@babylonlabs-io/ts-sdk 0.71.0 → 0.71.1

package/dist/primeVpAuth-tLRjdHwZ.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"primeVpAuth-tLRjdHwZ.js","sources":["../src/tbv/core/clients/eth/contract-address-resolver.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/eth/operation-key-reader.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/eth/protocol-params-reader.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/eth/signer-set-reader.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/eth/types.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/cbor.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/serverIdentity.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/gatedMethods.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/innerTokenClient.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/cborDecode.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/verifyDepositorCwt.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/tokenProvider.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/tokenRegistry.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/createAuthenticatedVpClient.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/primeVpAuth.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Contract Address Resolver\n *\n * Resolves ProtocolParams and ApplicationRegistry contract addresses\n * from the BTCVaultRegistry contract. These addresses are needed to\n * construct the SDK's contract readers.\n *\n * @module clients/eth/contract-address-resolver\n */\n\nimport type { Address, PublicClient } from \"viem\";\n\nimport { BTCVaultRegistryABI } from \"../../contracts/abis/BTCVaultRegistry.abi\";\n\nexport interface ProtocolAddresses {\n  /** Address of the ProtocolParams contract */\n  protocolParams: Address;\n  /** Address of the ApplicationRegistry contract */\n  applicationRegistry: Address;\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve ProtocolParams and ApplicationRegistry addresses from BTCVaultRegistry.\n *\n * Uses a single multicall for atomicity and efficiency.\n *\n * @param publicClient - viem PublicClient instance\n * @param btcVaultRegistryAddress - Address of the BTCVaultRegistry contract\n * @returns Resolved contract addresses\n */\nexport async function resolveProtocolAddresses(\n  publicClient: PublicClient,\n  btcVaultRegistryAddress: Address,\n): Promise<ProtocolAddresses> {\n  const [protocolParams, applicationRegistry] = await publicClient.multicall({\n    contracts: [\n      {\n        address: btcVaultRegistryAddress,\n        abi: BTCVaultRegistryABI,\n        functionName: \"protocolParams\",\n      },\n      {\n        address: btcVaultRegistryAddress,\n        abi: BTCVaultRegistryABI,\n        functionName: \"applicationRegistry\",\n      },\n    ],\n    allowFailure: false,\n  });\n\n  return {\n    protocolParams: protocolParams as Address,\n    applicationRegistry: applicationRegistry as Address,\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Concrete RFC-006 operation-key reader spanning all three registries.\n *\n * This is an optional utility — callers can use their own implementation of\n * the {@link OperationKeyReader} interface.\n */\n\nimport type { Abi, Address, Hex, PublicClient } from \"viem\";\n\nimport { ApplicationRegistryABI } from \"../../contracts/abis/ApplicationRegistry.abi\";\nimport { BTCVaultRegistryABI } from \"../../contracts/abis/BTCVaultRegistry.abi\";\nimport { ProtocolParamsABI } from \"../../contracts/abis/ProtocolParams.abi\";\nimport type {\n  KeyEpochs,\n  OperationKeyQuery,\n  OperationKeyReader,\n  RawOperationKeys,\n  RawPayoutScripts,\n} from \"./types\";\n\n/** Addresses of the three registries an operation-key resolution spans. */\nexport interface OperationKeyContracts {\n  btcVaultRegistry: Address;\n  applicationRegistry: Address;\n  protocolParams: Address;\n}\n\n/** One `multicall` entry. Loosely typed because the three ABIs differ. */\ntype Call = {\n  address: Address;\n  abi: Abi;\n  functionName: string;\n  args: readonly unknown[];\n};\n\n/**\n * Reject a multicall result that is not one-per-call.\n *\n * Every method here relies on positional alignment between calls and results,\n * so a short array does not fail — it silently hands back `undefined` for the\n * tail entries. Downstream that surfaces as a complaint about whichever\n * operator happens to occupy the missing slot, blaming a participant that is\n * perfectly fine for a read that came back incomplete. Assert the length where\n * the array arrives so the error names the real fault.\n */\nfunction assertMulticallLength(\n  actual: number,\n  expected: number,\n  label: string,\n): void {\n  if (actual !== expected) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `${label}: multicall returned ${actual} results for ${expected} calls, ` +\n        `so the results are not roster-aligned; refusing to use them`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Split a flat multicall result into VP / keepers / challengers.\n *\n * Every method below builds its calls in the same order — vault provider\n * first, then keepers in roster order, then challengers in roster order — so\n * the results stay index-aligned with `query.vaultKeepers` /\n * `query.universalChallengers`. That alignment is what lets the resolver pair\n * a resolved key back to its admin address; the sorted key arrays it exposes\n * are derived from those pairs, never the other way round.\n */\nfunction partition<T>(\n  results: readonly T[],\n  keeperCount: number,\n): { vaultProvider: T; vaultKeepers: T[]; universalChallengers: T[] } {\n  return {\n    vaultProvider: results[0],\n    vaultKeepers: results.slice(1, 1 + keeperCount),\n    universalChallengers: results.slice(1 + keeperCount),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Reads RFC-006 operation keys and payout scripts.\n *\n * Usage:\n * ```ts\n * const reader = new ViemOperationKeyReader(publicClient, contracts);\n * const keys = await reader.getCurrentOperationKeys(query);\n * ```\n */\nexport class ViemOperationKeyReader implements OperationKeyReader {\n  constructor(\n    private publicClient: PublicClient,\n    private contracts: OperationKeyContracts,\n  ) {}\n\n  /**\n   * One multicall, `allowFailure: false`, so every key in the set is read at\n   * the same block. A rotation landing between two separate `eth_call`s would\n   * otherwise produce a mixed-epoch key set and a lock no counterparty agrees\n   * with.\n   */\n  private async readAll<T>(\n    calls: Call[],\n    keeperCount: number,\n    challengerCount: number,\n    label: string,\n  ) {\n    const results = (await this.publicClient.multicall({\n      contracts: calls,\n      allowFailure: false,\n    })) as readonly T[];\n\n    assertMulticallLength(\n      results.length,\n      1 + keeperCount + challengerCount,\n      label,\n    );\n\n    return partition(results, keeperCount);\n  }\n\n  async getCurrentOperationKeys(\n    query: OperationKeyQuery,\n  ): Promise<RawOperationKeys> {\n    const calls: Call[] = [\n      {\n        address: this.contracts.btcVaultRegistry,\n        abi: BTCVaultRegistryABI as Abi,\n        functionName: \"getCurrentOperationBtcKey\",\n        args: [query.vaultProviderEthAddress],\n      },\n      ...query.vaultKeepers.map((keeper) => ({\n        address: this.contracts.applicationRegistry,\n        abi: ApplicationRegistryABI as Abi,\n        functionName: \"getCurrentOperationBtcKey\",\n        args: [query.applicationEntryPoint, keeper.ethAddress],\n      })),\n      ...query.universalChallengers.map((challenger) => ({\n        address: this.contracts.protocolParams,\n        abi: ProtocolParamsABI as Abi,\n        functionName: \"getCurrentOperationBtcKey\",\n        args: [challenger.ethAddress],\n      })),\n    ];\n\n    return this.readAll<Hex>(\n      calls,\n      query.vaultKeepers.length,\n      query.universalChallengers.length,\n      \"getCurrentOperationKeys\",\n    );\n  }\n\n  async getOperationKeysAtEpochs(\n    query: OperationKeyQuery,\n    epochs: KeyEpochs,\n  ): Promise<RawOperationKeys> {\n    const calls: Call[] = [\n      // The VP takes the plain `AtEpoch` variant: it has no membership\n      // version, so its genesis (the registration key at version 0) is\n      // unambiguous and the contract resolves it internally.\n      {\n        address: this.contracts.btcVaultRegistry,\n        abi: BTCVaultRegistryABI as Abi,\n        functionName: \"getOperationBtcKeyAtEpoch\",\n        args: [query.vaultProviderEthAddress, epochs.vpKeyEpoch],\n      },\n      // Keepers and challengers take `...OrGenesis` with their roster key\n      // passed explicitly, because the correct genesis for them is their key\n      // in *this vault's frozen membership version*. An operator dropped from\n      // the current roster, or listed under a different key in an older\n      // version, would otherwise resolve against the wrong genesis.\n      ...query.vaultKeepers.map((keeper) => ({\n        address: this.contracts.applicationRegistry,\n        abi: ApplicationRegistryABI as Abi,\n        functionName: \"getOperationBtcKeyAtEpochOrGenesis\",\n        args: [\n          query.applicationEntryPoint,\n          keeper.ethAddress,\n          epochs.appKeeperKeyEpoch,\n          keeper.btcPubKey,\n        ],\n      })),\n      ...query.universalChallengers.map((challenger) => ({\n        address: this.contracts.protocolParams,\n        abi: ProtocolParamsABI as Abi,\n        functionName: \"getOperationBtcKeyAtEpochOrGenesis\",\n        args: [challenger.ethAddress, epochs.ucKeyEpoch, challenger.btcPubKey],\n      })),\n    ];\n\n    return this.readAll<Hex>(\n      calls,\n      query.vaultKeepers.length,\n      query.universalChallengers.length,\n      \"getOperationKeysAtEpochs\",\n    );\n  }\n\n  async getPayoutScriptsAtEpochs(\n    query: OperationKeyQuery,\n    epochs: KeyEpochs,\n  ): Promise<RawPayoutScripts> {\n    // Universal challengers are never claimers, so they have no payout script\n    // and no call here.\n    const results = (await this.publicClient.multicall({\n      contracts: [\n        {\n          address: this.contracts.btcVaultRegistry,\n          abi: BTCVaultRegistryABI as Abi,\n          functionName: \"getPayoutScriptAtEpoch\",\n          args: [query.vaultProviderEthAddress, epochs.vpKeyEpoch],\n        },\n        ...query.vaultKeepers.map((keeper) => ({\n          address: this.contracts.applicationRegistry,\n          abi: ApplicationRegistryABI as Abi,\n          functionName: \"getPayoutScriptAtEpoch\",\n          args: [\n            query.applicationEntryPoint,\n            keeper.ethAddress,\n            epochs.appKeeperKeyEpoch,\n          ],\n        })),\n      ],\n      allowFailure: false,\n    })) as readonly Hex[];\n\n    // Expected length is `1 + keepers`, with no challenger term — see the\n    // comment above on why universal challengers have no call here.\n    assertMulticallLength(\n      results.length,\n      1 + query.vaultKeepers.length,\n      \"getPayoutScriptsAtEpochs\",\n    );\n\n    return {\n      vaultProvider: results[0],\n      vaultKeepers: [...results.slice(1)],\n    };\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Concrete ProtocolParams reader using viem's readContract and multicall.\n *\n * This is an optional utility — callers can use their own implementation\n * of the ProtocolParamsReader interface.\n */\n\nimport type { Abi, Address, Hex, PublicClient } from \"viem\";\n\nimport { ProtocolParamsABI } from \"../../contracts/abis/ProtocolParams.abi\";\nimport {\n  assertValidOffchainParamsVersion,\n  validateOffchainParams,\n  validatePegInConfiguration,\n  validateTBVProtocolParams,\n} from \"./protocol-params-validation\";\nimport type {\n  AllOffchainParamsData,\n  OnSkippedOffchainParamsVersion,\n  PegInConfiguration,\n  ProtocolParamsReader,\n  TBVProtocolParams,\n  VersionedOffchainParams,\n} from \"./types\";\n\n/**\n * Maximum value for a Solidity uint16.\n * PeginLogic.sol casts timelockAssert to uint16, so values above this are invalid.\n */\nconst UINT16_MAX = 65535;\n\n\n/**\n * Raw shape viem returns for VersionedOffchainParams struct.\n * viem resolves ABI struct outputs to named objects (not tuples).\n */\ninterface RawOffchainParams {\n  timelockAssert: bigint;\n  timelockChallengeAssert: bigint;\n  securityCouncilKeys: readonly Hex[];\n  councilQuorum: number;\n  feeRate: bigint;\n  babeTotalInstances: number;\n  babeInstancesToFinalize: number;\n  minVpCommissionBps: number;\n  tRefund: number;\n  tStale: number;\n  minPeginFeeRate: bigint;\n  proverCircuitVersion: number;\n  minPrepeginDepth: number;\n}\n\n/** Raw shape viem returns for TBVProtocolParams struct. */\ninterface RawTBVParams {\n  minimumPegInAmount: bigint;\n  maxPegInAmount: bigint;\n  pegInAckTimeout: bigint;\n  pegInActivationTimeout: bigint;\n  maxHtlcOutputCount: number;\n  expiredPegInGraceBlocks: bigint;\n}\n\n/** Map viem struct result to VersionedOffchainParams. */\nfunction mapOffchainParams(result: RawOffchainParams): VersionedOffchainParams {\n  return {\n    timelockAssert: result.timelockAssert,\n    timelockChallengeAssert: result.timelockChallengeAssert,\n    securityCouncilKeys: [...result.securityCouncilKeys],\n    councilQuorum: result.councilQuorum,\n    feeRate: result.feeRate,\n    babeTotalInstances: result.babeTotalInstances,\n    babeInstancesToFinalize: result.babeInstancesToFinalize,\n    minVpCommissionBps: result.minVpCommissionBps,\n    tRefund: result.tRefund,\n    tStale: result.tStale,\n    minPeginFeeRate: result.minPeginFeeRate,\n    proverCircuitVersion: result.proverCircuitVersion,\n    minPrepeginDepth: result.minPrepeginDepth,\n  };\n}\n\n/** Map viem struct result to TBVProtocolParams. */\nfunction mapTBVParams(result: RawTBVParams): TBVProtocolParams {\n  return {\n    minimumPegInAmount: result.minimumPegInAmount,\n    maxPegInAmount: result.maxPegInAmount,\n    pegInAckTimeout: result.pegInAckTimeout,\n    pegInActivationTimeout: result.pegInActivationTimeout,\n    maxHtlcOutputCount: result.maxHtlcOutputCount,\n    expiredPegInGraceBlocks: result.expiredPegInGraceBlocks,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive timelockPegin from timelockAssert.\n *\n * Matches PeginLogic.sol: `uint16(timelockAssert)`.\n * The contract validates `timelockAssert <= type(uint16).max` on write,\n * but we enforce the same bound here to reject invalid values early\n * rather than silently truncating.\n *\n * @throws if timelockAssert exceeds uint16 max (65535)\n */\nfunction deriveTimelockPegin(timelockAssert: bigint): number {\n  if (timelockAssert > BigInt(UINT16_MAX)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `timelockAssert value ${timelockAssert} exceeds uint16 max (${UINT16_MAX})`,\n    );\n  }\n  return Number(timelockAssert);\n}\n\n/**\n * Concrete protocol params reader using viem.\n *\n * Every read method runs the matching validator from\n * `protocol-params-validation` before returning, so callers don't have to\n * remember to validate.\n *\n * Usage:\n * ```ts\n * const reader = new ViemProtocolParamsReader(publicClient, protocolParamsAddress);\n * const config = await reader.getPegInConfiguration();\n * ```\n */\nexport class ViemProtocolParamsReader implements ProtocolParamsReader {\n  constructor(\n    private publicClient: PublicClient,\n    private contractAddress: Address,\n  ) {}\n\n  async getTBVProtocolParams(): Promise<TBVProtocolParams> {\n    const result = (await this.publicClient.readContract({\n      address: this.contractAddress,\n      abi: ProtocolParamsABI,\n      functionName: \"getTBVProtocolParams\",\n    })) as RawTBVParams;\n\n    const params = mapTBVParams(result);\n    validateTBVProtocolParams(params);\n    return params;\n  }\n\n  async getLatestOffchainParams(): Promise<VersionedOffchainParams> {\n    const result = (await this.publicClient.readContract({\n      address: this.contractAddress,\n      abi: ProtocolParamsABI,\n      functionName: \"getLatestOffchainParams\",\n    })) as RawOffchainParams;\n\n    const params = mapOffchainParams(result);\n    validateOffchainParams(params);\n    return params;\n  }\n\n  async getOffchainParamsByVersion(\n    version: number,\n  ): Promise<VersionedOffchainParams> {\n    const result = (await this.publicClient.readContract({\n      address: this.contractAddress,\n      abi: ProtocolParamsABI,\n      functionName: \"getOffchainParamsByVersion\",\n      args: [version],\n    })) as RawOffchainParams;\n\n    const params = mapOffchainParams(result);\n    validateOffchainParams(params);\n    return params;\n  }\n\n  async getLatestOffchainParamsVersion(): Promise<number> {\n    const raw = await this.publicClient.readContract({\n      address: this.contractAddress,\n      abi: ProtocolParamsABI,\n      functionName: \"latestOffchainParamsVersion\",\n    });\n    const version = Number(raw);\n    assertValidOffchainParamsVersion(version);\n    return version;\n  }\n\n  async getTimelockPeginByVersion(version: number): Promise<number> {\n    const params = await this.getOffchainParamsByVersion(version);\n    return deriveTimelockPegin(params.timelockAssert);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Returned as `bigint` with no `Number` narrowing: the registry compares it\n   * against `block.number`, so callers must do the same arithmetic the\n   * contract does. `0` is the documented \"disabled\" case and is returned as\n   * `0n`. A missing getter or a non-bigint payload throws — never coerced to\n   * `0`, which would fail open and skip the observation window.\n   *\n   * @throws If the deployment does not expose `peginActivationDelay()`, or\n   *   the decoded payload is not a `bigint`.\n   */\n  async getPeginActivationDelay(): Promise<bigint> {\n    const raw: unknown = await this.publicClient.readContract({\n      address: this.contractAddress,\n      abi: ProtocolParamsABI,\n      functionName: \"peginActivationDelay\",\n    });\n    if (typeof raw !== \"bigint\") {\n      throw new Error(\n        `Invalid peginActivationDelay from contract: must be a bigint, got ${typeof raw}`,\n      );\n    }\n    return raw;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Read TBV protocol params, latest offchain params, and the latest version\n   * label atomically via multicall. The version is paired with the params so\n   * that a governance update between separate reads cannot let JS build BTC\n   * scripts with version N params while the contract registers the vault\n   * under version N+1.\n   */\n  async getPegInConfiguration(): Promise<PegInConfiguration> {\n    const results = await this.publicClient.multicall({\n      contracts: [\n        {\n          address: this.contractAddress,\n          abi: ProtocolParamsABI,\n          functionName: \"getTBVProtocolParams\",\n        },\n        {\n          address: this.contractAddress,\n          abi: ProtocolParamsABI,\n          functionName: \"getLatestOffchainParams\",\n        },\n        {\n          address: this.contractAddress,\n          abi: ProtocolParamsABI,\n          functionName: \"latestOffchainParamsVersion\",\n        },\n        {\n          address: this.contractAddress,\n          abi: ProtocolParamsABI,\n          functionName: \"activeVaultCoreVersion\",\n        },\n      ],\n      allowFailure: false,\n    });\n\n    const tbvParams = mapTBVParams(results[0] as RawTBVParams);\n    const offchainParams = mapOffchainParams(results[1] as RawOffchainParams);\n    const offchainParamsVersion = Number(results[2]);\n    const activeVaultCoreVersion = Number(results[3]);\n\n    const config: PegInConfiguration = {\n      minimumPegInAmount: tbvParams.minimumPegInAmount,\n      maxPegInAmount: tbvParams.maxPegInAmount,\n      pegInAckTimeout: tbvParams.pegInAckTimeout,\n      pegInActivationTimeout: tbvParams.pegInActivationTimeout,\n      maxHtlcOutputCount: tbvParams.maxHtlcOutputCount,\n      expiredPegInGraceBlocks: tbvParams.expiredPegInGraceBlocks,\n      timelockPegin: deriveTimelockPegin(offchainParams.timelockAssert),\n      timelockRefund: offchainParams.tRefund,\n      minVpCommissionBps: offchainParams.minVpCommissionBps,\n      offchainParams,\n      offchainParamsVersion,\n      activeVaultCoreVersion,\n    };\n\n    validatePegInConfiguration(config);\n    return config;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Fetch every historical offchain params version in a single multicall.\n   * Iterates 1..latestVersion and calls `getOffchainParamsByVersion` for each.\n   * Versions whose payload fails validation are skipped (not included in the\n   * returned map) so a single bad historical version doesn't block the\n   * lookup of the rest.\n   *\n   * @param onSkippedVersion - optional observer invoked once per skipped\n   *   version. Use to log/telemeter without coupling the SDK to a logger.