@babylonlabs-io/ts-sdk 0.72.1 → 0.74.0

package/dist/tbv/core/managers/index.cjs

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-"use strict";Object.defineProperty(exports,Symbol.toStringTag,{value:"Module"});const e=require("../../../PeginManager-Bwjqb0_6.cjs"),a=require("../../../signPsbtsWithFallback-CrkvpSJz.cjs");exports.PeginManager=e.PeginManager;exports.estimateSubmitPeginRequestBatchGas=e.estimateSubmitPeginRequestBatchGas;exports.PayoutManager=a.PayoutManager;
+"use strict";Object.defineProperty(exports,Symbol.toStringTag,{value:"Module"});const e=require("../../../PeginManager-E-UHA1un.cjs"),a=require("../../../signPsbtsWithFallback-DMSpIQWH.cjs");exports.PeginManager=e.PeginManager;exports.estimateSubmitPeginRequestBatchGas=e.estimateSubmitPeginRequestBatchGas;exports.PayoutManager=a.PayoutManager;
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.cjs.map

package/dist/tbv/core/managers/index.d.ts

@@ -21,7 +21,8 @@
  * @module managers
  */
 export { PeginManager, estimateSubmitPeginRequestBatchGas } from './PeginManager';
-export type { PopSignature, PreparePeginResult, PreparePeginTransaction, PreparePeginDerivedSecrets, PreparePeginParams, PerVaultPeginData, PeginManagerConfig, RegisterPeginParams, RegisterPeginResult, SignAndBroadcastParams, BatchPeginRequestItem, RegisterPeginBatchParams, BatchPeginResultItem, RegisterPeginBatchResult, EstimateSubmitPeginRequestBatchGasParams, } from './PeginManager';
+export type { PreparePeginResult, PreparePeginTransaction, PreparePeginDerivedSecrets, PreparePeginParams, PerVaultPeginData, PeginManagerConfig, RegisterPeginParams, RegisterPeginResult, SignAndBroadcastParams, BatchPeginRequestItem, RegisterPeginBatchParams, BatchPeginResultItem, RegisterPeginBatchResult, EstimateSubmitPeginRequestBatchGasParams, } from './PeginManager';
+export type { PopSignature } from '../clients/eth';
 export { PayoutManager } from './PayoutManager';
 export type { PayoutManagerConfig, PayoutSignatureResult, SignPayoutParams, } from './PayoutManager';
 export type { UTXO } from '../utils/utxo/selectUtxos';

package/dist/tbv/core/managers/index.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/tbv/core/managers/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqBG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,MAAM,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAClF,YAAY,EACV,YAAY,EACZ,kBAAkB,EAClB,uBAAuB,EACvB,0BAA0B,EAC1B,kBAAkB,EAClB,iBAAiB,EACjB,kBAAkB,EAClB,mBAAmB,EACnB,mBAAmB,EACnB,sBAAsB,EACtB,qBAAqB,EACrB,wBAAwB,EACxB,oBAAoB,EACpB,wBAAwB,EACxB,wCAAwC,GACzC,MAAM,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAExB,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAChD,YAAY,EACV,mBAAmB,EACnB,qBAAqB,EACrB,gBAAgB,GACjB,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAGzB,YAAY,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,2BAA2B,CAAC;AACtD,YAAY,EACV,cAAc,EACd,aAAa,EACb,gBAAgB,EAChB,eAAe,GAChB,MAAM,kDAAkD,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/tbv/core/managers/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqBG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,MAAM,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAClF,YAAY,EACV,kBAAkB,EAClB,uBAAuB,EACvB,0BAA0B,EAC1B,kBAAkB,EAClB,iBAAiB,EACjB,kBAAkB,EAClB,mBAAmB,EACnB,mBAAmB,EACnB,sBAAsB,EACtB,qBAAqB,EACrB,wBAAwB,EACxB,oBAAoB,EACpB,wBAAwB,EACxB,wCAAwC,GACzC,MAAM,gBAAgB,CAAC;AACxB,YAAY,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAEnD,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAChD,YAAY,EACV,mBAAmB,EACnB,qBAAqB,EACrB,gBAAgB,GACjB,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAGzB,YAAY,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,2BAA2B,CAAC;AACtD,YAAY,EACV,cAAc,EACd,aAAa,EACb,gBAAgB,EAChB,eAAe,GAChB,MAAM,kDAAkD,CAAC"}

package/dist/tbv/core/managers/index.js

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { P as t, e as r } from "../../../PeginManager-DjatPUPS.js";
-import { P as o } from "../../../signPsbtsWithFallback-CCFTzE0o.js";
+import { P as t, e as r } from "../../../PeginManager-C9RPOd0L.js";
+import { P as o } from "../../../signPsbtsWithFallback-0VBALhjS.js";
 export {
   o as PayoutManager,
   t as PeginManager,

package/dist/tbv/core/pegin-fingerprint/__tests__/peginFingerprint.golden.test.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+/**
+ * Golden vectors for the peg-in configuration fingerprint, pinning this
+ * encoder byte-for-byte against the vault contracts.
+ *
+ * ## What is being pinned, and how it could silently diverge
+ *
+ * The contract computes `keccak256(abi.encode(...))` over ten static fields.
+ * Under `abi.encode` every static field becomes one left-padded 32-byte word,
+ * so the declared integer WIDTH never reaches the output — encoding the tuple
+ * with all-`uint256` slots produces a byte-identical hash. What does change the
+ * bytes is the field ORDER, the field COUNT, and static-vs-dynamic type class.
+ * A transposition of two same-width fields is therefore invisible to type
+ * checking, invisible to a review that only reads the types, and invisible to
+ * any fixture whose fields share a value. It surfaces only here.
+ *
+ * That is why the vectors below give every numeric field of every vector a
+ * different non-zero value. The contract repository enforces the rule on its
+ * side with `test_peginFingerprintVectors_fieldsAreDistinctAndNonZero`; the
+ * fixture is consumed verbatim so the rule carries over rather than being
+ * restated.
+ *
+ * ## Oracle and provenance
+ *
+ * Source of truth: `_peginFingerprint` in `src/protocol/lib/PeginLogic.sol` of
+ * `babylonlabs-io/vault-contracts-aave-v4`, introduced by
+ * https://github.com/babylonlabs-io/vault-contracts-aave-v4/pull/555.
+ *
+ * `vectors/pegin_fingerprint_vectors.json` is that repository's
+ * `test/data/pegin_fingerprint_vectors.json`, vendored verbatim at commit
+ * `ec62ac62da7a590408ccdcd0a6339a2fa36126b0`. Not transcribed, not reformatted
+ * — byte-identity is what makes a re-vendor a diff, and what keeps this file
+ * and the Rust `depositor-cli` pinned to one artifact rather than two copies of
+ * one. Confirm it with:
+ *
+ * ```
+ * gh api "repos/babylonlabs-io/vault-contracts-aave-v4/contents/test/data/pegin_fingerprint_vectors.json?ref=ec62ac62da7a590408ccdcd0a6339a2fa36126b0" \
+ *   --jq '.content' | base64 -d \
+ *   | diff - src/tbv/core/pegin-fingerprint/__tests__/vectors/pegin_fingerprint_vectors.json
+ * ```
+ *
+ * Each vector was also recomputed independently with Foundry, which shares no
+ * code with either this encoder or the Solidity library that produced the file:
+ *
+ * ```
+ * cast abi-encode 'f(bytes32,uint256,address,bytes32,uint64,uint64,uint16,uint16,uint16,uint16)' \
+ *   0x7a76c7af21338f0474e4755a879f9ae8b6351b37d1a2e79e88e1ae95f20ea24b \
+ *   1 0x5FbDB2315678afecb367f032d93F642f64180aa3 \
+ *   0x79be667ef9dcbbac55a06295ce870b07029bfcdb2dce28d959f2815b16f81798 \
+ *   3 5 7 11 13 17 | cast keccak
+ * # 0xe18d2cbf355cd69b44df7797eac6ad8c2dc522d328b63d20faa4f0be432cd73c
+ * ```
+ *
+ * ## Failure modes this test is designed to catch
+ *
+ * If the contract's field order, field count or domain string changes, the
+ * vector file changes with it and these assertions fail — which is the signal
+ * to re-vendor and re-check, not to edit the expectations. If this encoder
+ * drifts instead, the `encoded` assertion fails before the hash assertion and
+ * names the diverging word.
+ */
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=peginFingerprint.golden.test.d.ts.map

package/dist/tbv/core/pegin-fingerprint/__tests__/peginFingerprint.golden.test.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"peginFingerprint.golden.test.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/tbv/core/pegin-fingerprint/__tests__/peginFingerprint.golden.test.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA2DG"}

package/dist/tbv/core/pegin-fingerprint/__tests__/peginFingerprint.test.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+/**
+ * Behaviour of the fingerprint encoder that the golden vectors cannot reach:
+ * that every field reaches the output, that out-of-range inputs are rejected by
+ * name, and that a non-checksummed address still encodes.
+ *
+ * Note what is NOT tested here. Field ORDER is pinned by the golden vectors and
+ * only by them — a test that swaps two inputs and asserts the hash moves passes
+ * just as happily against an encoder that transposes those same two fields
+ * internally. What the cases below do catch is a field that never reaches the
+ * encoding at all: dropped from the tuple, aliased to a neighbour, or shadowed
+ * by a constant. That failure is silent against a hand-written expectation and
+ * would otherwise surface only if a vector happened to vary that one field.
+ */
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=peginFingerprint.test.d.ts.map

package/dist/tbv/core/pegin-fingerprint/__tests__/peginFingerprint.test.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"peginFingerprint.test.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/tbv/core/pegin-fingerprint/__tests__/peginFingerprint.test.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG"}

package/dist/tbv/core/pegin-fingerprint/index.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+/**
+ * Peg-in configuration fingerprint: the `keccak256(abi.encode(...))` commitment
+ * over the protocol state a Pre-PegIn transaction was built against, sent with
+ * the peg-in registration so the registry can reject a request whose protocol
+ * state moved between the build and inclusion.
+ *
+ * Reproduces `PeginLogic._peginFingerprint` from the vault contracts exactly;
+ * see {@link computePeginFingerprint} for the encoding rules that matter.
+ *
+ * @module pegin-fingerprint
+ */
+export { PEGIN_FINGERPRINT_DOMAIN, PEGIN_FINGERPRINT_DOMAIN_PREIMAGE, PeginFingerprintInputError, computePeginFingerprint, encodePeginFingerprintPreimage, } from './peginFingerprint';
+export type { PeginFingerprintInput } from './peginFingerprint';
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.d.ts.map

