@aztec-labs/stdlib 6.0.0-nightly.20261001 → 6.0.0-nightly.20261003

package/dest/config/network-consensus-config.d.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import { type L1ContractsConfig } from '@aztec-labs/ethereum/config';
 import type { SequencerConfig } from '../interfaces/configs.js';
 /**
- * Environment variables whose values must be identical across every node of a network. They fall into three
+ * Environment variables whose values must be identical across every node of a network. They fall into four
  * categories, all consensus-critical:
  *
  * - Timing/protocol consensus: slot and epoch durations, block sub-slot duration, max blocks per checkpoint, and
@@ -13,14 +13,22 @@ import type { SequencerConfig } from '../interfaces/configs.js';
  *   it points at would compute the wrong epoch geometry, fees, or slashing rounds.
  * - Node-side slashing offense consensus: the offense detection/penalty parameters validators apply locally to
  *   decide which payloads to sign. Validators must agree on these to reach the on-chain slashing quorum.
+ * - Validator acceptance limits: the most txs a validator accepts in a peer's checkpoint. These are floors rather
+ *   than exact values (see {@link NETWORK_CONSENSUS_RAISABLE_ENV_VARS}), and proposers must build within them.
  *
  * Deliberately excluded: bootnodes, P2P/store/OTEL/sentinel settings, SEQ_MIN_TX_PER_BLOCK, SEQ_MAX_TX_PER_*,
  * AZTEC_SLASHER_ENABLED, PROVER_REAL_PROOFS, TRANSACTIONS_DISABLED, and AZTEC_ENTRY_QUEUE_* (mainnet-only genesis
  * params enforced by L1).
  */
-export declare const NETWORK_CONSENSUS_ENV_VARS: readonly ["ETHEREUM_SLOT_DURATION", "AZTEC_SLOT_DURATION", "AZTEC_EPOCH_DURATION", "SEQ_BLOCK_DURATION_MS", "MAX_BLOCKS_PER_CHECKPOINT", "CHECKPOINT_PROPOSAL_SYNC_GRACE_SECONDS", "L1_CHAIN_ID", "AZTEC_TARGET_COMMITTEE_SIZE", "AZTEC_LAG_IN_EPOCHS_FOR_VALIDATOR_SET", "AZTEC_LAG_IN_EPOCHS_FOR_RANDAO", "AZTEC_ACTIVATION_THRESHOLD", "AZTEC_EJECTION_THRESHOLD", "AZTEC_LOCAL_EJECTION_THRESHOLD", "AZTEC_EXIT_DELAY_SECONDS", "AZTEC_PROOF_SUBMISSION_EPOCHS", "AZTEC_MANA_TARGET", "AZTEC_PROVING_COST_PER_MANA", "AZTEC_INITIAL_ETH_PER_FEE_ASSET", "AZTEC_GOVERNANCE_PROPOSER_ROUND_SIZE", "AZTEC_GOVERNANCE_PROPOSER_QUORUM", "AZTEC_SLASHING_QUORUM", "AZTEC_SLASHING_ROUND_SIZE_IN_EPOCHS", "AZTEC_SLASHING_LIFETIME_IN_ROUNDS", "AZTEC_SLASHING_OFFSET_IN_ROUNDS", "AZTEC_SLASHING_EXECUTION_DELAY_IN_ROUNDS", "AZTEC_SLASHING_VETOER", "AZTEC_SLASHING_DISABLE_DURATION", "AZTEC_SLASH_AMOUNT_SMALL", "AZTEC_SLASH_AMOUNT_MEDIUM", "AZTEC_SLASH_AMOUNT_LARGE", "SLASH_OFFENSE_EXPIRATION_ROUNDS", "SLASH_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE", "SLASH_EXECUTE_ROUNDS_LOOK_BACK", "SLASH_DATA_WITHHOLDING_TOLERANCE_SLOTS", "SLASH_DATA_WITHHOLDING_PENALTY", "SLASH_INACTIVITY_TARGET_PERCENTAGE", "SLASH_INACTIVITY_CONSECUTIVE_EPOCH_THRESHOLD", "SLASH_INACTIVITY_PENALTY", "SLASH_PROPOSE_INVALID_ATTESTATIONS_PENALTY", "SLASH_DUPLICATE_PROPOSAL_PENALTY", "SLASH_DUPLICATE_ATTESTATION_PENALTY", "SLASH_PROPOSE_DESCENDANT_OF_CHECKPOINT_WITH_INVALID_ATTESTATIONS_PENALTY", "SLASH_ATTEST_INVALID_CHECKPOINT_PROPOSAL_PENALTY", "SLASH_UNKNOWN_PENALTY", "SLASH_INVALID_BLOCK_PENALTY", "SLASH_INVALID_CHECKPOINT_PROPOSAL_PENALTY", "SLASH_GRACE_PERIOD_L2_SLOTS"];
+export declare const NETWORK_CONSENSUS_ENV_VARS: readonly ["ETHEREUM_SLOT_DURATION", "AZTEC_SLOT_DURATION", "AZTEC_EPOCH_DURATION", "SEQ_BLOCK_DURATION_MS", "MAX_BLOCKS_PER_CHECKPOINT", "CHECKPOINT_PROPOSAL_SYNC_GRACE_SECONDS", "L1_CHAIN_ID", "AZTEC_TARGET_COMMITTEE_SIZE", "AZTEC_LAG_IN_EPOCHS_FOR_VALIDATOR_SET", "AZTEC_LAG_IN_EPOCHS_FOR_RANDAO", "AZTEC_ACTIVATION_THRESHOLD", "AZTEC_EJECTION_THRESHOLD", "AZTEC_LOCAL_EJECTION_THRESHOLD", "AZTEC_EXIT_DELAY_SECONDS", "AZTEC_PROOF_SUBMISSION_EPOCHS", "AZTEC_MANA_TARGET", "AZTEC_PROVING_COST_PER_MANA", "AZTEC_INITIAL_ETH_PER_FEE_ASSET", "AZTEC_GOVERNANCE_PROPOSER_ROUND_SIZE", "AZTEC_GOVERNANCE_PROPOSER_