId];\n  if (!baseUrl) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Safe Transaction Service not configured for chainId ${chainId}. ` +\n        `Connected wallet appears to be a smart-contract account, but this ` +\n        `chain is not in the supported list. Either connect an EOA or extend ` +\n        `SAFE_TX_SERVICE_BASE_URLS in waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware.ts.`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const url = `${baseUrl}${SAFE_MULTISIG_TX_PATH}/${safeTxHash}/`;\n  const deadline = Date.now() + timeoutMs;\n\n  while (Date.now() < deadline) {\n    const controller = new AbortController();\n    const fetchTimeoutId = setTimeout(\n      () => controller.abort(),\n      SAFE_TX_SERVICE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS,\n    );\n\n    let response: Response;\n    try {\n      response = await fetch(url, { signal: controller.signal });\n    } catch (err) {\n      // Transient failure (AbortError on per-request timeout, DNS hiccup,\n      // connection reset, etc.). Log and continue to the next poll iteration\n      // instead of consuming the entire safePollTimeoutMs budget on one blip.\n      // The outer `while (Date.now() < deadline)` is what enforces the overall\n      // budget; this catch deliberately preserves it.\n      console.warn(\n        `Safe Transaction Service request failed (will retry in ${pollIntervalMs}ms): ` +\n          (err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)),\n      );\n      await sleep(pollIntervalMs);\n      continue;\n    } finally {\n      clearTimeout(fetchTimeoutId);\n    }\n\n    if (response.ok) {\n      const data = (await response.json()) as SafeMultisigTransaction;\n      if (data.isExecuted) {\n        if (data.isSuccessful === false) {\n          throw new Error(\n            `Safe transaction ${safeTxHash} was executed on chain but reverted. ` +\n              `Check the Safe queue UI for details.`,\n          );\n        }\n        if (data.transactionHash) {\n          return { kind: \"executed\", transactionHash: data.transactionHash };\n        }\n      }\n    } else if (response.status === SAFE_TX_SERVICE_NOT_FOUND) {\n      // Usually \"proposal not indexed yet\", so keep polling. But the very same\n      // 404 appears when the hash is not a safeTxHash at all — the case that\n      // used to burn the whole budget on an already-mined transaction. Ask the\n      // node: if it knows this hash, it is a real transaction, so stop treating\n      // it as a proposal and let the caller wait on it directly.\n      if (await hashIsRealTransaction(publicClient, safeTxHash)) {\n        console.warn(\n          `${safeTxHash} is a real transaction, not a Safe proposal — the ` +\n            `connected wallet submits its own transactions despite reporting ` +\n            `contract bytecode. Waiting for its receipt directly.`,\n        );\n        return { kind: \"not-a-proposal\" };\n      }\n    } else if (response.status >= SAFE_TX_SERVICE_SERVER_ERROR) {\n      // Transient server error — same treatment as a hung connection: log and retry.\n      console.warn(\n        `Safe Transaction Service returned ${response.status} for ${safeTxHash}; retrying in ${pollIntervalMs}ms.`,\n      );\n    } else {\n      // Other 4xx (403, 410, etc.) is likely permanent — surface immediately.\n      throw new Error(\n        `Safe Transaction Service returned ${response.status} for ${safeTxHash}.`,\n      );\n    }\n\n    await sleep(pollIntervalMs);\n  }\n\n  throw new Error(\n    `Timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms waiting for Safe transaction ${safeTxHash} ` +\n      `to reach quorum and execute. The proposal is still pending in the Safe ` +\n      `queue — co-signers must sign and execute it before the dApp can proceed.`,\n  );\n}\n\nfunction sleep(ms: number): Promise<void> {\n  return new Promise((resolve) => {\n    setTimeout(resolve, ms);\n  });\n}\n"],"names":["SAFE_TX_SERVICE_BASE_URLS","DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_INTERVAL_MS","DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_TIMEOUT_MS","SAFE_TX_SERVICE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS","SAFE_MULTISIG_TX_PATH","SAFE_TX_SERVICE_NOT_FOUND","SAFE_TX_SERVICE_SERVER_ERROR","HEX_CHARS_PER_BYTE","EIP_7702_DELEGATION_PREFIX","EIP_7702_DELEGATION_ADDRESS_BYTES","EIP_7702_DELEGATION_CODE_LENGTH","isEip7702DelegatedEoa","code","waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware","params","publicClient","walletAddress","hash","confirmations","timeout","safePollTimeoutMs","safePollIntervalMs","chainId","outcome","pollSafeTransactionServiceUntilExecuted","hashIsRealTransaction","safeTxHash","pollIntervalMs","timeoutMs","baseUrl","url","deadline","controller","fetchTimeoutId","response","err","sleep","data","ms","resolve"],"mappings":"gFAsCA,MAAMA,EAAoD,CACxD,EAAG,+CACH,SAAU,8CACZ,EAEMC,EAAgC,IAChCC,EAA+B,MAAc,IAC7CC,EAAmC,IAGnCC,EAAwB,gCAExBC,EAA4B,IAE5BC,EAA+B,IAG/BC,EAAqB,EASrBC,EAA6B,WAC7BC,EAAoC,GACpCC,EACJF,EAA2B,OAC3BD,EAAqBE,EAOvB,SAASE,EAAsBC,EAAuB,CACpD,OACEA,EAAK,SAAWF,GAChBE,EAAK,YAAA,EAAc,WAAWJ,CAA0B,CAE5D,CAqCA,eAAsBK,EACpBC,EAC6B,CAC7B,KAAM,CACJ,aAAAC,EACA,cAAAC,EACA,KAAAC,EACA,cAAAC,EACA,QAAAC,EACA,kBAAAC,EAAoBlB,EACpB,mBAAAmB,EAAqBpB,CAAA,EACnBa,EAEEF,EAAO,MAAMG,EAAa,QAAQ,CAAE,QAASC,EAAe,EAMlE,GAAI,EAFFJ,IAAS,QAAaA,IAAS,MAAQ,CAACD,EAAsBC,CAAI,GAGlE,OAAOG,EAAa,0BAA0B,CAC5C,KAAAE,EACA,cAAAC,EACA,QAAAC,CAAA,CACD,EAGH,MAAMG,EACJP,EAAa,QAAU,OACnB,MAAMA,EAAa,WAAA,EACnBA,EAAa,MAAM,GACnBQ,EAAU,MAAMC,EAAwC,CAC5D,QAAAF,EACA,aAAAP,EACA,WAAYE,EACZ,eAAgBI,EAChB,UAAWD,CAAA,CACZ,EAKD,OAAIG,EAAQ,OAAS,iBACZR,EAAa,0BAA0B,CAC5C,KAAAE,EACA,cAAAC,EACA,QAAAC,CAAA,CACD,EAGIJ,EAAa,0BAA0B,CAC5C,KAAMQ,EAAQ,gBACd,cAAAL,CAAA,CACD,CACH,CAkCA,eAAeO,EACbV,EACAE,EACkB,CAIlB,OAHoB,MAAMF,EACvB,eAAe,CAAE,KAAAE,EAAM,EACvB,MAAM,IAAM,IAAI,IACI,IACzB,CAEA,eAAeO,EAAwC,CACrD,QAAAF,EACA,aAAAP,EACA,WAAAW,EACA,eAAAC,EACA,UAAAC,CACF,EAM6B,CAC3B,MAAMC,EAAU7B,EAA0BsB,CAAO,EACjD,GAAI,CAACO,EACH,MAAM,IAAI,MACR,uDAAuDP,CAAO,8MAAA,EAOlE,MAAMQ,EAAM,GAAGD,CAAO,GAAGzB,CAAqB,IAAIsB,CAAU,IACtDK,EAAW,KAAK,IAAA,EAAQH,EAE9B,KAAO,KAAK,IAAA,EAAQG,GAAU,CAC5B,MAAMC,EAAa,IAAI,gBACjBC,EAAiB,WACrB,IAAMD,EAAW,MAAA,EACjB7B,CAAA,EAGF,IAAI+B,EACJ,GAAI,CACFA,EAAW,MAAM,MAAMJ,EAAK,CAAE,OAAQE,EAAW,OAAQ,CAC3D,OAASG,EAAK,CAMZ,QAAQ,KACN,0DAA0DR,CAAc,SACrEQ,aAAe,MAAQA,EAAI,QAAU,OAAOA,CAAG,EAAA,EAEpD,MAAMC,EAAMT,CAAc,EAC1B,QACF,QAAA,CACE,aAAaM,CAAc,CAC7B,CAEA,GAAIC,EAAS,GAAI,CACf,MAAMG,EAAQ,MAAMH,EAAS,KAAA,EAC7B,GAAIG,EAAK,WAAY,CACnB,GAAIA,EAAK,eAAiB,GACxB,MAAM,IAAI,MACR,oBAAoBX,CAAU,2EAAA,EAIlC,GAAIW,EAAK,gBACP,MAAO,CAAE,KAAM,WAAY,gBAAiBA,EAAK,eAAA,CAErD,CACF,SAAWH,EAAS,SAAW7B,GAM7B,GAAI,MAAMoB,EAAsBV,EAAcW,CAAU,EACtD,eAAQ,KACN,GAAGA,CAAU,wKAAA,EAIR,CAAE,KAAM,gBAAA,UAERQ,EAAS,QAAU5B,EAE5B,QAAQ,KACN,qCAAqC4B,EAAS,MAAM,QAAQR,CAAU,iBAAiBC,CAAc,KAAA,MAIvG,OAAM,IAAI,MACR,qCAAqCO,EAAS,MAAM,QAAQR,CAAU,GAAA,EAI1E,MAAMU,EAAMT,CAAc,CAC5B,CAEA,MAAM,IAAI,MACR,mBAAmBC,CAAS,mCAAmCF,CAAU,kJAAA,CAI7E,CAEA,SAASU,EAAME,EAA2B,CACxC,OAAO,IAAI,QAASC,GAAY,CAC9B,WAAWA,EAASD,CAAE,CACxB,CAAC,CACH"}