package/dist/tbv/core/pegin-fingerprint/index.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/tbv/core/pegin-fingerprint/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AAEH,OAAO,EACL,wBAAwB,EACxB,iCAAiC,EACjC,0BAA0B,EAC1B,uBAAuB,EACvB,8BAA8B,GAC/B,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAE5B,YAAY,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC"}

package/dist/tbv/core/pegin-fingerprint/peginFingerprint.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+import { Address, Hex } from 'viem';
+/**
+ * Domain-separation string hashed into every fingerprint, so the commitment
+ * cannot be replayed as a different one. Matches the contract's
+ * `PEGIN_FINGERPRINT_DOMAIN` preimage.
+ */
+export declare const PEGIN_FINGERPRINT_DOMAIN_PREIMAGE = "TBV.PeginFingerprint.v1";
+/**
+ * `keccak256("TBV.PeginFingerprint.v1")`, the first word of the encoded
+ * preimage.
+ *
+ * Derived from {@link PEGIN_FINGERPRINT_DOMAIN_PREIMAGE} rather than pasted as
+ * a hex literal, so the string that defines it stays visible. The golden test
+ * pins the derived value against the constant the contract's vector file
+ * publishes, so a change to either side is still caught.
+ */
+export declare const PEGIN_FINGERPRINT_DOMAIN: Hex;
+/**
+ * Protocol state a Pre-PegIn transaction commits to, one field per encoded
+ * word.
+ *
+ * Declared in encoding order so the interface reads as the specification does.
+ * Reordering these fields does not change the output — the encoder names each
+ * one explicitly — but keeping them aligned makes a divergence from the
+ * contract visible on sight.
+ */
+export interface PeginFingerprintInput {
+    /** `block.chainid` of the chain the registry is deployed on. */
+    chainId: bigint;
+    /**
+     * The `BTCVaultRegistry` address, which the contract encodes as
+     * `address(this)`. EIP-55 checksum casing is irrelevant to the encoded word
+     * and is not required here; see {@link encodePeginFingerprintPreimage}.
+     */
+    registryAddress: Address;
+    /**
+     * The vault provider's RESOLVED operation-BTC key, 32 bytes, `0x`-prefixed.
+     *
+     * The resolved key, not an epoch counter: the VP epoch is one registry-wide
+     * counter that ANY provider's key or payout append bumps, so committing to it
+     * would let any registered provider invalidate every in-flight Pre-PegIn
+     * protocol-wide. Only the chosen provider's key reaches the HTLC leaf, so
+     * that is what is committed.
+     *
+     * Note the SDK resolves this key as an x-only pubkey WITHOUT a `0x` prefix
+     * (`OnChainBtcPubkey`); callers add the prefix.
+     */
+    vaultProviderBtcKey: Hex;
+    /** Vault-keeper operation-key epoch for this application (`uint64`). */
+    appKeeperKeyEpoch: bigint;
+    /** Universal-challenger operation-key epoch (`uint64`). */
+    ucKeyEpoch: bigint;
+    /** Roster version selecting which vault keepers are in the leaf (`uint16`). */
+    appVaultKeepersVersion: number;
+    /** Roster version selecting which universal challengers are in the leaf (`uint16`). */
+    universalChallengersVersion: number;
+    /** Off-chain params version: `tRefund` and `minPeginFeeRate` (`uint16`). */
+    offchainParamsVersion: number;
+    /** Vault core (tx-graph) version: the PegIn output count (`uint16`). */
+    vaultCoreVersion: number;
+}
+/** An input field is missing, malformed, or outside the width the contract declares for it. */
+export declare class PeginFingerprintInputError extends Error {
+    constructor(message: string);
+}
+/**
+ * The encoded tuple, as one list so the ordering lives in exactly one place.
+ *
+ * Not re-exported from the module barrel — this is internal, and exists in
+ * this shape so the golden test can render it back into the type string the
+ * contract's vector file publishes and compare the two. That comparison is a
+ * second, independent check on the field order, one that does not depend on
+ * the sample values in the vectors.
+ */
+export declare const PEGIN_FINGERPRINT_ABI_PARAMETERS: readonly [{
+    readonly name: "domain";
+    readonly type: "bytes32";
+}, {
+    readonly name: "chainId";
+    readonly type: "uint256";
+}, {
+    readonly name: "registry";
+    readonly type: "address";
+}, {
+    readonly name: "vaultProviderBtcKey";
+    readonly type: "bytes32";
+}, {
+    readonly name: "appKeeperKeyEpoch";
+    readonly type: "uint64";
+}, {
+    readonly name: "ucKeyEpoch";
+    readonly type: "uint64";
+}, {
+    readonly name: "appVaultKeepersVersion";
+    readonly type: "uint16";
+}, {
+    readonly name: "universalChallengersVersion";
+    readonly type: "uint16";
+}, {
+    readonly name: "offchainParamsVersion";
+    readonly type: "uint16";
+}, {
+    readonly name: "vaultCoreVersion";
+    readonly type: "uint16";
+}];
+/**
+ * The `abi.encode` preimage the contract hashes — ten 32-byte words, 320 bytes.
+ *
+ * Exposed alongside {@link computePeginFingerprint} because a fingerprint
+ * mismatch is otherwise two opaque hashes: comparing preimages word by word
+ * localises the disagreement to a field. The contract's vector file ships the
+ * same preimage next to each hash for exactly that reason.
+ *
+ * Three fields are held to a tighter bound than the contract's own width — a
+ * zero `chainId`, a zero `registryAddress`, and a `vaultCoreVersion` below 1 —
+ * because for each of them a zero is unreachable on-chain and so can only mean
+ * a read that failed or was mis-decoded. No chain has id 0, no registry lives
+ * at the zero address, and
+ * `activeVaultCoreVersion()` is documented `uint16 >= 1` with a setter that
+ * rejects 0. Encoding any of them would produce a well-formed fingerprint that
+ * cannot ever match, turning a local mistake into an opaque on-chain revert.
+ *
+ * The three roster and params versions are NOT tightened: 0 is a legitimate
+ * value on those axes.
+ *
+ * @throws {PeginFingerprintInputError} If any field is missing, malformed, or
+ *   outside the accepted range, naming the field and what was expected.
+ */
+export declare function encodePeginFingerprintPreimage(input: PeginFingerprintInput): Hex;
+/**
+ * The fingerprint to send as `expectedFingerprint` on a peg-in registration.
+ *
+ * Must equal what the registry recomputes at inclusion, byte for byte — the
+ * comparison is exact equality, never "no older than", because resolving at a
+ * superseded epoch would bond a new vault to a retired key.
+ *
+ * @throws {PeginFingerprintInputError} If any field is outside the width the
+ *   contract declares for it.
+ */
+export declare function computePeginFingerprint(input: PeginFingerprintInput): Hex;
+//# sourceMappingURL=peginFingerprint.d.ts.map

package/dist/tbv/core/pegin-fingerprint/peginFingerprint.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/tbv/core/services/index.cjs