\n   */\n  async fetchAllOffchainParams(\n    onSkippedVersion?: OnSkippedOffchainParamsVersion,\n  ): Promise<AllOffchainParamsData> {\n    const latestVersion = await this.getLatestOffchainParamsVersion();\n    if (latestVersion === 0) {\n      return { byVersion: new Map(), latestVersion: 0 };\n    }\n\n    const versions = Array.from({ length: latestVersion }, (_, i) => i + 1);\n    const contracts = versions.map((v) => ({\n      address: this.contractAddress,\n      abi: ProtocolParamsABI as Abi,\n      functionName: \"getOffchainParamsByVersion\" as const,\n      args: [v] as const,\n    }));\n\n    const results = await this.publicClient.multicall({\n      contracts,\n      allowFailure: false,\n    });\n\n    const byVersion = new Map<number, VersionedOffchainParams>();\n    for (let i = 0; i < versions.length; i++) {\n      const params = mapOffchainParams(results[i] as RawOffchainParams);\n      try {\n        validateOffchainParams(params);\n        byVersion.set(versions[i], params);\n      } catch (error) {\n        // A malformed historical version mustn't block lookup of the rest.\n        // Surface the skip to the caller's observer if one was supplied.\n        onSkippedVersion?.(\n          versions[i],\n          error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error)),\n        );\n      }\n    }\n\n    return { byVersion, latestVersion };\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Concrete signer-set readers for vault keepers and universal challengers.\n *\n * These are optional utilities — callers can use their own implementations\n * of the VaultKeeperReader and UniversalChallengerReader interfaces.\n */\n\nimport type { Address, Hex, PublicClient } from \"viem\";\n\nimport { ApplicationRegistryABI } from \"../../contracts/abis/ApplicationRegistry.abi\";\nimport { ProtocolParamsABI } from \"../../contracts/abis/ProtocolParams.abi\";\nimport type {\n  AddressBTCKeyPair,\n  UniversalChallengerReader,\n  VaultKeeperReader,\n} from \"./types\";\n\n/** Map viem tuple array to AddressBTCKeyPair[]. */\nfunction mapKeyPairs(\n  result: readonly { ethAddress: Address; btcPubKey: Hex }[],\n): AddressBTCKeyPair[] {\n  return result.map((pair) => ({\n    ethAddress: pair.ethAddress,\n    btcPubKey: pair.btcPubKey,\n  }));\n}\n\n/**\n * Reads vault keepers from the ApplicationRegistry contract.\n *\n * Usage:\n * ```ts\n * const reader = new ViemVaultKeeperReader(publicClient, applicationRegistryAddress);\n * const keepers = await reader.getCurrentVaultKeepers(appEntryPoint);\n * ```\n */\nexport class ViemVaultKeeperReader implements VaultKeeperReader {\n  constructor(\n    private publicClient: PublicClient,\n    private contractAddress: Address,\n  ) {}\n\n  async getVaultKeepersByVersion(\n    appEntryPoint: Address,\n    version: number,\n  ): Promise<AddressBTCKeyPair[]> {\n    const result = (await this.publicClient.readContract({\n      address: this.contractAddress,\n      abi: ApplicationRegistryABI,\n      functionName: \"getVaultKeepersByVersion\",\n      args: [appEntryPoint, version],\n    })) as readonly { ethAddress: Address; btcPubKey: Hex }[];\n\n    return mapKeyPairs(result);\n  }\n\n  async getCurrentVaultKeepers(\n    appEntryPoint: Address,\n  ): Promise<AddressBTCKeyPair[]> {\n    const result = (await this.publicClient.readContract({\n      address: this.contractAddress,\n      abi: ApplicationRegistryABI,\n      functionName: \"getCurrentVaultKeepers\",\n      args: [appEntryPoint],\n    })) as readonly { ethAddress: Address; btcPubKey: Hex }[];\n\n    return mapKeyPairs(result);\n  }\n\n  async getCurrentVaultKeepersVersion(\n    appEntryPoint: Address,\n  ): Promise<number> {\n    const result = (await this.publicClient.readContract({\n      address: this.contractAddress,\n      abi: ApplicationRegistryABI,\n      functionName: \"getCurrentVaultKeepersVersion\",\n      args: [appEntryPoint],\n    })) as number;\n\n    return result;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Reads universal challengers from the ProtocolParams contract.\n *\n * Usage:\n * ```ts\n * const reader = new ViemUniversalChallengerReader(publicClient, protocolParamsAddress);\n * const challengers = await reader.getCurrentUniversalChallengers();\n * ```\n */\nexport class ViemUniversalChallengerReader implements UniversalChallengerReader {\n  constructor(\n    private publicClient: PublicClient,\n    private contractAddress: Address,\n  ) {}\n\n  async getUniversalChallengersByVersion(\n    version: number,\n  ): Promise<AddressBTCKeyPair[]> {\n    const result = (await this.publicClient.readContract({\n      address: this.contractAddress,\n      abi: ProtocolParamsABI,\n      functionName: \"getUniversalChallengersByVersion\",\n      args: [version],\n    })) as readonly { ethAddress: Address; btcPubKey: Hex }[];\n\n    return mapKeyPairs(result);\n  }\n\n  async getCurrentUniversalChallengers(): Promise<AddressBTCKeyPair[]> {\n    const result = (await this.publicClient.readContract({\n      address: this.contractAddress,\n      abi: ProtocolParamsABI,\n      functionName: \"getCurrentUniversalChallengers\",\n    })) as readonly { ethAddress: Address; btcPubKey: Hex }[];\n\n    return mapKeyPairs(result);\n  }\n\n  async getLatestUniversalChallengersVersion(): Promise<number> {\n    const result = (await this.publicClient.readContract({\n      address: this.contractAddress,\n      abi: ProtocolParamsABI,\n      functionName: \"latestUniversalChallengersVersion\",\n    })) as number;\n\n    return result;\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Types and interfaces for ETH contract readers.\n *\n * These are optional utilities — callers can use them or build their own.\n * Core service functions never import from this module.\n */\n\nimport type { Address, Hex } from \"viem\";\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Vault Registry Types\n// ============================================================================\n\ndeclare const onChainBtcPubkeyBrand: unique symbol;\n\n/**\n * 64-char lowercase hex (no `0x`) x-only BTC pubkey sourced from an on-chain\n * registry. Minted only by `assertOnChainBtcPubkey`, which is the shared\n * validator behind both producers:\n * {@link VaultRegistryReader.getVaultProviderGenesisBtcPubKey} (the fixed\n * registration key) and {@link OperationKeyReader} (RFC-006 operation keys,\n * resolved current or at a vault's frozen epoch).\n *\n * @stability frozen\n */\nexport type OnChainBtcPubkey = string & {\n  readonly [onChainBtcPubkeyBrand]: true;\n};\n\n/**\n * Mirrors `IBTCVaultRegistry.BTCVaultStatus` in BTCVaultRegistry.sol exactly.\n * Use this when consuming `status` from `getVaultBasicInfo` /\n * `getBtcVaultBasicInfo`.\n *\n * Do NOT confuse with the app-side `ContractStatus` enum\n * (`services/deposit/peginState.ts`) — that one is for the indexer and\n * extends this with values 5-7, reassigning 4 to LIQUIDATED. Reading an\n * on-chain status through `ContractStatus[n]` for labels will mislabel\n * Expired(4) as LIQUIDATED.\n */\nexport enum OnChainBtcVaultStatus {\n  PENDING = 0,\n  VERIFIED = 1,\n  ACTIVE = 2,\n  REDEEMED = 3,\n  EXPIRED = 4,\n}\n\n/** Basic vault info from BTCVaultRegistry.getBtcVaultBasicInfo */\nexport interface VaultBasicInfo {\n  depositor: Address;\n  depositorBtcPubKey: Hex;\n  amount: bigint;\n  vaultProvider: Address;\n  status: number;\n  applicationEntryPoint: Address;\n  createdAt: bigint;\n}\n\n/** Protocol info from BTCVaultRegistry.getBtcVaultProtocolInfo */\nexport interface VaultProtocolInfo {\n  depositorSignedPeginTx: Hex;\n  universalChallengersVersion: number;\n  appVaultKeepersVersion: number;\n  offchainParamsVersion: number;\n  /**\n   * ETH block number stamped at the Pending→Verified transition.\n   * Compared against `block.number` (inclusive:\n   * `block.number >= verifiedAt + peginActivationDelay`), never a unix timestamp.\n   */\n  verifiedAt: bigint;\n  depositorWotsPkHash: Hex;\n  hashlock: Hex;\n  htlcVout: number;\n  depositorPopSignature: Hex;\n  prePeginTxHash: Hex;\n  vaultProviderCommissionBps: number;\n  /** Vault core version (uint16) stamped at registration. VP-side gating only — see #1690. */\n  vaultCoreVersion: number;\n}\n\n/** Combined vault data (basic + protocol) */\nexport interface VaultData {\n  basic: VaultBasicInfo;\n  protocol: VaultProtocolInfo;\n}\n\n/**\n * RFC-006 operation-key epochs a vault froze at `submitPeginRequest`.\n *\n * Each registry keeps a monotonic epoch counter that every key/payout setter\n * pre-increments. A vault stamps the counters live at its creation, and every\n * participant resolves \"which key did this vault bond?\" by asking the registry\n * for the key whose appended version is the latest stamped `<=` this epoch. A\n * rotation after the vault was created therefore never moves its keys.\n *\n * `uint64` — kept as `bigint` end-to-end and passed straight back to the\n * `...AtEpoch` getters, never narrowed through `Number`.\n *\n * Only ever read through {@link VaultRegistryReader.getVaultKeyEpochs}, which\n * uses the extended ABI. See `BTCVaultRegistryKeyEpochs.abi.ts` for why that\n * read is quarantined to its own ABI.\n */\nexport interface KeyEpochs {\n  vpKeyEpoch: bigint;\n  appKeeperKeyEpoch: bigint;\n  ucKeyEpoch: bigint;\n}\n\n/** Interface for reading vault data from the BTCVaultRegistry contract. */\nexport interface VaultRegistryReader {\n  getVaultBasicInfo(vaultId: Hex): Promise<VaultBasicInfo>;\n  getVaultProtocolInfo(vaultId: Hex): Promise<VaultProtocolInfo>;\n  getProtocolInfoBatch(vaultIds: readonly Hex[]): Promise<VaultProtocolInfo[]>;\n  getVaultData(vaultId: Hex): Promise<VaultData>;\n  /**\n   * Read a vault provider's *genesis* (registration) BTC key — the key bonded\n   * at version 0, which never moves when the operator rotates.\n   *\n   * Used only as the genesis fallback for epoch-based resolution and as a\n   * candidate when cross-checking an indexer hint. Never the key to build a\n   * Bitcoin lock with; that comes from `OperationKeyReader`.\n   *\n   * Resolves via `getOperationBtcKeyAtEpoch` at epoch 0, so it requires an\n   * RFC-006 registry — as does every caller.\n   */\n  getVaultProviderGenesisBtcPubKey(\n    vpAddress: Address,\n  ): Promise<OnChainBtcPubkey>;\n  /** Read the protocol pegin fee (in wei) for a given vault provider. */\n  getPegInFee(vaultProvider: Address): Promise<bigint>;\n  /**\n   * Read a vault provider's current commission in basis points.\n   *\n   * Validates the contract-enforced `[0, 9999]` range — an out-of-range\n   * value signals a wrong contract address or ABI drift, not a real rate.\n   */\n  getVaultProviderCommission(vaultProvider: Address): Promise<number>;\n  /**\n   * Read a vault's frozen RFC-006 key epochs.\n   *\n   * Uses the extended `getBtcVaultProtocolInfo` ABI. Against a registry whose\n   * `BTCVaultProtocolInfo` struct is not extended this returns silent garbage\n   * for a populated vault rather than throwing, so it must only be called\n   * against an RFC-006 registry — a deployment invariant, not something this\n   * call can detect. A registry missing the operation-key getters altogether is\n   * the safer case: key resolution reverts downstream and these epochs are never\n   * used. See `BTCVaultRegistryKeyEpochs.abi.ts`.\n   */\n  getVaultKeyEpochs(vaultId: Hex): Promise<KeyEpochs>;\n  /** {@link getVaultKeyEpochs} for many vaults in one multicall. */\n  getVaultKeyEpochsBatch(vaultIds: readonly Hex[]): Promise<KeyEpochs[]>;\n  /**\n   * Read a vault provider's *current* RFC-006 operation BTC key — the key its\n   * server signs auth tokens with. Falls back to the registration key when the\n   * provider has never rotated.\n   */\n  getCurrentVaultProviderOperationBtcKey(\n    vpAddress: Address,\n  ): Promise<OnChainBtcPubkey>;\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Protocol Params Types (from IProtocolParams.sol)\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * TBV protocol parameters from the ProtocolParams contract.\n * Matches Solidity struct `IProtocolParams.TBVProtocolParams` exactly.\n *\n * All uint64 amounts use bigint (satoshi values can exceed 2^53).\n * uint8 uses number (bounded, max 255).\n */\nexport interface TBVProtocolParams {\n  minimumPegInAmount: bigint;\n  maxPegInAmount: bigint;\n  pegInAckTimeout: bigint;\n  pegInActivationTimeout: bigint;\n  maxHtlcOutputCount: number;\n  /**\n   * Number of blocks added to the activation deadline as a grace window\n   * during which a depositor may still reclaim an expired pegin via the\n   * HTLC preimage. Source: `IProtocolParams.TBVProtocolParams.expiredPegInGraceBlocks`.\n   */\n  expiredPegInGraceBlocks: bigint;\n}\n\n/**\n * Versioned offchain parameters from the ProtocolParams contract.\n * Matches Solidity struct `IProtocolParams.VersionedOffchainParams` exactly.\n *\n * bigint for: uint256 timelocks, uint64 fee rates/amounts.\n * number for: uint8/uint16/uint32 fields (bounded, safe for JS arithmetic).\n */\nexport interface VersionedOffchainParams {\n  timelockAssert: bigint;\n  timelockChallengeAssert: bigint;\n  securityCouncilKeys: Hex[];\n  councilQuorum: number;\n  feeRate: bigint;\n  babeTotalInstances: number;\n  babeInstancesToFinalize: number;\n  minVpCommissionBps: number;\n  tRefund: number;\n  tStale: number;\n  minPeginFeeRate: bigint;\n  proverCircuitVersion: number;\n  minPrepeginDepth: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Combined peg-in configuration read atomically via multicall.\n * Prevents TOCTOU inconsistency if governance updates params between reads.\n */\nexport interface PegInConfiguration {\n  minimumPegInAmount: bigint;\n  maxPegInAmount: bigint;\n  pegInAckTimeout: bigint;\n  pegInActivationTimeout: bigint;\n  maxHtlcOutputCount: number;\n  expiredPegInGraceBlocks: bigint;\n  timelockPegin: number;\n  timelockRefund: number;\n  minVpCommissionBps: number;\n  offchainParams: VersionedOffchainParams;\n  /**\n   * Version label paired atomically with `offchainParams`.\n   * Read in the same multicall as the params struct so that, if a parameter\n   * update lands between separate reads, the script-construction code and\n   * the version label stay consistent.\n   */\n  offchainParamsVersion: number;\n  /**\n   * Currently-active vault core (tx-graph) version\n   * (`ProtocolParams.activeVaultCoreVersion()`, uint16 ≥ 1). Stamped onto\n   * every new vault at peg-in submission; fresh deposits must build this\n   * graph version. Read in the same multicall so a governance version bump\n   * can't land between reading the params and reading the version.\n   */\n  activeVaultCoreVersion: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * All offchain params snapshots indexed by version, plus the latest version\n * number known when the snapshot was taken. Used by consumers that need to\n * resolve any historical version (e.g. signing for an existing vault locked\n * to an older version).\n */\nexport interface AllOffchainParamsData {\n  byVersion: Map<number, VersionedOffchainParams>;\n  latestVersion: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Optional observer invoked by `fetchAllOffchainParams` when a historical\n * version fails validation. Called once per skipped version so callers can\n * log/telemeter without coupling the SDK to a specific logger.\n */\nexport type OnSkippedOffchainParamsVersion = (\n  version: number,\n  error: Error,\n) => void;\n\n/** Interface for reading protocol parameters from the ProtocolParams contract. */\nexport interface ProtocolParamsReader {\n  getTBVProtocolParams(): Promise<TBVProtocolParams>;\n  getOffchainParamsByVersion(version: number): Promise<VersionedOffchainParams>;\n  getLatestOffchainParams(): Promise<VersionedOffchainParams>;\n  getLatestOffchainParamsVersion(): Promise<number>;\n  getTimelockPeginByVersion(version: number): Promise<number>;\n  getPegInConfiguration(): Promise<PegInConfiguration>;\n  /**\n   * Observation window enforced between a vault's final ACK and its\n   * activation, in ETH blocks measured from `verifiedAt`. `0` disables it.\n   *\n   * Deliberately its own read rather than a field on\n   * {@link PegInConfiguration}: the parameter is absent from deployments that\n   * predate it, so folding it into the shared multicall would make every\n   * protocol-param read fail wherever it is missing.\n   *\n   * @throws If the deployment does not expose `peginActivationDelay()`, or\n   *   the decoded payload is not a `bigint`.\n   */\n  getPeginActivationDelay(): Promise<bigint>;\n  fetchAllOffchainParams(\n    onSkippedVersion?: OnSkippedOffchainParamsVersion,\n  ): Promise<AllOffchainParamsData>;\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Signer-Set Types (from BTCVaultTypes.sol)\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Matches Solidity struct `BTCVaultTypes.AddressBTCKeyPair` exactly.\n * Used for vault keepers and universal challengers.\n */\nexport interface AddressBTCKeyPair {\n  ethAddress: Address;\n  btcPubKey: Hex;\n}\n\n/** Interface for reading vault keepers from the ApplicationRegistry contract. */\nexport interface VaultKeeperReader {\n  getVaultKeepersByVersion(\n    appEntryPoint: Address,\n    version: number,\n  ): Promise<AddressBTCKeyPair[]>;\n  getCurrentVaultKeepers(appEntryPoint: Address): Promise<AddressBTCKeyPair[]>;\n  getCurrentVaultKeepersVersion(appEntryPoint: Address): Promise<number>;\n}\n\n/** Interface for reading universal challengers from the ProtocolParams contract. */\nexport interface UniversalChallengerReader {\n  getUniversalChallengersByVersion(\n    version: number,\n  ): Promise<AddressBTCKeyPair[]>;\n  getCurrentUniversalChallengers(): Promise<AddressBTCKeyPair[]>;\n  getLatestUniversalChallengersVersion(): Promise<number>;\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// RFC-006 Operation-Key Types\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * The participants whose operation keys are being resolved, and the roster\n * they are resolved against.\n *\n * A roster entry's `ethAddress` is the operator's **admin** address — the\n * lookup key for its key history — and its `btcPubKey` is the operator's\n * **genesis** key. Both are needed: the `...AtEpochOrGenesis` getters take the\n * roster key explicitly because the correct genesis for a keeper/challenger is\n * its key in the vault's *frozen membership version*, which an operator that\n * was later dropped from the roster no longer has a current entry for.\n */\nexport interface OperationKeyQuery {\n  vaultProviderEthAddress: Address;\n  /**\n   * The VP's genesis (registration) key, from\n   * {@link VaultRegistryReader.getVaultProviderGenesisBtcPubKey}.\n   *\n   * The VP has no roster entry to carry a genesis key the way keepers and\n   * challengers do, so it is supplied here. Every call site already reads it:\n   * it is what the indexer hint is compared against, and what makes the VP's\n   * `rotated` flag mean the same thing as everyone else's.\n   */\n  vaultProviderGenesisBtcPubkey: Hex;\n  applicationEntryPoint: Address;\n  /** Keeper roster at the membership version being resolved against. */\n  vaultKeepers: readonly AddressBTCKeyPair[];\n  /** Challenger roster at the membership version being resolved against. */\n  universalChallengers: readonly AddressBTCKeyPair[];\n}\n\n/** Raw registry-returned operation keys, index-aligned with the query rosters. */\nexport interface RawOperationKeys {\n  vaultProvider: Hex;\n  vaultKeepers: Hex[];\n  universalChallengers: Hex[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Registry-returned payout scriptPubKeys, index-aligned with the query\n * rosters. `universalChallengers` has no counterpart: a UC is never a claimer,\n * so it has no payout script.\n */\nexport interface RawPayoutScripts {\n  vaultProvider: Hex;\n  vaultKeepers: Hex[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Reads RFC-006 operation keys and payout scripts across all three registries\n * (BTCVaultRegistry, ApplicationRegistry, ProtocolParams).\n *\n * Every method resolves the whole participant set in a **single** multicall so\n * the keys are pinned to one block. That atomicity is load-bearing: a rotation\n * landing between two `eth_call`s would yield a self-inconsistent key set that\n * builds a lock no counterparty agrees with.\n */\nexport interface OperationKeyReader {\n  /**\n   * Resolve every participant's *current* operation key.\n   *\n   * Used for new peg-ins and for the VP auth pin. Needs no epoch read at all —\n   * each registry's `getCurrentOperationBtcKey` resolves its own genesis\n   * fallback, so an operator that never rotated yields its registration key.\n   */\n  getCurrentOperationKeys(query: OperationKeyQuery): Promise<RawOperationKeys>;\n  /**\n   * Resolve every participant's operation key bonded at a vault's frozen\n   * epochs. Used for every existing-vault path (resume, payout, refund).\n   */\n  getOperationKeysAtEpochs(\n    query: OperationKeyQuery,\n    epochs: KeyEpochs,\n  ): Promise<RawOperationKeys>;\n  /**\n   * Resolve the VP's commission payout script and each keeper's payout script\n   * at a vault's frozen epochs.\n   *\n   * The registry backfills BIP-86 P2TR of the epoch's operation key for any\n   * operator that never called `setPayoutScript`, so this returns byte-identical\n   * results to local BIP-86 derivation until an operator registers a custom\n   * script.\n   */\n  getPayoutScriptsAtEpochs(\n    query: OperationKeyQuery,\n    epochs: KeyEpochs,\n  ): Promise<RawPayoutScripts>;\n}\n","/**\n * Minimal CBOR encoder for the server-identity payload shape.