@aztec/p2p 0.0.1-commit.fffb133c → 0.0.1-dev

package/src/services/peer-manager/metrics.ts

@@ -6,12 +6,13 @@ import {
   type TelemetryClient,
   type Tracer,
   type UpDownCounter,
+  createUpDownCounterWithDefault,
   getTelemetryClient,
 } from '@aztec/telemetry-client';
 
 import type { PeerId } from '@libp2p/interface';
 
-import { type GoodByeReason, prettyGoodbyeReason } from '../reqresp/protocols/index.js';
+import { GoodByeReason, prettyGoodbyeReason } from '../reqresp/protocols/index.js';
 
 export class PeerManagerMetrics {
   private sentGoodbyes: UpDownCounter;
@@ -31,10 +32,26 @@ export class PeerManagerMetrics {
     this.tracer = telemetryClient.getTracer(name);
 
     const meter = telemetryClient.getMeter(name);
-    this.sentGoodbyes = meter.createUpDownCounter(Metrics.PEER_MANAGER_GOODBYES_SENT);
-    this.receivedGoodbyes = meter.createUpDownCounter(Metrics.PEER_MANAGER_GOODBYES_RECEIVED);
+    const goodbyeReasonAttrs = {
+      [Attributes.P2P_GOODBYE_REASON]: [
+        prettyGoodbyeReason(GoodByeReason.SHUTDOWN),
+        prettyGoodbyeReason(GoodByeReason.MAX_PEERS),
+        prettyGoodbyeReason(GoodByeReason.LOW_SCORE),
+        prettyGoodbyeReason(GoodByeReason.BANNED),
+        prettyGoodbyeReason(GoodByeReason.WRONG_NETWORK),
+        prettyGoodbyeReason(GoodByeReason.UNKNOWN),
+      ],
+    };
+    this.sentGoodbyes = createUpDownCounterWithDefault(meter, Metrics.PEER_MANAGER_GOODBYES_SENT, goodbyeReasonAttrs);
+    this.receivedGoodbyes = createUpDownCounterWithDefault(
+      meter,
+      Metrics.PEER_MANAGER_GOODBYES_RECEIVED,
+      goodbyeReasonAttrs,
+    );
     this.peerCount = meter.createGauge(Metrics.PEER_MANAGER_PEER_COUNT);
-    this.lowScoreDisconnects = meter.createUpDownCounter(Metrics.PEER_MANAGER_LOW_SCORE_DISCONNECTS);
+    this.lowScoreDisconnects = createUpDownCounterWithDefault(meter, Metrics.PEER_MANAGER_LOW_SCORE_DISCONNECTS, {
+      [Attributes.P2P_PEER_SCORE_STATE]: ['Banned', 'Disconnect'],
+    });
     this.peerConnectionDuration = meter.createHistogram(Metrics.PEER_MANAGER_PEER_CONNECTION_DURATION);
   }
 

package/src/services/peer-manager/peer_manager.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import type { EpochCacheInterface } from '@aztec/epoch-cache';
+import { compactArray } from '@aztec/foundation/collection';
 import { makeEthSignDigest, tryRecoverAddress } from '@aztec/foundation/crypto/secp256k1-signer';
 import { Fr } from '@aztec/foundation/curves/bn254';
 import type { EthAddress } from '@aztec/foundation/eth-address';
@@ -198,21 +199,27 @@ export class PeerManager implements PeerManagerInterface {
       .then(peerIds => peerIds.forEach(peerId => this.preferredPeers.add(peerId.toString())))
       .catch(e => this.logger.error('Error initializing preferred peers', e));
 