package/dist/tbv/core/utils/eth/index.js

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 const f = {
   1: "https://safe-transaction-mainnet.safe.global",
   11155111: "https://safe-transaction-sepolia.safe.global"
-}, w = 5e3, d = 14400 * 1e3, T = 1e4, h = "/api/v1/multisig-transactions", p = 404, A = 500, m = 2, _ = "0xef0100", R = 20, g = _.length + m * R;
+}, d = 5e3, w = 14400 * 1e3, T = 1e4, h = "/api/v1/multisig-transactions", p = 404, A = 500, m = 2, _ = "0xef0100", R = 20, g = _.length + m * R;
 function I(e) {
   return e.length === g && e.toLowerCase().startsWith(_);
 }
@@ -9,32 +9,32 @@ async function L(e) {
   const {
     publicClient: t,
     walletAddress: a,
-    hash: r,
-    confirmations: i,
+    hash: i,
+    confirmations: r,
     timeout: c,
-    safePollTimeoutMs: l = d,
-    safePollIntervalMs: u = w
+    safePollTimeoutMs: l = w,
+    safePollIntervalMs: u = d
   } = e, s = await t.getCode({ address: a });
   if (!(s !== void 0 && s !== "0x" && !I(s)))
     return t.waitForTransactionReceipt({
-      hash: r,
-      confirmations: i,
+      hash: i,
+      confirmations: r,
       timeout: c
     });
-  const o = await t.getChainId(), n = await C({
+  const o = t.chain === void 0 ? await t.getChainId() : t.chain.id, n = await C({
     chainId: o,
     publicClient: t,
-    safeTxHash: r,
+    safeTxHash: i,
     pollIntervalMs: u,
     timeoutMs: l
   });
   return n.kind === "not-a-proposal" ? t.waitForTransactionReceipt({
-    hash: r,
-    confirmations: i,
+    hash: i,
+    confirmations: r,
     timeout: c
   }) : t.waitForTransactionReceipt({
     hash: n.transactionHash,
-    confirmations: i
+    confirmations: r
   });
 }
 async function F(e, t) {
@@ -44,15 +44,15 @@ async function C({
   chainId: e,
   publicClient: t,
   safeTxHash: a,
-  pollIntervalMs: r,
-  timeoutMs: i
+  pollIntervalMs: i,
+  timeoutMs: r
 }) {
   const c = f[e];
   if (!c)
     throw new Error(
       `Safe Transaction Service not configured for chainId ${e}. Connected wallet appears to be a smart-contract account, but this chain is not in the supported list. Either connect an EOA or extend SAFE_TX_SERVICE_BASE_URLS in waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware.ts.`
     );
-  const l = `${c}${h}/${a}/`, u = Date.now() + i;
+  const l = `${c}${h}/${a}/`, u = Date.now() + r;
   for (; Date.now() < u; ) {
     const s = new AbortController(), E = setTimeout(
       () => s.abort(),
@@ -63,8 +63,8 @@ async function C({
       o = await fetch(l, { signal: s.signal });
     } catch (n) {
       console.warn(
-        `Safe Transaction Service request failed (will retry in ${r}ms): ` + (n instanceof Error ? n.message : String(n))
-      ), await S(r);
+        `Safe Transaction Service request failed (will retry in ${i}ms): ` + (n instanceof Error ? n.message : String(n))
+      ), await S(i);
       continue;
     } finally {
       clearTimeout(E);
@@ -86,16 +86,16 @@ async function C({
         ), { kind: "not-a-proposal" };
     } else if (o.status >= A)
       console.warn(
-        `Safe Transaction Service returned ${o.status} for ${a}; retrying in ${r}ms.`
+        `Safe Transaction Service returned ${o.status} for ${a}; retrying in ${i}ms.`
       );
     else
       throw new Error(
         `Safe Transaction Service returned ${o.status} for ${a}.`
       );
-    await S(r);
+    await S(i);
   }
   throw new Error(
-    `Timed out after ${i}ms waiting for Safe transaction ${a} to reach quorum and execute. The proposal is still pending in the Safe queue — co-signers must sign and execute it before the dApp can proceed.`
+    `Timed out after ${r}ms waiting for Safe transaction ${a} to reach quorum and execute. The proposal is still pending in the Safe queue — co-signers must sign and execute it before the dApp can proceed.`
   );
 }
 function S(e) {

package/dist/tbv/core/utils/eth/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"index.js","sources":["../../../../../src/tbv/core/utils/eth/waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Smart-account-aware wrapper around viem's `waitForTransactionReceipt`.\n *\n * Externally Owned Accounts (EOAs) — wallets controlled by a single private\n * key, e.g. MetaMask or a hardware wallet. `eth_sendTransaction` returns a real\n * Ethereum tx hash, which viem can poll directly. This wrapper delegates\n * unchanged for them.\n *\n * Smart-contract accounts (e.g. Safe multisigs) — the wallet address is a\n * deployed contract that decides whether to accept a transaction. WalletConnect's\n * `eth_sendTransaction` returns a `safeTxHash` (an EIP-712 hash of the\n * *proposal*) rather than a real tx hash, and the proposal is held in Safe's\n * off-chain Transaction Service until quorum signs and executes it. We poll\n * that service for the proposal until execution, then wait for receipt on the\n * real Ethereum tx hash exposed in the service's response.\n *\n * The two are told apart by `eth_getCode`, but NOT by \"empty vs non-empty\":\n * an EIP-7702 delegated EOA reports `0xef0100 ‖ <delegate address>` and is\n * still an EOA — it signs and submits its own transactions, so\n * `eth_sendTransaction` returns a real tx hash. MetaMask upgrades accounts to\n * smart accounts this way by default, and treating one as a Safe means polling\n * the Transaction Service for a hash that is not a `safeTxHash`: a permanent\n * 404 that reads as \"proposal not yet indexed\" and hangs for the full poll\n * budget on a transaction that already succeeded. Delegation designators are\n * therefore classified as EOAs. As a backstop for any wallet that behaves this\n * way in future, a 404 from the Transaction Service is also checked against the\n * node: if it knows the hash as a real transaction, we were never waiting on a\n * proposal and switch to waiting for that transaction's receipt.