QUORUM", "AZTEC_SLASHING_QUORUM", "AZTEC_SLASHING_ROUND_SIZE_IN_EPOCHS", "AZTEC_SLASHING_LIFETIME_IN_ROUNDS", "AZTEC_SLASHING_OFFSET_IN_ROUNDS", "AZTEC_SLASHING_EXECUTION_DELAY_IN_ROUNDS", "AZTEC_SLASHING_VETOER", "AZTEC_SLASHING_DISABLE_DURATION", "AZTEC_SLASH_AMOUNT_SMALL", "AZTEC_SLASH_AMOUNT_MEDIUM", "AZTEC_SLASH_AMOUNT_LARGE", "SLASH_OFFENSE_EXPIRATION_ROUNDS", "SLASH_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE", "SLASH_EXECUTE_ROUNDS_LOOK_BACK", "SLASH_DATA_WITHHOLDING_TOLERANCE_SLOTS", "SLASH_DATA_WITHHOLDING_PENALTY", "SLASH_INACTIVITY_TARGET_PERCENTAGE", "SLASH_INACTIVITY_CONSECUTIVE_EPOCH_THRESHOLD", "SLASH_INACTIVITY_PENALTY", "SLASH_PROPOSE_INVALID_ATTESTATIONS_PENALTY", "SLASH_DUPLICATE_PROPOSAL_PENALTY", "SLASH_DUPLICATE_ATTESTATION_PENALTY", "SLASH_PROPOSE_DESCENDANT_OF_CHECKPOINT_WITH_INVALID_ATTESTATIONS_PENALTY", "SLASH_ATTEST_INVALID_CHECKPOINT_PROPOSAL_PENALTY", "SLASH_UNKNOWN_PENALTY", "SLASH_INVALID_BLOCK_PENALTY", "SLASH_INVALID_CHECKPOINT_PROPOSAL_PENALTY", "SLASH_GRACE_PERIOD_L2_SLOTS", "VALIDATOR_MAX_TX_PER_CHECKPOINT"];
 /** A consensus-critical environment variable name; see {@link NETWORK_CONSENSUS_ENV_VARS}. */
 export type ConsensusEnvVar = (typeof NETWORK_CONSENSUS_ENV_VARS)[number];
+/**
+ * Consensus-critical vars an operator may raise above the network value but never lower. A validator that accepts
+ * more than the network limit still accepts every checkpoint an honest proposer builds within it, whereas a stricter
+ * one would reject a protocol-valid checkpoint and decline to attest to it.
+ */
+export declare const NETWORK_CONSENSUS_RAISABLE_ENV_VARS: readonly ConsensusEnvVar[];
 /**
  * The subset of consensus-critical timing config whose geometry can be validated in isolation. Composed by
  * picking the canonical fields from their owning config types so the field set never drifts from the config
@@ -52,13 +60,17 @@ export declare function validateNetworkConsensusConfig(config: NetworkConsensusC
  *
  * For each var in {@link NETWORK_CONSENSUS_ENV_VARS} present in `networkConfig`: if the operator set it in `env`
  * to a conflicting value, this throws unless `ALLOW_OVERRIDING_NETWORK_CONFIG` is truthy (in which case it logs
- * and keeps the operator value).
+ * and keeps the operator value). For a var in {@link NETWORK_CONSENSUS_RAISABLE_ENV_VARS}, only a value below the
+ * network one conflicts. The same applies to a `SEQ_MAX_TX_PER_CHECKPOINT` (from `env`, or else from
+ * `networkConfig`) above the network `VALIDATOR_MAX_TX_PER_CHECKPOINT`: validators running the network value would
+ * reject every checkpoint this node proposed over it.
  *
  * This function is pure: it never writes to `env`. Instead it returns the canonical env writes the caller
  * should apply — a map of env-var name to canonical string value for every numeric var whose env value matched
  * the network value numerically. Applying these closes a bypass where the config layer parses some vars with
  * `parseInt` (which reads '6e3' as 6); rewriting them to the network value's string form keeps the operator's
- * numerically-equal value but in canonical form. Vars kept under `ALLOW_OVERRIDING_NETWORK_CONFIG` (genuine
+ * numerically-equal value but in canonical form. A raisable var set above the network value is canonicalized to
+ * its own numeric value for the same reason. Vars kept under `ALLOW_OVERRIDING_NETWORK_CONFIG` (genuine
  * conflicts) are not included, so the operator value is preserved untouched.
  *
  * @returns Canonical env writes (env-var name -> canonical string value) for the caller to apply.
@@ -70,4 +82,4 @@ export declare function checkConsensusEnvOverrides(networkConfig: Record<string,
 export declare function allowsNetworkConfigOverride(env?: {
     [key: string]: string | undefined;
 }): boolean;
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package/dest/config/network-consensus-config.d.ts.map