-    const directPeers = (
+    const directPeers = compactArray(
       await Promise.all(
         preferredPeersEnrs.map(async enr => {
-          const peerId = await enr.peerId();
-          const address = enr.getLocationMultiaddr('tcp');
-          if (address === undefined) {
-            throw new Error(`Direct peer ${peerId.toString()} has no TCP address, ENR: ${enr.encodeTxt()}`);
+          try {
+            const peerId = await enr.peerId();
+            const address = enr.getLocationMultiaddr('tcp');
+            if (address === undefined) {
+              throw new Error(`Direct peer ${peerId.toString()} has no TCP address, ENR: ${enr.encodeTxt()}`);
+            }
+            return {
+              id: peerId,
+              addrs: [address],
+            };
+          } catch (err) {
+            // A malformed configured ENR shouldn't abort preferred-peer setup — skip it and log.
+            this.logger.warn(`Skipping preferred peer with invalid ENR`, { err });
+            return undefined;
           }
-          return {
-            id: peerId,
-            addrs: [address],
-          };
         }),
-      )
-    ).filter(peer => peer !== undefined);
+      ),
+    );
 
     await Promise.all(
       directPeers.map(peer => {

package/src/services/peer-manager/peer_scoring.ts

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import {
   Metrics,
   type TelemetryClient,
   type UpDownCounter,
+  createUpDownCounterWithDefault,
   getTelemetryClient,
 } from '@aztec/telemetry-client';
 
@@ -13,6 +14,21 @@ import type { PeerId } from '@libp2p/interface';
 
 import type { P2PConfig } from '../../config.js';
 
+/**
+ * Application-level peer penalties.
+ *
+ * These scores are multiplied by appSpecificWeight (10) when contributing to gossipsub score.
+ * The values are designed to align with gossipsub thresholds:
+ *
+ * - LowToleranceError (50): 1 error → app score -50 → gossipsub -500 → gossipThreshold
+ * - MidToleranceError (10): 5 errors → app score -50 → gossipsub -500 → gossipThreshold
+ * - HighToleranceError (2): 25 errors → app score -50 → gossipsub -500 → gossipThreshold
+ *
+ * Examples of each severity:
+ * - LowToleranceError: Invalid messages, deserialization errors, manipulation attempts
+ * - MidToleranceError: Hash mismatches, protocol violations
+ * - HighToleranceError: Rate limit exceeded, failed responses, transient errors
+ */
 const DefaultPeerPenalties = {
   [PeerErrorSeverity.LowToleranceError]: 50,
   [PeerErrorSeverity.MidToleranceError]: 10,
@@ -25,6 +41,16 @@ export enum PeerScoreState {
   Healthy,
 }
 
+/**
+ * Score thresholds for peer states.
+ *
+ * These values align with gossipsub thresholds when multiplied by appSpecificWeight (10):
+ * - MIN_SCORE_BEFORE_DISCONNECT (-50) × 10 = -500 = gossipThreshold
+ * - MIN_SCORE_BEFORE_BAN (-100) × 10 = -1000 = publishThreshold
+ *
+ * This ensures that when a peer is disconnected at the application level,
+ * they also stop receiving gossip, and when banned, they cannot publish.
+ */
 // TODO: move into config / constants
 const MIN_SCORE_BEFORE_BAN = -100;
 const MIN_SCORE_BEFORE_DISCONNECT = -50;
@@ -52,7 +78,9 @@ export class PeerScoring {
 
     const meter = telemetry.getMeter('PeerScoring');
 
-    this.peerStateCounter = meter.createUpDownCounter(Metrics.P2P_PEER_STATE_COUNT);
+    this.peerStateCounter = createUpDownCounterWithDefault(meter, Metrics.P2P_PEER_STATE_COUNT, {
+      [Attributes.P2P_PEER_SCORE_STATE]: ['Healthy', 'Disconnect', 'Banned'],
+    });
   }
 
