@aztec-labs/protocol-contracts 6.0.0-rc.1 → 6.0.0-rc.2

package/artifacts/ContractClassRegistry.json

@@ -706,51 +706,63 @@
         },
         {
           "name": "poseidon2_hash_bytes",
-          "start": 11953
+          "start": 12580
+        },
+        {
+          "name": "poseidon2_hash_bytes_matches_hash_of_packed_chunks",
+          "start": 13179
+        },
+        {
+          "name": "poseidon2_hash_bytes_ignores_trailing_zeros_in_last_chunk",
+          "start": 13418
+        },
+        {
+          "name": "poseidon2_hash_bytes_commits_to_chunk_count",
+          "start": 13638
         },
         {
           "name": "subarray_hash_matches_fixed",
-          "start": 12529
+          "start": 13869
         },
         {
           "name": "subarray_hash_matches_variable",
-          "start": 12928
+          "start": 14268
         },
         {
           "name": "subarray_hash_with_separator_matches_fixed_len_with_separator",
-          "start": 13384
+          "start": 14724
         },
         {
           "name": "smoke_sha256_to_field",
-          "start": 14009
+          "start": 15349
         },
         {
           "name": "unique_siloed_note_hash_matches_typescript",
-          "start": 15411
+          "start": 16751
         },
         {
           "name": "siloed_nullifier_matches_typescript",
-          "start": 16633
+          "start": 17973
         },
         {
           "name": "siloed_private_log_first_field_matches_typescript",
-          "start": 17013
+          "start": 18353
         },
         {
           "name": "empty_l2_to_l1_message_hash_matches_typescript",
-          "start": 17423
+          "start": 18763
         },
         {
           "name": "l2_to_l1_message_hash_matches_typescript",
-          "start": 17874
+          "start": 19214
         },
         {
           "name": "poseidon2_hash_with_separator_bounded_vec_matches_non_bounded_vec_version",
-          "start": 18490
+          "start": 19830
         }
       ],
       "path": "/home/aztec-dev/aztec-packages/noir-projects/fnd/noir-protocol-circuits/crates/types/src/hash.nr",
-      "source": "mod poseidon2_chunks;\n\nuse crate::{\n    abis::{\n        contract_class_function_leaf_preimage::ContractClassFunctionLeafPreimage,\n        function_selector::FunctionSelector, nullifier::Nullifier, private_log::PrivateLog,\n        transaction::tx_request::TxRequest,\n    },\n    address::{AztecAddress, EthAddress},\n    constants::{\n        CONTRACT_CLASS_LOG_SIZE_IN_FIELDS, DOM_SEP__NOTE_HASH_NONCE,\n        DOM_SEP__PRIVATE_LOG_FIRST_FIELD, DOM_SEP__SILOED_NOTE_HASH, DOM_SEP__SILOED_NULLIFIER,\n        DOM_SEP__UNIQUE_NOTE_HASH, FUNCTION_TREE_HEIGHT, NULL_MSG_SENDER_CONTRACT_ADDRESS,\n        TWO_POW_64,\n    },\n    merkle_tree::root_from_sibling_path,\n    messaging::l2_to_l1_message::L2ToL1Message,\n    poseidon2::Poseidon2Sponge,\n    side_effect::{Counted, Scoped},\n    traits::{FromField, Hash, ToField},\n    utils::field::{field_from_bytes, field_from_bytes_32_trunc},\n};\n\npub use poseidon2_chunks::poseidon2_absorb_in_chunks_existing_sponge;\nuse poseidon2_chunks::poseidon2_absorb_in_chunks;\nuse std::embedded_curve_ops::EmbeddedCurveScalar;\n\n// TODO: refactor these into their own files: sha256, poseidon2, some protocol-specific hash computations, some merkle computations.\n\npub fn sha256_to_field<let N: u32>(bytes_to_hash: [u8; N]) -> Field {\n    let sha256_hashed = sha256::digest(bytes_to_hash);\n    let hash_in_a_field = field_from_bytes_32_trunc(sha256_hashed);\n\n    hash_in_a_field\n}\n\npub fn private_functions_root_from_siblings(\n    selector: FunctionSelector,\n    vk_hash: Field,\n    function_leaf_index: Field,\n    function_leaf_sibling_path: [Field; FUNCTION_TREE_HEIGHT],\n) -> Field {\n    let function_leaf_preimage = ContractClassFunctionLeafPreimage { selector, vk_hash };\n    let function_leaf = function_leaf_preimage.hash();\n    root_from_sibling_path(\n        function_leaf,\n        function_leaf_index,\n        function_leaf_sibling_path,\n    )\n}\n\n/// Siloing in the context of Aztec refers to the process of hashing a note hash with a contract address (this way\n/// the note hash is scoped to a specific contract). This is used to prevent intermingling of notes between contracts.\npub fn compute_siloed_note_hash(contract_address: AztecAddress, note_hash: Field) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [contract_address.to_field(), note_hash],\n        DOM_SEP__SILOED_NOTE_HASH,\n    )\n}\n\n/// Computes unique, siloed note hashes from siloed note hashes.\n///\n/// The protocol injects uniqueness into every note_hash, so that every single note_hash in the\n/// tree is unique. This prevents faerie gold attacks, where a malicious sender could create\n/// two identical note_hashes for a recipient (meaning only one would be nullifiable in future).\n///\n/// Most privacy protocols will inject the note's leaf_index (its position in the Note Hashes Tree)\n/// into the note, but this requires the creator of a note to wait until their tx is included in\n/// a block to know the note's final note hash (the unique, siloed note hash), because inserting\n/// leaves into trees is the job of a block producer.\n///\n/// We took a different approach so that the creator of a note will know each note's unique, siloed\n/// note hash before broadcasting their tx to the network.\n/// (There was also a historical requirement relating to \"chained transactions\" -- a feature that\n/// Aztec Connect had to enable notes to be spent from distinct txs earlier in the same block,\n/// and hence before an archive block root had been established for that block -- but that feature\n/// was abandoned for the Aztec Network for having too many bad tradeoffs).\n///\n/// (\n///   Edit: it is no longer true that all final note_hashes will be known by the creator of a tx\n///   before they send it to the network. If a tx makes public function calls, then _revertible_\n///   note_hashes that are created in private will not be made unique in private by the Reset circuit,\n///   but will instead be made unique by the AVM, because the `note_index_in_tx` will not be known\n///   until the AVM has executed the public functions of the tx. (See an explanation in\n///   reset_output_composer.nr for why).\n///   For some such txs, the `note_index_in_tx` might still be predictable through simulation, but\n///   for txs whose public functions create a varying number of non-revertible notes (determined at\n///   runtime), the `note_index_in_tx` will not be deterministically derivable before submitting the\n///   tx to the network.\n/// )\n///\n/// We use the `first_nullifier` of a tx as a seed of uniqueness. We have a guarantee that there will\n/// always be at least one nullifier per tx, because the init circuit will create one if one isn't\n/// created naturally by any functions of the tx. (Search \"protocol_nullifier\").\n/// We combine the `first_nullifier` with the note's index (its position within this tx's new\n/// note_hashes array) (`note_index_in_tx`) to get a truly unique value to inject into a note, which\n/// we call a `note_nonce`.\npub fn compute_unique_note_hash(note_nonce: Field, siloed_note_hash: Field) -> Field {\n    let inputs = [note_nonce, siloed_note_hash];\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(inputs, DOM_SEP__UNIQUE_NOTE_HASH)\n}\n\npub fn compute_note_hash_nonce(first_nullifier_in_tx: Field, note_index_in_tx: u32) -> Field {\n    // Hashing the first nullifier with note index in tx is guaranteed to be unique (because all nullifiers are also\n    // unique).\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [first_nullifier_in_tx, note_index_in_tx as Field],\n        DOM_SEP__NOTE_HASH_NONCE,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn compute_note_nonce_and_unique_note_hash(\n    siloed_note_hash: Field,\n    first_nullifier: Field,\n    note_index_in_tx: u32,\n) -> Field {\n    let note_nonce = compute_note_hash_nonce(first_nullifier, note_index_in_tx);\n    compute_unique_note_hash(note_nonce, siloed_note_hash)\n}\n\npub fn compute_siloed_nullifier(contract_address: AztecAddress, nullifier: Field) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [contract_address.to_field(), nullifier],\n        DOM_SEP__SILOED_NULLIFIER,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn create_protocol_nullifier(tx_request: TxRequest) -> Scoped<Counted<Nullifier>> {\n    // The protocol nullifier is ascribed a special side-effect counter of 1. No other side-effect\n    // can have counter 1 (see `validate_as_first_call` for that assertion). Its value is the\n    // transaction's nonce commitment (origin, chain id, version, salt): see\n    // `TxRequest::compute_protocol_nullifier_value`. The reset kernel siloes it under\n    // `NULL_MSG_SENDER_CONTRACT_ADDRESS` like every other nullifier.\n    Nullifier { value: tx_request.compute_protocol_nullifier_value(), note_hash: 0 }.count(1).scope(\n        NULL_MSG_SENDER_CONTRACT_ADDRESS,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn compute_log_tag(raw_tag: Field, dom_sep: u32) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator([raw_tag], dom_sep)\n}\n\npub fn compute_siloed_private_log_first_field(\n    contract_address: AztecAddress,\n    field: Field,\n) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [contract_address.to_field(), field],\n        DOM_SEP__PRIVATE_LOG_FIRST_FIELD,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn compute_siloed_private_log(contract_address: AztecAddress, log: PrivateLog) -> PrivateLog {\n    let mut fields = log.fields;\n    fields[0] = compute_siloed_private_log_first_field(contract_address, fields[0]);\n    PrivateLog::new(fields, log.length)\n}\n\npub fn compute_contract_class_log_hash(log: [Field; CONTRACT_CLASS_LOG_SIZE_IN_FIELDS]) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash(log)\n}\n\npub fn compute_app_siloed_secret_key(\n    master_secret_key: EmbeddedCurveScalar,\n    app_address: AztecAddress,\n    key_type_domain_separator: Field,\n) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [master_secret_key.hi, master_secret_key.lo, app_address.to_field()],\n        key_type_domain_separator,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn compute_l2_to_l1_message_hash(\n    message: Scoped<L2ToL1Message>,\n    rollup_version_id: Field,\n    chain_id: Field,\n) -> Field {\n    let contract_address_bytes: [u8; 32] = message.contract_address.to_field().to_be_bytes();\n    let recipient_bytes: [u8; 20] = message.inner.recipient.to_be_bytes();\n    let content_bytes: [u8; 32] = message.inner.content.to_be_bytes();\n    let rollup_version_id_bytes: [u8; 32] = rollup_version_id.to_be_bytes();\n    let chain_id_bytes: [u8; 32] = chain_id.to_be_bytes();\n\n    let mut bytes: [u8; 148] = std::mem::zeroed();\n    for i in 0..32 {\n        bytes[i] = contract_address_bytes[i];\n        bytes[i + 32] = rollup_version_id_bytes[i];\n        // 64 - 84 are for recipient.\n        bytes[i + 84] = chain_id_bytes[i];\n        bytes[i + 116] = content_bytes[i];\n    }\n\n    for i in 0..20 {\n        bytes[64 + i] = recipient_bytes[i];\n    }\n\n    sha256_to_field(bytes)\n}\n\n/// Computes sha256 hash of 2 input fields.\n///\n/// @returns A truncated field (i.e., the first byte is always 0).\npub fn accumulate_sha256(v0: Field, v1: Field) -> Field {\n    // Concatenate two fields into 32 x 2 = 64 bytes\n    let v0_as_bytes: [u8; 32] = v0.to_be_bytes();\n    let v1_as_bytes: [u8; 32] = v1.to_be_bytes();\n    let hash_input_flattened = v0_as_bytes.concat(v1_as_bytes);\n\n    sha256_to_field(hash_input_flattened)\n}\n\n/// Computes sha256 hash of 2 input fields, prefixed by a domain separator, so that the result cannot collide with an\n/// [`accumulate_sha256`] over the same two fields.\n///\n/// @returns A truncated field (i.e., the first byte is always 0).\npub fn accumulate_sha256_with_separator(separator: u32, v0: Field, v1: Field) -> Field {\n    // Concatenate the separator and two fields into 4 + 32 x 2 = 68 bytes\n    let separator_as_bytes: [u8; 4] = (separator as Field).to_be_bytes();\n    let v0_as_bytes: [u8; 32] = v0.to_be_bytes();\n    let v1_as_bytes: [u8; 32] = v1.to_be_bytes();\n    let hash_input_flattened = separator_as_bytes.concat(v0_as_bytes).concat(v1_as_bytes);\n\n    sha256_to_field(hash_input_flattened)\n}\n\npub fn poseidon2_hash<let N: u32>(inputs: [Field; N]) -> Field {\n    poseidon::poseidon2::Poseidon2::hash(inputs, N)\n}\n\n#[no_predicates]\npub fn poseidon2_hash_with_separator<let N: u32, T>(inputs: [Field; N], separator: T) -> Field\nwhere\n    T: ToField,\n{\n    let inputs_with_separator = [separator.to_field()].concat(inputs);\n    poseidon2_hash(inputs_with_separator)\n}\n\n/// Computes a Poseidon2 hash over a dynamic-length subarray of the given input.\n/// Only the first `in_len` fields of `input` are absorbed; any remaining fields are ignored.\n/// The caller is responsible for ensuring that the input is padded with zeros if required.\n#[no_predicates]\npub fn poseidon2_hash_subarray<let N: u32>(input: [Field; N], in_len: u32) -> Field {\n    let mut sponge = poseidon2_absorb_in_chunks(input, in_len);\n    sponge.squeeze()\n}\n\n/// Computes a Poseidon2 hash with a domain separator over a dynamic-length subarray of the given input.\n/// Only the first `in_len` fields of `input` are absorbed; any remaining fields are ignored.\n/// For `in_len == N` this is equivalent to [`poseidon2_hash_with_separator`].\n#[no_predicates]\npub fn poseidon2_hash_subarray_with_separator<let N: u32, T>(\n    input: [Field; N],\n    in_len: u32,\n    separator: T,\n) -> Field\nwhere\n    T: ToField,\n{\n    let inputs_with_separator = [separator.to_field()].concat(input);\n    poseidon::poseidon2::Poseidon2::hash(inputs_with_separator, in_len + 1)\n}\n\n// This function is  unconstrained because it is intended to be used in unconstrained context only as\n// in constrained contexts it would be too inefficient.