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-"use strict";Object.defineProperty(exports,Symbol.toStringTag,{value:"Module"});const e=require("../../../signPsbtsWithFallback-CrkvpSJz.cjs"),t=require("../../../buildAndBroadcastReclaim-HX2xQlbM.cjs"),i=require("../../../peginState-eaQ4IO_R.cjs");exports.computeHashlock=e.computeHashlock;exports.validateSecretAgainstHashlock=e.validateSecretAgainstHashlock;exports.BIP68NotMatureError=t.BIP68NotMatureError;exports.ClaimerPegoutStatusValue=t.ClaimerPegoutStatusValue;exports.PEGIN_ETH_CONFIRMATIONS=t.PEGIN_ETH_CONFIRMATIONS;exports.ParticipantKeyDriftError=t.ParticipantKeyDriftError;exports.PeginRegistrationMissingError=t.PeginRegistrationMissingError;exports.PeginRegistrationNotFinalError=t.PeginRegistrationNotFinalError;exports.RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_DENOMINATOR=t.RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_DENOMINATOR;exports.RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR=t.RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR;exports.RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_RATE_SATS_VB=t.RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_RATE_SATS_VB;exports.RECLAIM_WARN_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR=t.RECLAIM_WARN_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR;exports.REFUND_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_DENOMINATOR=t.REFUND_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_DENOMINATOR;exports.REFUND_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR=t.REFUND_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR;exports.REFUND_MAX_FEE_RATE_SATS_VB=t.REFUND_MAX_FEE_RATE_SATS_VB;exports.REFUND_VSIZE=t.REFUND_VSIZE;exports.ReclaimUneconomicalError=t.ReclaimUneconomicalError;exports.RegisteredVaultVersionMismatchError=t.RegisteredVaultVersionMismatchError;exports.activateVault=t.activateVault;exports.activateVaultAndRedeem=t.activateVaultAndRedeem;exports.assertVaultProviderHintAccepted=t.assertVaultProviderHintAccepted;exports.buildAndBroadcastReclaim=t.buildAndBroadcastReclaim;exports.buildAndBroadcastRefund=t.buildAndBroadcastRefund;exports.estimateRefundFeeSats=t.estimateRefundFeeSats;exports.isDepositAmountValid=t.isDepositAmountValid;exports.isHintAccepted=t.isHintAccepted;exports.isParticipantKeyDriftError=t.isParticipantKeyDriftError;exports.isPeginRegistrationMissingError=t.isPeginRegistrationMissingError;exports.isPeginRegistrationNotFinalError=t.isPeginRegistrationNotFinalError;exports.isPegoutTerminalStatus=t.isPegoutTerminalStatus;exports.isRecognizedPegoutStatus=t.isRecognizedPegoutStatus;exports.isRegisteredVaultVersionMismatchError=t.isRegisteredVaultVersionMismatchError;exports.matchKeyHint=t.matchKeyHint;exports.matchKeySetHint=t.matchKeySetHint;exports.resolveCurrentParticipantKeys=t.resolveCurrentParticipantKeys;exports.resolveParticipantKeysAtEpochs=t.resolveParticipantKeysAtEpochs;exports.runDepositorPresignFlow=t.runDepositorPresignFlow;exports.signDepositorGraph=t.signDepositorGraph;exports.submitWotsPublicKey=t.submitWotsPublicKey;exports.validateDepositAmount=t.validateDepositAmount;exports.validateMultiVaultDepositInputs=t.validateMultiVaultDepositInputs;exports.validateOnChainParticipantKeys=t.validateOnChainParticipantKeys;exports.validateProviderSelection=t.validateProviderSelection;exports.validateRemainingCapacity=t.validateRemainingCapacity;exports.validateVaultAmounts=t.validateVaultAmounts;exports.validateVaultProviderPubkey=t.validateVaultProviderPubkey;exports.verifyRegisteredParticipantKeys=t.verifyRegisteredParticipantKeys;exports.verifyRegisteredVaultVersions=t.verifyRegisteredVaultVersions;exports.waitForPeginRegistrationDepth=t.waitForPeginRegistrationDepth;exports.waitForPeginStatus=t.waitForPeginStatus;exports.ContractStatus=i.ContractStatus;exports.PeginAction=i.PeginAction;exports.canPerformAction=i.canPerformAction;exports.getPeginProtocolState=i.getPeginProtocolState;exports.isActivationDeadlinePassedOnChain=i.isActivationDeadlinePassedOnChain;
+"use strict";Object.defineProperty(exports,Symbol.toStringTag,{value:"Module"});const e=require("../../../signPsbtsWithFallback-DMSpIQWH.cjs"),t=require("../../../buildAndBroadcastReclaim-U-PyFfDg.cjs"),i=require("../../../peginState-eaQ4IO_R.cjs");exports.computeHashlock=e.computeHashlock;exports.validateSecretAgainstHashlock=e.validateSecretAgainstHashlock;exports.BIP68NotMatureError=t.BIP68NotMatureError;exports.ClaimerPegoutStatusValue=t.ClaimerPegoutStatusValue;exports.PEGIN_ETH_CONFIRMATIONS=t.PEGIN_ETH_CONFIRMATIONS;exports.ParticipantKeyDriftError=t.ParticipantKeyDriftError;exports.PeginRegistrationMissingError=t.PeginRegistrationMissingError;exports.PeginRegistrationNotFinalError=t.PeginRegistrationNotFinalError;exports.RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_DENOMINATOR=t.RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_DENOMINATOR;exports.RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR=t.RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR;exports.RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_RATE_SATS_VB=t.RECLAIM_MAX_FEE_RATE_SATS_VB;exports.RECLAIM_WARN_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR=t.RECLAIM_WARN_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR;exports.REFUND_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_DENOMINATOR=t.REFUND_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_DENOMINATOR;exports.REFUND_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR=t.REFUND_MAX_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR;exports.REFUND_MAX_FEE_RATE_SATS_VB=t.REFUND_MAX_FEE_RATE_SATS_VB;exports.REFUND_VSIZE=t.REFUND_VSIZE;exports.ReclaimUneconomicalError=t.ReclaimUneconomicalError;exports.RegisteredVaultVersionMismatchError=t.RegisteredVaultVersionMismatchError;exports.activateVault=t.activateVault;exports.activateVaultAndRedeem=t.activateVaultAndRedeem;exports.assertVaultProviderHintAccepted=t.assertVaultProviderHintAccepted;exports.buildAndBroadcastReclaim=t.buildAndBroadcastReclaim;exports.buildAndBroadcastRefund=t.buildAndBroadcastRefund;exports.estimateRefundFeeSats=t.estimateRefundFeeSats;exports.isDepositAmountValid=t.isDepositAmountValid;exports.isHintAccepted=t.isHintAccepted;exports.isParticipantKeyDriftError=t.isParticipantKeyDriftError;exports.isPeginRegistrationMissingError=t.isPeginRegistrationMissingError;exports.isPeginRegistrationNotFinalError=t.isPeginRegistrationNotFinalError;exports.isPegoutTerminalStatus=t.isPegoutTerminalStatus;exports.isRecognizedPegoutStatus=t.isRecognizedPegoutStatus;exports.isRegisteredVaultVersionMismatchError=t.isRegisteredVaultVersionMismatchError;exports.matchKeyHint=t.matchKeyHint;exports.matchKeySetHint=t.matchKeySetHint;exports.resolveCurrentParticipantKeys=t.resolveCurrentParticipantKeys;exports.resolveParticipantKeysAtEpochs=t.resolveParticipantKeysAtEpochs;exports.runDepositorPresignFlow=t.runDepositorPresignFlow;exports.signDepositorGraph=t.signDepositorGraph;exports.submitWotsPublicKey=t.submitWotsPublicKey;exports.validateDepositAmount=t.validateDepositAmount;exports.validateMultiVaultDepositInputs=t.validateMultiVaultDepositInputs;exports.validateOnChainParticipantKeys=t.validateOnChainParticipantKeys;exports.validateProviderSelection=t.validateProviderSelection;exports.validateRemainingCapacity=t.validateRemainingCapacity;exports.validateVaultAmounts=t.validateVaultAmounts;exports.validateVaultProviderPubkey=t.validateVaultProviderPubkey;exports.verifyRegisteredParticipantKeys=t.verifyRegisteredParticipantKeys;exports.verifyRegisteredVaultVersions=t.verifyRegisteredVaultVersions;exports.waitForPeginRegistrationDepth=t.waitForPeginRegistrationDepth;exports.waitForPeginStatus=t.waitForPeginStatus;exports.ContractStatus=i.ContractStatus;exports.PeginAction=i.PeginAction;exports.canPerformAction=i.canPerformAction;exports.getPeginProtocolState=i.getPeginProtocolState;exports.isActivationDeadlinePassedOnChain=i.isActivationDeadlinePassedOnChain;
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.cjs.map

package/dist/tbv/core/services/index.js

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { c as s, v as i } from "../../../signPsbtsWithFallback-CCFTzE0o.js";
-import { H as r, E as o, P as n, o as E, c as R, d as c, S as A, T as l, U as u, V as _, K as d, L as g, M as P, N as F, O as N, R as p, a as M, b as m, y as v, Q as C, I, J as T, g as V, z as O, p as S, i as D, e as y, G as h, F as f, t as K, A as U, B as H, C as b, D as B, r as X, s as L, f as k, h as w, j as x, v as G, k as z, l as W, m as j, n as q, q as J, u as Q, w as Z, x as Y } from "../../../buildAndBroadcastReclaim-QIN8Mcwq.js";
+import { c as s, v as i } from "../../../signPsbtsWithFallback-0VBALhjS.js";
+import { H as r, E as o, P as n, o as E, c as R, d as c, S as A, T as l, U as u, V as _, K as d, L as g, M as P, N as F, O as N, R as p, a as M, b as m, y as v, Q as C, I, J as T, g as V, z as O, p as S, i as D, e as y, G as h, F as f, t as K, A as U, B as H, C as b, D as B, r as X, s as L, f as k, h as w, j as x, v as G, k as z, l as W, m as j, n as q, q as J, u as Q, w as Z, x as Y } from "../../../buildAndBroadcastReclaim-BXclIcu_.js";
 import { C as aa, P as ta, c as sa, g as ia, i as ea } from "../../../peginState-CxDiaKuk.js";
 export {
   r as BIP68NotMatureError,

package/dist/tbv/core/utils/eth/index.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+"use strict";Object.defineProperty(exports,Symbol.toStringTag,{value:"Module"});const f={1:"https://safe-transaction-mainnet.safe.global",11155111:"https://safe-transaction-sepolia.safe.global"},w=5e3,d=14400*1e3,T=1e4,h="/api/v1/multisig-transactions",p=404,A=500,m=2,_="0xef0100",R=20,g=_.length+m*R;function I(e){return e.length===g&&e.toLowerCase().startsWith(_)}async function F(e){const{publicClient:t,walletAddress:a,hash:r,confirmations:i,timeout:c,safePollTimeoutMs:l=d,safePollIntervalMs:u=w}=e,s=await t.getCode({address:a});if(!(s!==void 0&&s!=="0x"&&!I(s)))return t.waitForTransactionReceipt({hash:r,confirmations:i,timeout:c});const o=await t.getChainId(),n=await L({chainId:o,publicClient:t,safeTxHash:r,pollIntervalMs:u,timeoutMs:l});return n.kind==="not-a-proposal"?t.waitForTransactionReceipt({hash:r,confirmations:i,timeout:c}):t.waitForTransactionReceipt({hash:n.transactionHash,confirmations:i})}async function C(e,t){return await e.getTransaction({hash:t}).catch(()=>null)!==null}async function L({chainId:e,publicClient:t,safeTxHash:a,pollIntervalMs:r,timeoutMs:i}){const c=f[e];if(!c)throw new Error(`Safe Transaction Service not configured for chainId ${e}. Connected wallet appears to be a smart-contract account, but this chain is not in the supported list. Either connect an EOA or extend SAFE_TX_SERVICE_BASE_URLS in waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware.ts.`);const l=`${c}${h}/${a}/`,u=Date.now()+i;for(;Date.now()<u;){const s=new AbortController,E=setTimeout(()=>s.abort(),T);let o;try{o=await fetch(l,{signal:s.signal})}catch(n){console.warn(`Safe Transaction Service request failed (will retry in ${r}ms): `+(n instanceof Error?n.message:String(n))),await S(r);continue}finally{clearTimeout(E)}if(o.ok){const n=await o.json();if(n.isExecuted){if(n.isSuccessful===!1)throw new Error(`Safe transaction ${a} was executed on chain but reverted. Check the Safe queue UI for details.`);if(n.transactionHash)return{kind:"executed",transactionHash:n.transactionHash}}}else if(o.status===p){if(await C(t,a))return console.warn(`${a} is a real transaction, not a Safe proposal — the connected wallet submits its own transactions despite reporting contract bytecode. Waiting for its receipt directly.`),{kind:"not-a-proposal"}}else if(o.status>=A)console.warn(`Safe Transaction Service returned ${o.status} for ${a}; retrying in ${r}ms.`);else throw new Error(`Safe Transaction Service returned ${o.status} for ${a}.`);await S(r)}throw new Error(`Timed out after ${i}ms waiting for Safe transaction ${a} to reach quorum and execute. The proposal is still pending in the Safe queue — co-signers must sign and execute it before the dApp can proceed.`)}function S(e){return new Promise(t=>{setTimeout(t,e)})}exports.waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware=F;
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.cjs.map

