@babylonlabs-io/ts-sdk 0.48.2 → 0.48.4

package/dist/primeVpAuth-rbejoBPu.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"primeVpAuth-rbejoBPu.js","sources":["../src/tbv/core/clients/eth/contract-address-resolver.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/eth/protocol-params-reader.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/eth/signer-set-reader.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/eth/types.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/validators.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/api.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/batchAttribution.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/batchPoll.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/bip322Verify.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/cbor.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/serverIdentity.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/gatedMethods.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/innerTokenClient.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/tokenProvider.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/tokenRegistry.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/createAuthenticatedVpClient.ts","../src/tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/primeVpAuth.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Contract Address Resolver\n *\n * Resolves ProtocolParams and ApplicationRegistry contract addresses\n * from the BTCVaultRegistry contract. These addresses are needed to\n * construct the SDK's contract readers.\n *\n * @module clients/eth/contract-address-resolver\n */\n\nimport type { Address, PublicClient } from \"viem\";\n\nimport { BTCVaultRegistryABI } from \"../../contracts/abis/BTCVaultRegistry.abi\";\n\nexport interface ProtocolAddresses {\n  /** Address of the ProtocolParams contract */\n  protocolParams: Address;\n  /** Address of the ApplicationRegistry contract */\n  applicationRegistry: Address;\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve ProtocolParams and ApplicationRegistry addresses from BTCVaultRegistry.\n *\n * Uses a single multicall for atomicity and efficiency.\n *\n * @param publicClient - viem PublicClient instance\n * @param btcVaultRegistryAddress - Address of the BTCVaultRegistry contract\n * @returns Resolved contract addresses\n */\nexport async function resolveProtocolAddresses(\n  publicClient: PublicClient,\n  btcVaultRegistryAddress: Address,\n): Promise<ProtocolAddresses> {\n  const [protocolParams, applicationRegistry] = await publicClient.multicall({\n    contracts: [\n      {\n        address: btcVaultRegistryAddress,\n        abi: BTCVaultRegistryABI,\n        functionName: \"protocolParams\",\n      },\n      {\n        address: btcVaultRegistryAddress,\n        abi: BTCVaultRegistryABI,\n        functionName: \"applicationRegistry\",\n      },\n    ],\n    allowFailure: false,\n  });\n\n  return {\n    protocolParams: protocolParams as Address,\n    applicationRegistry: applicationRegistry as Address,\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Concrete ProtocolParams reader using viem's readContract and multicall.\n *\n * This is an optional utility — callers can use their own implementation\n * of the ProtocolParamsReader interface.\n */\n\nimport type { Abi, Address, Hex, PublicClient } from \"viem\";\n\nimport { ProtocolParamsABI } from \"../../contracts/abis/ProtocolParams.abi\";\nimport {\n  assertValidOffchainParamsVersion,\n  validateOffchainParams,\n  validatePegInConfiguration,\n  validateTBVProtocolParams,\n} from \"./protocol-params-validation\";\nimport type {\n  AllOffchainParamsData,\n  OnSkippedOffchainParamsVersion,\n  PegInConfiguration,\n  ProtocolParamsReader,\n  TBVProtocolParams,\n  VersionedOffchainParams,\n} from \"./types\";\n\n/**\n * Maximum value for a Solidity uint16.\n * PeginLogic.sol casts timelockAssert to uint16, so values above this are invalid.\n */\nconst UINT16_MAX = 65535;\n\n\n/**\n * Raw shape viem returns for VersionedOffchainParams struct.\n * viem resolves ABI struct outputs to named objects (not tuples).\n */\ninterface RawOffchainParams {\n  timelockAssert: bigint;\n  timelockChallengeAssert: bigint;\n  securityCouncilKeys: readonly Hex[];\n  councilQuorum: number;\n  feeRate: bigint;\n  babeTotalInstances: number;\n  babeInstancesToFinalize: number;\n  minVpCommissionBps: number;\n  tRefund: number;\n  tStale: number;\n  minPeginFeeRate: bigint;\n  proverCircuitVersion: number;\n  minPrepeginDepth: number;\n}\n\n/** Raw shape viem returns for TBVProtocolParams struct. */\ninterface RawTBVParams {\n  minimumPegInAmount: bigint;\n  maxPegInAmount: bigint;\n  pegInAckTimeout: bigint;\n  pegInActivationTimeout: bigint;\n  maxHtlcOutputCount: number;\n  expiredPegInGraceBlocks: bigint;\n}\n\n/** Map viem struct result to VersionedOffchainParams. */\nfunction mapOffchainParams(result: RawOffchainParams): VersionedOffchainParams {\n  return {\n    timelockAssert: result.timelockAssert,\n    timelockChallengeAssert: result.timelockChallengeAssert,\n    securityCouncilKeys: [...result.securityCouncilKeys],\n    councilQuorum: result.councilQuorum,\n    feeRate: result.feeRate,\n    babeTotalInstances: result.babeTotalInstances,\n    babeInstancesToFinalize: result.babeInstancesToFinalize,\n    minVpCommissionBps: result.minVpCommissionBps,\n    tRefund: result.tRefund,\n    tStale: result.tStale,\n    minPeginFeeRate: result.minPeginFeeRate,\n    proverCircuitVersion: result.proverCircuitVersion,\n    minPrepeginDepth: result.minPrepeginDepth,\n  };\n}\n\n/** Map viem struct result to TBVProtocolParams. */\nfunction mapTBVParams(result: RawTBVParams): TBVProtocolParams {\n  return {\n    minimumPegInAmount: result.minimumPegInAmount,\n    maxPegInAmount: result.maxPegInAmount,\n    pegInAckTimeout: result.pegInAckTimeout,\n    pegInActivationTimeout: result.pegInActivationTimeout,\n    maxHtlcOutputCount: result.maxHtlcOutputCount,\n    expiredPegInGraceBlocks: result.expiredPegInGraceBlocks,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive timelockPegin from timelockAssert.\n *\n * Matches PeginLogic.sol: `uint16(timelockAssert)`.\n * The contract validates `timelockAssert <= type(uint16).max` on write,\n * but we enforce the same bound here to reject invalid values early\n * rather than silently truncating.\n *\n * @throws if timelockAssert exceeds uint16 max (65535)\n */\nfunction deriveTimelockPegin(timelockAssert: bigint): number {\n  if (timelockAssert > BigInt(UINT16_MAX)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `timelockAssert value ${timelockAssert} exceeds uint16 max (${UINT16_MAX})`,\n    );\n  }\n  return Number(timelockAssert);\n}\n\n/**\n * Concrete protocol params reader using viem.\n *\n * Every read method runs the matching validator from\n * `protocol-params-validation` before returning, so callers don't have to\n * remember to validate.\n *\n * Usage:\n * ```ts\n * const reader = new ViemProtocolParamsReader(publicClient, protocolParamsAddress);\n * const config = await reader.getPegInConfiguration();\n * ```\n */\nexport class ViemProtocolParamsReader implements ProtocolParamsReader {\n  constructor(\n    private publicClient: PublicClient,\n    private contractAddress: Address,\n  ) {}\n\n  async getTBVProtocolParams(): Promise<TBVProtocolParams> {\n    const result = (await this.publicClient.readContract({\n      address: this.contractAddress,\n      abi: ProtocolParamsABI,\n      functionName: \"getTBVProtocolParams\",\n    })) as RawTBVParams;\n\n    const params = mapTBVParams(result);\n    validateTBVProtocolParams(params);\n    return params;\n  }\n\n  async getLatestOffchainParams(): Promise<VersionedOffchainParams> {\n    const result = (await this.publicClient.readContract({\n      address: this.contractAddress,\n      abi: ProtocolParamsABI,\n      functionName: \"getLatestOffchainParams\",\n    })) as RawOffchainParams;\n\n    const params = mapOffchainParams(result);\n    validateOffchainParams(params);\n    return params;\n  }\n\n  async getOffchainParamsByVersion(\n    version: number,\n  ): Promise<VersionedOffchainParams> {\n    const result = (await this.publicClient.readContract({\n      address: this.contractAddress,\n      abi: ProtocolParamsABI,\n      functionName: \"getOffchainParamsByVersion\",\n      args: [version],\n    })) as RawOffchainParams;\n\n    const params = mapOffchainParams(result);\n    validateOffchainParams(params);\n    return params;\n  }\n\n  async getLatestOffchainParamsVersion(): Promise<number> {\n    const raw = await this.publicClient.readContract({\n      address: this.contractAddress,\n      abi: ProtocolParamsABI,\n      functionName: \"latestOffchainParamsVersion\",\n    });\n    const version = Number(raw);\n    assertValidOffchainParamsVersion(version);\n    return version;\n  }\n\n  async getTimelockPeginByVersion(version: number): Promise<number> {\n    const params = await this.getOffchainParamsByVersion(version);\n    return deriveTimelockPegin(params.timelockAssert);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Read TBV protocol params, latest offchain params, and the latest version\n   * label atomically via multicall. The version is paired with the params so\n   * that a governance update between separate reads cannot let JS build BTC\n   * scripts with version N params while the contract registers the vault\n   * under version N+1.\n   */\n  async getPegInConfiguration(): Promise<PegInConfiguration> {\n    const results = await this.publicClient.multicall({\n      contracts: [\n        {\n          address: this.contractAddress,\n          abi: ProtocolParamsABI,\n          functionName: \"getTBVProtocolParams\",\n        },\n        {\n          address: this.contractAddress,\n          abi: ProtocolParamsABI,\n          functionName: \"getLatestOffchainParams\",\n        },\n        {\n          address: this.contractAddress,\n          abi: ProtocolParamsABI,\n          functionName: \"latestOffchainParamsVersion\",\n        },\n      ],\n      allowFailure: false,\n    });\n\n    const tbvParams = mapTBVParams(results[0] as RawTBVParams);\n    const offchainParams = mapOffchainParams(results[1] as RawOffchainParams);\n    const offchainParamsVersion = Number(results[2]);\n\n    const config: PegInConfiguration = {\n      minimumPegInAmount: tbvParams.minimumPegInAmount,\n      maxPegInAmount: tbvParams.maxPegInAmount,\n      pegInAckTimeout: tbvParams.pegInAckTimeout,\n      pegInActivationTimeout: tbvParams.pegInActivationTimeout,\n      maxHtlcOutputCount: tbvParams.maxHtlcOutputCount,\n      expiredPegInGraceBlocks: tbvParams.expiredPegInGraceBlocks,\n      timelockPegin: deriveTimelockPegin(offchainParams.timelockAssert),\n      timelockRefund: offchainParams.tRefund,\n      minVpCommissionBps: offchainParams.minVpCommissionBps,\n      offchainParams,\n      offchainParamsVersion,\n    };\n\n    validatePegInConfiguration(config);\n    return config;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Fetch every historical offchain params version in a single multicall.\n   * Iterates 1..latestVersion and calls `getOffchainParamsByVersion` for each.\n   * Versions whose payload fails validation are skipped (not included in the\n   * returned map) so a single bad historical version doesn't block the\n   * lookup of the rest.\n   *\n   * @param onSkippedVersion - optional observer invoked once per skipped\n   *   version. Use to log/telemeter without coupling the SDK to a logger.\n   */\n  async fetchAllOffchainParams(\n    onSkippedVersion?: OnSkippedOffchainParamsVersion,\n  ): Promise<AllOffchainParamsData> {\n    const latestVersion = await this.getLatestOffchainParamsVersion();\n    if (latestVersion === 0) {\n      return { byVersion: new Map(), latestVersion: 0 };\n    }\n\n    const versions = Array.from({ length: latestVersion }, (_, i) => i + 1);\n    const contracts = versions.map((v) => ({\n      address: this.contractAddress,\n      abi: ProtocolParamsABI as Abi,\n      functionName: \"getOffchainParamsByVersion\" as const,\n      args: [v] as const,\n    }));\n\n    const results = await this.publicClient.multicall({\n      contracts,\n      allowFailure: false,\n    });\n\n    const byVersion = new Map<number, VersionedOffchainParams>();\n    for (let i = 0; i < versions.length; i++) {\n      const params = mapOffchainParams(results[i] as RawOffchainParams);\n      try {\n        validateOffchainParams(params);\n        byVersion.set(versions[i], params);\n      } catch (error) {\n        // A malformed historical version mustn't block lookup of the rest.\n        // Surface the skip to the caller's observer if one was supplied.\n        onSkippedVersion?.(\n          versions[i],\n          error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error)),\n        );\n      }\n    }\n\n    return { byVersion, latestVersion };\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Concrete signer-set readers for vault keepers and universal challengers.\n *\n * These are optional utilities — callers can use their own implementations\n * of the VaultKeeperReader and UniversalChallengerReader interfaces.\n */\n\nimport type { Address, Hex, PublicClient } from \"viem\";\n\nimport { ApplicationRegistryABI } from \"../../contracts/abis/ApplicationRegistry.abi\";\nimport { ProtocolParamsABI } from \"../../contracts/abis/ProtocolParams.abi\";\nimport type {\n  AddressBTCKeyPair,\n  UniversalChallengerReader,\n  VaultKeeperReader,\n} from \"./types\";\n\n/** Map viem tuple array to AddressBTCKeyPair[]. */\nfunction mapKeyPairs(\n  result: readonly { ethAddress: Address; btcPubKey: Hex }[],\n): AddressBTCKeyPair[] {\n  return result.map((pair) => ({\n    ethAddress: pair.ethAddress,\n    btcPubKey: pair.btcPubKey,\n  }));\n}\n\n/**\n * Reads vault keepers from the ApplicationRegistry contract.\n *\n * Usage:\n * ```ts\n * const reader = new ViemVaultKeeperReader(publicClient, applicationRegistryAddress);\n * const keepers = await reader.getCurrentVaultKeepers(appEntryPoint);\n * ```\n */\nexport class ViemVaultKeeperReader implements VaultKeeperReader {\n  constructor(\n    private publicClient: PublicClient,\n    private contractAddress: Address,\n  ) {}\n\n  async getVaultKeepersByVersion(\n    appEntryPoint: Address,\n    version: number,\n  ): Promise<AddressBTCKeyPair[]> {\n    const result = (await this.publicClient.readContract({\n      address: this.contractAddress,\n      abi: ApplicationRegistryABI,\n      functionName: \"getVaultKeepersByVersion\",\n      args: [appEntryPoint, version],\n    })) as readonly { ethAddress: Address; btcPubKey: Hex }[];\n\n    return mapKeyPairs(result);\n  }\n\n  async getCurrentVaultKeepers(\n    appEntryPoint: Address,\n  ): Promise<AddressBTCKeyPair[]> {\n    const result = (await this.publicClient.readContract({\n      address: this.contractAddress,\n      abi: ApplicationRegistryABI,\n      functionName: \"getCurrentVaultKeepers\",\n      args: [appEntryPoint],\n    })) as readonly { ethAddress: Address; btcPubKey: Hex }[];\n\n    return mapKeyPairs(result);\n  }\n\n  async getCurrentVaultKeepersVersion(\n    appEntryPoint: Address,\n  ): Promise<number> {\n    const result = (await this.publicClient.readContract({\n      address: this.contractAddress,\n      abi: ApplicationRegistryABI,\n      functionName: \"getCurrentVaultKeepersVersion\",\n      args: [appEntryPoint],\n    })) as number;\n\n    return result;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Reads universal challengers from the ProtocolParams contract.\n *\n * Usage:\n * ```ts\n * const reader = new ViemUniversalChallengerReader(publicClient, protocolParamsAddress);\n * const challengers = await reader.getCurrentUniversalChallengers();\n * ```\n */\nexport class ViemUniversalChallengerReader implements UniversalChallengerReader {\n  constructor(\n    private publicClient: PublicClient,\n    private contractAddress: Address,\n  ) {}\n\n  async getUniversalChallengersByVersion(\n    version: number,\n  ): Promise<AddressBTCKeyPair[]> {\n    const result = (await this.publicClient.readContract({\n      address: this.contractAddress,\n      abi: ProtocolParamsABI,\n      functionName: \"getUniversalChallengersByVersion\",\n      args: [version],\n    })) as readonly { ethAddress: Address; btcPubKey: Hex }[];\n\n    return mapKeyPairs(result);\n  }\n\n  async getCurrentUniversalChallengers(): Promise<AddressBTCKeyPair[]> {\n    const result = (await this.publicClient.readContract({\n      address: this.contractAddress,\n      abi: ProtocolParamsABI,\n      functionName: \"getCurrentUniversalChallengers\",\n    })) as readonly { ethAddress: Address; btcPubKey: Hex }[];\n\n    return mapKeyPairs(result);\n  }\n\n  async getLatestUniversalChallengersVersion(): Promise<number> {\n    const result = (await this.publicClient.readContract({\n      address: this.contractAddress,\n      abi: ProtocolParamsABI,\n      functionName: \"latestUniversalChallengersVersion\",\n    })) as number;\n\n    return result;\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Types and interfaces for ETH contract readers.\n *\n * These are optional utilities — callers can use them or build their own.\n * Core service functions never import from this module.\n */\n\nimport type { Address, Hex } from \"viem\";\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Vault Registry Types\n// ============================================================================\n\ndeclare const onChainBtcPubkeyBrand: unique symbol;\n\n/**\n * 64-char lowercase hex (no `0x`) x-only BTC pubkey sourced from the\n * on-chain BTCVaultRegistry. The only legitimate producer is\n * {@link VaultRegistryReader.getVaultProviderBtcPubKey}.\n *\n * @stability frozen\n */\nexport type OnChainBtcPubkey = string & {\n  readonly [onChainBtcPubkeyBrand]: true;\n};\n\n/**\n * Mirrors `IBTCVaultRegistry.BTCVaultStatus` in BTCVaultRegistry.sol exactly.\n * Use this when consuming `status` from `getVaultBasicInfo` /\n * `getBtcVaultBasicInfo`.\n *\n * Do NOT confuse with the app-side `ContractStatus` enum\n * (`services/deposit/peginState.ts`) — that one is for the indexer and\n * extends this with values 5-7, reassigning 4 to LIQUIDATED. Reading an\n * on-chain status through `ContractStatus[n]` for labels will mislabel\n * Expired(4) as LIQUIDATED.\n */\nexport enum OnChainBtcVaultStatus {\n  PENDING = 0,\n  VERIFIED = 1,\n  ACTIVE = 2,\n  REDEEMED = 3,\n  EXPIRED = 4,\n}\n\n/** Basic vault info from BTCVaultRegistry.getBtcVaultBasicInfo */\nexport interface VaultBasicInfo {\n  depositor: Address;\n  depositorBtcPubKey: Hex;\n  amount: bigint;\n  vaultProvider: Address;\n  status: number;\n  applicationEntryPoint: Address;\n  createdAt: bigint;\n}\n\n/** Protocol info from BTCVaultRegistry.getBtcVaultProtocolInfo */\nexport interface VaultProtocolInfo {\n  depositorSignedPeginTx: Hex;\n  universalChallengersVersion: number;\n  appVaultKeepersVersion: number;\n  offchainParamsVersion: number;\n  verifiedAt: bigint;\n  depositorWotsPkHash: Hex;\n  hashlock: Hex;\n  htlcVout: number;\n  depositorPopSignature: Hex;\n  prePeginTxHash: Hex;\n  vaultProviderCommissionBps: number;\n  /** Block deadline (uint256) for depositor reclaim. TODO(#1690): wire to refund flow. */\n  claimExpiredUntil: bigint;\n  /** Vault core version (uint16) stamped at registration. VP-side gating only — see #1690. */\n  vaultCoreVersion: number;\n}\n\n/** Combined vault data (basic + protocol) */\nexport interface VaultData {\n  basic: VaultBasicInfo;\n  protocol: VaultProtocolInfo;\n}\n\n/** Interface for reading vault data from the BTCVaultRegistry contract. */\nexport interface VaultRegistryReader {\n  getVaultBasicInfo(vaultId: Hex): Promise<VaultBasicInfo>;\n  getVaultProtocolInfo(vaultId: Hex): Promise<VaultProtocolInfo>;\n  getProtocolInfoBatch(vaultIds: readonly Hex[]): Promise<VaultProtocolInfo[]>;\n  getVaultData(vaultId: Hex): Promise<VaultData>;\n  getVaultProviderBtcPubKey(vpAddress: Address): Promise<OnChainBtcPubkey>;\n  /** Read the protocol pegin fee (in wei) for a given vault provider. */\n  getPegInFee(vaultProvider: Address): Promise<bigint>;\n  /**\n   * Read a vault provider's current commission in basis points.\n   *\n   * Validates the contract-enforced `[0, 9999]` range — an out-of-range\n   * value signals a wrong contract address or ABI drift, not a real rate.\n   */\n  getVaultProviderCommission(vaultProvider: Address): Promise<number>;\n  /**\n   * Read `offchainParamsVersion` for many vaults in a single multicall.\n   * Returns versions in the same order as the input. Throws if any vault\n   * is missing on-chain.\n   */\n  getOffchainParamsVersionsByVaultIds(\n    vaultIds: readonly Hex[],\n  ): Promise<number[]>;\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Protocol Params Types (from IProtocolParams.sol)\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * TBV protocol parameters from the ProtocolParams contract.\n * Matches Solidity struct `IProtocolParams.TBVProtocolParams` exactly.\n *\n * All uint64 amounts use bigint (satoshi values can exceed 2^53).\n * uint8 uses number (bounded, max 255).\n */\nexport interface TBVProtocolParams {\n  minimumPegInAmount: bigint;\n  maxPegInAmount: bigint;\n  pegInAckTimeout: bigint;\n  pegInActivationTimeout: bigint;\n  maxHtlcOutputCount: number;\n  /**\n   * Number of blocks added to the activation deadline as a grace window\n   * during which a depositor may still reclaim an expired pegin via the\n   * HTLC preimage. Source: `IProtocolParams.TBVProtocolParams.expiredPegInGraceBlocks`.\n   */\n  expiredPegInGraceBlocks: bigint;\n}\n\n/**\n * Versioned offchain parameters from the ProtocolParams contract.\n * Matches Solidity struct `IProtocolParams.VersionedOffchainParams` exactly.\n *\n * bigint for: uint256 timelocks, uint64 fee rates/amounts.\n * number for: uint8/uint16/uint32 fields (bounded, safe for JS arithmetic).\n */\nexport interface VersionedOffchainParams {\n  timelockAssert: bigint;\n  timelockChallengeAssert: bigint;\n  securityCouncilKeys: Hex[];\n  councilQuorum: number;\n  feeRate: bigint;\n  babeTotalInstances: number;\n  babeInstancesToFinalize: number;\n  minVpCommissionBps: number;\n  tRefund: number;\n  tStale: number;\n  minPeginFeeRate: bigint;\n  proverCircuitVersion: number;\n  minPrepeginDepth: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Combined peg-in configuration read atomically via multicall.\n * Prevents TOCTOU inconsistency if governance updates params between reads.\n */\nexport interface PegInConfiguration {\n  minimumPegInAmount: bigint;\n  maxPegInAmount: bigint;\n  pegInAckTimeout: bigint;\n  pegInActivationTimeout: bigint;\n  maxHtlcOutputCount: number;\n  expiredPegInGraceBlocks: bigint;\n  timelockPegin: number;\n  timelockRefund: number;\n  minVpCommissionBps: number;\n  offchainParams: VersionedOffchainParams;\n  /**\n   * Version label paired atomically with `offchainParams`.\n   * Read in the same multicall as the params struct so that, if a parameter\n   * update lands between separate reads, the script-construction code and\n   * the version label stay consistent.\n   */\n  offchainParamsVersion: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * All offchain params snapshots indexed by version, plus the latest version\n * number known when the snapshot was taken. Used by consumers that need to\n * resolve any historical version (e.g. signing for an existing vault locked\n * to an older version).