\npub unconstrained fn poseidon2_hash_with_separator_bounded_vec<let N: u32, T>(\n    inputs: BoundedVec<Field, N>,\n    separator: T,\n) -> Field\nwhere\n    T: ToField,\n{\n    let in_len = inputs.len() + 1;\n    let iv: Field = (in_len as Field) * TWO_POW_64;\n    let mut sponge = Poseidon2Sponge::new(iv);\n    sponge.absorb(separator.to_field());\n\n    for i in 0..inputs.len() {\n        sponge.absorb(inputs.get(i));\n    }\n\n    sponge.squeeze()\n}\n\n#[no_predicates]\npub fn poseidon2_hash_bytes<let N: u32>(inputs: [u8; N]) -> Field {\n    let mut fields = [0; (N + 30) / 31];\n    let mut field_index = 0;\n    let mut current_field = [0; 31];\n    for i in 0..inputs.len() {\n        let index = i % 31;\n        current_field[index] = inputs[i];\n        if index == 30 {\n            fields[field_index] = field_from_bytes(current_field, false);\n            current_field = [0; 31];\n            field_index += 1;\n        }\n    }\n    if field_index != fields.len() {\n        fields[field_index] = field_from_bytes(current_field, false);\n    }\n    poseidon2_hash(fields)\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn subarray_hash_matches_fixed() {\n    let values_to_hash = [3; 17];\n    let padded = values_to_hash.concat([0; 11]);\n    let subarray_hash = poseidon2_hash_subarray(padded, values_to_hash.len());\n\n    // Hash the entire values_to_hash.\n    let fixed_len_hash = poseidon::poseidon2::Poseidon2::hash(values_to_hash, values_to_hash.len());\n\n    assert_eq(subarray_hash, fixed_len_hash);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn subarray_hash_matches_variable() {\n    let values_to_hash = [3; 17];\n    let padded = values_to_hash.concat([0; 11]);\n    let subarray_hash = poseidon2_hash_subarray(padded, values_to_hash.len());\n\n    // Hash up to values_to_hash.len() fields of the padded array.\n    let variable_len_hash = poseidon::poseidon2::Poseidon2::hash(padded, values_to_hash.len());\n\n    assert_eq(subarray_hash, variable_len_hash);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn subarray_hash_with_separator_matches_fixed_len_with_separator() {\n    let values_to_hash = [3; 17];\n    let padded = values_to_hash.concat([0; 11]);\n    let separator = 42;\n\n    assert_eq(\n        poseidon2_hash_subarray_with_separator(padded, values_to_hash.len(), separator),\n        poseidon2_hash_with_separator(values_to_hash, separator),\n    );\n    // Hashing the whole array must differ from hashing a prefix of it, even though the padding is zero.\n    assert(\n        poseidon2_hash_subarray_with_separator(padded, padded.len(), separator)\n            != poseidon2_hash_subarray_with_separator(padded, values_to_hash.len(), separator),\n    );\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn smoke_sha256_to_field() {\n    let full_buffer = [\n        0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,\n        25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47,\n        48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70,\n        71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93,\n        94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112,\n        113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130,\n        131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148,\n        149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159,\n    ];\n    let result = sha256_to_field(full_buffer);\n\n    assert(result == 0x448ebbc9e1a31220a2f3830c18eef61b9bd070e5084b7fa2a359fe729184c7);\n\n    // to show correctness of the current ver (truncate one byte) vs old ver (mod full bytes):\n    let result_bytes = sha256::digest(full_buffer);\n    let truncated_field = crate::utils::field::field_from_bytes_32_trunc(result_bytes);\n    assert(truncated_field == result);\n    let mod_res = result + (result_bytes[31] as Field);\n    assert(mod_res == 0x448ebbc9e1a31220a2f3830c18eef61b9bd070e5084b7fa2a359fe729184e0);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn unique_siloed_note_hash_matches_typescript() {\n    let inner_note_hash = 1;\n    let contract_address = AztecAddress::from_field(2);\n    let first_nullifier = 3;\n    let note_index_in_tx = 4;\n\n    let siloed_note_hash = compute_siloed_note_hash(contract_address, inner_note_hash);\n    let siloed_note_hash_from_ts =\n        0x1986a4bea3eddb1fff917d629a13e10f63f514f401bdd61838c6b475db949169;\n    assert_eq(siloed_note_hash, siloed_note_hash_from_ts);\n\n    let nonce: Field = compute_note_hash_nonce(first_nullifier, note_index_in_tx);\n    let note_hash_nonce_from_ts =\n        0x28e7799791bf066a57bb51fdd0fbcaf3f0926414314c7db515ea343f44f5d58b;\n    assert_eq(nonce, note_hash_nonce_from_ts);\n\n    let unique_siloed_note_hash_from_nonce = compute_unique_note_hash(nonce, siloed_note_hash);\n    let unique_siloed_note_hash = compute_note_nonce_and_unique_note_hash(\n        siloed_note_hash,\n        first_nullifier,\n        note_index_in_tx,\n    );\n    assert_eq(unique_siloed_note_hash_from_nonce, unique_siloed_note_hash);\n\n    let unique_siloed_note_hash_from_ts =\n        0x29949aef207b715303b24639737c17fbfeb375c1d965ecfa85c7e4f0febb7d16;\n    assert_eq(unique_siloed_note_hash, unique_siloed_note_hash_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn siloed_nullifier_matches_typescript() {\n    let contract_address = AztecAddress::from_field(123);\n    let nullifier = 456;\n\n    let res = compute_siloed_nullifier(contract_address, nullifier);\n\n    let siloed_nullifier_from_ts =\n        0x169b50336c1f29afdb8a03d955a81e485f5ac7d5f0b8065673d1e407e5877813;\n\n    assert_eq(res, siloed_nullifier_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn siloed_private_log_first_field_matches_typescript() {\n    let contract_address = AztecAddress::from_field(123);\n    let field = 456;\n    let res = compute_siloed_private_log_first_field(contract_address, field);\n\n    let siloed_private_log_first_field_from_ts =\n        0x29480984f7b9257fded523d50addbcfc8d1d33adcf2db73ef3390a8fd5cdffaa;\n\n    assert_eq(res, siloed_private_log_first_field_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn empty_l2_to_l1_message_hash_matches_typescript() {\n    // All zeroes\n    let res = compute_l2_to_l1_message_hash(\n        L2ToL1Message { recipient: EthAddress::zero(), content: 0 }.scope(AztecAddress::from_field(\n            0,\n        )),\n        0,\n        0,\n    );\n\n    let empty_l2_to_l1_msg_hash_from_ts =\n        0x003b18c58c739716e76429634a61375c45b3b5cd470c22ab6d3e14cee23dd992;\n\n    assert_eq(res, empty_l2_to_l1_msg_hash_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn l2_to_l1_message_hash_matches_typescript() {\n    let message = L2ToL1Message { recipient: EthAddress::from_field(1), content: 2 }.scope(\n        AztecAddress::from_field(3),\n    );\n    let version = 4;\n    let chainId = 5;\n\n    let hash = compute_l2_to_l1_message_hash(message, version, chainId);\n\n    // The following value was generated by `yarn-project/stdlib/src/hash/hash.test.ts`\n    let l2_to_l1_message_hash_from_ts =\n        0x0081edf209e087ad31b3fd24263698723d57190bd1d6e9fe056fc0c0a68ee661;\n\n    assert_eq(hash, l2_to_l1_message_hash_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nunconstrained fn poseidon2_hash_with_separator_bounded_vec_matches_non_bounded_vec_version() {\n    let inputs = BoundedVec::<Field, 4>::from_array([1, 2, 3]);\n    let separator = 42;\n\n    // Hash using bounded vec version\n    let bounded_result = poseidon2_hash_with_separator_bounded_vec(inputs, separator);\n\n    // Hash using regular version\n    let regular_result = poseidon2_hash_with_separator([1, 2, 3], separator);\n\n    // Results should match\n    assert_eq(bounded_result, regular_result);\n}\n"
+      "source": "mod poseidon2_chunks;\n\nuse crate::{\n    abis::{\n        contract_class_function_leaf_preimage::ContractClassFunctionLeafPreimage,\n        function_selector::FunctionSelector, nullifier::Nullifier, private_log::PrivateLog,\n        transaction::tx_request::TxRequest,\n    },\n    address::{AztecAddress, EthAddress},\n    constants::{\n        CONTRACT_CLASS_LOG_SIZE_IN_FIELDS, DOM_SEP__NOTE_HASH_NONCE,\n        DOM_SEP__PRIVATE_LOG_FIRST_FIELD, DOM_SEP__SILOED_NOTE_HASH, DOM_SEP__SILOED_NULLIFIER,\n        DOM_SEP__UNIQUE_NOTE_HASH, FUNCTION_TREE_HEIGHT, NULL_MSG_SENDER_CONTRACT_ADDRESS,\n        TWO_POW_64,\n    },\n    merkle_tree::root_from_sibling_path,\n    messaging::l2_to_l1_message::L2ToL1Message,\n    poseidon2::Poseidon2Sponge,\n    side_effect::{Counted, Scoped},\n    traits::{FromField, Hash, ToField},\n    utils::field::{field_from_bytes, field_from_bytes_32_trunc},\n};\n\npub use poseidon2_chunks::poseidon2_absorb_in_chunks_existing_sponge;\nuse poseidon2_chunks::poseidon2_absorb_in_chunks;\nuse std::embedded_curve_ops::EmbeddedCurveScalar;\n\n// TODO: refactor these into their own files: sha256, poseidon2, some protocol-specific hash computations, some merkle computations.\n\npub fn sha256_to_field<let N: u32>(bytes_to_hash: [u8; N]) -> Field {\n    let sha256_hashed = sha256::digest(bytes_to_hash);\n    let hash_in_a_field = field_from_bytes_32_trunc(sha256_hashed);\n\n    hash_in_a_field\n}\n\npub fn private_functions_root_from_siblings(\n    selector: FunctionSelector,\n    vk_hash: Field,\n    function_leaf_index: Field,\n    function_leaf_sibling_path: [Field; FUNCTION_TREE_HEIGHT],\n) -> Field {\n    let function_leaf_preimage = ContractClassFunctionLeafPreimage { selector, vk_hash };\n    let function_leaf = function_leaf_preimage.hash();\n    root_from_sibling_path(\n        function_leaf,\n        function_leaf_index,\n        function_leaf_sibling_path,\n    )\n}\n\n/// Siloing in the context of Aztec refers to the process of hashing a note hash with a contract address (this way\n/// the note hash is scoped to a specific contract). This is used to prevent intermingling of notes between contracts.\npub fn compute_siloed_note_hash(contract_address: AztecAddress, note_hash: Field) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [contract_address.to_field(), note_hash],\n        DOM_SEP__SILOED_NOTE_HASH,\n    )\n}\n\n/// Computes unique, siloed note hashes from siloed note hashes.\n///\n/// The protocol injects uniqueness into every note_hash, so that every single note_hash in the\n/// tree is unique. This prevents faerie gold attacks, where a malicious sender could create\n/// two identical note_hashes for a recipient (meaning only one would be nullifiable in future).\n///\n/// Most privacy protocols will inject the note's leaf_index (its position in the Note Hashes Tree)\n/// into the note, but this requires the creator of a note to wait until their tx is included in\n/// a block to know the note's final note hash (the unique, siloed note hash), because inserting\n/// leaves into trees is the job of a block producer.\n///\n/// We took a different approach so that the creator of a note will know each note's unique, siloed\n/// note hash before broadcasting their tx to the network.\n/// (There was also a historical requirement relating to \"chained transactions\" -- a feature that\n/// Aztec Connect had to enable notes to be spent from distinct txs earlier in the same block,\n/// and hence before an archive block root had been established for that block -- but that feature\n/// was abandoned for the Aztec Network for having too many bad tradeoffs).\n///\n/// (\n///   Edit: it is no longer true that all final note_hashes will be known by the creator of a tx\n///   before they send it to the network. If a tx makes public function calls, then _revertible_\n///   note_hashes that are created in private will not be made unique in private by the Reset circuit,\n///   but will instead be made unique by the AVM, because the `note_index_in_tx` will not be known\n///   until the AVM has executed the public functions of the tx. (See an explanation in\n///   reset_output_composer.nr for why).\n///   For some such txs, the `note_index_in_tx` might still be predictable through simulation, but\n///   for txs whose public functions create a varying number of non-revertible notes (determined at\n///   runtime), the `note_index_in_tx` will not be deterministically derivable before submitting the\n///   tx to the network.\n/// )\n///\n/// We use the `first_nullifier` of a tx as a seed of uniqueness. We have a guarantee that there will\n/// always be at least one nullifier per tx, because the init circuit will create one if one isn't\n/// created naturally by any functions of the tx. (Search \"protocol_nullifier\").\n/// We combine the `first_nullifier` with the note's index (its position within this tx's new\n/// note_hashes array) (`note_index_in_tx`) to get a truly unique value to inject into a note, which\n/// we call a `note_nonce`.\npub fn compute_unique_note_hash(note_nonce: Field, siloed_note_hash: Field) -> Field {\n    let inputs = [note_nonce, siloed_note_hash];\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(inputs, DOM_SEP__UNIQUE_NOTE_HASH)\n}\n\npub fn compute_note_hash_nonce(first_nullifier_in_tx: Field, note_index_in_tx: u32) -> Field {\n    // Hashing the first nullifier with note index in tx is guaranteed to be unique (because all nullifiers are also\n    // unique).