package/dist/tbv/core/utils/eth/index.cjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"index.cjs","sources":["../../../../../src/tbv/core/utils/eth/waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Smart-account-aware wrapper around viem's `waitForTransactionReceipt`.\n *\n * Externally Owned Accounts (EOAs) — wallets controlled by a single private\n * key, e.g. MetaMask or a hardware wallet. `eth_sendTransaction` returns a real\n * Ethereum tx hash, which viem can poll directly. This wrapper delegates\n * unchanged for them.\n *\n * Smart-contract accounts (e.g. Safe multisigs) — the wallet address is a\n * deployed contract that decides whether to accept a transaction. WalletConnect's\n * `eth_sendTransaction` returns a `safeTxHash` (an EIP-712 hash of the\n * *proposal*) rather than a real tx hash, and the proposal is held in Safe's\n * off-chain Transaction Service until quorum signs and executes it. We poll\n * that service for the proposal until execution, then wait for receipt on the\n * real Ethereum tx hash exposed in the service's response.\n *\n * The two are told apart by `eth_getCode`, but NOT by \"empty vs non-empty\":\n * an EIP-7702 delegated EOA reports `0xef0100 ‖ <delegate address>` and is\n * still an EOA — it signs and submits its own transactions, so\n * `eth_sendTransaction` returns a real tx hash. MetaMask upgrades accounts to\n * smart accounts this way by default, and treating one as a Safe means polling\n * the Transaction Service for a hash that is not a `safeTxHash`: a permanent\n * 404 that reads as \"proposal not yet indexed\" and hangs for the full poll\n * budget on a transaction that already succeeded. Delegation designators are\n * therefore classified as EOAs. As a backstop for any wallet that behaves this\n * way in future, a 404 from the Transaction Service is also checked against the\n * node: if it knows the hash as a real transaction, we were never waiting on a\n * proposal and switch to waiting for that transaction's receipt.\n *\n * @module utils/eth\n */\n\nimport type { Address, Hash, PublicClient, TransactionReceipt } from \"viem\";\n\n/**\n * Chains where the Safe Transaction Service is supported by this utility.\n * Extend the map as more Safe-enabled chains are needed.\n */\nconst SAFE_TX_SERVICE_BASE_URLS: Record<number, string> = {\n  1: \"https://safe-transaction-mainnet.safe.global\",\n  11155111: \"https://safe-transaction-sepolia.safe.global\",\n};\n\nconst DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 5_000;\nconst DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_TIMEOUT_MS = 4 * 60 * 60 * 1_000;\nconst SAFE_TX_SERVICE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;\n\n/** Safe Transaction Service route for one multisig-transaction proposal. */\nconst SAFE_MULTISIG_TX_PATH = \"/api/v1/multisig-transactions\";\n/** The service answers 404 both for an unindexed proposal and an unknown Safe. */\nconst SAFE_TX_SERVICE_NOT_FOUND = 404;\n/** Statuses at or above this are server-side, so worth retrying. */\nconst SAFE_TX_SERVICE_SERVER_ERROR = 500;\n\n/** Two hex characters encode one byte in an `eth_getCode` result. */\nconst HEX_CHARS_PER_BYTE = 2;\n\n/**\n * EIP-7702 delegation designator: an EOA that has delegated its code to a\n * contract reports exactly `0xef0100 ‖ <20-byte delegate address>` from\n * `eth_getCode` (EIP-7702 §\"Delegation Designation\"). Both the prefix and the\n * exact length are checked so ordinary contract bytecode that merely happens to\n * start with these bytes is not mistaken for a delegation.\n */\nconst EIP_7702_DELEGATION_PREFIX = \"0xef0100\";\nconst EIP_7702_DELEGATION_ADDRESS_BYTES = 20;\nconst EIP_7702_DELEGATION_CODE_LENGTH =\n  EIP_7702_DELEGATION_PREFIX.length +\n  HEX_CHARS_PER_BYTE * EIP_7702_DELEGATION_ADDRESS_BYTES;\n\n/**\n * True when `eth_getCode` reports an EIP-7702 delegation designator rather than\n * a deployed contract. Such an account is still an EOA for our purposes: it\n * signs and submits its own transactions, so the hash we hold is a real tx hash.\n */\nfunction isEip7702DelegatedEoa(code: string): boolean {\n  return (\n    code.length === EIP_7702_DELEGATION_CODE_LENGTH &&\n    code.toLowerCase().startsWith(EIP_7702_DELEGATION_PREFIX)\n  );\n}\n\nexport interface WaitForTransactionReceiptSmartAwareParams {\n  publicClient: PublicClient;\n  walletAddress: Address;\n  hash: Hash;\n  /**\n   * Forwarded to viem verbatim.\n   *\n   * MUST NOT be used as a finality/reorg gate. viem fetches the receipt once\n   * and then only compares block numbers against that cached copy — it never\n   * re-checks that the receipt's block is still canonical, so it resolves\n   * happily for a transaction that has been reorged out. Setting this buys a\n   * delay, not a guarantee. For peg-in registration finality use\n   * `waitForPeginRegistrationDepth`, which re-reads live contract state on\n   * every poll.\n   */\n  confirmations?: number;\n  /**\n   * Forwarded to viem on the EOA (externally owned account) path, and on the\n   * fallback where a supposed smart account turns out to submit its own\n   * transactions — that is the EOA case too, however we arrived at it.\n   *\n   * Ignored only while waiting on a genuine Safe proposal, whose budget is\n   * safePollTimeoutMs. It is not forwarded to the receipt wait that follows a\n   * proposal's execution either: viem's own default applies there (180s as of\n   * viem 2.38.2), so that wait is bounded too — a sufficiently slow node still\n   * raises WaitForTransactionReceiptTimeoutError, just on viem's uniform bound\n   * rather than on a caller's shorter one.\n   */\n  timeout?: number;\n  /** Total budget for waiting on Safe quorum + execution. Default 4h. */\n  safePollTimeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Poll cadence against the Safe Transaction Service. Default 5s. */\n  safePollIntervalMs?: number;\n}\n\nexport async function waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware(\n  params: WaitForTransactionReceiptSmartAwareParams,\n): Promise<TransactionReceipt> {\n  const {\n    publicClient,\n    walletAddress,\n    hash,\n    confirmations,\n    timeout,\n    safePollTimeoutMs = DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_TIMEOUT_MS,\n    safePollIntervalMs = DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_INTERVAL_MS,\n  } = params;\n\n  const code = await publicClient.getCode({ address: walletAddress });\n  // An EIP-7702 delegated EOA has non-empty code but still submits its own\n  // transactions, so it belongs on the EOA path — see the module docblock.\n  const isSmartAccount =\n    code !== undefined && code !== \"0x\" && !isEip7702DelegatedEoa(code);\n\n  if (!isSmartAccount) {\n    return publicClient.waitForTransactionReceipt({\n      hash,\n      confirmations,\n      timeout,\n    });\n  }\n\n  const chainId = await publicClient.getChainId();\n  const outcome = await pollSafeTransactionServiceUntilExecuted({\n    chainId,\n    publicClient,\n    safeTxHash: hash,\n    pollIntervalMs: safePollIntervalMs,\n    timeoutMs: safePollTimeoutMs,\n  });\n\n  // The wallet turned out to submit its own transactions, so this is the EOA\n  // case after all — including the caller's `timeout`, which only ever meant to\n  // be ignored while waiting on a genuine Safe proposal.\n  if (outcome.kind === \"not-a-proposal\") {\n    return publicClient.waitForTransactionReceipt({\n      hash,\n      confirmations,\n      timeout,\n    });\n  }\n\n  return publicClient.waitForTransactionReceipt({\n    hash: outcome.transactionHash,\n    confirmations,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * How the Safe path ended. The two outcomes are not interchangeable, so they are\n * distinguished rather than both collapsing to a bare hash: `executed` is a real\n * Safe proposal that reached quorum, while `not-a-proposal` means the wallet was\n * never a Safe and we are really on the EOA path — which decides whether the\n * caller's `timeout` applies to the receipt wait that follows.\n */\ntype SafePollOutcome =\n  | { kind: \"executed\"; transactionHash: Hash }\n  | { kind: \"not-a-proposal\" };\n\ninterface SafeMultisigTransaction {\n  isExecuted: boolean;\n  isSuccessful: boolean | null;\n  transactionHash: Hash | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Decide whether a 404 from the Transaction Service means \"proposal not indexed\n * yet\" or \"this hash was never a proposal at all\".\n *\n * The Safe indexer cannot answer that: a genuine Safe and its freshly-submitted\n * proposal are both absent from it for a while, so its 404 proves nothing. The\n * NODE can. A `safeTxHash` is an EIP-712 digest of a proposal and is never a\n * transaction on chain, so if the node knows the hash as a real transaction then\n * this was never a proposal and we are on the wrong path entirely.\n *\n * Returns true only on that positive identification. Anything else — the node\n * has not seen it yet, or the lookup fails — is inconclusive and leaves the\n * caller polling, which is the correct behaviour for a Safe that is simply\n * still being indexed.\n */\nasync function hashIsRealTransaction(\n  publicClient: PublicClient,\n  hash: Hash,\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  const transaction = await publicClient\n    .getTransaction({ hash })\n    .catch(() => null);\n  return transaction !== null;\n}\n\nasync function pollSafeTransactionServiceUntilExecuted({\n  chainId,\n  publicClient,\n  safeTxHash,\n  pollIntervalMs,\n  timeoutMs,\n}: {\n  chainId: number;\n  publicClient: PublicClient;\n  safeTxHash: Hash;\n  pollIntervalMs: number;\n  timeoutMs: number;\n}): Promise<SafePollOutcome> {\n  const baseUrl = SAFE_TX_SERVICE_BASE_URLS[chainId];\n  if (!baseUrl) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Safe Transaction Service not configured for chainId ${chainId}. ` +\n        `Connected wallet appears to be a smart-contract account, but this ` +\n        `chain is not in the supported list. Either connect an EOA or extend ` +\n        `SAFE_TX_SERVICE_BASE_URLS in waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware.ts.`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const url = `${baseUrl}${SAFE_MULTISIG_TX_PATH}/${safeTxHash}/`;\n  const deadline = Date.now() + timeoutMs;\n\n  while (Date.now() < deadline) {\n    const controller = new AbortController();\n    const fetchTimeoutId = setTimeout(\n      () => controller.abort(),\n      SAFE_TX_SERVICE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS,\n    );\n\n    let response: Response;\n    try {\n      response = await fetch(url, { signal: controller.signal });\n    } catch (err) {\n      // Transient failure (AbortError on per-request timeout, DNS hiccup,\n      // connection reset, etc.). Log and continue to the next poll iteration\n      // instead of consuming the entire safePollTimeoutMs budget on one blip.\n      // The outer `while (Date.now() < deadline)` is what enforces the overall\n      // budget; this catch deliberately preserves it.\n      console.warn(\n        `Safe Transaction Service request failed (will retry in ${pollIntervalMs}ms): ` +\n          (err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)),\n      );\n      await sleep(pollIntervalMs);\n      continue;\n    } finally {\n      clearTimeout(fetchTimeoutId);\n    }\n\n    if (response.ok) {\n      const data = (await response.json()) as SafeMultisigTransaction;\n      if (data.isExecuted) {\n        if (data.isSuccessful === false) {\n          throw new Error(\n            `Safe transaction ${safeTxHash} was executed on chain but reverted. ` +\n              `Check the Safe queue UI for details.`,\n          );\n        }\n        if (data.transactionHash) {\n          return { kind: \"executed\", transactionHash: data.transactionHash };\n        }\n      }\n    } else if (response.status === SAFE_TX_SERVICE_NOT_FOUND) {\n      // Usually \"proposal not indexed yet\", so keep polling. But the very same\n      // 404 appears when the hash is not a safeTxHash at all — the case that\n      // used to burn the whole budget on an already-mined transaction. Ask the\n      // node: if it knows this hash, it is a real transaction, so stop treating\n      // it as a proposal and let the caller wait on it directly.\n      if (await hashIsRealTransaction(publicClient, safeTxHash)) {\n        console.warn(\n          `${safeTxHash} is a real transaction, not a Safe proposal — the ` +\n            `connected wallet submits its own transactions despite reporting ` +\n            `contract bytecode. Waiting for its receipt directly.`,\n        );\n        return { kind: \"not-a-proposal\" };\n      }\n    } else if (response.status >= SAFE_TX_SERVICE_SERVER_ERROR) {\n      // Transient server error — same treatment as a hung connection: log and retry.\n      console.warn(\n        `Safe Transaction Service returned ${response.status} for ${safeTxHash}; retrying in ${pollIntervalMs}ms.`,\n      );\n    } else {\n      // Other 4xx (403, 410, etc.) is likely permanent — surface immediately.\n      throw new Error(\n        `Safe Transaction Service returned ${response.status} for ${safeTxHash}.`,\n      );\n    }\n\n    await sleep(pollIntervalMs);\n  }\n\n  throw new Error(\n    `Timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms waiting for Safe transaction ${safeTxHash} ` +\n      `to reach quorum and execute. The proposal is still pending in the Safe ` +\n      `queue — co-signers must sign and execute it before the dApp can proceed.`,\n  );\n}\n\nfunction sleep(ms: number): Promise<void> {\n  return new Promise((resolve) => {\n    setTimeout(resolve, ms);\n  });\n}\n"],"names":["SAFE_TX_SERVICE_BASE_URLS","DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_INTERVAL_MS","DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_TIMEOUT_MS","SAFE_TX_SERVICE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS","SAFE_MULTISIG_TX_PATH","SAFE_TX_SERVICE_NOT_FOUND","SAFE_TX_SERVICE_SERVER_ERROR","HEX_CHARS_PER_BYTE","EIP_7702_DELEGATION_PREFIX","EIP_7702_DELEGATION_ADDRESS_BYTES","EIP_7702_DELEGATION_CODE_LENGTH","isEip7702DelegatedEoa","code","waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware","params","publicClient","walletAddress","hash","confirmations","timeout","safePollTimeoutMs","safePollIntervalMs","chainId","outcome","pollSafeTransactionServiceUntilExecuted","hashIsRealTransaction","safeTxHash","pollIntervalMs","timeoutMs","baseUrl","url","deadline","controller","fetchTimeoutId","response","err","sleep","data","ms","resolve"],"mappings":"gFAsCA,MAAMA,EAAoD,CACxD,EAAG,+CACH,SAAU,8CACZ,EAEMC,EAAgC,IAChCC,EAA+B,MAAc,IAC7CC,EAAmC,IAGnCC,EAAwB,gCAExBC,EAA4B,IAE5BC,EAA+B,IAG/BC,EAAqB,EASrBC,EAA6B,WAC7BC,EAAoC,GACpCC,EACJF,EAA2B,OAC3BD,EAAqBE,EAOvB,SAASE,EAAsBC,EAAuB,CACpD,OACEA,EAAK,SAAWF,GAChBE,EAAK,YAAA,EAAc,WAAWJ,CAA0B,CAE5D,CAqCA,eAAsBK,EACpBC,EAC6B,CAC7B,KAAM,CACJ,aAAAC,EACA,cAAAC,EACA,KAAAC,EACA,cAAAC,EACA,QAAAC,EACA,kBAAAC,EAAoBlB,EACpB,mBAAAmB,EAAqBpB,CAAA,EACnBa,EAEEF,EAAO,MAAMG,EAAa,QAAQ,CAAE,QAASC,EAAe,EAMlE,GAAI,EAFFJ,IAAS,QAAaA,IAAS,MAAQ,CAACD,EAAsBC,CAAI,GAGlE,OAAOG,EAAa,0BAA0B,CAC5C,KAAAE,EACA,cAAAC,EACA,QAAAC,CAAA,CACD,EAGH,MAAMG,EAAU,MAAMP,EAAa,WAAA,EAC7BQ,EAAU,MAAMC,EAAwC,CAC5D,QAAAF,EACA,aAAAP,EACA,WAAYE,EACZ,eAAgBI,EAChB,UAAWD,CAAA,CACZ,EAKD,OAAIG,EAAQ,OAAS,iBACZR,EAAa,0BAA0B,CAC5C,KAAAE,EACA,cAAAC,EACA,QAAAC,CAAA,CACD,EAGIJ,EAAa,0BAA0B,CAC5C,KAAMQ,EAAQ,gBACd,cAAAL,CAAA,CACD,CACH,CAkCA,eAAeO,EACbV,EACAE,EACkB,CAIlB,OAHoB,MAAMF,EACvB,eAAe,CAAE,KAAAE,EAAM,EACvB,MAAM,IAAM,IAAI,IACI,IACzB,CAEA,eAAeO,EAAwC,CACrD,QAAAF,EACA,aAAAP,EACA,WAAAW,EACA,eAAAC,EACA,UAAAC,CACF,EAM6B,CAC3B,MAAMC,EAAU7B,EAA0BsB,CAAO,EACjD,GAAI,CAACO,EACH,MAAM,IAAI,MACR,uDAAuDP,CAAO,8MAAA,EAOlE,MAAMQ,EAAM,GAAGD,CAAO,GAAGzB,CAAqB,IAAIsB,CAAU,IACtDK,EAAW,KAAK,IAAA,EAAQH,EAE9B,KAAO,KAAK,IAAA,EAAQG,GAAU,CAC5B,MAAMC,EAAa,IAAI,gBACjBC,EAAiB,WACrB,IAAMD,EAAW,MAAA,EACjB7B,CAAA,EAGF,IAAI+B,EACJ,GAAI,CACFA,EAAW,MAAM,MAAMJ,EAAK,CAAE,OAAQE,EAAW,OAAQ,CAC3D,OAASG,EAAK,CAMZ,QAAQ,KACN,0DAA0DR,CAAc,SACrEQ,aAAe,MAAQA,EAAI,QAAU,OAAOA,CAAG,EAAA,EAEpD,MAAMC,EAAMT,CAAc,EAC1B,QACF,QAAA,CACE,aAAaM,CAAc,CAC7B,CAEA,GAAIC,EAAS,GAAI,CACf,MAAMG,EAAQ,MAAMH,EAAS,KAAA,EAC7B,GAAIG,EAAK,WAAY,CACnB,GAAIA,EAAK,eAAiB,GACxB,MAAM,IAAI,MACR,oBAAoBX,CAAU,2EAAA,EAIlC,GAAIW,EAAK,gBACP,MAAO,CAAE,KAAM,WAAY,gBAAiBA,EAAK,eAAA,CAErD,CACF,SAAWH,EAAS,SAAW7B,GAM7B,GAAI,MAAMoB,EAAsBV,EAAcW,CAAU,EACtD,eAAQ,KACN,GAAGA,CAAU,wKAAA,EAIR,CAAE,KAAM,gBAAA,UAERQ,EAAS,QAAU5B,EAE5B,QAAQ,KACN,qCAAqC4B,EAAS,MAAM,QAAQR,CAAU,iBAAiBC,CAAc,KAAA,MAIvG,OAAM,IAAI,MACR,qCAAqCO,EAAS,MAAM,QAAQR,CAAU,GAAA,EAI1E,MAAMU,EAAMT,CAAc,CAC5B,CAEA,MAAM,IAAI,MACR,mBAAmBC,CAAS,mCAAmCF,CAAU,kJAAA,CAI7E,CAEA,SAASU,EAAME,EAA2B,CACxC,OAAO,IAAI,QAASC,GAAY,CAC9B,WAAWA,EAASD,CAAE,CACxB,CAAC,CACH"}

