@aztec/p2p 0.0.1-commit.db765a8 → 0.0.1-commit.df81a97b5

package/src/services/libp2p/libp2p_service.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import type { EpochCacheInterface } from '@aztec/epoch-cache';
 import { BlockNumber, type SlotNumber } from '@aztec/foundation/branded-types';
+import { maxBy } from '@aztec/foundation/collection';
 import { Fr } from '@aztec/foundation/curves/bn254';
 import { type Logger, createLibp2pComponentLogger, createLogger } from '@aztec/foundation/log';
 import { RunningPromise } from '@aztec/foundation/running-promise';
@@ -17,8 +18,8 @@ import {
   type CheckpointProposalCore,
   type Gossipable,
   P2PMessage,
-  type ValidationResult as P2PValidationResult,
   PeerErrorSeverity,
+  PeerErrorSeverityByHarshness,
   TopicType,
   createTopicString,
   getTopicsForConfig,
@@ -129,7 +130,7 @@ type ValidationOutcome = { allPassed: true } | { allPassed: false; failure: Vali
 // REFACTOR: Unify with the type above
 type ReceivedMessageValidationResult<T, M = undefined> =
   | { obj: T; result: Exclude<TopicValidatorResult, TopicValidatorResult.Reject>; metadata?: M }
-  | { obj?: T; result: TopicValidatorResult.Reject; metadata?: M };
+  | { obj?: T; result: TopicValidatorResult.Reject; metadata?: M; severity: PeerErrorSeverity };
 
 /**
  * Lib P2P implementation of the P2PService interface.
@@ -222,14 +223,12 @@ export class LibP2PService extends WithTracer implements P2PService {
       this.protocolVersion,
     );
 
-    this.blockProposalValidator = new BlockProposalValidator(epochCache, {
+    const proposalValidatorOpts = {
       txsPermitted: !config.disableTransactions,
-      maxTxsPerBlock: config.maxTxsPerBlock,
-    });
-    this.checkpointProposalValidator = new CheckpointProposalValidator(epochCache, {
-      txsPermitted: !config.disableTransactions,
-      maxTxsPerBlock: config.maxTxsPerBlock,
-    });
+      maxTxsPerBlock: config.validateMaxTxsPerBlock ?? config.validateMaxTxsPerCheckpoint,
+    };
+    this.blockProposalValidator = new BlockProposalValidator(epochCache, proposalValidatorOpts);
+    this.checkpointProposalValidator = new CheckpointProposalValidator(epochCache, proposalValidatorOpts);
     this.checkpointAttestationValidator = config.fishermanMode
       ? new FishermanAttestationValidator(epochCache, mempools.attestationPool, telemetry)
       : new CheckpointAttestationValidator(epochCache);
@@ -237,11 +236,11 @@ export class LibP2PService extends WithTracer implements P2PService {
     this.gossipSubEventHandler = this.handleGossipSubEvent.bind(this);
 
     this.blockReceivedCallback = async (block: BlockProposal): Promise<boolean> => {
-      this.logger.debug(
-        `Handler not yet registered: Block received callback not set. Received block for slot ${block.slotNumber} from peer.`,
+      this.logger.warn(
+        `Handler for block received not yet registered on P2P service. Received block ${block.blockNumber} for slot ${block.slotNumber} from peer.`,
         { p2pMessageIdentifier: await block.p2pMessageLoggingIdentifier() },
       );
-      return false;
+      return true;
     };
 
     this.checkpointReceivedCallback = (
@@ -754,6 +753,9 @@ export class LibP2PService extends WithTracer implements P2PService {
     if (!validator || !validator.addMessage(msgId)) {
       this.instrumentation.incMessagePrevalidationStatus(false, topicType);
       this.node.services.pubsub.reportMessageValidationResult(msgId, source.toString(), TopicValidatorResult.Ignore);
+      if (topicType === TopicType.tx) {
+        this.logger.verbose(`Ignoring already-seen tx gossip message`, { msgId, source: source.toString() });
+      }
       return { result: false, topicType };
     }
 