\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [first_nullifier_in_tx, note_index_in_tx as Field],\n        DOM_SEP__NOTE_HASH_NONCE,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn compute_note_nonce_and_unique_note_hash(\n    siloed_note_hash: Field,\n    first_nullifier: Field,\n    note_index_in_tx: u32,\n) -> Field {\n    let note_nonce = compute_note_hash_nonce(first_nullifier, note_index_in_tx);\n    compute_unique_note_hash(note_nonce, siloed_note_hash)\n}\n\npub fn compute_siloed_nullifier(contract_address: AztecAddress, nullifier: Field) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [contract_address.to_field(), nullifier],\n        DOM_SEP__SILOED_NULLIFIER,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn create_protocol_nullifier(tx_request: TxRequest) -> Scoped<Counted<Nullifier>> {\n    // The protocol nullifier is ascribed a special side-effect counter of 1. No other side-effect\n    // can have counter 1 (see `validate_as_first_call` for that assertion). Its value is the\n    // transaction's nonce commitment (origin, chain id, version, salt): see\n    // `TxRequest::compute_protocol_nullifier_value`. The reset kernel siloes it under\n    // `NULL_MSG_SENDER_CONTRACT_ADDRESS` like every other nullifier.\n    Nullifier { value: tx_request.compute_protocol_nullifier_value(), note_hash: 0 }.count(1).scope(\n        NULL_MSG_SENDER_CONTRACT_ADDRESS,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn compute_log_tag(raw_tag: Field, dom_sep: u32) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator([raw_tag], dom_sep)\n}\n\npub fn compute_siloed_private_log_first_field(\n    contract_address: AztecAddress,\n    field: Field,\n) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [contract_address.to_field(), field],\n        DOM_SEP__PRIVATE_LOG_FIRST_FIELD,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn compute_siloed_private_log(contract_address: AztecAddress, log: PrivateLog) -> PrivateLog {\n    let mut fields = log.fields;\n    fields[0] = compute_siloed_private_log_first_field(contract_address, fields[0]);\n    PrivateLog::new(fields, log.length)\n}\n\npub fn compute_contract_class_log_hash(log: [Field; CONTRACT_CLASS_LOG_SIZE_IN_FIELDS]) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash(log)\n}\n\npub fn compute_app_siloed_secret_key(\n    master_secret_key: EmbeddedCurveScalar,\n    app_address: AztecAddress,\n    key_type_domain_separator: Field,\n) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [master_secret_key.hi, master_secret_key.lo, app_address.to_field()],\n        key_type_domain_separator,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn compute_l2_to_l1_message_hash(\n    message: Scoped<L2ToL1Message>,\n    rollup_version_id: Field,\n    chain_id: Field,\n) -> Field {\n    let contract_address_bytes: [u8; 32] = message.contract_address.to_field().to_be_bytes();\n    let recipient_bytes: [u8; 20] = message.inner.recipient.to_be_bytes();\n    let content_bytes: [u8; 32] = message.inner.content.to_be_bytes();\n    let rollup_version_id_bytes: [u8; 32] = rollup_version_id.to_be_bytes();\n    let chain_id_bytes: [u8; 32] = chain_id.to_be_bytes();\n\n    let mut bytes: [u8; 148] = std::mem::zeroed();\n    for i in 0..32 {\n        bytes[i] = contract_address_bytes[i];\n        bytes[i + 32] = rollup_version_id_bytes[i];\n        // 64 - 84 are for recipient.\n        bytes[i + 84] = chain_id_bytes[i];\n        bytes[i + 116] = content_bytes[i];\n    }\n\n    for i in 0..20 {\n        bytes[64 + i] = recipient_bytes[i];\n    }\n\n    sha256_to_field(bytes)\n}\n\n/// Computes sha256 hash of 2 input fields.\n///\n/// @returns A truncated field (i.e., the first byte is always 0).\npub fn accumulate_sha256(v0: Field, v1: Field) -> Field {\n    // Concatenate two fields into 32 x 2 = 64 bytes\n    let v0_as_bytes: [u8; 32] = v0.to_be_bytes();\n    let v1_as_bytes: [u8; 32] = v1.to_be_bytes();\n    let hash_input_flattened = v0_as_bytes.concat(v1_as_bytes);\n\n    sha256_to_field(hash_input_flattened)\n}\n\n/// Computes sha256 hash of 2 input fields, prefixed by a domain separator, so that the result cannot collide with an\n/// [`accumulate_sha256`] over the same two fields.\n///\n/// @returns A truncated field (i.e., the first byte is always 0).\npub fn accumulate_sha256_with_separator(separator: u32, v0: Field, v1: Field) -> Field {\n    // Concatenate the separator and two fields into 4 + 32 x 2 = 68 bytes\n    let separator_as_bytes: [u8; 4] = (separator as Field).to_be_bytes();\n    let v0_as_bytes: [u8; 32] = v0.to_be_bytes();\n    let v1_as_bytes: [u8; 32] = v1.to_be_bytes();\n    let hash_input_flattened = separator_as_bytes.concat(v0_as_bytes).concat(v1_as_bytes);\n\n    sha256_to_field(hash_input_flattened)\n}\n\npub fn poseidon2_hash<let N: u32>(inputs: [Field; N]) -> Field {\n    poseidon::poseidon2::Poseidon2::hash(inputs, N)\n}\n\n#[no_predicates]\npub fn poseidon2_hash_with_separator<let N: u32, T>(inputs: [Field; N], separator: T) -> Field\nwhere\n    T: ToField,\n{\n    let inputs_with_separator = [separator.to_field()].concat(inputs);\n    poseidon2_hash(inputs_with_separator)\n}\n\n/// Computes a Poseidon2 hash over a dynamic-length subarray of the given input.\n/// Only the first `in_len` fields of `input` are absorbed; any remaining fields are ignored.\n/// The caller is responsible for ensuring that the input is padded with zeros if required.\n#[no_predicates]\npub fn poseidon2_hash_subarray<let N: u32>(input: [Field; N], in_len: u32) -> Field {\n    let mut sponge = poseidon2_absorb_in_chunks(input, in_len);\n    sponge.squeeze()\n}\n\n/// Computes a Poseidon2 hash with a domain separator over a dynamic-length subarray of the given input.\n/// Only the first `in_len` fields of `input` are absorbed; any remaining fields are ignored.\n/// For `in_len == N` this is equivalent to [`poseidon2_hash_with_separator`].\n#[no_predicates]\npub fn poseidon2_hash_subarray_with_separator<let N: u32, T>(\n    input: [Field; N],\n    in_len: u32,\n    separator: T,\n) -> Field\nwhere\n    T: ToField,\n{\n    let inputs_with_separator = [separator.to_field()].concat(input);\n    poseidon::poseidon2::Poseidon2::hash(inputs_with_separator, in_len + 1)\n}\n\n// This function is  unconstrained because it is intended to be used in unconstrained context only as\n// in constrained contexts it would be too inefficient.\npub unconstrained fn poseidon2_hash_with_separator_bounded_vec<let N: u32, T>(\n    inputs: BoundedVec<Field, N>,\n    separator: T,\n) -> Field\nwhere\n    T: ToField,\n{\n    let in_len = inputs.len() + 1;\n    let iv: Field = (in_len as Field) * TWO_POW_64;\n    let mut sponge = Poseidon2Sponge::new(iv);\n    sponge.absorb(separator.to_field());\n\n    for i in 0..inputs.len() {\n        sponge.absorb(inputs.get(i));\n    }\n\n    sponge.squeeze()\n}\n\n/// Computes a Poseidon2 hash of a fixed string, such as a function signature or a domain separator name.\n///\n/// The bytes are packed into 31-byte little-endian chunks, one `Field` per chunk, and the result is\n/// [`poseidon2_hash`] of those fields.\n///\n/// The hash commits to the number of chunks but not to the byte length `N`: zero bytes at the end of the last chunk\n/// do not change the result, so `[1]`, `[1, 0]` and `[1, 0, ..., 0]` (31 bytes) all hash to the same value. Do not\n/// use this to commit to variable-length data, e.g. a payload zero-padded to a maximum length, unless the length is\n/// bound separately.\n#[no_predicates]\npub fn poseidon2_hash_bytes<let N: u32>(inputs: [u8; N]) -> Field {\n    let mut fields = [0; (N + 30) / 31];\n    let mut field_index = 0;\n    let mut current_field = [0; 31];\n    for i in 0..inputs.len() {\n        let index = i % 31;\n        current_field[index] = inputs[i];\n        if index == 30 {\n            fields[field_index] = field_from_bytes(current_field, false);\n            current_field = [0; 31];\n            field_index += 1;\n        }\n    }\n    if field_index != fields.len() {\n        fields[field_index] = field_from_bytes(current_field, false);\n    }\n    poseidon2_hash(fields)\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn poseidon2_hash_bytes_matches_hash_of_packed_chunks() {\n    let mut bytes = [0; 32];\n    bytes[0] = 1;\n    bytes[1] = 2;\n    bytes[31] = 3;\n\n    assert_eq(poseidon2_hash_bytes(bytes), poseidon2_hash([1 + 2 * 256, 3]));\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn poseidon2_hash_bytes_ignores_trailing_zeros_in_last_chunk() {\n    let hash = poseidon2_hash_bytes([1]);\n\n    assert_eq(poseidon2_hash_bytes([1, 0]), hash);\n    assert_eq(poseidon2_hash_bytes([1].concat([0; 30])), hash);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn poseidon2_hash_bytes_commits_to_chunk_count() {\n    let one_chunk: [u8; 31] = [1].concat([0; 30]);\n    let two_chunks: [u8; 32] = [1].concat([0; 31]);\n\n    assert(poseidon2_hash_bytes(one_chunk) != poseidon2_hash_bytes(two_chunks));\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn subarray_hash_matches_fixed() {\n    let values_to_hash = [3; 17];\n    let padded = values_to_hash.concat([0; 11]);\n    let subarray_hash = poseidon2_hash_subarray(padded, values_to_hash.len());\n\n    // Hash the entire values_to_hash.\n    let fixed_len_hash = poseidon::poseidon2::Poseidon2::hash(values_to_hash, values_to_hash.len());\n\n    assert_eq(subarray_hash, fixed_len_hash);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn subarray_hash_matches_variable() {\n    let values_to_hash = [3; 17];\n    let padded = values_to_hash.concat([0; 11]);\n    let subarray_hash = poseidon2_hash_subarray(padded, values_to_hash.len());\n\n    // Hash up to values_to_hash.len() fields of the padded array.\n    let variable_len_hash = poseidon::poseidon2::Poseidon2::hash(padded, values_to_hash.len());\n\n    assert_eq(subarray_hash, variable_len_hash);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn subarray_hash_with_separator_matches_fixed_len_with_separator() {\n    let values_to_hash = [3; 17];\n    let padded = values_to_hash.concat([0; 11]);\n    let separator = 42;\n\n    assert_eq(\n        poseidon2_hash_subarray_with_separator(padded, values_to_hash.len(), separator),\n        poseidon2_hash_with_separator(values_to_hash, separator),\n    );\n    // Hashing the whole array must differ from hashing a prefix of it, even though the padding is zero.\n    assert(\n        poseidon2_hash_subarray_with_separator(padded, padded.len(), separator)\n            != poseidon2_hash_subarray_with_separator(padded, values_to_hash.len(), separator),\n    );\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn smoke_sha256_to_field() {\n    let full_buffer = [\n        0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,\n        25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47,\n        48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70,\n        71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93,\n        94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112,\n        113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130,\n        131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148,\n        149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159,\n    ];\n    let result = sha256_to_field(full_buffer);\n\n    assert(result == 0x448ebbc9e1a31220a2f3830c18eef61b9bd070e5084b7fa2a359fe729184c7);\n\n    // to show correctness of the current ver (truncate one byte) vs old ver (mod full bytes):\n    let result_bytes = sha256::digest(full_buffer);\n    let truncated_field = crate::utils::field::field_from_bytes_32_trunc(result_bytes);\n    assert(truncated_field == result);\n    let mod_res = result + (result_bytes[31] as Field);\n    assert(mod_res == 0x448ebbc9e1a31220a2f3830c18eef61b9bd070e5084b7fa2a359fe729184e0);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn unique_siloed_note_hash_matches_typescript() {\n    let inner_note_hash = 1;\n    let contract_address = AztecAddress::from_field(2);\n    let first_nullifier = 3;\n    let note_index_in_tx = 4;\n\n    let siloed_note_hash = compute_siloed_note_hash(contract_address, inner_note_hash);\n    let siloed_note_hash_from_ts =\n        0x1986a4bea3eddb1fff917d629a13e10f63f514f401bdd61838c6b475db949169;\n    assert_eq(siloed_note_hash, siloed_note_hash_from_ts);\n\n    let nonce: Field = compute_note_hash_nonce(first_nullifier, note_index_in_tx);\n    let note_hash_nonce_from_ts =\n        0x28e7799791bf066a57bb51fdd0fbcaf3f0926414314c7db515ea343f44f5d58b;\n    assert_eq(nonce, note_hash_nonce_from_ts);\n\n    let unique_siloed_note_hash_from_nonce = compute_unique_note_hash(nonce, siloed_note_hash);\n    let unique_siloed_note_hash = compute_note_nonce_and_unique_note_hash(\n        siloed_note_hash,\n        first_nullifier,\n        note_index_in_tx,\n    );\n    assert_eq(unique_siloed_note_hash_from_nonce, unique_siloed_note_hash);\n\n    let unique_siloed_note_hash_from_ts =\n        0x29949aef207b715303b24639737c17fbfeb375c1d965ecfa85c7e4f0febb7d16;\n    assert_eq(unique_siloed_note_hash, unique_siloed_note_hash_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn siloed_nullifier_matches_typescript() {\n    let contract_address = AztecAddress::from_field(123);\n    let nullifier = 456;\n\n    let res = compute_siloed_nullifier(contract_address, nullifier);\n\n    let siloed_nullifier_from_ts =\n        0x169b50336c1f29afdb8a03d955a81e485f5ac7d5f0b8065673d1e407e5877813;\n\n    assert_eq(res, siloed_nullifier_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn siloed_private_log_first_field_matches_typescript() {\n    let contract_address = AztecAddress::from_field(123);\n    let field = 456;\n    let res = compute_siloed_private_log_first_field(contract_address, field);\n\n    let siloed_private_log_first_field_from_ts =\n        0x29480984f7b9257fded523d50addbcfc8d1d33adcf2db73ef3390a8fd5cdffaa;\n\n    assert_eq(res, siloed_private_log_first_field_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn empty_l2_to_l1_message_hash_matches_typescript() {\n    // All zeroes\n    let res = compute_l2_to_l1_message_hash(\n        L2ToL1Message { recipient: EthAddress::zero(), content: 0 }.scope(AztecAddress::from_field(\n            0,\n        )),\n        0,\n        0,\n    );\n\n    let empty_l2_to_l1_msg_hash_from_ts =\n        0x003b18c58c739716e76429634a61375c45b3b5cd470c22ab6d3e14cee23dd992;\n\n    assert_eq(res, empty_l2_to_l1_msg_hash_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn l2_to_l1_message_hash_matches_typescript() {\n    let message = L2ToL1Message { recipient: EthAddress::from_field(1), content: 2 }.scope(\n        AztecAddress::from_field(3),\n    );\n    let version = 4;\n    let chainId = 5;\n\n    let hash = compute_l2_to_l1_message_hash(message, version, chainId);\n\n    // The following value was generated by `yarn-project/stdlib/src/hash/hash.test.ts`\n    let l2_to_l1_message_hash_from_ts =\n        0x0081edf209e087ad31b3fd24263698723d57190bd1d6e9fe056fc0c0a68ee661;\n\n    assert_eq(hash, l2_to_l1_message_hash_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nunconstrained fn poseidon2_hash_with_separator_bounded_vec_matches_non_bounded_vec_version() {\n    let inputs = BoundedVec::<Field, 4>::from_array([1, 2, 3]);\n    let separator = 42;\n\n    // Hash using bounded vec version\n    let bounded_result = poseidon2_hash_with_separator_bounded_vec(inputs, separator);\n\n    // Hash using regular version\n    let regular_result = poseidon2_hash_with_separator([1, 2, 3], separator);\n\n    // Results should match\n    assert_eq(bounded_result, regular_result);\n}\n"