package/dist/tbv/core/utils/eth/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+const f = {
+  1: "https://safe-transaction-mainnet.safe.global",
+  11155111: "https://safe-transaction-sepolia.safe.global"
+}, w = 5e3, d = 14400 * 1e3, T = 1e4, h = "/api/v1/multisig-transactions", p = 404, A = 500, m = 2, _ = "0xef0100", R = 20, g = _.length + m * R;
+function I(e) {
+  return e.length === g && e.toLowerCase().startsWith(_);
+}
+async function L(e) {
+  const {
+    publicClient: t,
+    walletAddress: a,
+    hash: r,
+    confirmations: i,
+    timeout: c,
+    safePollTimeoutMs: l = d,
+    safePollIntervalMs: u = w
+  } = e, s = await t.getCode({ address: a });
+  if (!(s !== void 0 && s !== "0x" && !I(s)))
+    return t.waitForTransactionReceipt({
+      hash: r,
+      confirmations: i,
+      timeout: c
+    });
+  const o = await t.getChainId(), n = await C({
+    chainId: o,
+    publicClient: t,
+    safeTxHash: r,
+    pollIntervalMs: u,
+    timeoutMs: l
+  });
+  return n.kind === "not-a-proposal" ? t.waitForTransactionReceipt({
+    hash: r,
+    confirmations: i,
+    timeout: c
+  }) : t.waitForTransactionReceipt({
+    hash: n.transactionHash,
+    confirmations: i
+  });
+}
+async function F(e, t) {
+  return await e.getTransaction({ hash: t }).catch(() => null) !== null;
+}
+async function C({
+  chainId: e,
+  publicClient: t,
+  safeTxHash: a,
+  pollIntervalMs: r,
+  timeoutMs: i
+}) {
+  const c = f[e];
+  if (!c)
+    throw new Error(
+      `Safe Transaction Service not configured for chainId ${e}. Connected wallet appears to be a smart-contract account, but this chain is not in the supported list. Either connect an EOA or extend SAFE_TX_SERVICE_BASE_URLS in waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware.ts.`
+    );
+  const l = `${c}${h}/${a}/`, u = Date.now() + i;
+  for (; Date.now() < u; ) {
+    const s = new AbortController(), E = setTimeout(
+      () => s.abort(),
+      T
+    );
+    let o;
+    try {
+      o = await fetch(l, { signal: s.signal });
+    } catch (n) {
+      console.warn(
+        `Safe Transaction Service request failed (will retry in ${r}ms): ` + (n instanceof Error ? n.message : String(n))
+      ), await S(r);
+      continue;
+    } finally {
+      clearTimeout(E);
+    }
+    if (o.ok) {
+      const n = await o.json();
+      if (n.isExecuted) {
+        if (n.isSuccessful === !1)
+          throw new Error(
+            `Safe transaction ${a} was executed on chain but reverted. Check the Safe queue UI for details.`
+          );
+        if (n.transactionHash)
+          return { kind: "executed", transactionHash: n.transactionHash };
+      }
+    } else if (o.status === p) {
+      if (await F(t, a))
+        return console.warn(
+          `${a} is a real transaction, not a Safe proposal — the connected wallet submits its own transactions despite reporting contract bytecode. Waiting for its receipt directly.`
+        ), { kind: "not-a-proposal" };
+    } else if (o.status >= A)
+      console.warn(
+        `Safe Transaction Service returned ${o.status} for ${a}; retrying in ${r}ms.`
+      );
+    else
+      throw new Error(
+        `Safe Transaction Service returned ${o.status} for ${a}.`
+      );
+    await S(r);
+  }
+  throw new Error(
+    `Timed out after ${i}ms waiting for Safe transaction ${a} to reach quorum and execute. The proposal is still pending in the Safe queue — co-signers must sign and execute it before the dApp can proceed.`
+  );
+}
+function S(e) {
+  return new Promise((t) => {
+    setTimeout(t, e);
+  });
+}
+export {
+  L as waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map