@@ -880,30 +882,56 @@ export class LibP2PService extends WithTracer implements P2PService {
     source: PeerId,
     topicType: TopicType,
   ): Promise<ReceivedMessageValidationResult<T, M>> {
-    let resultAndObj: ReceivedMessageValidationResult<T, M> = { result: TopicValidatorResult.Reject };
+    // Default to reject result with a penalty if validation function throws an error
+    let resultAndObj: ReceivedMessageValidationResult<T, M> = {
+      result: TopicValidatorResult.Reject,
+      severity: PeerErrorSeverity.MidToleranceError,
+    };
     const timer = new Timer();
     try {
       resultAndObj = await validationFunc();
     } catch (err) {
-      this.peerManager.penalizePeer(source, PeerErrorSeverity.LowToleranceError);
-      this.logger.error(`Error deserializing and validating gossipsub message`, err, {
-        msgId,
-        source: source.toString(),
-        topicType,
-      });
+      this.logger.error(`Error validating gossipsub message`, err, { msgId, source: source.toString(), topicType });
     }
 
     if (resultAndObj.result === TopicValidatorResult.Accept) {
+      this.logger.debug(`Message ${topicType} accepted by validator`, { msgId, source: source.toString(), topicType });
       this.instrumentation.recordMessageValidation(topicType, timer);
+    } else if (resultAndObj.result === TopicValidatorResult.Reject) {
+      this.logger.warn(`Message ${topicType} rejected by validator with severity ${resultAndObj.severity}`, {
+        msgId,
+        source: source.toString(),
+        topicType,
+        severity: resultAndObj.severity,
+      });
+      this.peerManager.penalizePeer(source, resultAndObj.severity);
+    } else {
+      this.logger.trace(`Message ${topicType} ignored by validator`, { msgId, source: source.toString(), topicType });
     }
 
     this.node.services.pubsub.reportMessageValidationResult(msgId, source.toString(), resultAndObj.result);
     return resultAndObj;
   }
 
+  private tryDeserialize<T>(deserializeFunc: () => T, msgId: string, source: PeerId): T | undefined {
+    try {
+      return deserializeFunc();
+    } catch (err) {
+      this.logger.warn(`Failed to deserialize gossipsub message from buffer`, {
+        err,
+        msgId,
+        source: source.toString(),
+      });
+      return undefined;
+    }
+  }
+
   protected async handleGossipedTx(payloadData: Buffer, msgId: string, source: PeerId) {
     const validationFunc: () => Promise<ReceivedMessageValidationResult<Tx>> = async () => {
-      const tx = Tx.fromBuffer(payloadData);
+      const tx = this.tryDeserialize(() => Tx.fromBuffer(payloadData), msgId, source);
+      if (!tx) {
+        return { result: TopicValidatorResult.Reject, severity: PeerErrorSeverity.LowToleranceError };
+      }
 
       const currentBlockNumber = await this.archiver.getBlockNumber();
       const { ts: nextSlotTimestamp } = this.epochCache.getEpochAndSlotInNextL1Slot();
@@ -923,13 +951,20 @@ export class LibP2PService extends WithTracer implements P2PService {
           severity = await this.handleDoubleSpendFailure(tx, txBlockNumber);
         }
 
-        this.peerManager.penalizePeer(source, severity);
-        return { result: TopicValidatorResult.Reject };
+        this.logger.verbose(`Rejecting gossiped tx ${tx.getTxHash().toString()}: stage 1 validation failed`, {
+          validator: name,
+          severity,
+          source: source.toString(),
+        });
+        return { result: TopicValidatorResult.Reject, severity };
       }
 
       // Pool pre-check: see if the pool would accept this tx before doing expensive proof verification
       const canAdd = await this.mempools.txPool.canAddPendingTx(tx);
       if (canAdd === 'ignored') {
+        this.logger.verbose(`Ignoring gossiped tx ${tx.getTxHash().toString()}: pool pre-check returned ignored`, {
+          source: source.toString(),
+        });
         return { result: TopicValidatorResult.Ignore, obj: tx };
       }
 
@@ -937,9 +972,13 @@ export class LibP2PService extends WithTracer implements P2PService {
       const secondStageValidators = this.createSecondStageMessageValidators();
       const secondStageOutcome = await this.runValidations(tx, secondStageValidators);
       if (!secondStageOutcome.allPassed) {
-        const { severity } = secondStageOutcome.failure;
-        this.peerManager.penalizePeer(source, severity);
-        return { result: TopicValidatorResult.Reject };
+        const { severity, name } = secondStageOutcome.failure;
+        this.logger.verbose(`Rejecting gossiped tx ${tx.getTxHash().toString()}: stage 2 validation failed`, {
+          validator: name,
+          severity,
+          source: source.toString(),
+        });
+        return { result: TopicValidatorResult.Reject, severity };
       }
 