     },
     "196": {
       "function_locations": [
@@ -4088,5 +4100,5 @@
     }
   },
   "transpiled": true,
-  "aztec_version": "6.0.0-rc.1"
+  "aztec_version": "6.0.0-rc.2"
 }

package/artifacts/ContractInstanceRegistry.json

@@ -846,23 +846,23 @@
         },
         {
           "name": "ScheduledValueChange<T>::get_time_horizon",
-          "start": 4008
+          "start": 4037
         },
         {
           "name": "ScheduledValueChange<T>::schedule_change",
-          "start": 8420
+          "start": 8926
         },
         {
           "name": "<impl Eq for ScheduledValueChange<T>>::eq",
-          "start": 8747
+          "start": 9253
         },
         {
           "name": "<impl Empty for ScheduledValueChange<T>>::empty",
-          "start": 8987
+          "start": 9493
         }
       ],
       "path": "/home/aztec-dev/aztec-packages/noir-projects/fnd/noir-protocol-circuits/crates/types/src/delayed_public_mutable/scheduled_value_change.nr",
-      "source": "use crate::traits::Empty;\nuse std::cmp::min;\n\nmod test;\n\n// This data structure is used by DelayedPublicMutable to represent a value that changes from `pre` to `post` at some timestamp\n// called the `timestamp_of_change`. The value can only be made to change by scheduling a change event at some future\n// timestamp after some minimum delay measured in seconds has elapsed. This means that at any given timestamp we know\n// both the current value and the smallest timestamp at which the value might change - this is called the\n// 'time horizon'.\npub struct ScheduledValueChange<T> {\n    pub(crate) pre: T,\n    pub(crate) post: T,\n    // Timestamp at which `post` value is used instead of `pre`\n    pub(crate) timestamp_of_change: u64,\n}\n\nimpl<T> ScheduledValueChange<T> {\n    pub fn new(pre: T, post: T, timestamp_of_change: u64) -> Self {\n        Self { pre, post, timestamp_of_change }\n    }\n\n    /// Returns the value stored in the data structure at a given timestamp. This function can be called both in public\n    /// (where `timestamp` is simply the current timestamp, i.e. the timestamp at which the current transaction will be\n    /// included) and in private (where `timestamp` is the anchor block's timestamp). Reading in private is only safe\n    /// if the transaction's `expiration_timestamp` property is set to a value lower or equal to the time horizon (see\n    /// `get_time_horizon()`).\n    pub fn get_current_at(self, timestamp: u64) -> T {\n        // The post value becomes the current one at the timestamp of change. This means different things in each realm:\n        // - in public, any transaction that is included at the timestamp of change will use the post value\n        // - in private, any transaction that includes the timestamp of change as part of the historical state will use\n        //   the post value (barring any follow-up changes)\n        if timestamp < self.timestamp_of_change {\n            self.pre\n        } else {\n            self.post\n        }\n    }\n\n    /// Returns the scheduled change, i.e. the post-change value and the timestamp at which it will become the current\n    /// value. Note that this timestamp may be in the past if the change has already taken place.\n    /// Additionally, further changes might be later scheduled, potentially canceling the one returned by this function.\n    pub fn get_scheduled(self) -> (T, u64) {\n        (self.post, self.timestamp_of_change)\n    }\n\n    // Returns the previous value. This is the value that is current up until the timestamp of change. Note that this\n    // value might not be the current anymore since timestamp of change might have already passed.\n    pub fn get_previous(self) -> (T, u64) {\n        (self.pre, self.timestamp_of_change)\n    }\n\n    /// Returns the largest timestamp at which the value returned by `get_current_at` is known to remain the current\n    /// value. This value is only meaningful in private where the proof is constructed against an anchor block, since\n    /// due to its asynchronous nature private execution cannot know about any later scheduled changes.\n    /// The caller of this function must know how quickly the value can change due to a scheduled change in the form of\n    /// `minimum_delay`. If the delay itself is immutable, then this is just its duration. If the delay is mutable\n    /// however, then this value is the 'effective minimum delay' (obtained by calling\n    /// `ScheduledDelayChange.get_effective_minimum_delay_at`), which equals the minimum time in seconds that needs to\n    /// elapse from the next block's timestamp until the value changes, regardless of further delay changes.\n    /// The value returned by `get_current_at` in private when called with a anchor block's timestamp is only safe to use\n    /// if the transaction's `expiration_timestamp` property is set to a value lower or equal to the time horizon\n    /// computed using the same anchor timestamp.\n    pub fn get_time_horizon(self, anchor_block_timestamp: u64, minimum_delay: u64) -> u64 {\n        // The time horizon is the very last timestamp in which the current value is known. Any timestamp past the\n        // horizon (i.e. with a timestamp larger than the time horizon) may have a different current value.\n        // Reading the current value in private typically requires constraining the maximum valid timestamp to be equal\n        // to the time horizon.\n        if anchor_block_timestamp >= self.timestamp_of_change {\n            // Once the timestamp of change has passed (block with timestamp >= timestamp_of_change was mined),\n            // the current value (post) will not change unless a new value change is scheduled. This did not happen at\n            // the anchor timestamp (or else it would not be greater or equal to the timestamp of change), and\n            // therefore could only happen after the anchor timestamp. The earliest would be the immediate next\n            // timestamp, and so the smallest possible next timestamp of change equals `anchor_block_timestamp + 1 +\n            // minimum_delay`. Our time horizon is simply the previous timestamp to that one.\n            //\n            //   timestamp of    anchor\n            //      change       timestamp          time horizon\n            //   =======|=============N===================H===========>\n            //                         ^                   ^\n            //                         ---------------------\n            //                             minimum delay\n            anchor_block_timestamp + minimum_delay\n        } else {\n            // If the timestamp of change has not yet been reached however, then there are two possible scenarios.\n            //   a) It could be so far into the future that the time horizon is actually determined by the minimum\n            //      delay, because a new change could be scheduled and take place _before_ the currently scheduled one.\n            //      This is similar to the scenario where the timestamp of change is in the past: the time horizon is\n            //      the timestamp prior to the earliest one in which a new timestamp of change might land.\n            //\n            //         anchor\n            //         timestamp                      time horizon    timestamp of change\n            //        =====N=================================H=================|=========>\n            //              ^                                 ^\n            //              |                                 |\n            //              -----------------------------------\n            //                        minimum delay\n            //\n            //   b) It could be fewer than `minimum_delay` seconds away from the anchor timestamp, in which case\n            //      the timestamp of change would become the limiting factor for the time horizon, which would equal\n            //      the timestamp right before the timestamp of change (since by definition the value changes at the\n            //      timestamp of change).\n            //\n            //           anchor                         time horizon\n            //           timestamp   timestamp of change    if not scheduled\n            //        =======N=============|===================H=================>\n            //                ^           ^                     ^\n            //                |     actual horizon              |\n            //                -----------------------------------\n            //                          minimum delay\n            //\n            // Note that the current implementation does not allow the caller to set the timestamp of change to an\n            // arbitrary value, and therefore scenario a) is not currently possible. However implementing #5501 would\n            // allow for this to happen.\n            // Because anchor_block_timestamp < self.timestamp_of_change, then timestamp_of_change > 0 and we can safely\n            // subtract 1.\n            min(\n                anchor_block_timestamp + minimum_delay,\n                self.timestamp_of_change - 1,\n            )\n        }\n    }\n\n    /// Mutates the value by scheduling a change at the current timestamp. This function is only meaningful when\n    /// called in public with the current timestamp.\n    pub fn schedule_change(\n        &mut self,\n        new_value: T,\n        current_timestamp: u64,\n        minimum_delay: u64,\n        timestamp_of_change: u64,\n    ) {\n        assert(timestamp_of_change >= current_timestamp + minimum_delay);\n\n        self.pre = self.get_current_at(current_timestamp);\n        self.post = new_value;\n        self.timestamp_of_change = timestamp_of_change;\n    }\n}\n\nimpl<T> Eq for ScheduledValueChange<T>\nwhere\n    T: Eq,\n{\n    fn eq(self, other: Self) -> bool {\n        (self.pre == other.pre)\n            & (self.post == other.post)\n            & (self.timestamp_of_change == other.timestamp_of_change)\n    }\n}\n\nimpl<T> Empty for ScheduledValueChange<T>\nwhere\n    T: Empty,\n{\n    fn empty() -> Self {\n        Self { pre: T::empty(), post: T::empty(), timestamp_of_change: 0 }\n    }\n}\n"
+      "source": "use crate::traits::Empty;\nuse std::cmp::min;\n\nmod test;\n\n// This data structure is used by DelayedPublicMutable to represent a value that changes from `pre` to `post` at some timestamp\n// called the `timestamp_of_change`. The value can only be made to change by scheduling a change event at some future\n// timestamp after some minimum delay measured in seconds has elapsed. This means that at any given timestamp we know\n// both the current value and the smallest timestamp at which the value might change - this is called the\n// 'time horizon'.\npub struct ScheduledValueChange<T> {\n    pub(crate) pre: T,\n    pub(crate) post: T,\n    // Timestamp at which `post` value is used instead of `pre`\n    pub(crate) timestamp_of_change: u64,\n}\n\nimpl<T> ScheduledValueChange<T> {\n    pub fn new(pre: T, post: T, timestamp_of_change: u64) -> Self {\n        Self { pre, post, timestamp_of_change }\n    }\n\n    /// Returns the value stored in the data structure at a given timestamp. This function can be called both in public\n    /// (where `timestamp` is simply the current timestamp, i.e. the timestamp at which the current transaction will be\n    /// included) and in private (where `timestamp` is the anchor block's timestamp). Reading in private is only safe\n    /// if the transaction's `expiration_timestamp` property is set to a value lower or equal to the time horizon (see\n    /// `get_time_horizon()`).\n    pub fn get_current_at(self, timestamp: u64) -> T {\n        // The post value becomes the current one at the timestamp of change. This means different things in each realm:\n        // - in public, any transaction that is included at the timestamp of change will use the post value\n        // - in private, any transaction that includes the timestamp of change as part of the historical state will use\n        //   the post value (barring any follow-up changes)\n        if timestamp < self.timestamp_of_change {\n            self.pre\n        } else {\n            self.post\n        }\n    }\n\n    /// Returns the scheduled change, i.e. the post-change value and the timestamp at which it will become the current\n    /// value. Note that this timestamp may be in the past if the change has already taken place.\n    /// Additionally, further changes might be later scheduled, potentially canceling the one returned by this function.