\n *\n * We only need to encode one specific CBOR structure — the 3-tuple\n * `(SERVER_IDENTITY_DOMAIN, ephemeral_pubkey_bytes, expires_at_u64)` —\n * byte-for-byte identical to what the Rust `ciborium` crate produces\n * for the corresponding tuple, because that's the exact message the\n * VP signs with BIP-322.\n *\n * IMPORTANT encoding quirk: the Rust side passes the domain and\n * pubkey as `&[u8]` / `Vec<u8>` without a `#[serde(with = \"serde_bytes\")]`\n * attribute, so serde/ciborium encodes them as **CBOR arrays of u8**\n * (major type 4, one item per byte) — NOT as CBOR byte strings (major\n * type 2). A naive byte-string encoding would produce the wrong bytes\n * and signature verification would fail.\n *\n * Rather than pull in a full CBOR dependency for this one shape, we\n * implement the exact subset inline (~40 LOC) and pin it with golden\n * vectors against the Rust reference output.\n *\n * @module tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/cbor\n */\n\n/**\n * Encode a small CBOR unsigned-integer \"head\" byte for major type\n * `major` (0..7) with argument `arg` (0..2^64-1).\n *\n * Returns the header bytes; the caller concatenates any trailing data\n * (e.g. array elements). Encoding rules:\n *   arg < 24         → single byte `(major << 5) | arg`\n *   arg < 256        → `(major << 5) | 24` + 1-byte arg\n *   arg < 65536      → `(major << 5) | 25` + 2-byte BE arg\n *   arg < 2^32       → `(major << 5) | 26` + 4-byte BE arg\n *   arg < 2^64       → `(major << 5) | 27` + 8-byte BE arg\n */\nfunction cborHead(major: number, arg: number | bigint): Uint8Array {\n  const tag = (major & 0x07) << 5;\n  const n = typeof arg === \"bigint\" ? arg : BigInt(arg);\n  if (n < 0n) throw new Error(\"cborHead: negative argument\");\n\n  if (n < 24n) return new Uint8Array([tag | Number(n)]);\n  if (n < 0x100n) return new Uint8Array([tag | 24, Number(n)]);\n  if (n < 0x10000n) {\n    const v = Number(n);\n    return new Uint8Array([tag | 25, (v >>> 8) & 0xff, v & 0xff]);\n  }\n  if (n < 0x1_0000_0000n) {\n    const v = Number(n);\n    return new Uint8Array([\n      tag | 26,\n      (v >>> 24) & 0xff,\n      (v >>> 16) & 0xff,\n      (v >>> 8) & 0xff,\n      v & 0xff,\n    ]);\n  }\n  // 8-byte BE for u64 range\n  const out = new Uint8Array(9);\n  out[0] = tag | 27;\n  for (let i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {\n    out[1 + i] = Number(n >> BigInt((7 - i) * 8)) & 0xff;\n  }\n  return out;\n}\n\nfunction concat(...parts: Uint8Array[]): Uint8Array {\n  const total = parts.reduce((s, p) => s + p.length, 0);\n  const out = new Uint8Array(total);\n  let offset = 0;\n  for (const p of parts) {\n    out.set(p, offset);\n    offset += p.length;\n  }\n  return out;\n}\n\n/**\n * Encode a `Vec<u8>` / `&[u8]` the way ciborium does by default — as a\n * CBOR array of u8 (major type 4), one element per byte.\n *\n * Each byte becomes a CBOR unsigned integer (major type 0): bytes\n * < 24 are encoded as single bytes, bytes 24..255 as `0x18 XX`.\n */\nfunction encodeBytesAsArrayOfU8(bytes: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {\n  const header = cborHead(4, bytes.length);\n  const items: Uint8Array[] = [header];\n  for (const b of bytes) {\n    items.push(cborHead(0, b));\n  }\n  return concat(...items);\n}\n\n/**\n * Encode the server-identity payload the Rust side signs:\n *\n *     ciborium::into_writer(\n *       &(SERVER_IDENTITY_DOMAIN, ephemeral_pubkey.serialize().to_vec(), expires_at),\n *       buf\n *     )\n *\n * Output bytes are byte-for-byte identical to the Rust reference,\n * pinned by the golden vector in the corresponding test file.\n *\n * @internal Exposed only for the golden-vector test that pins this\n * encoding against ciborium's output. Production callers reach this\n * via `verifyServerIdentity` from `./serverIdentity`.\n *\n * @param domain - Must be `\"btc-auth.server-identity.v1\"` (27 bytes)\n *                 — the constant from btc-vault's `server_identity.rs`.\n * @param ephemeralPubkeyCompressed - 33-byte SEC1-compressed pubkey.\n * @param expiresAt - Unix timestamp (seconds). Must be a safe integer.\n */\nexport function encodeServerIdentityPayload(\n  domain: Uint8Array,\n  ephemeralPubkeyCompressed: Uint8Array,\n  expiresAt: number,\n): Uint8Array {\n  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(expiresAt) || expiresAt < 0) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `encodeServerIdentityPayload: expires_at must be a non-negative safe integer, got ${expiresAt}`,\n    );\n  }\n  const arrayHeader = cborHead(4, 3); // 3-tuple encoded as array of 3\n  const domainBytes = encodeBytesAsArrayOfU8(domain);\n  const pubkeyBytes = encodeBytesAsArrayOfU8(ephemeralPubkeyCompressed);\n  const expiresAtBytes = cborHead(0, expiresAt);\n  return concat(arrayHeader, domainBytes, pubkeyBytes, expiresAtBytes);\n}\n","/**\n * Server-identity verification for the vault provider's\n * `auth_createDepositorToken` response.\n *\n * The VP returns a `ServerIdentityResponse` bundled with every issued\n * token:\n *\n *   - `server_pubkey`:    VP's persistent x-only pubkey (HEX, 32B)\n *   - `ephemeral_pubkey`: VP's ephemeral token-signing key (HEX, 33B compressed)\n *   - `expires_at`:       Unix timestamp when the ephemeral key expires\n *   - `signature`:        BIP-322 signature by the persistent key over\n *                         `(SERVER_IDENTITY_DOMAIN, ephemeral_pubkey, expires_at)`\n *\n * The FE pins `server_pubkey` against the on-chain `VaultProvider.btcPubKey`\n * it reads from the registry contract. A mismatch rejects the token.\n *\n * @module tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/serverIdentity\n */\n\nimport * as ecc from \"@bitcoin-js/tiny-secp256k1-asmjs\";\n\nimport {\n  SCHNORR_SIG_HEX_LEN,\n  stripHexPrefix,\n} from \"../../../primitives/utils/bitcoin\";\nimport {\n  COMPRESSED_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN,\n  HEX_RE,\n  X_ONLY_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN,\n} from \"../../../utils/validation\";\n\nimport { verifyBip322Simple } from \"./bip322Verify\";\nimport { encodeServerIdentityPayload } from \"./cbor\";\n\n/**\n * Byte-string domain the btc-vault Rust reference passes as the first\n * element of the CBOR tuple signed over for server-identity proofs.\n * Must match `SERVER_IDENTITY_DOMAIN` in\n * `btc-vault/crates/btc-auth/src/server_identity.rs`.\n */\nconst SERVER_IDENTITY_DOMAIN = new TextEncoder().encode(\n  \"btc-auth.server-identity.v1\",\n);\n\n/**\n * Cap on `proof.expires_at - now`. Bounds how long a leaked VP\n * ephemeral key stays usable; the bearer token's own TTL does not\n * (different trust boundary). 2h = Rust ref VP's 1h rotation × 2 for\n * clock skew. Override per call via `maxLifetimeSecs`.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_MAX_PROOF_LIFETIME_SECS = 2 * 3600;\n\n/**\n * Wire representation from btc-vault's `ServerIdentityResponse`.\n */\nexport interface ServerIdentityResponse {\n  /** Hex-encoded x-only (32-byte) persistent server pubkey. */\n  server_pubkey: string;\n  /** Hex-encoded compressed (33-byte) ephemeral token-signing pubkey. */\n  ephemeral_pubkey: string;\n  /** Unix timestamp at which the ephemeral key expires. */\n  expires_at: number;\n  /** Hex-encoded 64-byte BIP-322 Schnorr signature. */\n  signature: string;\n}\n\nexport interface VerifyServerIdentityInput {\n  /** The proof returned by `auth_createDepositorToken`. */\n  proof: ServerIdentityResponse;\n  /**\n   * The x-only persistent server pubkey the FE expects (sourced from\n   * the on-chain `VaultProvider.btcPubKey` via the vault registry\n   * reader). 64-char lowercase hex, no `0x` prefix.\n   */\n  pinnedServerPubkey: string;\n  /** Current Unix timestamp in seconds. Injected for testability. */\n  now: number;\n  /** Cap on `proof.expires_at - now` (seconds). Defaults to {@link DEFAULT_MAX_PROOF_LIFETIME_SECS}. */\n  maxLifetimeSecs?: number;\n}\n\nexport class ServerIdentityError extends Error {\n  constructor(\n    message: string,\n    public readonly reason:\n      | \"pinned_pubkey_mismatch\"\n      | \"expired\"\n      | \"expires_too_far\"\n      | \"invalid_expires_at\"\n      | \"invalid_max_lifetime\"\n      | \"invalid_pubkey_encoding\"\n      | \"invalid_ephemeral_pubkey\"\n      | \"invalid_signature_encoding\"\n      | \"signature_verification_failed\",\n  ) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = \"ServerIdentityError\";\n  }\n}\n\n/** Parse a lowercase-hex string to bytes. Expects even length, already validated. */\nfunction hexToBytes(hex: string): Uint8Array {\n  const out = new Uint8Array(hex.length / 2);\n  for (let i = 0; i < out.length; i++) {\n    out[i] = parseInt(hex.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);\n  }\n  return out;\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify a server identity proof against a pinned server pubkey.\n *\n * Checks:\n *   1. `server_pubkey` matches the pin.\n *   2. `now < expires_at <= now + maxLifetimeSecs` (with integer guards).\n *   3. `ephemeral_pubkey` is a well-formed 33-byte compressed pubkey.\n *   4. `signature` is a well-formed 64-byte Schnorr hex string.\n *   5. The BIP-322 Schnorr signature cryptographically verifies\n *      against `server_pubkey` over the CBOR-encoded tuple\n *      `(SERVER_IDENTITY_DOMAIN, ephemeral_pubkey, expires_at)`.\n *\n * Step 5 is what actually binds the ephemeral key to the persistent\n * pubkey — without it, a TLS-MITM attacker who reads the pinned\n * pubkey from the on-chain registry could substitute an arbitrary\n * ephemeral pubkey paired with any lexically-valid signature.\n *\n * @throws ServerIdentityError on any validation failure.\n */\nexport function verifyServerIdentity(input: VerifyServerIdentityInput): void {\n  const { proof, pinnedServerPubkey, now } = input;\n  const maxLifetimeSecs =\n    input.maxLifetimeSecs ?? DEFAULT_MAX_PROOF_LIFETIME_SECS;\n\n  const pinned = stripHexPrefix(pinnedServerPubkey).toLowerCase();\n  if (pinned.length !== X_ONLY_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN || !HEX_RE.test(pinned)) {\n    throw new ServerIdentityError(\n      `pinnedServerPubkey must be 32-byte hex; got ${pinned.length} chars`,\n      \"invalid_pubkey_encoding\",\n    );\n  }\n\n  const actual = stripHexPrefix(proof.server_pubkey).toLowerCase();\n  if (actual.length !== X_ONLY_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN || !HEX_RE.test(actual)) {\n    throw new ServerIdentityError(\n      `server_pubkey must be 32-byte hex; got ${actual.length} chars`,\n      \"invalid_pubkey_encoding\",\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (actual !== pinned) {\n    throw new ServerIdentityError(\n      `server_pubkey does not match pinned value: expected ${pinned}, got ${actual}`,\n      \"pinned_pubkey_mismatch\",\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Validate both sides of the comparison are well-formed integers\n  // BEFORE comparing — untrusted JSON-RPC input can supply\n  // undefined/NaN/string values for `expires_at`, and relational\n  // comparisons with those silently evaluate to `false` (accepting the\n  // proof). Caller's `now` is injected but we still sanity-check it.\n  // Garbage data and \"valid but past\" both render the proof unusable\n  // but mean different things to a caller — keep the reasons distinct.\n  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(proof.expires_at)) {\n    throw new ServerIdentityError(\n      `expires_at must be a finite integer; got ${JSON.stringify(proof.expires_at)}`,\n      \"invalid_expires_at\",\n    );\n  }\n  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(now)) {\n    throw new ServerIdentityError(\n      `now must be a finite integer; got ${JSON.stringify(now)}`,\n      \"invalid_expires_at\",\n    );\n  }\n  if (proof.expires_at <= now) {\n    throw new ServerIdentityError(\n      `server identity proof expired at ${proof.expires_at}, now ${now}`,\n      \"expired\",\n    );\n  }\n  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(maxLifetimeSecs) || maxLifetimeSecs <= 0) {\n    throw new ServerIdentityError(\n      `maxLifetimeSecs must be a positive safe integer; got ${JSON.stringify(maxLifetimeSecs)}`,\n      \"invalid_max_lifetime\",\n    );\n  }\n  if (proof.expires_at - now > maxLifetimeSecs) {\n    throw new ServerIdentityError(\n      `server identity proof expires too far in the future: ` +\n        `expires_at=${proof.expires_at}, now=${now}, max lifetime=${maxLifetimeSecs}s`,\n      \"expires_too_far\",\n    );\n  }\n\n  const eph = stripHexPrefix(proof.ephemeral_pubkey).toLowerCase();\n  if (eph.length !== COMPRESSED_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN || !HEX_RE.test(eph)) {\n    throw new ServerIdentityError(\n      `ephemeral_pubkey must be 33-byte compressed hex; got ${eph.length} chars`,\n      \"invalid_ephemeral_pubkey\",\n    );\n  }\n  const prefix = eph.slice(0, 2);\n  if (prefix !== \"02\" && prefix !== \"03\") {\n    throw new ServerIdentityError(\n      `ephemeral_pubkey must be compressed (prefix 02/03); got ${prefix}`,\n      \"invalid_ephemeral_pubkey\",\n    );\n  }\n  // Curve validation. The BIP-322 signature attests to the byte string\n  // of `ephemeral_pubkey` only, not to its curve validity. Without\n  // this check, a server could sign a structurally-valid byte string\n  // that doesn't decode to a secp256k1 point — passing verification\n  // here and surfacing as an obscure crypto error later when the\n  // depositor tries to use the key. Reject up front.\n  const ephBytes = hexToBytes(eph);\n  if (!ecc.isPoint(ephBytes)) {\n    throw new ServerIdentityError(\n      \"ephemeral_pubkey is not a valid secp256k1 point\",\n      \"invalid_ephemeral_pubkey\",\n    );\n  }\n\n  const sig = stripHexPrefix(proof.signature).toLowerCase();\n  if (sig.length !== SCHNORR_SIG_HEX_LEN || !HEX_RE.test(sig)) {\n    throw new ServerIdentityError(\n      `signature must be 64-byte Schnorr hex; got ${sig.length} chars`,\n      \"invalid_signature_encoding\",\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Cryptographic verification of the BIP-322 signature over the\n  // CBOR-encoded payload. Without this, the ephemeral-key binding is\n  // unenforced and a TLS-MITM could substitute a fake ephemeral key\n  // alongside the real (publicly-readable) pinned pubkey.\n  const payload = encodeServerIdentityPayload(\n    SERVER_IDENTITY_DOMAIN,\n    hexToBytes(eph),\n    proof.expires_at,\n  );\n  const verified = verifyBip322Simple(\n    payload,\n    hexToBytes(actual),\n    hexToBytes(sig),\n  );\n  if (!verified) {\n    throw new ServerIdentityError(\n      \"BIP-322 signature verification failed — ephemeral key is not attested by pinned server pubkey\",\n      \"signature_verification_failed\",\n    );\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * VP RPC methods that require `Authorization: Bearer <token>`.\n * Protocol invariant — must be kept in sync with the VP server.\n *\n * Split into two sets by the CWT subject the VP demands:\n *\n * - {@link AUTH_GATED_METHODS} — bearer minted by\n *   `auth_createDepositorToken` (Subject::VaultdJsonRpc). These run\n *   through the proxy's plain JSON-RPC forward path.\n * - {@link GRPC_AUTH_GATED_METHODS} — bearer minted by\n *   `auth_createDepositorTokenGrpc` (Subject::VaultdGrpc). The proxy\n *   translates these into gRPC calls to vaultd's daemon gRPC server,\n *   so a JSON-RPC-subject token would be rejected by\n *   `GrpcAuthInterceptor`.\n *\n * @stability frozen\n *\n * @module tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/gatedMethods\n */\n\nexport const AUTH_GATED_METHODS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n  \"vaultProvider_submitDepositorWotsKey\",\n  \"vaultProvider_submitDepositorPresignatures\",\n  \"vaultProvider_requestDepositorPresignTransactions\",\n]);\n\nexport const GRPC_AUTH_GATED_METHODS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n  \"vaultProvider_requestDepositorClaimerArtifacts\",\n]);\n","/**\n * Shared internals for the unauthenticated token-issuing JSON-RPC\n * client. The \"inner\" client is dedicated to `auth_createDepositorToken`\n * — it MUST NOT carry a `tokenProvider`, else the JSON-RPC header\n * builder would recurse into token acquisition.\n *\n * @module tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/innerTokenClient\n */\n\nimport { JsonRpcClient } from \"../json-rpc-client\";\n\nconst TOKEN_RPC_TIMEOUT_MS = 60_000;\n\nexport const TOKEN_ISSUE_METHOD = \"auth_createDepositorToken\";\n/**\n * gRPC-subject sibling of {@link TOKEN_ISSUE_METHOD}. The proxy bridges\n * this call to vaultd's `VaultProviderDepositorAuthService.CreateDepositorToken`\n * so the resulting CWT is bound to `Subject::VaultdGrpc` — required to\n * pass vaultd's `GrpcAuthInterceptor` on methods the proxy translates to\n * gRPC (currently just the artifact stream).\n */\nexport const GRPC_TOKEN_ISSUE_METHOD = \"auth_createDepositorTokenGrpc\";\n\nexport function buildInnerTokenClient(\n  baseUrl: string,\n  headers?: Record<string, string>,\n): JsonRpcClient {\n  return new JsonRpcClient({\n    baseUrl,\n    timeout: TOKEN_RPC_TIMEOUT_MS,\n    headers,\n    retryableFor: (method) =>\n      method === TOKEN_ISSUE_METHOD || method === GRPC_TOKEN_ISSUE_METHOD,\n  });\n}\n","/**\n * Minimal CBOR decoder — the read-side counterpart to {@link ./cbor}.\n *\n * Decodes only the subset needed to verify a vault-provider CWT bearer\n * token (RFC 8392) wrapped in a COSE Sign1 envelope (RFC 8152): tagged\n * values, definite-length arrays and maps, byte/text strings, and\n * unsigned/negative integers. Indefinite-length items, floats, and\n * big-number tags are intentionally rejected — the issuer\n * (btc-vault's `coset`/`ciborium` stack) never emits them for this\n * shape, so accepting them would only widen the parser's attack\n * surface.\n *\n * The decoder is a cursor over a single buffer. {@link CborReader.pos}\n * is public so callers can slice the exact encoded byte range of an\n * item (head + content) — required to reconstruct the COSE\n * `Sig_structure` byte-for-byte from the token's own protected-header\n * and payload byte strings.\n *\n * @module tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/cborDecode\n */\n\n/** CBOR major types (the high 3 bits of the initial byte). */\nconst MAJOR_UNSIGNED_INT = 0;\nconst MAJOR_NEGATIVE_INT = 1;\nconst MAJOR_BYTE_STRING = 2;\nconst MAJOR_TEXT_STRING = 3;\nconst MAJOR_ARRAY = 4;\nconst MAJOR_MAP = 5;\nconst MAJOR_TAG = 6;\nconst MAJOR_SIMPLE = 7;\n\n/**\n * Smallest additional-info value that introduces a multi-byte argument\n * (24 ⇒ 1 byte, 25 ⇒ 2, 26 ⇒ 4, 27 ⇒ 8 — i.e. `1 << (info - 24)`).\n */\nconst ARG_IN_NEXT_1_BYTE = 24;\n/** Additional-info ≥ this (28..31) is reserved/indefinite — unsupported. */\nconst ARG_RESERVED_MIN = 28;\n\n/** Major-7 simple values we accept. */\nconst SIMPLE_FALSE = 20;\nconst SIMPLE_TRUE = 21;\nconst SIMPLE_NULL = 22;\n\n/**\n * Maximum CBOR nesting depth. Mirrors the issuer's recursion cap (256 in\n * btc-vault's `ciborium` stack). The COSE protected header is decoded\n * *before* the signature is verified, so without this bound a\n * malicious/MITM'd VP could send a deeply-nested blob and crash token\n * acquisition with an uncatchable stack overflow. Far below the JS call\n * stack limit, so it converts that DoS into a catchable decode error.\n */\nconst MAX_NESTING_DEPTH = 256;\n\n/** A decoded CBOR data item. Maps preserve key insertion order. */\nexport type CborValue =\n  | number\n  | bigint\n  | string\n  | Uint8Array\n  | boolean\n  | null\n  | CborValue[]\n  | Map<CborValue, CborValue>\n  | CborTagged;\n\n/** A CBOR tagged value (major type 6). */\nexport interface CborTagged {\n  tag: number;\n  value: CborValue;\n}\n\n/** Parsed initial-byte header: major type plus its decoded argument. */\nexport interface CborHead {\n  major: number;\n  /** The header argument (length, value, tag number, …) as a number. */\n  arg: number;\n}\n\nexport class CborDecodeError extends Error {\n  constructor(message: string) {\n    super(`CBOR decode: ${message}`);\n    this.name = \"CborDecodeError\";\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Cursor-based reader over a CBOR buffer. Not reusable across buffers —\n * construct one per decode.\n */\nexport class CborReader {\n  readonly buf: Uint8Array;\n  /** Current read offset. Public so callers can slice encoded sub-ranges. */\n  pos = 0;\n\n  constructor(buf: Uint8Array) {\n    this.buf = buf;\n  }\n\n  private nextByte(): number {\n    if (this.pos >= this.buf.length) {\n      throw new CborDecodeError(\"unexpected end of input\");\n    }\n    return this.buf[this.pos++];\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Read an initial byte and its argument. Rejects indefinite-length\n   * and reserved additional-info encodings. Arguments wider than\n   * {@link Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER} are rejected — none of the token's\n   * lengths, tags, or timestamps approach that bound.