\n */\nexport interface AllOffchainParamsData {\n  byVersion: Map<number, VersionedOffchainParams>;\n  latestVersion: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Optional observer invoked by `fetchAllOffchainParams` when a historical\n * version fails validation. Called once per skipped version so callers can\n * log/telemeter without coupling the SDK to a specific logger.\n */\nexport type OnSkippedOffchainParamsVersion = (\n  version: number,\n  error: Error,\n) => void;\n\n/** Interface for reading protocol parameters from the ProtocolParams contract. */\nexport interface ProtocolParamsReader {\n  getTBVProtocolParams(): Promise<TBVProtocolParams>;\n  getOffchainParamsByVersion(version: number): Promise<VersionedOffchainParams>;\n  getLatestOffchainParams(): Promise<VersionedOffchainParams>;\n  getLatestOffchainParamsVersion(): Promise<number>;\n  getTimelockPeginByVersion(version: number): Promise<number>;\n  getPegInConfiguration(): Promise<PegInConfiguration>;\n  fetchAllOffchainParams(\n    onSkippedVersion?: OnSkippedOffchainParamsVersion,\n  ): Promise<AllOffchainParamsData>;\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Signer-Set Types (from BTCVaultTypes.sol)\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Matches Solidity struct `BTCVaultTypes.AddressBTCKeyPair` exactly.\n * Used for vault keepers and universal challengers.\n */\nexport interface AddressBTCKeyPair {\n  ethAddress: Address;\n  btcPubKey: Hex;\n}\n\n/** Interface for reading vault keepers from the ApplicationRegistry contract. */\nexport interface VaultKeeperReader {\n  getVaultKeepersByVersion(\n    appEntryPoint: Address,\n    version: number,\n  ): Promise<AddressBTCKeyPair[]>;\n  getCurrentVaultKeepers(\n    appEntryPoint: Address,\n  ): Promise<AddressBTCKeyPair[]>;\n  getCurrentVaultKeepersVersion(appEntryPoint: Address): Promise<number>;\n}\n\n/** Interface for reading universal challengers from the ProtocolParams contract. */\nexport interface UniversalChallengerReader {\n  getUniversalChallengersByVersion(\n    version: number,\n  ): Promise<AddressBTCKeyPair[]>;\n  getCurrentUniversalChallengers(): Promise<AddressBTCKeyPair[]>;\n  getLatestUniversalChallengersVersion(): Promise<number>;\n}\n","/**\n * Runtime validation for vault provider RPC responses.\n *\n * All VP RPC methods return untyped JSON that TypeScript generics cast without\n * inspection. These validators check the critical top-level fields and\n * security-relevant values (status, txids, pubkeys). Optional progress\n * sub-fields (gc_data, ack_collection, claimer_graphs) are NOT validated\n * since they are informational and not used for signing or transaction\n * construction. Only `progress.presigning` sub-fields are checked.\n */\n\nimport {\n  COMPRESSED_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN,\n  X_ONLY_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN,\n} from \"../../primitives/utils/bitcoin\";\nimport { HEX_RE } from \"../../utils/validation\";\n\nimport { DaemonStatus } from \"./types\";\nimport type {\n  BatchGetPeginStatusResponse,\n  BatchGetPegoutStatusResponse,\n  GetPeginStatusResponse,\n  GetPegoutStatusResponse,\n  RequestDepositorClaimerArtifactsResponse,\n  RequestDepositorPresignTransactionsResponse,\n} from \"./types\";\n\nconst DAEMON_STATUS_VALUES = new Set<string>(Object.values(DaemonStatus));\n\nconst VP_ERROR_PREVIEW_MAX_LEN = 200;\n\nfunction preview(value: unknown): string {\n  return (\n    JSON.stringify(value)?.slice(0, VP_ERROR_PREVIEW_MAX_LEN) ?? \"undefined\"\n  );\n}\n\nconst VP_VALIDATION_USER_MESSAGE =\n  \"The vault provider returned an unexpected response. Please try again or contact support.\";\n\n/**\n * Thrown when a VP RPC response fails runtime validation.\n *\n * `.message` is a user-facing string safe to display in the UI.\n * `.detail` contains the technical reason, suitable for logging.\n */\nexport class VpResponseValidationError extends Error {\n  readonly detail: string;\n\n  constructor(detail: string) {\n    super(VP_VALIDATION_USER_MESSAGE);\n    this.name = \"VpResponseValidationError\";\n    this.detail = detail;\n  }\n}\n\n/** Expected length (in hex chars) of a Bitcoin transaction ID (32 bytes). */\nconst TXID_HEX_LEN = 64;\n\nfunction isNonEmptyHex(value: unknown): value is string {\n  return typeof value === \"string\" && value.length > 0 && HEX_RE.test(value);\n}\n\nfunction isNonEmptyString(value: unknown): value is string {\n  return typeof value === \"string\" && value.length > 0;\n}\n\nfunction assertNonEmptyHex(value: unknown, field: string): void {\n  if (!isNonEmptyHex(value)) {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"${field}\" must be a non-empty hex string, got ${preview(value)}`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\nfunction assertNonEmptyString(value: unknown, field: string): void {\n  if (!isNonEmptyString(value)) {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"${field}\" must be a non-empty string, got ${preview(value)}`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Accept both x-only (64-char) and compressed (66-char) pubkeys from VP responses.\n * The signing code normalizes to x-only via processPublicKeyToXOnly().\n */\nfunction assertBtcPubkey(value: unknown, field: string): void {\n  if (\n    !isNonEmptyHex(value) ||\n    (value.length !== X_ONLY_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN &&\n      value.length !== COMPRESSED_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN)\n  ) {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"${field}\" must be a ${X_ONLY_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN} or ${COMPRESSED_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN}-char hex string (BTC pubkey), got ${preview(value)}`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate the optional presigning progress fields returned inside PeginProgressDetails.\n */\nfunction validatePresigningProgressFields(\n  progress: Record<string, unknown>,\n): void {\n  const presigning = progress.presigning;\n  if (presigning === undefined || presigning === null) return;\n  if (typeof presigning !== \"object\" || Array.isArray(presigning)) {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"progress.presigning\" must be an object if present`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const p = presigning as Record<string, unknown>;\n\n  if (\n    p.depositor_graph_created !== undefined &&\n    typeof p.depositor_graph_created !== \"boolean\"\n  ) {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"progress.presigning.depositor_graph_created\" must be a boolean if present, got ${preview(p.depositor_graph_created)}`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (\n    p.vk_challenger_presigning_completed !== undefined &&\n    typeof p.vk_challenger_presigning_completed !== \"number\"\n  ) {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"progress.presigning.vk_challenger_presigning_completed\" must be a number if present, got ${preview(p.vk_challenger_presigning_completed)}`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (\n    p.vk_challenger_presigning_total !== undefined &&\n    typeof p.vk_challenger_presigning_total !== \"number\"\n  ) {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"progress.presigning.vk_challenger_presigning_total\" must be a number if present, got ${preview(p.vk_challenger_presigning_total)}`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate a getPeginStatus response.\n *\n * Throws if the status field is not a recognized DaemonStatus value.\n */\nexport function validateGetPeginStatusResponse(\n  response: unknown,\n): asserts response is GetPeginStatusResponse {\n  if (response === null || typeof response !== \"object\") {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: getPeginStatus response is not an object`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const r = response as Record<string, unknown>;\n\n  if (!isNonEmptyHex(r.pegin_txid) || r.pegin_txid.length !== TXID_HEX_LEN) {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"pegin_txid\" must be a ${TXID_HEX_LEN}-char hex string (txid), got ${preview(r.pegin_txid)}`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (typeof r.status !== \"string\") {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"status\" must be a string`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (!DAEMON_STATUS_VALUES.has(r.status)) {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: unrecognized status \"${r.status}\". Expected one of: ${[...DAEMON_STATUS_VALUES].join(\", \")}`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (\n    r.progress === null ||\n    typeof r.progress !== \"object\" ||\n    Array.isArray(r.progress)\n  ) {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"progress\" must be an object`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  validatePresigningProgressFields(r.progress as Record<string, unknown>);\n\n  if (typeof r.health_info !== \"string\") {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"health_info\" must be a string`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (r.last_error !== undefined && typeof r.last_error !== \"string\") {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"last_error\" must be a string if present, got ${preview(r.last_error)}`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate a requestDepositorPresignTransactions response.\n */\nexport function validateRequestDepositorPresignTransactionsResponse(\n  response: unknown,\n): asserts response is RequestDepositorPresignTransactionsResponse {\n  if (response === null || typeof response !== \"object\") {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: requestDepositorPresignTransactions response is not an object`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const r = response as Record<string, unknown>;\n\n  if (!Array.isArray(r.txs)) {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"txs\" must be an array`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  for (let i = 0; i < r.txs.length; i++) {\n    validateClaimerTransactions(r.txs[i], `txs[${i}]`);\n  }\n\n  if (r.depositor_graph === null || typeof r.depositor_graph !== \"object\") {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"depositor_graph\" must be an object`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  validateDepositorGraphTransactions(\n    r.depositor_graph as Record<string, unknown>,\n  );\n}\n\nfunction validateTransactionData(value: unknown, field: string): void {\n  if (value === null || typeof value !== \"object\") {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"${field}\" must be an object`,\n    );\n  }\n  const tx = value as Record<string, unknown>;\n  assertNonEmptyHex(tx.tx_hex, `${field}.tx_hex`);\n}\n\nfunction validateClaimerTransactions(value: unknown, field: string): void {\n  if (value === null || typeof value !== \"object\") {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"${field}\" must be an object`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const tx = value as Record<string, unknown>;\n\n  assertBtcPubkey(tx.claimer_pubkey, `${field}.claimer_pubkey`);\n  validateTransactionData(tx.claim_tx, `${field}.claim_tx`);\n  validateTransactionData(tx.assert_tx, `${field}.assert_tx`);\n  validateTransactionData(tx.payout_tx, `${field}.payout_tx`);\n  assertNonEmptyString(tx.payout_psbt, `${field}.payout_psbt`);\n}\n\nfunction validateChallengeAssertConnectorData(\n  value: unknown,\n  field: string,\n): void {\n  if (value === null || typeof value !== \"object\") {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"${field}\" must be an object`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const c = value as Record<string, unknown>;\n  assertNonEmptyString(c.wots_pks_json, `${field}.wots_pks_json`);\n  assertNonEmptyString(c.gc_wots_keys_json, `${field}.gc_wots_keys_json`);\n}\n\nfunction validatePresignDataPerChallenger(value: unknown, field: string): void {\n  if (value === null || typeof value !== \"object\") {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"${field}\" must be an object`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const d = value as Record<string, unknown>;\n\n  assertBtcPubkey(d.challenger_pubkey, `${field}.challenger_pubkey`);\n  validateTransactionData(\n    d.challenge_assert_x_tx,\n    `${field}.challenge_assert_x_tx`,\n  );\n  validateTransactionData(\n    d.challenge_assert_y_tx,\n    `${field}.challenge_assert_y_tx`,\n  );\n  validateTransactionData(d.nopayout_tx, `${field}.nopayout_tx`);\n  assertNonEmptyString(d.nopayout_psbt, `${field}.nopayout_psbt`);\n\n  if (!Array.isArray(d.challenge_assert_connectors)) {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"${field}.challenge_assert_connectors\" must be an array`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  for (let i = 0; i < d.challenge_assert_connectors.length; i++) {\n    validateChallengeAssertConnectorData(\n      d.challenge_assert_connectors[i],\n      `${field}.challenge_assert_connectors[${i}]`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (!Array.isArray(d.output_label_hashes)) {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"${field}.output_label_hashes\" must be an array`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  for (let i = 0; i < d.output_label_hashes.length; i++) {\n    assertNonEmptyHex(\n      d.output_label_hashes[i],\n      `${field}.output_label_hashes[${i}]`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate a requestDepositorClaimerArtifacts response.\n */\nexport function validateRequestDepositorClaimerArtifactsResponse(\n  response: unknown,\n): asserts response is RequestDepositorClaimerArtifactsResponse {\n  if (response === null || typeof response !== \"object\") {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: requestDepositorClaimerArtifacts response is not an object`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const r = response as Record<string, unknown>;\n\n  if (!isNonEmptyString(r.tx_graph_json)) {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"tx_graph_json\" must be a non-empty string, got ${preview(r.tx_graph_json)}`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (!isNonEmptyHex(r.verifying_key_hex)) {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"verifying_key_hex\" must be a non-empty hex string, got ${preview(r.verifying_key_hex)}`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (\n    r.babe_sessions === null ||\n    typeof r.babe_sessions !== \"object\" ||\n    Array.isArray(r.babe_sessions)\n  ) {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"babe_sessions\" must be an object`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const sessionEntries = Object.entries(\n    r.babe_sessions as Record<string, unknown>,\n  );\n  if (sessionEntries.length === 0) {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"babe_sessions\" must contain at least one challenger entry`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  for (const [key, session] of sessionEntries) {\n    assertBtcPubkey(key, `babe_sessions[\"${key}\"]`);\n    if (session === null || typeof session !== \"object\") {\n      throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n        `VP response validation failed: \"babe_sessions.${key}\" must be an object`,\n      );\n    }\n    const s = session as Record<string, unknown>;\n    if (!isNonEmptyHex(s.decryptor_artifacts_hex)) {\n      throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n        `VP response validation failed: \"babe_sessions.${key}.decryptor_artifacts_hex\" must be a non-empty hex string, got ${preview(s.decryptor_artifacts_hex)}`,\n      );\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate a single pegout status payload. Embedded by\n * `validateBatchGetPegoutStatusResponse`. Mirrors btc-vault\n * `crates/vaultd/src/rpc/server/pegout_status.rs::GetPegoutStatusResponse`.\n */\nexport function validateGetPegoutStatusResponse(\n  response: unknown,\n): asserts response is GetPegoutStatusResponse {\n  if (response === null || typeof response !== \"object\") {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: pegout status payload is not an object`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const r = response as Record<string, unknown>;\n\n  if (!isNonEmptyHex(r.pegin_txid) || r.pegin_txid.length !== TXID_HEX_LEN) {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"pegin_txid\" must be a ${TXID_HEX_LEN}-char hex string (txid), got ${preview(r.pegin_txid)}`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (typeof r.found !== \"boolean\") {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"found\" must be a boolean, got ${preview(r.found)}`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  // `claimer` is `Option<ClaimerPegoutStatus>` server-side; null when absent.\n  if (r.claimer !== null) {\n    if (typeof r.claimer !== \"object\") {\n      throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n        `VP response validation failed: \"claimer\" must be an object or null, got ${preview(r.claimer)}`,\n      );\n    }\n    validateClaimerPegoutStatus(r.claimer as Record<string, unknown>);\n  }\n\n  // `challengers: Vec<ChallengerStatus>` server-side; always present (possibly empty).\n  if (!Array.isArray(r.challengers)) {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"challengers\" must be an array, got ${preview(r.challengers)}`,\n    );\n  }\n  for (let i = 0; i < r.challengers.length; i++) {\n    validateChallengerStatus(r.challengers[i], i);\n  }\n}\n\nfunction validateClaimerPegoutStatus(value: Record<string, unknown>): void {\n  assertNonEmptyString(value.status, \"claimer.status\");\n  if (typeof value.failed !== \"boolean\") {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"claimer.failed\" must be a boolean, got ${preview(value.failed)}`,\n    );\n  }\n  assertNonEmptyString(value.claim_txid, \"claimer.claim_txid\");\n  assertNonEmptyString(value.claimer_pubkey, \"claimer.claimer_pubkey\");\n  assertNonEmptyString(value.assert_txid, \"claimer.assert_txid\");\n  if (typeof value.created_at !== \"number\") {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"claimer.created_at\" must be a number, got ${preview(value.created_at)}`,\n    );\n  }\n  if (typeof value.updated_at !== \"number\") {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"claimer.updated_at\" must be a number, got ${preview(value.updated_at)}`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\nfunction validateChallengerStatus(value: unknown, index: number): void {\n  if (value === null || typeof value !== \"object\") {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"challengers[${index}]\" must be an object, got ${preview(value)}`,\n    );\n  }\n  const c = value as Record<string, unknown>;\n  assertNonEmptyString(c.status, `challengers[${index}].status`);\n  assertNonEmptyString(c.claim_txid, `challengers[${index}].claim_txid`);\n  assertNonEmptyString(c.claimer_pubkey, `challengers[${index}].claimer_pubkey`);\n  assertNullableString(c.assert_txid, `challengers[${index}].assert_txid`);\n  assertNullableString(\n    c.challenge_assert_x_txid,\n    `challengers[${index}].challenge_assert_x_txid`,\n  );\n  assertNullableString(\n    c.challenge_assert_y_txid,\n    `challengers[${index}].challenge_assert_y_txid`,\n  );\n  assertNullableString(c.nopayout_txid, `challengers[${index}].nopayout_txid`);\n  if (typeof c.created_at !== \"number\") {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"challengers[${index}].created_at\" must be a number, got ${preview(c.created_at)}`,\n    );\n  }\n  if (typeof c.updated_at !== \"number\") {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"challengers[${index}].updated_at\" must be a number, got ${preview(c.updated_at)}`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\nfunction assertNullableString(value: unknown, field: string): void {\n  if (value !== null && typeof value !== \"string\") {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"${field}\" must be a string or null, got ${preview(value)}`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate a `batchGetPeginStatus` response. Per-result envelope shape:\n * `{ pegin_txid, result: GetPeginStatusResponse | null, error: string | null }`.\n * The inner result (when non-null) is validated via the single-item validator.\n */\nexport function validateBatchGetPeginStatusResponse(\n  response: unknown,\n): asserts response is BatchGetPeginStatusResponse {\n  validateBatchEnvelope(response, \"batchGetPeginStatus\", (entry) => {\n    if (entry.result !== null) {\n      validateGetPeginStatusResponse(entry.result);\n    }\n  });\n}\n\n/** Validate a `batchGetPegoutStatus` response. Same envelope as peginStatus. */\nexport function validateBatchGetPegoutStatusResponse(\n  response: unknown,\n): asserts response is BatchGetPegoutStatusResponse {\n  validateBatchEnvelope(response, \"batchGetPegoutStatus\", (entry) => {\n    if (entry.result !== null) {\n      validateGetPegoutStatusResponse(entry.result);\n    }\n  });\n}\n\ninterface BatchResultEnvelope {\n  pegin_txid: string;\n  result: unknown;\n  error: string | null;\n}\n\nfunction validateBatchEnvelope(\n  response: unknown,\n  rpcName: string,\n  validateInnerResult: (entry: BatchResultEnvelope, index: number) => void,\n): void {\n  if (response === null || typeof response !== \"object\") {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: ${rpcName} response is not an object`,\n    );\n  }\n  const r = response as Record<string, unknown>;\n  if (!Array.isArray(r.results)) {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"${rpcName}.results\" must be an array, got ${preview(r.results)}`,\n    );\n  }\n  for (let i = 0; i < r.results.length; i++) {\n    const entry = r.results[i];\n    if (entry === null || typeof entry !== \"object\") {\n      throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n        `VP response validation failed: \"${rpcName}.results[${i}]\" must be an object, got ${preview(entry)}`,\n      );\n    }\n    const e = entry as Record<string, unknown>;\n    if (\n      !isNonEmptyHex(e.pegin_txid) ||\n      e.pegin_txid.length !== TXID_HEX_LEN\n    ) {\n      throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n        `VP response validation failed: \"${rpcName}.results[${i}].pegin_txid\" must be a ${TXID_HEX_LEN}-char hex string, got ${preview(e.pegin_txid)}`,\n      );\n    }\n    if (e.error !== null && typeof e.error !== \"string\") {\n      throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n        `VP response validation failed: \"${rpcName}.results[${i}].error\" must be a string or null, got ${preview(e.error)}`,\n      );\n    }\n    // Exactly one of `result` / `error` must be populated. The server only\n    // ever sets one per item; treating both-null as a protocol violation\n    // surfaces server bugs early instead of letting them silently degrade.\n    if (e.result === null && e.error === null) {\n      throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n        `VP response validation failed: \"${rpcName}.results[${i}]\" has neither \"result\" nor \"error\" populated`,\n      );\n    }\n    if (e.result !== null && e.error !