       // Pool add: persist the tx
@@ -949,7 +988,7 @@ export class LibP2PService extends WithTracer implements P2PService {
       const wasAccepted = addResult.accepted.some(h => h.equals(txHash));
       const wasIgnored = addResult.ignored.some(h => h.equals(txHash));
 
-      this.logger.trace(`Validate propagated tx`, {
+      this.logger.verbose(`Validate propagated tx ${txHash.toString()}`, {
         wasAccepted,
         wasIgnored,
         [Attributes.P2P_ID]: source.toString(),
@@ -960,7 +999,11 @@ export class LibP2PService extends WithTracer implements P2PService {
       } else if (wasIgnored) {
         return { result: TopicValidatorResult.Ignore, obj: tx };
       } else {
-        return { result: TopicValidatorResult.Reject };
+        this.logger.warn(`Gossiped tx ${txHash.toString()} unexpectedly rejected by pool`, {
+          source: source.toString(),
+          txHash: txHash.toString(),
+        });
+        return { result: TopicValidatorResult.Reject, severity: PeerErrorSeverity.HighToleranceError };
       }
     };
 
@@ -990,7 +1033,16 @@ export class LibP2PService extends WithTracer implements P2PService {
     source: PeerId,
   ): Promise<void> {
     const { result, obj: attestation } = await this.validateReceivedMessage<CheckpointAttestation>(
-      () => this.validateAndStoreCheckpointAttestation(source, CheckpointAttestation.fromBuffer(payloadData)),
+      () => {
+        const attestation = this.tryDeserialize(() => CheckpointAttestation.fromBuffer(payloadData), msgId, source);
+        if (!attestation) {
+          return Promise.resolve({
+            result: TopicValidatorResult.Reject,
+            severity: PeerErrorSeverity.LowToleranceError,
+          });
+        }
+        return this.validateAndStoreCheckpointAttestation(source, attestation);
+      },
       msgId,
       source,
       TopicType.checkpoint_attestation,
@@ -1023,8 +1075,7 @@ export class LibP2PService extends WithTracer implements P2PService {
 
     if (validationResult.result === 'reject') {
       this.logger.warn(`Penalizing peer ${peerId} for checkpoint attestation validation failure`);
-      this.peerManager.penalizePeer(peerId, validationResult.severity);
-      return { result: TopicValidatorResult.Reject };
+      return { result: TopicValidatorResult.Reject, severity: validationResult.severity };
     }
 
     if (validationResult.result === 'ignore') {
@@ -1050,16 +1101,16 @@ export class LibP2PService extends WithTracer implements P2PService {
       return { result: TopicValidatorResult.Ignore, obj: attestation };
     }
 
-    // Could not add (cap reached for signer), no need to re-broadcast
+    // Could not add (cap reached for signer), penalize and do not re-broadcast
     if (!added) {
-      this.logger.warn(`Dropping checkpoint attestation due to cap`, {
+      this.logger.warn(`Rejecting checkpoint attestation due to cap`, {
         slot: slot.toString(),
         archive: attestation.archive.toString(),
         source: peerId.toString(),
         attester: attestation.getSender()?.toString(),
         count,
       });
-      return { result: TopicValidatorResult.Ignore, obj: attestation };
+      return { result: TopicValidatorResult.Reject, severity: PeerErrorSeverity.HighToleranceError };
     }
 
     // Check if this is a duplicate attestation (signer attested to a different proposal at the same slot)
@@ -1114,8 +1165,7 @@ export class LibP2PService extends WithTracer implements P2PService {
 
     if (validationResult.result === 'reject') {
       this.logger.warn(`Penalizing peer ${peerId} for block proposal validation failure`);
-      this.peerManager.penalizePeer(peerId, validationResult.severity);
-      return { result: TopicValidatorResult.Reject };
+      return { result: TopicValidatorResult.Reject, severity: validationResult.severity };
     }
 
     if (validationResult.result === 'ignore') {
@@ -1139,7 +1189,6 @@ export class LibP2PService extends WithTracer implements P2PService {
 