   public penalizePeer(peerId: PeerId, penalty: PeerErrorSeverity) {

package/src/services/reqresp/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+# ReqResp Protocols
+
+This module implements libp2p request-response protocols for the Aztec P2P network. All protocols share common transport-level validation (rate limiting, timeouts, Snappy decompression, error penalties) with protocol-specific logic layered on top.
+
+## Common Transport Validation
+
+### Rate Limiting (Responder Side)
+
+Applied before the protocol handler runs.
+
+| Protocol | Peer Limit | Global Limit | File |
+|----------|-----------|-------------|------|
+| PING | 5/s | 10/s | `rate-limiter/rate_limits.ts` |
+| STATUS | 5/s | 10/s | same |
+| AUTH | 5/s | 10/s | same |
+| GOODBYE | 5/s | 10/s | same |
+| BLOCK | 2/s | 5/s | same |
+| BLOCK_TXS | 10/s | 200/s | same |
+| TX | (see rate limits file) | (see rate limits file) | same |
+
+- Per-peer limit exceeded: `HighToleranceError` penalty + `RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED` status. Penalty fires inside `RequestResponseRateLimiter.allow()`, not the stream handler.
+- Global limit exceeded: `RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED` status only (no peer penalty).
+
+### Response Status Byte (Requester Side)
+
+| Rule | Consequence | File |
+|------|-------------|------|
+| First chunk must be exactly 1 byte | `ReqRespStatusError(UNKNOWN)` | `status.ts` |
+| Byte must be valid `ReqRespStatus` enum (0-4, 126, 127) | `ReqRespStatusError(UNKNOWN)` | same |
+
+Note: `prettyPrintReqRespStatus` is missing a `NOT_FOUND` case (minor logging bug).
+
+### Snappy Decompression (Requester Side)
+
+Per-protocol size limits checked via preamble before decompression.
+
+### Timeouts (Requester Side)
+
+| Timeout | Default | Penalty |
+|---------|---------|---------|
+| Individual request | 10s | HighToleranceError |
+| Dial | 5s | HighToleranceError |
+
+### Error Penalty Categorization (Requester Side)
+
+| Error Type | Severity |
+|------------|----------|
+| GOODBYE subprotocol errors | None |
+| `CollectiveReqRespTimeoutError` / `InvalidResponseError` | None |
+| `AbortError` / connection close / muxer closed | None |
+| `ECONNRESET` / `EPIPE` / `ECONNREFUSED` / `ERR_UNEXPECTED_EOF` | HighToleranceError |
+| `ERR_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL` | HighToleranceError |
+| `IndividualReqRespTimeoutError` / `TimeoutError` | HighToleranceError |
+| Catch-all | HighToleranceError |
+
+### Request Error Penalty (Responder Side)
+
+| Error Type | Severity |
+|------------|----------|
+| `BADLY_FORMED_REQUEST` | LowToleranceError |
+| All others | None |
+
+### Notes
+
+- Request payloads are NOT snappy-compressed (asymmetric: only responses use snappy).
+
+---
+
+## Handshake Protocols
+
+### Connection-Level Gating (Before Any Handshake)
+
+| Rule | Consequence | File |
+|------|-------------|------|
+| Deny inbound connection from IP/peerId with too many failed auth handshakes | Connection denied | `libp2p_service.ts` |
+| Threshold: `p2pMaxFailedAuthAttemptsAllowed` (default 3) | Tracked per peerId AND per IP | `peer_manager.ts` |
+| Failed auth entries expire after 1 hour | Peer can reconnect; no escalating penalty for repeat offenders | same |
+
+### Handshake Trigger Logic (`peer:connect`)
+
+1. `p2pDisableStatusHandshake` = true: no handshake
+2. `p2pAllowOnlyValidators` = false: STATUS handshake
+3. Peer is protected (trusted/private/preferred): STATUS handshake
+4. Otherwise: AUTH handshake (superset of STATUS)
+
+Config constraint: `p2pDisableStatusHandshake && p2pAllowOnlyValidators` is disallowed.
+
+### STATUS Protocol (`/aztec/req/status/1.0.0`)
+
+**Requester side** (`peer_manager.ts`):
+
+| Rule | Consequence |
+|------|-------------|
+| Response status must be SUCCESS | Peer scheduled for disconnect |