\n *\n * @module utils/eth\n */\n\nimport type { Address, Hash, PublicClient, TransactionReceipt } from \"viem\";\n\n/**\n * Chains where the Safe Transaction Service is supported by this utility.\n * Extend the map as more Safe-enabled chains are needed.\n */\nconst SAFE_TX_SERVICE_BASE_URLS: Record<number, string> = {\n  1: \"https://safe-transaction-mainnet.safe.global\",\n  11155111: \"https://safe-transaction-sepolia.safe.global\",\n};\n\nconst DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 5_000;\nconst DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_TIMEOUT_MS = 4 * 60 * 60 * 1_000;\nconst SAFE_TX_SERVICE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;\n\n/** Safe Transaction Service route for one multisig-transaction proposal. */\nconst SAFE_MULTISIG_TX_PATH = \"/api/v1/multisig-transactions\";\n/** The service answers 404 both for an unindexed proposal and an unknown Safe. */\nconst SAFE_TX_SERVICE_NOT_FOUND = 404;\n/** Statuses at or above this are server-side, so worth retrying. */\nconst SAFE_TX_SERVICE_SERVER_ERROR = 500;\n\n/** Two hex characters encode one byte in an `eth_getCode` result. */\nconst HEX_CHARS_PER_BYTE = 2;\n\n/**\n * EIP-7702 delegation designator: an EOA that has delegated its code to a\n * contract reports exactly `0xef0100 ‖ <20-byte delegate address>` from\n * `eth_getCode` (EIP-7702 §\"Delegation Designation\"). Both the prefix and the\n * exact length are checked so ordinary contract bytecode that merely happens to\n * start with these bytes is not mistaken for a delegation.\n */\nconst EIP_7702_DELEGATION_PREFIX = \"0xef0100\";\nconst EIP_7702_DELEGATION_ADDRESS_BYTES = 20;\nconst EIP_7702_DELEGATION_CODE_LENGTH =\n  EIP_7702_DELEGATION_PREFIX.length +\n  HEX_CHARS_PER_BYTE * EIP_7702_DELEGATION_ADDRESS_BYTES;\n\n/**\n * True when `eth_getCode` reports an EIP-7702 delegation designator rather than\n * a deployed contract. Such an account is still an EOA for our purposes: it\n * signs and submits its own transactions, so the hash we hold is a real tx hash.\n */\nfunction isEip7702DelegatedEoa(code: string): boolean {\n  return (\n    code.length === EIP_7702_DELEGATION_CODE_LENGTH &&\n    code.toLowerCase().startsWith(EIP_7702_DELEGATION_PREFIX)\n  );\n}\n\nexport interface WaitForTransactionReceiptSmartAwareParams {\n  publicClient: PublicClient;\n  walletAddress: Address;\n  hash: Hash;\n  /**\n   * Forwarded to viem verbatim.\n   *\n   * MUST NOT be used as a finality/reorg gate. viem fetches the receipt once\n   * and then only compares block numbers against that cached copy — it never\n   * re-checks that the receipt's block is still canonical, so it resolves\n   * happily for a transaction that has been reorged out. Setting this buys a\n   * delay, not a guarantee. For peg-in registration finality use\n   * `waitForPeginRegistrationDepth`, which re-reads live contract state on\n   * every poll.\n   */\n  confirmations?: number;\n  /**\n   * Forwarded to viem on the EOA (externally owned account) path, and on the\n   * fallback where a supposed smart account turns out to submit its own\n   * transactions — that is the EOA case too, however we arrived at it.\n   *\n   * Ignored only while waiting on a genuine Safe proposal, whose budget is\n   * safePollTimeoutMs. It is not forwarded to the receipt wait that follows a\n   * proposal's execution either: viem's own default applies there (180s as of\n   * viem 2.38.2), so that wait is bounded too — a sufficiently slow node still\n   * raises WaitForTransactionReceiptTimeoutError, just on viem's uniform bound\n   * rather than on a caller's shorter one.\n   */\n  timeout?: number;\n  /** Total budget for waiting on Safe quorum + execution. Default 4h. */\n  safePollTimeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Poll cadence against the Safe Transaction Service. Default 5s. */\n  safePollIntervalMs?: number;\n}\n\nexport async function waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware(\n  params: WaitForTransactionReceiptSmartAwareParams,\n): Promise<TransactionReceipt> {\n  const {\n    publicClient,\n    walletAddress,\n    hash,\n    confirmations,\n    timeout,\n    safePollTimeoutMs = DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_TIMEOUT_MS,\n    safePollIntervalMs = DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_INTERVAL_MS,\n  } = params;\n\n  const code = await publicClient.getCode({ address: walletAddress });\n  // An EIP-7702 delegated EOA has non-empty code but still submits its own\n  // transactions, so it belongs on the EOA path — see the module docblock.\n  const isSmartAccount =\n    code !== undefined && code !== \"0x\" && !isEip7702DelegatedEoa(code);\n\n  if (!isSmartAccount) {\n    return publicClient.waitForTransactionReceipt({\n      hash,\n      confirmations,\n      timeout,\n    });\n  }\n\n  const chainId = await publicClient.getChainId();\n  const outcome = await pollSafeTransactionServiceUntilExecuted({\n    chainId,\n    publicClient,\n    safeTxHash: hash,\n    pollIntervalMs: safePollIntervalMs,\n    timeoutMs: safePollTimeoutMs,\n  });\n\n  // The wallet turned out to submit its own transactions, so this is the EOA\n  // case after all — including the caller's `timeout`, which only ever meant to\n  // be ignored while waiting on a genuine Safe proposal.\n  if (outcome.kind === \"not-a-proposal\") {\n    return publicClient.waitForTransactionReceipt({\n      hash,\n      confirmations,\n      timeout,\n    });\n  }\n\n  return publicClient.waitForTransactionReceipt({\n    hash: outcome.transactionHash,\n    confirmations,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * How the Safe path ended. The two outcomes are not interchangeable, so they are\n * distinguished rather than both collapsing to a bare hash: `executed` is a real\n * Safe proposal that reached quorum, while `not-a-proposal` means the wallet was\n * never a Safe and we are really on the EOA path — which decides whether the\n * caller's `timeout` applies to the receipt wait that follows.\n */\ntype SafePollOutcome =\n  | { kind: \"executed\"; transactionHash: Hash }\n  | { kind: \"not-a-proposal\" };\n\ninterface SafeMultisigTransaction {\n  isExecuted: boolean;\n  isSuccessful: boolean | null;\n  transactionHash: Hash | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Decide whether a 404 from the Transaction Service means \"proposal not indexed\n * yet\" or \"this hash was never a proposal at all\".