== null) {\n      throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n        `VP response validation failed: \"${rpcName}.results[${i}]\" has both \"result\" and \"error\" populated`,\n      );\n    }\n    validateInnerResult(e as unknown as BatchResultEnvelope, i);\n  }\n}\n\nfunction validateDepositorGraphTransactions(\n  graph: Record<string, unknown>,\n): void {\n  validateTransactionData(graph.claim_tx, \"depositor_graph.claim_tx\");\n  validateTransactionData(graph.assert_tx, \"depositor_graph.assert_tx\");\n  validateTransactionData(graph.payout_tx, \"depositor_graph.payout_tx\");\n  assertNonEmptyString(graph.payout_psbt, \"depositor_graph.payout_psbt\");\n\n  if (!Array.isArray(graph.challenger_presign_data)) {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"depositor_graph.challenger_presign_data\" must be an array`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  for (let i = 0; i < graph.challenger_presign_data.length; i++) {\n    validatePresignDataPerChallenger(\n      graph.challenger_presign_data[i],\n      `depositor_graph.challenger_presign_data[${i}]`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (typeof graph.offchain_params_version !== \"number\") {\n    throw new VpResponseValidationError(\n      `VP response validation failed: \"depositor_graph.offchain_params_version\" must be a number`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * JSON-RPC client for the Vault Provider API.\n *\n * Wraps {@link JsonRpcClient} with typed methods matching the\n * `vaultProvider_*` RPC namespace defined in the btc-vault pegin spec.\n *\n * Implements the narrow service interfaces (PeginStatusReader, WotsKeySubmitter,\n * PresignClient, ClaimerArtifactsReader) so it can be passed directly to\n * any deposit protocol service function.\n *\n * @see https://github.com/babylonlabs-io/btc-vault/blob/main/docs/pegin.md\n */\n\nimport type { PeginStatusReader, WotsKeySubmitter, PresignClient, ClaimerArtifactsReader } from \"../../services/deposit/interfaces\";\n\nimport {\n  type BearerTokenProvider,\n  JsonRpcClient,\n  type JsonRpcClientConfig,\n} from \"./json-rpc-client\";\nimport type {\n  BatchGetPeginStatusParams,\n  BatchGetPeginStatusResponse,\n  BatchGetPegoutStatusParams,\n  BatchGetPegoutStatusResponse,\n  GetPeginStatusParams,\n  GetPeginStatusResponse,\n  RequestDepositorClaimerArtifactsParams,\n  RequestDepositorClaimerArtifactsResponse,\n  RequestDepositorPresignTransactionsParams,\n  RequestDepositorPresignTransactionsResponse,\n  SubmitDepositorPresignaturesParams,\n  SubmitDepositorWotsKeyParams,\n} from \"./types\";\nimport {\n  validateBatchGetPeginStatusResponse,\n  validateBatchGetPegoutStatusResponse,\n  validateGetPeginStatusResponse,\n  validateRequestDepositorClaimerArtifactsResponse,\n  validateRequestDepositorPresignTransactionsResponse,\n} from \"./validators\";\n\nexport interface VaultProviderRpcClientOptions {\n  /** Timeout in milliseconds per request (default: 60000) */\n  timeout?: number;\n  /** Number of retry attempts for safe methods (default: 3) */\n  retries?: number;\n  /** Initial retry delay in milliseconds (default: 1000) */\n  retryDelay?: number;\n  /**\n   * Custom retry predicate. Default retries only the idempotent read\n   * methods: `getPeginStatus`, `batchGetPeginStatus`, `batchGetPegoutStatus`,\n   * `requestDepositorPresignTransactions`.\n   */\n  retryableFor?: (method: string) => boolean;\n  /** Custom headers. */\n  headers?: Record<string, string>;\n  /**\n   * Per-request bearer-token source. A non-null return attaches\n   * `Authorization: Bearer <token>`; `null` skips auth. Wire a\n   * {@link VpTokenProvider} for depositor-gated methods.\n   */\n  tokenProvider?: BearerTokenProvider;\n  /** Maximum response body size, in bytes, for typed JSON-RPC calls */\n  maxResponseBytes?: number;\n}\n\nconst DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = 60_000;\n\n/**\n * Concrete VP RPC client implementing all service interfaces.\n *\n * Usage:\n * ```ts\n * const client = new VaultProviderRpcClient(\"https://vp.example.com/rpc\");\n * const status = await client.getPeginStatus({ pegin_txid: \"abc...\" });\n * ```\n */\nexport class VaultProviderRpcClient\n  implements PeginStatusReader, WotsKeySubmitter, PresignClient, ClaimerArtifactsReader\n{\n  private client: JsonRpcClient;\n\n  constructor(baseUrl: string, options?: VaultProviderRpcClientOptions) {\n    const config: JsonRpcClientConfig = {\n      baseUrl,\n      timeout: options?.timeout ?? DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS,\n      retries: options?.retries,\n      retryDelay: options?.retryDelay,\n      retryableFor: options?.retryableFor,\n      headers: options?.headers,\n      tokenProvider: options?.tokenProvider,\n      maxResponseBytes: options?.maxResponseBytes,\n    };\n    this.client = new JsonRpcClient(config);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Request the payout/claim/assert transactions that the depositor\n   * needs to pre-sign before the vault can be activated on Bitcoin.\n   */\n  async requestDepositorPresignTransactions(\n    params: RequestDepositorPresignTransactionsParams,\n    signal?: AbortSignal,\n  ): Promise<RequestDepositorPresignTransactionsResponse> {\n    const response = await this.client.call<\n      RequestDepositorPresignTransactionsParams,\n      unknown\n    >(\"vaultProvider_requestDepositorPresignTransactions\", params, signal);\n    validateRequestDepositorPresignTransactionsResponse(response);\n    return response;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Submit the depositor's pre-signatures for the payout transactions\n   * and the depositor-as-claimer graph.\n   */\n  async submitDepositorPresignatures(\n    params: SubmitDepositorPresignaturesParams,\n    signal?: AbortSignal,\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    return this.client.call<SubmitDepositorPresignaturesParams, void>(\n      \"vaultProvider_submitDepositorPresignatures\",\n      params,\n      signal,\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Submit the depositor's WOTS public key to the vault provider.\n   * Called after the pegin is finalized on Ethereum, when the VP is in\n   * `PendingDepositorWotsPK` status.\n   */\n  async submitDepositorWotsKey(\n    params: SubmitDepositorWotsKeyParams,\n    signal?: AbortSignal,\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    return this.client.call<SubmitDepositorWotsKeyParams, void>(\n      \"vaultProvider_submitDepositorWotsKey\",\n      params,\n      signal,\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Request the BaBe DecryptorArtifacts needed for the depositor to\n   * independently evaluate garbled circuits during a challenge.\n   */\n  async requestDepositorClaimerArtifacts(\n    params: RequestDepositorClaimerArtifactsParams,\n    signal?: AbortSignal,\n  ): Promise<RequestDepositorClaimerArtifactsResponse> {\n    const response = await this.client.call<\n      RequestDepositorClaimerArtifactsParams,\n      unknown\n    >(\"vaultProvider_requestDepositorClaimerArtifacts\", params, signal);\n    validateRequestDepositorClaimerArtifactsResponse(response);\n    return response;\n  }\n\n  /** Get the current pegin status from the vault provider daemon. */\n  async getPeginStatus(\n    params: GetPeginStatusParams,\n    signal?: AbortSignal,\n  ): Promise<GetPeginStatusResponse> {\n    const response = await this.client.call<GetPeginStatusParams, unknown>(\n      \"vaultProvider_getPeginStatus\",\n      params,\n      signal,\n    );\n    validateGetPeginStatusResponse(response);\n    return response;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Get pegin status for many txids in one round trip. Per-result envelope\n   * isolates per-pegin failures from the overall RPC. Caller must chunk\n   * inputs at `VP_BATCH_MAX_SIZE`.\n   */\n  async batchGetPeginStatus(\n    params: BatchGetPeginStatusParams,\n    signal?: AbortSignal,\n  ): Promise<BatchGetPeginStatusResponse> {\n    const response = await this.client.call<\n      BatchGetPeginStatusParams,\n      unknown\n    >(\"vaultProvider_batchGetPeginStatus\", params, signal);\n    validateBatchGetPeginStatusResponse(response);\n    return response;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Get pegout status for many txids in one round trip. Same per-result\n   * envelope semantics as `batchGetPeginStatus`.\n   */\n  async batchGetPegoutStatus(\n    params: BatchGetPegoutStatusParams,\n    signal?: AbortSignal,\n  ): Promise<BatchGetPegoutStatusResponse> {\n    const response = await this.client.call<\n      BatchGetPegoutStatusParams,\n      unknown\n    >(\"vaultProvider_batchGetPegoutStatus\", params, signal);\n    validateBatchGetPegoutStatusResponse(response);\n    return response;\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Defensive helper for attributing per-item results in a VP batch RPC\n * response back to the requested txids. The server promises 1:1 ordered\n * results, but we don't trust that promise — a server bug could duplicate,\n * skip, or scramble items, and silent attribution-by-array-index would\n * mask the bug.\n *\n * Lowercases all txids on both sides to absorb case mismatch (the FE\n * strips `0x` but doesn't otherwise normalize).\n *\n * @module tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/batchAttribution\n */\n\n/** Per-item entry in a VP batch response. */\nexport interface BatchResultEntry<T> {\n  pegin_txid: string;\n  result: T | null;\n  error: string | null;\n}\n\n/** Output of {@link attributeBatchResults}. */\nexport interface BatchAttributionResult<T> {\n  /** Lowercase requested txid -> per-item envelope. */\n  byTxid: Map<string, { result: T | null; error: string | null }>;\n  /** Requested txids that did not appear in the response. */\n  missing: string[];\n  /** Echoed txids that were not in the request — logged + dropped. */\n  unexpected: string[];\n  /** Echoed txids that appeared more than once — first kept, rest dropped. */\n  duplicate: string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Attribute batch results to requested txids defensively.\n *\n * Both `requestedTxids` and the echoed `pegin_txid` field on each result\n * are lowercased before lookup. Duplicates and unexpected echoes are\n * surfaced so callers can flag the affected items as errored rather than\n * silently overwriting state.\n *\n * `requestedTxids` may contain duplicates; they are de-duplicated for the\n * purposes of map keys (each unique txid becomes a single map entry).\n */\nexport function attributeBatchResults<T>(\n  requestedTxids: string[],\n  results: ReadonlyArray<BatchResultEntry<T>>,\n): BatchAttributionResult<T> {\n  const requestedSet = new Set<string>();\n  for (const txid of requestedTxids) {\n    requestedSet.add(txid.toLowerCase());\n  }\n\n  const byTxid = new Map<\n    string,\n    { result: T | null; error: string | null }\n  >();\n  const seen = new Set<string>();\n  const duplicate: string[] = [];\n  const unexpected: string[] = [];\n\n  for (const entry of results) {\n    const lower = entry.pegin_txid.toLowerCase();\n    if (!requestedSet.has(lower)) {\n      unexpected.push(lower);\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (seen.has(lower)) {\n      duplicate.push(lower);\n      continue;\n    }\n    seen.add(lower);\n    byTxid.set(lower, { result: entry.result, error: entry.error });\n  }\n\n  const missing: string[] = [];\n  for (const txid of requestedSet) {\n    if (!seen.has(txid)) missing.push(txid);\n  }\n\n  return { byTxid, missing, unexpected, duplicate };\n}\n","/**\n * Generic chunk + attribute + dispatch loop for VP batch RPCs.\n *\n * Wraps {@link attributeBatchResults} with chunking and per-callback\n * dispatch so the FE polling hooks (and any future SDK consumer) only\n * have to declare per-item handlers — chunking by `VP_BATCH_MAX_SIZE`,\n * lowercase txid normalization, missing/duplicate/unexpected\n * surfacing, and the duplicate-skip invariant in the byTxid loop are\n * all owned here.\n *\n * @module tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/batchPoll\n */\n\nimport {\n  attributeBatchResults,\n  type BatchResultEntry,\n} from \"./batchAttribution\";\nimport { VP_BATCH_MAX_SIZE } from \"./types\";\n\nexport interface BatchPollByProviderOptions<TItem, TResult> {\n  /** Items to poll for this provider, e.g. `DepositToPoll[]`. */\n  items: TItem[];\n  /** Extract the canonical txid for each item. Helper lowercases it. */\n  getTxid: (item: TItem) => string;\n  /**\n   * Per-chunk RPC call. Receives lowercased txids; returns the batch\n   * envelope. Caller wraps `rpcClient.batchGet*Status({ pegin_txids })`.\n   */\n  batchCall: (\n    txids: string[],\n  ) => Promise<{ results: ReadonlyArray<BatchResultEntry<TResult>> }>;\n  /**\n   * Handle a per-item envelope. Exactly one of `result` / `error` is\n   * populated (validator invariant). Caller decides UI state, logging,\n   * etc. Not invoked for txids surfaced via {@link onDuplicate}.\n   *\n   * Note: `envelope.pegin_txid` is the lowercased txid the helper\n   * sent in the request, not whatever case/encoding the server echoed.\n   */\n  onItem: (item: TItem, envelope: BatchResultEntry<TResult>) => void;\n  /** Server omitted this item from the response. */\n  onMissing: (item: TItem) => void;\n  /** Server returned this item more than once. Caller picks UI state. */\n  onDuplicate: (item: TItem) => void;\n  /**\n   * Optional aggregate signal for an entire chunk where the server\n   * returned duplicates. Fires once per chunk (only if `count > 0`)\n   * AFTER all per-item `onDuplicate` dispatches. Caller typically logs\n   * the count alongside the provider name.\n   */\n  onDuplicateBatch?: (count: number) => void;\n  /**\n   * The whole chunk's RPC call failed (transport or response\n   * validation). Receives the chunk and the error. Caller decides how\n   * to project that onto per-item state.\n   */\n  onWholeBatchError: (chunk: TItem[], error: unknown) => void;\n  /**\n   * Server returned txids that were not in the request. Caller\n   * typically logs the count for observability — there's no recovery\n   * action since the original request items are unaffected. Optional;\n   * defaults to no-op.\n   */\n  onUnexpected?: (echoedTxids: string[]) => void;\n  /**\n   * Maximum items per RPC call. Defaults to {@link VP_BATCH_MAX_SIZE}.\n   * Exposed for tests so chunking can be exercised without 50+\n   * fixtures.\n   */\n  batchSize?: number;\n}\n\nexport async function batchPollByProvider<TItem, TResult>(\n  options: BatchPollByProviderOptions<TItem, TResult>,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const {\n    items,\n    getTxid,\n    batchCall,\n    onItem,\n    onMissing,\n    onDuplicate,\n    onDuplicateBatch,\n    onWholeBatchError,\n    onUnexpected,\n    batchSize = VP_BATCH_MAX_SIZE,\n  } = options;\n\n  if (!Number.isInteger(batchSize) || batchSize <= 0) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `batchPollByProvider: batchSize must be a positive integer, got ${batchSize}`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  for (let i = 0; i < items.length; i += batchSize) {\n    const chunk = items.slice(i, i + batchSize);\n    const txidToItem = new Map<string, TItem>();\n    const txids: string[] = [];\n    for (const item of chunk) {\n      const lowerTxid = getTxid(item).toLowerCase();\n      txidToItem.set(lowerTxid, item);\n      txids.push(lowerTxid);\n    }\n\n    // Both the RPC call and attribution sit inside the same try/catch\n    // so a malformed-batch validator throw is routed through\n    // `onWholeBatchError` rather than aborting the polling pass.\n    let attribution;\n    try {\n      const response = await batchCall(txids);\n      attribution = attributeBatchResults<TResult>(txids, response.results);\n    } catch (error) {\n      onWholeBatchError(chunk, error);\n      continue;\n    }\n\n    if (onUnexpected && attribution.unexpected.length > 0) {\n      onUnexpected(attribution.unexpected);\n    }\n\n    const duplicateTxids = new Set(attribution.duplicate);\n    for (const txid of duplicateTxids) {\n      const item = txidToItem.get(txid);\n      if (item) onDuplicate(item);\n    }\n    if (onDuplicateBatch && duplicateTxids.size > 0) {\n      onDuplicateBatch(duplicateTxids.size);\n    }\n    for (const txid of attribution.missing) {\n      const item = txidToItem.get(txid);\n      if (item) onMissing(item);\n    }\n    for (const [txid, envelope] of attribution.byTxid) {\n      // Skip duplicates — already dispatched via onDuplicate above.\n      if (duplicateTxids.has(txid)) continue;\n      const item = txidToItem.get(txid);\n      if (!item) continue;\n      onItem(item, {\n        pegin_txid: txid,\n        result: envelope.result,\n        error: envelope.error,\n      });\n    }\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * BIP-322 \"simple\" signature verification for P2TR key-path.\n *\n * Mirrors the Rust reference in\n * `btc-vault/crates/btc-signer/src/message.rs::verify_bip322_message`\n * (which delegates to `rust-bitcoin::bip322::verify_simple` for a\n * P2TR key-path-only address with no merkle root).\n *\n * The algorithm:\n *\n *   1. Compute the BIP-322 tagged-hash of the message:\n *        m_hash = SHA256( SHA256(tag) || SHA256(tag) || message )\n *      where tag = \"BIP0322-signed-message\".\n *\n *   2. Build a virtual \"to_spend\" transaction with one input (prevout\n *      all-zero txid + 0xFFFFFFFF vout, scriptSig = `OP_0 PUSH32 m_hash`,\n *      sequence = 0) and one output (value 0, scriptPubKey = P2TR for\n *      the signer's x-only pubkey).\n *\n *   3. Build a \"to_sign\" transaction that spends to_spend[0] and has a\n *      single `OP_RETURN` output (value 0).\n *\n *   4. Compute the BIP-341 taproot sighash of to_sign input 0 with\n *      SIGHASH_DEFAULT (0x00).\n *\n *   5. Verify the 64-byte Schnorr signature against the **tweaked**\n *      output key `Q = P + tap_tweak(P) * G`, where `tap_tweak(P) =\n *      hash_TapTweak(serialize_x_only(P))` (no merkle root — key-path\n *      only).\n *\n * `bitcoinjs-lib` handles (2)–(4); `tiny-secp256k1-asmjs` provides\n * the tweak and Schnorr verify. Pulling in a full BIP-322 library\n * would add a peer dep for what amounts to ~40 lines of glue.\n *\n * @module tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/bip322Verify\n */\n\nimport * as ecc from \"@bitcoin-js/tiny-secp256k1-asmjs\";\nimport { payments, Transaction } from \"bitcoinjs-lib\";\n\nimport { Buffer } from \"buffer\";\nimport { sha256 } from \"@noble/hashes/sha2.js\";\n\n/** BIP-322 message tag (BIP-340 tagged-hash style). */\nconst BIP322_TAG = \"BIP0322-signed-message\";\n\n/** BIP-341 taproot-tweak tag. */\nconst TAPTWEAK_TAG = \"TapTweak\";\n\nconst X_ONLY_PUBKEY_SIZE = 32;\nconst SCHNORR_SIG_SIZE = 64;\n\n/**\n * BIP-340 tagged hash: `SHA256( SHA256(tag) || SHA256(tag) || data )`.\n * Used for both BIP-322 message hashing and BIP-341 tap-tweak.\n */\nfunction taggedHash(tag: string, data: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {\n  const tagBytes = new TextEncoder().encode(tag);\n  const tagHash = sha256(tagBytes);\n  const preimage = new Uint8Array(tagHash.length * 2 + data.length);\n  preimage.set(tagHash, 0);\n  preimage.set(tagHash, tagHash.length);\n  preimage.set(data, tagHash.length * 2);\n  return sha256(preimage);\n}\n\n/**\n * Apply BIP-341 taproot tweak to an x-only pubkey with no merkle\n * root (key-path-only address).\n *\n * `tap_tweak = hash_TapTweak(P)`\n * `Q = P + tap_tweak * G` (x-only, even-Y parity)\n *\n * Returns the tweaked 32-byte x-only pubkey, or null if the tweak\n * produces a point-at-infinity or invalid result.\n */\nfunction tweakXOnlyKey(xOnly: Uint8Array): Uint8Array | null {\n  if (xOnly.length !== X_ONLY_PUBKEY_SIZE) return null;\n  const tweak = taggedHash(TAPTWEAK_TAG, xOnly);\n  const tweaked = ecc.xOnlyPointAddTweak(xOnly, tweak);\n  return tweaked ? tweaked.xOnlyPubkey : null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify a BIP-322 \"simple\" P2TR key-path signature over an arbitrary\n * byte message.\n *\n * @internal Exposed only so the golden-vector test suite can pin the\n * verifier independently of `verifyServerIdentity`. Production callers\n * should use `verifyServerIdentity` from `./serverIdentity` instead.\n *\n * @param messageBytes - The bytes that were signed (e.g. a CBOR-encoded\n *                       payload). Not pre-hashed; this function applies\n *                       the BIP-322 tagged hash internally.\n * @param xOnlyPubkey  - 32-byte x-only pubkey of the signer (pre-tweak).\n * @param signature    - 64-byte raw Schnorr signature (BIP-340), as\n *                       emitted by a key-path witness with\n *                       SIGHASH_DEFAULT.\n * @returns `true` if the signature verifies against the address\n *          derived from `xOnlyPubkey`; `false` otherwise.\n */\nexport function verifyBip322Simple(\n  messageBytes: Uint8Array,\n  xOnlyPubkey: Uint8Array,\n  signature: Uint8Array,\n): boolean {\n  if (xOnlyPubkey.length !== X_ONLY_PUBKEY_SIZE) return false;\n  if (signature.length !== SCHNORR_SIG_SIZE) return false;\n\n  // Any exception from the underlying crypto libraries (e.g. the\n  // `Expected Point` error `tiny-secp256k1` throws when the supplied\n  // 32 bytes don't represent a valid x-coordinate on secp256k1) is\n  // treated as a verification failure rather than propagated — a\n  // verifier MUST return a boolean, not raise.\n  try {\n    // Step 1: BIP-322 tagged hash of the message.\n    const messageHash = taggedHash(BIP322_TAG, messageBytes);\n\n    // Step 2: scriptPubKey for the signer's P2TR key-path-only address.\n    // bitcoinjs-lib's `payments.p2tr({ internalPubkey })` computes the\n    // tweak and produces the `OP_1 <tweaked_xonly>` output script.\n    const p2tr = payments.p2tr({\n      internalPubkey: Buffer.from(xOnlyPubkey),\n    });\n    if (!p2tr.output) return false;\n    const scriptPubKey = p2tr.output;\n\n    // Step 3: build to_spend virtual tx.\n    //\n    // NOTE: bitcoinjs-lib v6.x's `Transaction.addOutput` and\n    // `hashForWitnessV1` are typed for `Satoshi` (a UInt53 number),\n    // not `bigint`. Passing `BigInt(0)` triggers a typeforce\n    // assertion in `addOutput` (\"Expected property '1' of type\n    // Satoshi, got BigInt 0\") which our outer try/catch silently\n    // turns into `verify -> false`. Use plain `0` everywhere.\n    const ZERO_SATS = 0;\n    const toSpend = new Transaction();\n    toSpend.version = 0;\n    toSpend.locktime = 0;\n    // scriptSig: OP_0 (0x00) + OP_PUSHBYTES_32 (0x20) + message_hash (32B)\n    const scriptSig = Buffer.concat([\n      Buffer.from([0x00, 0x20]),\n      Buffer.from(messageHash),\n    ]);\n    toSpend.addInput(\n      Buffer.alloc(32, 0), // prev_txid = 0x0000...0000\n      0xffffffff,          // prev_vout = 0xFFFFFFFF\n      0,                   // sequence = 0\n      scriptSig,\n    );\n    toSpend.addOutput(scriptPubKey, ZERO_SATS);\n\n    // Step 4: build to_sign virtual tx spending to_spend[0].\n    const toSign = new Transaction();\n    toSign.version = 0;\n    toSign.locktime = 0;\n    // Bitcoin txid in natural-byte (little-endian) form.\n    const toSpendTxid = toSpend.getHash();\n    toSign.addInput(toSpendTxid, 0, 0);\n    toSign.addOutput(Buffer.from([0x6a]), ZERO_SATS); // OP_RETURN\n\n    // Step 5: taproot sighash for to_sign input 0 (SIGHASH_DEFAULT).\n    const sighash = toSign.hashForWitnessV1(\n      0,\n      [scriptPubKey],\n      [ZERO_SATS],\n      Transaction.SIGHASH_DEFAULT,\n    );\n\n    // Step 6: tweak the x-only pubkey (no merkle root) and verify Schnorr.\n    const tweakedXOnly = tweakXOnlyKey(xOnlyPubkey);\n    if (!tweakedXOnly) return false;\n\n    return ecc.verifySchnorr(sighash, tweakedXOnly, signature);\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Minimal CBOR encoder for the server-identity payload shape.\n *\n * We only need to encode one specific CBOR structure — the 3-tuple\n * `(SERVER_IDENTITY_DOMAIN, ephemeral_pubkey_bytes, expires_at_u64)` —\n * byte-for-byte identical to what the Rust `ciborium` crate produces\n * for the corresponding tuple, because that's the exact message the\n * VP signs with BIP-322.