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package/dest/config/network-consensus-config.js

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import { DEFAULT_CHECKPOINT_PROPOSAL_INIT_TIME, DEFAULT_CHECKPOINT_PROPOSAL_PREP
 import { ProposerTimetable } from '../timetable/proposer_timetable.js';
 import { sharedSequencerConfigMappings } from './sequencer-config.js';
 /**
- * Environment variables whose values must be identical across every node of a network. They fall into three
+ * Environment variables whose values must be identical across every node of a network. They fall into four
  * categories, all consensus-critical:
  *
  * - Timing/protocol consensus: slot and epoch durations, block sub-slot duration, max blocks per checkpoint, and
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ import { sharedSequencerConfigMappings } from './sequencer-config.js';
  *   it points at would compute the wrong epoch geometry, fees, or slashing rounds.
  * - Node-side slashing offense consensus: the offense detection/penalty parameters validators apply locally to
  *   decide which payloads to sign. Validators must agree on these to reach the on-chain slashing quorum.
+ * - Validator acceptance limits: the most txs a validator accepts in a peer's checkpoint. These are floors rather
+ *   than exact values (see {@link NETWORK_CONSENSUS_RAISABLE_ENV_VARS}), and proposers must build within them.
  *
  * Deliberately excluded: bootnodes, P2P/store/OTEL/sentinel settings, SEQ_MIN_TX_PER_BLOCK, SEQ_MAX_TX_PER_*,
  * AZTEC_SLASHER_ENABLED, PROVER_REAL_PROOFS, TRANSACTIONS_DISABLED, and AZTEC_ENTRY_QUEUE_* (mainnet-only genesis
@@ -72,7 +74,16 @@ import { sharedSequencerConfigMappings } from './sequencer-config.js';
     'SLASH_UNKNOWN_PENALTY',
     'SLASH_INVALID_BLOCK_PENALTY',
     'SLASH_INVALID_CHECKPOINT_PROPOSAL_PENALTY',
-    'SLASH_GRACE_PERIOD_L2_SLOTS'
+    'SLASH_GRACE_PERIOD_L2_SLOTS',
+    // Validator acceptance limits.
+    'VALIDATOR_MAX_TX_PER_CHECKPOINT'
+];
+/**
+ * Consensus-critical vars an operator may raise above the network value but never lower. A validator that accepts
+ * more than the network limit still accepts every checkpoint an honest proposer builds within it, whereas a stricter
+ * one would reject a protocol-valid checkpoint and decline to attest to it.
+ */ export const NETWORK_CONSENSUS_RAISABLE_ENV_VARS = [
+    'VALIDATOR_MAX_TX_PER_CHECKPOINT'
 ];
 /** Config mappings for the slot-timing fields of {@link NetworkConsensusConfig}, picked from their owners. */ const networkConsensusConfigMappings = {
     ...pickConfigMappings(l1ContractsConfigMappings, [
@@ -177,13 +188,17 @@ import { sharedSequencerConfigMappings } from './sequencer-config.js';
  *
  * For each var in {@link NETWORK_CONSENSUS_ENV_VARS} present in `networkConfig`: if the operator set it in `env`
  * to a conflicting value, this throws unless `ALLOW_OVERRIDING_NETWORK_CONFIG` is truthy (in which case it logs
- * and keeps the operator value).
+ * and keeps the operator value). For a var in {@link NETWORK_CONSENSUS_RAISABLE_ENV_VARS}, only a value below the
+ * network one conflicts. The same applies to a `SEQ_MAX_TX_PER_CHECKPOINT` (from `env`, or else from
+ * `networkConfig`) above the network `VALIDATOR_MAX_TX_PER_CHECKPOINT`: validators running the network value would
+ * reject every checkpoint this node proposed over it.
  *
  * This function is pure: it never writes to `env`. Instead it returns the canonical env writes the caller
  * should apply — a map of env-var name to canonical string value for every numeric var whose env value matched
  * the network value numerically. Applying these closes a bypass where the config layer parses some vars with
  * `parseInt` (which reads '6e3' as 6); rewriting them to the network value's string form keeps the operator's
- * numerically-equal value but in canonical form. Vars kept under `ALLOW_OVERRIDING_NETWORK_CONFIG` (genuine
+ * numerically-equal value but in canonical form. A raisable var set above the network value is canonicalized to