package/dist/tbv/core/utils/eth/index.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"index.js","sources":["../../../../../src/tbv/core/utils/eth/waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Smart-account-aware wrapper around viem's `waitForTransactionReceipt`.\n *\n * Externally Owned Accounts (EOAs) — wallets controlled by a single private\n * key, e.g. MetaMask or a hardware wallet. `eth_sendTransaction` returns a real\n * Ethereum tx hash, which viem can poll directly. This wrapper delegates\n * unchanged for them.\n *\n * Smart-contract accounts (e.g. Safe multisigs) — the wallet address is a\n * deployed contract that decides whether to accept a transaction. WalletConnect's\n * `eth_sendTransaction` returns a `safeTxHash` (an EIP-712 hash of the\n * *proposal*) rather than a real tx hash, and the proposal is held in Safe's\n * off-chain Transaction Service until quorum signs and executes it. We poll\n * that service for the proposal until execution, then wait for receipt on the\n * real Ethereum tx hash exposed in the service's response.\n *\n * The two are told apart by `eth_getCode`, but NOT by \"empty vs non-empty\":\n * an EIP-7702 delegated EOA reports `0xef0100 ‖ <delegate address>` and is\n * still an EOA — it signs and submits its own transactions, so\n * `eth_sendTransaction` returns a real tx hash. MetaMask upgrades accounts to\n * smart accounts this way by default, and treating one as a Safe means polling\n * the Transaction Service for a hash that is not a `safeTxHash`: a permanent\n * 404 that reads as \"proposal not yet indexed\" and hangs for the full poll\n * budget on a transaction that already succeeded. Delegation designators are\n * therefore classified as EOAs. As a backstop for any wallet that behaves this\n * way in future, a 404 from the Transaction Service is also checked against the\n * node: if it knows the hash as a real transaction, we were never waiting on a\n * proposal and switch to waiting for that transaction's receipt.\n *\n * @module utils/eth\n */\n\nimport type { Address, Hash, PublicClient, TransactionReceipt } from \"viem\";\n\n/**\n * Chains where the Safe Transaction Service is supported by this utility.\n * Extend the map as more Safe-enabled chains are needed.\n */\nconst SAFE_TX_SERVICE_BASE_URLS: Record<number, string> = {\n  1: \"https://safe-transaction-mainnet.safe.global\",\n  11155111: \"https://safe-transaction-sepolia.safe.global\",\n};\n\nconst DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 5_000;\nconst DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_TIMEOUT_MS = 4 * 60 * 60 * 1_000;\nconst SAFE_TX_SERVICE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;\n\n/** Safe Transaction Service route for one multisig-transaction proposal. */\nconst SAFE_MULTISIG_TX_PATH = \"/api/v1/multisig-transactions\";\n/** The service answers 404 both for an unindexed proposal and an unknown Safe. */\nconst SAFE_TX_SERVICE_NOT_FOUND = 404;\n/** Statuses at or above this are server-side, so worth retrying. */\nconst SAFE_TX_SERVICE_SERVER_ERROR = 500;\n\n/** Two hex characters encode one byte in an `eth_getCode` result. */\nconst HEX_CHARS_PER_BYTE = 2;\n\n/**\n * EIP-7702 delegation designator: an EOA that has delegated its code to a\n * contract reports exactly `0xef0100 ‖ <20-byte delegate address>` from\n * `eth_getCode` (EIP-7702 §\"Delegation Designation\"). Both the prefix and the\n * exact length are checked so ordinary contract bytecode that merely happens to\n * start with these bytes is not mistaken for a delegation.\n */\nconst EIP_7702_DELEGATION_PREFIX = \"0xef0100\";\nconst EIP_7702_DELEGATION_ADDRESS_BYTES = 20;\nconst EIP_7702_DELEGATION_CODE_LENGTH =\n  EIP_7702_DELEGATION_PREFIX.length +\n  HEX_CHARS_PER_BYTE * EIP_7702_DELEGATION_ADDRESS_BYTES;\n\n/**\n * True when `eth_getCode` reports an EIP-7702 delegation designator rather than\n * a deployed contract. Such an account is still an EOA for our purposes: it\n * signs and submits its own transactions, so the hash we hold is a real tx hash.\n */\nfunction isEip7702DelegatedEoa(code: string): boolean {\n  return (\n    code.length === EIP_7702_DELEGATION_CODE_LENGTH &&\n    code.toLowerCase().startsWith(EIP_7702_DELEGATION_PREFIX)\n  );\n}\n\nexport interface WaitForTransactionReceiptSmartAwareParams {\n  publicClient: PublicClient;\n  walletAddress: Address;\n  hash: Hash;\n  /**\n   * Forwarded to viem verbatim.\n   *\n   * MUST NOT be used as a finality/reorg gate. viem fetches the receipt once\n   * and then only compares block numbers against that cached copy — it never\n   * re-checks that the receipt's block is still canonical, so it resolves\n   * happily for a transaction that has been reorged out. Setting this buys a\n   * delay, not a guarantee. For peg-in registration finality use\n   * `waitForPeginRegistrationDepth`, which re-reads live contract state on\n   * every poll.\n   */\n  confirmations?: number;\n  /**\n   * Forwarded to viem on the EOA (externally owned account) path, and on the\n   * fallback where a supposed smart account turns out to submit its own\n   * transactions — that is the EOA case too, however we arrived at it.\n   *\n   * Ignored only while waiting on a genuine Safe proposal, whose budget is\n   * safePollTimeoutMs. It is not forwarded to the receipt wait that follows a\n   * proposal's execution either: viem's own default applies there (180s as of\n   * viem 2.38.2), so that wait is bounded too — a sufficiently slow node still\n   * raises WaitForTransactionReceiptTimeoutError, just on viem's uniform bound\n   * rather than on a caller's shorter one.\n   */\n  timeout?: number;\n  /** Total budget for waiting on Safe quorum + execution. Default 4h. */\n  safePollTimeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Poll cadence against the Safe Transaction Service. Default 5s. */\n  safePollIntervalMs?: number;\n}\n\nexport async function waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware(\n  params: WaitForTransactionReceiptSmartAwareParams,\n): Promise<TransactionReceipt> {\n  const {\n    publicClient,\n    walletAddress,\n    hash,\n    confirmations,\n    timeout,\n    safePollTimeoutMs = DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_TIMEOUT_MS,\n    safePollIntervalMs = DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_INTERVAL_MS,\n  } = params;\n\n  const code = await publicClient.getCode({ address: walletAddress });\n  // An EIP-7702 delegated EOA has non-empty code but still submits its own\n  // transactions, so it belongs on the EOA path — see the module docblock.\n  const isSmartAccount =\n    code !== undefined && code !== \"0x\" && !isEip7702DelegatedEoa(code);\n\n  if (!isSmartAccount) {\n    return publicClient.waitForTransactionReceipt({\n      hash,\n      confirmations,\n      timeout,\n    });\n  }\n\n  const chainId = await publicClient.getChainId();\n  const outcome = await pollSafeTransactionServiceUntilExecuted({\n    chainId,\n    publicClient,\n    safeTxHash: hash,\n    pollIntervalMs: safePollIntervalMs,\n    timeoutMs: safePollTimeoutMs,\n  });\n\n  // The wallet turned out to submit its own transactions, so this is the EOA\n  // case after all — including the caller's `timeout`, which only ever meant to\n  // be ignored while waiting on a genuine Safe proposal.\n  if (outcome.kind === \"not-a-proposal\") {\n    return publicClient.waitForTransactionReceipt({\n      hash,\n      confirmations,\n      timeout,\n    });\n  }\n\n  return publicClient.waitForTransactionReceipt({\n    hash: outcome.transactionHash,\n    confirmations,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * How the Safe path ended. The two outcomes are not interchangeable, so they are\n * distinguished rather than both collapsing to a bare hash: `executed` is a real\n * Safe proposal that reached quorum, while `not-a-proposal` means the wallet was\n * never a Safe and we are really on the EOA path — which decides whether the\n * caller's `timeout` applies to the receipt wait that follows.\n */\ntype SafePollOutcome =\n  | { kind: \"executed\"; transactionHash: Hash }\n  | { kind: \"not-a-proposal\" };\n\ninterface SafeMultisigTransaction {\n  isExecuted: boolean;\n  isSuccessful: boolean | null;\n  transactionHash: Hash | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Decide whether a 404 from the Transaction Service means \"proposal not indexed\n * yet\" or \"this hash was never a proposal at all\".