\n *\n * IMPORTANT encoding quirk: the Rust side passes the domain and\n * pubkey as `&[u8]` / `Vec<u8>` without a `#[serde(with = \"serde_bytes\")]`\n * attribute, so serde/ciborium encodes them as **CBOR arrays of u8**\n * (major type 4, one item per byte) — NOT as CBOR byte strings (major\n * type 2). A naive byte-string encoding would produce the wrong bytes\n * and signature verification would fail.\n *\n * Rather than pull in a full CBOR dependency for this one shape, we\n * implement the exact subset inline (~40 LOC) and pin it with golden\n * vectors against the Rust reference output.\n *\n * @module tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/cbor\n */\n\n/**\n * Encode a small CBOR unsigned-integer \"head\" byte for major type\n * `major` (0..7) with argument `arg` (0..2^64-1).\n *\n * Returns the header bytes; the caller concatenates any trailing data\n * (e.g. array elements). Encoding rules:\n *   arg < 24         → single byte `(major << 5) | arg`\n *   arg < 256        → `(major << 5) | 24` + 1-byte arg\n *   arg < 65536      → `(major << 5) | 25` + 2-byte BE arg\n *   arg < 2^32       → `(major << 5) | 26` + 4-byte BE arg\n *   arg < 2^64       → `(major << 5) | 27` + 8-byte BE arg\n */\nfunction cborHead(major: number, arg: number | bigint): Uint8Array {\n  const tag = (major & 0x07) << 5;\n  const n = typeof arg === \"bigint\" ? arg : BigInt(arg);\n  if (n < 0n) throw new Error(\"cborHead: negative argument\");\n\n  if (n < 24n) return new Uint8Array([tag | Number(n)]);\n  if (n < 0x100n) return new Uint8Array([tag | 24, Number(n)]);\n  if (n < 0x10000n) {\n    const v = Number(n);\n    return new Uint8Array([tag | 25, (v >>> 8) & 0xff, v & 0xff]);\n  }\n  if (n < 0x1_0000_0000n) {\n    const v = Number(n);\n    return new Uint8Array([\n      tag | 26,\n      (v >>> 24) & 0xff,\n      (v >>> 16) & 0xff,\n      (v >>> 8) & 0xff,\n      v & 0xff,\n    ]);\n  }\n  // 8-byte BE for u64 range\n  const out = new Uint8Array(9);\n  out[0] = tag | 27;\n  for (let i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {\n    out[1 + i] = Number(n >> BigInt((7 - i) * 8)) & 0xff;\n  }\n  return out;\n}\n\nfunction concat(...parts: Uint8Array[]): Uint8Array {\n  const total = parts.reduce((s, p) => s + p.length, 0);\n  const out = new Uint8Array(total);\n  let offset = 0;\n  for (const p of parts) {\n    out.set(p, offset);\n    offset += p.length;\n  }\n  return out;\n}\n\n/**\n * Encode a `Vec<u8>` / `&[u8]` the way ciborium does by default — as a\n * CBOR array of u8 (major type 4), one element per byte.\n *\n * Each byte becomes a CBOR unsigned integer (major type 0): bytes\n * < 24 are encoded as single bytes, bytes 24..255 as `0x18 XX`.\n */\nfunction encodeBytesAsArrayOfU8(bytes: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {\n  const header = cborHead(4, bytes.length);\n  const items: Uint8Array[] = [header];\n  for (const b of bytes) {\n    items.push(cborHead(0, b));\n  }\n  return concat(...items);\n}\n\n/**\n * Encode the server-identity payload the Rust side signs:\n *\n *     ciborium::into_writer(\n *       &(SERVER_IDENTITY_DOMAIN, ephemeral_pubkey.serialize().to_vec(), expires_at),\n *       buf\n *     )\n *\n * Output bytes are byte-for-byte identical to the Rust reference,\n * pinned by the golden vector in the corresponding test file.\n *\n * @internal Exposed only for the golden-vector test that pins this\n * encoding against ciborium's output. Production callers reach this\n * via `verifyServerIdentity` from `./serverIdentity`.\n *\n * @param domain - Must be `\"btc-auth.server-identity.v1\"` (27 bytes)\n *                 — the constant from btc-vault's `server_identity.rs`.\n * @param ephemeralPubkeyCompressed - 33-byte SEC1-compressed pubkey.\n * @param expiresAt - Unix timestamp (seconds). Must be a safe integer.\n */\nexport function encodeServerIdentityPayload(\n  domain: Uint8Array,\n  ephemeralPubkeyCompressed: Uint8Array,\n  expiresAt: number,\n): Uint8Array {\n  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(expiresAt) || expiresAt < 0) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `encodeServerIdentityPayload: expires_at must be a non-negative safe integer, got ${expiresAt}`,\n    );\n  }\n  const arrayHeader = cborHead(4, 3); // 3-tuple encoded as array of 3\n  const domainBytes = encodeBytesAsArrayOfU8(domain);\n  const pubkeyBytes = encodeBytesAsArrayOfU8(ephemeralPubkeyCompressed);\n  const expiresAtBytes = cborHead(0, expiresAt);\n  return concat(arrayHeader, domainBytes, pubkeyBytes, expiresAtBytes);\n}\n","/**\n * Server-identity verification for the vault provider's\n * `auth_createDepositorToken` response.\n *\n * The VP returns a `ServerIdentityResponse` bundled with every issued\n * token:\n *\n *   - `server_pubkey`:    VP's persistent x-only pubkey (HEX, 32B)\n *   - `ephemeral_pubkey`: VP's ephemeral token-signing key (HEX, 33B compressed)\n *   - `expires_at`:       Unix timestamp when the ephemeral key expires\n *   - `signature`:        BIP-322 signature by the persistent key over\n *                         `(SERVER_IDENTITY_DOMAIN, ephemeral_pubkey, expires_at)`\n *\n * The FE pins `server_pubkey` against the on-chain `VaultProvider.btcPubKey`\n * it reads from the registry contract. A mismatch rejects the token.\n *\n * @module tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/serverIdentity\n */\n\nimport * as ecc from \"@bitcoin-js/tiny-secp256k1-asmjs\";\n\nimport {\n  COMPRESSED_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN,\n  SCHNORR_SIG_HEX_LEN,\n  stripHexPrefix,\n  X_ONLY_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN,\n} from \"../../../primitives/utils/bitcoin\";\nimport { HEX_RE } from \"../../../utils/validation\";\n\nimport { verifyBip322Simple } from \"./bip322Verify\";\nimport { encodeServerIdentityPayload } from \"./cbor\";\n\n/**\n * Byte-string domain the btc-vault Rust reference passes as the first\n * element of the CBOR tuple signed over for server-identity proofs.\n * Must match `SERVER_IDENTITY_DOMAIN` in\n * `btc-vault/crates/btc-auth/src/server_identity.rs`.\n */\nconst SERVER_IDENTITY_DOMAIN = new TextEncoder().encode(\n  \"btc-auth.server-identity.v1\",\n);\n\n/**\n * Cap on `proof.expires_at - now`. Bounds how long a leaked VP\n * ephemeral key stays usable; the bearer token's own TTL does not\n * (different trust boundary). 2h = Rust ref VP's 1h rotation × 2 for\n * clock skew. Override per call via `maxLifetimeSecs`.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_MAX_PROOF_LIFETIME_SECS = 2 * 3600;\n\n/**\n * Wire representation from btc-vault's `ServerIdentityResponse`.\n */\nexport interface ServerIdentityResponse {\n  /** Hex-encoded x-only (32-byte) persistent server pubkey. */\n  server_pubkey: string;\n  /** Hex-encoded compressed (33-byte) ephemeral token-signing pubkey. */\n  ephemeral_pubkey: string;\n  /** Unix timestamp at which the ephemeral key expires. */\n  expires_at: number;\n  /** Hex-encoded 64-byte BIP-322 Schnorr signature. */\n  signature: string;\n}\n\nexport interface VerifyServerIdentityInput {\n  /** The proof returned by `auth_createDepositorToken`. */\n  proof: ServerIdentityResponse;\n  /**\n   * The x-only persistent server pubkey the FE expects (sourced from\n   * the on-chain `VaultProvider.btcPubKey` via the vault registry\n   * reader). 64-char lowercase hex, no `0x` prefix.\n   */\n  pinnedServerPubkey: string;\n  /** Current Unix timestamp in seconds. Injected for testability. */\n  now: number;\n  /** Cap on `proof.expires_at - now` (seconds). Defaults to {@link DEFAULT_MAX_PROOF_LIFETIME_SECS}. */\n  maxLifetimeSecs?: number;\n}\n\nexport class ServerIdentityError extends Error {\n  constructor(\n    message: string,\n    public readonly reason:\n      | \"pinned_pubkey_mismatch\"\n      | \"expired\"\n      | \"expires_too_far\"\n      | \"invalid_expires_at\"\n      | \"invalid_max_lifetime\"\n      | \"invalid_pubkey_encoding\"\n      | \"invalid_ephemeral_pubkey\"\n      | \"invalid_signature_encoding\"\n      | \"signature_verification_failed\",\n  ) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = \"ServerIdentityError\";\n  }\n}\n\n/** Parse a lowercase-hex string to bytes. Expects even length, already validated. */\nfunction hexToBytes(hex: string): Uint8Array {\n  const out = new Uint8Array(hex.length / 2);\n  for (let i = 0; i < out.length; i++) {\n    out[i] = parseInt(hex.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);\n  }\n  return out;\n}\n\n\n/**\n * Verify a server identity proof against a pinned server pubkey.\n *\n * Checks:\n *   1. `server_pubkey` matches the pin.\n *   2. `now < expires_at <= now + maxLifetimeSecs` (with integer guards).\n *   3. `ephemeral_pubkey` is a well-formed 33-byte compressed pubkey.\n *   4. `signature` is a well-formed 64-byte Schnorr hex string.\n *   5. The BIP-322 Schnorr signature cryptographically verifies\n *      against `server_pubkey` over the CBOR-encoded tuple\n *      `(SERVER_IDENTITY_DOMAIN, ephemeral_pubkey, expires_at)`.\n *\n * Step 5 is what actually binds the ephemeral key to the persistent\n * pubkey — without it, a TLS-MITM attacker who reads the pinned\n * pubkey from the on-chain registry could substitute an arbitrary\n * ephemeral pubkey paired with any lexically-valid signature.\n *\n * @throws ServerIdentityError on any validation failure.\n */\nexport function verifyServerIdentity(input: VerifyServerIdentityInput): void {\n  const { proof, pinnedServerPubkey, now } = input;\n  const maxLifetimeSecs =\n    input.maxLifetimeSecs ?? DEFAULT_MAX_PROOF_LIFETIME_SECS;\n\n  const pinned = stripHexPrefix(pinnedServerPubkey).toLowerCase();\n  if (pinned.length !== X_ONLY_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN || !HEX_RE.test(pinned)) {\n    throw new ServerIdentityError(\n      `pinnedServerPubkey must be 32-byte hex; got ${pinned.length} chars`,\n      \"invalid_pubkey_encoding\",\n    );\n  }\n\n  const actual = stripHexPrefix(proof.server_pubkey).toLowerCase();\n  if (actual.length !== X_ONLY_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN || !HEX_RE.test(actual)) {\n    throw new ServerIdentityError(\n      `server_pubkey must be 32-byte hex; got ${actual.length} chars`,\n      \"invalid_pubkey_encoding\",\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (actual !== pinned) {\n    throw new ServerIdentityError(\n      `server_pubkey does not match pinned value: expected ${pinned}, got ${actual}`,\n      \"pinned_pubkey_mismatch\",\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Validate both sides of the comparison are well-formed integers\n  // BEFORE comparing — untrusted JSON-RPC input can supply\n  // undefined/NaN/string values for `expires_at`, and relational\n  // comparisons with those silently evaluate to `false` (accepting the\n  // proof). Caller's `now` is injected but we still sanity-check it.\n  // Garbage data and \"valid but past\" both render the proof unusable\n  // but mean different things to a caller — keep the reasons distinct.\n  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(proof.expires_at)) {\n    throw new ServerIdentityError(\n      `expires_at must be a finite integer; got ${JSON.stringify(proof.expires_at)}`,\n      \"invalid_expires_at\",\n    );\n  }\n  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(now)) {\n    throw new ServerIdentityError(\n      `now must be a finite integer; got ${JSON.stringify(now)}`,\n      \"invalid_expires_at\",\n    );\n  }\n  if (proof.expires_at <= now) {\n    throw new ServerIdentityError(\n      `server identity proof expired at ${proof.expires_at}, now ${now}`,\n      \"expired\",\n    );\n  }\n  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(maxLifetimeSecs) || maxLifetimeSecs <= 0) {\n    throw new ServerIdentityError(\n      `maxLifetimeSecs must be a positive safe integer; got ${JSON.stringify(maxLifetimeSecs)}`,\n      \"invalid_max_lifetime\",\n    );\n  }\n  if (proof.expires_at - now > maxLifetimeSecs) {\n    throw new ServerIdentityError(\n      `server identity proof expires too far in the future: ` +\n        `expires_at=${proof.expires_at}, now=${now}, max lifetime=${maxLifetimeSecs}s`,\n      \"expires_too_far\",\n    );\n  }\n\n  const eph = stripHexPrefix(proof.ephemeral_pubkey).toLowerCase();\n  if (eph.length !== COMPRESSED_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN || !HEX_RE.test(eph)) {\n    throw new ServerIdentityError(\n      `ephemeral_pubkey must be 33-byte compressed hex; got ${eph.length} chars`,\n      \"invalid_ephemeral_pubkey\",\n    );\n  }\n  const prefix = eph.slice(0, 2);\n  if (prefix !== \"02\" && prefix !== \"03\") {\n    throw new ServerIdentityError(\n      `ephemeral_pubkey must be compressed (prefix 02/03); got ${prefix}`,\n      \"invalid_ephemeral_pubkey\",\n    );\n  }\n  // Curve validation. The BIP-322 signature attests to the byte string\n  // of `ephemeral_pubkey` only, not to its curve validity. Without\n  // this check, a server could sign a structurally-valid byte string\n  // that doesn't decode to a secp256k1 point — passing verification\n  // here and surfacing as an obscure crypto error later when the\n  // depositor tries to use the key. Reject up front.\n  const ephBytes = hexToBytes(eph);\n  if (!ecc.isPoint(ephBytes)) {\n    throw new ServerIdentityError(\n      \"ephemeral_pubkey is not a valid secp256k1 point\",\n      \"invalid_ephemeral_pubkey\",\n    );\n  }\n\n  const sig = stripHexPrefix(proof.signature).toLowerCase();\n  if (sig.length !== SCHNORR_SIG_HEX_LEN || !HEX_RE.test(sig)) {\n    throw new ServerIdentityError(\n      `signature must be 64-byte Schnorr hex; got ${sig.length} chars`,\n      \"invalid_signature_encoding\",\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Cryptographic verification of the BIP-322 signature over the\n  // CBOR-encoded payload. Without this, the ephemeral-key binding is\n  // unenforced and a TLS-MITM could substitute a fake ephemeral key\n  // alongside the real (publicly-readable) pinned pubkey.\n  const payload = encodeServerIdentityPayload(\n    SERVER_IDENTITY_DOMAIN,\n    hexToBytes(eph),\n    proof.expires_at,\n  );\n  const verified = verifyBip322Simple(payload, hexToBytes(actual), hexToBytes(sig));\n  if (!verified) {\n    throw new ServerIdentityError(\n      \"BIP-322 signature verification failed — ephemeral key is not attested by pinned server pubkey\",\n      \"signature_verification_failed\",\n    );\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * VP RPC methods that require `Authorization: Bearer <token>`.\n * Protocol invariant — must be kept in sync with the VP server.\n *\n * Split into two sets by the CWT subject the VP demands:\n *\n * - {@link AUTH_GATED_METHODS} — bearer minted by\n *   `auth_createDepositorToken` (Subject::VaultdJsonRpc). These run\n *   through the proxy's plain JSON-RPC forward path.\n * - {@link GRPC_AUTH_GATED_METHODS} — bearer minted by\n *   `auth_createDepositorTokenGrpc` (Subject::VaultdGrpc). The proxy\n *   translates these into gRPC calls to vaultd's daemon gRPC server,\n *   so a JSON-RPC-subject token would be rejected by\n *   `GrpcAuthInterceptor`.\n *\n * @stability frozen\n *\n * @module tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/gatedMethods\n */\n\nexport const AUTH_GATED_METHODS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n  \"vaultProvider_submitDepositorWotsKey\",\n  \"vaultProvider_submitDepositorPresignatures\",\n  \"vaultProvider_requestDepositorPresignTransactions\",\n]);\n\nexport const GRPC_AUTH_GATED_METHODS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n  \"vaultProvider_requestDepositorClaimerArtifacts\",\n]);\n","/**\n * Shared internals for the unauthenticated token-issuing JSON-RPC\n * client. The \"inner\" client is dedicated to `auth_createDepositorToken`\n * — it MUST NOT carry a `tokenProvider`, else the JSON-RPC header\n * builder would recurse into token acquisition.\n *\n * @module tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/innerTokenClient\n */\n\nimport { JsonRpcClient } from \"../json-rpc-client\";\n\nconst TOKEN_RPC_TIMEOUT_MS = 60_000;\n\nexport const TOKEN_ISSUE_METHOD = \"auth_createDepositorToken\";\n/**\n * gRPC-subject sibling of {@link TOKEN_ISSUE_METHOD}. The proxy bridges\n * this call to vaultd's `VaultProviderDepositorAuthService.CreateDepositorToken`\n * so the resulting CWT is bound to `Subject::VaultdGrpc` — required to\n * pass vaultd's `GrpcAuthInterceptor` on methods the proxy translates to\n * gRPC (currently just the artifact stream).\n */\nexport const GRPC_TOKEN_ISSUE_METHOD = \"auth_createDepositorTokenGrpc\";\n\nexport function buildInnerTokenClient(\n  baseUrl: string,\n  headers?: Record<string, string>,\n): JsonRpcClient {\n  return new JsonRpcClient({\n    baseUrl,\n    timeout: TOKEN_RPC_TIMEOUT_MS,\n    headers,\n    retryableFor: (method) =>\n      method === TOKEN_ISSUE_METHOD || method === GRPC_TOKEN_ISSUE_METHOD,\n  });\n}\n","/**\n * `VpTokenProvider` — caches CWT bearer tokens issued by the vault\n * provider's `auth_createDepositorToken` RPC, with lazy expiry check\n * and single-flight concurrent acquire.\n *\n * Usage:\n *\n * ```ts\n * const provider = new VpTokenProvider({\n *   client,\n *   peginTxid,\n *   authAnchorHex,\n *   pinnedServerPubkey,\n *   authGatedMethods,\n * });\n * const bearer = await provider.getToken(method); // null if not gated\n * ```\n *\n * The provider implements the `BearerTokenProvider` interface expected\n * by `JsonRpcClient`. Plug directly:\n *\n * ```ts\n * const client = new JsonRpcClient({ ..., tokenProvider: provider });\n * ```\n *\n * @module tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/tokenProvider\n */\n\nimport type { OnChainBtcPubkey } from \"../../eth/types\";\nimport type { BearerTokenProvider, JsonRpcClient } from \"../json-rpc-client\";\nimport {\n  GRPC_TOKEN_ISSUE_METHOD,\n  TOKEN_ISSUE_METHOD,\n} from \"./innerTokenClient\";\nimport {\n  type ServerIdentityResponse,\n  verifyServerIdentity,\n} from \"./serverIdentity\";\n\n/**\n * Maximum reasonable `expires_at` value (seconds since epoch). Guards\n * against a bogus far-future timestamp that would lock the cache on a\n * bad token forever. Jan 1, 2100 in Unix seconds.\n */\nconst MAX_EXPIRES_AT_SECS = 4_102_444_800;\n\n/**\n * Default safety margin before `expires_at` — we treat a token as\n * expired this many seconds before its stated expiry so that in-flight\n * requests don't race the expiry boundary.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_REFRESH_SKEW_SECS = 30;\n\n/**\n * Wire response shape of `auth_createDepositorToken`.\n */\nexport interface CreateDepositorTokenResponse {\n  /** Base64url-encoded COSE Sign1 CWT bearer token. */\n  token: string;\n  /** Unix timestamp at which the token expires. */\n  expires_at: number;\n  /** Server identity proof bundled with every token response. */\n  server_identity: ServerIdentityResponse;\n}\n\nexport interface VpTokenProviderConfig {\n  client: JsonRpcClient;\n  /** Per-vault depositor-signed PegIn tx id. NOT shared across sibling vaults in a batch. */\n  peginTxid: string;\n  /** 64-char hex of the 32-byte OP_RETURN auth-anchor preimage. */\n  authAnchorHex: string;\n  /** Pinned VP pubkey from the on-chain registry; branded so indexer mirrors can't substitute. */\n  pinnedServerPubkey: OnChainBtcPubkey;\n  /**\n   * Methods that need a JSON-RPC-subject bearer (minted via\n   * `auth_createDepositorToken`). Forwarded over plain HTTP JSON-RPC by\n   * the proxy. `getToken` returns `null` for any method outside this and\n   * {@link grpcGatedMethods}.\n   */\n  authGatedMethods: ReadonlySet<string>;\n  /**\n   * Methods that need a gRPC-subject bearer (minted via\n   * `auth_createDepositorTokenGrpc`). The proxy translates these into\n   * gRPC calls to vaultd; the JSON-RPC bearer is rejected with a\n   * `Subject` mismatch.\n   */\n  grpcGatedMethods: ReadonlySet<string>;\n  /** Default {@link DEFAULT_REFRESH_SKEW_SECS}. */\n  refreshSkewSecs?: number;\n  /** Clock source for testability. */\n  now?: () => number;\n}\n\ninterface CachedToken {\n  token: string;\n  expiresAt: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Acquire, cache, and refresh VP bearer tokens.\n *\n * Implements {@link BearerTokenProvider}. Safe to pass directly into\n * `JsonRpcClient` as `tokenProvider`.\n */\nexport class VpTokenProvider implements BearerTokenProvider {\n  // `client` is the only mutable field — see `setClient`. The\n  // identity-bearing fields (peginTxid/authAnchorHex/pinnedServerPubkey)\n  // remain readonly and are checked against re-registration in the\n  // registry's `getOrCreate`.\n  private client: JsonRpcClient;\n  private readonly peginTxid: string;\n  private readonly authAnchorHex: string;\n  private readonly pinnedServerPubkey: OnChainBtcPubkey;\n  private readonly authGatedMethods: ReadonlySet<string>;\n  private readonly grpcGatedMethods: ReadonlySet<string>;\n  private readonly refreshSkewSecs: number;\n  private readonly now: () => number;\n\n  /** Cached JSON-RPC-subject bearer (auth_createDepositorToken). */\n  private cachedJsonRpc: CachedToken | null = null;\n  private inFlightJsonRpc: Promise<CachedToken> | null = null;\n  /** Cached gRPC-subject bearer (auth_createDepositorTokenGrpc). */\n  private cachedGrpc: CachedToken | null = null;\n  private inFlightGrpc: Promise<CachedToken> | null = null;\n\n  constructor(config: VpTokenProviderConfig) {\n    this.client = config.client;\n    this.peginTxid = config.peginTxid;\n    this.authAnchorHex = config.authAnchorHex;\n    this.pinnedServerPubkey = config.pinnedServerPubkey;\n    this.authGatedMethods = config.authGatedMethods;\n    this.grpcGatedMethods = config.grpcGatedMethods;\n    this.refreshSkewSecs = config.refreshSkewSecs ?? DEFAULT_REFRESH_SKEW_SECS;\n    this.now = config.now ?? (() => Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Return a bearer token for `method`, or `null` if `method` is not\n   * auth-gated.\n   *\n   * Routes by subject: `authGatedMethods` → JSON-RPC bearer (issued via\n   * `auth_createDepositorToken`); `grpcGatedMethods` → gRPC bearer\n   * (`auth_createDepositorTokenGrpc`). Either path acquires lazily and\n   * single-flights concurrent callers; the two cache slots are\n   * independent.\n   *\n   * Both token-issuing methods are hard-exempted from the gate — if\n   * either were ever included in the gated sets (caller misconfiguration)\n   * the provider would recurse into `acquireSingleFlight` from inside the\n   * JSON-RPC header builder before `inFlight` is assigned, defeating the\n   * single-flight guard. Returning `null` here breaks that recursion\n   * deterministically.\n   */\n  async getToken(method: string): Promise<string | null> {\n    if (method === TOKEN_ISSUE_METHOD || method === GRPC_TOKEN_ISSUE_METHOD) {\n      return null;\n    }\n\n    if (this.grpcGatedMethods.has(method)) {\n      return this.getTokenForSubject(\"grpc\");\n    }\n    if (this.authGatedMethods.has(method)) {\n      return this.getTokenForSubject(\"jsonrpc\");\n    }\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Drop both cached tokens. Next `getToken` call re-acquires the slot\n   * that's actually needed. Called by `JsonRpcClient` on wire\n   * `auth_expired` responses; the client doesn't tell us which subject\n   * expired, so we evict both to stay correct under either.\n   *\n   * Worst case is one extra round-trip on the slot that was still fresh,\n   * which is cheaper than carrying a `Subject` argument through\n   * `BearerTokenProvider`.