+ * its own numeric value for the same reason. Vars kept under `ALLOW_OVERRIDING_NETWORK_CONFIG` (genuine
  * conflicts) are not included, so the operator value is preserved untouched.
  *
  * @returns Canonical env writes (env-var name -> canonical string value) for the caller to apply.
@@ -191,6 +206,13 @@ import { sharedSequencerConfigMappings } from './sequencer-config.js';
     const allowOverride = allowsNetworkConfigOverride(env);
     const canonical = {};
     const conflicts = [];
+    const reportConflict = (conflict)=>{
+        if (allowOverride) {
+            log?.(`Environment variable ${conflict}. Consensus-critical values must match across the network, but ` + `ALLOW_OVERRIDING_NETWORK_CONFIG is set so the operator value is kept (only do this if you know what ` + `you are doing).`);
+        } else {
+            conflicts.push(conflict);
+        }
+    };
     for (const envVar of NETWORK_CONSENSUS_ENV_VARS){
         const networkValue = networkConfig[envVar];
         if (networkValue === undefined) {
@@ -208,12 +230,19 @@ import { sharedSequencerConfigMappings } from './sequencer-config.js';
             }
             continue;
         }
-        const conflict = `${envVar}=${current} conflicts with the network value ${networkValue}`;
-        if (allowOverride) {
-            log?.(`Environment variable ${conflict}. Consensus-critical values must match across the network, but ` + `ALLOW_OVERRIDING_NETWORK_CONFIG is set so the operator value is kept (only do this if you know what ` + `you are doing).`);
+        if (NETWORK_CONSENSUS_RAISABLE_ENV_VARS.includes(envVar) && networkIsNumeric) {
+            if (Number(current) > networkValue) {
+                canonical[envVar] = String(Number(current));
+                continue;
+            }
+            reportConflict(`${envVar}=${current} is below the network value ${networkValue} and may only be raised`);
             continue;
         }
-        conflicts.push(conflict);
+        reportConflict(`${envVar}=${current} conflicts with the network value ${networkValue}`);
+    }
+    const proposerConflict = getProposerTxLimitConflict(networkConfig, env);
+    if (proposerConflict !== undefined) {
+        reportConflict(proposerConflict);
     }
     // Accumulate every conflict so the operator sees all the env vars they need to reconcile at once, rather than
     // fixing them one failed startup at a time.
@@ -222,6 +251,23 @@ import { sharedSequencerConfigMappings } from './sequencer-config.js';
     }
     return canonical;
 }
+/**
+ * Returns a conflict when this node would propose checkpoints with more txs than the network's validators accept:
+ * its `SEQ_MAX_TX_PER_CHECKPOINT` (from `env`, or else from `networkConfig`) exceeds the network
+ * `VALIDATOR_MAX_TX_PER_CHECKPOINT`. Compares against the network value, not this node's own raised one, since
+ * that is what the rest of the committee enforces.
+ */ function getProposerTxLimitConflict(networkConfig, env) {
+    const validatorMax = networkConfig.VALIDATOR_MAX_TX_PER_CHECKPOINT;
+    if (typeof validatorMax !== 'number') {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    const fromEnv = env.SEQ_MAX_TX_PER_CHECKPOINT;
+    const proposerMax = fromEnv !== undefined && fromEnv !== '' ? Number(fromEnv) : Number(networkConfig.SEQ_MAX_TX_PER_CHECKPOINT);
+    if (!Number.isFinite(proposerMax) || proposerMax <= validatorMax) {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    return `SEQ_MAX_TX_PER_CHECKPOINT=${proposerMax} exceeds the network VALIDATOR_MAX_TX_PER_CHECKPOINT of ` + `${validatorMax}, so validators would reject checkpoints this node proposes above it`;
+}
 /** Whether the env opts into overriding network-wide consensus values (`ALLOW_OVERRIDING_NETWORK_CONFIG`). */ export function allowsNetworkConfigOverride(env = process.env) {
     const value = env.ALLOW_OVERRIDING_NETWORK_CONFIG;
     return value === '1' || value?.toLowerCase() === 'true';