\n    pub fn get_scheduled(self) -> (T, u64) {\n        (self.post, self.timestamp_of_change)\n    }\n\n    // Returns the previous value. This is the value that is current up until the timestamp of change. Note that this\n    // value might not be the current anymore since timestamp of change might have already passed.\n    pub fn get_previous(self) -> (T, u64) {\n        (self.pre, self.timestamp_of_change)\n    }\n\n    /// Returns the largest timestamp at which the value returned by `get_current_at` is known to remain the current\n    /// value. This value is only meaningful in private where the proof is constructed against an anchor block, since\n    /// due to its asynchronous nature private execution cannot know about any later scheduled changes.\n    /// The caller of this function must know how quickly the value can change due to a scheduled change in the form of\n    /// `minimum_delay`. If the delay itself is immutable, then this is just its duration. If the delay is mutable\n    /// however, then this value is the 'effective minimum delay' (obtained by calling\n    /// `ScheduledDelayChange.get_effective_minimum_delay_at`), which equals the minimum time in seconds that needs to\n    /// elapse from the next block's timestamp until the value changes, regardless of further delay changes.\n    /// The value returned by `get_current_at` in private when called with a anchor block's timestamp is only safe to use\n    /// if the transaction's `expiration_timestamp` property is set to a value lower or equal to the time horizon\n    /// computed using the same anchor timestamp.\n    pub fn get_time_horizon(self, anchor_block_timestamp: u64, minimum_delay: u64) -> u64\n    where\n        T: Eq,\n    {\n        // The time horizon is the very last timestamp in which the current value is known. Any timestamp past the\n        // horizon (i.e. with a timestamp larger than the time horizon) may have a different current value.\n        // Reading the current value in private typically requires constraining the maximum valid timestamp to be equal\n        // to the time horizon.\n        //\n        // A scheduled change with `post == pre` does not change the current value at its timestamp of change. An\n        // example is a cancellation, which schedules the current value. Such a change does not limit the time\n        // horizon. Only a change that is scheduled after the anchor block can give a different value, and\n        // `minimum_delay` limits that change in the same way as when the timestamp of change has passed.\n        if (anchor_block_timestamp >= self.timestamp_of_change) | (self.pre == self.post) {\n            // Once the timestamp of change has passed (block with timestamp >= timestamp_of_change was mined),\n            // the current value (post) will not change unless a new value change is scheduled. This did not happen at\n            // the anchor timestamp (or else it would not be greater or equal to the timestamp of change), and\n            // therefore could only happen after the anchor timestamp. The earliest would be the immediate next\n            // timestamp, and so the smallest possible next timestamp of change equals `anchor_block_timestamp + 1 +\n            // minimum_delay`. Our time horizon is simply the previous timestamp to that one.\n            //\n            //   timestamp of    anchor\n            //      change       timestamp          time horizon\n            //   =======|=============N===================H===========>\n            //                         ^                   ^\n            //                         ---------------------\n            //                             minimum delay\n            anchor_block_timestamp + minimum_delay\n        } else {\n            // If the timestamp of change has not yet been reached however, then there are two possible scenarios.\n            //   a) It could be so far into the future that the time horizon is actually determined by the minimum\n            //      delay, because a new change could be scheduled and take place _before_ the currently scheduled one.\n            //      This is similar to the scenario where the timestamp of change is in the past: the time horizon is\n            //      the timestamp prior to the earliest one in which a new timestamp of change might land.\n            //\n            //         anchor\n            //         timestamp                      time horizon    timestamp of change\n            //        =====N=================================H=================|=========>\n            //              ^                                 ^\n            //              |                                 |\n            //              -----------------------------------\n            //                        minimum delay\n            //\n            //   b) It could be fewer than `minimum_delay` seconds away from the anchor timestamp, in which case\n            //      the timestamp of change would become the limiting factor for the time horizon, which would equal\n            //      the timestamp right before the timestamp of change (since by definition the value changes at the\n            //      timestamp of change).\n            //\n            //           anchor                         time horizon\n            //           timestamp   timestamp of change    if not scheduled\n            //        =======N=============|===================H=================>\n            //                ^           ^                     ^\n            //                |     actual horizon              |\n            //                -----------------------------------\n            //                          minimum delay\n            //\n            // Note that the current implementation does not allow the caller to set the timestamp of change to an\n            // arbitrary value, and therefore scenario a) is not currently possible. However implementing #5501 would\n            // allow for this to happen.\n            // Because anchor_block_timestamp < self.timestamp_of_change, then timestamp_of_change > 0 and we can safely\n            // subtract 1.\n            min(\n                anchor_block_timestamp + minimum_delay,\n                self.timestamp_of_change - 1,\n            )\n        }\n    }\n\n    /// Mutates the value by scheduling a change at the current timestamp. This function is only meaningful when\n    /// called in public with the current timestamp.\n    pub fn schedule_change(\n        &mut self,\n        new_value: T,\n        current_timestamp: u64,\n        minimum_delay: u64,\n        timestamp_of_change: u64,\n    ) {\n        assert(timestamp_of_change >= current_timestamp + minimum_delay);\n\n        self.pre = self.get_current_at(current_timestamp);\n        self.post = new_value;\n        self.timestamp_of_change = timestamp_of_change;\n    }\n}\n\nimpl<T> Eq for ScheduledValueChange<T>\nwhere\n    T: Eq,\n{\n    fn eq(self, other: Self) -> bool {\n        (self.pre == other.pre)\n            & (self.post == other.post)\n            & (self.timestamp_of_change == other.timestamp_of_change)\n    }\n}\n\nimpl<T> Empty for ScheduledValueChange<T>\nwhere\n    T: Empty,\n{\n    fn empty() -> Self {\n        Self { pre: T::empty(), post: T::empty(), timestamp_of_change: 0 }\n    }\n}\n"
     },
     "17": {
       "function_locations": [
@@ -1138,51 +1138,63 @@
         },
         {
           "name": "poseidon2_hash_bytes",
-          "start": 11953
+          "start": 12580
+        },
+        {
+          "name": "poseidon2_hash_bytes_matches_hash_of_packed_chunks",
+          "start": 13179
+        },
+        {
+          "name": "poseidon2_hash_bytes_ignores_trailing_zeros_in_last_chunk",
+          "start": 13418
+        },
+        {
+          "name": "poseidon2_hash_bytes_commits_to_chunk_count",
+          "start": 13638
         },
         {
           "name": "subarray_hash_matches_fixed",
-          "start": 12529
+          "start": 13869
         },
         {
           "name": "subarray_hash_matches_variable",
-          "start": 12928
+          "start": 14268
         },
         {
           "name": "subarray_hash_with_separator_matches_fixed_len_with_separator",
-          "start": 13384
+          "start": 14724
         },
         {
           "name": "smoke_sha256_to_field",
-          "start": 14009
+          "start": 15349
         },
         {
           "name": "unique_siloed_note_hash_matches_typescript",
-          "start": 15411
+          "start": 16751
         },
         {
           "name": "siloed_nullifier_matches_typescript",
-          "start": 16633
+          "start": 17973
         },
         {
           "name": "siloed_private_log_first_field_matches_typescript",
-          "start": 17013
+          "start": 18353
         },
         {
           "name": "empty_l2_to_l1_message_hash_matches_typescript",
-          "start": 17423
+          "start": 18763
         },
         {
           "name": "l2_to_l1_message_hash_matches_typescript",
-          "start": 17874
+          "start": 19214
         },
         {
           "name": "poseidon2_hash_with_separator_bounded_vec_matches_non_bounded_vec_version",
-          "start": 18490
+          "start": 19830
         }
       ],
       "path": "/home/aztec-dev/aztec-packages/noir-projects/fnd/noir-protocol-circuits/crates/types/src/hash.nr",
-      "source": "mod poseidon2_chunks;\n\nuse crate::{\n    abis::{\n        contract_class_function_leaf_preimage::ContractClassFunctionLeafPreimage,\n        function_selector::FunctionSelector, nullifier::Nullifier, private_log::PrivateLog,\n        transaction::tx_request::TxRequest,\n    },\n    address::{AztecAddress, EthAddress},\n    constants::{\n        CONTRACT_CLASS_LOG_SIZE_IN_FIELDS, DOM_SEP__NOTE_HASH_NONCE,\n        DOM_SEP__PRIVATE_LOG_FIRST_FIELD, DOM_SEP__SILOED_NOTE_HASH, DOM_SEP__SILOED_NULLIFIER,\n        DOM_SEP__UNIQUE_NOTE_HASH, FUNCTION_TREE_HEIGHT, NULL_MSG_SENDER_CONTRACT_ADDRESS,\n        TWO_POW_64,\n    },\n    merkle_tree::root_from_sibling_path,\n    messaging::l2_to_l1_message::L2ToL1Message,\n    poseidon2::Poseidon2Sponge,\n    side_effect::{Counted, Scoped},\n    traits::{FromField, Hash, ToField},\n    utils::field::{field_from_bytes, field_from_bytes_32_trunc},\n};\n\npub use poseidon2_chunks::poseidon2_absorb_in_chunks_existing_sponge;\nuse poseidon2_chunks::poseidon2_absorb_in_chunks;\nuse std::embedded_curve_ops::EmbeddedCurveScalar;\n\n// TODO: refactor these into their own files: sha256, poseidon2, some protocol-specific hash computations, some merkle computations.\n\npub fn sha256_to_field<let N: u32>(bytes_to_hash: [u8; N]) -> Field {\n    let sha256_hashed = sha256::digest(bytes_to_hash);\n    let hash_in_a_field = field_from_bytes_32_trunc(sha256_hashed);\n\n    hash_in_a_field\n}\n\npub fn private_functions_root_from_siblings(\n    selector: FunctionSelector,\n    vk_hash: Field,\n    function_leaf_index: Field,\n    function_leaf_sibling_path: [Field; FUNCTION_TREE_HEIGHT],\n) -> Field {\n    let function_leaf_preimage = ContractClassFunctionLeafPreimage { selector, vk_hash };\n    let function_leaf = function_leaf_preimage.hash();\n    root_from_sibling_path(\n        function_leaf,\n        function_leaf_index,\n        function_leaf_sibling_path,\n    )\n}\n\n/// Siloing in the context of Aztec refers to the process of hashing a note hash with a contract address (this way\n/// the note hash is scoped to a specific contract). This is used to prevent intermingling of notes between contracts.\npub fn compute_siloed_note_hash(contract_address: AztecAddress, note_hash: Field) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [contract_address.to_field(), note_hash],\n        DOM_SEP__SILOED_NOTE_HASH,\n    )\n}\n\n/// Computes unique, siloed note hashes from siloed note hashes.\n///\n/// The protocol injects uniqueness into every note_hash, so that every single note_hash in the\n/// tree is unique. This prevents faerie gold attacks, where a malicious sender could create\n/// two identical note_hashes for a recipient (meaning only one would be nullifiable in future).\n///\n/// Most privacy protocols will inject the note's leaf_index (its position in the Note Hashes Tree)\n/// into the note, but this requires the creator of a note to wait until their tx is included in\n/// a block to know the note's final note hash (the unique, siloed note hash), because inserting\n/// leaves into trees is the job of a block producer.\n///\n/// We took a different approach so that the creator of a note will know each note's unique, siloed\n/// note hash before broadcasting their tx to the network.\n/// (There was also a historical requirement relating to \"chained transactions\" -- a feature that\n/// Aztec Connect had to enable notes to be spent from distinct txs earlier in the same block,\n/// and hence before an archive block root had been established for that block -- but that feature\n/// was abandoned for the Aztec Network for having too many bad tradeoffs).\n///\n/// (\n///   Edit: it is no longer true that all final note_hashes will be known by the creator of a tx\n///   before they send it to the network. If a tx makes public function calls, then _revertible_\n///   note_hashes that are created in private will not be made unique in private by the Reset circuit,\n///   but will instead be made unique by the AVM, because the `note_index_in_tx` will not be known\n///   until the AVM has executed the public functions of the tx. (See an explanation in\n///   reset_output_composer.nr for why).\n///   For some such txs, the `note_index_in_tx` might still be predictable through simulation, but\n///   for txs whose public functions create a varying number of non-revertible notes (determined at\n///   runtime), the `note_index_in_tx` will not be deterministically derivable before submitting the\n///   tx to the network.