\n   */\n  invalidate(): void {\n    this.cachedJsonRpc = null;\n    this.cachedGrpc = null;\n    // Do NOT clear `inFlight*` — a concurrent acquire is still valid;\n    // the invalidator is saying \"the cached token is bad\", not \"any\n    // in-flight acquire is bad\". The in-flight acquire will populate\n    // a fresh `cached*` on completion.\n  }\n\n  private async getTokenForSubject(\n    subject: \"jsonrpc\" | \"grpc\",\n  ): Promise<string> {\n    const cached =\n      subject === \"grpc\" ? this.cachedGrpc : this.cachedJsonRpc;\n    if (cached && this.now() + this.refreshSkewSecs < cached.expiresAt) {\n      return cached.token;\n    }\n    const fresh = await this.acquireSingleFlight(subject);\n    return fresh.token;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Swap in a different transport for subsequent token-issuing calls.\n   * Used by the registry when a later caller registers the same\n   * `peginTxid` against a different `baseUrl` — the cached token\n   * (bound to identity, not transport) stays valid, but future\n   * refreshes hit the new URL. An in-flight acquire keeps using the\n   * old client (it captured the reference); next call uses the new.\n   */\n  setClient(client: JsonRpcClient): void {\n    this.client = client;\n  }\n\n  private acquireSingleFlight(\n    subject: \"jsonrpc\" | \"grpc\",\n  ): Promise<CachedToken> {\n    const existing =\n      subject === \"grpc\" ? this.inFlightGrpc : this.inFlightJsonRpc;\n    if (existing) return existing;\n\n    const issueMethod =\n      subject === \"grpc\" ? GRPC_TOKEN_ISSUE_METHOD : TOKEN_ISSUE_METHOD;\n\n    const p = (async () => {\n      try {\n        const response = await this.client.call<\n          { pegin_txid: string; auth_anchor: string },\n          CreateDepositorTokenResponse\n        >(issueMethod, {\n          pegin_txid: this.peginTxid,\n          auth_anchor: this.authAnchorHex,\n        });\n\n        verifyServerIdentity({\n          proof: response.server_identity,\n          pinnedServerPubkey: this.pinnedServerPubkey,\n          now: this.now(),\n        });\n\n        // Validate wire payload before caching so a malformed response\n        // from a compromised VP or proxy can't poison the cache with\n        // unusable values (non-string token, non-integer expiry, etc.).\n        if (typeof response.token !== \"string\" || response.token.length === 0) {\n          throw new Error(\n            `VpTokenProvider: invalid token in acquire response (expected non-empty string, got ${typeof response.token})`,\n          );\n        }\n        const now = this.now();\n        if (\n          !Number.isSafeInteger(response.expires_at) ||\n          response.expires_at <= now ||\n          response.expires_at > MAX_EXPIRES_AT_SECS\n        ) {\n          throw new Error(\n            `VpTokenProvider: invalid expires_at in acquire response (got ${JSON.stringify(response.expires_at)}; must be a safe integer in (${now}, ${MAX_EXPIRES_AT_SECS}])`,\n          );\n        }\n\n        const fresh: CachedToken = {\n          token: response.token,\n          expiresAt: response.expires_at,\n        };\n        if (subject === \"grpc\") {\n          this.cachedGrpc = fresh;\n        } else {\n          this.cachedJsonRpc = fresh;\n        }\n        return fresh;\n      } finally {\n        if (subject === \"grpc\") {\n          this.inFlightGrpc = null;\n        } else {\n          this.inFlightJsonRpc = null;\n        }\n      }\n    })();\n\n    if (subject === \"grpc\") {\n      this.inFlightGrpc = p;\n    } else {\n      this.inFlightJsonRpc = p;\n    }\n    return p;\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * In-memory registry of {@link VpTokenProvider} instances keyed by\n * the per-vault depositor-signed PegIn tx hash. Module-level\n * singleton, per-tab, never persisted.\n *\n * @module tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/tokenRegistry\n */\n\nimport type { OnChainBtcPubkey } from \"../../eth/types\";\nimport type { JsonRpcClient } from \"../json-rpc-client\";\n\nimport { AUTH_GATED_METHODS, GRPC_AUTH_GATED_METHODS } from \"./gatedMethods\";\nimport { VpTokenProvider } from \"./tokenProvider\";\n\nexport interface VpTokenRegistryInput {\n  client: JsonRpcClient;\n  peginTxid: string;\n  authAnchorHex: string;\n  pinnedServerPubkey: OnChainBtcPubkey;\n  /**\n   * Opt into gRPC-subject auth for {@link GRPC_AUTH_GATED_METHODS}\n   * (currently the artifact stream). Defaults to `false`: those methods\n   * fall back into the JSON-RPC-subject set and authenticate via\n   * `auth_createDepositorToken`, matching a proxy that runs with\n   * `ENABLE_GRPC_ARTIFACTS` off. Set `true` only against a proxy that\n   * serves `auth_createDepositorTokenGrpc`.\n   */\n  enableGrpcArtifactAuth?: boolean;\n}\n\ninterface RegistryEntry {\n  provider: VpTokenProvider;\n  authAnchorHex: string;\n  pinnedServerPubkey: OnChainBtcPubkey;\n  /** Resolved (defaulted) gRPC-auth gating the provider was built with. */\n  enableGrpcArtifactAuth: boolean;\n}\n\nexport class VpTokenRegistry {\n  private readonly entries = new Map<string, RegistryEntry>();\n\n  /**\n   * Return the cached `VpTokenProvider` for `peginTxid` if one exists\n   * with matching `authAnchorHex`, `pinnedServerPubkey`, and\n   * `enableGrpcArtifactAuth`, otherwise construct and cache a fresh\n   * provider. A mismatch on any of those throws — silent overwrite would\n   * mask derivation drift, VP pubkey rotation, or a caller that disagrees\n   * on the auth subject (which the cached provider can't switch).\n   */\n  getOrCreate(input: VpTokenRegistryInput): VpTokenProvider {\n    // gRPC-subject auth is opt-in. When off (default), the gRPC-gated\n    // methods are folded into the JSON-RPC-subject set so they keep\n    // minting their bearer via `auth_createDepositorToken` — the\n    // pre-PR-#1789 behaviour, and the only path a proxy without\n    // `ENABLE_GRPC_ARTIFACTS` accepts. Resolved once here so the cache-hit\n    // mismatch check and the miss-path construction agree on the default.\n    const useGrpcAuth = input.enableGrpcArtifactAuth ?? false;\n\n    const existing = this.entries.get(input.peginTxid);\n    if (existing) {\n      if (existing.authAnchorHex !== input.authAnchorHex) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `VpTokenRegistry: peginTxid ${input.peginTxid} already bound to authAnchorHex ${existing.authAnchorHex.slice(0, 8)}…; got ${input.authAnchorHex.slice(0, 8)}…`,\n        );\n      }\n      if (existing.pinnedServerPubkey !== input.pinnedServerPubkey) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `VpTokenRegistry: peginTxid ${input.peginTxid} already bound to pinnedServerPubkey ${existing.pinnedServerPubkey.slice(0, 8)}…; got ${input.pinnedServerPubkey.slice(0, 8)}…`,\n        );\n      }\n      // The provider's gated-method sets are fixed at construction, so a\n      // later caller asking for a different subject can't be honoured by\n      // the cached instance. Fail loudly rather than silently serve the\n      // wrong-subject token (a Subject-mismatch rejection at the VP).\n      if (existing.enableGrpcArtifactAuth !== useGrpcAuth) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `VpTokenRegistry: peginTxid ${input.peginTxid} already bound to enableGrpcArtifactAuth=${existing.enableGrpcArtifactAuth}; got ${useGrpcAuth}`,\n        );\n      }\n      // Refresh the inner transport on every reuse so a VP URL\n      // change between calls doesn't leave the cached provider\n      // pinned to a dead URL for token refresh.\n      existing.provider.setClient(input.client);\n      return existing.provider;\n    }\n\n    const provider = new VpTokenProvider({\n      client: input.client,\n      peginTxid: input.peginTxid,\n      authAnchorHex: input.authAnchorHex,\n      pinnedServerPubkey: input.pinnedServerPubkey,\n      authGatedMethods: useGrpcAuth\n        ? AUTH_GATED_METHODS\n        : new Set([...AUTH_GATED_METHODS, ...GRPC_AUTH_GATED_METHODS]),\n      grpcGatedMethods: useGrpcAuth ? GRPC_AUTH_GATED_METHODS : new Set(),\n    });\n    this.entries.set(input.peginTxid, {\n      provider,\n      authAnchorHex: input.authAnchorHex,\n      pinnedServerPubkey: input.pinnedServerPubkey,\n      enableGrpcArtifactAuth: useGrpcAuth,\n    });\n    return provider;\n  }\n\n  /** Return the cached provider, or `undefined` if none. */\n  peek(peginTxid: string): VpTokenProvider | undefined {\n    return this.entries.get(peginTxid)?.provider;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Evict the entry for `peginTxid`. Idempotent. Called on terminal\n   * paths — activation success, user-cancel, or component unmount —\n   * so `authAnchorHex` doesn't outlive the deposit session.\n   */\n  release(peginTxid: string): void {\n    this.entries.delete(peginTxid);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Wipe every cached entry. Test-only escape hatch — not exposed on\n   * the public {@link VpTokenRegistryPublic} singleton type.\n   *\n   * @internal\n   */\n  clear(): void {\n    this.entries.clear();\n  }\n\n  get size(): number {\n    return this.entries.size;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Public surface of the singleton — excludes the test-only `clear`\n * method.\n */\nexport interface VpTokenRegistryPublic {\n  getOrCreate(input: VpTokenRegistryInput): VpTokenProvider;\n  peek(peginTxid: string): VpTokenProvider | undefined;\n  release(peginTxid: string): void;\n  readonly size: number;\n}\n\nexport const vpTokenRegistry: VpTokenRegistryPublic = new VpTokenRegistry();\n","/**\n * Build a {@link VaultProviderRpcClient} that auto-attaches CWT\n * bearer tokens on auth-gated methods. Caller pre-derives both the\n * `authAnchorHex` (from the wallet) and the `pinnedServerPubkey`\n * (from the on-chain registry) and hands them in — the SDK has no\n * notion of wallets here.\n *\n * @module tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/createAuthenticatedVpClient\n */\n\nimport type { OnChainBtcPubkey } from \"../../eth/types\";\nimport {\n  VaultProviderRpcClient,\n  type VaultProviderRpcClientOptions,\n} from \"../api\";\n\nimport { buildInnerTokenClient } from \"./innerTokenClient\";\nimport { vpTokenRegistry } from \"./tokenRegistry\";\n\nexport interface AuthenticatedVpClientConfig {\n  /** Base URL of the VP RPC endpoint (already proxied if applicable). */\n  baseUrl: string;\n  /** Per-vault depositor-signed PegIn tx id (registry cache key). */\n  peginTxid: string;\n  /** Already-derived 32-byte auth-anchor preimage (64-char hex, no `0x`). */\n  authAnchorHex: string;\n  /** On-chain VP pubkey, branded so it can only come from the registry reader. */\n  pinnedServerPubkey: OnChainBtcPubkey;\n  /**\n   * Opt into gRPC-subject auth for the artifact stream. Defaults to\n   * `false` (JSON-RPC bearer). Only enable against a proxy running with\n   * `ENABLE_GRPC_ARTIFACTS`. Forwarded to {@link vpTokenRegistry}.\n   */\n  enableGrpcArtifactAuth?: boolean;\n  /** Optional outer-client tunables (timeout, retries, headers, etc.). */\n  options?: VaultProviderRpcClientOptions;\n}\n\nexport function createAuthenticatedVpClient(\n  config: AuthenticatedVpClientConfig,\n): VaultProviderRpcClient {\n  const innerTokenClient = buildInnerTokenClient(\n    config.baseUrl,\n    config.options?.headers,\n  );\n\n  const tokenProvider = vpTokenRegistry.getOrCreate({\n    client: innerTokenClient,\n    peginTxid: config.peginTxid,\n    authAnchorHex: config.authAnchorHex,\n    pinnedServerPubkey: config.pinnedServerPubkey,\n    enableGrpcArtifactAuth: config.enableGrpcArtifactAuth,\n  });\n\n  return new VaultProviderRpcClient(config.baseUrl, {\n    ...config.options,\n    tokenProvider,\n  });\n}\n","/**\n * Pre-populate {@link vpTokenRegistry} when the caller already has\n * both the auth-anchor preimage and the on-chain VP pubkey. Seeds\n * the cache for a `peginTxid` so a later `createAuthenticatedVpClient`\n * call reuses the cached `VpTokenProvider` instead of rebuilding it.\n *\n * @module tbv/core/clients/vault-provider/auth/primeVpAuth\n */\n\nimport type { OnChainBtcPubkey } from \"../../eth/types\";\n\nimport { buildInnerTokenClient } from \"./innerTokenClient\";\nimport { vpTokenRegistry } from \"./tokenRegistry\";\n\nexport interface PrimeVpAuthInput {\n  baseUrl: string;\n  peginTxid: string;\n  authAnchorHex: string;\n  pinnedServerPubkey: OnChainBtcPubkey;\n  /** Optional headers forwarded to the inner token client (e.g. gateway auth). */\n  headers?: Record<string, string>;\n  /**\n   * Opt into gRPC-subject auth for the artifact stream. Defaults to\n   * `false`. 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package/dist/verifyScriptPathSchnorrSignature-D43cncKJ.cjs

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-"use strict";const m=require("@babylonlabs-io/babylon-tbv-rust-wasm"),I=require("./fundPeginTransaction-DuMwnytD.cjs"),l=require("buffer"),w=require("bitcoinjs-lib"),c=require("./bitcoin-CHfKAhcI.cjs"),z=require("@bitcoin-js/tiny-secp256k1-asmjs");function Y(e){const t=Object.create(null,{[Symbol.toStringTag]:{value:"Module"}});if(e){for(const r in e)if(r!=="default"){const n=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(e,r);Object.defineProperty(t,r,n.get?n:{enumerable:!0,get:()=>e[r]})}}return t.default=e,Object.freeze(t)}const D=Y(z);async function G(e,t){const r=t.pegInAmounts.length;if(e.htlcValues.length!==r)throw new Error(`WASM Pre-PegIn returned ${e.htlcValues.length} HTLC value(s), expected ${r} (one per requested deposit).`);if(e.peginAmounts.length!==r||e.htlcScriptPubKeys.length!==r||e.htlcAddresses.length!==r)throw new Error(`WASM Pre-PegIn returned mismatched array lengths (htlcValues=${e.htlcValues.length}, peginAmounts=${e.peginAmounts.length}, htlcScriptPubKeys=${e.htlcScriptPubKeys.length}, htlcAddresses=${e.htlcAddresses.length}); expected ${r} each.`);if(e.depositorClaimValue<=0n)throw new Error(`WASM Pre-PegIn returned non-positive depositorClaimValue ${e.depositorClaimValue}; expected > 0.`);const n=await m.computeMinClaimValue(t.numLocalChallengers,t.universalChallengerPubkeys.length,t.councilQuorum,t.councilSize,t.feeRate);if(e.depositorClaimValue!==n)throw new Error(`WASM Pre-PegIn depositorClaimValue ${e.depositorClaimValue} does not match the independently computed minimum claim value ${n} (numLocalChallengers=${t.numLocalChallengers}, numUniversalChallengers=${t.universalChallengerPubkeys.length}, councilQuorum=${t.councilQuorum}, councilSize=${t.councilSize}, feeRate=${t.feeRate}).`);const o=t.minPeginFeeRate*I.MAX_REASONABLE_PEGIN_VBYTES;for(let i=0;i<r;i++){const u=t.pegInAmounts[i],s=e.peginAmounts[i],a=e.htlcValues[i];if(s!==u)throw new Error(`WASM Pre-PegIn peginAmount[${i}] ${s} does not match the requested amount ${u}; refusing to build a tx whose recorded amount differs from the depositor's request.`);if(s<=0n)throw new Error(`WASM Pre-PegIn peginAmount[${i}] is non-positive (${s}); expected > 0.`);if(a<=0n)throw new Error(`WASM Pre-PegIn htlcValue[${i}] is non-positive (${a}); expected > 0.`);const h=a-s-e.depositorClaimValue;if(h<=0n)throw new Error(`WASM Pre-PegIn htlcValue[${i}] ${a} does not strictly cover peginAmount ${s} + depositorClaimValue ${e.depositorClaimValue} + a PegIn fee (implied fee ${h}).`);if(h>o)throw new Error(`WASM Pre-PegIn implied PegIn fee for HTLC[${i}] (${h} sat) exceeds the plausibility cap ${o} sat (minPeginFeeRate=${t.minPeginFeeRate} × ${I.MAX_REASONABLE_PEGIN_VBYTES} vbytes); htlcValue ${a} appears grossly inflated.`)}}function Q(e,t,r){if(e.length<t.length)throw new Error(`Encoded Pre-PegIn tx has ${e.length} output(s), fewer than the ${t.length} HTLC output(s) the cross-check validated.`);for(let n=0;n<t.length;n++){const o=BigInt(e[n].value);if(o!==t[n])throw new Error(`Encoded Pre-PegIn HTLC output[${n}] value ${o} does not match the cross-checked htlcValue ${t[n]}; the funded/signed tx would not pay the validated amount.`);const i=e[n].script.toString("hex").toLowerCase(),u=r[n].toLowerCase();if(i!==u)throw new Error(`Encoded Pre-PegIn HTLC output[${n}] scriptPubKey ${i} does not match the cross-checked htlcScriptPubKey ${u}.`)}}const B=64,Z=/^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/;async function j(e){const t=H(e.authAnchorHash),r=await m.createPrePeginTransaction({depositorPubkey:e.depositorPubkey,vaultProviderPubkey:e.vaultProviderPubkey,vaultKeeperPubkeys:e.vaultKeeperPubkeys,universalChallengerPubkeys:e.universalChallengerPubkeys,hashlocks:[...e.hashlocks],timelockRefund:e.timelockRefund,pegInAmounts:[...e.pegInAmounts],feeRate:e.feeRate,minPeginFeeRate:e.minPeginFeeRate,numLocalChallengers:e.numLocalChallengers,councilQuorum:e.councilQuorum,councilSize:e.councilSize,network:e.network,authAnchorHash:t});await G(r,e);const n=I.parseUnfundedWasmTransaction(r.txHex);Q(n.outputs,r.htlcValues,r.htlcScriptPubKeys);const o=n.outputs.reduce((u,s)=>u+BigInt(s.value),0n),i=t!==void 0?r.htlcValues.length:null;return{psbtHex:r.txHex,totalOutputValue:o,htlcValues:r.htlcValues,htlcScriptPubKeys:r.htlcScriptPubKeys,htlcAddresses:r.htlcAddresses,peginAmounts:r.peginAmounts,depositorClaimValue:r.depositorClaimValue,authAnchorVout:i}}function H(e){if(e===void 0)return;const t=e.startsWith("0x")||e.startsWith("0X")?e.slice(2):e;if(t.length!==B||!Z.test(t))throw new Error(`authAnchorHash must be 32-byte hex (${B} chars, no 0x prefix); got length ${t.length}`);return t.toLowerCase()}async function J(e){const t=await m.buildPeginTxFromPrePegin({depositorPubkey:e.prePeginParams.depositorPubkey,vaultProviderPubkey:e.prePeginParams.vaultProviderPubkey,vaultKeeperPubkeys:e.prePeginParams.vaultKeeperPubkeys,universalChallengerPubkeys:e.prePeginParams.universalChallengerPubkeys,hashlocks:[...e.prePeginParams.hashlocks],timelockRefund:e.prePeginParams.timelockRefund,pegInAmounts:[...e.prePeginParams.pegInAmounts],feeRate:e.prePeginParams.feeRate,minPeginFeeRate:e.prePeginParams.minPeginFeeRate,numLocalChallengers:e.prePeginParams.numLocalChallengers,councilQuorum:e.prePeginParams.councilQuorum,councilSize:e.prePeginParams.councilSize,network:e.prePeginParams.network,authAnchorHash:H(e.prePeginParams.authAnchorHash)},e.timelockPegin,e.fundedPrePeginTxHex,e.htlcVout);return{txHex:t.txHex,txid:t.txid,vaultScriptPubKey:t.vaultScriptPubKey,vaultValue:t.vaultValue}}async function W(e){const t=await m.createPayoutConnector({depositor:e.depositor,vaultProvider:e.vaultProvider,vaultKeepers:e.vaultKeepers,universalChallengers:e.universalChallengers,timelockPegin:e.timelockPegin},e.network);return{payoutScript:t.payoutScript,taprootScriptHash:t.taprootScriptHash,scriptPubKey:t.scriptPubKey,address:t.address,payoutControlBlock:t.payoutControlBlock}}const ee=2,A=0,_=0,V=546,te=3,R=2,k=1e4,L=3,N=10,q=100;async function re(e){const t=c.stripHexPrefix(e.payoutTxHex),r=c.stripHexPrefix(e.peginTxHex),n=c.stripHexPrefix(e.assertTxHex),o=await W({depositor:e.depositorBtcPubkey,vaultProvider:e.vaultProviderBtcPubkey,vaultKeepers:e.vaultKeeperBtcPubkeys,universalChallengers:e.universalChallengerBtcPubkeys,timelockPegin:e.timelockPegin,network:e.network}),i=c.hexToUint8Array(o.payoutScript),u=c.hexToUint8Array(o.payoutControlBlock),s=w.Transaction.fromHex(t),a=w.Transaction.fromHex(r),h=w.Transaction.fromHex(n),f=new w.Psbt;if(f.setVersion(s.version),f.setLocktime(s.locktime),s.ins.length!==2)throw new Error(`Payout transaction must have exactly 2 inputs, got ${s.ins.length}`);const P=s.ins[0],x=s.ins[1],d=c.uint8ArrayToHex(new Uint8Array(P.hash).slice().reverse()),y=a.getId();if(d!==y||P.index!==A)throw new Error(`Input 0 must spend PegIn:${A}. Expected ${y}:${A}, got ${d}:${P.index}`);const $=c.uint8ArrayToHex(new Uint8Array(x.hash).slice().reverse()),p=h.getId();if($!==p||x.index!==_)throw new Error(`Input 1 must spend Assert:${_}. Expected ${p}:${_}, got ${$}:${x.index}`);const g=a.outs[P.index];if(!g)throw new Error(`Previous output not found for input 0 (txid: ${d}, index: ${P.index})`);const v=h.outs[x.index];if(!v)throw new Error(`Previous output not found for input 1 (txid: ${$}, index: ${x.index})`);ne({payoutTx:s,peginValueSats:g.value,claimerBtcPubkey:e.claimerBtcPubkey,vaultProviderBtcPubkey:e.vaultProviderBtcPubkey,depositorBtcPubkey:e.depositorBtcPubkey,vaultKeeperBtcPubkeys:e.vaultKeeperBtcPubkeys,registeredPayoutScriptPubKey:e.registeredPayoutScriptPubKey,commissionBps:e.commissionBps});const E=g.value+v.value;let b=0;for(const T of s.outs)b+=T.value;if(b>E)throw new Error(`Payout outputs (${b} sats) exceed inputs (${E} sats); invalid transaction.`);const O=E-b,U=Math.floor(E*N/q);if(O>U)throw new Error(`Payout implicit fee ${O} sats exceeds the safety cap of ${U} sats (${N}/${q} of inputs=${E}); refusing to sign payout.`);f.addInput({hash:P.hash,index:P.index,sequence:P.sequence,witnessUtxo:{script:g.script,value:g.value},tapLeafScript:[{leafVersion:c.TAPSCRIPT_LEAF_VERSION,script:l.Buffer.from(i),controlBlock:l.Buffer.from(u)}],tapInternalKey:l.Buffer.from(m.tapInternalPubkey)}),f.addInput({hash:x.hash,index:x.index,sequence:x.sequence,witnessUtxo:{script:v.script,value:v.value}});for(const T of s.outs)f.addOutput({script:T.script,value:T.value});return{psbtHex:f.toHex()}}function ne(e){const{payoutTx:t,peginValueSats:r,claimerBtcPubkey:n,vaultProviderBtcPubkey:o,depositorBtcPubkey:i,vaultKeeperBtcPubkeys:u,registeredPayoutScriptPubKey:s,commissionBps:a}=e;if(!c.isValidHex(s))throw new Error("Invalid registeredPayoutScriptPubKey: not valid hex");const h=c.stripHexPrefix(n).toLowerCase(),f=c.stripHexPrefix(o).toLowerCase(),P=c.stripHexPrefix(i).toLowerCase(),x=u.map(v=>c.stripHexPrefix(v).toLowerCase());let d,y,$;if(h===f)d="vp-claimer",y=te,$=c.stripHexPrefix(s);else if(h===P)d="depositor-as-claimer",y=R,$=c.stripHexPrefix(s);else if(x.includes(h))d="vk-claimer",y=R,$=c.stripHexPrefix(c.deriveBip86ScriptPubKeyHex(h));else throw new Error(`Unknown claimer pubkey ${h}: not VP, depositor, or a registered vault keeper`);if(t.outs.length!==y)throw new Error(`Payout transaction has ${t.outs.length} output(s), expected exactly ${y} for role ${d}.`);const p=l.Buffer.from($,"hex");if(!t.outs[0].script.equals(p))throw new Error(`Payout transaction output 0 does not pay the expected scriptPubKey for role ${d}`);const g=y-1;if(t.outs[g].value!==V)throw new Error(`Payout CPFP anchor (out ${g}) value ${t.outs[g].value} sats must equal ${V} sats`);if(d==="vp-claimer"){if(!Number.isInteger(a)||a<0||a>=k)throw new Error(`commissionBps must be an integer in [0, ${k}), got ${a}`);const v=Math.floor(r*a/k);if(t.outs[1].value>v)throw new Error(`Payout VP commission (out 1) value ${t.outs[1].value} sats exceeds cap ${v} sats (${a} bps of peginValue=${r})`)}}function oe(e,t,r=0){const n=w.Psbt.fromHex(e);if(r>=n.data.inputs.length)throw new Error(`Input index ${r} out of range (${n.data.inputs.length} inputs)`);const o=n.data.inputs[r];if(o.tapScriptSig&&o.tapScriptSig.length>0){const i=c.hexToUint8Array(t);for(const u of o.tapScriptSig)if(u.pubkey.equals(l.Buffer.from(i)))return M(u.signature,r);throw new Error(`No signature found for depositor pubkey: ${t} at input ${r}`)}if(o.finalScriptWitness&&o.finalScriptWitness.length>0){const i=ie(o.finalScriptWitness);if(i.length!==L)throw new Error(`Unexpected finalized witness stack size at input ${r}: expected ${L} items (signature, script, controlBlock), got ${i.length}`);return M(i[0],r)}throw new Error(`No tapScriptSig or finalScriptWitness found in signed PSBT at input ${r}`)}function M(e,t){if(e.length===64)return c.uint8ArrayToHex(new Uint8Array(e));throw e.length===65?new Error(`Unexpected sighash byte 0x${e[64].toString(16).padStart(2,"0")} at input ${t}. Expected implicit SIGHASH_DEFAULT as a 64-byte signature.