package/dest/gas/gas_fees.d.ts

@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ export declare class GasFees {
      */
     static fromPlainObject(obj: any): GasFees;
     static random(): GasFees;
+    /** The lower of the two fees on each dimension independently. */
+    static min(a: GasFees, b: GasFees): GasFees;
     static empty(): GasFees;
     isEmpty(): boolean;
     static fromBuffer(buffer: Buffer | BufferReader): GasFees;
@@ -48,4 +50,28 @@ export declare class GasFees {
 export interface BlockMinFeesProvider {
     getCurrentMinFees(): Promise<GasFees>;
 }
-//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,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
+/**
+ * Provides the mana min fee the next block this node would build is going to charge.
+ *
+ * Distinct from {@link BlockMinFeesProvider}, which answers the L1-anchored price after the on-chain pending
+ * checkpoint and therefore cannot see the fee a locally proposed in-progress checkpoint already froze.
+ */
+export interface NextBlockMinFeesProvider {
+    /**
+     * The fee the next block will charge, or undefined when the node cannot resolve it right now. For callers that
+     * must not act on a stand-in price, such as evicting transactions the next block could not include.
+     */
+    getNextBlockMinFees(): Promise<GasFees | undefined>;
+}
+/** Provides the mana min fees a transaction is held to on its way into this node, over gossip or into the pool. */
+export interface TxAdmissionMinFeesProvider extends NextBlockMinFeesProvider {
+    /**
+     * The fee a transaction must be able to pay to enter this node, over gossip or into the pending pool. The
+     * next-block fee when it resolves, otherwise the L1-forward fee, so admission never runs without a floor: a
+     * zero `maxFeesPerGas` has a zero fee limit, which a fee payer with no balance also covers.
+     */
+    getAdmissionMinFees(): Promise<GasFees>;
+    /** The L1-anchored fee projected after the on-chain pending checkpoint, as {@link BlockMinFeesProvider} reports. */
+    getL1ForwardMinFees(): Promise<GasFees>;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,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

package/dest/gas/gas_fees.d.ts.map

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package/dest/gas/gas_fees.js