     // Too many blocks received for this slot and index, penalize peer and do not re-broadcast
     if (!added) {
-      this.peerManager.penalizePeer(peerId, PeerErrorSeverity.HighToleranceError);
       this.logger.warn(`Penalizing peer for block proposal exceeding per-position cap`, {
         ...block.toBlockInfo(),
         indexWithinCheckpoint: block.indexWithinCheckpoint,
@@ -1147,7 +1196,11 @@ export class LibP2PService extends WithTracer implements P2PService {
         proposer: block.getSender()?.toString(),
         source: peerId.toString(),
       });
-      return { result: TopicValidatorResult.Reject, metadata: { isEquivocated } };
+      return {
+        result: TopicValidatorResult.Reject,
+        metadata: { isEquivocated },
+        severity: PeerErrorSeverity.HighToleranceError,
+      };
     }
 
     // If this was a duplicate proposal, do not process it, but do invoke the duplicate callback,
@@ -1192,7 +1245,7 @@ export class LibP2PService extends WithTracer implements P2PService {
     // Note: Validators do NOT attest to individual blocks, only to checkpoint proposals.
     const isValid = await this.blockReceivedCallback(block, sender);
     if (!isValid) {
-      this.logger.warn(`Block proposal validation failed for block ${block.blockNumber}`, block.toBlockInfo());
+      this.logger.info(`Block proposal validation failed for block ${block.blockNumber}`, block.toBlockInfo());
     }
   }
 
@@ -1240,8 +1293,7 @@ export class LibP2PService extends WithTracer implements P2PService {
 
     if (validationResult.result === 'reject') {
       this.logger.warn(`Penalizing peer ${peerId} for checkpoint proposal validation failure`);
-      this.peerManager.penalizePeer(peerId, validationResult.severity);
-      return { result: TopicValidatorResult.Reject };
+      return { result: TopicValidatorResult.Reject, severity: validationResult.severity };
     }
 
     if (validationResult.result === 'ignore') {
@@ -1256,20 +1308,21 @@ export class LibP2PService extends WithTracer implements P2PService {
         [Attributes.SLOT_NUMBER]: checkpoint.slotNumber.toString(),
         [Attributes.P2P_ID]: peerId.toString(),
       });
-      const {
-        result,
-        obj,
-        metadata: { isEquivocated } = {},
-      } = await this.validateAndStoreBlockProposal(peerId, blockProposal);
-      if (result === TopicValidatorResult.Reject || !obj || isEquivocated) {
+      const blockProposalResult = await this.validateAndStoreBlockProposal(peerId, blockProposal);
+      const { obj, metadata: { isEquivocated } = {} } = blockProposalResult;
+      if (blockProposalResult.result === TopicValidatorResult.Reject || !obj || isEquivocated) {
         this.logger.debug(`Rejecting checkpoint due to invalid last block proposal`, {
           [Attributes.SLOT_NUMBER]: checkpoint.slotNumber.toString(),
           [Attributes.P2P_ID]: peerId.toString(),
           isEquivocated,
-          result,
+          result: blockProposalResult.result,
         });
-        return { result: TopicValidatorResult.Reject };
-      } else if (result === TopicValidatorResult.Accept && obj && !isEquivocated) {
+        return {
+          result: TopicValidatorResult.Reject,
+          severity:
+            'severity' in blockProposalResult ? blockProposalResult.severity : PeerErrorSeverity.MidToleranceError,
+        };
+      } else if (blockProposalResult.result === TopicValidatorResult.Accept && obj && !isEquivocated) {
         processBlock = true;
       }
     }
@@ -1296,13 +1349,17 @@ export class LibP2PService extends WithTracer implements P2PService {
     // Too many checkpoint proposals received for this slot, penalize peer and do not re-broadcast
     // Note: We still return the checkpoint obj so the lastBlock can be processed if valid
     if (!added) {
-      this.peerManager.penalizePeer(peerId, PeerErrorSeverity.HighToleranceError);
       this.logger.warn(`Penalizing peer for checkpoint proposal exceeding per-slot cap`, {
         ...checkpoint.toCheckpointInfo(),
         count,
         source: peerId.toString(),
       });
-      return { result: TopicValidatorResult.Reject, obj: checkpoint, metadata: { isEquivocated, processBlock } };
+      return {
+        result: TopicValidatorResult.Reject,
+        obj: checkpoint,
+        metadata: { isEquivocated, processBlock },
+        severity: PeerErrorSeverity.HighToleranceError,
+      };
     }
 