\n *\n * The Safe indexer cannot answer that: a genuine Safe and its freshly-submitted\n * proposal are both absent from it for a while, so its 404 proves nothing. The\n * NODE can. A `safeTxHash` is an EIP-712 digest of a proposal and is never a\n * transaction on chain, so if the node knows the hash as a real transaction then\n * this was never a proposal and we are on the wrong path entirely.\n *\n * Returns true only on that positive identification. Anything else — the node\n * has not seen it yet, or the lookup fails — is inconclusive and leaves the\n * caller polling, which is the correct behaviour for a Safe that is simply\n * still being indexed.\n */\nasync function hashIsRealTransaction(\n  publicClient: PublicClient,\n  hash: Hash,\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  const transaction = await publicClient\n    .getTransaction({ hash })\n    .catch(() => null);\n  return transaction !== null;\n}\n\nasync function pollSafeTransactionServiceUntilExecuted({\n  chainId,\n  publicClient,\n  safeTxHash,\n  pollIntervalMs,\n  timeoutMs,\n}: {\n  chainId: number;\n  publicClient: PublicClient;\n  safeTxHash: Hash;\n  pollIntervalMs: number;\n  timeoutMs: number;\n}): Promise<SafePollOutcome> {\n  const baseUrl = SAFE_TX_SERVICE_BASE_URLS[chainId];\n  if (!baseUrl) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Safe Transaction Service not configured for chainId ${chainId}. ` +\n        `Connected wallet appears to be a smart-contract account, but this ` +\n        `chain is not in the supported list. Either connect an EOA or extend ` +\n        `SAFE_TX_SERVICE_BASE_URLS in waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware.ts.`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const url = `${baseUrl}${SAFE_MULTISIG_TX_PATH}/${safeTxHash}/`;\n  const deadline = Date.now() + timeoutMs;\n\n  while (Date.now() < deadline) {\n    const controller = new AbortController();\n    const fetchTimeoutId = setTimeout(\n      () => controller.abort(),\n      SAFE_TX_SERVICE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS,\n    );\n\n    let response: Response;\n    try {\n      response = await fetch(url, { signal: controller.signal });\n    } catch (err) {\n      // Transient failure (AbortError on per-request timeout, DNS hiccup,\n      // connection reset, etc.). Log and continue to the next poll iteration\n      // instead of consuming the entire safePollTimeoutMs budget on one blip.\n      // The outer `while (Date.now() < deadline)` is what enforces the overall\n      // budget; this catch deliberately preserves it.\n      console.warn(\n        `Safe Transaction Service request failed (will retry in ${pollIntervalMs}ms): ` +\n          (err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)),\n      );\n      await sleep(pollIntervalMs);\n      continue;\n    } finally {\n      clearTimeout(fetchTimeoutId);\n    }\n\n    if (response.ok) {\n      const data = (await response.json()) as SafeMultisigTransaction;\n      if (data.isExecuted) {\n        if (data.isSuccessful === false) {\n          throw new Error(\n            `Safe transaction ${safeTxHash} was executed on chain but reverted. ` +\n              `Check the Safe queue UI for details.`,\n          );\n        }\n        if (data.transactionHash) {\n          return { kind: \"executed\", transactionHash: data.transactionHash };\n        }\n      }\n    } else if (response.status === SAFE_TX_SERVICE_NOT_FOUND) {\n      // Usually \"proposal not indexed yet\", so keep polling. But the very same\n      // 404 appears when the hash is not a safeTxHash at all — the case that\n      // used to burn the whole budget on an already-mined transaction. Ask the\n      // node: if it knows this hash, it is a real transaction, so stop treating\n      // it as a proposal and let the caller wait on it directly.\n      if (await hashIsRealTransaction(publicClient, safeTxHash)) {\n        console.warn(\n          `${safeTxHash} is a real transaction, not a Safe proposal — the ` +\n            `connected wallet submits its own transactions despite reporting ` +\n            `contract bytecode. Waiting for its receipt directly.`,\n        );\n        return { kind: \"not-a-proposal\" };\n      }\n    } else if (response.status >= SAFE_TX_SERVICE_SERVER_ERROR) {\n      // Transient server error — same treatment as a hung connection: log and retry.\n      console.warn(\n        `Safe Transaction Service returned ${response.status} for ${safeTxHash}; retrying in ${pollIntervalMs}ms.`,\n      );\n    } else {\n      // Other 4xx (403, 410, etc.) is likely permanent — surface immediately.\n      throw new Error(\n        `Safe Transaction Service returned ${response.status} for ${safeTxHash}.`,\n      );\n    }\n\n    await sleep(pollIntervalMs);\n  }\n\n  throw new Error(\n    `Timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms waiting for Safe transaction ${safeTxHash} ` +\n      `to reach quorum and execute. The proposal is still pending in the Safe ` +\n      `queue — co-signers must sign and execute it before the dApp can proceed.`,\n  );\n}\n\nfunction sleep(ms: number): Promise<void> {\n  return new Promise((resolve) => {\n    setTimeout(resolve, ms);\n  });\n}\n"],"names":["SAFE_TX_SERVICE_BASE_URLS","DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_INTERVAL_MS","DEFAULT_SAFE_POLL_TIMEOUT_MS","SAFE_TX_SERVICE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS","SAFE_MULTISIG_TX_PATH","SAFE_TX_SERVICE_NOT_FOUND","SAFE_TX_SERVICE_SERVER_ERROR","HEX_CHARS_PER_BYTE","EIP_7702_DELEGATION_PREFIX","EIP_7702_DELEGATION_ADDRESS_BYTES","EIP_7702_DELEGATION_CODE_LENGTH","isEip7702DelegatedEoa","code","waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware","params","publicClient","walletAddress","hash","confirmations","timeout","safePollTimeoutMs","safePollIntervalMs","chainId","outcome","pollSafeTransactionServiceUntilExecuted","hashIsRealTransaction","safeTxHash","pollIntervalMs","timeoutMs","baseUrl","url","deadline","controller","fetchTimeoutId","response","err","sleep","data","ms","resolve"],"mappings":"AAsCA,MAAMA,IAAoD;AAAA,EACxD,GAAG;AAAA,EACH,UAAU;AACZ,GAEMC,IAAgC,KAChCC,IAA+B,QAAc,KAC7CC,IAAmC,KAGnCC,IAAwB,iCAExBC,IAA4B,KAE5BC,IAA+B,KAG/BC,IAAqB,GASrBC,IAA6B,YAC7BC,IAAoC,IACpCC,IACJF,EAA2B,SAC3BD,IAAqBE;AAOvB,SAASE,EAAsBC,GAAuB;AACpD,SACEA,EAAK,WAAWF,KAChBE,EAAK,YAAA,EAAc,WAAWJ,CAA0B;AAE5D;AAqCA,eAAsBK,EACpBC,GAC6B;AAC7B,QAAM;AAAA,IACJ,cAAAC;AAAA,IACA,eAAAC;AAAA,IACA,MAAAC;AAAA,IACA,eAAAC;AAAA,IACA,SAAAC;AAAA,IACA,mBAAAC,IAAoBlB;AAAA,IACpB,oBAAAmB,IAAqBpB;AAAA,EAAA,IACnBa,GAEEF,IAAO,MAAMG,EAAa,QAAQ,EAAE,SAASC,GAAe;AAMlE,MAAI,EAFFJ,MAAS,UAAaA,MAAS,QAAQ,CAACD,EAAsBC,CAAI;AAGlE,WAAOG,EAAa,0BAA0B;AAAA,MAC5C,MAAAE;AAAA,MACA,eAAAC;AAAA,MACA,SAAAC;AAAA,IAAA,CACD;AAGH,QAAMG,IAAU,MAAMP,EAAa,WAAA,GAC7BQ,IAAU,MAAMC,EAAwC;AAAA,IAC5D,SAAAF;AAAA,IACA,cAAAP;AAAA,IACA,YAAYE;AAAA,IACZ,gBAAgBI;AAAA,IAChB,WAAWD;AAAA,EAAA,CACZ;AAKD,SAAIG,EAAQ,SAAS,mBACZR,EAAa,0BAA0B;AAAA,IAC5C,MAAAE;AAAA,IACA,eAAAC;AAAA,IACA,SAAAC;AAAA,EAAA,CACD,IAGIJ,EAAa,0BAA0B;AAAA,IAC5C,MAAMQ,EAAQ;AAAA,IACd,eAAAL;AAAA,EAAA,CACD;AACH;AAkCA,eAAeO,EACbV,GACAE,GACkB;AAIlB,SAHoB,MAAMF,EACvB,eAAe,EAAE,MAAAE,GAAM,EACvB,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,MACI;AACzB;AAEA,eAAeO,EAAwC;AAAA,EACrD,SAAAF;AAAA,EACA,cAAAP;AAAA,EACA,YAAAW;AAAA,EACA,gBAAAC;AAAA,EACA,WAAAC;AACF,GAM6B;AAC3B,QAAMC,IAAU7B,EAA0BsB,CAAO;AACjD,MAAI,CAACO;AACH,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,uDAAuDP,CAAO;AAAA,IAAA;AAOlE,QAAMQ,IAAM,GAAGD,CAAO,GAAGzB,CAAqB,IAAIsB,CAAU,KACtDK,IAAW,KAAK,IAAA,IAAQH;AAE9B,SAAO,KAAK,IAAA,IAAQG,KAAU;AAC5B,UAAMC,IAAa,IAAI,gBAAA,GACjBC,IAAiB;AAAA,MACrB,MAAMD,EAAW,MAAA;AAAA,MACjB7B;AAAA,IAAA;AAGF,QAAI+B;AACJ,QAAI;AACF,MAAAA,IAAW,MAAM,MAAMJ,GAAK,EAAE,QAAQE,EAAW,QAAQ;AAAA,IAC3D,SAASG,GAAK;AAMZ,cAAQ;AAAA,QACN,0DAA0DR,CAAc,WACrEQ,aAAe,QAAQA,EAAI,UAAU,OAAOA,CAAG;AAAA,MAAA,GAEpD,MAAMC,EAAMT,CAAc;AAC1B;AAAA,IACF,UAAA;AACE,mBAAaM,CAAc;AAAA,IAC7B;AAEA,QAAIC,EAAS,IAAI;AACf,YAAMG,IAAQ,MAAMH,EAAS,KAAA;AAC7B,UAAIG,EAAK,YAAY;AACnB,YAAIA,EAAK,iBAAiB;AACxB,gBAAM,IAAI;AAAA,YACR,oBAAoBX,CAAU;AAAA,UAAA;AAIlC,YAAIW,EAAK;AACP,iBAAO,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,iBAAiBA,EAAK,gBAAA;AAAA,MAErD;AAAA,IACF,WAAWH,EAAS,WAAW7B;AAM7B,UAAI,MAAMoB,EAAsBV,GAAcW,CAAU;AACtD,uBAAQ;AAAA,UACN,GAAGA,CAAU;AAAA,QAAA,GAIR,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAA;AAAA,eAERQ,EAAS,UAAU5B;AAE5B,cAAQ;AAAA,QACN,qCAAqC4B,EAAS,MAAM,QAAQR,CAAU,iBAAiBC,CAAc;AAAA,MAAA;AAAA;AAIvG,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR,qCAAqCO,EAAS,MAAM,QAAQR,CAAU;AAAA,MAAA;AAI1E,UAAMU,EAAMT,CAAc;AAAA,EAC5B;AAEA,QAAM,IAAI;AAAA,IACR,mBAAmBC,CAAS,mCAAmCF,CAAU;AAAA,EAAA;AAI7E;AAEA,SAASU,EAAME,GAA2B;AACxC,SAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,CAACC,MAAY;AAC9B,eAAWA,GAASD,CAAE;AAAA,EACxB,CAAC;AACH;"}