\n   */\n  readHead(): CborHead {\n    const initial = this.nextByte();\n    const major = initial >> 5;\n    const info = initial & 0x1f;\n\n    if (info < ARG_IN_NEXT_1_BYTE) {\n      return { major, arg: info };\n    }\n    if (info >= ARG_RESERVED_MIN) {\n      throw new CborDecodeError(\n        `unsupported additional info ${info} (indefinite-length or reserved)`,\n      );\n    }\n\n    const byteCount = 1 << (info - ARG_IN_NEXT_1_BYTE);\n\n    let value = 0n;\n    for (let i = 0; i < byteCount; i++) {\n      value = (value << 8n) | BigInt(this.nextByte());\n    }\n    if (value > BigInt(Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER)) {\n      throw new CborDecodeError(`argument ${value} exceeds safe integer range`);\n    }\n    return { major, arg: Number(value) };\n  }\n\n  /** Read `length` raw bytes as a sub-array view into the backing buffer. */\n  private readBytes(length: number): Uint8Array {\n    if (this.pos + length > this.buf.length) {\n      throw new CborDecodeError(\"length overruns end of input\");\n    }\n    const slice = this.buf.subarray(this.pos, this.pos + length);\n    this.pos += length;\n    return slice;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Read a byte string (major type 2), returning its content bytes.\n   * Throws if the next item is not a byte string.\n   */\n  readByteString(): Uint8Array {\n    const head = this.readHead();\n    if (head.major !== MAJOR_BYTE_STRING) {\n      throw new CborDecodeError(\n        `expected byte string (major ${MAJOR_BYTE_STRING}), got major ${head.major}`,\n      );\n    }\n    return this.readBytes(head.arg);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Read the next complete data item as a decoded {@link CborValue}.\n   *\n   * `depth` tracks the current nesting level so a deeply-nested blob is\n   * rejected with a {@link CborDecodeError} rather than overflowing the\n   * native call stack (see {@link MAX_NESTING_DEPTH}).\n   */\n  readValue(depth = 0): CborValue {\n    if (depth > MAX_NESTING_DEPTH) {\n      throw new CborDecodeError(\n        `nesting exceeds maximum depth ${MAX_NESTING_DEPTH}`,\n      );\n    }\n    const head = this.readHead();\n    switch (head.major) {\n      case MAJOR_UNSIGNED_INT:\n        return head.arg;\n      case MAJOR_NEGATIVE_INT:\n        // RFC 8949 §3.1: the encoded argument n represents -1 - n.\n        return -1 - head.arg;\n      case MAJOR_BYTE_STRING:\n        return this.readBytes(head.arg);\n      case MAJOR_TEXT_STRING:\n        return new TextDecoder(\"utf-8\", { fatal: true }).decode(\n          this.readBytes(head.arg),\n        );\n      case MAJOR_ARRAY: {\n        const items: CborValue[] = [];\n        for (let i = 0; i < head.arg; i++) {\n          items.push(this.readValue(depth + 1));\n        }\n        return items;\n      }\n      case MAJOR_MAP: {\n        const map = new Map<CborValue, CborValue>();\n        for (let i = 0; i < head.arg; i++) {\n          const key = this.readValue(depth + 1);\n          const value = this.readValue(depth + 1);\n          map.set(key, value);\n        }\n        return map;\n      }\n      case MAJOR_TAG:\n        return { tag: head.arg, value: this.readValue(depth + 1) };\n      case MAJOR_SIMPLE:\n        if (head.arg === SIMPLE_FALSE) return false;\n        if (head.arg === SIMPLE_TRUE) return true;\n        if (head.arg === SIMPLE_NULL) return null;\n        throw new CborDecodeError(\n          `unsupported simple/float value ${head.arg}`,\n        );\n      default:\n        throw new CborDecodeError(`unsupported major type ${head.major}`);\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Decode a single CBOR item from `bytes`, rejecting any trailing bytes.\n *\n * Used to parse the COSE protected header and CWT claims set — both are\n * exactly one top-level item, so a valid prefix followed by extra bytes\n * is a malformed structure, not a benign tail. Strict consumption keeps\n * the parser from silently accepting a token a stricter CWT/COSE\n * consumer would interpret differently.\n */\nexport function decodeCbor(bytes: Uint8Array): CborValue {\n  const reader = new CborReader(bytes);\n  const value = reader.readValue();\n  if (reader.pos !== bytes.length) {\n    throw new CborDecodeError(\"trailing bytes after top-level item\");\n  }\n  return value;\n}\n","/**\n * Verify a vault-provider CWT bearer (RFC 8392 / COSE Sign1, ES256K): checks the\n * signature against the VP's attested ephemeral key (see {@link ./serverIdentity})\n * and binds `iss`/`sub`/`aud` to the pinned VP, subject, and depositor. TS port\n * of btc-vault `client.rs::validate_token_with_public_key_at_time`.\n *\n * Divergence from that reference: the FE does NOT clock-gate `nbf`/`iat`. The VP\n * server is the temporal authority and re-checks `nbf`/`exp` on every gated call;\n * re-checking `nbf` against the browser clock only bricked freshly minted tokens\n * on benign skew. `exp` (wide window) and the structural `iat <= exp` are kept.\n *\n * @module tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/verifyDepositorCwt\n */\n\nimport * as ecc from \"@bitcoin-js/tiny-secp256k1-asmjs\";\nimport { sha256 } from \"@noble/hashes/sha2.js\";\n\nimport {\n  hexToUint8Array,\n  stripHexPrefix,\n} from \"../../../primitives/utils/bitcoin\";\nimport {\n  COMPRESSED_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN,\n  HEX_RE,\n  X_ONLY_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN,\n} from \"../../../utils/validation\";\n\nimport { CborReader, decodeCbor } from \"./cborDecode\";\n\n/** CWT `sub` value for JSON-RPC-subject tokens (`auth_createDepositorToken`). */\nexport const CWT_SUBJECT_JSONRPC = \"vaultd-jsonrpc\";\n/** CWT `sub` value for gRPC-subject tokens (`auth_createDepositorTokenGrpc`). */\nexport const CWT_SUBJECT_GRPC = \"vaultd-grpc\";\n\n/** CBOR tag wrapping a COSE_Sign1 structure (RFC 8152 §2). */\nconst COSE_SIGN1_TAG = 18;\n/** A COSE_Sign1 is a 4-element array: [protected, unprotected, payload, signature]. */\nconst COSE_SIGN1_ARRAY_LEN = 4;\n/** COSE algorithm id for ES256K (ECDSA w/ secp256k1 + SHA-256), RFC 8812. */\nconst COSE_ALG_ES256K = -47;\n/** COSE header label for the algorithm (RFC 8152 §3.1). */\nconst COSE_HEADER_LABEL_ALG = 1;\n/** ECDSA signature length in COSE compact (r‖s) form. */\nconst ECDSA_COMPACT_SIG_LEN = 64;\n\n/** CBOR major-type 4 (array) high bits, for the Sig_structure header. */\nconst CBOR_ARRAY_HEAD = 0x80;\n/** CBOR major-type 3 (text string) high bits, for the context string head. */\nconst CBOR_TEXT_STRING_HEAD = 0x60;\n/** CBOR encoding of an empty byte string (major type 2, length 0). */\nconst CBOR_EMPTY_BYTE_STRING = 0x40;\n\n/** CWT registered claim keys (RFC 8392 §4 / IANA CWT registry). */\nconst CWT_CLAIM_ISS = 1;\nconst CWT_CLAIM_SUB = 2;\nconst CWT_CLAIM_AUD = 3;\nconst CWT_CLAIM_EXP = 4;\nconst CWT_CLAIM_NBF = 5;\nconst CWT_CLAIM_IAT = 6;\nconst CWT_CLAIM_CTI = 7;\n\n/**\n * Context string for a COSE_Sign1 Sig_structure (RFC 8152 §4.4). 10\n * bytes, so it encodes with a single-byte CBOR text-string head.\n */\nconst SIG_STRUCTURE_CONTEXT = new TextEncoder().encode(\"Signature1\");\n\nexport type CwtVerificationReason =\n  | \"invalid_input\"\n  | \"invalid_token_structure\"\n  | \"unexpected_algorithm\"\n  | \"signature_verification_failed\"\n  | \"invalid_claims\"\n  | \"issuer_mismatch\"\n  | \"subject_mismatch\"\n  | \"audience_mismatch\"\n  | \"token_expired\"\n  | \"expiry_mismatch\"\n  | \"server_identity_expires_before_token\";\n\nexport class CwtVerificationError extends Error {\n  constructor(\n    message: string,\n    public readonly reason: CwtVerificationReason,\n  ) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = \"CwtVerificationError\";\n  }\n}\n\nexport interface VerifyDepositorCwtInput {\n  /** Base64url (no padding) COSE Sign1 token from `auth_createDepositorToken`. */\n  token: string;\n  /**\n   * VP ephemeral token-signing pubkey (33-byte compressed hex) from the\n   * bundled `server_identity` proof — MUST already be verified by\n   * {@link verifyServerIdentity} before being passed here.\n   */\n  ephemeralPubkeyHex: string;\n  /** Pinned VP persistent x-only pubkey (on-chain). Asserted against the token `iss`. */\n  expectedIssuerXOnlyPubkey: string;\n  /** Expected `sub` — {@link CWT_SUBJECT_JSONRPC} or {@link CWT_SUBJECT_GRPC}. */\n  expectedSubject: string;\n  /** Depositor x-only pubkey. Asserted against the token `aud`. */\n  expectedAudienceXOnlyPubkey: string;\n  /** Outer wire `expires_at`. Must equal the token's `exp` exactly. */\n  responseExpiresAt: number;\n  /** `server_identity.expires_at`. Must be ≥ the token's `exp`. */\n  serverIdentityExpiresAt: number;\n  /** Current Unix time (seconds). Injected for testability. */\n  now: number;\n}\n\nexport interface VerifiedCwtClaims {\n  issuer: string;\n  subject: string;\n  audience: string;\n  expiresAt: number;\n  notBefore: number;\n  issuedAt: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify a depositor CWT and return its claims, or throw\n * {@link CwtVerificationError}.\n *\n * Steps (mirroring the Rust reference; see the divergence note above):\n *   1. Decode the COSE Sign1 envelope and assert the protected header\n *      pins ES256K.\n *   2. Verify the ECDSA signature over the reconstructed Sig_structure\n *      against the (already server-identity-verified) ephemeral key.\n *   3. Decode the CWT claims and assert `iss`/`sub`/`aud` bindings, the\n *      structural `iat <= exp`, `exp` validity, `cti` presence, and the\n *      outer-vs-inner expiry cross-checks. `nbf`/`iat` are intentionally not\n *      clock-gated here (see the module note above).\n */\nexport function verifyDepositorCwt(\n  input: VerifyDepositorCwtInput,\n): VerifiedCwtClaims {\n  const expectedIssuer = normalizeXOnly(\n    input.expectedIssuerXOnlyPubkey,\n    \"expectedIssuerXOnlyPubkey\",\n  );\n  const expectedAudience = normalizeXOnly(\n    input.expectedAudienceXOnlyPubkey,\n    \"expectedAudienceXOnlyPubkey\",\n  );\n  const ephemeral = decodeCompressedPubkey(input.ephemeralPubkeyHex);\n\n  const tokenBytes = base64UrlToBytes(input.token);\n\n  // --- 1. COSE Sign1 structural decode -------------------------------\n  // Capture the exact encoded byte ranges of the protected header and\n  // payload so the Sig_structure can be rebuilt byte-for-byte from the\n  // token's own bytes (any re-encoding risks a non-canonical mismatch).\n  const reader = new CborReader(tokenBytes);\n  const tag = reader.readHead();\n  if (tag.major !== 6 || tag.arg !== COSE_SIGN1_TAG) {\n    throw new CwtVerificationError(\n      `token is not a COSE Sign1 tagged value (tag ${COSE_SIGN1_TAG})`,\n      \"invalid_token_structure\",\n    );\n  }\n  const array = reader.readHead();\n  if (array.major !== 4 || array.arg !== COSE_SIGN1_ARRAY_LEN) {\n    throw new CwtVerificationError(\n      `COSE Sign1 must be a ${COSE_SIGN1_ARRAY_LEN}-element array`,\n      \"invalid_token_structure\",\n    );\n  }\n\n  const protectedStart = reader.pos;\n  const protectedContent = reader.readByteString();\n  const protectedBstr = tokenBytes.subarray(protectedStart, reader.pos);\n\n  // Unprotected header map: present in the envelope but unused here.\n  reader.readValue();\n\n  const payloadStart = reader.pos;\n  const payloadContent = reader.readByteString();\n  const payloadBstr = tokenBytes.subarray(payloadStart, reader.pos);\n\n  const signature = reader.readByteString();\n  if (signature.length !== ECDSA_COMPACT_SIG_LEN) {\n    throw new CwtVerificationError(\n      `COSE signature must be ${ECDSA_COMPACT_SIG_LEN} bytes, got ${signature.length}`,\n      \"invalid_token_structure\",\n    );\n  }\n  // Reject anything after the COSE_Sign1 structure. The bearer we verify\n  // must be the exact bytes attached to authenticated calls; a stricter\n  // CWT/COSE consumer could interpret trailing bytes differently.\n  if (reader.pos !== tokenBytes.length) {\n    throw new CwtVerificationError(\n      \"COSE Sign1 token has trailing bytes after the signature\",\n      \"invalid_token_structure\",\n    );\n  }\n\n  // --- 2a. Algorithm pin --------------------------------------------\n  const alg = readProtectedAlgorithm(protectedContent);\n  if (alg !== COSE_ALG_ES256K) {\n    throw new CwtVerificationError(\n      `unexpected COSE algorithm ${alg} (expected ES256K ${COSE_ALG_ES256K})`,\n      \"unexpected_algorithm\",\n    );\n  }\n\n  // --- 2b. Signature verification -----------------------------------\n  const sigStructure = buildSigStructure(protectedBstr, payloadBstr);\n  const digest = sha256(sigStructure);\n  // strict = true enforces low-S, matching libsecp256k1's `verify_ecdsa`.\n  if (!ecc.verify(digest, ephemeral, signature, true)) {\n    throw new CwtVerificationError(\n      \"COSE signature does not verify against the server's ephemeral key\",\n      \"signature_verification_failed\",\n    );\n  }\n\n  // --- 3. Claims -----------------------------------------------------\n  const claims = decodeClaims(payloadContent);\n\n  const audience = claims.audience.toLowerCase();\n  if (audience.length !== X_ONLY_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN || !HEX_RE.test(audience)) {\n    throw new CwtVerificationError(\n      \"token `aud` is not a 32-byte x-only pubkey hex\",\n      \"invalid_claims\",\n    );\n  }\n  if (claims.issuedAt > claims.expiresAt) {\n    throw new CwtVerificationError(\n      `token iat (${claims.issuedAt}) is after exp (${claims.expiresAt})`,\n      \"invalid_claims\",\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (claims.issuer.toLowerCase() !== expectedIssuer) {\n    throw new CwtVerificationError(\n      `token issuer does not match pinned server pubkey: expected ${expectedIssuer}, got ${claims.issuer.toLowerCase()}`,\n      \"issuer_mismatch\",\n    );\n  }\n  if (claims.subject !== input.expectedSubject) {\n    throw new CwtVerificationError(\n      `token subject mismatch: expected ${input.expectedSubject}, got ${claims.subject}`,\n      \"subject_mismatch\",\n    );\n  }\n  if (audience !== expectedAudience) {\n    throw new CwtVerificationError(\n      `token audience does not match depositor pubkey: expected ${expectedAudience}, got ${audience}`,\n      \"audience_mismatch\",\n    );\n  }\n  // No nbf/iat clock-gate on purpose — the VP server is the temporal authority\n  // (re-checks nbf/exp per call). See the module-level divergence note.\n  if (claims.expiresAt <= input.now) {\n    throw new CwtVerificationError(\n      `token expired: exp ${claims.expiresAt} <= now ${input.now}`,\n      \"token_expired\",\n    );\n  }\n  if (input.responseExpiresAt !== claims.expiresAt) {\n    throw new CwtVerificationError(\n      `response expires_at (${input.responseExpiresAt}) does not equal token exp (${claims.expiresAt})`,\n      \"expiry_mismatch\",\n    );\n  }\n  if (input.serverIdentityExpiresAt < claims.expiresAt) {\n    throw new CwtVerificationError(\n      `server identity expires (${input.serverIdentityExpiresAt}) before token exp (${claims.expiresAt})`,\n      \"server_identity_expires_before_token\",\n    );\n  }\n\n  return {\n    issuer: claims.issuer,\n    subject: claims.subject,\n    audience,\n    expiresAt: claims.expiresAt,\n    notBefore: claims.notBefore,\n    issuedAt: claims.issuedAt,\n  };\n}\n\n/** Read the algorithm label from the COSE protected-header byte string. */\nfunction readProtectedAlgorithm(protectedContent: Uint8Array): number {\n  if (protectedContent.length === 0) {\n    throw new CwtVerificationError(\n      \"empty COSE protected header (no algorithm)\",\n      \"unexpected_algorithm\",\n    );\n  }\n  const header = decodeCbor(protectedContent);\n  if (!(header instanceof Map)) {\n    throw new CwtVerificationError(\n      \"COSE protected header is not a map\",\n      \"invalid_token_structure\",\n    );\n  }\n  const alg = header.get(COSE_HEADER_LABEL_ALG);\n  if (typeof alg !== \"number\") {\n    throw new CwtVerificationError(\n      \"COSE protected header missing integer algorithm label\",\n      \"unexpected_algorithm\",\n    );\n  }\n  return alg;\n}\n\n/**\n * Rebuild the COSE_Sign1 Sig_structure (RFC 8152 §4.4):\n *\n *   [ \"Signature1\", body_protected (bstr), external_aad = h'' , payload (bstr) ]\n *\n * `body_protected` and `payload` are spliced verbatim from the token's\n * own encoded byte strings, so the result is byte-identical to what the\n * issuer signed regardless of CBOR canonicalization choices.\n */\nfunction buildSigStructure(\n  protectedBstr: Uint8Array,\n  payloadBstr: Uint8Array,\n): Uint8Array {\n  return concatBytes(\n    Uint8Array.of(CBOR_ARRAY_HEAD | COSE_SIGN1_ARRAY_LEN),\n    Uint8Array.of(CBOR_TEXT_STRING_HEAD | SIG_STRUCTURE_CONTEXT.length),\n    SIG_STRUCTURE_CONTEXT,\n    protectedBstr,\n    Uint8Array.of(CBOR_EMPTY_BYTE_STRING),\n    payloadBstr,\n  );\n}\n\ninterface DecodedClaims {\n  issuer: string;\n  subject: string;\n  audience: string;\n  expiresAt: number;\n  notBefore: number;\n  issuedAt: number;\n}\n\n/** Decode and type-check the CWT registered claims from the payload. */\nfunction decodeClaims(payloadContent: Uint8Array): DecodedClaims {\n  const root = decodeCbor(payloadContent);\n  if (!(root instanceof Map)) {\n    throw new CwtVerificationError(\n      \"CWT claims root is not a map\",\n      \"invalid_claims\",\n    );\n  }\n  const cti = requireBytes(root, CWT_CLAIM_CTI, \"cti\");\n  if (cti.length === 0) {\n    throw new CwtVerificationError(\"token cti is empty\", \"invalid_claims\");\n  }\n  return {\n    issuer: requireString(root, CWT_CLAIM_ISS, \"iss\"),\n    subject: requireString(root, CWT_CLAIM_SUB, \"sub\"),\n    audience: requireString(root, CWT_CLAIM_AUD, \"aud\"),\n    expiresAt: requireTimestamp(root, CWT_CLAIM_EXP, \"exp\"),\n    notBefore: requireTimestamp(root, CWT_CLAIM_NBF, \"nbf\"),\n    issuedAt: requireTimestamp(root, CWT_CLAIM_IAT, \"iat\"),\n  };\n}\n\nfunction requireString(\n  claims: Map<unknown, unknown>,\n  key: number,\n  name: string,\n): string {\n  const value = claims.get(key);\n  if (typeof value !== \"string\") {\n    throw new CwtVerificationError(\n      `token claim ${name} is missing or not a text string`,\n      \"invalid_claims\",\n    );\n  }\n  return value;\n}\n\nfunction requireBytes(\n  claims: Map<unknown, unknown>,\n  key: number,\n  name: string,\n): Uint8Array {\n  const value = claims.get(key);\n  if (!(value instanceof Uint8Array)) {\n    throw new CwtVerificationError(\n      `token claim ${name} is missing or not a byte string`,\n      \"invalid_claims\",\n    );\n  }\n  return value;\n}\n\nfunction requireTimestamp(\n  claims: Map<unknown, unknown>,\n  key: number,\n  name: string,\n): number {\n  const value = claims.get(key);\n  if (typeof value !== \"number\" || !Number.isSafeInteger(value) || value < 0) {\n    throw new CwtVerificationError(\n      `token claim ${name} is missing or not a non-negative integer timestamp`,\n      \"invalid_claims\",\n    );\n  }\n  return value;\n}\n\n/** Validate and normalize a 32-byte x-only pubkey to lowercase hex. */\nfunction normalizeXOnly(pubkey: string, label: string): string {\n  const normalized = stripHexPrefix(pubkey).toLowerCase();\n  if (normalized.length !== X_ONLY_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN || !HEX_RE.test(normalized)) {\n    throw new CwtVerificationError(\n      `${label} must be 32-byte x-only hex; got ${normalized.length} chars`,\n      \"invalid_input\",\n    );\n  }\n  return normalized;\n}\n\n/** Validate a 33-byte compressed pubkey hex and return its bytes. */\nfunction decodeCompressedPubkey(pubkeyHex: string): Uint8Array {\n  const normalized = stripHexPrefix(pubkeyHex).toLowerCase();\n  const prefix = normalized.slice(0, 2);\n  if (\n    normalized.length !== COMPRESSED_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN ||\n    !HEX_RE.test(normalized) ||\n    (prefix !== \"02\" && prefix !== \"03\")\n  ) {\n    throw new CwtVerificationError(\n      \"ephemeralPubkeyHex must be 33-byte compressed pubkey hex (prefix 02/03)\",\n      \"invalid_input\",\n    );\n  }\n  return hexToUint8Array(normalized);\n}\n\nconst B64URL_LOOKUP = (() => {\n  const table = new Int16Array(128).fill(-1);\n  const alphabet =\n    \"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789-_\";\n  for (let i = 0; i < alphabet.length; i++) {\n    table[alphabet.charCodeAt(i)] = i;\n  }\n  return table;\n})();\n\n/** Decode a base64url (no-padding) string to bytes. */\nfunction base64UrlToBytes(input: string): Uint8Array {\n  const len = input.length;\n  const fullGroups = Math.floor(len / 4);\n  const remainder = len % 4;\n  if (remainder === 1) {\n    throw new CwtVerificationError(\n      \"invalid base64url length\",\n      \"invalid_token_structure\",\n    );\n  }\n  const outLen = fullGroups * 3 + (remainder === 0 ? 