     // If this was a duplicate proposal, do not process it, but do invoke the duplicate callback,
@@ -1626,6 +1683,7 @@ export class LibP2PService extends WithTracer implements P2PService {
       ...(this.config.txPublicSetupAllowListExtend ?? []),
     ];
     const blockNumber = BlockNumber(currentBlockNumber + 1);
+    const l1Constants = await this.archiver.getL1Constants();
 
     return createFirstStageTxValidationsForGossipedTransactions(
       nextSlotTimestamp,
@@ -1639,6 +1697,11 @@ export class LibP2PService extends WithTracer implements P2PService {
       !this.config.disableTransactions,
       allowedInSetup,
       this.logger.getBindings(),
+      {
+        rollupManaLimit: l1Constants.rollupManaLimit,
+        maxBlockL2Gas: this.config.validateMaxL2BlockGas,
+        maxBlockDAGas: this.config.validateMaxDABlockGas,
+      },
     );
   }
 
@@ -1664,8 +1727,10 @@ export class LibP2PService extends WithTracer implements P2PService {
 
     // A promise that resolves when all validations have been run
     const allValidations = await Promise.all(validationPromises);
-    const failed = allValidations.find(x => !x.isValid);
-    if (failed) {
+    const failures = allValidations.filter(x => !x.isValid);
+    if (failures.length > 0) {
+      // Pick the most severe failure (lowest tolerance = harshest penalty)
+      const failed = maxBy(failures, f => PeerErrorSeverityByHarshness.indexOf(f.severity))!;
       return {
         allPassed: false,
         failure: {
@@ -1718,31 +1783,6 @@ export class LibP2PService extends WithTracer implements P2PService {
     return PeerErrorSeverity.HighToleranceError;
   }
 
-  /**
-   * Validate a checkpoint attestation.
-   *
-   * @param attestation - The checkpoint attestation to validate.
-   * @returns True if the checkpoint attestation is valid, false otherwise.
-   */
-  @trackSpan('Libp2pService.validateCheckpointAttestation', async (_, attestation) => ({
-    [Attributes.SLOT_NUMBER]: attestation.payload.header.slotNumber,
-    [Attributes.BLOCK_ARCHIVE]: attestation.archive.toString(),
-    [Attributes.P2P_ID]: await attestation.p2pMessageLoggingIdentifier().then(i => i.toString()),
-  }))
-  public async validateCheckpointAttestation(
-    peerId: PeerId,
-    attestation: CheckpointAttestation,
-  ): Promise<P2PValidationResult> {
-    const result = await this.checkpointAttestationValidator.validate(attestation);
-
-    if (result.result === 'reject') {
-      this.logger.warn(`Penalizing peer ${peerId} for checkpoint attestation validation failure`);
-      this.peerManager.penalizePeer(peerId, result.severity);
-    }
-
-    return result;
-  }
-
   public getPeerScore(peerId: PeerId): number {
     return this.node.services.pubsub.score.score(peerId.toString());
   }

package/src/services/peer-manager/peer_manager.ts

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ import { PeerScoreState, type PeerScoring } from './peer_scoring.js';
 const MAX_DIAL_ATTEMPTS = 3;
 const MAX_CACHED_PEERS = 100;
 const MAX_CACHED_PEER_AGE_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000; // 5 minutes
-const FAILED_PEER_BAN_TIME_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000; // 5 minutes timeout after failing MAX_DIAL_ATTEMPTS
+const DEFAULT_FAILED_PEER_BAN_TIME_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000; // 5 minutes timeout after failing MAX_DIAL_ATTEMPTS
 const GOODBYE_DIAL_TIMEOUT_MS = 1000;
 const FAILED_AUTH_HANDSHAKE_EXPIRY_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 1 hour
 