\n *\n * The Safe indexer cannot answer that: a genuine Safe and its freshly-submitted\n * proposal are both absent from it for a while, so its 404 proves nothing. The\n * NODE can. A `safeTxHash` is an EIP-712 digest of a proposal and is never a\n * transaction on chain, so if the node knows the hash as a real transaction then\n * this was never a proposal and we are on the wrong path entirely.\n *\n * Returns true only on that positive identification. Anything else — the node\n * has not seen it yet, or the lookup fails — is inconclusive and leaves the\n * caller polling, which is the correct behaviour for a Safe that is simply\n * still being indexed.\n */\nasync function hashIsRealTransaction(\n  publicClient: PublicClient,\n  hash: Hash,\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  const transaction = await publicClient\n    .getTransaction({ hash })\n    .catch(() => null);\n  return transaction !== null;\n}\n\nasync function pollSafeTransactionServiceUntilExecuted({\n  chainId,\n  publicClient,\n  safeTxHash,\n  pollIntervalMs,\n  timeoutMs,\n}: {\n  chainId: number;\n  publicClient: PublicClient;\n  safeTxHash: Hash;\n  pollIntervalMs: number;\n  timeoutMs: number;\n}): Promise<SafePollOutcome> {\n  const baseUrl = SAFE_TX_SERVICE_BASE_URLS[chainId];\n  if (!baseUrl) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Safe Transaction Service not configured for chainId ${chainId}. ` +\n        `Connected wallet appears to be a smart-contract account, but this ` +\n        `chain is not in the supported list. Either connect an EOA or extend ` +\n        `SAFE_TX_SERVICE_BASE_URLS in waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware.ts.`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const url = `${baseUrl}${SAFE_MULTISIG_TX_PATH}/${safeTxHash}/`;\n  const deadline = Date.now() + timeoutMs;\n\n  while (Date.now() < deadline) {\n    const controller = new AbortController();\n    const fetchTimeoutId = setTimeout(\n      () => controller.abort(),\n      SAFE_TX_SERVICE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS,\n    );\n\n    let response: Response;\n    try {\n      response = await fetch(url, { signal: controller.signal });\n    } catch (err) {\n      // Transient failure (AbortError on per-request timeout, DNS hiccup,\n      // connection reset, etc.). Log and continue to the next poll iteration\n      // instead of consuming the entire safePollTimeoutMs budget on one blip.\n      // The outer `while (Date.now() < deadline)` is what enforces the overall\n      // budget; this catch deliberately preserves it.\n      console.warn(\n        `Safe Transaction Service request failed (will retry in ${pollIntervalMs}ms): ` +\n          (err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)),\n      );\n      await sleep(pollIntervalMs);\n      continue;\n    } finally {\n      clearTimeout(fetchTimeoutId);\n    }\n\n    if (response.ok) {\n      const data = (await response.json()) as SafeMultisigTransaction;\n      if (data.isExecuted) {\n        if (data.isSuccessful === false) {\n          throw new Error(\n            `Safe transaction ${safeTxHash} was executed on chain but reverted. ` +\n              `Check the Safe queue UI for details.`,\n          );\n        }\n        if (data.transactionHash) {\n          return { kind: \"executed\", transactionHash: data.transactionHash };\n        }\n      }\n    } else if (response.status === SAFE_TX_SERVICE_NOT_FOUND) {\n      // Usually \"proposal not indexed yet\", so keep polling. But the very same\n      // 404 appears when the hash is not a safeTxHash at all — the case that\n      // used to burn the whole budget on an already-mined transaction. Ask the\n      // node: if it knows this hash, it is a real transaction, so stop treating\n      // it as a proposal and let the caller wait on it directly.\n      if (await hashIsRealTransaction(publicClient, safeTxHash)) {\n        console.warn(\n          `${safeTxHash} is a real transaction, not a Safe proposal — the ` +\n            `connected wallet submits its own transactions despite reporting ` +\n            `contract bytecode. Waiting for its receipt directly.`,\n        );\n        return { kind: \"not-a-proposal\" };\n      }\n    } else if (response.status >= SAFE_TX_SERVICE_SERVER_ERROR) {\n      // Transient server error — same treatment as a hung connection: log and retry.\n      console.warn(\n        `Safe Transaction Service returned ${response.status} for ${safeTxHash}; retrying in ${pollIntervalMs}ms.`,\n      );\n    } else {\n      // Other 4xx (403, 410, etc.) is likely permanent — surface immediately.\n      throw new Error(\n        `Safe Transaction Service returned ${response.status} for ${safeTxHash}.`,\n      );\n    }\n\n    await sleep(pollIntervalMs);\n  }\n\n  throw new Error(\n    `Timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms waiting for Safe transaction ${safeTxHash} ` +\n      `to reach quorum and execute. The proposal is still pending in the Safe ` +\n      `queue — co-signers must sign and execute it before the dApp can proceed.`,\n  );\n}\n\nfunction sleep(ms: number): Promise<void> {\n  return new Promise((resolve) => {\n    setTimeout(resolve, ms);\n  });\n}\n"],"names":["SAFE_TX_SERVICE_BASE_URLS","DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_INTERVAL_MS","DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_TIMEOUT_MS","SAFE_TX_SERVICE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS","SAFE_MULTISIG_TX_PATH","SAFE_TX_SERVICE_NOT_FOUND","SAFE_TX_SERVICE_SERVER_ERROR","HEX_CHARS_PER_BYTE","EIP_7702_DELEGATION_PREFIX","EIP_7702_DELEGATION_ADDRESS_BYTES","EIP_7702_DELEGATION_CODE_LENGTH","isEip7702DelegatedEoa","code","waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware","params","publicClient","walletAddress","hash","confirmations","timeout","safePollTimeoutMs","safePollIntervalMs","chainId","outcome","pollSafeTransactionServiceUntilExecuted","hashIsRealTransaction","safeTxHash","pollIntervalMs","timeoutMs","baseUrl","url","deadline","controller","fetchTimeoutId","response","err","sleep","data","ms","resolve"],"mappings":"AAsCA,MAAMA,IAAoD;AAAA,EACxD,GAAG;AAAA,EACH,UAAU;AACZ,GAEMC,IAAgC,KAChCC,IAA+B,QAAc,KAC7CC,IAAmC,KAGnCC,IAAwB,iCAExBC,IAA4B,KAE5BC,IAA+B,KAG/BC,IAAqB,GASrBC,IAA6B,YAC7BC,IAAoC,IACpCC,IACJF,EAA2B,SAC3BD,IAAqBE;AAOvB,SAASE,EAAsBC,GAAuB;AACpD,SACEA,EAAK,WAAWF,KAChBE,EAAK,YAAA,EAAc,WAAWJ,CAA0B;AAE5D;AAqCA,eAAsBK,EACpBC,GAC6B;AAC7B,QAAM;AAAA,IACJ,cAAAC;AAAA,IACA,eAAAC;AAAA,IACA,MAAAC;AAAA,IACA,eAAAC;AAAA,IACA,SAAAC;AAAA,IACA,mBAAAC,IAAoBlB;AAAA,IACpB,oBAAAmB,IAAqBpB;AAAA,EAAA,IACnBa,GAEEF,IAAO,MAAMG,EAAa,QAAQ,EAAE,SAASC,GAAe;AAMlE,MAAI,EAFFJ,MAAS,UAAaA,MAAS,QAAQ,CAACD,EAAsBC,CAAI;AAGlE,WAAOG,EAAa,0BAA0B;AAAA,MAC5C,MAAAE;AAAA,MACA,eAAAC;AAAA,MACA,SAAAC;AAAA,IAAA,CACD;AAGH,QAAMG,IAAU,MAAMP,EAAa,WAAA,GAC7BQ,IAAU,MAAMC,EAAwC;AAAA,IAC5D,SAAAF;AAAA,IACA,cAAAP;AAAA,IACA,YAAYE;AAAA,IACZ,gBAAgBI;AAAA,IAChB,WAAWD;AAAA,EAAA,CACZ;AAKD,SAAIG,EAAQ,SAAS,mBACZR,EAAa,0BAA0B;AAAA,IAC5C,MAAAE;AAAA,IACA,eAAAC;AAAA,IACA,SAAAC;AAAA,EAAA,CACD,IAGIJ,EAAa,0BAA0B;AAAA,IAC5C,MAAMQ,EAAQ;AAAA,IACd,eAAAL;AAAA,EAAA,CACD;AACH;AAkCA,eAAeO,EACbV,GACAE,GACkB;AAIlB,SAHoB,MAAMF,EACvB,eAAe,EAAE,MAAAE,GAAM,EACvB,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,MACI;AACzB;AAEA,eAAeO,EAAwC;AAAA,EACrD,SAAAF;AAAA,EACA,cAAAP;AAAA,EACA,YAAAW;AAAA,EACA,gBAAAC;AAAA,EACA,WAAAC;AACF,GAM6B;AAC3B,QAAMC,IAAU7B,EAA0BsB,CAAO;AACjD,MAAI,CAACO;AACH,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,uDAAuDP,CAAO;AAAA,IAAA;AAOlE,QAAMQ,IAAM,GAAGD,CAAO,GAAGzB,CAAqB,IAAIsB,CAAU,KACtDK,IAAW,KAAK,IAAA,IAAQH;AAE9B,SAAO,KAAK,IAAA,IAAQG,KAAU;AAC5B,UAAMC,IAAa,IAAI,gBAAA,GACjBC,IAAiB;AAAA,MACrB,MAAMD,EAAW,MAAA;AAAA,MACjB7B;AAAA,IAAA;AAGF,QAAI+B;AACJ,QAAI;AACF,MAAAA,IAAW,MAAM,MAAMJ,GAAK,EAAE,QAAQE,EAAW,QAAQ;AAAA,IAC3D,SAASG,GAAK;AAMZ,cAAQ;AAAA,QACN,0DAA0DR,CAAc,WACrEQ,aAAe,QAAQA,EAAI,UAAU,OAAOA,CAAG;AAAA,MAAA,GAEpD,MAAMC,EAAMT,CAAc;AAC1B;AAAA,IACF,UAAA;AACE,mBAAaM,CAAc;AAAA,IAC7B;AAEA,QAAIC,EAAS,IAAI;AACf,YAAMG,IAAQ,MAAMH,EAAS,KAAA;AAC7B,UAAIG,EAAK,YAAY;AACnB,YAAIA,EAAK,iBAAiB;AACxB,gBAAM,IAAI;AAAA,YACR,oBAAoBX,CAAU;AAAA,UAAA;AAIlC,YAAIW,EAAK;AACP,iBAAO,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,iBAAiBA,EAAK,gBAAA;AAAA,MAErD;AAAA,IACF,WAAWH,EAAS,WAAW7B;AAM7B,UAAI,MAAMoB,EAAsBV,GAAcW,CAAU;AACtD,uBAAQ;AAAA,UACN,GAAGA,CAAU;AAAA,QAAA,GAIR,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAA;AAAA,eAERQ,EAAS,UAAU5B;AAE5B,cAAQ;AAAA,QACN,qCAAqC4B,EAAS,MAAM,QAAQR,CAAU,iBAAiBC,CAAc;AAAA,MAAA;AAAA;AAIvG,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR,qCAAqCO,EAAS,MAAM,QAAQR,CAAU;AAAA,MAAA;AAI1E,UAAMU,EAAMT,CAAc;AAAA,EAC5B;AAEA,QAAM,IAAI;AAAA,IACR,mBAAmBC,CAAS,mCAAmCF,CAAU;AAAA,EAAA;AAI7E;AAEA,SAASU,EAAME,GAA2B;AACxC,SAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,CAACC,MAAY;AAC9B,eAAWA,GAASD,CAAE;AAAA,EACxB,CAAC;AACH;"}
+{"version":3,"file":"index.js","sources":["../../../../../src/tbv/core/utils/eth/waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Smart-account-aware wrapper around viem's `waitForTransactionReceipt`.\n *\n * Externally Owned Accounts (EOAs) — wallets controlled by a single private\n * key, e.g. MetaMask or a hardware wallet. `eth_sendTransaction` returns a real\n * Ethereum tx hash, which viem can poll directly. This wrapper delegates\n * unchanged for them.\n *\n * Smart-contract accounts (e.g. Safe multisigs) — the wallet address is a\n * deployed contract that decides whether to accept a transaction. WalletConnect's\n * `eth_sendTransaction` returns a `safeTxHash` (an EIP-712 hash of the\n * *proposal*) rather than a real tx hash, and the proposal is held in Safe's\n * off-chain Transaction Service until quorum signs and executes it. We poll\n * that service for the proposal until execution, then wait for receipt on the\n * real Ethereum tx hash exposed in the service's response.\n *\n * The two are told apart by `eth_getCode`, but NOT by \"empty vs non-empty\":\n * an EIP-7702 delegated EOA reports `0xef0100 ‖ <delegate address>` and is\n * still an EOA — it signs and submits its own transactions, so\n * `eth_sendTransaction` returns a real tx hash. MetaMask upgrades accounts to\n * smart accounts this way by default, and treating one as a Safe means polling\n * the Transaction Service for a hash that is not a `safeTxHash`: a permanent\n * 404 that reads as \"proposal not yet indexed\" and hangs for the full poll\n * budget on a transaction that already succeeded. Delegation designators are\n * therefore classified as EOAs. As a backstop for any wallet that behaves this\n * way in future, a 404 from the Transaction Service is also checked against the\n * node: if it knows the hash as a real transaction, we were never waiting on a\n * proposal and switch to waiting for that transaction's receipt.\n *\n * @module utils/eth\n */\n\nimport type { Address, Hash, PublicClient, TransactionReceipt } from \"viem\";\n\n/**\n * Chains where the Safe Transaction Service is supported by this utility.\n * Extend the map as more Safe-enabled chains are needed.\n */\nconst SAFE_TX_SERVICE_BASE_URLS: Record<number, string> = {\n  1: \"https://safe-transaction-mainnet.safe.global\",\n  11155111: \"https://safe-transaction-sepolia.safe.global\",\n};\n\nconst DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 5_000;\nconst DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_TIMEOUT_MS = 4 * 60 * 60 * 1_000;\nconst SAFE_TX_SERVICE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;\n\n/** Safe Transaction Service route for one multisig-transaction proposal. */\nconst SAFE_MULTISIG_TX_PATH = \"/api/v1/multisig-transactions\";\n/** The service answers 404 both for an unindexed proposal and an unknown Safe. */\nconst SAFE_TX_SERVICE_NOT_FOUND = 404;\n/** Statuses at or above this are server-side, so worth retrying. */\nconst SAFE_TX_SERVICE_SERVER_ERROR = 500;\n\n/** Two hex characters encode one byte in an `eth_getCode` result. */\nconst HEX_CHARS_PER_BYTE = 2;\n\n/**\n * EIP-7702 delegation designator: an EOA that has delegated its code to a\n * contract reports exactly `0xef0100 ‖ <20-byte delegate address>` from\n * `eth_getCode` (EIP-7702 §\"Delegation Designation\"). Both the prefix and the\n * exact length are checked so ordinary contract bytecode that merely happens to\n * start with these bytes is not mistaken for a delegation.\n */\nconst EIP_7702_DELEGATION_PREFIX = \"0xef0100\";\nconst EIP_7702_DELEGATION_ADDRESS_BYTES = 20;\nconst EIP_7702_DELEGATION_CODE_LENGTH =\n  EIP_7702_DELEGATION_PREFIX.length +\n  HEX_CHARS_PER_BYTE * EIP_7702_DELEGATION_ADDRESS_BYTES;\n\n/**\n * True when `eth_getCode` reports an EIP-7702 delegation designator rather than\n * a deployed contract. Such an account is still an EOA for our purposes: it\n * signs and submits its own transactions, so the hash we hold is a real tx hash.