`):new Error(`Unexpected signature length at input ${t}: ${e.length}`)}function ie(e){const t=[];let r=0;const n=u=>{if(r+u>e.length)throw new Error(`Malformed witness data: need ${u} byte(s) at offset ${r}, only ${e.length-r} remaining`)},o=()=>{n(1);const u=e[r++];if(u<253)return u;if(u===253){n(2);const s=(e[r]|e[r+1]<<8)>>>0;return r+=2,s}if(u===254){n(4);const s=(e[r]|e[r+1]<<8|e[r+2]<<16|e[r+3]<<24)>>>0;return r+=4,s}throw new Error(`Malformed witness data: 8-byte varint (0xff) not supported at offset ${r-1}`)},i=o();for(let u=0;u<i;u++){const s=o();n(s),t.push(l.Buffer.from(e.subarray(r,r+s))),r+=s}if(r!==e.length)throw new Error(`Malformed witness data: ${e.length-r} trailing byte(s) after parsing ${i} item(s)`);return t}class S extends Error{constructor(t){super(`Wallet returned a PSBT for a different transaction: ${t}`),this.name="PsbtSubstitutionError"}}function K(e,t){try{return w.Psbt.fromHex(t)}catch(r){const n=r instanceof Error?r.message:String(r);throw new Error(`Failed to parse ${e} PSBT: ${n}`)}}const se=8;function C(e){return`${e.toString("hex").slice(0,se)}…`}function F(e){const t=l.Buffer.from(e).reverse();return C(t)}function ue(e){const t=K("requested",e.requestedPsbtHex),r=K("returned",e.returnedPsbtHex);if(t.version!==r.version)throw new S(`tx version differs (requested=${t.version}, returned=${r.version})`);if(t.locktime!==r.locktime)throw new S(`tx locktime differs (requested=${t.locktime}, returned=${r.locktime})`);if(t.txInputs.length!==r.txInputs.length)throw new S(`input count differs (requested=${t.txInputs.length}, returned=${r.txInputs.length})`);if(t.txOutputs.length!==r.txOutputs.length)throw new S(`output count differs (requested=${t.txOutputs.length}, returned=${r.txOutputs.length})`);for(let n=0;n<t.txInputs.length;n++){const o=t.txInputs[n],i=r.txInputs[n];if(!o.hash.equals(i.hash))throw new S(`input ${n} prevout txid differs (requested=${F(o.hash)}, returned=${F(i.hash)})`);if(o.index!==i.index)throw new S(`input ${n} prevout vout differs (requested=${o.index}, returned=${i.index})`);if(o.sequence!==i.sequence)throw new S(`input ${n} sequence differs (requested=${o.sequence}, returned=${i.sequence})`)}for(let n=0;n<t.txOutputs.length;n++){const o=t.txOutputs[n],i=r.txOutputs[n];if(!o.script.equals(i.script))throw new S(`output ${n} scriptPubKey differs (requested=${C(o.script)}, returned=${C(i.script)})`);if(o.value!==i.value)throw new S(`output ${n} value differs (requested=${o.value}, returned=${i.value})`)}}const X=253,ce=254,ae=65535,le=4294967295;function he(e){if(e<X)return l.Buffer.from([e]);if(e<=ae){const t=l.Buffer.alloc(2);return t.writeUInt16LE(e),l.Buffer.concat([l.Buffer.from([X]),t])}if(e<=le){const t=l.Buffer.alloc(4);return t.writeUInt32LE(e),l.Buffer.concat([l.Buffer.from([ce]),t])}throw new Error(`Script too large to encode as CompactSize: ${e} bytes`)}const de="TapLeaf";function pe(e,t){const r=l.Buffer.concat([l.Buffer.from([e]),he(t.length),l.Buffer.from(t)]);return w.crypto.taggedHash(de,r)}function fe(e){const{requestedPsbtHex:t,signatureHex:r,signerXOnlyPubkeyHex:n,inputIndex:o}=e,i=c.stripHexPrefix(r);if(i.length!==c.SCHNORR_SIG_HEX_LEN)throw new Error(`Schnorr signature for input ${o} must be ${c.SCHNORR_SIG_HEX_LEN} hex chars (64 bytes), got ${i.length}.`);const u=c.stripHexPrefix(n);if(u.length!==c.X_ONLY_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN)throw new Error(`Signer x-only pubkey for input ${o} must be ${c.X_ONLY_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN} hex chars (32 bytes), got ${u.length}.`);const s=w.Psbt.fromHex(t);if(o<0||o>=s.data.inputs.length)throw new Error(`Input index ${o} out of range (${s.data.inputs.length} inputs).`);const a=[],h=[];for(let p=0;p<s.data.inputs.length;p++){const g=s.data.inputs[p].witnessUtxo;if(!g)throw new Error(`Cannot verify signature: input ${p} of the requested PSBT has no witnessUtxo (required to recompute the Taproot sighash).`);a.push(g.script),h.push(g.value)}const f=s.data.inputs[o].tapLeafScript;if(!f||f.length!==1)throw new Error(`Cannot verify signature: input ${o} of the requested PSBT must have exactly one tapLeafScript, got ${(f==null?void 0:f.length)??0}.`);const P=f[0];if(P.leafVersion!==c.TAPSCRIPT_LEAF_VERSION)throw new Error(`Cannot verify signature: input ${o} tapLeafScript has leaf version 0x${P.leafVersion.toString(16)}, expected 0x${c.TAPSCRIPT_LEAF_VERSION.toString(16)}.`);const x=pe(P.leafVersion,P.script),d=new w.Transaction;d.version=s.version,d.locktime=s.locktime;for(const p of s.txInputs)d.addInput(p.hash,p.index,p.sequence);for(const p of s.txOutputs)d.addOutput(p.script,p.value);const y=d.hashForWitnessV1(o,a,h,w.Transaction.SIGHASH_DEFAULT,x);if(!D.verifySchnorr(y,c.hexToUint8Array(u),c.hexToUint8Array(i)))throw new Error(`Schnorr signature for input ${o} (signer ${u}) does not verify against the expected Taproot script-path sighash. The wallet may have signed with the tweaked key, signed a different transaction, or returned an invalid signature.`)}exports.ASSERT_PAYOUT_OUTPUT_INDEX=_;exports.DEPOSITOR_PAYOUT_INPUT_COUNT=ee;exports.PEGIN_VAULT_OUTPUT_INDEX=A;exports.PsbtSubstitutionError=S;exports.assertPsbtUnsignedTxMatches=ue;exports.assertScriptPathSchnorrSignature=fe;exports.buildPayoutPsbt=re;exports.buildPeginTxFromFundedPrePegin=J;exports.buildPrePeginPsbt=j;exports.createPayoutScript=W;exports.extractPayoutSignature=oe;exports.normalizeAuthAnchorHash=H;
-//# sourceMappingURL=verifyScriptPathSchnorrSignature-D43cncKJ.cjs.map

package/dist/verifyScriptPathSchnorrSignature-D43cncKJ.cjs.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"verifyScriptPathSchnorrSignature-D43cncKJ.cjs","sources":["../src/tbv/core/primitives/psbt/assertWasmPeginSizing.ts","../src/tbv/core/primitives/psbt/pegin.ts","../src/tbv/core/primitives/scripts/payout.ts","../src/tbv/core/primitives/psbt/constants.ts","../src/tbv/core/primitives/psbt/payout.ts","../src/tbv/core/primitives/psbt/assertPsbtUnsignedTxMatches.ts","../src/tbv/core/primitives/psbt/verifyScriptPathSchnorrSignature.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Cross-check the values WASM returns from `createPrePeginTransaction`\n * against independently-known expectations before they feed a signed\n * Bitcoin transaction or the on-chain PegIn registration.\n *\n * CLAUDE.md critical path #1: the Rust/WASM layer computes\n * `htlcValue = peginAmount + depositorClaimValue + minPeginFee` internally\n * and JS receives the outputs with no runtime validation. A doctored or\n * buggy binary that returns a different `peginAmount`, an out-of-formula\n * `htlcValue`, or a wrong `depositorClaimValue` would otherwise be committed\n * verbatim — taxing the depositor or starving the downstream tx graph of fees.\n *\n * @module primitives/psbt/assertWasmPeginSizing\n */\n\nimport {\n  computeMinClaimValue,\n  type PrePeginResult,\n} from \"@babylonlabs-io/babylon-tbv-rust-wasm\";\n\nimport { MAX_REASONABLE_PEGIN_VBYTES } from \"../../utils/fee/constants\";\nimport type { ParsedOutput } from \"../../utils/transaction/fundPeginTransaction\";\n\nimport type { PrePeginParams } from \"./pegin\";\n\n/**\n * Assert the WASM Pre-PegIn sizing result is internally consistent and\n * matches what the caller requested.\n *\n * The strong checks are pure-JS and fully independent of the WASM binary:\n * the per-HTLC `peginAmount` must equal the requested amount, array lengths\n * must match, and every value must be positive. The implied PegIn fee\n * (`htlcValue - peginAmount - depositorClaimValue`) is bounded by\n * plausibility rather than recomputed exactly, because JS↔Rust vbyte parity\n * is not a cross-stack guarantee (see {@link MAX_REASONABLE_PEGIN_VBYTES}).\n * The `depositorClaimValue` cross-check against `computeMinClaimValue` is a\n * WASM-vs-WASM consistency check (a different entry point), not an\n * independent one.\n *\n * @param result - The result returned by `createPrePeginTransaction`.\n * @param params - The parameters that were passed to build it.\n * @throws If any value is missing, non-positive, mismatched against the\n *   request, or outside the protocol formula / plausibility bounds.\n */\nexport async function assertWasmPeginSizing(\n  result: PrePeginResult,\n  params: PrePeginParams,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const expectedCount = params.pegInAmounts.length;\n\n  // Count: every parallel array must carry exactly one entry per requested\n  // deposit, otherwise the per-HTLC indexing downstream is meaningless.\n  if (result.htlcValues.length !== expectedCount) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `WASM Pre-PegIn returned ${result.htlcValues.length} HTLC value(s), ` +\n        `expected ${expectedCount} (one per requested deposit).`,\n    );\n  }\n  if (\n    result.peginAmounts.length !== expectedCount ||\n    result.htlcScriptPubKeys.length !== expectedCount ||\n    result.htlcAddresses.length !== expectedCount\n  ) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `WASM Pre-PegIn returned mismatched array lengths ` +\n        `(htlcValues=${result.htlcValues.length}, ` +\n        `peginAmounts=${result.peginAmounts.length}, ` +\n        `htlcScriptPubKeys=${result.htlcScriptPubKeys.length}, ` +\n        `htlcAddresses=${result.htlcAddresses.length}); ` +\n        `expected ${expectedCount} each.`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  // depositorClaimValue: positivity + WASM-vs-WASM consistency. Sized by the\n  // tx-graph `feeRate` (see PrePeginParams.feeRate), so the standalone\n  // `computeMinClaimValue` must reproduce the constructor's internal value.\n  if (result.depositorClaimValue <= 0n) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `WASM Pre-PegIn returned non-positive depositorClaimValue ` +\n        `${result.depositorClaimValue}; expected > 0.`,\n    );\n  }\n  const expectedClaimValue = await computeMinClaimValue(\n    params.numLocalChallengers,\n    params.universalChallengerPubkeys.length,\n    params.councilQuorum,\n    params.councilSize,\n    params.feeRate,\n  );\n  if (result.depositorClaimValue !== expectedClaimValue) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `WASM Pre-PegIn depositorClaimValue ${result.depositorClaimValue} does ` +\n        `not match the independently computed minimum claim value ` +\n        `${expectedClaimValue} (numLocalChallengers=${params.numLocalChallengers}, ` +\n        `numUniversalChallengers=${params.universalChallengerPubkeys.length}, ` +\n        `councilQuorum=${params.councilQuorum}, councilSize=${params.councilSize}, ` +\n        `feeRate=${params.feeRate}).`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const maxImpliedFee = params.minPeginFeeRate * MAX_REASONABLE_PEGIN_VBYTES;\n\n  for (let i = 0; i < expectedCount; i++) {\n    const requested = params.pegInAmounts[i];\n    const peginAmount = result.peginAmounts[i];\n    const htlcValue = result.htlcValues[i];\n\n    // Amount echo (strongest, fully independent): the recorded pegin amount\n    // must equal exactly what the caller requested. A mismatch is the\n    // WASM-tax attack — the contract would record a doctored amount while the\n    // depositor's wallet funds the original, and the difference is a\n    // WASM-controlled tax.\n    if (peginAmount !== requested) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `WASM Pre-PegIn peginAmount[${i}] ${peginAmount} does not match the ` +\n          `requested amount ${requested}; refusing to build a tx whose ` +\n          `recorded amount differs from the depositor's request.`,\n      );\n    }\n    if (peginAmount <= 0n) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `WASM Pre-PegIn peginAmount[${i}] is non-positive (${peginAmount}); ` +\n          `expected > 0.`,\n      );\n    }\n    if (htlcValue <= 0n) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `WASM Pre-PegIn htlcValue[${i}] is non-positive (${htlcValue}); ` +\n          `expected > 0.`,\n      );\n    }\n\n    // Formula: htlcValue = peginAmount + depositorClaimValue + minPeginFee.\n    // The implied fee must be strictly positive (the HTLC must reserve a real\n    // PegIn fee) and within the plausibility bound.\n    const impliedFee = htlcValue - peginAmount - result.depositorClaimValue;\n    if (impliedFee <= 0n) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `WASM Pre-PegIn htlcValue[${i}] ${htlcValue} does not strictly cover ` +\n          `peginAmount ${peginAmount} + depositorClaimValue ` +\n          `${result.depositorClaimValue} + a PegIn fee (implied fee ` +\n          `${impliedFee}).`,\n      );\n    }\n    if (impliedFee > maxImpliedFee) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `WASM Pre-PegIn implied PegIn fee for HTLC[${i}] (${impliedFee} sat) ` +\n          `exceeds the plausibility cap ${maxImpliedFee} sat ` +\n          `(minPeginFeeRate=${params.minPeginFeeRate} × ` +\n          `${MAX_REASONABLE_PEGIN_VBYTES} vbytes); htlcValue ${htlcValue} ` +\n          `appears grossly inflated.`,\n      );\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Bind the validated metadata to the bytes that actually get funded and\n * signed.\n *\n * `assertWasmPeginSizing` proves the WASM *metadata* (`htlcValues`,\n * `htlcScriptPubKeys`) matches the request and the protocol formula — but the\n * transaction the depositor funds and signs is `result.txHex`. If the encoded\n * tx carried a different HTLC output value or script than the metadata, the\n * depositor would fund a transaction whose real outputs differ from the values\n * that were cross-checked. This closes that final link: the encoded HTLC\n * outputs must equal the validated metadata.\n *\n * The WASM lays out HTLC outputs first (vouts `0..N-1`), then the optional\n * auth-anchor OP_RETURN, then the CPFP anchor — so we only compare the first\n * `htlcValues.length` outputs.\n *\n * @param outputs - Outputs parsed from the unfunded Pre-PegIn tx hex.\n * @param htlcValues - The (already value-validated) per-HTLC values.\n * @param htlcScriptPubKeys - The per-HTLC scriptPubKeys (hex).\n * @throws If the encoded outputs are too few, or any HTLC output's value or\n *   scriptPubKey disagrees with the validated metadata.\n */\nexport function assertEncodedHtlcOutputsMatch(\n  outputs: readonly ParsedOutput[],\n  htlcValues: readonly bigint[],\n  htlcScriptPubKeys: readonly string[],\n): void {\n  if (outputs.length < htlcValues.length) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Encoded Pre-PegIn tx has ${outputs.length} output(s), fewer than the ` +\n        `${htlcValues.length} HTLC output(s) the cross-check validated.`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  for (let i = 0; i < htlcValues.length; i++) {\n    const encodedValue = BigInt(outputs[i].value);\n    if (encodedValue !== htlcValues[i]) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `Encoded Pre-PegIn HTLC output[${i}] value ${encodedValue} does not ` +\n          `match the cross-checked htlcValue ${htlcValues[i]}; the funded/signed ` +\n          `tx would not pay the validated amount.`,\n      );\n    }\n\n    const encodedScript = outputs[i].script.toString(\"hex\").toLowerCase();\n    const expectedScript = htlcScriptPubKeys[i].toLowerCase();\n    if (encodedScript !== expectedScript) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `Encoded Pre-PegIn HTLC output[${i}] scriptPubKey ${encodedScript} does ` +\n          `not match the cross-checked htlcScriptPubKey ${expectedScript}.`,\n      );\n    }\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Pre-PegIn PSBT Builder Primitive\n *\n * This module provides pure functions for building unfunded Pre-PegIn transactions\n * and deriving PegIn transactions from them, using the WASM implementation from\n * @babylonlabs-io/babylon-tbv-rust-wasm.\n *\n * Pre-PegIn Flow:\n * 1. buildPrePeginPsbt()     — creates unfunded Pre-PegIn tx (HTLC output)\n * 2. [caller funds Pre-PegIn tx and computes txid]\n * 3. buildPeginTxFromFundedPrePegin() — derives PegIn tx spending the HTLC\n * 4. buildPeginInputPsbt()   — PSBT for depositor to sign PegIn HTLC leaf 0 input\n *\n * @module primitives/psbt/pegin\n */\n\nimport {\n  buildPeginTxFromPrePegin,\n  createPrePeginTransaction,\n  type Network,\n} from \"@babylonlabs-io/babylon-tbv-rust-wasm\";\n\nimport { parseUnfundedWasmTransaction } from \"../../utils/transaction/fundPeginTransaction\";\n\nimport {\n  assertEncodedHtlcOutputsMatch,\n  assertWasmPeginSizing,\n} from \"./assertWasmPeginSizing\";\n\n/**\n * Parameters for building an unfunded Pre-PegIn PSBT\n */\nexport interface PrePeginParams {\n  /** Depositor's BTC public key (x-only, 64-char hex without 0x prefix) */\n  depositorPubkey: string;\n  /** Vault provider's BTC public key (x-only, 64-char hex) */\n  vaultProviderPubkey: string;\n  /** Array of vault keeper BTC public keys (x-only, 64-char hex) */\n  vaultKeeperPubkeys: string[];\n  /** Array of universal challenger BTC public keys (x-only, 64-char hex) */\n  universalChallengerPubkeys: string[];\n  /** SHA256 hash commitment(s) (64 hex chars = 32 bytes each) */\n  hashlocks: readonly string[];\n  /** CSV timelock in blocks for the HTLC refund path */\n  timelockRefund: number;\n  /** Amounts to peg in (satoshis), one per deposit */\n  pegInAmounts: readonly bigint[];\n  /** TX-graph fee rate in sat/vB from contract offchain params; sizes the depositor claim value */\n  feeRate: bigint;\n  /** Minimum PegIn fee rate in sat/vB from contract offchain params; sizes the PegIn tx fee */\n  minPeginFeeRate: bigint;\n  /** Number of local challengers (from contract params) */\n  numLocalChallengers: number;\n  /** M in M-of-N council multisig (from contract params) */\n  councilQuorum: number;\n  /** N in M-of-N council multisig (from contract params) */\n  councilSize: number;\n  /** Bitcoin network */\n  network: Network;\n  /**\n   * Optional 32-byte `SHA256(auth_anchor)` commitment (64-char hex, no\n   * `0x` prefix). If provided, the Pre-PegIn tx will include an\n   * `OP_RETURN <PUSH32 authAnchorHash>` output at vout =\n   * `hashlocks.length`, binding the depositor's bearer-token\n   * `auth_anchor` preimage to this Pre-PegIn.\n   */\n  authAnchorHash?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Byte length of an `auth_anchor_hash` commitment when encoded as a\n * lowercase hex string (32 bytes → 64 hex chars).\n */\nconst AUTH_ANCHOR_HASH_HEX_LEN = 64;\n\nconst HEX_PATTERN = /^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/;\n\n/**\n * Result of building an unfunded Pre-PegIn transaction\n */\nexport interface PrePeginPsbtResult {\n  /**\n   * Unfunded transaction hex (no inputs, HTLC outputs + optional\n   * auth-anchor OP_RETURN + CPFP anchor).\n   *\n   * The caller is responsible for:\n   * - Selecting UTXOs covering totalOutputValue + network fees\n   * - Funding the transaction (add inputs and change output)\n   * - Calling buildPeginTxFromFundedPrePegin() with the funded tx hex\n   */\n  psbtHex: string;\n  /** Sum of all unfunded outputs — use this for UTXO selection */\n  totalOutputValue: bigint;\n  /** HTLC output values in satoshis, one per deposit (each includes peginAmount + depositorClaimValue + minPeginFee) */\n  htlcValues: readonly bigint[];\n  /** HTLC output scriptPubKeys (hex encoded), one per deposit */\n  htlcScriptPubKeys: readonly string[];\n  /** HTLC Taproot addresses, one per deposit */\n  htlcAddresses: readonly string[];\n  /** Pegin amounts in satoshis, one per deposit */\n  peginAmounts: readonly bigint[];\n  /** Depositor claim value computed by WASM from contract parameters */\n  depositorClaimValue: bigint;\n  /**\n   * Vout index of the auth-anchor `OP_RETURN` output if one was\n   * included (i.e. `authAnchorHash` was provided), or `null` if not.\n   * Always equals `htlcValues.length` when present.\n   */\n  authAnchorVout: number | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Parameters for building the PegIn transaction from a funded Pre-PegIn tx\n */\nexport interface BuildPeginTxParams {\n  /** Same PrePeginParams used to create the Pre-PegIn transaction */\n  prePeginParams: PrePeginParams;\n  /** CSV timelock in blocks for the PegIn vault output */\n  timelockPegin: number;\n  /** Hex-encoded funded Pre-PegIn transaction */\n  fundedPrePeginTxHex: string;\n  /** Index of the HTLC output to spend */\n  htlcVout: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of building the PegIn transaction\n */\nexport interface PeginTxResult {\n  /** PegIn transaction hex (1 input spending HTLC, 1 vault output) */\n  txHex: string;\n  /** PegIn transaction ID */\n  txid: string;\n  /** Vault output scriptPubKey (hex encoded) */\n  vaultScriptPubKey: string;\n  /** Vault output value in satoshis */\n  vaultValue: bigint;\n}\n\n/**\n * Build unfunded Pre-PegIn transaction using WASM.\n *\n * Creates a Bitcoin transaction template with no inputs, an HTLC output, and a\n * CPFP anchor output. The HTLC value is computed internally from the contract\n * parameters — the caller does not need to compute depositorClaimValue separately.\n *\n * @param params - Pre-PegIn parameters\n * @returns Unfunded Pre-PegIn transaction details with HTLC output information\n * @throws If WASM initialization fails or parameters are invalid\n */\nexport async function buildPrePeginPsbt(\n  params: PrePeginParams,\n): Promise<PrePeginPsbtResult> {\n  const authAnchorHash = normalizeAuthAnchorHash(params.authAnchorHash);\n\n  const result = await createPrePeginTransaction({\n    depositorPubkey: params.depositorPubkey,\n    vaultProviderPubkey: params.vaultProviderPubkey,\n    vaultKeeperPubkeys: params.vaultKeeperPubkeys,\n    universalChallengerPubkeys: params.universalChallengerPubkeys,\n    hashlocks: [...params.hashlocks],\n    timelockRefund: params.timelockRefund,\n    pegInAmounts: [...params.pegInAmounts],\n    feeRate: params.feeRate,\n    minPeginFeeRate: params.minPeginFeeRate,\n    numLocalChallengers: params.numLocalChallengers,\n    councilQuorum: params.councilQuorum,\n    councilSize: params.councilSize,\n    network: params.network,\n    authAnchorHash,\n  });\n\n  // CLAUDE.md critical path #1: the WASM outputs reach JS with no runtime\n  // validation. Cross-check every value-bearing field against the request\n  // and the protocol formula before it can feed a signed tx or the on-chain\n  // PegIn registration. Both the sizing and commit passes route through here.\n  await assertWasmPeginSizing(result, params);\n\n  // Parse the unfunded tx to sum all output values\n  // (HTLCs + optional OP_RETURN + CPFP anchor). This is the amount\n  // UTXOs must cover before adding network fees.\n  const parsed = parseUnfundedWasmTransaction(result.txHex);\n\n  // Bind the validated metadata to the bytes that get funded and signed:\n  // the encoded HTLC outputs must carry exactly the values/scripts the\n  // cross-check above validated. Otherwise a tx whose real outputs differ\n  // from the checked metadata could still be funded and signed.\n  assertEncodedHtlcOutputsMatch(\n    parsed.outputs,\n    result.htlcValues,\n    result.htlcScriptPubKeys,\n  );\n\n  const totalOutputValue = parsed.outputs.reduce(\n    (sum, o) => sum + BigInt(o.value),\n    0n,\n  );\n\n  // The WASM places the OP_RETURN commitment immediately after the\n  // HTLC outputs when authAnchorHash is provided.\n  const authAnchorVout =\n    authAnchorHash !== undefined ? result.htlcValues.length : null;\n\n  return {\n    psbtHex: result.txHex,\n    totalOutputValue,\n    htlcValues: result.htlcValues,\n    htlcScriptPubKeys: result.htlcScriptPubKeys,\n    htlcAddresses: result.htlcAddresses,\n    peginAmounts: result.peginAmounts,\n    depositorClaimValue: result.depositorClaimValue,\n    authAnchorVout,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate and normalize an `authAnchorHash` hex string before passing\n * it to the WASM boundary. WASM expects exactly 64 lowercase hex chars.