+| `compressedComponentsVersion` must match | Peer scheduled for disconnect |
+| Any exception | Peer scheduled for disconnect |
+
+`StatusMessage.validate()` currently only checks `compressedComponentsVersion`. Fields `latestBlockNumber`, `latestBlockHash`, `finalizedBlockNumber` are NOT validated (TODO in code).
+
+**Responder side**: no validation of incoming request content (always responds with own status). This means the requester leaks its blockchain state to any peer before validation.
+
+**Deserialization bounds**: `MAX_VERSION_STRING_LENGTH` = 64 bytes, `MAX_BLOCK_HASH_STRING_LENGTH` = 128 bytes. Expected response size: 1 KB.
+
+### AUTH Protocol (`/aztec/req/auth/1.0.0`)
+
+**Requester side** (`peer_manager.ts`):
+
+| # | Rule | Consequence |
+|---|------|-------------|
+| 1 | Response status is SUCCESS | `markAuthHandshakeFailed` + disconnect |
+| 2 | `compressedComponentsVersion` match | `markAuthHandshakeFailed` + disconnect |
+| 3 | Valid ECDSA signature recovery from challenge response | `markAuthHandshakeFailed` + disconnect |
+| 4 | Recovered address is a registered validator | `markAuthHandshakeFailed` + disconnect |
+| 5 | Validator address not already authenticated to different peerId | Silent return (no disconnect, no failure marking -- peer stays connected but unauthenticated) |
+| 6 | Any exception | `markAuthHandshakeFailed` + disconnect |
+
+Challenge: random `Fr`, payload = `keccak256("Aztec Validator Challenge:" + challenge)`, signed with `eth_sign` style. Challenge is NOT bound to peer identity (transport encryption via Noise is the binding layer).
+
+On success: peer added to authenticated maps, prior failures cleared (including IP-based ones -- shared-IP peers benefit from a legitimate validator's success).
+
+**Responder side** (`validator-client/src/validator.ts` + `peer_manager.ts`):
+
+| # | Rule | Consequence |
+|---|------|-------------|
+| 1 | Peer must be protected (`shouldTrustWithIdentity` in `peer_manager.ts`) | Returns empty buffer (SUCCESS status + empty payload -> requester gets parse error -> `markAuthHandshakeFailed`) |
+| 2 | Node must have registered validator address | Returns empty buffer (same consequence) |
+
+**Unauthenticated peer gossip**: when `p2pAllowOnlyValidators` is true, unauthenticated peers get `appSpecificScore = -Infinity`, completely excluding them from all gossip.
+
+### PING Protocol (`/aztec/req/ping/1.0.0`)
+
+No validation on either side. Responder returns `Buffer.from('pong')`. Expected response: 1 KB.
+
+### GOODBYE Protocol (`/aztec/req/goodbye/1.0.0`)
+
+**Responder**: buffer must be 1 byte (defaults to `UNKNOWN` on invalid length). Goodbye reason byte is NOT validated against the enum -- any byte 0-255 accepted. Peer scheduled for disconnect regardless of reason.
+
+**Requester**: response errors are never penalized (GOODBYE subprotocol exempt from error categorization).
+
+### Periodic Re-validation
+
+| Rule | Interval | File |
+|------|----------|------|
+| Authenticated validators re-checked against current validator set | Every heartbeat (`peerCheckIntervalMS`) | `peer_manager.ts` |
+| If validator address no longer registered, auth entry removed | Same | same |
+
+Protected peers (private/trusted/preferred) are always considered "authenticated" without AUTH handshake.
+
+---
+
+## Block Data Protocols
+
+### BLOCK Protocol (`/aztec/req/block/1.0.0`)
+
+**Server side**:
+
+| Rule | Consequence | File |
+|------|-------------|------|
+| Request must parse as `Fr` | `BADLY_FORMED_REQUEST` + LowToleranceError | `protocols/block.ts` |
+| Block lookup throws | `INTERNAL_ERROR` status | same |
+| Block not found | SUCCESS + empty buffer (design choice; no `NOT_FOUND` status used) | same |
+
+**Requester side** (Snappy limit: 3 MB):
+
+| Rule | Consequence | File |
+|------|-------------|------|