\n */\nfunction isEip7702DelegatedEoa(code: string): boolean {\n  return (\n    code.length === EIP_7702_DELEGATION_CODE_LENGTH &&\n    code.toLowerCase().startsWith(EIP_7702_DELEGATION_PREFIX)\n  );\n}\n\nexport interface WaitForTransactionReceiptSmartAwareParams {\n  publicClient: PublicClient;\n  walletAddress: Address;\n  hash: Hash;\n  /**\n   * Forwarded to viem verbatim.\n   *\n   * MUST NOT be used as a finality/reorg gate. viem fetches the receipt once\n   * and then only compares block numbers against that cached copy — it never\n   * re-checks that the receipt's block is still canonical, so it resolves\n   * happily for a transaction that has been reorged out. Setting this buys a\n   * delay, not a guarantee. For peg-in registration finality use\n   * `waitForPeginRegistrationDepth`, which re-reads live contract state on\n   * every poll.\n   */\n  confirmations?: number;\n  /**\n   * Forwarded to viem on the EOA (externally owned account) path, and on the\n   * fallback where a supposed smart account turns out to submit its own\n   * transactions — that is the EOA case too, however we arrived at it.\n   *\n   * Ignored only while waiting on a genuine Safe proposal, whose budget is\n   * safePollTimeoutMs. It is not forwarded to the receipt wait that follows a\n   * proposal's execution either: viem's own default applies there (180s as of\n   * viem 2.38.2), so that wait is bounded too — a sufficiently slow node still\n   * raises WaitForTransactionReceiptTimeoutError, just on viem's uniform bound\n   * rather than on a caller's shorter one.\n   */\n  timeout?: number;\n  /** Total budget for waiting on Safe quorum + execution. Default 4h. */\n  safePollTimeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Poll cadence against the Safe Transaction Service. Default 5s. */\n  safePollIntervalMs?: number;\n}\n\nexport async function waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware(\n  params: WaitForTransactionReceiptSmartAwareParams,\n): Promise<TransactionReceipt> {\n  const {\n    publicClient,\n    walletAddress,\n    hash,\n    confirmations,\n    timeout,\n    safePollTimeoutMs = DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_TIMEOUT_MS,\n    safePollIntervalMs = DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_INTERVAL_MS,\n  } = params;\n\n  const code = await publicClient.getCode({ address: walletAddress });\n  // An EIP-7702 delegated EOA has non-empty code but still submits its own\n  // transactions, so it belongs on the EOA path — see the module docblock.\n  const isSmartAccount =\n    code !== undefined && code !== \"0x\" && !isEip7702DelegatedEoa(code);\n\n  if (!isSmartAccount) {\n    return publicClient.waitForTransactionReceipt({\n      hash,\n      confirmations,\n      timeout,\n    });\n  }\n\n  const chainId =\n    publicClient.chain === undefined\n      ? await publicClient.getChainId()\n      : publicClient.chain.id;\n  const outcome = await pollSafeTransactionServiceUntilExecuted({\n    chainId,\n    publicClient,\n    safeTxHash: hash,\n    pollIntervalMs: safePollIntervalMs,\n    timeoutMs: safePollTimeoutMs,\n  });\n\n  // The wallet turned out to submit its own transactions, so this is the EOA\n  // case after all — including the caller's `timeout`, which only ever meant to\n  // be ignored while waiting on a genuine Safe proposal.\n  if (outcome.kind === \"not-a-proposal\") {\n    return publicClient.waitForTransactionReceipt({\n      hash,\n      confirmations,\n      timeout,\n    });\n  }\n\n  return publicClient.waitForTransactionReceipt({\n    hash: outcome.transactionHash,\n    confirmations,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * How the Safe path ended. The two outcomes are not interchangeable, so they are\n * distinguished rather than both collapsing to a bare hash: `executed` is a real\n * Safe proposal that reached quorum, while `not-a-proposal` means the wallet was\n * never a Safe and we are really on the EOA path — which decides whether the\n * caller's `timeout` applies to the receipt wait that follows.\n */\ntype SafePollOutcome =\n  | { kind: \"executed\"; transactionHash: Hash }\n  | { kind: \"not-a-proposal\" };\n\ninterface SafeMultisigTransaction {\n  isExecuted: boolean;\n  isSuccessful: boolean | null;\n  transactionHash: Hash | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Decide whether a 404 from the Transaction Service means \"proposal not indexed\n * yet\" or \"this hash was never a proposal at all\".\n *\n * The Safe indexer cannot answer that: a genuine Safe and its freshly-submitted\n * proposal are both absent from it for a while, so its 404 proves nothing. The\n * NODE can. A `safeTxHash` is an EIP-712 digest of a proposal and is never a\n * transaction on chain, so if the node knows the hash as a real transaction then\n * this was never a proposal and we are on the wrong path entirely.\n *\n * Returns true only on that positive identification. Anything else — the node\n * has not seen it yet, or the lookup fails — is inconclusive and leaves the\n * caller polling, which is the correct behaviour for a Safe that is simply\n * still being indexed.\n */\nasync function hashIsRealTransaction(\n  publicClient: PublicClient,\n  hash: Hash,\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  const transaction = await publicClient\n    .getTransaction({ hash })\n    .catch(() => null);\n  return transaction !== null;\n}\n\nasync function pollSafeTransactionServiceUntilExecuted({\n  chainId,\n  publicClient,\n  safeTxHash,\n  pollIntervalMs,\n  timeoutMs,\n}: {\n  chainId: number;\n  publicClient: PublicClient;\n  safeTxHash: Hash;\n  pollIntervalMs: number;\n  timeoutMs: number;\n}): Promise<SafePollOutcome> {\n  const baseUrl = SAFE_TX_SERVICE_BASE_URLS[chainId];\n  if (!baseUrl) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Safe Transaction Service not configured for chainId ${chainId}. ` +\n        `Connected wallet appears to be a smart-contract account, but this ` +\n        `chain is not in the supported list. Either connect an EOA or extend ` +\n        `SAFE_TX_SERVICE_BASE_URLS in waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware.ts.