\n */\nexport function normalizeAuthAnchorHash(\n  value: string | undefined,\n): string | undefined {\n  if (value === undefined) return undefined;\n  const cleaned =\n    value.startsWith(\"0x\") || value.startsWith(\"0X\") ? value.slice(2) : value;\n  if (\n    cleaned.length !== AUTH_ANCHOR_HASH_HEX_LEN ||\n    !HEX_PATTERN.test(cleaned)\n  ) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `authAnchorHash must be 32-byte hex (${AUTH_ANCHOR_HASH_HEX_LEN} chars, no 0x prefix); got length ${cleaned.length}`,\n    );\n  }\n  return cleaned.toLowerCase();\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the PegIn transaction from a funded Pre-PegIn transaction.\n *\n * The PegIn transaction spends the Pre-PegIn HTLC output at htlcVout via the\n * hashlock + all-party script (leaf 0).\n *\n * @param params - Build parameters including Pre-PegIn params and funded tx hex\n * @returns PegIn transaction details\n * @throws If WASM initialization fails or parameters are invalid\n */\nexport async function buildPeginTxFromFundedPrePegin(\n  params: BuildPeginTxParams,\n): Promise<PeginTxResult> {\n  // WASM reconstructs the Pre-PegIn template from these params to\n  // decode the funded tx. Must pass `authAnchorHash` (normalized\n  // identically to buildPrePeginPsbt) so the reconstruction matches\n  // the original outputs, including the OP_RETURN at vout =\n  // hashlocks.length.\n  const result = await buildPeginTxFromPrePegin(\n    {\n      depositorPubkey: params.prePeginParams.depositorPubkey,\n      vaultProviderPubkey: params.prePeginParams.vaultProviderPubkey,\n      vaultKeeperPubkeys: params.prePeginParams.vaultKeeperPubkeys,\n      universalChallengerPubkeys:\n        params.prePeginParams.universalChallengerPubkeys,\n      hashlocks: [...params.prePeginParams.hashlocks],\n      timelockRefund: params.prePeginParams.timelockRefund,\n      pegInAmounts: [...params.prePeginParams.pegInAmounts],\n      feeRate: params.prePeginParams.feeRate,\n      minPeginFeeRate: params.prePeginParams.minPeginFeeRate,\n      numLocalChallengers: params.prePeginParams.numLocalChallengers,\n      councilQuorum: params.prePeginParams.councilQuorum,\n      councilSize: params.prePeginParams.councilSize,\n      network: params.prePeginParams.network,\n      authAnchorHash: normalizeAuthAnchorHash(\n        params.prePeginParams.authAnchorHash,\n      ),\n    },\n    params.timelockPegin,\n    params.fundedPrePeginTxHex,\n    params.htlcVout,\n  );\n\n  return {\n    txHex: result.txHex,\n    txid: result.txid,\n    vaultScriptPubKey: result.vaultScriptPubKey,\n    vaultValue: result.vaultValue,\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Payout Script Generator Primitive\n *\n * This module provides pure functions for generating payout scripts and taproot information\n * by wrapping the WASM implementation from @babylonlabs-io/babylon-tbv-rust-wasm.\n *\n * The payout script is used for signing payout transactions in the vault system.\n * It defines the spending conditions for the vault output, enabling the depositor\n * to authorize payouts during the peg-in flow (Step 3).\n *\n * @remarks\n * This is a low-level primitive. For most use cases, prefer using {@link buildPayoutPsbt}\n * which handles script creation internally. For high-level wallet orchestration, use\n * PayoutManager from the managers module.\n *\n * @see {@link buildPayoutPsbt} - Higher-level function that uses this internally\n *\n * @module primitives/scripts/payout\n */\n\nimport {\n  createPayoutConnector,\n  type Network,\n} from \"@babylonlabs-io/babylon-tbv-rust-wasm\";\n\n/**\n * Parameters for creating a payout script.\n *\n * These parameters define the participants in a vault and are used to generate\n * the taproot script that controls how funds can be spent from the vault.\n */\nexport interface PayoutScriptParams {\n  /**\n   * Depositor's BTC public key (x-only, 64-char hex without 0x prefix).\n   *\n   * This is the user depositing BTC into the vault. The depositor must sign\n   * payout transactions to authorize fund distribution.\n   */\n  depositor: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Vault provider's BTC public key (x-only, 64-char hex without 0x prefix).\n   *\n   * The service provider managing vault operations. Also referred to as\n   * \"claimer\" in the WASM layer.\n   */\n  vaultProvider: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Array of vault keeper BTC public keys (x-only, 64-char hex without 0x prefix).\n   *\n   * Vault keepers participate in vault operations and script spending conditions.\n   */\n  vaultKeepers: string[];\n\n  /**\n   * Array of universal challenger BTC public keys (x-only, 64-char hex without 0x prefix).\n   *\n   * These parties can challenge the vault under certain conditions.\n   */\n  universalChallengers: string[];\n\n  /**\n   * CSV timelock in blocks for the PegIn output.\n   */\n  timelockPegin: number;\n\n  /**\n   * Bitcoin network for script generation.\n   *\n   * Must match the network used for all other vault operations to ensure\n   * address encoding compatibility.\n   */\n  network: Network;\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of creating a payout script.\n *\n * Contains all the taproot-related data needed for constructing and signing\n * payout transactions from the vault.\n */\nexport interface PayoutScriptResult {\n  /**\n   * The payout script hex used in taproot script path spending.\n   *\n   * This is the raw script bytes that define the spending conditions,\n   * encoded as a hexadecimal string. Used when constructing the\n   * tapLeafScript for PSBT signing.\n   */\n  payoutScript: string;\n\n  /**\n   * The taproot script hash (leaf hash) for the payout script.\n   *\n   * This is the tagged hash of the script used in taproot tree construction.\n   * Required for computing the control block during script path spending.\n   */\n  taprootScriptHash: string;\n\n  /**\n   * The full scriptPubKey for the vault output address.\n   *\n   * This is the complete output script (OP_1 <32-byte-key>) that should be\n   * used when creating the vault output in a peg-in transaction.\n   */\n  scriptPubKey: string;\n\n  /**\n   * The vault Bitcoin address derived from the script.\n   *\n   * A human-readable bech32m address (bc1p... for mainnet, tb1p... for testnet/signet)\n   * that can be used to receive funds into the vault.\n   */\n  address: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Serialized control block for Taproot script path spend (hex encoded).\n   *\n   * Computed by the Rust WASM PeginPayoutConnector. Used directly in\n   * tapLeafScript when building payout PSBTs.\n   */\n  payoutControlBlock: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Create payout script and taproot information using WASM.\n *\n * This is a pure function that wraps the Rust WASM implementation.\n * The payout connector generates the necessary taproot scripts and information\n * required for signing payout transactions.\n *\n * @remarks\n * The generated script encodes spending conditions that require signatures from\n * the depositor and vault provider (or liquidators in challenge scenarios).\n * This script is used internally by {@link buildPayoutPsbt}.\n *\n * @param params - Payout script parameters defining vault participants and network\n * @returns Payout script and taproot information for PSBT construction\n *\n * @see {@link buildPayoutPsbt} - Use this for building complete payout PSBTs\n */\nexport async function createPayoutScript(\n  params: PayoutScriptParams,\n): Promise<PayoutScriptResult> {\n  // Call the WASM wrapper with the correct parameter structure\n  const connector = await createPayoutConnector(\n    {\n      depositor: params.depositor,\n      vaultProvider: params.vaultProvider,\n      vaultKeepers: params.vaultKeepers,\n      universalChallengers: params.universalChallengers,\n      timelockPegin: params.timelockPegin,\n    },\n    params.network,\n  );\n\n  return {\n    payoutScript: connector.payoutScript,\n    taprootScriptHash: connector.taprootScriptHash,\n    scriptPubKey: connector.scriptPubKey,\n    address: connector.address,\n    payoutControlBlock: connector.payoutControlBlock,\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Protocol invariants for depositor graph transactions.\n *\n * These indices and counts encode the on-chain vault protocol layout\n * (which output of PegIn/Assert each child transaction spends, and how\n * many inputs each transaction has). Consumed by the PSBT builders and\n * the depositor graph signing service; a drift between copies of these\n * values would silently change validation behaviour.\n *\n * @module primitives/psbt/constants\n * @see btc-vault crates/vault/docs/btc-transactions-spec.md\n */\n\n/**\n * Depositor Payout transaction input count.\n * Input 0: PegIn:0 (signed). Input 1: Assert:0 (in sighash, not signed).\n */\nexport const DEPOSITOR_PAYOUT_INPUT_COUNT = 2;\n\n/** PegIn vault output index spent by the depositor's Payout input 0. */\nexport const PEGIN_VAULT_OUTPUT_INDEX = 0;\n\n/** Assert output index spent by the depositor's Payout input 1 (NOT signed). */\nexport const ASSERT_PAYOUT_OUTPUT_INDEX = 0;\n\n/**\n * Dust amount (sats) for the payout CPFP anchor output. Matches `DUST_AMOUNT`\n * in `btc-vault crates/vault/src/lib.rs`.\n */\nexport const PAYOUT_ANCHOR_DUST_SATS = 546;\n\n/** VP-claimer payout output count: [depositor payout, VP commission, CPFP anchor]. */\nexport const VP_CLAIMER_PAYOUT_OUTPUT_COUNT = 3;\n\n/** Depositor/VK-claimer payout output count: [claimer payout, CPFP anchor]. */\nexport const NON_VP_CLAIMER_PAYOUT_OUTPUT_COUNT = 2;\n\n/**\n * Exclusive upper bound on VP commission (bps), and the bps denominator for\n * `floor(peginValue * bps / 10_000)`. Matches `BTCVaultRegistry._validateCommission`\n * (`commissionBps >= 10000` reverts). The minimum is version-locked\n * (`minVpCommissionBps`) and enforced upstream, not here.\n */\nexport const MAX_VP_COMMISSION_BPS_EXCLUSIVE = 10_000;\n","/**\n * Payout PSBT Builder Primitives\n *\n * This module provides pure functions for building unsigned payout PSBTs and extracting\n * Schnorr signatures from signed PSBTs. It uses WASM-generated scripts from the payout\n * connector and bitcoinjs-lib for PSBT construction.\n *\n * The Payout transaction references the Assert transaction (input 1).\n *\n * @module primitives/psbt/payout\n */\n\nimport {\n  type Network,\n  tapInternalPubkey,\n} from \"@babylonlabs-io/babylon-tbv-rust-wasm\";\nimport { Buffer } from \"buffer\";\nimport { Psbt, Transaction } from \"bitcoinjs-lib\";\nimport { createPayoutScript } from \"../scripts/payout\";\nimport {\n  TAPSCRIPT_LEAF_VERSION,\n  deriveBip86ScriptPubKeyHex,\n  hexToUint8Array,\n  isValidHex,\n  stripHexPrefix,\n  uint8ArrayToHex,\n} from \"../utils/bitcoin\";\nimport {\n  ASSERT_PAYOUT_OUTPUT_INDEX,\n  MAX_VP_COMMISSION_BPS_EXCLUSIVE,\n  NON_VP_CLAIMER_PAYOUT_OUTPUT_COUNT,\n  PAYOUT_ANCHOR_DUST_SATS,\n  PEGIN_VAULT_OUTPUT_INDEX,\n  VP_CLAIMER_PAYOUT_OUTPUT_COUNT,\n} from \"./constants\";\n\n/**\n * Number of items in a Taproot script-path spend witness stack for a\n * single-signature script: [signature, script, controlBlock].\n *\n * The current payout script requires exactly one depositor signature. If the\n * protocol evolves to require multiple signatures in the payout script, this\n * invariant and the finalized-PSBT extraction path must be revisited because\n * the first witness item would no longer necessarily be the depositor's.\n */\nconst TAPROOT_SINGLE_SIG_WITNESS_STACK_SIZE = 3;\n\n/**\n * Coarse cap on a payout tx's implicit fee (inputs − outputs), as a fraction\n * of input value — blocks a VP deflating outputs and burning the remainder\n * as miner fee. A backstop only; the per-role structural checks in\n * {@link assertPayoutOutputLayout} are the primary value-diversion guard.\n */\nconst MAX_PAYOUT_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR = 10;\nconst MAX_PAYOUT_FEE_FRACTION_DENOMINATOR = 100;\n\n/**\n * Parameters for building an unsigned Payout PSBT\n *\n * Payout is used in the challenge path after Assert, when the claimer proves validity.\n * Input 1 references the Assert transaction.\n */\nexport interface PayoutParams {\n  /**\n   * Payout transaction hex (unsigned)\n   * This is the transaction that needs to be signed by the depositor\n   */\n  payoutTxHex: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Assert transaction hex\n   * Payout input 1 references Assert output 0\n   */\n  assertTxHex: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Peg-in transaction hex\n   * This transaction created the vault output that we're spending\n   */\n  peginTxHex: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Depositor's BTC public key (x-only, 64-char hex without 0x prefix)\n   */\n  depositorBtcPubkey: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Vault provider's BTC public key (x-only, 64-char hex)\n   */\n  vaultProviderBtcPubkey: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Vault keeper BTC public keys (x-only, 64-char hex)\n   */\n  vaultKeeperBtcPubkeys: string[];\n\n  /**\n   * Universal challenger BTC public keys (x-only, 64-char hex)\n   */\n  universalChallengerBtcPubkeys: string[];\n\n  /**\n   * CSV timelock in blocks for the PegIn output.\n   */\n  timelockPegin: number;\n\n  /**\n   * Bitcoin network\n   */\n  network: Network;\n\n  /**\n   * Claimer's x-only BTC public key (64-char hex, no prefix). Drives role\n   * inference (VP / depositor-as-claimer / VK-claimer) inside `buildPayoutPsbt`.\n   */\n  claimerBtcPubkey: string;\n\n  /**\n   * On-chain registered depositor payout scriptPubKey (hex, 0x optional).\n   * Expected outs[0].script for VP- and depositor-claimer roles; unused for\n   * VK-claimer (its outs[0].script is derived from `claimerBtcPubkey`).\n   */\n  registeredPayoutScriptPubKey: string;\n\n  /**\n   * VP commission in basis points (`BTCVaultRegistry.vaultProviderCommissionBps`).\n   * Caps the VP-claimer outs[1].value. The protocol minimum is enforced\n   * upstream; here only `0 <= bps < 10_000` is checked, for safe cap math.\n   */\n  commissionBps: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of building an unsigned payout PSBT\n */\nexport interface PayoutPsbtResult {\n  /**\n   * Unsigned PSBT hex ready for signing\n   */\n  psbtHex: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Build unsigned Payout PSBT for depositor to sign.\n *\n * Payout is used in the **challenge path** when the claimer proves validity:\n * 1. Vault provider submits Claim transaction\n * 2. Challenge is raised during challenge period\n * 3. Claimer submits Assert transaction to prove validity\n * 4. Payout can be executed (references Assert tx)\n *\n * Payout transactions have the following structure:\n * - Input 0: from PeginTx output0 (signed by depositor)\n * - Input 1: from Assert output0 (NOT signed by depositor)\n *\n * @param params - Payout parameters\n * @returns Unsigned PSBT ready for depositor to sign\n *\n * @throws If payout transaction does not have exactly 2 inputs\n * @throws If input 0 does not spend PegIn:0 (vault UTXO)\n * @throws If input 1 does not spend Assert:0 (proof output)\n * @throws If previous output is not found for either input\n * @throws If sum of output values exceeds sum of input values (invalid tx)\n * @throws If implicit fee (inputs − outputs) exceeds the configured fraction\n *   of total input value — see {@link MAX_PAYOUT_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR}\n * @throws If `claimerBtcPubkey` is not VP, depositor, or a registered VK\n * @throws If payout output count, outs[0] script, outs[last] anchor value, or\n *   (VP-claimer) outs[1] commission cap do not match the protocol layout\n * @throws If `commissionBps` is not a non-negative integer below 10_000\n */\nexport async function buildPayoutPsbt(\n  params: PayoutParams,\n): Promise<PayoutPsbtResult> {\n  // Normalize hex inputs (strip 0x prefix if present)\n  const payoutTxHex = stripHexPrefix(params.payoutTxHex);\n  const peginTxHex = stripHexPrefix(params.peginTxHex);\n  const assertTxHex = stripHexPrefix(params.assertTxHex);\n\n  // Get payout script from WASM\n  const payoutConnector = await createPayoutScript({\n    depositor: params.depositorBtcPubkey,\n    vaultProvider: params.vaultProviderBtcPubkey,\n    vaultKeepers: params.vaultKeeperBtcPubkeys,\n    universalChallengers: params.universalChallengerBtcPubkeys,\n    timelockPegin: params.timelockPegin,\n    network: params.network,\n  });\n\n  const payoutScriptBytes = hexToUint8Array(payoutConnector.payoutScript);\n  const controlBlock = hexToUint8Array(payoutConnector.payoutControlBlock);\n\n  // Parse transactions\n  const payoutTx = Transaction.fromHex(payoutTxHex);\n  const peginTx = Transaction.fromHex(peginTxHex);\n  const assertTx = Transaction.fromHex(assertTxHex);\n\n  // Create PSBT\n  const psbt = new Psbt();\n  psbt.setVersion(payoutTx.version);\n  psbt.setLocktime(payoutTx.locktime);\n\n  // PayoutTx has exactly 2 inputs:\n  // - Input 0: from PeginTx output0 (signed by depositor using taproot script path)\n  // - Input 1: from Assert output0 (signed by claimer/challengers, not depositor)\n  //\n  // IMPORTANT: For Taproot SIGHASH_DEFAULT (0x00), the sighash commits to ALL inputs'\n  // prevouts, not just the one being signed. Therefore, we must include BOTH inputs\n  // in the PSBT so the wallet computes the correct sighash that the VP expects.\n\n  // Verify payout transaction has expected structure\n  if (payoutTx.ins.length !== 2) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Payout transaction must have exactly 2 inputs, got ${payoutTx.ins.length}`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const input0 = payoutTx.ins[0];\n  const input1 = payoutTx.ins[1];\n\n  // Verify input 0 spends PegIn:0 (the vault UTXO).\n  // Both txid AND vout must match the protocol contract — the vout is the\n  // input-side anchor that prevents a malicious VP from binding the\n  // depositor's signature to a different output of the same parent.\n  const input0Txid = uint8ArrayToHex(\n    new Uint8Array(input0.hash).slice().reverse(),\n  );\n  const peginTxid = peginTx.getId();\n\n  if (input0Txid !== peginTxid || input0.index !== PEGIN_VAULT_OUTPUT_INDEX) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Input 0 must spend PegIn:${PEGIN_VAULT_OUTPUT_INDEX}. ` +\n        `Expected ${peginTxid}:${PEGIN_VAULT_OUTPUT_INDEX}, got ${input0Txid}:${input0.index}`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Verify input 1 spends Assert:0 (the proof output).\n  const input1Txid = uint8ArrayToHex(\n    new Uint8Array(input1.hash).slice().reverse(),\n  );\n  const assertTxid = assertTx.getId();\n\n  if (input1Txid !== assertTxid || input1.index !== ASSERT_PAYOUT_OUTPUT_INDEX) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Input 1 must spend Assert:${ASSERT_PAYOUT_OUTPUT_INDEX}. ` +\n        `Expected ${assertTxid}:${ASSERT_PAYOUT_OUTPUT_INDEX}, got ${input1Txid}:${input1.index}`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const peginPrevOut = peginTx.outs[input0.index];\n  if (!peginPrevOut) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Previous output not found for input 0 (txid: ${input0Txid}, index: ${input0.index})`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const input1PrevOut = assertTx.outs[input1.index];\n  if (!input1PrevOut) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Previous output not found for input 1 (txid: ${input1Txid}, index: ${input1.index})`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Per-role output validation — blocks an extra attacker output or value\n  // routed into a non-payout slot.\n  assertPayoutOutputLayout({\n    payoutTx,\n    peginValueSats: peginPrevOut.value,\n    claimerBtcPubkey: params.claimerBtcPubkey,\n    vaultProviderBtcPubkey: params.vaultProviderBtcPubkey,\n    depositorBtcPubkey: params.depositorBtcPubkey,\n    vaultKeeperBtcPubkeys: params.vaultKeeperBtcPubkeys,\n    registeredPayoutScriptPubKey: params.registeredPayoutScriptPubKey,\n    commissionBps: params.commissionBps,\n  });\n\n  // Bound the implicit fee — blocks a VP deflating output values and burning\n  // the difference as miner fee.\n  const inputValueSats = peginPrevOut.value + input1PrevOut.value;\n  let outputValueSats = 0;\n  for (const out of payoutTx.outs) outputValueSats += out.value;\n  if (outputValueSats > inputValueSats) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Payout outputs (${outputValueSats} sats) exceed inputs ` +\n        `(${inputValueSats} sats); invalid transaction.`,\n    );\n  }\n  const implicitFeeSats = inputValueSats - outputValueSats;\n  const maxFeeSats = Math.floor(\n    (inputValueSats * MAX_PAYOUT_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR) /\n      MAX_PAYOUT_FEE_FRACTION_DENOMINATOR,\n  );\n  if (implicitFeeSats > maxFeeSats) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Payout implicit fee ${implicitFeeSats} sats exceeds the safety cap ` +\n        `of ${maxFeeSats} sats ` +\n        `(${MAX_PAYOUT_FEE_FRACTION_NUMERATOR}/${MAX_PAYOUT_FEE_FRACTION_DENOMINATOR} ` +\n        `of inputs=${inputValueSats}); refusing to sign payout.`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Input 0: Depositor signs using Taproot script path spend\n  // This input includes tapLeafScript for signing\n  psbt.addInput({\n    hash: input0.hash,\n    index: input0.index,\n    sequence: input0.sequence,\n    witnessUtxo: {\n      script: peginPrevOut.script,\n      value: peginPrevOut.value,\n    },\n    tapLeafScript: [\n      {\n        leafVersion: TAPSCRIPT_LEAF_VERSION,\n        script: Buffer.from(payoutScriptBytes),\n        controlBlock: Buffer.from(controlBlock),\n      },\n    ],\n    tapInternalKey: Buffer.from(tapInternalPubkey),\n    // sighashType omitted - defaults to SIGHASH_DEFAULT (0x00) for Taproot\n  });\n\n  // Input 1: From Assert transaction (NOT signed by depositor)\n  // We include this with witnessUtxo so the sighash is computed correctly,\n  // but we do NOT include tapLeafScript since the depositor doesn't sign it.\n  psbt.addInput({\n    hash: input1.hash,\n    index: input1.index,\n    sequence: input1.sequence,\n    witnessUtxo: {\n      script: input1PrevOut.script,\n      value: input1PrevOut.value,\n    },\n    // No tapLeafScript - depositor doesn't sign this input\n  });\n\n  // Add outputs\n  for (const output of payoutTx.outs) {\n    psbt.addOutput({\n      script: output.script,\n      value: output.value,\n    });\n  }\n\n  return {\n    psbtHex: psbt.toHex(),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate a payout transaction's output structure for the claimer's role,\n * keyed on `claimerBtcPubkey`. Pins per role: `outs.length`, `outs[0].script`,\n * `outs[last].value` (anchor dust), and (VP-claimer) `outs[1].value` capped at\n * `floor(peginValue × commissionBps / 10_000)`. Canonical layouts: VP-claimer\n * = [payout, commission, anchor]; depositor/VK-claimer = [payout, anchor].\n *\n * `outs[1].script` and `outs[last].script` are intentionally not pinned: the\n * value pins above bound depositor exposure regardless of where those outputs\n * are sent, so the value pins — not script pins — are load-bearing.\n *\n * @internal Helper invoked by {@link buildPayoutPsbt}.