+| Response block number must match requested | LowToleranceError; rejected | `libp2p_service.ts` (`validateRequestedBlock`) |
+| Local block must exist for hash verification | Rejected (no penalty) | same |
+| Response block hash must equal local block hash | MidToleranceError; rejected | same |
+
+**Limitation**: the local-block requirement means BLOCK req/resp is unusable for initial P2P-only sync (before L1 sync provides local copies for verification). A TODO in the code acknowledges this.
+
+### BLOCK_TXS Protocol (`/aztec/req/block_txs/1.0.0`)
+
+**Server side**:
+
+| Rule | Consequence | File |
+|------|-------------|------|
+| Request must parse as `BlockTxsRequest` (Fr + TxHashArray + BitVector) | `BADLY_FORMED_REQUEST` + LowToleranceError | `protocols/block_txs/block_txs_handler.ts` |
+| BitVector length: non-negative and <= `MAX_TXS_PER_BLOCK` (65536) | Deserialization throws -> `BADLY_FORMED_REQUEST` | `protocols/block_txs/bitvector.ts` |
+| Archive root not found and no explicit txHashes | `NOT_FOUND` status | handler |
+| Internal error during lookup | Unhandled exception -> stream abort (no `INTERNAL_ERROR` status, unlike BLOCK) | handler |
+
+Conditional registration: BLOCK_TXS handler only registered when `config.disableTransactions` is false. Otherwise peers get `ERR_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL`.
+
+**Requester side via `sendBatchRequest`** (Snappy limit: `max(N, 1) * 512 + 1` KB):
+
+| Rule | Consequence | File |
+|------|-------------|------|
+| Archive root must match request | MidToleranceError | `libp2p_service.ts` (`validateRequestedBlockTxs`) |
+| BitVector length must match request | MidToleranceError | same |
+| No duplicate tx hashes | MidToleranceError | same |
+| Tx count within bounds | MidToleranceError | same |
+| Local block proposal must exist for archive root | Rejected (no penalty) | same |
+| All tx hashes must be in proposal's tx list at allowed indices | LowToleranceError | same |
+| Txs in strictly increasing index order | LowToleranceError | same |
+| Each tx passes well-formedness (Metadata [4 fields], Size, Data, Proof) | LowToleranceError | same |
+
+**Requester side via `BatchTxRequester`** (separate validation path):
+
+| Rule | Consequence | File |
+|------|-------------|------|
+| Non-SUCCESS status: `FAILURE`/`UNKNOWN` | HighToleranceError + "bad peer" tracking | `batch-tx-requester/batch_tx_requester.ts` |
+| `RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED` | Peer marked rate-limited (cooldown) | same |
+| `NOT_FOUND` / `BADLY_FORMED_REQUEST` / `INTERNAL_ERROR` | Falls through silently (no penalty) | same |
+| Each tx validated (Metadata + Size + Data + Proof) | LowToleranceError per invalid tx; valid txs from same response still accepted | same |
+| Archive root match + non-empty txIndices | No penalty on mismatch; peer not promoted to "smart" | same |
+
+**Double penalty on transport errors**: when `BatchTxRequester` encounters a transport error (e.g., ECONNRESET), both `sendRequestToPeer`'s internal handler and the `BatchTxRequester`'s catch block penalize the peer, resulting in double HighToleranceError.
+
+See [BatchTxRequester README](batch-tx-requester/README.md) for the full architecture (peer classification, worker model, wire protocol).
+
+### TX Protocol (`/aztec/req/tx/1.0.0`)
+
+**Server side**:
+
+| Rule | Consequence | File |
+|------|-------------|------|
+| Request must parse as `TxHashArray` | `BADLY_FORMED_REQUEST` + LowToleranceError | `protocols/tx.ts` |
+
+**Requester side** (validator registered at startup, not the default noop):
+
+| Rule | Consequence | File |
+|------|-------------|------|
+| Each returned tx hash must be in the requested set | MidToleranceError | `libp2p_service.ts` (`validateRequestedTxs`) |
+| Each tx passes well-formedness (Metadata + Size + Data + Proof) | LowToleranceError | same |
+
+Snappy limit: `max(N, 1) * 512 + 1` KB.
+