0 : remainder - 1);\n  const out = new Uint8Array(outLen);\n\n  const sextet = (charCode: number): number => {\n    const value = charCode < 128 ? B64URL_LOOKUP[charCode] : -1;\n    if (value < 0) {\n      throw new CwtVerificationError(\n        \"invalid base64url character\",\n        \"invalid_token_structure\",\n      );\n    }\n    return value;\n  };\n\n  let inPos = 0;\n  let outPos = 0;\n  for (let g = 0; g < fullGroups; g++) {\n    const a = sextet(input.charCodeAt(inPos++));\n    const b = sextet(input.charCodeAt(inPos++));\n    const c = sextet(input.charCodeAt(inPos++));\n    const d = sextet(input.charCodeAt(inPos++));\n    out[outPos++] = (a << 2) | (b >> 4);\n    out[outPos++] = ((b & 0x0f) << 4) | (c >> 2);\n    out[outPos++] = ((c & 0x03) << 6) | d;\n  }\n  if (remainder === 2) {\n    const a = sextet(input.charCodeAt(inPos++));\n    const b = sextet(input.charCodeAt(inPos++));\n    out[outPos++] = (a << 2) | (b >> 4);\n  } else if (remainder === 3) {\n    const a = sextet(input.charCodeAt(inPos++));\n    const b = sextet(input.charCodeAt(inPos++));\n    const c = sextet(input.charCodeAt(inPos++));\n    out[outPos++] = (a << 2) | (b >> 4);\n    out[outPos++] = ((b & 0x0f) << 4) | (c >> 2);\n  }\n  return out;\n}\n\nfunction concatBytes(...parts: Uint8Array[]): Uint8Array {\n  const total = parts.reduce((sum, part) => sum + part.length, 0);\n  const out = new Uint8Array(total);\n  let offset = 0;\n  for (const part of parts) {\n    out.set(part, offset);\n    offset += part.length;\n  }\n  return out;\n}\n","/**\n * `VpTokenProvider` — caches CWT bearer tokens issued by the vault\n * provider's `auth_createDepositorToken` RPC, with lazy expiry check\n * and single-flight concurrent acquire.\n *\n * Usage:\n *\n * ```ts\n * const provider = new VpTokenProvider({\n *   client,\n *   peginTxid,\n *   authAnchorHex,\n *   pinnedServerPubkey,\n *   authGatedMethods,\n * });\n * const bearer = await provider.getToken(method); // null if not gated\n * ```\n *\n * The provider implements the `BearerTokenProvider` interface expected\n * by `JsonRpcClient`. Plug directly:\n *\n * ```ts\n * const client = new JsonRpcClient({ ..., tokenProvider: provider });\n * ```\n *\n * @module tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/tokenProvider\n */\n\nimport type { OnChainBtcPubkey } from \"../../eth/types\";\nimport type { BearerTokenProvider, JsonRpcClient } from \"../json-rpc-client\";\nimport {\n  GRPC_TOKEN_ISSUE_METHOD,\n  TOKEN_ISSUE_METHOD,\n} from \"./innerTokenClient\";\nimport {\n  type ServerIdentityResponse,\n  verifyServerIdentity,\n} from \"./serverIdentity\";\nimport {\n  CWT_SUBJECT_GRPC,\n  CWT_SUBJECT_JSONRPC,\n  verifyDepositorCwt,\n} from \"./verifyDepositorCwt\";\n\n/**\n * Maximum reasonable `expires_at` value (seconds since epoch). Guards\n * against a bogus far-future timestamp that would lock the cache on a\n * bad token forever. Jan 1, 2100 in Unix seconds.\n */\nconst MAX_EXPIRES_AT_SECS = 4_102_444_800;\n\n/**\n * Default safety margin before `expires_at` — we treat a token as\n * expired this many seconds before its stated expiry so that in-flight\n * requests don't race the expiry boundary.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_REFRESH_SKEW_SECS = 30;\n\n/**\n * Wire response shape of `auth_createDepositorToken`.\n */\nexport interface CreateDepositorTokenResponse {\n  /** Base64url-encoded COSE Sign1 CWT bearer token. */\n  token: string;\n  /** Unix timestamp at which the token expires. */\n  expires_at: number;\n  /** Server identity proof bundled with every token response. */\n  server_identity: ServerIdentityResponse;\n}\n\nexport interface VpTokenProviderConfig {\n  client: JsonRpcClient;\n  /** Per-vault depositor-signed PegIn tx id. NOT shared across sibling vaults in a batch. */\n  peginTxid: string;\n  /** 64-char hex of the 32-byte OP_RETURN auth-anchor preimage. */\n  authAnchorHex: string;\n  /** Pinned VP pubkey from the on-chain registry; branded so indexer mirrors can't substitute. */\n  pinnedServerPubkey: OnChainBtcPubkey;\n  /**\n   * Depositor x-only pubkey (32-byte hex). Asserted against every\n   * issued token's CWT `aud` claim so a token minted for a different\n   * depositor — or mis-issued by a buggy/compromised VP — is rejected\n   * before it can authenticate a mutation.\n   */\n  expectedAudienceXOnlyPubkey: string;\n  /**\n   * Methods that need a JSON-RPC-subject bearer (minted via\n   * `auth_createDepositorToken`). Forwarded over plain HTTP JSON-RPC by\n   * the proxy. `getToken` returns `null` for any method outside this and\n   * {@link grpcGatedMethods}.\n   */\n  authGatedMethods: ReadonlySet<string>;\n  /**\n   * Methods that need a gRPC-subject bearer (minted via\n   * `auth_createDepositorTokenGrpc`). The proxy translates these into\n   * gRPC calls to vaultd; the JSON-RPC bearer is rejected with a\n   * `Subject` mismatch.\n   */\n  grpcGatedMethods: ReadonlySet<string>;\n  /** Default {@link DEFAULT_REFRESH_SKEW_SECS}. */\n  refreshSkewSecs?: number;\n  /** Clock source for testability. */\n  now?: () => number;\n}\n\ninterface CachedToken {\n  token: string;\n  expiresAt: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Acquire, cache, and refresh VP bearer tokens.\n *\n * Implements {@link BearerTokenProvider}. Safe to pass directly into\n * `JsonRpcClient` as `tokenProvider`.\n */\nexport class VpTokenProvider implements BearerTokenProvider {\n  // `client` is the only mutable field — see `setClient`. The\n  // identity-bearing fields (peginTxid/authAnchorHex/pinnedServerPubkey)\n  // remain readonly and are checked against re-registration in the\n  // registry's `getOrCreate`.\n  private client: JsonRpcClient;\n  private readonly peginTxid: string;\n  private readonly authAnchorHex: string;\n  private readonly pinnedServerPubkey: OnChainBtcPubkey;\n  private readonly expectedAudienceXOnlyPubkey: string;\n  private readonly authGatedMethods: ReadonlySet<string>;\n  private readonly grpcGatedMethods: ReadonlySet<string>;\n  private readonly refreshSkewSecs: number;\n  private readonly now: () => number;\n\n  /** Cached JSON-RPC-subject bearer (auth_createDepositorToken). */\n  private cachedJsonRpc: CachedToken | null = null;\n  private inFlightJsonRpc: Promise<CachedToken> | null = null;\n  /** Cached gRPC-subject bearer (auth_createDepositorTokenGrpc). */\n  private cachedGrpc: CachedToken | null = null;\n  private inFlightGrpc: Promise<CachedToken> | null = null;\n\n  constructor(config: VpTokenProviderConfig) {\n    this.client = config.client;\n    this.peginTxid = config.peginTxid;\n    this.authAnchorHex = config.authAnchorHex;\n    this.pinnedServerPubkey = config.pinnedServerPubkey;\n    this.expectedAudienceXOnlyPubkey = config.expectedAudienceXOnlyPubkey;\n    this.authGatedMethods = config.authGatedMethods;\n    this.grpcGatedMethods = config.grpcGatedMethods;\n    this.refreshSkewSecs = config.refreshSkewSecs ?? DEFAULT_REFRESH_SKEW_SECS;\n    this.now = config.now ?? (() => Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Return a bearer token for `method`, or `null` if `method` is not\n   * auth-gated.\n   *\n   * Routes by subject: `authGatedMethods` → JSON-RPC bearer (issued via\n   * `auth_createDepositorToken`); `grpcGatedMethods` → gRPC bearer\n   * (`auth_createDepositorTokenGrpc`). Either path acquires lazily and\n   * single-flights concurrent callers; the two cache slots are\n   * independent.\n   *\n   * Both token-issuing methods are hard-exempted from the gate — if\n   * either were ever included in the gated sets (caller misconfiguration)\n   * the provider would recurse into `acquireSingleFlight` from inside the\n   * JSON-RPC header builder before `inFlight` is assigned, defeating the\n   * single-flight guard. Returning `null` here breaks that recursion\n   * deterministically.\n   */\n  async getToken(method: string): Promise<string | null> {\n    if (method === TOKEN_ISSUE_METHOD || method === GRPC_TOKEN_ISSUE_METHOD) {\n      return null;\n    }\n\n    if (this.grpcGatedMethods.has(method)) {\n      return this.getTokenForSubject(\"grpc\");\n    }\n    if (this.authGatedMethods.has(method)) {\n      return this.getTokenForSubject(\"jsonrpc\");\n    }\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Drop both cached tokens. Next `getToken` call re-acquires the slot\n   * that's actually needed. Called by `JsonRpcClient` on wire\n   * `auth_expired` responses; the client doesn't tell us which subject\n   * expired, so we evict both to stay correct under either.\n   *\n   * Worst case is one extra round-trip on the slot that was still fresh,\n   * which is cheaper than carrying a `Subject` argument through\n   * `BearerTokenProvider`.\n   */\n  invalidate(): void {\n    this.cachedJsonRpc = null;\n    this.cachedGrpc = null;\n    // Do NOT clear `inFlight*` — a concurrent acquire is still valid;\n    // the invalidator is saying \"the cached token is bad\", not \"any\n    // in-flight acquire is bad\". The in-flight acquire will populate\n    // a fresh `cached*` on completion.\n  }\n\n  private async getTokenForSubject(\n    subject: \"jsonrpc\" | \"grpc\",\n  ): Promise<string> {\n    const cached =\n      subject === \"grpc\" ? this.cachedGrpc : this.cachedJsonRpc;\n    if (cached && this.now() + this.refreshSkewSecs < cached.expiresAt) {\n      return cached.token;\n    }\n    const fresh = await this.acquireSingleFlight(subject);\n    return fresh.token;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Swap in a different transport for subsequent token-issuing calls.\n   * Used by the registry when a later caller registers the same\n   * `peginTxid` against a different `baseUrl` — the cached token\n   * (bound to identity, not transport) stays valid, but future\n   * refreshes hit the new URL. An in-flight acquire keeps using the\n   * old client (it captured the reference); next call uses the new.\n   */\n  setClient(client: JsonRpcClient): void {\n    this.client = client;\n  }\n\n  private acquireSingleFlight(\n    subject: \"jsonrpc\" | \"grpc\",\n  ): Promise<CachedToken> {\n    const existing =\n      subject === \"grpc\" ? this.inFlightGrpc : this.inFlightJsonRpc;\n    if (existing) return existing;\n\n    const issueMethod =\n      subject === \"grpc\" ? GRPC_TOKEN_ISSUE_METHOD : TOKEN_ISSUE_METHOD;\n\n    const p = (async () => {\n      try {\n        const response = await this.client.call<\n          { pegin_txid: string; auth_anchor: string },\n          CreateDepositorTokenResponse\n        >(issueMethod, {\n          pegin_txid: this.peginTxid,\n          auth_anchor: this.authAnchorHex,\n        });\n\n        verifyServerIdentity({\n          proof: response.server_identity,\n          pinnedServerPubkey: this.pinnedServerPubkey,\n          now: this.now(),\n        });\n\n        // Validate wire payload before caching so a malformed response\n        // from a compromised VP or proxy can't poison the cache with\n        // unusable values (non-string token, non-integer expiry, etc.).\n        if (typeof response.token !== \"string\" || response.token.length === 0) {\n          throw new Error(\n            `VpTokenProvider: invalid token in acquire response (expected non-empty string, got ${typeof response.token})`,\n          );\n        }\n        const now = this.now();\n        if (\n          !Number.isSafeInteger(response.expires_at) ||\n          response.expires_at <= now ||\n          response.expires_at > MAX_EXPIRES_AT_SECS\n        ) {\n          throw new Error(\n            `VpTokenProvider: invalid expires_at in acquire response (got ${JSON.stringify(response.expires_at)}; must be a safe integer in (${now}, ${MAX_EXPIRES_AT_SECS}])`,\n          );\n        }\n\n        // Cryptographically verify the token itself — not just the wire\n        // envelope. The COSE Sign1 signature is checked against the\n        // (server-identity-verified) ephemeral key, and the inner CWT\n        // claims are bound to this depositor (`aud`), this VP (`iss`),\n        // and this subject. Without this the bearer is an opaque blob the\n        // FE would attach to mutations on the VP's word alone.\n        verifyDepositorCwt({\n          token: response.token,\n          ephemeralPubkeyHex: response.server_identity.ephemeral_pubkey,\n          expectedIssuerXOnlyPubkey: this.pinnedServerPubkey,\n          expectedSubject:\n            subject === \"grpc\" ? CWT_SUBJECT_GRPC : CWT_SUBJECT_JSONRPC,\n          expectedAudienceXOnlyPubkey: this.expectedAudienceXOnlyPubkey,\n          responseExpiresAt: response.expires_at,\n          serverIdentityExpiresAt: response.server_identity.expires_at,\n          now,\n        });\n\n        const fresh: CachedToken = {\n          token: response.token,\n          expiresAt: response.expires_at,\n        };\n        if (subject === \"grpc\") {\n          this.cachedGrpc = fresh;\n        } else {\n          this.cachedJsonRpc = fresh;\n        }\n        return fresh;\n      } finally {\n        if (subject === \"grpc\") {\n          this.inFlightGrpc = null;\n        } else {\n          this.inFlightJsonRpc = null;\n        }\n      }\n    })();\n\n    if (subject === \"grpc\") {\n      this.inFlightGrpc = p;\n    } else {\n      this.inFlightJsonRpc = p;\n    }\n    return p;\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * In-memory registry of {@link VpTokenProvider} instances keyed by\n * the per-vault depositor-signed PegIn tx hash. Module-level\n * singleton, per-tab, never persisted.\n *\n * @module tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/tokenRegistry\n */\n\nimport type { OnChainBtcPubkey } from \"../../eth/types\";\nimport type { JsonRpcClient } from \"../json-rpc-client\";\n\nimport { AUTH_GATED_METHODS, GRPC_AUTH_GATED_METHODS } from \"./gatedMethods\";\nimport { VpTokenProvider } from \"./tokenProvider\";\n\nexport interface VpTokenRegistryInput {\n  client: JsonRpcClient;\n  peginTxid: string;\n  authAnchorHex: string;\n  pinnedServerPubkey: OnChainBtcPubkey;\n  /** Depositor x-only pubkey (32-byte hex), asserted against each token's CWT `aud`. */\n  expectedAudienceXOnlyPubkey: string;\n}\n\ninterface RegistryEntry {\n  provider: VpTokenProvider;\n  authAnchorHex: string;\n  pinnedServerPubkey: OnChainBtcPubkey;\n  expectedAudienceXOnlyPubkey: string;\n}\n\nexport class VpTokenRegistry {\n  private readonly entries = new Map<string, RegistryEntry>();\n\n  /**\n   * Return the cached `VpTokenProvider` for `peginTxid` if one exists\n   * with matching `authAnchorHex` and `pinnedServerPubkey`, otherwise\n   * construct and cache a fresh provider. A mismatch on either throws —\n   * silent overwrite would mask derivation drift or VP pubkey rotation.\n   */\n  getOrCreate(input: VpTokenRegistryInput): VpTokenProvider {\n    const existing = this.entries.get(input.peginTxid);\n    if (existing) {\n      if (existing.authAnchorHex !== input.authAnchorHex) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `VpTokenRegistry: peginTxid ${input.peginTxid} already bound to authAnchorHex ${existing.authAnchorHex.slice(0, 8)}…; got ${input.authAnchorHex.slice(0, 8)}…`,\n        );\n      }\n      if (existing.pinnedServerPubkey !== input.pinnedServerPubkey) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `VpTokenRegistry: peginTxid ${input.peginTxid} already bound to pinnedServerPubkey ${existing.pinnedServerPubkey.slice(0, 8)}…; got ${input.pinnedServerPubkey.slice(0, 8)}…`,\n        );\n      }\n      if (\n        existing.expectedAudienceXOnlyPubkey !==\n        input.expectedAudienceXOnlyPubkey\n      ) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `VpTokenRegistry: peginTxid ${input.peginTxid} already bound to expectedAudienceXOnlyPubkey ${existing.expectedAudienceXOnlyPubkey.slice(0, 8)}…; got ${input.expectedAudienceXOnlyPubkey.slice(0, 8)}…`,\n        );\n      }\n      // Refresh the inner transport on every reuse so a VP URL\n      // change between calls doesn't leave the cached provider\n      // pinned to a dead URL for token refresh.\n      existing.provider.setClient(input.client);\n      return existing.provider;\n    }\n\n    const provider = new VpTokenProvider({\n      client: input.client,\n      peginTxid: input.peginTxid,\n      authAnchorHex: input.authAnchorHex,\n      pinnedServerPubkey: input.pinnedServerPubkey,\n      expectedAudienceXOnlyPubkey: input.expectedAudienceXOnlyPubkey,\n      authGatedMethods: AUTH_GATED_METHODS,\n      grpcGatedMethods: GRPC_AUTH_GATED_METHODS,\n    });\n    this.entries.set(input.peginTxid, {\n      provider,\n      authAnchorHex: input.authAnchorHex,\n      pinnedServerPubkey: input.pinnedServerPubkey,\n      expectedAudienceXOnlyPubkey: input.expectedAudienceXOnlyPubkey,\n    });\n    return provider;\n  }\n\n  /** Return the cached provider, or `undefined` if none. */\n  peek(peginTxid: string): VpTokenProvider | undefined {\n    return this.entries.get(peginTxid)?.provider;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Evict the entry for `peginTxid`. Idempotent. Called on terminal\n   * paths — activation success, user-cancel, or component unmount —\n   * so `authAnchorHex` doesn't outlive the deposit session.\n   */\n  release(peginTxid: string): void {\n    this.entries.delete(peginTxid);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Wipe every cached entry. Test-only escape hatch — not exposed on\n   * the public {@link VpTokenRegistryPublic} singleton type.\n   *\n   * @internal\n   */\n  clear(): void {\n    this.entries.clear();\n  }\n\n  get size(): number {\n    return this.entries.size;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Public surface of the singleton — excludes the test-only `clear`\n * method.\n */\nexport interface VpTokenRegistryPublic {\n  getOrCreate(input: VpTokenRegistryInput): VpTokenProvider;\n  peek(peginTxid: string): VpTokenProvider | undefined;\n  release(peginTxid: string): void;\n  readonly size: number;\n}\n\nexport const vpTokenRegistry: VpTokenRegistryPublic = new VpTokenRegistry();\n","/**\n * Build a {@link VaultProviderRpcClient} that auto-attaches CWT\n * bearer tokens on auth-gated methods. Caller pre-derives both the\n * `authAnchorHex` (from the wallet) and the `pinnedServerPubkey`\n * (from the on-chain registry) and hands them in — the SDK has no\n * notion of wallets here.\n *\n * @module tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/createAuthenticatedVpClient\n */\n\nimport { processPublicKeyToXOnly } from \"../../../primitives/utils/bitcoin\";\nimport type { OnChainBtcPubkey } from \"../../eth/types\";\nimport {\n  VaultProviderRpcClient,\n  type VaultProviderRpcClientOptions,\n} from \"../api\";\n\nimport { buildInnerTokenClient } from \"./innerTokenClient\";\nimport { vpTokenRegistry } from \"./tokenRegistry\";\n\nexport interface AuthenticatedVpClientConfig {\n  /** Base URL of the VP RPC endpoint (already proxied if applicable). */\n  baseUrl: string;\n  /** Per-vault depositor-signed PegIn tx id (registry cache key). */\n  peginTxid: string;\n  /** Already-derived 32-byte auth-anchor preimage (64-char hex, no `0x`). */\n  authAnchorHex: string;\n  /** On-chain VP pubkey, branded so it can only come from the registry reader. */\n  pinnedServerPubkey: OnChainBtcPubkey;\n  /**\n   * Depositor BTC pubkey (x-only or compressed hex). Normalized to\n   * x-only and asserted against every issued token's CWT `aud` claim.\n   */\n  depositorBtcPubkey: string;\n  /** Optional outer-client tunables (timeout, retries, headers, etc.). */\n  options?: VaultProviderRpcClientOptions;\n}\n\nexport function createAuthenticatedVpClient(\n  config: AuthenticatedVpClientConfig,\n): VaultProviderRpcClient {\n  const innerTokenClient = buildInnerTokenClient(\n    config.baseUrl,\n    config.options?.headers,\n  );\n\n  const tokenProvider = vpTokenRegistry.getOrCreate({\n    client: innerTokenClient,\n    peginTxid: config.peginTxid,\n    authAnchorHex: config.authAnchorHex,\n    pinnedServerPubkey: config.pinnedServerPubkey,\n    expectedAudienceXOnlyPubkey: processPublicKeyToXOnly(\n      config.depositorBtcPubkey,\n    ),\n  });\n\n  return new VaultProviderRpcClient(config.baseUrl, {\n    ...config.options,\n    tokenProvider,\n  });\n}\n","/**\n * Pre-populate {@link vpTokenRegistry} when the caller already has\n * both the auth-anchor preimage and the on-chain VP pubkey. Seeds\n * the cache for a `peginTxid` so a later `createAuthenticatedVpClient`\n * call reuses the cached `VpTokenProvider` instead of rebuilding it.\n *\n * @module tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/primeVpAuth\n */\n\nimport { processPublicKeyToXOnly } from \"../../../primitives/utils/bitcoin\";\nimport type { OnChainBtcPubkey } from \"../../eth/types\";\n\nimport { buildInnerTokenClient } from \"./innerTokenClient\";\nimport { vpTokenRegistry } from \"./tokenRegistry\";\n\nexport interface PrimeVpAuthInput {\n  baseUrl: string;\n  peginTxid: string;\n  authAnchorHex: string;\n  pinnedServerPubkey: OnChainBtcPubkey;\n  /**\n   * Depositor BTC pubkey (x-only or compressed hex). 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package/dist/{signPsbtsWithFallback-BjXdnI0X.js → signPsbtsWithFallback-CCFTzE0o.js}

@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ var p = (t, e, s) => R(t, typeof e != "symbol" ? e + "" : e, s);
 import * as T from "bitcoinjs-lib";
 import { s as w, v as h } from "./bitcoin-C-TuHb-v.js";
 import { s as C } from "./sha2-BYVxyZzX.js";
-import { f as b, i as y, g as d, j as f } from "./verifyScriptPathSchnorrSignature-ZAZfFJ6S.js";
+import { f as b, i as y, g as d, j as f } from "./verifyScriptPathSchnorrSignature-Ciq_xZhw.js";
 import { D as x } from "./constants-CPzppOdq.js";
-import { c as m } from "./signing-DaLvGwQe.js";
+import { a as m } from "./signing-Cm-McVR2.js";
 const S = 106, H = 32, l = 34;
 function W(t, e, s) {
   const o = w(t), r = T.Transaction.fromHex(o);
@@ -308,4 +308,4 @@ export {
   _ as s,
   M as v