`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const url = `${baseUrl}${SAFE_MULTISIG_TX_PATH}/${safeTxHash}/`;\n  const deadline = Date.now() + timeoutMs;\n\n  while (Date.now() < deadline) {\n    const controller = new AbortController();\n    const fetchTimeoutId = setTimeout(\n      () => controller.abort(),\n      SAFE_TX_SERVICE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS,\n    );\n\n    let response: Response;\n    try {\n      response = await fetch(url, { signal: controller.signal });\n    } catch (err) {\n      // Transient failure (AbortError on per-request timeout, DNS hiccup,\n      // connection reset, etc.). Log and continue to the next poll iteration\n      // instead of consuming the entire safePollTimeoutMs budget on one blip.\n      // The outer `while (Date.now() < deadline)` is what enforces the overall\n      // budget; this catch deliberately preserves it.\n      console.warn(\n        `Safe Transaction Service request failed (will retry in ${pollIntervalMs}ms): ` +\n          (err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)),\n      );\n      await sleep(pollIntervalMs);\n      continue;\n    } finally {\n      clearTimeout(fetchTimeoutId);\n    }\n\n    if (response.ok) {\n      const data = (await response.json()) as SafeMultisigTransaction;\n      if (data.isExecuted) {\n        if (data.isSuccessful === false) {\n          throw new Error(\n            `Safe transaction ${safeTxHash} was executed on chain but reverted. ` +\n              `Check the Safe queue UI for details.`,\n          );\n        }\n        if (data.transactionHash) {\n          return { kind: \"executed\", transactionHash: data.transactionHash };\n        }\n      }\n    } else if (response.status === SAFE_TX_SERVICE_NOT_FOUND) {\n      // Usually \"proposal not indexed yet\", so keep polling. 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Waiting for its receipt directly.`,\n        );\n        return { kind: \"not-a-proposal\" };\n      }\n    } else if (response.status >= SAFE_TX_SERVICE_SERVER_ERROR) {\n      // Transient server error — same treatment as a hung connection: log and retry.\n      console.warn(\n        `Safe Transaction Service returned ${response.status} for ${safeTxHash}; retrying in ${pollIntervalMs}ms.`,\n      );\n    } else {\n      // Other 4xx (403, 410, etc.) is likely permanent — surface immediately.\n      throw new Error(\n        `Safe Transaction Service returned ${response.status} for ${safeTxHash}.`,\n      );\n    }\n\n    await sleep(pollIntervalMs);\n  }\n\n  throw new Error(\n    `Timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms waiting for Safe transaction ${safeTxHash} ` +\n      `to reach quorum and execute. The proposal is still pending in the Safe ` +\n      `queue — co-signers must sign and execute it before the dApp can proceed.`,\n  );\n}\n\nfunction sleep(ms: number): Promise<void> {\n  return new Promise((resolve) => {\n    setTimeout(resolve, ms);\n  });\n}\n"],"names":["SAFE_TX_SERVICE_BASE_URLS","DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_INTERVAL_MS","DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_TIMEOUT_MS","SAFE_TX_SERVICE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS","SAFE_MULTISIG_TX_PATH","SAFE_TX_SERVICE_NOT_FOUND","SAFE_TX_SERVICE_SERVER_ERROR","HEX_CHARS_PER_BYTE","EIP_7702_DELEGATION_PREFIX","EIP_7702_DELEGATION_ADDRESS_BYTES","EIP_7702_DELEGATION_CODE_LENGTH","isEip7702DelegatedEoa","code","waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware","params","publicClient","walletAddress","hash","confirmations","timeout","safePollTimeoutMs","safePollIntervalMs","chainId","outcome","pollSafeTransactionServiceUntilExecuted","hashIsRealTransaction","safeTxHash","pollIntervalMs","timeoutMs","baseUrl","url","deadline","controller","fetchTimeoutId","response","err","sleep","data","ms","resolve"],"mappings":"AAsCA,MAAMA,IAAoD;AAAA,EACxD,GAAG;AAAA,EACH,UAAU;AACZ,GAEMC,IAAgC,KAChCC,IAA+B,QAAc,KAC7CC,IAAmC,KAGnCC,IAAwB,iCAExBC,IAA4B,KAE5BC,IAA+B,KAG/BC,IAAqB,GASrBC,IAA6B,YAC7BC,IAAoC,IACpCC,IACJF,EAA2B,SAC3BD,IAAqBE;AAOvB,SAASE,EAAsBC,GAAuB;AACpD,SACEA,EAAK,WAAWF,KAChBE,EAAK,YAAA,EAAc,WAAWJ,CAA0B;AAE5D;AAqCA,eAAsBK,EACpBC,GAC6B;AAC7B,QAAM;AAAA,IACJ,cAAAC;AAAA,IACA,eAAAC;AAAA,IACA,MAAAC;AAAA,IACA,eAAAC;AAAA,IACA,SAAAC;AAAA,IACA,mBAAAC,IAAoBlB;AAAA,IACpB,oBAAAmB,IAAqBpB;AAAA,EAAA,IACnBa,GAEEF,IAAO,MAAMG,EAAa,QAAQ,EAAE,SAASC,GAAe;AAMlE,MAAI,EAFFJ,MAAS,UAAaA,MAAS,QAAQ,CAACD,EAAsBC,CAAI;AAGlE,WAAOG,EAAa,0BAA0B;AAAA,MAC5C,MAAAE;AAAA,MACA,eAAAC;AAAA,MACA,SAAAC;AAAA,IAAA,CACD;AAGH,QAAMG,IACJP,EAAa,UAAU,SACnB,MAAMA,EAAa,WAAA,IACnBA,EAAa,MAAM,IACnBQ,IAAU,MAAMC,EAAwC;AAAA,IAC5D,SAAAF;AAAA,IACA,cAAAP;AAAA,IACA,YAAYE;AAAA,IACZ,gBAAgBI;AAAA,IAChB,WAAWD;AAAA,EAAA,CACZ;AAKD,SAAIG,EAAQ,SAAS,mBACZR,EAAa,0BAA0B;AAAA,IAC5C,MAAAE;AAAA,IACA,eAAAC;AAAA,IACA,SAAAC;AAAA,EAAA,CACD,IAGIJ,EAAa,0BAA0B;AAAA,IAC5C,MAAMQ,EAAQ;AAAA,IACd,eAAAL;AAAA,EAAA,CACD;AACH;AAkCA,eAAeO,EACbV,GACAE,GACkB;AAIlB,SAHoB,MAAMF,EACvB,eAAe,EAAE,MAAAE,GAAM,EACvB,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,MACI;AACzB;AAEA,eAAeO,EAAwC;AAAA,EACrD,SAAAF;AAAA,EACA,cAAAP;AAAA,EACA,YAAAW;AAAA,EACA,gBAAAC;AAAA,EACA,WAAAC;AACF,GAM6B;AAC3B,QAAMC,IAAU7B,EAA0BsB,CAAO;AACjD,MAAI,CAACO;AACH,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,uDAAuDP,CAAO;AAAA,IAAA;AAOlE,QAAMQ,IAAM,GAAGD,CAAO,GAAGzB,CAAqB,IAAIsB,CAAU,KACtDK,IAAW,KAAK,IAAA,IAAQH;AAE9B,SAAO,KAAK,IAAA,IAAQG,KAAU;AAC5B,UAAMC,IAAa,IAAI,gBAAA,GACjBC,IAAiB;AAAA,MACrB,MAAMD,EAAW,MAAA;AAAA,MACjB7B;AAAA,IAAA;AAGF,QAAI+B;AACJ,QAAI;AACF,MAAAA,IAAW,MAAM,MAAMJ,GAAK,EAAE,QAAQE,EAAW,QAAQ;AAAA,IAC3D,SAASG,GAAK;AAMZ,cAAQ;AAAA,QACN,0DAA0DR,CAAc,WACrEQ,aAAe,QAAQA,EAAI,UAAU,OAAOA,CAAG;AAAA,MAAA,GAEpD,MAAMC,EAAMT,CAAc;AAC1B;AAAA,IACF,UAAA;AACE,mBAAaM,CAAc;AAAA,IAC7B;AAEA,QAAIC,EAAS,IAAI;AACf,YAAMG,IAAQ,MAAMH,EAAS,KAAA;AAC7B,UAAIG,EAAK,YAAY;AACnB,YAAIA,EAAK,iBAAiB;AACxB,gBAAM,IAAI;AAAA,YACR,oBAAoBX,CAAU;AAAA,UAAA;AAIlC,YAAIW,EAAK;AACP,iBAAO,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,iBAAiBA,EAAK,gBAAA;AAAA,MAErD;AAAA,IACF,WAAWH,EAAS,WAAW7B;AAM7B,UAAI,MAAMoB,EAAsBV,GAAcW,CAAU;AACtD,uBAAQ;AAAA,UACN,GAAGA,CAAU;AAAA,QAAA,GAIR,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAA;AAAA,eAERQ,EAAS,UAAU5B;AAE5B,cAAQ;AAAA,QACN,qCAAqC4B,EAAS,MAAM,QAAQR,CAAU,iBAAiBC,CAAc;AAAA,MAAA;AAAA;AAIvG,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR,qCAAqCO,EAAS,MAAM,QAAQR,CAAU;AAAA,MAAA;AAI1E,UAAMU,EAAMT,CAAc;AAAA,EAC5B;AAEA,QAAM,IAAI;AAAA,IACR,mBAAmBC,CAAS,mCAAmCF,CAAU;AAAA,EAAA;AAI7E;AAEA,SAASU,EAAME,GAA2B;AACxC,SAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,CAACC,MAAY;AAC9B,eAAWA,GAASD,CAAE;AAAA,EACxB,CAAC;AACH;"}