\n/// )\n///\n/// We use the `first_nullifier` of a tx as a seed of uniqueness. We have a guarantee that there will\n/// always be at least one nullifier per tx, because the init circuit will create one if one isn't\n/// created naturally by any functions of the tx. (Search \"protocol_nullifier\").\n/// We combine the `first_nullifier` with the note's index (its position within this tx's new\n/// note_hashes array) (`note_index_in_tx`) to get a truly unique value to inject into a note, which\n/// we call a `note_nonce`.\npub fn compute_unique_note_hash(note_nonce: Field, siloed_note_hash: Field) -> Field {\n    let inputs = [note_nonce, siloed_note_hash];\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(inputs, DOM_SEP__UNIQUE_NOTE_HASH)\n}\n\npub fn compute_note_hash_nonce(first_nullifier_in_tx: Field, note_index_in_tx: u32) -> Field {\n    // Hashing the first nullifier with note index in tx is guaranteed to be unique (because all nullifiers are also\n    // unique).\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [first_nullifier_in_tx, note_index_in_tx as Field],\n        DOM_SEP__NOTE_HASH_NONCE,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn compute_note_nonce_and_unique_note_hash(\n    siloed_note_hash: Field,\n    first_nullifier: Field,\n    note_index_in_tx: u32,\n) -> Field {\n    let note_nonce = compute_note_hash_nonce(first_nullifier, note_index_in_tx);\n    compute_unique_note_hash(note_nonce, siloed_note_hash)\n}\n\npub fn compute_siloed_nullifier(contract_address: AztecAddress, nullifier: Field) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [contract_address.to_field(), nullifier],\n        DOM_SEP__SILOED_NULLIFIER,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn create_protocol_nullifier(tx_request: TxRequest) -> Scoped<Counted<Nullifier>> {\n    // The protocol nullifier is ascribed a special side-effect counter of 1. No other side-effect\n    // can have counter 1 (see `validate_as_first_call` for that assertion). Its value is the\n    // transaction's nonce commitment (origin, chain id, version, salt): see\n    // `TxRequest::compute_protocol_nullifier_value`. The reset kernel siloes it under\n    // `NULL_MSG_SENDER_CONTRACT_ADDRESS` like every other nullifier.\n    Nullifier { value: tx_request.compute_protocol_nullifier_value(), note_hash: 0 }.count(1).scope(\n        NULL_MSG_SENDER_CONTRACT_ADDRESS,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn compute_log_tag(raw_tag: Field, dom_sep: u32) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator([raw_tag], dom_sep)\n}\n\npub fn compute_siloed_private_log_first_field(\n    contract_address: AztecAddress,\n    field: Field,\n) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [contract_address.to_field(), field],\n        DOM_SEP__PRIVATE_LOG_FIRST_FIELD,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn compute_siloed_private_log(contract_address: AztecAddress, log: PrivateLog) -> PrivateLog {\n    let mut fields = log.fields;\n    fields[0] = compute_siloed_private_log_first_field(contract_address, fields[0]);\n    PrivateLog::new(fields, log.length)\n}\n\npub fn compute_contract_class_log_hash(log: [Field; CONTRACT_CLASS_LOG_SIZE_IN_FIELDS]) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash(log)\n}\n\npub fn compute_app_siloed_secret_key(\n    master_secret_key: EmbeddedCurveScalar,\n    app_address: AztecAddress,\n    key_type_domain_separator: Field,\n) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [master_secret_key.hi, master_secret_key.lo, app_address.to_field()],\n        key_type_domain_separator,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn compute_l2_to_l1_message_hash(\n    message: Scoped<L2ToL1Message>,\n    rollup_version_id: Field,\n    chain_id: Field,\n) -> Field {\n    let contract_address_bytes: [u8; 32] = message.contract_address.to_field().to_be_bytes();\n    let recipient_bytes: [u8; 20] = message.inner.recipient.to_be_bytes();\n    let content_bytes: [u8; 32] = message.inner.content.to_be_bytes();\n    let rollup_version_id_bytes: [u8; 32] = rollup_version_id.to_be_bytes();\n    let chain_id_bytes: [u8; 32] = chain_id.to_be_bytes();\n\n    let mut bytes: [u8; 148] = std::mem::zeroed();\n    for i in 0..32 {\n        bytes[i] = contract_address_bytes[i];\n        bytes[i + 32] = rollup_version_id_bytes[i];\n        // 64 - 84 are for recipient.\n        bytes[i + 84] = chain_id_bytes[i];\n        bytes[i + 116] = content_bytes[i];\n    }\n\n    for i in 0..20 {\n        bytes[64 + i] = recipient_bytes[i];\n    }\n\n    sha256_to_field(bytes)\n}\n\n/// Computes sha256 hash of 2 input fields.\n///\n/// @returns A truncated field (i.e., the first byte is always 0).\npub fn accumulate_sha256(v0: Field, v1: Field) -> Field {\n    // Concatenate two fields into 32 x 2 = 64 bytes\n    let v0_as_bytes: [u8; 32] = v0.to_be_bytes();\n    let v1_as_bytes: [u8; 32] = v1.to_be_bytes();\n    let hash_input_flattened = v0_as_bytes.concat(v1_as_bytes);\n\n    sha256_to_field(hash_input_flattened)\n}\n\n/// Computes sha256 hash of 2 input fields, prefixed by a domain separator, so that the result cannot collide with an\n/// [`accumulate_sha256`] over the same two fields.\n///\n/// @returns A truncated field (i.e., the first byte is always 0).\npub fn accumulate_sha256_with_separator(separator: u32, v0: Field, v1: Field) -> Field {\n    // Concatenate the separator and two fields into 4 + 32 x 2 = 68 bytes\n    let separator_as_bytes: [u8; 4] = (separator as Field).to_be_bytes();\n    let v0_as_bytes: [u8; 32] = v0.to_be_bytes();\n    let v1_as_bytes: [u8; 32] = v1.to_be_bytes();\n    let hash_input_flattened = separator_as_bytes.concat(v0_as_bytes).concat(v1_as_bytes);\n\n    sha256_to_field(hash_input_flattened)\n}\n\npub fn poseidon2_hash<let N: u32>(inputs: [Field; N]) -> Field {\n    poseidon::poseidon2::Poseidon2::hash(inputs, N)\n}\n\n#[no_predicates]\npub fn poseidon2_hash_with_separator<let N: u32, T>(inputs: [Field; N], separator: T) -> Field\nwhere\n    T: ToField,\n{\n    let inputs_with_separator = [separator.to_field()].concat(inputs);\n    poseidon2_hash(inputs_with_separator)\n}\n\n/// Computes a Poseidon2 hash over a dynamic-length subarray of the given input.\n/// Only the first `in_len` fields of `input` are absorbed; any remaining fields are ignored.\n/// The caller is responsible for ensuring that the input is padded with zeros if required.\n#[no_predicates]\npub fn poseidon2_hash_subarray<let N: u32>(input: [Field; N], in_len: u32) -> Field {\n    let mut sponge = poseidon2_absorb_in_chunks(input, in_len);\n    sponge.squeeze()\n}\n\n/// Computes a Poseidon2 hash with a domain separator over a dynamic-length subarray of the given input.\n/// Only the first `in_len` fields of `input` are absorbed; any remaining fields are ignored.\n/// For `in_len == N` this is equivalent to [`poseidon2_hash_with_separator`].\n#[no_predicates]\npub fn poseidon2_hash_subarray_with_separator<let N: u32, T>(\n    input: [Field; N],\n    in_len: u32,\n    separator: T,\n) -> Field\nwhere\n    T: ToField,\n{\n    let inputs_with_separator = [separator.to_field()].concat(input);\n    poseidon::poseidon2::Poseidon2::hash(inputs_with_separator, in_len + 1)\n}\n\n// This function is  unconstrained because it is intended to be used in unconstrained context only as\n// in constrained contexts it would be too inefficient.\npub unconstrained fn poseidon2_hash_with_separator_bounded_vec<let N: u32, T>(\n    inputs: BoundedVec<Field, N>,\n    separator: T,\n) -> Field\nwhere\n    T: ToField,\n{\n    let in_len = inputs.len() + 1;\n    let iv: Field = (in_len as Field) * TWO_POW_64;\n    let mut sponge = Poseidon2Sponge::new(iv);\n    sponge.absorb(separator.to_field());\n\n    for i in 0..inputs.len() {\n        sponge.absorb(inputs.get(i));\n    }\n\n    sponge.squeeze()\n}\n\n#[no_predicates]\npub fn poseidon2_hash_bytes<let N: u32>(inputs: [u8; N]) -> Field {\n    let mut fields = [0; (N + 30) / 31];\n    let mut field_index = 0;\n    let mut current_field = [0; 31];\n    for i in 0..inputs.len() {\n        let index = i % 31;\n        current_field[index] = inputs[i];\n        if index == 30 {\n            fields[field_index] = field_from_bytes(current_field, false);\n            current_field = [0; 31];\n            field_index += 1;\n        }\n    }\n    if field_index != fields.len() {\n        fields[field_index] = field_from_bytes(current_field, false);\n    }\n    poseidon2_hash(fields)\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn subarray_hash_matches_fixed() {\n    let values_to_hash = [3; 17];\n    let padded = values_to_hash.concat([0; 11]);\n    let subarray_hash = poseidon2_hash_subarray(padded, values_to_hash.len());\n\n    // Hash the entire values_to_hash.\n    let fixed_len_hash = poseidon::poseidon2::Poseidon2::hash(values_to_hash, values_to_hash.len());\n\n    assert_eq(subarray_hash, fixed_len_hash);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn subarray_hash_matches_variable() {\n    let values_to_hash = [3; 17];\n    let padded = values_to_hash.concat([0; 11]);\n    let subarray_hash = poseidon2_hash_subarray(padded, values_to_hash.len());\n\n    // Hash up to values_to_hash.len() fields of the padded array.\n    let variable_len_hash = poseidon::poseidon2::Poseidon2::hash(padded, values_to_hash.len());\n\n    assert_eq(subarray_hash, variable_len_hash);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn subarray_hash_with_separator_matches_fixed_len_with_separator() {\n    let values_to_hash = [3; 17];\n    let padded = values_to_hash.concat([0; 11]);\n    let separator = 42;\n\n    assert_eq(\n        poseidon2_hash_subarray_with_separator(padded, values_to_hash.len(), separator),\n        poseidon2_hash_with_separator(values_to_hash, separator),\n    );\n    // Hashing the whole array must differ from hashing a prefix of it, even though the padding is zero.\n    assert(\n        poseidon2_hash_subarray_with_separator(padded, padded.len(), separator)\n            != poseidon2_hash_subarray_with_separator(padded, values_to_hash.len(), separator),\n    );\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn smoke_sha256_to_field() {\n    let full_buffer = [\n        0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,\n        25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47,\n        48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70,\n        71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93,\n        94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112,\n        113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130,\n        131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148,\n        149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159,\n    ];\n    let result = sha256_to_field(full_buffer);\n\n    assert(result == 0x448ebbc9e1a31220a2f3830c18eef61b9bd070e5084b7fa2a359fe729184c7);\n\n    // to show correctness of the current ver (truncate one byte) vs old ver (mod full bytes):\n    let result_bytes = sha256::digest(full_buffer);\n    let truncated_field = crate::utils::field::field_from_bytes_32_trunc(result_bytes);\n    assert(truncated_field == result);\n    let mod_res = result + (result_bytes[31] as Field);\n    assert(mod_res == 0x448ebbc9e1a31220a2f3830c18eef61b9bd070e5084b7fa2a359fe729184e0);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn unique_siloed_note_hash_matches_typescript() {\n    let inner_note_hash = 1;\n    let contract_address = AztecAddress::from_field(2);\n    let first_nullifier = 3;\n    let note_index_in_tx = 4;\n\n    let siloed_note_hash = compute_siloed_note_hash(contract_address, inner_note_hash);\n    let siloed_note_hash_from_ts =\n        0x1986a4bea3eddb1fff917d629a13e10f63f514f401bdd61838c6b475db949169;\n    assert_eq(siloed_note_hash, siloed_note_hash_from_ts);\n\n    let nonce: Field = compute_note_hash_nonce(first_nullifier, note_index_in_tx);\n    let note_hash_nonce_from_ts =\n        0x28e7799791bf066a57bb51fdd0fbcaf3f0926414314c7db515ea343f44f5d58b;\n    assert_eq(nonce, note_hash_nonce_from_ts);\n\n    let unique_siloed_note_hash_from_nonce = compute_unique_note_hash(nonce, siloed_note_hash);\n    let unique_siloed_note_hash = compute_note_nonce_and_unique_note_hash(\n        siloed_note_hash,\n        first_nullifier,\n        note_index_in_tx,\n    );\n    assert_eq(unique_siloed_note_hash_from_nonce, unique_siloed_note_hash);\n\n    let unique_siloed_note_hash_from_ts =\n        0x29949aef207b715303b24639737c17fbfeb375c1d965ecfa85c7e4f0febb7d16;\n    assert_eq(unique_siloed_note_hash, unique_siloed_note_hash_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn siloed_nullifier_matches_typescript() {\n    let contract_address = AztecAddress::from_field(123);\n    let nullifier = 456;\n\n    let res = compute_siloed_nullifier(contract_address, nullifier);\n\n    let siloed_nullifier_from_ts =\n        0x169b50336c1f29afdb8a03d955a81e485f5ac7d5f0b8065673d1e407e5877813;\n\n    assert_eq(res, siloed_nullifier_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn siloed_private_log_first_field_matches_typescript() {\n    let contract_address = AztecAddress::from_field(123);\n    let field = 456;\n    let res = compute_siloed_private_log_first_field(contract_address, field);\n\n    let siloed_private_log_first_field_from_ts =\n        0x29480984f7b9257fded523d50addbcfc8d1d33adcf2db73ef3390a8fd5cdffaa;\n\n    assert_eq(res, siloed_private_log_first_field_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn empty_l2_to_l1_message_hash_matches_typescript() {\n    // All zeroes\n    let res = compute_l2_to_l1_message_hash(\n        L2ToL1Message { recipient: EthAddress::zero(), content: 0 }.scope(AztecAddress::from_field(\n            0,\n        )),\n        0,\n        0,\n    );\n\n    let empty_l2_to_l1_msg_hash_from_ts =\n        0x003b18c58c739716e76429634a61375c45b3b5cd470c22ab6d3e14cee23dd992;\n\n    assert_eq(res, empty_l2_to_l1_msg_hash_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn l2_to_l1_message_hash_matches_typescript() {\n    let message = L2ToL1Message { recipient: EthAddress::from_field(1), content: 2 }.scope(\n        AztecAddress::from_field(3),\n    );\n    let version = 4;\n    let chainId = 5;\n\n    let hash = compute_l2_to_l1_message_hash(message, version, chainId);\n\n    // The following value was generated by `yarn-project/stdlib/src/hash/hash.test.ts`\n    let l2_to_l1_message_hash_from_ts =\n        0x0081edf209e087ad31b3fd24263698723d57190bd1d6e9fe056fc0c0a68ee661;\n\n    assert_eq(hash, l2_to_l1_message_hash_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nunconstrained fn poseidon2_hash_with_separator_bounded_vec_matches_non_bounded_vec_version() {\n    let inputs = BoundedVec::<Field, 4>::from_array([1, 2, 3]);\n    let separator = 42;\n\n    // Hash using bounded vec version\n    let bounded_result = poseidon2_hash_with_separator_bounded_vec(inputs, separator);\n\n    // Hash using regular version\n    let regular_result = poseidon2_hash_with_separator([1, 2, 3], separator);\n\n    // Results should match\n    assert_eq(bounded_result, regular_result);\n}\n"