@@ -776,7 +776,8 @@ export class PeerManager implements PeerManagerInterface {
         // Add to timed out peers
         this.timedOutPeers.set(id, {
           peerId: id,
-          timeoutUntilMs: this.dateProvider.now() + FAILED_PEER_BAN_TIME_MS,
+          timeoutUntilMs:
+            this.dateProvider.now() + (this.config.peerFailedBanTimeMs ?? DEFAULT_FAILED_PEER_BAN_TIME_MS),
         });
       }
     }
@@ -938,6 +939,8 @@ export class PeerManager implements PeerManagerInterface {
           `Received auth for validator ${sender.toString()} from peer ${peerIdString}, but this validator is already authenticated to peer ${peerForAddress.toString()}`,
           { ...logData, address: sender.toString() },
         );
+        this.markAuthHandshakeFailed(peerId);
+        this.markPeerForDisconnect(peerId);
         return;
       }
 

package/src/services/reqresp/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+# ReqResp Protocols
+
+This module implements libp2p request-response protocols for the Aztec P2P network. All protocols share common transport-level validation (rate limiting, timeouts, Snappy decompression, error penalties) with protocol-specific logic layered on top.
+
+## Common Transport Validation
+
+### Rate Limiting (Responder Side)
+
+Applied before the protocol handler runs.
+
+| Protocol | Peer Limit | Global Limit | File |
+|----------|-----------|-------------|------|
+| PING | 5/s | 10/s | `rate-limiter/rate_limits.ts` |
+| STATUS | 5/s | 10/s | same |
+| AUTH | 5/s | 10/s | same |
+| GOODBYE | 5/s | 10/s | same |
+| BLOCK | 2/s | 5/s | same |
+| BLOCK_TXS | 10/s | 200/s | same |
+| TX | (see rate limits file) | (see rate limits file) | same |
+
+- Per-peer limit exceeded: `HighToleranceError` penalty + `RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED` status. Penalty fires inside `RequestResponseRateLimiter.allow()`, not the stream handler.
+- Global limit exceeded: `RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED` status only (no peer penalty).
+
+### Response Status Byte (Requester Side)
+
+| Rule | Consequence | File |
+|------|-------------|------|
+| First chunk must be exactly 1 byte | `ReqRespStatusError(UNKNOWN)` | `status.ts` |
+| Byte must be valid `ReqRespStatus` enum (0-4, 126, 127) | `ReqRespStatusError(UNKNOWN)` | same |
+
+Note: `prettyPrintReqRespStatus` is missing a `NOT_FOUND` case (minor logging bug).
+
+### Snappy Decompression (Requester Side)
+
+Per-protocol size limits checked via preamble before decompression.
+
+### Timeouts (Requester Side)
+
+| Timeout | Default | Penalty |
+|---------|---------|---------|
+| Individual request | 10s | HighToleranceError |
+| Dial | 5s | HighToleranceError |
+
+### Error Penalty Categorization (Requester Side)
+
+| Error Type | Severity |
+|------------|----------|
+| GOODBYE subprotocol errors | None |
+| `CollectiveReqRespTimeoutError` / `InvalidResponseError` | None |
+| `AbortError` / connection close / muxer closed | None |
+| `ECONNRESET` / `EPIPE` / `ECONNREFUSED` / `ERR_UNEXPECTED_EOF` | HighToleranceError |
+| `ERR_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL` | HighToleranceError |
+| `IndividualReqRespTimeoutError` / `TimeoutError` | HighToleranceError |
+| Catch-all | HighToleranceError |
+
+### Request Error Penalty (Responder Side)
+
+| Error Type | Severity |
+|------------|----------|
+| `BADLY_FORMED_REQUEST` | LowToleranceError |
+| All others | None |
+
+### Notes
+
+- Request payloads are NOT snappy-compressed (asymmetric: only responses use snappy).
+
+---
+
+## Handshake Protocols
+
+### Connection-Level Gating (Before Any Handshake)
+
+| Rule | Consequence | File |
+|------|-------------|------|
+| Deny inbound connection from IP/peerId with too many failed auth handshakes | Connection denied | `libp2p_service.ts` |
+| Threshold: `p2pMaxFailedAuthAttemptsAllowed` (default 3) | Tracked per peerId AND per IP | `peer_manager.ts` |
+| Failed auth entries expire after 1 hour | Peer can reconnect; no escalating penalty for repeat offenders | same |
+
+### Handshake Trigger Logic (`peer:connect`)
+