package/dist/tbv/core/utils/eth/waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware.d.ts.map

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package/dist/tbv/core/utils/index.cjs

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-"use strict";Object.defineProperty(exports,Symbol.toStringTag,{value:"Module"});const i=require("../../../abortSignals-msbmbqFe.cjs"),E=require("../../../signing-3l5Aqd-H.cjs"),_=require("../../../validation-C6XTfZak.cjs"),n=require("./eth/index.cjs"),e=require("../../../psbtInputFields-BrV_ZfL_.cjs"),t=require("../../../fundPeginTransaction-54-Rwb2k.cjs"),a=require("../../../reservation-ECxjZi5t.cjs"),r=require("../../../bitcoin-D-O2GjbC.cjs");exports.combineAbortSignals=i.combineAbortSignals;exports.calculateBtcTxHash=E.calculateBtcTxHash;exports.createTaprootScriptPathSignOptions=E.createTaprootScriptPathSignOptions;exports.createTaprootScriptPathSignOptionsForInput=E.createTaprootScriptPathSignOptionsForInput;exports.BITCOIN_ADDRESS_RE=_.BITCOIN_ADDRESS_RE;exports.COMPRESSED_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN=_.COMPRESSED_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN;exports.HEX_RE=_.HEX_RE;exports.KNOWN_SCRIPT_PREFIXES=_.KNOWN_SCRIPT_PREFIXES;exports.MAX_REASONABLE_FEE_SATS=_.MAX_REASONABLE_FEE_SATS;exports.TXID_RE=_.TXID_RE;exports.X_ONLY_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN=_.X_ONLY_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN;exports.waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware=n.waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware;exports.BitcoinScriptType=e.BitcoinScriptType;exports.applyChangeOutputPolicy=e.applyChangeOutputPolicy;exports.computeChangeOutputFeeSats=e.computeChangeOutputFeeSats;exports.computeMaxDeposit=e.computeMaxDeposit;exports.computePeginBaseFeeSats=e.computePeginBaseFeeSats;exports.getDustThreshold=e.getDustThreshold;exports.getPsbtInputFields=e.getPsbtInputFields;exports.getScriptType=e.getScriptType;exports.selectUtxosForPegin=e.selectUtxosForPegin;exports.shouldAddChangeOutput=e.shouldAddChangeOutput;exports.BTC_DUST_SAT=t.BTC_DUST_SAT;exports.DUST_THRESHOLD=t.DUST_THRESHOLD;exports.LOW_RATE_ESTIMATION_ACCURACY_BUFFER=t.LOW_RATE_ESTIMATION_ACCURACY_BUFFER;exports.MAX_NON_LEGACY_OUTPUT_SIZE=t.MAX_NON_LEGACY_OUTPUT_SIZE;exports.MAX_REASONABLE_PEGIN_VBYTES=t.MAX_REASONABLE_PEGIN_VBYTES;exports.P2TR_INPUT_SIZE=t.P2TR_INPUT_SIZE;exports.PEGIN_AUTH_ANCHOR_OUTPUTS=t.PEGIN_AUTH_ANCHOR_OUTPUTS;exports.PEGIN_FIXED_OUTPUTS=t.PEGIN_FIXED_OUTPUTS;exports.SPLIT_TX_FEE_SAFETY_MULTIPLIER=t.SPLIT_TX_FEE_SAFETY_MULTIPLIER;exports.TX_BUFFER_SIZE_OVERHEAD=t.TX_BUFFER_SIZE_OVERHEAD;exports.WALLET_RELAY_FEE_RATE_THRESHOLD=t.WALLET_RELAY_FEE_RATE_THRESHOLD;exports.fundPeginTransaction=t.fundPeginTransaction;exports.parseUnfundedWasmTransaction=t.parseUnfundedWasmTransaction;exports.peginOutputCount=t.peginOutputCount;exports.rateBasedTxBufferFee=t.rateBasedTxBufferFee;exports.UtxoNotAvailableError=a.UtxoNotAvailableError;exports.assertUtxosAvailable=a.assertUtxosAvailable;exports.extractInputsFromTransaction=a.extractInputsFromTransaction;exports.findOverlappingPendingVaults=a.findOverlappingPendingVaults;exports.validateUtxosAvailable=a.validateUtxosAvailable;exports.getNetwork=r.getNetwork;
+"use strict";Object.defineProperty(exports,Symbol.toStringTag,{value:"Module"});const i=require("../../../abortSignals-msbmbqFe.cjs"),E=require("../../../signing-DvISftFk.cjs"),a=require("../../../validation-C6XTfZak.cjs"),n=require("./eth/index.cjs"),e=require("../../../psbtInputFields-BrV_ZfL_.cjs"),t=require("../../../fundPeginTransaction-54-Rwb2k.cjs"),_=require("../../../reservation-ECxjZi5t.cjs"),r=require("../../../bitcoin-D-O2GjbC.cjs"),T=require("../../../btcTxHash-CGb5BqFL.cjs");exports.combineAbortSignals=i.combineAbortSignals;exports.createTaprootScriptPathSignOptions=E.createTaprootScriptPathSignOptions;exports.createTaprootScriptPathSignOptionsForInput=E.createTaprootScriptPathSignOptionsForInput;exports.BITCOIN_ADDRESS_RE=a.BITCOIN_ADDRESS_RE;exports.COMPRESSED_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN=a.COMPRESSED_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN;exports.HEX_RE=a.HEX_RE;exports.KNOWN_SCRIPT_PREFIXES=a.KNOWN_SCRIPT_PREFIXES;exports.MAX_REASONABLE_FEE_SATS=a.MAX_REASONABLE_FEE_SATS;exports.TXID_RE=a.TXID_RE;exports.X_ONLY_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN=a.X_ONLY_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN;exports.waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware=n.waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware;exports.BitcoinScriptType=e.BitcoinScriptType;exports.applyChangeOutputPolicy=e.applyChangeOutputPolicy;exports.computeChangeOutputFeeSats=e.computeChangeOutputFeeSats;exports.computeMaxDeposit=e.computeMaxDeposit;exports.computePeginBaseFeeSats=e.computePeginBaseFeeSats;exports.getDustThreshold=e.getDustThreshold;exports.getPsbtInputFields=e.getPsbtInputFields;exports.getScriptType=e.getScriptType;exports.selectUtxosForPegin=e.selectUtxosForPegin;exports.shouldAddChangeOutput=e.shouldAddChangeOutput;exports.BTC_DUST_SAT=t.BTC_DUST_SAT;exports.DUST_THRESHOLD=t.DUST_THRESHOLD;exports.LOW_RATE_ESTIMATION_ACCURACY_BUFFER=t.LOW_RATE_ESTIMATION_ACCURACY_BUFFER;exports.MAX_NON_LEGACY_OUTPUT_SIZE=t.MAX_NON_LEGACY_OUTPUT_SIZE;exports.MAX_REASONABLE_PEGIN_VBYTES=t.MAX_REASONABLE_PEGIN_VBYTES;exports.P2TR_INPUT_SIZE=t.P2TR_INPUT_SIZE;exports.PEGIN_AUTH_ANCHOR_OUTPUTS=t.PEGIN_AUTH_ANCHOR_OUTPUTS;exports.PEGIN_FIXED_OUTPUTS=t.PEGIN_FIXED_OUTPUTS;exports.SPLIT_TX_FEE_SAFETY_MULTIPLIER=t.SPLIT_TX_FEE_SAFETY_MULTIPLIER;exports.TX_BUFFER_SIZE_OVERHEAD=t.TX_BUFFER_SIZE_OVERHEAD;exports.WALLET_RELAY_FEE_RATE_THRESHOLD=t.WALLET_RELAY_FEE_RATE_THRESHOLD;exports.fundPeginTransaction=t.fundPeginTransaction;exports.parseUnfundedWasmTransaction=t.parseUnfundedWasmTransaction;exports.peginOutputCount=t.peginOutputCount;exports.rateBasedTxBufferFee=t.rateBasedTxBufferFee;exports.UtxoNotAvailableError=_.UtxoNotAvailableError;exports.assertUtxosAvailable=_.assertUtxosAvailable;exports.extractInputsFromTransaction=_.extractInputsFromTransaction;exports.findOverlappingPendingVaults=_.findOverlappingPendingVaults;exports.validateUtxosAvailable=_.validateUtxosAvailable;exports.getNetwork=r.getNetwork;exports.calculateBtcTxHash=T.calculateBtcTxHash;
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.cjs.map