+      "source": "mod poseidon2_chunks;\n\nuse crate::{\n    abis::{\n        contract_class_function_leaf_preimage::ContractClassFunctionLeafPreimage,\n        function_selector::FunctionSelector, nullifier::Nullifier, private_log::PrivateLog,\n        transaction::tx_request::TxRequest,\n    },\n    address::{AztecAddress, EthAddress},\n    constants::{\n        CONTRACT_CLASS_LOG_SIZE_IN_FIELDS, DOM_SEP__NOTE_HASH_NONCE,\n        DOM_SEP__PRIVATE_LOG_FIRST_FIELD, DOM_SEP__SILOED_NOTE_HASH, DOM_SEP__SILOED_NULLIFIER,\n        DOM_SEP__UNIQUE_NOTE_HASH, FUNCTION_TREE_HEIGHT, NULL_MSG_SENDER_CONTRACT_ADDRESS,\n        TWO_POW_64,\n    },\n    merkle_tree::root_from_sibling_path,\n    messaging::l2_to_l1_message::L2ToL1Message,\n    poseidon2::Poseidon2Sponge,\n    side_effect::{Counted, Scoped},\n    traits::{FromField, Hash, ToField},\n    utils::field::{field_from_bytes, field_from_bytes_32_trunc},\n};\n\npub use poseidon2_chunks::poseidon2_absorb_in_chunks_existing_sponge;\nuse poseidon2_chunks::poseidon2_absorb_in_chunks;\nuse std::embedded_curve_ops::EmbeddedCurveScalar;\n\n// TODO: refactor these into their own files: sha256, poseidon2, some protocol-specific hash computations, some merkle computations.\n\npub fn sha256_to_field<let N: u32>(bytes_to_hash: [u8; N]) -> Field {\n    let sha256_hashed = sha256::digest(bytes_to_hash);\n    let hash_in_a_field = field_from_bytes_32_trunc(sha256_hashed);\n\n    hash_in_a_field\n}\n\npub fn private_functions_root_from_siblings(\n    selector: FunctionSelector,\n    vk_hash: Field,\n    function_leaf_index: Field,\n    function_leaf_sibling_path: [Field; FUNCTION_TREE_HEIGHT],\n) -> Field {\n    let function_leaf_preimage = ContractClassFunctionLeafPreimage { selector, vk_hash };\n    let function_leaf = function_leaf_preimage.hash();\n    root_from_sibling_path(\n        function_leaf,\n        function_leaf_index,\n        function_leaf_sibling_path,\n    )\n}\n\n/// Siloing in the context of Aztec refers to the process of hashing a note hash with a contract address (this way\n/// the note hash is scoped to a specific contract). This is used to prevent intermingling of notes between contracts.\npub fn compute_siloed_note_hash(contract_address: AztecAddress, note_hash: Field) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [contract_address.to_field(), note_hash],\n        DOM_SEP__SILOED_NOTE_HASH,\n    )\n}\n\n/// Computes unique, siloed note hashes from siloed note hashes.\n///\n/// The protocol injects uniqueness into every note_hash, so that every single note_hash in the\n/// tree is unique. This prevents faerie gold attacks, where a malicious sender could create\n/// two identical note_hashes for a recipient (meaning only one would be nullifiable in future).\n///\n/// Most privacy protocols will inject the note's leaf_index (its position in the Note Hashes Tree)\n/// into the note, but this requires the creator of a note to wait until their tx is included in\n/// a block to know the note's final note hash (the unique, siloed note hash), because inserting\n/// leaves into trees is the job of a block producer.\n///\n/// We took a different approach so that the creator of a note will know each note's unique, siloed\n/// note hash before broadcasting their tx to the network.\n/// (There was also a historical requirement relating to \"chained transactions\" -- a feature that\n/// Aztec Connect had to enable notes to be spent from distinct txs earlier in the same block,\n/// and hence before an archive block root had been established for that block -- but that feature\n/// was abandoned for the Aztec Network for having too many bad tradeoffs).\n///\n/// (\n///   Edit: it is no longer true that all final note_hashes will be known by the creator of a tx\n///   before they send it to the network. If a tx makes public function calls, then _revertible_\n///   note_hashes that are created in private will not be made unique in private by the Reset circuit,\n///   but will instead be made unique by the AVM, because the `note_index_in_tx` will not be known\n///   until the AVM has executed the public functions of the tx. (See an explanation in\n///   reset_output_composer.nr for why).\n///   For some such txs, the `note_index_in_tx` might still be predictable through simulation, but\n///   for txs whose public functions create a varying number of non-revertible notes (determined at\n///   runtime), the `note_index_in_tx` will not be deterministically derivable before submitting the\n///   tx to the network.\n/// )\n///\n/// We use the `first_nullifier` of a tx as a seed of uniqueness. We have a guarantee that there will\n/// always be at least one nullifier per tx, because the init circuit will create one if one isn't\n/// created naturally by any functions of the tx. (Search \"protocol_nullifier\").\n/// We combine the `first_nullifier` with the note's index (its position within this tx's new\n/// note_hashes array) (`note_index_in_tx`) to get a truly unique value to inject into a note, which\n/// we call a `note_nonce`.\npub fn compute_unique_note_hash(note_nonce: Field, siloed_note_hash: Field) -> Field {\n    let inputs = [note_nonce, siloed_note_hash];\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(inputs, DOM_SEP__UNIQUE_NOTE_HASH)\n}\n\npub fn compute_note_hash_nonce(first_nullifier_in_tx: Field, note_index_in_tx: u32) -> Field {\n    // Hashing the first nullifier with note index in tx is guaranteed to be unique (because all nullifiers are also\n    // unique).\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [first_nullifier_in_tx, note_index_in_tx as Field],\n        DOM_SEP__NOTE_HASH_NONCE,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn compute_note_nonce_and_unique_note_hash(\n    siloed_note_hash: Field,\n    first_nullifier: Field,\n    note_index_in_tx: u32,\n) -> Field {\n    let note_nonce = compute_note_hash_nonce(first_nullifier, note_index_in_tx);\n    compute_unique_note_hash(note_nonce, siloed_note_hash)\n}\n\npub fn compute_siloed_nullifier(contract_address: AztecAddress, nullifier: Field) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [contract_address.to_field(), nullifier],\n        DOM_SEP__SILOED_NULLIFIER,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn create_protocol_nullifier(tx_request: TxRequest) -> Scoped<Counted<Nullifier>> {\n    // The protocol nullifier is ascribed a special side-effect counter of 1. No other side-effect\n    // can have counter 1 (see `validate_as_first_call` for that assertion). Its value is the\n    // transaction's nonce commitment (origin, chain id, version, salt): see\n    // `TxRequest::compute_protocol_nullifier_value`. The reset kernel siloes it under\n    // `NULL_MSG_SENDER_CONTRACT_ADDRESS` like every other nullifier.\n    Nullifier { value: tx_request.compute_protocol_nullifier_value(), note_hash: 0 }.count(1).scope(\n        NULL_MSG_SENDER_CONTRACT_ADDRESS,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn compute_log_tag(raw_tag: Field, dom_sep: u32) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator([raw_tag], dom_sep)\n}\n\npub fn compute_siloed_private_log_first_field(\n    contract_address: AztecAddress,\n    field: Field,\n) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [contract_address.to_field(), field],\n        DOM_SEP__PRIVATE_LOG_FIRST_FIELD,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn compute_siloed_private_log(contract_address: AztecAddress, log: PrivateLog) -> PrivateLog {\n    let mut fields = log.fields;\n    fields[0] = compute_siloed_private_log_first_field(contract_address, fields[0]);\n    PrivateLog::new(fields, log.length)\n}\n\npub fn compute_contract_class_log_hash(log: [Field; CONTRACT_CLASS_LOG_SIZE_IN_FIELDS]) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash(log)\n}\n\npub fn compute_app_siloed_secret_key(\n    master_secret_key: EmbeddedCurveScalar,\n    app_address: AztecAddress,\n    key_type_domain_separator: Field,\n) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [master_secret_key.hi, master_secret_key.lo, app_address.to_field()],\n        key_type_domain_separator,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn compute_l2_to_l1_message_hash(\n    message: Scoped<L2ToL1Message>,\n    rollup_version_id: Field,\n    chain_id: Field,\n) -> Field {\n    let contract_address_bytes: [u8; 32] = message.contract_address.to_field().to_be_bytes();\n    let recipient_bytes: [u8; 20] = message.inner.recipient.to_be_bytes();\n    let content_bytes: [u8; 32] = message.inner.content.to_be_bytes();\n    let rollup_version_id_bytes: [u8; 32] = rollup_version_id.to_be_bytes();\n    let chain_id_bytes: [u8; 32] = chain_id.to_be_bytes();\n\n    let mut bytes: [u8; 148] = std::mem::zeroed();\n    for i in 0..32 {\n        bytes[i] = contract_address_bytes[i];\n        bytes[i + 32] = rollup_version_id_bytes[i];\n        // 64 - 84 are for recipient.\n        bytes[i + 84] = chain_id_bytes[i];\n        bytes[i + 116] = content_bytes[i];\n    }\n\n    for i in 0..20 {\n        bytes[64 + i] = recipient_bytes[i];\n    }\n\n    sha256_to_field(bytes)\n}\n\n/// Computes sha256 hash of 2 input fields.\n///\n/// @returns A truncated field (i.e., the first byte is always 0).\npub fn accumulate_sha256(v0: Field, v1: Field) -> Field {\n    // Concatenate two fields into 32 x 2 = 64 bytes\n    let v0_as_bytes: [u8; 32] = v0.to_be_bytes();\n    let v1_as_bytes: [u8; 32] = v1.to_be_bytes();\n    let hash_input_flattened = v0_as_bytes.concat(v1_as_bytes);\n\n    sha256_to_field(hash_input_flattened)\n}\n\n/// Computes sha256 hash of 2 input fields, prefixed by a domain separator, so that the result cannot collide with an\n/// [`accumulate_sha256`] over the same two fields.\n///\n/// @returns A truncated field (i.e., the first byte is always 0).\npub fn accumulate_sha256_with_separator(separator: u32, v0: Field, v1: Field) -> Field {\n    // Concatenate the separator and two fields into 4 + 32 x 2 = 68 bytes\n    let separator_as_bytes: [u8; 4] = (separator as Field).to_be_bytes();\n    let v0_as_bytes: [u8; 32] = v0.to_be_bytes();\n    let v1_as_bytes: [u8; 32] = v1.to_be_bytes();\n    let hash_input_flattened = separator_as_bytes.concat(v0_as_bytes).concat(v1_as_bytes);\n\n    sha256_to_field(hash_input_flattened)\n}\n\npub fn poseidon2_hash<let N: u32>(inputs: [Field; N]) -> Field {\n    poseidon::poseidon2::Poseidon2::hash(inputs, N)\n}\n\n#[no_predicates]\npub fn poseidon2_hash_with_separator<let N: u32, T>(inputs: [Field; N], separator: T) -> Field\nwhere\n    T: ToField,\n{\n    let inputs_with_separator = [separator.to_field()].concat(inputs);\n    poseidon2_hash(inputs_with_separator)\n}\n\n/// Computes a Poseidon2 hash over a dynamic-length subarray of the given input.\n/// Only the first `in_len` fields of `input` are absorbed; any remaining fields are ignored.\n/// The caller is responsible for ensuring that the input is padded with zeros if required.\n#[no_predicates]\npub fn poseidon2_hash_subarray<let N: u32>(input: [Field; N], in_len: u32) -> Field {\n    let mut sponge = poseidon2_absorb_in_chunks(input, in_len);\n    sponge.squeeze()\n}\n\n/// Computes a Poseidon2 hash with a domain separator over a dynamic-length subarray of the given input.\n/// Only the first `in_len` fields of `input` are absorbed; any remaining fields are ignored.\n/// For `in_len == N` this is equivalent to [`poseidon2_hash_with_separator`].\n#[no_predicates]\npub fn poseidon2_hash_subarray_with_separator<let N: u32, T>(\n    input: [Field; N],\n    in_len: u32,\n    separator: T,\n) -> Field\nwhere\n    T: ToField,\n{\n    let inputs_with_separator = [separator.to_field()].concat(input);\n    poseidon::poseidon2::Poseidon2::hash(inputs_with_separator, in_len + 1)\n}\n\n// This function is  unconstrained because it is intended to be used in unconstrained context only as\n// in constrained contexts it would be too inefficient.\npub unconstrained fn poseidon2_hash_with_separator_bounded_vec<let N: u32, T>(\n    inputs: BoundedVec<Field, N>,\n    separator: T,\n) -> Field\nwhere\n    T: ToField,\n{\n    let in_len = inputs.len() + 1;\n    let iv: Field = (in_len as Field) * TWO_POW_64;\n    let mut sponge = Poseidon2Sponge::new(iv);\n    sponge.absorb(separator.to_field());\n\n    for i in 0..inputs.len() {\n        sponge.absorb(inputs.get(i));\n    }\n\n    sponge.squeeze()\n}\n\n/// Computes a Poseidon2 hash of a fixed string, such as a function signature or a domain separator name.\n///\n/// The bytes are packed into 31-byte little-endian chunks, one `Field` per chunk, and the result is\n/// [`poseidon2_hash`] of those fields.