+1. `p2pDisableStatusHandshake` = true: no handshake
+2. `p2pAllowOnlyValidators` = false: STATUS handshake
+3. Peer is protected (trusted/private/preferred): STATUS handshake
+4. Otherwise: AUTH handshake (superset of STATUS)
+
+Config constraint: `p2pDisableStatusHandshake && p2pAllowOnlyValidators` is disallowed.
+
+### STATUS Protocol (`/aztec/req/status/1.0.0`)
+
+**Requester side** (`peer_manager.ts`):
+
+| Rule | Consequence |
+|------|-------------|
+| Response status must be SUCCESS | Peer scheduled for disconnect |
+| `compressedComponentsVersion` must match | Peer scheduled for disconnect |
+| Any exception | Peer scheduled for disconnect |
+
+`StatusMessage.validate()` currently only checks `compressedComponentsVersion`. Fields `latestBlockNumber`, `latestBlockHash`, `finalizedBlockNumber` are NOT validated (TODO in code).
+
+**Responder side**: no validation of incoming request content (always responds with own status). This means the requester leaks its blockchain state to any peer before validation.
+
+**Deserialization bounds**: `MAX_VERSION_STRING_LENGTH` = 64 bytes, `MAX_BLOCK_HASH_STRING_LENGTH` = 128 bytes. Expected response size: 1 KB.
+
+### AUTH Protocol (`/aztec/req/auth/1.0.0`)
+
+**Requester side** (`peer_manager.ts`):
+
+| # | Rule | Consequence |
+|---|------|-------------|
+| 1 | Response status is SUCCESS | `markAuthHandshakeFailed` + disconnect |
+| 2 | `compressedComponentsVersion` match | `markAuthHandshakeFailed` + disconnect |
+| 3 | Valid ECDSA signature recovery from challenge response | `markAuthHandshakeFailed` + disconnect |
+| 4 | Recovered address is a registered validator | `markAuthHandshakeFailed` + disconnect |
+| 5 | Validator address not already authenticated to different peerId | Silent return (no disconnect, no failure marking -- peer stays connected but unauthenticated) |
+| 6 | Any exception | `markAuthHandshakeFailed` + disconnect |
+
+Challenge: random `Fr`, payload = `keccak256("Aztec Validator Challenge:" + challenge)`, signed with `eth_sign` style. Challenge is NOT bound to peer identity (transport encryption via Noise is the binding layer).
+
+On success: peer added to authenticated maps, prior failures cleared (including IP-based ones -- shared-IP peers benefit from a legitimate validator's success).
+
+**Responder side** (`validator-client/src/validator.ts` + `peer_manager.ts`):
+
+| # | Rule | Consequence |
+|---|------|-------------|
+| 1 | Peer must be protected (`shouldTrustWithIdentity` in `peer_manager.ts`) | Returns empty buffer (SUCCESS status + empty payload -> requester gets parse error -> `markAuthHandshakeFailed`) |
+| 2 | Node must have registered validator address | Returns empty buffer (same consequence) |
+
+**Unauthenticated peer gossip**: when `p2pAllowOnlyValidators` is true, unauthenticated peers get `appSpecificScore = -Infinity`, completely excluding them from all gossip.
+
+### PING Protocol (`/aztec/req/ping/1.0.0`)
+
+No validation on either side. Responder returns `Buffer.from('pong')`. Expected response: 1 KB.
+
+### GOODBYE Protocol (`/aztec/req/goodbye/1.0.0`)
+
+**Responder**: buffer must be 1 byte (defaults to `UNKNOWN` on invalid length). Goodbye reason byte is NOT validated against the enum -- any byte 0-255 accepted. Peer scheduled for disconnect regardless of reason.
+
+**Requester**: response errors are never penalized (GOODBYE subprotocol exempt from error categorization).
+
+### Periodic Re-validation
+
+| Rule | Interval | File |
+|------|----------|------|
+| Authenticated validators re-checked against current validator set | Every heartbeat (`peerCheckIntervalMS`) | `peer_manager.ts` |
+| If validator address no longer registered, auth entry removed | Same | same |
+
+Protected peers (private/trusted/preferred) are always considered "authenticated" without AUTH handshake.
+
+---
+
+## Block Data Protocols
+
+### BLOCK Protocol (`/aztec/req/block/1.0.0`)
+
+**Server side**:
+
+| Rule | Consequence | File |
+|------|-------------|------|
+| Request must parse as `Fr` | `BADLY_FORMED_REQUEST` + LowToleranceError | `protocols/block.ts` |
+| Block lookup throws | `INTERNAL_ERROR` status | same |