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=signPsbtsWithFallback-BjXdnI0X.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=signPsbtsWithFallback-CCFTzE0o.js.map

package/dist/{signPsbtsWithFallback-BjXdnI0X.js.map → signPsbtsWithFallback-CCFTzE0o.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"signPsbtsWithFallback-BjXdnI0X.js","sources":["../src/tbv/core/managers/pegin/assertAuthAnchorOpReturn.ts","../src/tbv/core/services/htlc/index.ts","../src/tbv/core/deposit-terms/depositTerms.ts","../src/tbv/core/managers/PayoutManager.ts","../src/tbv/core/managers/pegin/signPsbtsWithFallback.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Structural verifier for the auth-anchor OP_RETURN in a funded\n * Pre-PegIn transaction.\n *\n * @module managers/pegin/assertAuthAnchorOpReturn\n */\n\nimport * as bitcoin from \"bitcoinjs-lib\";\n\nimport { stripHexPrefix } from \"../../primitives/utils/bitcoin\";\n\n/** OP_RETURN opcode. */\nconst OP_RETURN = 0x6a;\n/** Push-32-bytes opcode (raw push, not OP_PUSHDATA1). */\nconst OP_PUSH32 = 0x20;\n/** Encoded length of a standard OP_RETURN script with a 32-byte payload. */\nconst OP_RETURN_PUSH32_SCRIPT_LEN = 1 + 1 + 32;\n\n/**\n * Verify the broadcast Pre-PegIn carries the expected OP_RETURN\n * commitment to the auth anchor.\n *\n * The OP_RETURN sits at `vout = vaultCount` (right after the per-vault\n * HTLC outputs and before the depositor-claim/change outputs) and\n * pushes the 32-byte `SHA256(authAnchor)`. The script encoding is\n * exactly `OP_RETURN || PUSH32 || <32 bytes>` (34 bytes). A\n * non-conformant WASM build that omitted the OP_RETURN, swapped its\n * position, or changed its push payload would let the depositor\n * obtain a valid bearer token for a Pre-PegIn whose on-chain\n * commitment doesn't actually bind the anchor — degrading the auth\n * from on-chain-bound to a shared secret. Fail closed.\n *\n * @throws If the OP_RETURN is missing, mis-located, mis-encoded, or\n *         pushes a payload other than `expectedAuthAnchorHashHex`.\n */\nexport function assertAuthAnchorOpReturn(\n  fundedPrePeginTxHex: string,\n  vaultCount: number,\n  expectedAuthAnchorHashHex: string,\n): void {\n  const cleanHex = stripHexPrefix(fundedPrePeginTxHex);\n  const tx = bitcoin.Transaction.fromHex(cleanHex);\n\n  if (tx.outs.length <= vaultCount) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Pre-PegIn auth-anchor OP_RETURN missing: tx has ${tx.outs.length} ` +\n        `outputs, expected at least ${vaultCount + 1} (vault outputs + OP_RETURN)`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const opReturnOutput = tx.outs[vaultCount];\n  const script = opReturnOutput.script;\n  if (\n    script.length !== OP_RETURN_PUSH32_SCRIPT_LEN ||\n    script[0] !== OP_RETURN ||\n    script[1] !== OP_PUSH32\n  ) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Pre-PegIn auth-anchor OP_RETURN at vout ${vaultCount} has unexpected ` +\n        `script encoding (got ${script.length}-byte script with prefix ` +\n        `0x${script.slice(0, Math.min(2, script.length)).toString(\"hex\")}; ` +\n        `expected ${OP_RETURN_PUSH32_SCRIPT_LEN}-byte OP_RETURN + PUSH32 layout)`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const pushedHex = script.slice(2).toString(\"hex\").toLowerCase();\n  if (pushedHex !== expectedAuthAnchorHashHex.toLowerCase()) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Pre-PegIn auth-anchor OP_RETURN payload mismatch at vout ${vaultCount}: ` +\n        `tx pushes ${pushedHex}, expected ${expectedAuthAnchorHashHex}`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (opReturnOutput.value !== 0) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Pre-PegIn auth-anchor OP_RETURN at vout ${vaultCount} has non-zero ` +\n        `value ${opReturnOutput.value}; OP_RETURN outputs must be 0-value`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Scan a funded Pre-PegIn transaction for its auth-anchor commitment\n * (an `OP_RETURN || PUSH32 || <32 bytes>` output with value 0).\n *\n * Returns `{ vout, hash }` when exactly one such output is found.\n * Returns `undefined` when:\n *   - the hex is unparseable,\n *   - no matching output exists (legacy non-auth-anchored Pre-PegIn),\n *   - more than one matching output exists (ambiguous / malformed).\n *\n * Used by the refund orchestrator to (a) locate the on-chain anchor\n * regardless of how many HTLCs preceded it and (b) detect multi-vault\n * funded transactions structurally: the single-vault refund path\n * reconstructs only one hashlock and expects the anchor at vout 1, so\n * any other vout signals a layout this call cannot safely refund.\n */\nexport function findAuthAnchorOpReturn(\n  fundedPrePeginTxHex: string,\n): { vout: number; hash: string } | undefined {\n  let tx: bitcoin.Transaction;\n  try {\n    tx = bitcoin.Transaction.fromHex(stripHexPrefix(fundedPrePeginTxHex));\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n\n  const hits: { vout: number; hash: string }[] = [];\n  for (let i = 0; i < tx.outs.length; i++) {\n    const output = tx.outs[i];\n    const script = output.script;\n    if (\n      script.length === OP_RETURN_PUSH32_SCRIPT_LEN &&\n      script[0] === OP_RETURN &&\n      script[1] === OP_PUSH32 &&\n      output.value === 0\n    ) {\n      hits.push({\n        vout: i,\n        hash: script.slice(2).toString(\"hex\").toLowerCase(),\n      });\n    }\n  }\n\n  return hits.length === 1 ? hits[0] : undefined;\n}\n","/**\n * HTLC Secret / Hashlock Utilities\n *\n * Pure functions for computing and validating SHA-256 hashlocks used in the\n * vault deposit protocol's HTLC (Hash Time Lock Contract).\n *\n * The SDK does NOT generate secrets — that is the caller's responsibility.\n * Today callers use `crypto.getRandomValues(32)`; when the `deriveContextHash`\n * wallet API ships, callers will use `wallet.deriveContextHash(\"babylon-btc-vault\", ctx)`.\n * These utilities work identically regardless of how the secret was produced.\n *\n * On-chain contract validation (BTCVaultRegistry.activateVaultWithSecret):\n *   if (sha256(abi.encodePacked(s)) != hashlock) revert InvalidSecret();\n *\n * @module htlc\n */\n\nimport { sha256 } from \"@noble/hashes/sha2.js\";\nimport type { Hex } from \"viem\";\n\n/** Expected hex length for a 0x-prefixed bytes32 value. */\nconst HEX_BYTES32_LENGTH = 66; // \"0x\" + 64 hex chars\n\n/**\n * Decode a 0x-prefixed hex string to bytes, with strict validation.\n * @throws if the input is not a valid 0x-prefixed hex string\n */\nfunction hexToBytes(hex: Hex): Uint8Array {\n  if (!hex.startsWith(\"0x\") && !hex.startsWith(\"0X\")) {\n    throw new Error(\"Expected 0x-prefixed hex string\");\n  }\n  const clean = hex.slice(2);\n  if (clean.length % 2 !== 0) {\n    throw new Error(`Hex string has odd length: ${clean.length}`);\n  }\n  if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]*$/.test(clean)) {\n    throw new Error(\"Hex string contains non-hex characters\");\n  }\n  const bytes = new Uint8Array(clean.length / 2);\n  for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) {\n    bytes[i] = parseInt(clean.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);\n  }\n  return bytes;\n}\n\n/**\n * Encode a Uint8Array as a 0x-prefixed lowercase hex string.\n */\nfunction bytesToHex(bytes: Uint8Array): Hex {\n  return `0x${Array.from(bytes)\n    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, \"0\"))\n    .join(\"\")}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate that a value is a 0x-prefixed bytes32 (exactly 32 bytes).\n * @throws if the value is not exactly 32 bytes\n */\nfunction assertBytes32(value: Hex, label: string): void {\n  if (value.length !== HEX_BYTES32_LENGTH) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `${label} must be exactly 32 bytes (${HEX_BYTES32_LENGTH} hex chars with 0x prefix), got ${value.length}`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Compute the SHA-256 hashlock from a secret preimage.\n *\n * Matches the on-chain validation: `sha256(abi.encodePacked(s))` where `s` is a `bytes32`.\n * `abi.encodePacked(bytes32)` is just the raw 32 bytes — no ABI padding.\n *\n * @param secret - 0x-prefixed bytes32 secret (66 hex chars)\n * @returns 0x-prefixed bytes32 SHA-256 hash\n * @throws if secret is not exactly 32 bytes\n */\nexport function computeHashlock(secret: Hex): Hex {\n  assertBytes32(secret, \"Secret\");\n  const secretBytes = hexToBytes(secret);\n  const hash = sha256(secretBytes);\n  return bytesToHex(hash);\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate that a secret's SHA-256 hash matches the expected hashlock.\n *\n * Use this for client-side pre-validation before sending the activation\n * transaction to avoid wasting gas on a contract revert.\n *\n * @param secret - 0x-prefixed bytes32 secret (66 hex chars)\n * @param hashlock - 0x-prefixed bytes32 expected hashlock from the vault\n * @returns true if SHA-256(secret) matches the hashlock\n * @throws if secret or hashlock is not exactly 32 bytes\n */\nexport function validateSecretAgainstHashlock(\n  secret: Hex,\n  hashlock: Hex,\n): boolean {\n  assertBytes32(secret, \"Secret\");\n  assertBytes32(hashlock, \"Hashlock\");\n  // Validate hashlock is valid hex (secret is validated inside computeHashlock)\n  hexToBytes(hashlock);\n\n  const computed = computeHashlock(secret);\n  return computed.toLowerCase() === hashlock.toLowerCase();\n}\n","import type { BitcoinWallet } from \"../../../shared/wallets/interfaces\";\n\n// Field docs use /** */ so they survive into the emitted .d.ts — the published\n// package is the only contract the external provider author (#2109) sees.\n\nexport interface DepositTermsVaultGroup {\n  /** 0-based; equals the group's position (groups are ascending by vout). */\n  readonly htlcVout: number;\n  /** x-only hex (64 chars), as validated on-chain upstream. */\n  readonly vaultProviderBtcPubkey: string;\n  /** sats */\n  readonly peginAmount: bigint;\n  /**\n   * sats; the MAXIMUM commission the depositor accepts —\n   * floor(peginAmount * maxAcceptableCommissionBps / 10_000), the same\n   * ceiling the registration calldata carries. An approving wallet MUST\n   * enforce the VP payout commission output `<= commissionFee` (e.g. the\n   * Ledger vault app does, firmware >= c8db53e), and every commission the\n   * contract admits stays under this ceiling (floor is monotonic in bps),\n   * so no contract-admitted deposit can be refused at payout. The actual\n   * stamped commission may be lower. Display the quoted value in UI, not this.\n   */\n  readonly commissionFee: bigint;\n  /** sats; the same value for every vault. */\n  readonly depositorClaimValue: bigint;\n  /**\n   * sats; the cap an approving wallet enforces on the PegIn tx fee. Equals\n   * the graph's exact (minimum) PegIn fee, which is deterministic — so the\n   * cap is satisfied exact-by-construction.\n   */\n  readonly peginMaxFee: bigint;\n}\n\n/**\n * Field names follow btc-vault vocabulary (the protocol source of truth);\n * a device-wire encoder maps them to its intent fields (e.g. the Ledger TLV:\n * protocolFeeRate -> base_fee_rate, timelockPegin -> pegin_csv_timelock,\n * timelockAssert -> payout_timelock, peginAmount -> vault_amount).\n */\nexport interface DepositTerms {\n  /**\n   * btc-vault tx-graph version (`vaultCoreVersion`) these terms describe —\n   * the vault's stamped on-chain version for resumes, the chain's\n   * `activeVaultCoreVersion` for fresh deposits. It selects the PegIn shape\n   * an approving wallet must expect: v1 = 2 outputs, no anchor; v2/v3 = TRUC\n   * nVersion 3, 3 outputs with a 240-sat P2A anchor at vout 2, and an\n   * Assert OP_RETURN marker that raises the claim value\n   * (btc-vault `transactions/pegin.rs`, `assert_marker.rs`). A provider that\n   * supports only one shape MUST reject the others here rather than\n   * mis-validating the PSBTs later.\n   */\n  vaultCoreVersion: number;\n  /**\n   * sat/vB; the tx-graph fee rate (protocolFeeRate), NOT the mempool funding\n   * rate. Approving wallets bound each payout's fee against this rate —\n   * pass the exact graph rate, not an inflated ceiling.\n   */\n  protocolFeeRate: bigint;\n  /** Vault-UTXO CSV timelock (blocks). */\n  timelockPegin: number;\n  /**\n   * btc-vault `timelock_assert` (t2) — the CSV on Assert output 0. Its own\n   * param, though production derives it and `timelockPegin` from one value.\n   */\n  timelockAssert: number;\n  /** HTLC refund CSV timelock (blocks). */\n  timelockRefund: number;\n  /**\n   * 64-char hex in display order. A device-wire encoder may need the\n   * little-endian form — some hardware byte-compares it against\n   * PSBT_IN_PREVIOUS_TXID rather than recomputing the txid.\n   */\n  prepeginTxid: string;\n  /** sats; the funded Pre-PegIn fee (an approving wallet caps the signed fee at this). */\n  prepeginMaxFee: bigint;\n  /**\n   * x-only hex. Sorted ascending by the upstream on-chain validation\n   * (validateOnChainParticipantKeys); the builder passes them through\n   * unasserted — approving devices may reject unsorted lists at load.\n   */\n  vaultKeeperBtcPubkeys: readonly string[];\n  /**\n   * x-only hex, sorted ascending upstream independently of vaultKeeperBtcPubkeys (same\n   * pass-through contract). Universal challengers only — the full graph\n   * challenger set is vaultKeeperBtcPubkeys ∪ universalChallengerBtcPubkeys (vault keepers are the local\n   * challengers).\n   */\n  universalChallengerBtcPubkeys: readonly string[];\n  /** Per-vault groups, ordered by ascending htlcVout. */\n  vaults: readonly DepositTermsVaultGroup[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Implemented only by depositor-approval wallets (e.g. a Ledger vault\n * provider). Provider obligations:\n *\n * - Envelope: validate terms against the device's envelope BEFORE the\n *   ceremony, rejecting with the shape `{ name: \"DepositTermsRejectedError\",\n *   reason: \"device-envelope\", message }` (matched structurally, not by class).\n * - Idempotence: a byte-equal re-approval MUST be a no-op while the\n *   device-side approval is live; anything that invalidates it (a later\n *   `deriveContextHash`, a signing failure) MUST clear the memo.\n *\n * Seam invariant: any derive invalidates a prior approval, so the SDK\n * re-approves after every derive and before the next terms-bound signature.\n * The re-approval sites are `PeginManager.preparePegin`,\n * `runDepositorPresignFlow`, and `signAndBroadcast` (the Pre-PegIn broadcast,\n * which re-derives before approving unless `holdsApprovedDepositTerms`\n * reports the byte-equal intent still live — see `ensurePrePeginTermsApproval`).\n */\nexport interface DepositTermsApprover {\n  approveDepositTerms(terms: DepositTerms): Promise<void>;\n  /**\n   * OPTIONAL fast-path probe: can the Pre-PegIn signature for exactly these\n   * terms proceed under the connection's held approval without a new\n   * ceremony? MUST report false once that Pre-PegIn was signed (one-shot),\n   * MUST answer from host state without device I/O, MUST return false on any\n   * doubt, and MUST never throw. A stale true fails closed at the next\n   * signature — this is a UX optimization, never an authorization.\n   */\n  holdsApprovedDepositTerms?(terms: DepositTerms): Promise<boolean>;\n  /**\n   * OPTIONAL validate-only pre-check (#2110): reject terms the device\n   * envelope would refuse, with the same `{ name:\n   * \"DepositTermsRejectedError\", reason: \"device-envelope\", message }` shape\n   * as `approveDepositTerms`, WITHOUT any device I/O and WITHOUT touching a\n   * held approval — the SDK calls it before the first derive screen, so a\n   * side effect here would cost or invalidate a physical ceremony. Success\n   * is NOT an approval: `approveDepositTerms` still runs its own envelope\n   * gate before the ceremony. Callers may pass provisional terms whose\n   * `prepeginTxid` is a placeholder (the real txid exists only post-derive),\n   * so implementations MUST NOT validate or bind `prepeginTxid` here.\n   */\n  validateDepositTerms?(terms: DepositTerms): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Where Pre-PegIn change must pay. Approval (policy) wallets sign key-path\n * under a wallet policy whose change branch the device alone can derive and\n * mark internal — the receive address is NOT acceptable change\n * (`process_in_outs.c:114-117` @ e400d8d8).\n *\n * Separate from {@link DepositTermsApprover} because only the Pre-PegIn build\n * needs it: the presign/payout ceremonies approve terms without ever creating\n * change, so they must not require a wallet to implement this.\n *\n * MUST be stable across a deposit flow: the app reads it to build the tx and\n * `preparePegin` re-reads it to verify, so mid-flow rotation fails that gate.\n */\nexport interface PrePeginChangeSource {\n  getChangeAddress(): Promise<string>;\n}\n\n/** Probes {@link DepositTermsApprover.approveDepositTerms}. */\nexport function supportsDepositApproval(\n  wallet: BitcoinWallet,\n): wallet is BitcoinWallet & DepositTermsApprover {\n  return (\n    typeof (wallet as Partial<DepositTermsApprover>).approveDepositTerms ===\n    \"function\"\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * The wallet's change address, for the one caller that needs it.\n *\n * Narrowing on `approveDepositTerms` alone cannot promise this method, so\n * calling it off the narrowed value would die on `is not a function` in the\n * middle of `preparePegin`, after the pubkey read. Ask here instead and fail\n * with something a provider author can act on.\n *\n * @throws If the wallet cannot report a change address.\n */\nexport async function requireChangeAddress(\n  wallet: BitcoinWallet,\n): Promise<string> {\n  const changeSource = wallet as Partial<PrePeginChangeSource>;\n  if (typeof changeSource.getChangeAddress !== \"function\") {\n    throw new Error(\n      \"Approval wallet does not implement getChangeAddress; it must expose its change branch, \" +\n        \"because the signing device accepts Pre-PegIn change only there.\",\n    );\n  }\n  return changeSource.getChangeAddress();\n}\n\n/**\n * Spreadable forward of the approval capability for wallet-wrapper objects.\n * Object spread drops prototype methods, so every `{...wallet}` wrapper site\n * must re-attach the capability explicitly: `...forwardDepositApproval(wallet)`.\n */\nexport function forwardDepositApproval(\n  wallet: BitcoinWallet,\n): Partial<DepositTermsApprover & PrePeginChangeSource> {\n  if (!supportsDepositApproval(wallet)) {\n    return {};\n  }\n  const holdsApprovedDepositTerms = wallet.holdsApprovedDepositTerms;\n  const validateDepositTerms = wallet.validateDepositTerms;\n  const getChangeAddress = (wallet as Partial<PrePeginChangeSource>)\n    .getChangeAddress;\n  return {\n    approveDepositTerms: (terms) => wallet.approveDepositTerms(terms),\n    // All optional in the seam: forward only what the provider implements, so\n    // wrapper consumers can keep probing by typeof.\n    ...(typeof getChangeAddress === \"function\"\n      ? { getChangeAddress: () => getChangeAddress.call(wallet) }\n      : {}),\n    ...(typeof holdsApprovedDepositTerms === \"function\"\n      ? {\n          holdsApprovedDepositTerms: (terms: DepositTerms) =>\n            holdsApprovedDepositTerms.call(wallet, terms),\n        }\n      : {}),\n    ...(typeof validateDepositTerms === \"function\"\n      ? {\n          validateDepositTerms: (terms: DepositTerms) =>\n            validateDepositTerms.call(wallet, terms),\n        }\n      : {}),\n  };\n}\n\nexport interface BuildDepositTermsInputs {\n  /** btc-vault tx-graph version the graph is built under. */\n  vaultCoreVersion: number;\n  protocolFeeRate: bigint;\n  timelockPegin: number;\n  /** btc-vault `timelock_assert` (t2) — its own param; NOT derived from timelockPegin here. */\n  timelockAssert: number;\n  timelockRefund: number;\n  prepeginTxid: string;\n  prepeginMaxFee: bigint;\n  vaultProviderBtcPubkey: string;\n  vaultKeeperBtcPubkeys: readonly string[];\n  universalChallengerBtcPubkeys: readonly string[];\n  /** Ceiling bps, not the quote — see {@link DepositTermsVaultGroup.commissionFee}. */\n  maxAcceptableCommissionBps: number;\n  peginAmounts: readonly bigint[];\n  depositorClaimValue: bigint;\n  peginMaxFee: bigint;\n}\n","/**\n * Payout Manager\n *\n * High-level manager that orchestrates the payout signing flow by coordinating\n * SDK primitives ({@link buildPayoutPsbt}, {@link extractPayoutSignature})\n * with a user-provided Bitcoin wallet.\n *\n * The Payout transaction references the Assert transaction (input 1).\n *\n * @see {@link PeginManager} - For Steps 1–4 of the peg-in flow\n * @see {@link buildPayoutPsbt} - Lower-level primitive for custom implementations\n * @see {@link extractPayoutSignature} - Extract signatures from signed PSBTs\n *\n * @module managers/PayoutManager\n */\n\nimport type { BitcoinWallet, SignPsbtOptions } from \"../../../shared/wallets\";\nimport {\n  assertPsbtUnsignedTxMatches,\n  assertScriptPathSchnorrSignature,\n  buildPayoutPsbt,\n  extractPayoutSignature,\n  validateWalletPubkey,\n  type Network,\n} from \"../primitives\";\nimport { DEPOSITOR_SIGNED_INPUT_COUNT } from \"../primitives/psbt/constants\";\nimport { createTaprootScriptPathSignOptions } from \"../utils/signing\";\n\n/** Payout PSBTs are signed by the depositor on input 0 (Taproot script-path). */\nconst PAYOUT_SIGNED_INPUT_INDEX = 0;\n\n/**\n * Configuration for the PayoutManager.