package/dist/tbv/core/utils/index.cjs

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-"use strict";Object.defineProperty(exports,Symbol.toStringTag,{value:"Module"});const T=require("../../../abortSignals-msbmbqFe.cjs"),_=require("../../../signing-BJ3X66b-.cjs"),a=require("../../../validation-C6XTfZak.cjs"),e=require("../../../waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware-DpQ69ySe.cjs"),t=require("../../../fundPeginTransaction-BLD8FRL9.cjs"),E=require("../../../reservation-Dr2HLCxx.cjs"),i=require("../../../bitcoin-D-O2GjbC.cjs");exports.combineAbortSignals=T.combineAbortSignals;exports.calculateBtcTxHash=_.calculateBtcTxHash;exports.createTaprootScriptPathSignOptions=_.createTaprootScriptPathSignOptions;exports.BITCOIN_ADDRESS_RE=a.BITCOIN_ADDRESS_RE;exports.COMPRESSED_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN=a.COMPRESSED_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN;exports.HEX_RE=a.HEX_RE;exports.KNOWN_SCRIPT_PREFIXES=a.KNOWN_SCRIPT_PREFIXES;exports.MAX_REASONABLE_FEE_SATS=a.MAX_REASONABLE_FEE_SATS;exports.TXID_RE=a.TXID_RE;exports.X_ONLY_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN=a.X_ONLY_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN;exports.BitcoinScriptType=e.BitcoinScriptType;exports.applyChangeOutputPolicy=e.applyChangeOutputPolicy;exports.computeChangeOutputFeeSats=e.computeChangeOutputFeeSats;exports.computeMaxDeposit=e.computeMaxDeposit;exports.computePeginBaseFeeSats=e.computePeginBaseFeeSats;exports.getDustThreshold=e.getDustThreshold;exports.getPsbtInputFields=e.getPsbtInputFields;exports.getScriptType=e.getScriptType;exports.selectUtxosForPegin=e.selectUtxosForPegin;exports.shouldAddChangeOutput=e.shouldAddChangeOutput;exports.waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware=e.waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware;exports.BTC_DUST_SAT=t.BTC_DUST_SAT;exports.DUST_THRESHOLD=t.DUST_THRESHOLD;exports.LOW_RATE_ESTIMATION_ACCURACY_BUFFER=t.LOW_RATE_ESTIMATION_ACCURACY_BUFFER;exports.MAX_NON_LEGACY_OUTPUT_SIZE=t.MAX_NON_LEGACY_OUTPUT_SIZE;exports.MAX_REASONABLE_PEGIN_VBYTES=t.MAX_REASONABLE_PEGIN_VBYTES;exports.P2TR_INPUT_SIZE=t.P2TR_INPUT_SIZE;exports.PEGIN_AUTH_ANCHOR_OUTPUTS=t.PEGIN_AUTH_ANCHOR_OUTPUTS;exports.PEGIN_FIXED_OUTPUTS=t.PEGIN_FIXED_OUTPUTS;exports.SPLIT_TX_FEE_SAFETY_MULTIPLIER=t.SPLIT_TX_FEE_SAFETY_MULTIPLIER;exports.TX_BUFFER_SIZE_OVERHEAD=t.TX_BUFFER_SIZE_OVERHEAD;exports.WALLET_RELAY_FEE_RATE_THRESHOLD=t.WALLET_RELAY_FEE_RATE_THRESHOLD;exports.fundPeginTransaction=t.fundPeginTransaction;exports.parseUnfundedWasmTransaction=t.parseUnfundedWasmTransaction;exports.peginOutputCount=t.peginOutputCount;exports.rateBasedTxBufferFee=t.rateBasedTxBufferFee;exports.UtxoNotAvailableError=E.UtxoNotAvailableError;exports.assertUtxosAvailable=E.assertUtxosAvailable;exports.extractInputsFromTransaction=E.extractInputsFromTransaction;exports.findOverlappingPendingVaults=E.findOverlappingPendingVaults;exports.validateUtxosAvailable=E.validateUtxosAvailable;exports.getNetwork=i.getNetwork;
+"use strict";Object.defineProperty(exports,Symbol.toStringTag,{value:"Module"});const i=require("../../../abortSignals-msbmbqFe.cjs"),a=require("../../../signing-BJ3X66b-.cjs"),_=require("../../../validation-C6XTfZak.cjs"),n=require("./eth/index.cjs"),e=require("../../../psbtInputFields-BIxBpPj2.cjs"),t=require("../../../fundPeginTransaction-BLD8FRL9.cjs"),E=require("../../../reservation-Dr2HLCxx.cjs"),T=require("../../../bitcoin-D-O2GjbC.cjs");exports.combineAbortSignals=i.combineAbortSignals;exports.calculateBtcTxHash=a.calculateBtcTxHash;exports.createTaprootScriptPathSignOptions=a.createTaprootScriptPathSignOptions;exports.BITCOIN_ADDRESS_RE=_.BITCOIN_ADDRESS_RE;exports.COMPRESSED_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN=_.COMPRESSED_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN;exports.HEX_RE=_.HEX_RE;exports.KNOWN_SCRIPT_PREFIXES=_.KNOWN_SCRIPT_PREFIXES;exports.MAX_REASONABLE_FEE_SATS=_.MAX_REASONABLE_FEE_SATS;exports.TXID_RE=_.TXID_RE;exports.X_ONLY_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN=_.X_ONLY_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN;exports.waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware=n.waitForTransactionReceiptSmartAware;exports.BitcoinScriptType=e.BitcoinScriptType;exports.applyChangeOutputPolicy=e.applyChangeOutputPolicy;exports.computeChangeOutputFeeSats=e.computeChangeOutputFeeSats;exports.computeMaxDeposit=e.computeMaxDeposit;exports.computePeginBaseFeeSats=e.computePeginBaseFeeSats;exports.getDustThreshold=e.getDustThreshold;exports.getPsbtInputFields=e.getPsbtInputFields;exports.getScriptType=e.getScriptType;exports.selectUtxosForPegin=e.selectUtxosForPegin;exports.shouldAddChangeOutput=e.shouldAddChangeOutput;exports.BTC_DUST_SAT=t.BTC_DUST_SAT;exports.DUST_THRESHOLD=t.DUST_THRESHOLD;exports.LOW_RATE_ESTIMATION_ACCURACY_BUFFER=t.LOW_RATE_ESTIMATION_ACCURACY_BUFFER;exports.MAX_NON_LEGACY_OUTPUT_SIZE=t.MAX_NON_LEGACY_OUTPUT_SIZE;exports.MAX_REASONABLE_PEGIN_VBYTES=t.MAX_REASONABLE_PEGIN_VBYTES;exports.P2TR_INPUT_SIZE=t.P2TR_INPUT_SIZE;exports.PEGIN_AUTH_ANCHOR_OUTPUTS=t.PEGIN_AUTH_ANCHOR_OUTPUTS;exports.PEGIN_FIXED_OUTPUTS=t.PEGIN_FIXED_OUTPUTS;exports.SPLIT_TX_FEE_SAFETY_MULTIPLIER=t.SPLIT_TX_FEE_SAFETY_MULTIPLIER;exports.TX_BUFFER_SIZE_OVERHEAD=t.TX_BUFFER_SIZE_OVERHEAD;exports.WALLET_RELAY_FEE_RATE_THRESHOLD=t.WALLET_RELAY_FEE_RATE_THRESHOLD;exports.fundPeginTransaction=t.fundPeginTransaction;exports.parseUnfundedWasmTransaction=t.parseUnfundedWasmTransaction;exports.peginOutputCount=t.peginOutputCount;exports.rateBasedTxBufferFee=t.rateBasedTxBufferFee;exports.UtxoNotAvailableError=E.UtxoNotAvailableError;exports.assertUtxosAvailable=E.assertUtxosAvailable;exports.extractInputsFromTransaction=E.extractInputsFromTransaction;exports.findOverlappingPendingVaults=E.findOverlappingPendingVaults;exports.validateUtxosAvailable=E.validateUtxosAvailable;exports.getNetwork=T.getNetwork;
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.cjs.map