@@ -70,6 +70,9 @@ _computedKey = inspect.custom;
     static random() {
         return new GasFees(Math.floor(Math.random() * 1e9), Math.floor(Math.random() * 1e9));
     }
+    /** The lower of the two fees on each dimension independently. */ static min(a, b) {
+        return new GasFees(a.feePerDaGas < b.feePerDaGas ? a.feePerDaGas : b.feePerDaGas, a.feePerL2Gas < b.feePerL2Gas ? a.feePerL2Gas : b.feePerL2Gas);
+    }
     static empty() {
         return new GasFees(0, 0);
     }

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@aztec-labs/stdlib",
-  "version": "6.0.0-nightly.20261001",
+  "version": "6.0.0-nightly.20261003",
   "type": "module",
   "inherits": [
     "../package.common.json",
@@ -92,12 +92,12 @@
   },
   "dependencies": {
     "@aws-sdk/client-s3": "^3.892.0",
-    "@aztec-foundation/bb.js": "6.0.0-rc.2",
-    "@aztec-foundation/noir-noirc_abi": "6.0.0-rc.2",
-    "@aztec-labs/blob-lib": "6.0.0-nightly.20261001",
-    "@aztec-labs/constants": "6.0.0-nightly.20261001",
-    "@aztec-labs/ethereum": "6.0.0-nightly.20261001",
-    "@aztec-labs/foundation": "6.0.0-nightly.20261001",
+    "@aztec-foundation/bb.js": "6.0.0-nightly.20261001",
+    "@aztec-foundation/noir-noirc_abi": "6.0.0-nightly.20261001",
+    "@aztec-labs/blob-lib": "6.0.0-nightly.20261003",
+    "@aztec-labs/constants": "6.0.0-nightly.20261003",
+    "@aztec-labs/ethereum": "6.0.0-nightly.20261003",
+    "@aztec-labs/foundation": "6.0.0-nightly.20261003",
     "@google-cloud/storage": "^7.15.0",
     "axios": "^1.15.1",
     "json-stringify-deterministic": "1.0.12",

package/src/config/network-consensus-config.ts

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ import { ProposerTimetable } from '../timetable/proposer_timetable.js';
 import { sharedSequencerConfigMappings } from './sequencer-config.js';
 
 /**
- * Environment variables whose values must be identical across every node of a network. They fall into three
+ * Environment variables whose values must be identical across every node of a network. They fall into four
  * categories, all consensus-critical:
  *
  * - Timing/protocol consensus: slot and epoch durations, block sub-slot duration, max blocks per checkpoint, and
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ import { sharedSequencerConfigMappings } from './sequencer-config.js';
  *   it points at would compute the wrong epoch geometry, fees, or slashing rounds.
  * - Node-side slashing offense consensus: the offense detection/penalty parameters validators apply locally to
  *   decide which payloads to sign. Validators must agree on these to reach the on-chain slashing quorum.
+ * - Validator acceptance limits: the most txs a validator accepts in a peer's checkpoint. These are floors rather
+ *   than exact values (see {@link NETWORK_CONSENSUS_RAISABLE_ENV_VARS}), and proposers must build within them.
  *
  * Deliberately excluded: bootnodes, P2P/store/OTEL/sentinel settings, SEQ_MIN_TX_PER_BLOCK, SEQ_MAX_TX_PER_*,
  * AZTEC_SLASHER_ENABLED, PROVER_REAL_PROOFS, TRANSACTIONS_DISABLED, and AZTEC_ENTRY_QUEUE_* (mainnet-only genesis
@@ -84,11 +86,21 @@ export const NETWORK_CONSENSUS_ENV_VARS = [
   'SLASH_INVALID_BLOCK_PENALTY',
   'SLASH_INVALID_CHECKPOINT_PROPOSAL_PENALTY',
   'SLASH_GRACE_PERIOD_L2_SLOTS',
+
+  // Validator acceptance limits.
+  'VALIDATOR_MAX_TX_PER_CHECKPOINT',
 ] as const satisfies readonly EnvVar[];
 
 /** A consensus-critical environment variable name; see {@link NETWORK_CONSENSUS_ENV_VARS}. */
 export type ConsensusEnvVar = (typeof NETWORK_CONSENSUS_ENV_VARS)[number];
 