\n */\nexport interface PayoutManagerConfig {\n  /**\n   * Bitcoin network to use for transactions.\n   */\n  network: Network;\n\n  /**\n   * Bitcoin wallet for signing payout transactions.\n   */\n  btcWallet: BitcoinWallet;\n}\n\n/**\n * Base parameters shared by both payout transaction types.\n */\ninterface SignPayoutBaseParams {\n  /**\n   * Vault core (tx-graph) version the vault was registered under — the\n   * vault's stamped on-chain `vaultCoreVersion`. Forwarded to\n   * {@link buildPayoutPsbt} to derive the matching graph's payout scripts.\n   */\n  vaultCoreVersion: number;\n\n  /**\n   * Peg-in transaction hex.\n   * The original transaction that created the vault output being spent.\n   */\n  peginTxHex: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Vault provider's BTC public key (x-only, 64-char hex).\n   */\n  vaultProviderBtcPubkey: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Vault keeper BTC public keys (x-only, 64-char hex).\n   */\n  vaultKeeperBtcPubkeys: string[];\n\n  /**\n   * Universal challenger BTC public keys (x-only, 64-char hex).\n   */\n  universalChallengerBtcPubkeys: string[];\n\n  /**\n   * CSV timelock in blocks for the PegIn output.\n   */\n  timelockPegin: number;\n  /** btc-vault `timelock_assert`; payout input 1's sequence. */\n  timelockAssert: number;\n\n  /**\n   * Depositor's BTC public key (x-only, 64-char hex). This MUST be the\n   * key registered on-chain for the vault — typically read from\n   * `BTCVaultRegistry.getBtcVaultBasicInfo(...).depositorBtcPubKey`.\n   *\n   * Required: omitting it would degrade `validateWalletPubkey` to a\n   * self-comparison, allowing the wrong wallet to produce a signature\n   * over a script tree that doesn't match the on-chain UTXO.\n   */\n  depositorBtcPubkey: string;\n\n  /**\n   * The on-chain registered depositor payout scriptPubKey (hex, with or without 0x prefix).\n   * Used to validate that the VP-provided payout transaction actually pays to the\n   * correct depositor payout address before signing.\n   */\n  registeredPayoutScriptPubKey: string;\n\n  /**\n   * The claimer's x-only BTC public key for this payout (64-char hex, no prefix).\n   * Forwarded to {@link buildPayoutPsbt} for per-role output validation.\n   */\n  claimerBtcPubkey: string;\n\n  /**\n   * VP commission in basis points (`1..=9999`). Forwarded to {@link buildPayoutPsbt}.\n   */\n  commissionBps: number;\n\n  /**\n   * Version-locked tx-graph fee rate (sat/vB) the graph was built with.\n   * Forwarded to {@link buildPayoutPsbt} for the fee band.\n   */\n  protocolFeeRate: bigint;\n\n  /**\n   * Security council member x-only pubkeys (hex); forwarded to\n   * {@link buildPayoutPsbt} to rebuild the Assert:0 payout leaf and to size the\n   * fee floor (see PayoutParams).\n   */\n  councilMembers: string[];\n\n  /** M-of-N council quorum; shapes the Assert:0 council leaf (see PayoutParams). */\n  councilQuorum: number;\n\n  /**\n   * RFC-006 resolved payout destinations, keyed by lowercased x-only operation\n   * pubkey. Forwarded verbatim to {@link buildPayoutPsbt}; every VK claimer\n   * must be present.\n   */\n  vkClaimerPayoutScriptPubKeys: Readonly<Record<string, string>>;\n  /** RFC-006 VP commission destination. Forwarded to {@link buildPayoutPsbt}. */\n  vpCommissionScriptPubKey: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Parameters for signing a Payout transaction.\n *\n * Payout is used in the challenge path after Assert, when the claimer proves validity.\n * Input 1 references the Assert transaction.\n */\nexport interface SignPayoutParams extends SignPayoutBaseParams {\n  /**\n   * Payout transaction hex (unsigned).\n   * This is the transaction from the vault provider that needs depositor signature.\n   */\n  payoutTxHex: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Assert transaction hex.\n   * Payout input 1 references Assert output 0.\n   */\n  assertTxHex: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of signing a payout transaction.\n */\nexport interface PayoutSignatureResult {\n  /**\n   * 64-byte Schnorr signature (128 hex characters).\n   */\n  signature: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Depositor's BTC public key used for signing.\n   */\n  depositorBtcPubkey: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * High-level manager for payout transaction signing.\n *\n * @remarks\n * After registering your peg-in on Ethereum (Step 3), the vault provider prepares\n * claim/payout transaction pairs. You must sign each payout transaction using this\n * manager and submit the signatures to the vault provider's RPC API.\n *\n * **What happens internally:**\n * 1. Validates your wallet's public key matches the vault's depositor\n * 2. Builds an unsigned PSBT with taproot script path spend info\n * 3. Signs input 0 (the vault UTXO) with your wallet\n * 4. Extracts the 64-byte Schnorr signature\n *\n * **Note:** The payout transaction has 2 inputs. PayoutManager only signs input 0\n * (from the peg-in tx). Input 1 (from the assert tx) is signed by the vault provider.\n *\n * @see {@link PeginManager} - For the complete peg-in flow context\n * @see {@link buildPayoutPsbt} - Lower-level primitive used internally\n * @see {@link extractPayoutSignature} - Signature extraction primitive\n */\nexport class PayoutManager {\n  private readonly config: PayoutManagerConfig;\n\n  /**\n   * Creates a new PayoutManager instance.\n   *\n   * @param config - Manager configuration including wallet\n   */\n  constructor(config: PayoutManagerConfig) {\n    this.config = config;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Signs a Payout transaction and extracts the Schnorr signature.\n   *\n   * Flow:\n   * 1. Vault provider submits Claim transaction\n   * 2. Claimer submits Assert transaction to prove validity\n   * 3. Payout can be executed (references Assert tx)\n   *\n   * This method orchestrates the following steps:\n   * 1. Get wallet's public key and convert to x-only format\n   * 2. Validate wallet pubkey matches on-chain depositor pubkey (if provided)\n   * 3. Build unsigned PSBT using primitives\n   * 4. Sign PSBT via btcWallet.signPsbt()\n   * 5. Extract 64-byte Schnorr signature using primitives\n   *\n   * The returned signature can be submitted to the vault provider API.\n   *\n   * @param params - Payout signing parameters\n   * @returns Signature result with 64-byte Schnorr signature and depositor pubkey\n   * @throws Error if wallet pubkey doesn't match depositor pubkey\n   * @throws Error if wallet operations fail or signature extraction fails\n   */\n  async signPayoutTransaction(\n    params: SignPayoutParams,\n  ): Promise<PayoutSignatureResult> {\n    // Validate wallet pubkey matches depositor and get both formats\n    const walletPubkeyRaw = await this.config.btcWallet.getPublicKeyHex();\n    const { depositorPubkey } = validateWalletPubkey(\n      walletPubkeyRaw,\n      params.depositorBtcPubkey,\n    );\n\n    // Build unsigned PSBT for Payout (uses Assert tx). Per-role output\n    // validation happens inside buildPayoutPsbt against the resolved input\n    // values.\n    const payoutPsbt = await buildPayoutPsbt({\n      vaultCoreVersion: params.vaultCoreVersion,\n      payoutTxHex: params.payoutTxHex,\n      peginTxHex: params.peginTxHex,\n      assertTxHex: params.assertTxHex,\n      depositorBtcPubkey: depositorPubkey,\n      vaultProviderBtcPubkey: params.vaultProviderBtcPubkey,\n      vaultKeeperBtcPubkeys: params.vaultKeeperBtcPubkeys,\n      universalChallengerBtcPubkeys: params.universalChallengerBtcPubkeys,\n      timelockPegin: params.timelockPegin,\n      timelockAssert: params.timelockAssert,\n      network: this.config.network,\n      claimerBtcPubkey: params.claimerBtcPubkey,\n      registeredPayoutScriptPubKey: params.registeredPayoutScriptPubKey,\n      commissionBps: params.commissionBps,\n      protocolFeeRate: params.protocolFeeRate,\n      councilMembers: params.councilMembers,\n      councilQuorum: params.councilQuorum,\n      vkClaimerPayoutScriptPubKeys: params.vkClaimerPayoutScriptPubKeys,\n      vpCommissionScriptPubKey: params.vpCommissionScriptPubKey,\n    });\n\n    // Sign PSBT via wallet (Taproot script-path spend, input 0 only)\n    const signedPsbtHex = await this.config.btcWallet.signPsbt(\n      payoutPsbt.psbtHex,\n      createTaprootScriptPathSignOptions(\n        walletPubkeyRaw,\n        DEPOSITOR_SIGNED_INPUT_COUNT,\n      ),\n    );\n\n    assertPsbtUnsignedTxMatches({\n      requestedPsbtHex: payoutPsbt.psbtHex,\n      returnedPsbtHex: signedPsbtHex,\n    });\n\n    // Extract Schnorr signature\n    const signature = extractPayoutSignature(signedPsbtHex, depositorPubkey);\n    // Critical Path #7: verify the signature against a sighash recomputed from\n    // the PSBT we built, not the wallet-returned one.\n    assertScriptPathSchnorrSignature({\n      requestedPsbtHex: payoutPsbt.psbtHex,\n      signatureHex: signature,\n      signerXOnlyPubkeyHex: depositorPubkey,\n      inputIndex: PAYOUT_SIGNED_INPUT_INDEX,\n    });\n\n    return {\n      signature,\n      depositorBtcPubkey: depositorPubkey,\n    };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Gets the configured Bitcoin network.\n   *\n   * @returns The Bitcoin network (mainnet, testnet, signet, regtest)\n   */\n  getNetwork(): Network {\n    return this.config.network;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Checks if the wallet supports batch signing (signPsbts).\n   *\n   * @returns true if batch signing is supported\n   */\n  supportsBatchSigning(): boolean {\n    return typeof this.config.btcWallet.signPsbts === \"function\";\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Batch signs multiple payout transactions (1 per claimer).\n   * This allows signing all transactions with a single wallet interaction.\n   *\n   * @param transactions - Array of payout params to sign\n   * @returns Array of signature results matching input order\n   * @throws Error if wallet doesn't support batch signing\n   * @throws Error if any signing operation fails\n   */\n  async signPayoutTransactionsBatch(transactions: SignPayoutParams[]): Promise<\n    Array<{\n      payoutSignature: string;\n      depositorBtcPubkey: string;\n    }>\n  > {\n    if (!this.supportsBatchSigning()) {\n      throw new Error(\n        \"Wallet does not support batch signing (signPsbts method not available)\",\n      );\n    }\n\n    // Get wallet pubkey once\n    const walletPubkeyRaw = await this.config.btcWallet.getPublicKeyHex();\n\n    // Build all PSBTs (1 per claimer)\n    const psbtsToSign: string[] = [];\n    const signOptions: SignPsbtOptions[] = [];\n    const depositorPubkeys: string[] = [];\n\n    for (const tx of transactions) {\n      // Validate wallet pubkey matches depositor\n      const { depositorPubkey } = validateWalletPubkey(\n        walletPubkeyRaw,\n        tx.depositorBtcPubkey,\n      );\n      depositorPubkeys.push(depositorPubkey);\n\n      // Build Payout PSBT (output validation runs inside buildPayoutPsbt\n      // against resolved input values).\n      const payoutPsbt = await buildPayoutPsbt({\n        vaultCoreVersion: tx.vaultCoreVersion,\n        payoutTxHex: tx.payoutTxHex,\n        peginTxHex: tx.peginTxHex,\n        assertTxHex: tx.assertTxHex,\n        depositorBtcPubkey: depositorPubkey,\n        vaultProviderBtcPubkey: tx.vaultProviderBtcPubkey,\n        vaultKeeperBtcPubkeys: tx.vaultKeeperBtcPubkeys,\n        universalChallengerBtcPubkeys: tx.universalChallengerBtcPubkeys,\n        timelockPegin: tx.timelockPegin,\n        timelockAssert: tx.timelockAssert,\n        network: this.config.network,\n        claimerBtcPubkey: tx.claimerBtcPubkey,\n        registeredPayoutScriptPubKey: tx.registeredPayoutScriptPubKey,\n        commissionBps: tx.commissionBps,\n        protocolFeeRate: tx.protocolFeeRate,\n        councilMembers: tx.councilMembers,\n        councilQuorum: tx.councilQuorum,\n        vkClaimerPayoutScriptPubKeys: tx.vkClaimerPayoutScriptPubKeys,\n        vpCommissionScriptPubKey: tx.vpCommissionScriptPubKey,\n      });\n      psbtsToSign.push(payoutPsbt.psbtHex);\n      signOptions.push(\n        createTaprootScriptPathSignOptions(\n          walletPubkeyRaw,\n          DEPOSITOR_SIGNED_INPUT_COUNT,\n        ),\n      );\n    }\n\n    // Batch sign all PSBTs with single wallet interaction\n    const signedPsbts = await this.config.btcWallet.signPsbts!(\n      psbtsToSign,\n      signOptions,\n    );\n\n    // Validate that wallet returned the expected number of signed PSBTs\n    if (signedPsbts.length !== transactions.length) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `Expected ${transactions.length} signed PSBTs but received ${signedPsbts.length}`,\n      );\n    }\n\n    // Extract signatures from signed PSBTs\n    const results: Array<{\n      payoutSignature: string;\n      depositorBtcPubkey: string;\n    }> = [];\n\n    for (let i = 0; i < transactions.length; i++) {\n      const depositorPubkey = depositorPubkeys[i];\n      assertPsbtUnsignedTxMatches({\n        requestedPsbtHex: psbtsToSign[i],\n        returnedPsbtHex: signedPsbts[i],\n      });\n      const payoutSignature = extractPayoutSignature(\n        signedPsbts[i],\n        depositorPubkey,\n      );\n      assertScriptPathSchnorrSignature({\n        requestedPsbtHex: psbtsToSign[i],\n        signatureHex: payoutSignature,\n        signerXOnlyPubkeyHex: depositorPubkey,\n        inputIndex: PAYOUT_SIGNED_INPUT_INDEX,\n      });\n\n      results.push({\n        payoutSignature,\n        depositorBtcPubkey: depositorPubkey,\n      });\n    }\n\n    return results;\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Wallet-signing helper that routes a lone PSBT to `signPsbt`, prefers native\n * `signPsbts` for real batches, and falls back to sequential `signPsbt` for\n * wallets that don't implement batch signing.\n *\n * @module managers/pegin/signPsbtsWithFallback\n */\n\nimport type {\n  BitcoinWallet,\n  SignPsbtOptions,\n} from \"../../../../shared/wallets\";\n\n/**\n * Sign one or more PSBTs against a wallet.\n *\n * A single PSBT is always signed via `signPsbt`, never the batch endpoint: it's\n * one wallet interaction either way, and `signPsbt` is the universally-required\n * wallet method (batch `signPsbts` is optional), so single-sign is the portable\n * choice — some integrations (notably MPC / institutional wallets) prefer it.\n * For a real batch (>1), wallets exposing native `signPsbts` (e.g. UniSat) sign\n * in one interaction; others loop `signPsbt`.\n *\n * @throws If native `signPsbts` returns a different number of signed PSBTs\n *         than were submitted.\n */\nexport async function signPsbtsWithFallback(\n  wallet: BitcoinWallet,\n  psbtsHexes: string[],\n  options?: SignPsbtOptions[],\n): Promise<string[]> {\n  if (psbtsHexes.length === 1) {\n    return [await wallet.signPsbt(psbtsHexes[0], options?.[0])];\n  }\n\n  if (typeof wallet.signPsbts === \"function\") {\n    const signedPsbts = await wallet.signPsbts(psbtsHexes, options);\n    if (signedPsbts.length !== psbtsHexes.length) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `Expected ${psbtsHexes.length} signed PSBTs but received ${signedPsbts.length}`,\n      );\n    }\n    return signedPsbts;\n  }\n\n  const signedPsbts: string[] = [];\n  for (let i = 0; i < psbtsHexes.length; i++) {\n    signedPsbts.push(await wallet.signPsbt(psbtsHexes[i], options?.[i]));\n  }\n  return 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An approving wallet MUST\n   * enforce the VP payout commission output `<= commissionFee` (e.g. the\n   * Ledger vault app does, firmware >= c8db53e), and every commission the\n   * contract admits stays under this ceiling (floor is monotonic in bps),\n   * so no contract-admitted deposit can be refused at payout. The actual\n   * stamped commission may be lower. Display the quoted value in UI, not this.\n   */\n  readonly commissionFee: bigint;\n  /** sats; the same value for every vault. */\n  readonly depositorClaimValue: bigint;\n  /**\n   * sats; the cap an approving wallet enforces on the PegIn tx fee. Equals\n   * the graph's exact (minimum) PegIn fee, which is deterministic — so the\n   * cap is satisfied exact-by-construction.\n   */\n  readonly peginMaxFee: bigint;\n}\n\n/**\n * Field names follow btc-vault vocabulary (the protocol source of truth);\n * a device-wire encoder maps them to its intent fields (e.g. the Ledger TLV:\n * protocolFeeRate -> base_fee_rate, timelockPegin -> pegin_csv_timelock,\n * timelockAssert -> payout_timelock, peginAmount -> vault_amount).\n */\nexport interface DepositTerms {\n  /**\n   * btc-vault tx-graph version (`vaultCoreVersion`) these terms describe —\n   * the vault's stamped on-chain version for resumes, the chain's\n   * `activeVaultCoreVersion` for fresh deposits. It selects the PegIn shape\n   * an approving wallet must expect: v1 = 2 outputs, no anchor; v2/v3 = TRUC\n   * nVersion 3, 3 outputs with a 240-sat P2A anchor at vout 2, and an\n   * Assert OP_RETURN marker that raises the claim value\n   * (btc-vault `transactions/pegin.rs`, `assert_marker.rs`). A provider that\n   * supports only one shape MUST reject the others here rather than\n   * mis-validating the PSBTs later.\n   */\n  vaultCoreVersion: number;\n  /**\n   * sat/vB; the tx-graph fee rate (protocolFeeRate), NOT the mempool funding\n   * rate. Approving wallets bound each payout's fee against this rate —\n   * pass the exact graph rate, not an inflated ceiling.\n   */\n  protocolFeeRate: bigint;\n  /** Vault-UTXO CSV timelock (blocks). */\n  timelockPegin: number;\n  /**\n   * btc-vault `timelock_assert` (t2) — the CSV on Assert output 0. Its own\n   * param, though production derives it and `timelockPegin` from one value.\n   */\n  timelockAssert: number;\n  /** HTLC refund CSV timelock (blocks). */\n  timelockRefund: number;\n  /**\n   * 64-char hex in display order. A device-wire encoder may need the\n   * little-endian form — some hardware byte-compares it against\n   * PSBT_IN_PREVIOUS_TXID rather than recomputing the txid.\n   */\n  prepeginTxid: string;\n  /** sats; the funded Pre-PegIn fee (an approving wallet caps the signed fee at this). */\n  prepeginMaxFee: bigint;\n  /**\n   * x-only hex. Sorted ascending by the upstream on-chain validation\n   * (validateOnChainParticipantKeys); the builder passes them through\n   * unasserted — approving devices may reject unsorted lists at load.\n   */\n  vaultKeeperBtcPubkeys: readonly string[];\n  /**\n   * x-only hex, sorted ascending upstream independently of vaultKeeperBtcPubkeys (same\n   * pass-through contract). Universal challengers only — the full graph\n   * challenger set is vaultKeeperBtcPubkeys ∪ universalChallengerBtcPubkeys (vault keepers are the local\n   * challengers).\n   */\n  universalChallengerBtcPubkeys: readonly string[];\n  /** Per-vault groups, ordered by ascending htlcVout. */\n  vaults: readonly DepositTermsVaultGroup[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Implemented only by depositor-approval wallets (e.g. a Ledger vault\n * provider). Provider obligations:\n *\n * - Envelope: validate terms against the device's envelope BEFORE the\n *   ceremony, rejecting with the shape `{ name: \"DepositTermsRejectedError\",\n *   reason: \"device-envelope\", message }` (matched structurally, not by class).\n * - Idempotence: a byte-equal re-approval MUST be a no-op while the\n *   device-side approval is live; anything that invalidates it (a later\n *   `deriveContextHash`, a signing failure) MUST clear the memo.\n *\n * Seam invariant: any derive invalidates a prior approval, so the SDK\n * re-approves after every derive and before the next terms-bound signature.\n * The re-approval sites are `PeginManager.preparePegin`,\n * `runDepositorPresignFlow`, and `signAndBroadcast` (the Pre-PegIn broadcast,\n * which re-derives before approving unless `holdsApprovedDepositTerms`\n * reports the byte-equal intent still live — see `ensurePrePeginTermsApproval`).\n */\nexport interface DepositTermsApprover {\n  approveDepositTerms(terms: DepositTerms): Promise<void>;\n  /**\n   * OPTIONAL fast-path probe: can the Pre-PegIn signature for exactly these\n   * terms proceed under the connection's held approval without a new\n   * ceremony? MUST report false once that Pre-PegIn was signed (one-shot),\n   * MUST answer from host state without device I/O, MUST return false on any\n   * doubt, and MUST never throw. A stale true fails closed at the next\n   * signature — this is a UX optimization, never an authorization.\n   */\n  holdsApprovedDepositTerms?(terms: DepositTerms): Promise<boolean>;\n  /**\n   * OPTIONAL validate-only pre-check (#2110): reject terms the device\n   * envelope would refuse, with the same `{ name:\n   * \"DepositTermsRejectedError\", reason: \"device-envelope\", message }` shape\n   * as `approveDepositTerms`, WITHOUT any device I/O and WITHOUT touching a\n   * held approval — the SDK calls it before the first derive screen, so a\n   * side effect here would cost or invalidate a physical ceremony. Success\n   * is NOT an approval: `approveDepositTerms` still runs its own envelope\n   * gate before the ceremony. Callers may pass provisional terms whose\n   * `prepeginTxid` is a placeholder (the real txid exists only post-derive),\n   * so implementations MUST NOT validate or bind `prepeginTxid` here.