\n */\nfunction assertPayoutOutputLayout(args: {\n  payoutTx: Transaction;\n  peginValueSats: number;\n  claimerBtcPubkey: string;\n  vaultProviderBtcPubkey: string;\n  depositorBtcPubkey: string;\n  vaultKeeperBtcPubkeys: string[];\n  registeredPayoutScriptPubKey: string;\n  commissionBps: number;\n}): void {\n  const {\n    payoutTx,\n    peginValueSats,\n    claimerBtcPubkey,\n    vaultProviderBtcPubkey,\n    depositorBtcPubkey,\n    vaultKeeperBtcPubkeys,\n    registeredPayoutScriptPubKey,\n    commissionBps,\n  } = args;\n\n  if (!isValidHex(registeredPayoutScriptPubKey)) {\n    throw new Error(\"Invalid registeredPayoutScriptPubKey: not valid hex\");\n  }\n\n  const claimer = stripHexPrefix(claimerBtcPubkey).toLowerCase();\n  const vp = stripHexPrefix(vaultProviderBtcPubkey).toLowerCase();\n  const dep = stripHexPrefix(depositorBtcPubkey).toLowerCase();\n  const keepers = vaultKeeperBtcPubkeys.map((k) =>\n    stripHexPrefix(k).toLowerCase(),\n  );\n\n  type Role = \"vp-claimer\" | \"depositor-as-claimer\" | \"vk-claimer\";\n  let role: Role;\n  let expectedOutCount: number;\n  let expectedOut0ScriptHex: string;\n\n  if (claimer === vp) {\n    role = \"vp-claimer\";\n    expectedOutCount = VP_CLAIMER_PAYOUT_OUTPUT_COUNT;\n    expectedOut0ScriptHex = stripHexPrefix(registeredPayoutScriptPubKey);\n  } else if (claimer === dep) {\n    role = \"depositor-as-claimer\";\n    expectedOutCount = NON_VP_CLAIMER_PAYOUT_OUTPUT_COUNT;\n    expectedOut0ScriptHex = stripHexPrefix(registeredPayoutScriptPubKey);\n  } else if (keepers.includes(claimer)) {\n    role = \"vk-claimer\";\n    expectedOutCount = NON_VP_CLAIMER_PAYOUT_OUTPUT_COUNT;\n    expectedOut0ScriptHex = stripHexPrefix(deriveBip86ScriptPubKeyHex(claimer));\n  } else {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Unknown claimer pubkey ${claimer}: not VP, depositor, or a registered vault keeper`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (payoutTx.outs.length !== expectedOutCount) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Payout transaction has ${payoutTx.outs.length} output(s), ` +\n        `expected exactly ${expectedOutCount} for role ${role}.`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const expectedOut0Script = Buffer.from(expectedOut0ScriptHex, \"hex\");\n  if (!payoutTx.outs[0].script.equals(expectedOut0Script)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Payout transaction output 0 does not pay the expected scriptPubKey for role ${role}`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const anchorIdx = expectedOutCount - 1;\n  if (payoutTx.outs[anchorIdx].value !== PAYOUT_ANCHOR_DUST_SATS) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Payout CPFP anchor (out ${anchorIdx}) value ${payoutTx.outs[anchorIdx].value} sats ` +\n        `must equal ${PAYOUT_ANCHOR_DUST_SATS} sats`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (role === \"vp-claimer\") {\n    // Structural guard only — a non-negative integer below the bps\n    // denominator, so the cap math `floor(peginValue * bps / 10_000)` is\n    // meaningful. The protocol minimum is enforced at the trust boundary\n    // (`prepareSigningContext`); a too-low value here is fail-safe.\n    if (\n      !Number.isInteger(commissionBps) ||\n      commissionBps < 0 ||\n      commissionBps >= MAX_VP_COMMISSION_BPS_EXCLUSIVE\n    ) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `commissionBps must be an integer in ` +\n          `[0, ${MAX_VP_COMMISSION_BPS_EXCLUSIVE}), got ${commissionBps}`,\n      );\n    }\n    const maxCommissionSats = Math.floor(\n      (peginValueSats * commissionBps) / MAX_VP_COMMISSION_BPS_EXCLUSIVE,\n    );\n    if (payoutTx.outs[1].value > maxCommissionSats) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `Payout VP commission (out 1) value ${payoutTx.outs[1].value} sats ` +\n          `exceeds cap ${maxCommissionSats} sats ` +\n          `(${commissionBps} bps of peginValue=${peginValueSats})`,\n      );\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract Schnorr signature from signed payout PSBT.\n *\n * This function supports two cases:\n * 1. Non-finalized PSBT: Extracts from tapScriptSig field\n * 2. Finalized PSBT: Extracts from witness data\n *\n * The signature is returned as a 64-byte hex string (128 hex characters).\n * Payout signatures must use implicit Taproot SIGHASH_DEFAULT, which is\n * encoded by omitting the sighash byte.\n *\n * @param signedPsbtHex - Signed PSBT hex\n * @param depositorPubkey - Depositor's public key (x-only, 64-char hex)\n * @param inputIndex - Input index to extract signature from (default: 0)\n * @returns 64-byte Schnorr signature (128 hex characters, no sighash flag)\n *\n * @throws If no signature is found in the PSBT\n * @throws If the signature has an unexpected length\n */\nexport function extractPayoutSignature(\n  signedPsbtHex: string,\n  depositorPubkey: string,\n  inputIndex = 0,\n): string {\n  const signedPsbt = Psbt.fromHex(signedPsbtHex);\n\n  if (inputIndex >= signedPsbt.data.inputs.length) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Input index ${inputIndex} out of range (${signedPsbt.data.inputs.length} inputs)`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const input = signedPsbt.data.inputs[inputIndex];\n\n  // Case 1: Non-finalized PSBT — extract from tapScriptSig\n  if (input.tapScriptSig && input.tapScriptSig.length > 0) {\n    const depositorPubkeyBytes = hexToUint8Array(depositorPubkey);\n\n    for (const sigEntry of input.tapScriptSig) {\n      if (sigEntry.pubkey.equals(Buffer.from(depositorPubkeyBytes))) {\n        return extractSchnorrSig(sigEntry.signature, inputIndex);\n      }\n    }\n\n    throw new Error(\n      `No signature found for depositor pubkey: ${depositorPubkey} at input ${inputIndex}`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Case 2: Finalized PSBT — extract from finalScriptWitness\n  // Taproot single-signature script-path witness: [signature, script, controlBlock].\n  // Enforce the exact stack size so that if a wallet produces an unexpected\n  // finalization (e.g. a multi-signature stack, an annex, or malformed data),\n  // we fail loudly instead of silently returning witnessStack[0] which may\n  // not be the depositor's signature.\n  if (input.finalScriptWitness && input.finalScriptWitness.length > 0) {\n    const witnessStack = parseWitnessStack(input.finalScriptWitness);\n    if (witnessStack.length !== TAPROOT_SINGLE_SIG_WITNESS_STACK_SIZE) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `Unexpected finalized witness stack size at input ${inputIndex}: ` +\n          `expected ${TAPROOT_SINGLE_SIG_WITNESS_STACK_SIZE} items (signature, script, controlBlock), ` +\n          `got ${witnessStack.length}`,\n      );\n    }\n    return extractSchnorrSig(witnessStack[0], inputIndex);\n  }\n\n  throw new Error(\n    `No tapScriptSig or finalScriptWitness found in signed PSBT at input ${inputIndex}`,\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract and validate a 64-byte Schnorr signature.\n * Rejects 65-byte signatures because the appended sighash byte changes the\n * Taproot message being signed; stripping it would produce an unverifiable\n * SIGHASH_DEFAULT signature.\n * @internal\n */\nfunction extractSchnorrSig(sig: Uint8Array, inputIndex: number): string {\n  if (sig.length === 64) {\n    return uint8ArrayToHex(new Uint8Array(sig));\n  }\n  if (sig.length === 65) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Unexpected sighash byte 0x${sig[64].toString(16).padStart(2, \"0\")} at input ${inputIndex}. ` +\n        \"Expected implicit SIGHASH_DEFAULT as a 64-byte signature.\",\n    );\n  }\n  throw new Error(\n    `Unexpected signature length at input ${inputIndex}: ${sig.length}`,\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse a BIP-141 serialized witness stack into individual stack items.\n * Format: [varint item_count] [varint len, data]...\n *\n * Throws on malformed input (truncated buffer, 8-byte varints, or trailing\n * bytes) so callers never receive silently-corrupted witness items.\n * @internal\n */\nfunction parseWitnessStack(witness: Buffer): Buffer[] {\n  const items: Buffer[] = [];\n  let offset = 0;\n\n  const requireBytes = (n: number): void => {\n    if (offset + n > witness.length) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `Malformed witness data: need ${n} byte(s) at offset ${offset}, only ${witness.length - offset} remaining`,\n      );\n    }\n  };\n\n  const readVarInt = (): number => {\n    requireBytes(1);\n    const first = witness[offset++];\n    if (first < 0xfd) return first;\n    if (first === 0xfd) {\n      requireBytes(2);\n      const val = (witness[offset] | (witness[offset + 1] << 8)) >>> 0;\n      offset += 2;\n      return val;\n    }\n    if (first === 0xfe) {\n      requireBytes(4);\n      const val =\n        (witness[offset] |\n          (witness[offset + 1] << 8) |\n          (witness[offset + 2] << 16) |\n          (witness[offset + 3] << 24)) >>>\n        0;\n      offset += 4;\n      return val;\n    }\n    // 0xff — 8-byte varint. Not used for witness sizes in practice and JS\n    // numbers cannot represent all 64-bit values exactly, so reject rather\n    // than risk silent truncation.\n    throw new Error(\n      `Malformed witness data: 8-byte varint (0xff) not supported at offset ${offset - 1}`,\n    );\n  };\n\n  const count = readVarInt();\n  for (let i = 0; i < count; i++) {\n    const len = readVarInt();\n    requireBytes(len);\n    items.push(Buffer.from(witness.subarray(offset, offset + len)));\n    offset += len;\n  }\n\n  if (offset !== witness.length) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Malformed witness data: ${witness.length - offset} trailing byte(s) after parsing ${count} item(s)`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  return items;\n}\n\n","/**\n * Asserts a wallet-returned PSBT encodes the same unsigned transaction\n * as the locally-built PSBT we asked the wallet to sign. Per-input PSBT\n * metadata (witnessUtxo, tapLeafScript, sighashType) is intentionally NOT\n * compared — those fields are committed to the Schnorr sighash and the\n * vault provider's `verify_depositor_signature` rejects mismatches there.\n * This primitive defends the path where a colluding VP would otherwise\n * accept a wallet-substituted signature.\n */\n\nimport { Buffer } from \"buffer\";\n\nimport { Psbt } from \"bitcoinjs-lib\";\n\n/**\n * Thrown when a wallet-returned PSBT encodes a different unsigned\n * transaction than the one the caller asked the wallet to sign.\n */\nexport class PsbtSubstitutionError extends Error {\n  constructor(detail: string) {\n    super(\n      `Wallet returned a PSBT for a different transaction: ${detail}`,\n    );\n    this.name = \"PsbtSubstitutionError\";\n  }\n}\n\nexport interface AssertPsbtUnsignedTxMatchesParams {\n  /** PSBT we built locally and asked the wallet to sign. */\n  requestedPsbtHex: string;\n  /** PSBT the wallet returned after signing. */\n  returnedPsbtHex: string;\n}\n\nfunction parsePsbt(label: \"requested\" | \"returned\", hex: string): Psbt {\n  try {\n    return Psbt.fromHex(hex);\n  } catch (cause) {\n    const reason = cause instanceof Error ? cause.message : String(cause);\n    throw new Error(`Failed to parse ${label} PSBT: ${reason}`);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Length of the hex prefix included in mismatch errors. Short enough that\n * full prevout txids and output scriptPubKeys never reach logs / error\n * trackers, long enough to disambiguate during forensic triage.\n */\nconst REDACTED_HEX_PREFIX_LEN = 8;\n\nfunction redactHex(buf: Buffer): string {\n  return `${buf.toString(\"hex\").slice(0, REDACTED_HEX_PREFIX_LEN)}…`;\n}\n\n/**\n * `bitcoinjs-lib` exposes `txInputs[i].hash` in internal little-endian form;\n * a human reading logs expects the big-endian txid an explorer would show.\n * Reverse before truncating so the surfaced prefix matches what an operator\n * can search for.\n */\nfunction redactTxid(internalHash: Buffer): string {\n  const reversed = Buffer.from(internalHash).reverse();\n  return redactHex(reversed);\n}\n\n/**\n * Compare two PSBTs and throw `PsbtSubstitutionError` unless they encode\n * the same unsigned transaction (version, locktime, inputs, outputs).\n *\n * @throws PsbtSubstitutionError on any mismatch in the unsigned tx\n * @throws Error if either PSBT cannot be parsed\n */\nexport function assertPsbtUnsignedTxMatches(\n  params: AssertPsbtUnsignedTxMatchesParams,\n): void {\n  const requested = parsePsbt(\"requested\", params.requestedPsbtHex);\n  const returned = parsePsbt(\"returned\", params.returnedPsbtHex);\n\n  if (requested.version !== returned.version) {\n    throw new PsbtSubstitutionError(\n      `tx version differs (requested=${requested.version}, returned=${returned.version})`,\n    );\n  }\n  if (requested.locktime !== returned.locktime) {\n    throw new PsbtSubstitutionError(\n      `tx locktime differs (requested=${requested.locktime}, returned=${returned.locktime})`,\n    );\n  }\n  if (requested.txInputs.length !== returned.txInputs.length) {\n    throw new PsbtSubstitutionError(\n      `input count differs (requested=${requested.txInputs.length}, returned=${returned.txInputs.length})`,\n    );\n  }\n  if (requested.txOutputs.length !== returned.txOutputs.length) {\n    throw new PsbtSubstitutionError(\n      `output count differs (requested=${requested.txOutputs.length}, returned=${returned.txOutputs.length})`,\n    );\n  }\n  for (let i = 0; i < requested.txInputs.length; i++) {\n    const r = requested.txInputs[i];\n    const s = returned.txInputs[i];\n    if (!r.hash.equals(s.hash)) {\n      throw new PsbtSubstitutionError(\n        `input ${i} prevout txid differs (requested=${redactTxid(r.hash)}, returned=${redactTxid(s.hash)})`,\n      );\n    }\n    if (r.index !== s.index) {\n      throw new PsbtSubstitutionError(\n        `input ${i} prevout vout differs (requested=${r.index}, returned=${s.index})`,\n      );\n    }\n    if (r.sequence !== s.sequence) {\n      throw new PsbtSubstitutionError(\n        `input ${i} sequence differs (requested=${r.sequence}, returned=${s.sequence})`,\n      );\n    }\n  }\n  for (let i = 0; i < requested.txOutputs.length; i++) {\n    const r = requested.txOutputs[i];\n    const s = returned.txOutputs[i];\n    if (!r.script.equals(s.script)) {\n      throw new PsbtSubstitutionError(\n        `output ${i} scriptPubKey differs (requested=${redactHex(r.script)}, returned=${redactHex(s.script)})`,\n      );\n    }\n    if (r.value !== s.value) {\n      throw new PsbtSubstitutionError(\n        `output ${i} value differs (requested=${r.value}, returned=${s.value})`,\n      );\n    }\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Independent BIP-340 verification of a wallet-returned Taproot script-path\n * Schnorr signature against an independently-recomputed sighash.\n *\n * Critical Path #7 (CLAUDE.md): the SDK requests script-path signatures with\n * `useTweakedSigner: false, autoFinalized: false`. Wallet support for the\n * untweaked-key flag is inconsistent — older OKX / mobile bridges silently sign\n * with the *tweaked* key, Keystone ignores the flag — and a compromised\n * extension can stuff a 64-byte stub into `tapScriptSig`. A bad signature that\n * the SDK forwards is only caught on broadcast; in the worst case it passes the\n * VP off-chain but Bitcoin rejects it, leaving the depositor's BTC locked in the\n * HTLC until `timelockRefund` matures. This guard rejects such signatures before\n * they are trusted.\n *\n * Why verify against the *locally-built* PSBT, not the wallet-returned one:\n * `assertPsbtUnsignedTxMatches` pins the unsigned transaction but deliberately\n * skips per-input metadata (`witnessUtxo`, `tapLeafScript`). A malicious wallet\n * could rewrite those consistently in the returned PSBT so a wrong-message\n * signature self-validates. The trusted prevout scripts/values and leaf script\n * therefore come from the PSBT we built ourselves (derived from on-chain / WASM\n * sources); only the 64-byte signature comes from the wallet.\n *\n * Reuses the exact primitives `bip322Verify.ts` already depends on — no new\n * dependency:\n *   - `@bitcoin-js/tiny-secp256k1-asmjs` → `verifySchnorr`\n *   - `bitcoinjs-lib` → `Transaction.hashForWitnessV1`, `crypto.taggedHash` (TapLeaf hash)\n *\n * @module tbv/core/primitives/psbt/verifyScriptPathSchnorrSignature\n */\n\nimport * as ecc from \"@bitcoin-js/tiny-secp256k1-asmjs\";\nimport { Psbt, Transaction, crypto as bcrypto } from \"bitcoinjs-lib\";\n\nimport { Buffer } from \"buffer\";\n\nimport {\n  SCHNORR_SIG_HEX_LEN,\n  TAPSCRIPT_LEAF_VERSION,\n  X_ONLY_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN,\n  hexToUint8Array,\n  stripHexPrefix,\n} from \"../utils/bitcoin\";\n\n// Bitcoin CompactSize (varint) prefix markers — values fixed by the protocol.\n// https://developer.bitcoin.org/reference/transactions.html#compactsize-unsigned-integers\nconst COMPACT_SIZE_UINT16_PREFIX = 0xfd; // value in [0xfd, 0xffff] → 0xfd + uint16 LE\nconst COMPACT_SIZE_UINT32_PREFIX = 0xfe; // value in [0x10000, 0xffffffff] → 0xfe + uint32 LE\nconst COMPACT_SIZE_UINT16_MAX = 0xffff;\nconst COMPACT_SIZE_UINT32_MAX = 0xffffffff;\n\n/**\n * Encode a length as a Bitcoin CompactSize (varint). Tapscript leaf scripts can\n * exceed 252 bytes (WOTS scripts), so the multi-byte forms are required, not\n * just the single-byte fast path.\n */\nfunction encodeCompactSize(n: number): Buffer {\n  if (n < COMPACT_SIZE_UINT16_PREFIX) {\n    return Buffer.from([n]);\n  }\n  if (n <= COMPACT_SIZE_UINT16_MAX) {\n    const value = Buffer.alloc(2); // uint16, little-endian\n    value.writeUInt16LE(n);\n    return Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([COMPACT_SIZE_UINT16_PREFIX]), value]);\n  }\n  if (n <= COMPACT_SIZE_UINT32_MAX) {\n    const value = Buffer.alloc(4); // uint32, little-endian\n    value.writeUInt32LE(n);\n    return Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([COMPACT_SIZE_UINT32_PREFIX]), value]);\n  }\n  throw new Error(`Script too large to encode as CompactSize: ${n} bytes`);\n}\n\n/** BIP-341 tag for the TapLeaf hash. */\nconst TAPLEAF_TAG = \"TapLeaf\";\n\n/**\n * Compute the BIP-341 TapLeaf hash for a tapscript leaf:\n * `tagged_hash(\"TapLeaf\", leaf_version || compact_size(script) || script)`.\n */\nfunction computeTapLeafHash(leafVersion: number, script: Uint8Array): Buffer {\n  const preimage = Buffer.concat([\n    Buffer.from([leafVersion]),\n    encodeCompactSize(script.length),\n    Buffer.from(script),\n  ]);\n  return bcrypto.taggedHash(TAPLEAF_TAG, preimage);\n}\n\nexport interface VerifyScriptPathSchnorrSignatureParams {\n  /**\n   * Hex of the PSBT we built locally and sent to the wallet (the trusted\n   * source of prevout scripts/values and the leaf script). NOT the\n   * wallet-returned PSBT.\n   */\n  requestedPsbtHex: string;\n  /** The 64-byte Schnorr signature extracted from the wallet's response (128 hex chars). */\n  signatureHex: string;\n  /** X-only public key (64 hex chars) the wallet signed the script-path leaf with. */\n  signerXOnlyPubkeyHex: string;\n  /** Index of the input the signature is for. */\n  inputIndex: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Assert that `signatureHex` is a valid BIP-340 Schnorr signature by the\n * `signerXOnlyPubkeyHex` key over the Taproot script-path sighash of\n * `requestedPsbtHex` input `inputIndex` (SIGHASH_DEFAULT).\n *\n * @throws If the requested PSBT is malformed, lacks the prevout/leaf data needed\n *         to recompute the sighash, or the signature does not verify.\n */\nexport function assertScriptPathSchnorrSignature(\n  params: VerifyScriptPathSchnorrSignatureParams,\n): void {\n  const { requestedPsbtHex, signatureHex, signerXOnlyPubkeyHex, inputIndex } =\n    params;\n\n  const signatureRaw = stripHexPrefix(signatureHex);\n  if (signatureRaw.length !== SCHNORR_SIG_HEX_LEN) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Schnorr signature for input ${inputIndex} must be ${SCHNORR_SIG_HEX_LEN} hex chars ` +\n        `(64 bytes), got ${signatureRaw.length}.`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const signerXOnly = stripHexPrefix(signerXOnlyPubkeyHex);\n  if (signerXOnly.length !== X_ONLY_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Signer x-only pubkey for input ${inputIndex} must be ${X_ONLY_PUBKEY_HEX_LEN} hex chars ` +\n        `(32 bytes), got ${signerXOnly.length}.`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const psbt = Psbt.fromHex(requestedPsbtHex);\n\n  if (inputIndex < 0 || inputIndex >= psbt.data.inputs.length) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Input index ${inputIndex} out of range (${psbt.data.inputs.length} inputs).`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Taproot's sighash commits to every input's prevout (script + value), so all\n  // inputs must carry a witnessUtxo. A missing one is a build error, not a\n  // value we can default — fail loudly.\n  const prevOutScripts: Buffer[] = [];\n  const values: number[] = [];\n  for (let i = 0; i < psbt.data.inputs.length; i++) {\n    const witnessUtxo = psbt.data.inputs[i].witnessUtxo;\n    if (!witnessUtxo) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `Cannot verify signature: input ${i} of the requested PSBT has no witnessUtxo ` +\n          `(required to recompute the Taproot sighash).`,\n      );\n    }\n    prevOutScripts.push(witnessUtxo.script);\n    values.push(witnessUtxo.value);\n  }\n\n  // The signed input must expose exactly one tapLeafScript — the leaf the\n  // depositor signs. Zero means we sent the wrong PSBT; more than one means an\n  // ambiguous spend path we never construct for a single-signature input.\n  const tapLeafScripts = psbt.data.inputs[inputIndex].tapLeafScript;\n  if (!tapLeafScripts || tapLeafScripts.length !== 1) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Cannot verify signature: input ${inputIndex} of the requested PSBT must have exactly ` +\n        `one tapLeafScript, got ${tapLeafScripts?.length ?? 0}.`,\n    );\n  }\n  const leaf = tapLeafScripts[0];\n  if (leaf.leafVersion !== TAPSCRIPT_LEAF_VERSION) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Cannot verify signature: input ${inputIndex} tapLeafScript has leaf version ` +\n        `0x${leaf.leafVersion.toString(16)}, expected 0x${TAPSCRIPT_LEAF_VERSION.toString(16)}.`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const leafHash = computeTapLeafHash(leaf.leafVersion, leaf.script);\n\n  // Reconstruct the unsigned transaction from the requested PSBT using only\n  // public bitcoinjs-lib API (same pattern as bip322Verify.ts), then compute the\n  // BIP-341 script-path sighash with SIGHASH_DEFAULT.\n  const tx = new Transaction();\n  tx.version = psbt.version;\n  tx.locktime = psbt.locktime;\n  for (const input of psbt.txInputs) {\n    tx.addInput(input.hash, input.index, input.sequence);\n  }\n  for (const output of psbt.txOutputs) {\n    tx.addOutput(output.script, output.value);\n  }\n\n  const sighash = tx.hashForWitnessV1(\n    inputIndex,\n    prevOutScripts,\n    values,\n    Transaction.SIGHASH_DEFAULT,\n    leafHash,\n  );\n\n  const isValid = ecc.verifySchnorr(\n    sighash,\n    hexToUint8Array(signerXOnly),\n    hexToUint8Array(signatureRaw),\n  );\n\n  if (!isValid) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Schnorr signature for input ${inputIndex} (signer ${signerXOnly}) does not verify ` +\n        `against the expected Taproot script-path sighash. The wallet may have signed with ` +\n        `the tweaked key, signed a different transaction, or returned an invalid signature.`,\n    );\n  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