+/**
+ * Consensus-critical vars an operator may raise above the network value but never lower. A validator that accepts
+ * more than the network limit still accepts every checkpoint an honest proposer builds within it, whereas a stricter
+ * one would reject a protocol-valid checkpoint and decline to attest to it.
+ */
+export const NETWORK_CONSENSUS_RAISABLE_ENV_VARS: readonly ConsensusEnvVar[] = ['VALIDATOR_MAX_TX_PER_CHECKPOINT'];
+
 /**
  * The subset of consensus-critical timing config whose geometry can be validated in isolation. Composed by
  * picking the canonical fields from their owning config types so the field set never drifts from the config
@@ -231,13 +243,17 @@ export function validateNetworkConsensusConfig(config: NetworkConsensusConfig):
  *
  * For each var in {@link NETWORK_CONSENSUS_ENV_VARS} present in `networkConfig`: if the operator set it in `env`
  * to a conflicting value, this throws unless `ALLOW_OVERRIDING_NETWORK_CONFIG` is truthy (in which case it logs
- * and keeps the operator value).
+ * and keeps the operator value). For a var in {@link NETWORK_CONSENSUS_RAISABLE_ENV_VARS}, only a value below the
+ * network one conflicts. The same applies to a `SEQ_MAX_TX_PER_CHECKPOINT` (from `env`, or else from
+ * `networkConfig`) above the network `VALIDATOR_MAX_TX_PER_CHECKPOINT`: validators running the network value would
+ * reject every checkpoint this node proposed over it.
  *
  * This function is pure: it never writes to `env`. Instead it returns the canonical env writes the caller
  * should apply — a map of env-var name to canonical string value for every numeric var whose env value matched
  * the network value numerically. Applying these closes a bypass where the config layer parses some vars with
  * `parseInt` (which reads '6e3' as 6); rewriting them to the network value's string form keeps the operator's
- * numerically-equal value but in canonical form. Vars kept under `ALLOW_OVERRIDING_NETWORK_CONFIG` (genuine
+ * numerically-equal value but in canonical form. A raisable var set above the network value is canonicalized to
+ * its own numeric value for the same reason. Vars kept under `ALLOW_OVERRIDING_NETWORK_CONFIG` (genuine
  * conflicts) are not included, so the operator value is preserved untouched.
  *
  * @returns Canonical env writes (env-var name -> canonical string value) for the caller to apply.
@@ -251,6 +267,18 @@ export function checkConsensusEnvOverrides(
   const canonical: Record<string, string> = {};
   const conflicts: string[] = [];
 
+  const reportConflict = (conflict: string) => {
+    if (allowOverride) {
+      log?.(
+        `Environment variable ${conflict}. Consensus-critical values must match across the network, but ` +
+          `ALLOW_OVERRIDING_NETWORK_CONFIG is set so the operator value is kept (only do this if you know what ` +
+          `you are doing).`,
+      );
+    } else {
+      conflicts.push(conflict);
+    }
+  };
+
   for (const envVar of NETWORK_CONSENSUS_ENV_VARS) {
     const networkValue = networkConfig[envVar];
     if (networkValue === undefined) {
@@ -271,16 +299,21 @@ export function checkConsensusEnvOverrides(
       continue;
     }
 
-    const conflict = `${envVar}=${current} conflicts with the network value ${networkValue}`;
-    if (allowOverride) {
-      log?.(
-        `Environment variable ${conflict}. Consensus-critical values must match across the network, but ` +
-          `ALLOW_OVERRIDING_NETWORK_CONFIG is set so the operator value is kept (only do this if you know what ` +
-          `you are doing).`,
-      );
+    if (NETWORK_CONSENSUS_RAISABLE_ENV_VARS.includes(envVar) && networkIsNumeric) {
+      if (Number(current) > networkValue) {
+        canonical[envVar] = String(Number(current));
+        continue;
+      }
+      reportConflict(`${envVar}=${current} is below the network value ${networkValue} and may only be raised`);
       continue;
     }
-    conflicts.push(conflict);
+
+    reportConflict(`${envVar}=${current} conflicts with the network value ${networkValue}`);
+  }
+
+  const proposerConflict = getProposerTxLimitConflict(networkConfig, env);
+  if (proposerConflict !== undefined) {
+    reportConflict(proposerConflict);
   }
 