\n   */\n  validateDepositTerms?(terms: DepositTerms): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Where Pre-PegIn change must pay. Approval (policy) wallets sign key-path\n * under a wallet policy whose change branch the device alone can derive and\n * mark internal — the receive address is NOT acceptable change\n * (`process_in_outs.c:114-117` @ e400d8d8).\n *\n * Separate from {@link DepositTermsApprover} because only the Pre-PegIn build\n * needs it: the presign/payout ceremonies approve terms without ever creating\n * change, so they must not require a wallet to implement this.\n *\n * MUST be stable across a deposit flow: the app reads it to build the tx and\n * `preparePegin` re-reads it to verify, so mid-flow rotation fails that gate.\n */\nexport interface PrePeginChangeSource {\n  getChangeAddress(): Promise<string>;\n}\n\n/** Probes {@link DepositTermsApprover.approveDepositTerms}. */\nexport function supportsDepositApproval(\n  wallet: BitcoinWallet,\n): wallet is BitcoinWallet & DepositTermsApprover {\n  return (\n    typeof (wallet as Partial<DepositTermsApprover>).approveDepositTerms ===\n    \"function\"\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * The wallet's change address, for the one caller that needs it.\n *\n * Narrowing on `approveDepositTerms` alone cannot promise this method, so\n * calling it off the narrowed value would die on `is not a function` in the\n * middle of `preparePegin`, after the pubkey read. Ask here instead and fail\n * with something a provider author can act on.\n *\n * @throws If the wallet cannot report a change address.\n */\nexport async function requireChangeAddress(\n  wallet: BitcoinWallet,\n): Promise<string> {\n  const changeSource = wallet as Partial<PrePeginChangeSource>;\n  if (typeof changeSource.getChangeAddress !== \"function\") {\n    throw new Error(\n      \"Approval wallet does not implement getChangeAddress; it must expose its change branch, \" +\n        \"because the signing device accepts Pre-PegIn change only there.\",\n    );\n  }\n  return changeSource.getChangeAddress();\n}\n\n/**\n * Spreadable forward of the approval capability for wallet-wrapper objects.\n * Object spread drops prototype methods, so every `{...wallet}` wrapper site\n * must re-attach the capability explicitly: `...forwardDepositApproval(wallet)`.\n */\nexport function forwardDepositApproval(\n  wallet: BitcoinWallet,\n): Partial<DepositTermsApprover & PrePeginChangeSource> {\n  if (!supportsDepositApproval(wallet)) {\n    return {};\n  }\n  const holdsApprovedDepositTerms = wallet.holdsApprovedDepositTerms;\n  const validateDepositTerms = wallet.validateDepositTerms;\n  const getChangeAddress = (wallet as Partial<PrePeginChangeSource>)\n    .getChangeAddress;\n  return {\n    approveDepositTerms: (terms) => wallet.approveDepositTerms(terms),\n    // All optional in the seam: forward only what the provider implements, so\n    // wrapper consumers can keep probing by typeof.\n    ...(typeof getChangeAddress === \"function\"\n      ? { getChangeAddress: () => getChangeAddress.call(wallet) }\n      : {}),\n    ...(typeof holdsApprovedDepositTerms === \"function\"\n      ? {\n          holdsApprovedDepositTerms: (terms: DepositTerms) =>\n            holdsApprovedDepositTerms.call(wallet, terms),\n        }\n      : {}),\n    ...(typeof validateDepositTerms === \"function\"\n      ? {\n          validateDepositTerms: (terms: DepositTerms) =>\n            validateDepositTerms.call(wallet, terms),\n        }\n      : {}),\n  };\n}\n\nexport interface BuildDepositTermsInputs {\n  /** btc-vault tx-graph version the graph is built under. */\n  vaultCoreVersion: number;\n  protocolFeeRate: bigint;\n  timelockPegin: number;\n  /** btc-vault `timelock_assert` (t2) — its own param; NOT derived from timelockPegin here. */\n  timelockAssert: number;\n  timelockRefund: number;\n  prepeginTxid: string;\n  prepeginMaxFee: bigint;\n  vaultProviderBtcPubkey: string;\n  vaultKeeperBtcPubkeys: readonly string[];\n  universalChallengerBtcPubkeys: readonly string[];\n  /** Ceiling bps, not the quote — see {@link DepositTermsVaultGroup.commissionFee}. */\n  maxAcceptableCommissionBps: number;\n  peginAmounts: readonly bigint[];\n  depositorClaimValue: bigint;\n  peginMaxFee: bigint;\n}\n","/**\n * Payout Manager\n *\n * High-level manager that orchestrates the payout signing flow by coordinating\n * SDK primitives ({@link buildPayoutPsbt}, {@link extractPayoutSignature})\n * with a user-provided Bitcoin wallet.\n *\n * The Payout transaction references the Assert transaction (input 1).\n *\n * @see {@link PeginManager} - For Steps 1–4 of the peg-in flow\n * @see {@link buildPayoutPsbt} - Lower-level primitive for custom implementations\n * @see {@link extractPayoutSignature} - Extract signatures from signed PSBTs\n *\n * @module managers/PayoutManager\n */\n\nimport type { BitcoinWallet, SignPsbtOptions } from \"../../../shared/wallets\";\nimport {\n  assertPsbtUnsignedTxMatches,\n  assertScriptPathSchnorrSignature,\n  buildPayoutPsbt,\n  extractPayoutSignature,\n  validateWalletPubkey,\n  type Network,\n} from \"../primitives\";\nimport { DEPOSITOR_SIGNED_INPUT_COUNT } from \"../primitives/psbt/constants\";\nimport { createTaprootScriptPathSignOptions } from \"../utils/signing\";\n\n/** Payout PSBTs are signed by the depositor on input 0 (Taproot script-path). */\nconst PAYOUT_SIGNED_INPUT_INDEX = 0;\n\n/**\n * Configuration for the PayoutManager.\n */\nexport interface PayoutManagerConfig {\n  /**\n   * Bitcoin network to use for transactions.\n   */\n  network: Network;\n\n  /**\n   * Bitcoin wallet for signing payout transactions.\n   */\n  btcWallet: BitcoinWallet;\n}\n\n/**\n * Base parameters shared by both payout transaction types.\n */\ninterface SignPayoutBaseParams {\n  /**\n   * Vault core (tx-graph) version the vault was registered under — the\n   * vault's stamped on-chain `vaultCoreVersion`. Forwarded to\n   * {@link buildPayoutPsbt} to derive the matching graph's payout scripts.\n   */\n  vaultCoreVersion: number;\n\n  /**\n   * Peg-in transaction hex.\n   * The original transaction that created the vault output being spent.\n   */\n  peginTxHex: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Vault provider's BTC public key (x-only, 64-char hex).\n   */\n  vaultProviderBtcPubkey: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Vault keeper BTC public keys (x-only, 64-char hex).\n   */\n  vaultKeeperBtcPubkeys: string[];\n\n  /**\n   * Universal challenger BTC public keys (x-only, 64-char hex).\n   */\n  universalChallengerBtcPubkeys: string[];\n\n  /**\n   * CSV timelock in blocks for the PegIn output.\n   */\n  timelockPegin: number;\n  /** btc-vault `timelock_assert`; payout input 1's sequence. */\n  timelockAssert: number;\n\n  /**\n   * Depositor's BTC public key (x-only, 64-char hex). This MUST be the\n   * key registered on-chain for the vault — typically read from\n   * `BTCVaultRegistry.getBtcVaultBasicInfo(...).depositorBtcPubKey`.\n   *\n   * Required: omitting it would degrade `validateWalletPubkey` to a\n   * self-comparison, allowing the wrong wallet to produce a signature\n   * over a script tree that doesn't match the on-chain UTXO.\n   */\n  depositorBtcPubkey: string;\n\n  /**\n   * The on-chain registered depositor payout scriptPubKey (hex, with or without 0x prefix).\n   * Used to validate that the VP-provided payout transaction actually pays to the\n   * correct depositor payout address before signing.\n   */\n  registeredPayoutScriptPubKey: string;\n\n  /**\n   * The claimer's x-only BTC public key for this payout (64-char hex, no prefix).\n   * Forwarded to {@link buildPayoutPsbt} for per-role output validation.\n   */\n  claimerBtcPubkey: string;\n\n  /**\n   * VP commission in basis points (`1..=9999`). Forwarded to {@link buildPayoutPsbt}.\n   */\n  commissionBps: number;\n\n  /**\n   * Version-locked tx-graph fee rate (sat/vB) the graph was built with.\n   * Forwarded to {@link buildPayoutPsbt} for the fee band.\n   */\n  protocolFeeRate: bigint;\n\n  /**\n   * Security council member x-only pubkeys (hex); forwarded to\n   * {@link buildPayoutPsbt} to rebuild the Assert:0 payout leaf and to size the\n   * fee floor (see PayoutParams).\n   */\n  councilMembers: string[];\n\n  /** M-of-N council quorum; shapes the Assert:0 council leaf (see PayoutParams). */\n  councilQuorum: number;\n\n  /**\n   * RFC-006 resolved payout destinations, keyed by lowercased x-only operation\n   * pubkey. Forwarded verbatim to {@link buildPayoutPsbt}; every VK claimer\n   * must be present.\n   */\n  vkClaimerPayoutScriptPubKeys: Readonly<Record<string, string>>;\n  /** RFC-006 VP commission destination. Forwarded to {@link buildPayoutPsbt}. */\n  vpCommissionScriptPubKey: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Parameters for signing a Payout transaction.\n *\n * Payout is used in the challenge path after Assert, when the claimer proves validity.\n * Input 1 references the Assert transaction.\n */\nexport interface SignPayoutParams extends SignPayoutBaseParams {\n  /**\n   * Payout transaction hex (unsigned).\n   * This is the transaction from the vault provider that needs depositor signature.\n   */\n  payoutTxHex: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Assert transaction hex.\n   * Payout input 1 references Assert output 0.\n   */\n  assertTxHex: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of signing a payout transaction.\n */\nexport interface PayoutSignatureResult {\n  /**\n   * 64-byte Schnorr signature (128 hex characters).\n   */\n  signature: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Depositor's BTC public key used for signing.\n   */\n  depositorBtcPubkey: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * High-level manager for payout transaction signing.\n *\n * @remarks\n * After registering your peg-in on Ethereum (Step 3), the vault provider prepares\n * claim/payout transaction pairs. You must sign each payout transaction using this\n * manager and submit the signatures to the vault provider's RPC API.\n *\n * **What happens internally:**\n * 1. Validates your wallet's public key matches the vault's depositor\n * 2. Builds an unsigned PSBT with taproot script path spend info\n * 3. Signs input 0 (the vault UTXO) with your wallet\n * 4. Extracts the 64-byte Schnorr signature\n *\n * **Note:** The payout transaction has 2 inputs. PayoutManager only signs input 0\n * (from the peg-in tx). Input 1 (from the assert tx) is signed by the vault provider.\n *\n * @see {@link PeginManager} - For the complete peg-in flow context\n * @see {@link buildPayoutPsbt} - Lower-level primitive used internally\n * @see {@link extractPayoutSignature} - Signature extraction primitive\n */\nexport class PayoutManager {\n  private readonly config: PayoutManagerConfig;\n\n  /**\n   * Creates a new PayoutManager instance.\n   *\n   * @param config - Manager configuration including wallet\n   */\n  constructor(config: PayoutManagerConfig) {\n    this.config = config;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Signs a Payout transaction and extracts the Schnorr signature.\n   *\n   * Flow:\n   * 1. Vault provider submits Claim transaction\n   * 2. Claimer submits Assert transaction to prove validity\n   * 3. Payout can be executed (references Assert tx)\n   *\n   * This method orchestrates the following steps:\n   * 1. Get wallet's public key and convert to x-only format\n   * 2. Validate wallet pubkey matches on-chain depositor pubkey (if provided)\n   * 3. Build unsigned PSBT using primitives\n   * 4. Sign PSBT via btcWallet.signPsbt()\n   * 5. Extract 64-byte Schnorr signature using primitives\n   *\n   * The returned signature can be submitted to the vault provider API.\n   *\n   * @param params - Payout signing parameters\n   * @returns Signature result with 64-byte Schnorr signature and depositor pubkey\n   * @throws Error if wallet pubkey doesn't match depositor pubkey\n   * @throws Error if wallet operations fail or signature extraction fails\n   */\n  async signPayoutTransaction(\n    params: SignPayoutParams,\n  ): Promise<PayoutSignatureResult> {\n    // Validate wallet pubkey matches depositor and get both formats\n    const walletPubkeyRaw = await this.config.btcWallet.getPublicKeyHex();\n    const { depositorPubkey } = validateWalletPubkey(\n      walletPubkeyRaw,\n      params.depositorBtcPubkey,\n    );\n\n    // Build unsigned PSBT for Payout (uses Assert tx). Per-role output\n    // validation happens inside buildPayoutPsbt against the resolved input\n    // values.\n    const payoutPsbt = await buildPayoutPsbt({\n      vaultCoreVersion: params.vaultCoreVersion,\n      payoutTxHex: params.payoutTxHex,\n      peginTxHex: params.peginTxHex,\n      assertTxHex: params.assertTxHex,\n      depositorBtcPubkey: depositorPubkey,\n      vaultProviderBtcPubkey: params.vaultProviderBtcPubkey,\n      vaultKeeperBtcPubkeys: params.vaultKeeperBtcPubkeys,\n      universalChallengerBtcPubkeys: params.universalChallengerBtcPubkeys,\n      timelockPegin: params.timelockPegin,\n      timelockAssert: params.timelockAssert,\n      network: this.config.network,\n      claimerBtcPubkey: params.claimerBtcPubkey,\n      registeredPayoutScriptPubKey: params.registeredPayoutScriptPubKey,\n      commissionBps: params.commissionBps,\n      protocolFeeRate: params.protocolFeeRate,\n      councilMembers: params.councilMembers,\n      councilQuorum: params.councilQuorum,\n      vkClaimerPayoutScriptPubKeys: params.vkClaimerPayoutScriptPubKeys,\n      vpCommissionScriptPubKey: params.vpCommissionScriptPubKey,\n    });\n\n    // Sign PSBT via wallet (Taproot script-path spend, input 0 only)\n    const signedPsbtHex = await this.config.btcWallet.signPsbt(\n      payoutPsbt.psbtHex,\n      createTaprootScriptPathSignOptions(\n        walletPubkeyRaw,\n        DEPOSITOR_SIGNED_INPUT_COUNT,\n      ),\n    );\n\n    assertPsbtUnsignedTxMatches({\n      requestedPsbtHex: payoutPsbt.psbtHex,\n      returnedPsbtHex: signedPsbtHex,\n    });\n\n    // Extract Schnorr signature\n    const signature = extractPayoutSignature(signedPsbtHex, depositorPubkey);\n    // Critical Path #7: verify the signature against a sighash recomputed from\n    // the PSBT we built, not the wallet-returned one.\n    assertScriptPathSchnorrSignature({\n      requestedPsbtHex: payoutPsbt.psbtHex,\n      signatureHex: signature,\n      signerXOnlyPubkeyHex: depositorPubkey,\n      inputIndex: PAYOUT_SIGNED_INPUT_INDEX,\n    });\n\n    return {\n      signature,\n      depositorBtcPubkey: depositorPubkey,\n    };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Gets the configured Bitcoin network.\n   *\n   * @returns The Bitcoin network (mainnet, testnet, signet, regtest)\n   */\n  getNetwork(): Network {\n    return this.config.network;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Checks if the wallet supports batch signing (signPsbts).\n   *\n   * @returns true if batch signing is supported\n   */\n  supportsBatchSigning(): boolean {\n    return typeof this.config.btcWallet.signPsbts === \"function\";\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Batch signs multiple payout transactions (1 per claimer).\n   * This allows signing all transactions with a single wallet interaction.\n   *\n   * @param transactions - Array of payout params to sign\n   * @returns Array of signature results matching input order\n   * @throws Error if wallet doesn't support batch signing\n   * @throws Error if any signing operation fails\n   */\n  async signPayoutTransactionsBatch(transactions: SignPayoutParams[]): Promise<\n    Array<{\n      payoutSignature: string;\n      depositorBtcPubkey: string;\n    }>\n  > {\n    if (!this.supportsBatchSigning()) {\n      throw new Error(\n        \"Wallet does not support batch signing (signPsbts method not available)\",\n      );\n    }\n\n    // Get wallet pubkey once\n    const walletPubkeyRaw = await this.config.btcWallet.getPublicKeyHex();\n\n    // Build all PSBTs (1 per claimer)\n    const psbtsToSign: string[] = [];\n    const signOptions: SignPsbtOptions[] = [];\n    const depositorPubkeys: string[] = [];\n\n    for (const tx of transactions) {\n      // Validate wallet pubkey matches depositor\n      const { depositorPubkey } = validateWalletPubkey(\n        walletPubkeyRaw,\n        tx.depositorBtcPubkey,\n      );\n      depositorPubkeys.push(depositorPubkey);\n\n      // Build Payout PSBT (output validation runs inside buildPayoutPsbt\n      // against resolved input values).\n      const payoutPsbt = await buildPayoutPsbt({\n        vaultCoreVersion: tx.vaultCoreVersion,\n        payoutTxHex: tx.payoutTxHex,\n        peginTxHex: tx.peginTxHex,\n        assertTxHex: tx.assertTxHex,\n        depositorBtcPubkey: depositorPubkey,\n        vaultProviderBtcPubkey: tx.vaultProviderBtcPubkey,\n        vaultKeeperBtcPubkeys: tx.vaultKeeperBtcPubkeys,\n        universalChallengerBtcPubkeys: tx.universalChallengerBtcPubkeys,\n        timelockPegin: tx.timelockPegin,\n        timelockAssert: tx.timelockAssert,\n        network: this.config.network,\n        claimerBtcPubkey: tx.claimerBtcPubkey,\n        registeredPayoutScriptPubKey: tx.registeredPayoutScriptPubKey,\n        commissionBps: tx.commissionBps,\n        protocolFeeRate: tx.protocolFeeRate,\n        councilMembers: tx.councilMembers,\n        councilQuorum: tx.councilQuorum,\n        vkClaimerPayoutScriptPubKeys: tx.vkClaimerPayoutScriptPubKeys,\n        vpCommissionScriptPubKey: tx.vpCommissionScriptPubKey,\n      });\n      psbtsToSign.push(payoutPsbt.psbtHex);\n      signOptions.push(\n        createTaprootScriptPathSignOptions(\n          walletPubkeyRaw,\n          DEPOSITOR_SIGNED_INPUT_COUNT,\n        ),\n      );\n    }\n\n    // Batch sign all PSBTs with single wallet interaction\n    const signedPsbts = await this.config.btcWallet.signPsbts!(\n      psbtsToSign,\n      signOptions,\n    );\n\n    // Validate that wallet returned the expected number of signed PSBTs\n    if (signedPsbts.length !== transactions.length) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `Expected ${transactions.length} signed PSBTs but received ${signedPsbts.length}`,\n      );\n    }\n\n    // Extract signatures from signed PSBTs\n    const results: Array<{\n      payoutSignature: string;\n      depositorBtcPubkey: string;\n    }> = [];\n\n    for (let i = 0; i < transactions.length; i++) {\n      const depositorPubkey = depositorPubkeys[i];\n      assertPsbtUnsignedTxMatches({\n        requestedPsbtHex: psbtsToSign[i],\n        returnedPsbtHex: signedPsbts[i],\n      });\n      const payoutSignature = extractPayoutSignature(\n        signedPsbts[i],\n        depositorPubkey,\n      );\n      assertScriptPathSchnorrSignature({\n        requestedPsbtHex: psbtsToSign[i],\n        signatureHex: payoutSignature,\n        signerXOnlyPubkeyHex: depositorPubkey,\n        inputIndex: PAYOUT_SIGNED_INPUT_INDEX,\n      });\n\n      results.push({\n        payoutSignature,\n        depositorBtcPubkey: depositorPubkey,\n      });\n    }\n\n    return results;\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Wallet-signing helper that routes a lone PSBT to `signPsbt`, prefers native\n * `signPsbts` for real batches, and falls back to sequential `signPsbt` for\n * wallets that don't implement batch signing.\n *\n * @module managers/pegin/signPsbtsWithFallback\n */\n\nimport type {\n  BitcoinWallet,\n  SignPsbtOptions,\n} from \"../../../../shared/wallets\";\n\n/**\n * Sign one or more PSBTs against a wallet.\n *\n * A single PSBT is always signed via `signPsbt`, never the batch endpoint: it's\n * one wallet interaction either way, and `signPsbt` is the universally-required\n * wallet method (batch `signPsbts` is optional), so single-sign is the portable\n * choice — some integrations (notably MPC / institutional wallets) prefer it.\n * For a real batch (>1), wallets exposing native `signPsbts` (e.g. UniSat) sign\n * in one interaction; others loop `signPsbt`.\n *\n * @throws If native `signPsbts` returns a different number of signed PSBTs\n *         than were submitted.\n */\nexport async function signPsbtsWithFallback(\n  wallet: BitcoinWallet,\n  psbtsHexes: string[],\n  options?: SignPsbtOptions[],\n): Promise<string[]> {\n  if (psbtsHexes.length === 1) {\n    return [await wallet.signPsbt(psbtsHexes[0], options?.[0])];\n  }\n\n  if (typeof wallet.signPsbts === \"function\") {\n    const signedPsbts = await wallet.signPsbts(psbtsHexes, options);\n    if (signedPsbts.length !== psbtsHexes.length) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `Expected ${psbtsHexes.length} signed PSBTs but received ${signedPsbts.length}`,\n      );\n    }\n    return signedPsbts;\n  }\n\n  const signedPsbts: string[] = [];\n  for (let i = 0; i < psbtsHexes.length; i++) {\n    signedPsbts.push(await wallet.signPsbt(psbtsHexes[i], options?.[i]));\n  }\n  return 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