+| Block not found | SUCCESS + empty buffer (design choice; no `NOT_FOUND` status used) | same |
+
+**Requester side** (Snappy limit: 3 MB):
+
+| Rule | Consequence | File |
+|------|-------------|------|
+| Response block number must match requested | LowToleranceError; rejected | `libp2p_service.ts` (`validateRequestedBlock`) |
+| Local block must exist for hash verification | Rejected (no penalty) | same |
+| Response block hash must equal local block hash | MidToleranceError; rejected | same |
+
+**Limitation**: the local-block requirement means BLOCK req/resp is unusable for initial P2P-only sync (before L1 sync provides local copies for verification). A TODO in the code acknowledges this.
+
+### BLOCK_TXS Protocol (`/aztec/req/block_txs/1.0.0`)
+
+**Server side**:
+
+| Rule | Consequence | File |
+|------|-------------|------|
+| Request must parse as `BlockTxsRequest` (Fr + TxHashArray + BitVector) | `BADLY_FORMED_REQUEST` + LowToleranceError | `protocols/block_txs/block_txs_handler.ts` |
+| BitVector length: non-negative and <= `MAX_TXS_PER_BLOCK` (65536) | Deserialization throws -> `BADLY_FORMED_REQUEST` | `protocols/block_txs/bitvector.ts` |
+| Archive root not found and no explicit txHashes | `NOT_FOUND` status | handler |
+| Internal error during lookup | Unhandled exception -> stream abort (no `INTERNAL_ERROR` status, unlike BLOCK) | handler |
+
+Conditional registration: BLOCK_TXS handler only registered when `config.disableTransactions` is false. Otherwise peers get `ERR_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL`.
+
+**Requester side via `sendBatchRequest`** (Snappy limit: `max(N, 1) * 512 + 1` KB):
+
+| Rule | Consequence | File |
+|------|-------------|------|
+| Archive root must match request | MidToleranceError | `libp2p_service.ts` (`validateRequestedBlockTxs`) |
+| BitVector length must match request | MidToleranceError | same |
+| No duplicate tx hashes | MidToleranceError | same |
+| Tx count within bounds | MidToleranceError | same |
+| Local block proposal must exist for archive root | Rejected (no penalty) | same |
+| All tx hashes must be in proposal's tx list at allowed indices | LowToleranceError | same |
+| Txs in strictly increasing index order | LowToleranceError | same |
+| Each tx passes well-formedness (Metadata [4 fields], Size, Data, Proof) | LowToleranceError | same |
+
+**Requester side via `BatchTxRequester`** (separate validation path):
+
+| Rule | Consequence | File |
+|------|-------------|------|
+| Non-SUCCESS status: `FAILURE`/`UNKNOWN` | HighToleranceError + "bad peer" tracking | `batch-tx-requester/batch_tx_requester.ts` |
+| `RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED` | Peer marked rate-limited (cooldown) | same |
+| `NOT_FOUND` / `BADLY_FORMED_REQUEST` / `INTERNAL_ERROR` | Falls through silently (no penalty) | same |
+| Each tx validated (Metadata + Size + Data + Proof) | LowToleranceError per invalid tx; valid txs from same response still accepted | same |
+| Archive root match + non-empty txIndices | No penalty on mismatch; peer not promoted to "smart" | same |
+
+**Double penalty on transport errors**: when `BatchTxRequester` encounters a transport error (e.g., ECONNRESET), both `sendRequestToPeer`'s internal handler and the `BatchTxRequester`'s catch block penalize the peer, resulting in double HighToleranceError.
+
+See [BatchTxRequester README](batch-tx-requester/README.md) for the full architecture (peer classification, worker model, wire protocol).
+
+### TX Protocol (`/aztec/req/tx/1.0.0`)
+
+**Server side**:
+
+| Rule | Consequence | File |
+|------|-------------|------|
+| Request must parse as `TxHashArray` | `BADLY_FORMED_REQUEST` + LowToleranceError | `protocols/tx.ts` |
+
+**Requester side** (validator registered at startup, not the default noop):
+
+| Rule | Consequence | File |
+|------|-------------|------|
+| Each returned tx hash must be in the requested set | MidToleranceError | `libp2p_service.ts` (`validateRequestedTxs`) |
+| Each tx passes well-formedness (Metadata + Size + Data + Proof) | LowToleranceError | same |
+
+Snappy limit: `max(N, 1) * 512 + 1` KB.
+