   // Accumulate every conflict so the operator sees all the env vars they need to reconcile at once, rather than
@@ -297,6 +330,32 @@ export function checkConsensusEnvOverrides(
   return canonical;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Returns a conflict when this node would propose checkpoints with more txs than the network's validators accept:
+ * its `SEQ_MAX_TX_PER_CHECKPOINT` (from `env`, or else from `networkConfig`) exceeds the network
+ * `VALIDATOR_MAX_TX_PER_CHECKPOINT`. Compares against the network value, not this node's own raised one, since
+ * that is what the rest of the committee enforces.
+ */
+function getProposerTxLimitConflict(
+  networkConfig: Record<string, string | number | boolean>,
+  env: { [key: string]: string | undefined },
+): string | undefined {
+  const validatorMax = networkConfig.VALIDATOR_MAX_TX_PER_CHECKPOINT;
+  if (typeof validatorMax !== 'number') {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  const fromEnv = env.SEQ_MAX_TX_PER_CHECKPOINT;
+  const proposerMax =
+    fromEnv !== undefined && fromEnv !== '' ? Number(fromEnv) : Number(networkConfig.SEQ_MAX_TX_PER_CHECKPOINT);
+  if (!Number.isFinite(proposerMax) || proposerMax <= validatorMax) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  return (
+    `SEQ_MAX_TX_PER_CHECKPOINT=${proposerMax} exceeds the network VALIDATOR_MAX_TX_PER_CHECKPOINT of ` +
+    `${validatorMax}, so validators would reject checkpoints this node proposes above it`
+  );
+}
+
 /** Whether the env opts into overriding network-wide consensus values (`ALLOW_OVERRIDING_NETWORK_CONFIG`). */
 export function allowsNetworkConfigOverride(env: { [key: string]: string | undefined } = process.env): boolean {
   const value = env.ALLOW_OVERRIDING_NETWORK_CONFIG;

package/src/gas/gas_fees.ts

@@ -90,6 +90,14 @@ export class GasFees {
     return new GasFees(Math.floor(Math.random() * 1e9), Math.floor(Math.random() * 1e9));
   }
 
+  /** The lower of the two fees on each dimension independently. */
+  static min(a: GasFees, b: GasFees) {
+    return new GasFees(
+      a.feePerDaGas < b.feePerDaGas ? a.feePerDaGas : b.feePerDaGas,
+      a.feePerL2Gas < b.feePerL2Gas ? a.feePerL2Gas : b.feePerL2Gas,
+    );
+  }
+
   static empty() {
     return new GasFees(0, 0);
   }
@@ -138,3 +146,30 @@ export class GasFees {
 export interface BlockMinFeesProvider {
   getCurrentMinFees(): Promise<GasFees>;
 }
+
+/**
+ * Provides the mana min fee the next block this node would build is going to charge.
+ *
+ * Distinct from {@link BlockMinFeesProvider}, which answers the L1-anchored price after the on-chain pending
+ * checkpoint and therefore cannot see the fee a locally proposed in-progress checkpoint already froze.
+ */
+export interface NextBlockMinFeesProvider {
+  /**
+   * The fee the next block will charge, or undefined when the node cannot resolve it right now. For callers that
+   * must not act on a stand-in price, such as evicting transactions the next block could not include.
+   */
+  getNextBlockMinFees(): Promise<GasFees | undefined>;
+}
+
+/** Provides the mana min fees a transaction is held to on its way into this node, over gossip or into the pool. */
+export interface TxAdmissionMinFeesProvider extends NextBlockMinFeesProvider {
+  /**
+   * The fee a transaction must be able to pay to enter this node, over gossip or into the pending pool. The
+   * next-block fee when it resolves, otherwise the L1-forward fee, so admission never runs without a floor: a
+   * zero `maxFeesPerGas` has a zero fee limit, which a fee payer with no balance also covers.
+   */
+  getAdmissionMinFees(): Promise<GasFees>;
+
+  /** The L1-anchored fee projected after the on-chain pending checkpoint, as {@link BlockMinFeesProvider} reports. */
+  getL1ForwardMinFees(): Promise<GasFees>;
+}