\n///\n/// The hash commits to the number of chunks but not to the byte length `N`: zero bytes at the end of the last chunk\n/// do not change the result, so `[1]`, `[1, 0]` and `[1, 0, ..., 0]` (31 bytes) all hash to the same value. Do not\n/// use this to commit to variable-length data, e.g. a payload zero-padded to a maximum length, unless the length is\n/// bound separately.\n#[no_predicates]\npub fn poseidon2_hash_bytes<let N: u32>(inputs: [u8; N]) -> Field {\n    let mut fields = [0; (N + 30) / 31];\n    let mut field_index = 0;\n    let mut current_field = [0; 31];\n    for i in 0..inputs.len() {\n        let index = i % 31;\n        current_field[index] = inputs[i];\n        if index == 30 {\n            fields[field_index] = field_from_bytes(current_field, false);\n            current_field = [0; 31];\n            field_index += 1;\n        }\n    }\n    if field_index != fields.len() {\n        fields[field_index] = field_from_bytes(current_field, false);\n    }\n    poseidon2_hash(fields)\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn poseidon2_hash_bytes_matches_hash_of_packed_chunks() {\n    let mut bytes = [0; 32];\n    bytes[0] = 1;\n    bytes[1] = 2;\n    bytes[31] = 3;\n\n    assert_eq(poseidon2_hash_bytes(bytes), poseidon2_hash([1 + 2 * 256, 3]));\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn poseidon2_hash_bytes_ignores_trailing_zeros_in_last_chunk() {\n    let hash = poseidon2_hash_bytes([1]);\n\n    assert_eq(poseidon2_hash_bytes([1, 0]), hash);\n    assert_eq(poseidon2_hash_bytes([1].concat([0; 30])), hash);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn poseidon2_hash_bytes_commits_to_chunk_count() {\n    let one_chunk: [u8; 31] = [1].concat([0; 30]);\n    let two_chunks: [u8; 32] = [1].concat([0; 31]);\n\n    assert(poseidon2_hash_bytes(one_chunk) != poseidon2_hash_bytes(two_chunks));\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn subarray_hash_matches_fixed() {\n    let values_to_hash = [3; 17];\n    let padded = values_to_hash.concat([0; 11]);\n    let subarray_hash = poseidon2_hash_subarray(padded, values_to_hash.len());\n\n    // Hash the entire values_to_hash.\n    let fixed_len_hash = poseidon::poseidon2::Poseidon2::hash(values_to_hash, values_to_hash.len());\n\n    assert_eq(subarray_hash, fixed_len_hash);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn subarray_hash_matches_variable() {\n    let values_to_hash = [3; 17];\n    let padded = values_to_hash.concat([0; 11]);\n    let subarray_hash = poseidon2_hash_subarray(padded, values_to_hash.len());\n\n    // Hash up to values_to_hash.len() fields of the padded array.\n    let variable_len_hash = poseidon::poseidon2::Poseidon2::hash(padded, values_to_hash.len());\n\n    assert_eq(subarray_hash, variable_len_hash);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn subarray_hash_with_separator_matches_fixed_len_with_separator() {\n    let values_to_hash = [3; 17];\n    let padded = values_to_hash.concat([0; 11]);\n    let separator = 42;\n\n    assert_eq(\n        poseidon2_hash_subarray_with_separator(padded, values_to_hash.len(), separator),\n        poseidon2_hash_with_separator(values_to_hash, separator),\n    );\n    // Hashing the whole array must differ from hashing a prefix of it, even though the padding is zero.\n    assert(\n        poseidon2_hash_subarray_with_separator(padded, padded.len(), separator)\n            != poseidon2_hash_subarray_with_separator(padded, values_to_hash.len(), separator),\n    );\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn smoke_sha256_to_field() {\n    let full_buffer = [\n        0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,\n        25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47,\n        48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70,\n        71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93,\n        94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112,\n        113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130,\n        131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148,\n        149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159,\n    ];\n    let result = sha256_to_field(full_buffer);\n\n    assert(result == 0x448ebbc9e1a31220a2f3830c18eef61b9bd070e5084b7fa2a359fe729184c7);\n\n    // to show correctness of the current ver (truncate one byte) vs old ver (mod full bytes):\n    let result_bytes = sha256::digest(full_buffer);\n    let truncated_field = crate::utils::field::field_from_bytes_32_trunc(result_bytes);\n    assert(truncated_field == result);\n    let mod_res = result + (result_bytes[31] as Field);\n    assert(mod_res == 0x448ebbc9e1a31220a2f3830c18eef61b9bd070e5084b7fa2a359fe729184e0);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn unique_siloed_note_hash_matches_typescript() {\n    let inner_note_hash = 1;\n    let contract_address = AztecAddress::from_field(2);\n    let first_nullifier = 3;\n    let note_index_in_tx = 4;\n\n    let siloed_note_hash = compute_siloed_note_hash(contract_address, inner_note_hash);\n    let siloed_note_hash_from_ts =\n        0x1986a4bea3eddb1fff917d629a13e10f63f514f401bdd61838c6b475db949169;\n    assert_eq(siloed_note_hash, siloed_note_hash_from_ts);\n\n    let nonce: Field = compute_note_hash_nonce(first_nullifier, note_index_in_tx);\n    let note_hash_nonce_from_ts =\n        0x28e7799791bf066a57bb51fdd0fbcaf3f0926414314c7db515ea343f44f5d58b;\n    assert_eq(nonce, note_hash_nonce_from_ts);\n\n    let unique_siloed_note_hash_from_nonce = compute_unique_note_hash(nonce, siloed_note_hash);\n    let unique_siloed_note_hash = compute_note_nonce_and_unique_note_hash(\n        siloed_note_hash,\n        first_nullifier,\n        note_index_in_tx,\n    );\n    assert_eq(unique_siloed_note_hash_from_nonce, unique_siloed_note_hash);\n\n    let unique_siloed_note_hash_from_ts =\n        0x29949aef207b715303b24639737c17fbfeb375c1d965ecfa85c7e4f0febb7d16;\n    assert_eq(unique_siloed_note_hash, unique_siloed_note_hash_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn siloed_nullifier_matches_typescript() {\n    let contract_address = AztecAddress::from_field(123);\n    let nullifier = 456;\n\n    let res = compute_siloed_nullifier(contract_address, nullifier);\n\n    let siloed_nullifier_from_ts =\n        0x169b50336c1f29afdb8a03d955a81e485f5ac7d5f0b8065673d1e407e5877813;\n\n    assert_eq(res, siloed_nullifier_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn siloed_private_log_first_field_matches_typescript() {\n    let contract_address = AztecAddress::from_field(123);\n    let field = 456;\n    let res = compute_siloed_private_log_first_field(contract_address, field);\n\n    let siloed_private_log_first_field_from_ts =\n        0x29480984f7b9257fded523d50addbcfc8d1d33adcf2db73ef3390a8fd5cdffaa;\n\n    assert_eq(res, siloed_private_log_first_field_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn empty_l2_to_l1_message_hash_matches_typescript() {\n    // All zeroes\n    let res = compute_l2_to_l1_message_hash(\n        L2ToL1Message { recipient: EthAddress::zero(), content: 0 }.scope(AztecAddress::from_field(\n            0,\n        )),\n        0,\n        0,\n    );\n\n    let empty_l2_to_l1_msg_hash_from_ts =\n        0x003b18c58c739716e76429634a61375c45b3b5cd470c22ab6d3e14cee23dd992;\n\n    assert_eq(res, empty_l2_to_l1_msg_hash_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn l2_to_l1_message_hash_matches_typescript() {\n    let message = L2ToL1Message { recipient: EthAddress::from_field(1), content: 2 }.scope(\n        AztecAddress::from_field(3),\n    );\n    let version = 4;\n    let chainId = 5;\n\n    let hash = compute_l2_to_l1_message_hash(message, version, chainId);\n\n    // The following value was generated by `yarn-project/stdlib/src/hash/hash.test.ts`\n    let l2_to_l1_message_hash_from_ts =\n        0x0081edf209e087ad31b3fd24263698723d57190bd1d6e9fe056fc0c0a68ee661;\n\n    assert_eq(hash, l2_to_l1_message_hash_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nunconstrained fn poseidon2_hash_with_separator_bounded_vec_matches_non_bounded_vec_version() {\n    let inputs = BoundedVec::<Field, 4>::from_array([1, 2, 3]);\n    let separator = 42;\n\n    // Hash using bounded vec version\n    let bounded_result = poseidon2_hash_with_separator_bounded_vec(inputs, separator);\n\n    // Hash using regular version\n    let regular_result = poseidon2_hash_with_separator([1, 2, 3], separator);\n\n    // Results should match\n    assert_eq(bounded_result, regular_result);\n}\n"
     },
     "192": {
       "function_locations": [
@@ -2727,7 +2739,7 @@
       "custom_attributes": [
         "abi_public"
       ],
-      "debug_symbols": 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"tZ1djhw3DoDvMs95kChKpHyVIAicxFkYMJzAay+wCHz3FSmJrJlFqTVV45f015xqipJI/ZDdzj9Pf3z47du/fv34+c+//v307ud/nn778vHTp4//+vXTX7+///rxr89N+s9TkP/EWp/exZ+eIODTO5DX2l/jeB/He0jjlftrGu/TeI8wXqm/5jhei74mkWN7Fbm+lv5axvsy3tN4T61dbq+M47W1E0VRbQ1HeaJyBwzQ/4SBBkSRFAEaAHlAChOa4lgFpIciwTSBB+QpyVNSpqTQADG4QxnAYUKeMJuoOEEUtn5lMb4DDYhTEqcEpgSmREe/CvAAGf8UBZoktUHIMsIKMsRJnil5AIUJU8JTwiapA2TAO3CHIjZ3oAExTigDoCnEKIAT6oA0JWlKcEpwSnIzA5vxpYQJ8kyb7iLGYxbgAdwszPIM04AKE4aEAkyYErG5Qx4gNnfACXVAShN4gAx4RoEyQFy7w5SUKSlTQlNCYkYznhgmyDPUoMozLFA6sARnh2ZPaQ+zhGdpD7P4RpE/iW/onxKMP2EYf8I8/pTD+JP4M4UG4s8dRNJGnkkk8owML7WpZDGM5RkxrEOeUDtUsbDDlMQ0gQZAnJAnzIdleDkJtEa5mVrzaLSKA3SYn6IpoSnhKakG055pYQzTxEYmiyaTKeeiVCclk8lkD5LeVKEMRqUPawwy4YNMRiYjk3GTVVAqk8T2QWjEg6L476D5iYZGaGSfAPuEuEanZLJkWtC0oGmROOwkS2AtSjypiBZSoknSy8pKZZJMS61KaFQnVZPVKdNdaBBPkvVwEE0SVxpUJqVglI1kdwtRUFb3iWyYXZpdWlxaXEqyYwRQrIaszxbFaigR0jGFKEiKxaS6Rclm1VA2qZgEARxdmlwq0zYQo6NLs0tlDR0oQTQRHashuVTifiB7w+zmVG+iWsMYgmN2tCYwoqM2kQXlXDHRpb3HHckQXapTKPt4xAyOZFjUSFYshhQcsyG7tPdNfCer6SAzn2Utm8iG4FJwaXKpzhCgYjGURbh5m2I2LC4tKlUb1N6kytTegdUekMCaKNIk45sltDrqXj2RDGXva/OvKJahSmX/m5gNk0uTS9GlsmxMZEONrIFkKEvHRG9YFo+J2kRWrIbazYEurS6tJqVgUopqZFHMjvqsTDf1bsrw6Q4/UXqRZVsgXTVyVGRDWfAHqp9lVabz1lHnbaBL2aV8kFZDPdsO5ImsUziQDGN0LIY6hSUoomM1TC5NLkWXokvVPYt0k9U9B+qzSVGfFa9mXUA66qoxUOwl/ZgcydrQNqy6VBAqZsdqqPE2kA3Bpbo4dkzR0ZUlV4b+MdSPyVJcddXQrV/PE+MB7cVA18AuZZfWKQU9WkxkQ+tFQ5eCS8Gl6nKsFzE1h/Uupr7TkV2qV6GO6iVycIJ2WnF0qbpGR9kzoxxYGoq0SmuxX4P0pqdj1h9Qf+gP6ED1BzSO+wMax/0BtbeiYjZUe2tWVCnrZTI4oiNPBPX1gcUwBkd09I+Bfwz8Y+oaA12KrgxdGboyXbkGyoUr6L1XejxRbnpBBhX09jdQbnsB9Y4cHOXGF7IiG0qgTzRpCsnRpXofHFgMITpmwxQc0bEa6h1XDiOgN/KBGRxdWlxaXEouJTWSNQuQHOXZqLkB7ebAOlGPByAHAUCZ2CGNZSYSwoQ8QT8r9uutfSIbaq8GujTrx4omJcQmCIKyOoHsz4DijROlLRCbsqxObQIU0bEaRpdGl4JLNUfSUQ4yE8lQDgYTi2H2hmXlnahN9FRKcmRDcim5lF3KLtX8Q9Ju6oQoFvW7lBX1WRmzEpOhOttAsRfFsiLhBajSpFKZfj0NgOyjoLf5gZpJGUiG6mEDXaoxNTA7ujJ2Zewfk6MbyKYMFOxZismRDcGl4NLkUjygNUEZHF3qvSDvhV7wQa76oFd8kDt+QzKsLq0m5RAdi2F0aXSpRsrA7FgNNVoGulT7NlAblmBm7dvAYliio0t732Tmufeto0urS6tJawBHl0aXRpeCS8GlyaXJpehSdKlmIAcWw+LS4lJyqbrcwGqoy/hANtT1beBsOAXrZsNiGKNjNuxT2BEdq2FKjmyI3gR6w9mbyN5w8SaKN1y8CfKGyZtgb5i9ieoNV2sihuhoTWh6YiI6WsMRkqM1HG2OG1rDEb0J9IazN5G94exNFG+4eBPkDZM3wd4wexPVG67WBITgiI7WMOi6k6siG+rq2VFXz4HZEIPjQVoNdbEZSIbkUnIpexPsytiV6XYw0KQpoKOZnrxDKVoTCazh1NPeQTEb6h4rF4eGKtVigM7xQE2kJ0H16oEqlTS/3u9B0pdJ7/dtqxDUcRjoUh0HSbGlvuV31ImVTGhDMqwuVVcu0ousriwZ0YYilctLyrpkDpQhITE966Y2UKVJCxsq7TUOlYrpfZce6FINMiqKbKjLilxTkubcO+pNvm0gitILyc228onWBoKiVgfEyNIrBh1VKkYWHfWBLtVRlytCQzLMLtVRZy3S6Con+dlEvXBBimSou1NHPTQMrIa6JTErirSK6aSHho46qAPZUNfqjrpWy9WjoUrFSFJf76guNzBPZD3kDFS90iFWr5asZkM21DHrqGPWUWNzoOqVDmlOfeJBWg3VHwaSoXrqQJf2XnRUZVr66h2qilKeCTIOeotOkplMeoseGF0qi+5ENhTXmEiGyaVylhuIqkyrbqhNyPDVrFItweVsWFxa0JENCRzJkF3KxbCqsqyoTUjNLPQek6JKWbD3uONBWg1lm5lIhr3HHV0q28xEVSYVwqA9jkFRpDEKao8HHqTVUGJ+Ihlqjwe6VLaZiapM65jaY7kqoW6sSeudMVRDneOBLgWXgktTciTDXjjsWAxznAjdXi2idnsVq0trmai57okujS6NLgWXJnRkQ7QmkhYso8y8FoKTJGtRr5dp1HB5IgaTYm+4o1ZDZQpRGx5YDdWGgS5Fl/bCqsyQ1oXb1qeoUpkhrQ0nyfE2VGkWVCfoZWVSafn+/aenWYn/9euXDx+kEH8ozbeC/d/vv3z4/PXp3edvnz799PSf95++6UP//vv9Z339+v5L+2sz68PnP9prU/jnx08fhL7/5J8O5x+NsvGOj0v9AE1FTts6Wh6/TB3YMiZXdLSCBZgdbcM805HOdbAs5aqhZQDt84X2bSiylw4b2l50ZkM+19FuEGkaQeQaWprlmYpyrqKEMK1oe304qCjPVNC5CpC0t2poJ5+DgldMB0keeQ4FhbOhqIuhyDCtqBnrmYa4MqO4c5Z8MIKfq4jnKlKaRqSDghdOsbahTA0tg02nNiwcE2FGaFtpDhoujWQ+DY248sswp7MV200B4rYJTDM8W+4bTk2gZXhFd6l8OpC88OsyI7wddc8mc9kLm4nKOZ71AhbuUGEGZ63xrA+wcMhcQ/bwLqaiFaGe64DFUIZo09HKz6Gea1m4ZeuAjUbNdK4DF+GFc7lrG/JhpXm+AcHCM1u1YG4e7YaM13RoArPrgLKwY+Ge7TQ6Q0QOkIfR2DajqZge3rCem7FabgLbkhcP7vHCw9JCRclzQNs97VKUBPcL5AtLf/PJFNw/y2mkpXQz0hLej7SU3yLSUrkfaYnuRlri+5G21LEZaRhuR9rKjN1IW/nXZqRh+nGR1jwqepy02+ylWMPsHop8qgMXDhr9xCjfWTIVbWifqVidOTnYjBz8Ijw/YiC/RaxhvR9rOdyNtRzvx9pSx2as5XQ71lZm7Mba0r9i9ZtVKGf+lRcqSL9FoCpaStFPoMSvUMFsKojOVGwHWyv7nl4RF0qI0hyMlrmMZ2aU9bW9Br8uHyb2pZLVxOoX3PrERjy9XRVYBX2dw9GysvVURbp9LSh481qw7gaSdQPSqQ3LFTRYN1rl/5oVdtNs43o+H+s0CqL7RS2nflFXaxfYeB79ohXRXqMjuQ4+1bGOE3OultbHs67Q6qLUcng2LZL8O1WSbscJ4e04oXw7TqjcjJN1N7bihPh2nKwnFf200tKxfLoXrJyLczTnonSmgpf7s8drK7KdjQYvuoJ2aMLDoenFWCy74XccOmZ2XnZjNakhWKgGPByYXmFGK6VNMzjGSxPCEdhU5NNAZVolucCSVK2Cc+jJ82MGr/yT7cDUSv54qmPZFT+4MeCpb9XVQp6TBWtsZefTIa1x5RzTxTn4aHDeVsBoCko6VfAGKaZ6O8VUV+mhUH1DC/WajmiHNoj5oh1+/gQIdFHH3sWivkG6LIb7t/j6BvmydaAgVg8UOj0Jx7Da4kux22thOM1Nh6WfWpY+4fl2EMNyk09eBTvsSv9Xr1jaYUfAVtA7PWssbzlsy7n8Hu284hAWK2nB2ZVSzssmYWEHRqvHISCdFtPiqn7TasZ2eiPihZLFQogB3dkPV7aXNbndAaHFgKw0wIyXwotq2MI5yA6RVOFSjdSTw40jXKr1EuNBRz51r2U5KZCn78LFviTPSjCVS32p4H2p53XruEr6365cN6ckr8BDOLdidRhFO93L9xnOnXxVVNorPe/b8UxJecVXEhL6gORyPiDLrFVOdhhsSs7LnqvC0m4RG/huFXttxWYZO9ysY79mROm0MBQT3CxmP7CD2e1Y7XCrAtNuRXtVYNq6kz/qix3novws77wvdLPaFlc1md1ymx6k79cA4qrEtHvviBjvXjwiwv3T+lrJ7nEd8fZxfWnI7nl96WibZbe4qjVt1d0eBU30oKmLoFlrqWzeCi37cFULefUt5Iu2QCgHLTWdaslwuxAYVzWnvUpgzPgmy0DOb7AMrKpGm8tApjdYBpZKdpeBVWpqdxnI9AbLwNLR9iqCcVUw2SwJPtCxVRN8RejF49HoReiV1d2/7Wi+MuJ5Mjcu61C7FY9Y6HbJIxa+XfOIqzLS7gmLwt0T1ronW2WPuCxa7NU9HsztZuHjkZ+V4n620EL5dvEjrupRW9WPB33JPqxtvTmPGVrermx+Uzokul9WQDQddbeMsrYk2zfpW/W2XlNSuPrxKFxUQsEuahQ4nitZTk9bGNHPJHy+GDG+wZcdIuf7SxqX+0sav8XXoO9+D/pBT/aWtGXqfXNJW9ux9Z2HB/6x+aWHuCpV7X7r4ZGSra89PIqanDxqSjrvT3mDCmKsdLOEuNSwVUPUw+DdUzyE21/pU4++W0ZcK9msIz5QsldIfKBk84v34Q2+owih3L6ULA3ZvpSsY2azmAirstVmMRGWVau9YiKsilabxcQHdmwVE9epeLLdu2WQz391E/GHVnsQwA/PUC5VruR3qaYjnZcVYFm5ghL9utiqA+daVmeAHG01yimfe8jCU7PtM/lQ/fo//1j3xZLxjWu9OCJ0uEAfq7QvtazqRltFkkd2pOJ2nGcFYfWbqM0cGix/0bSVQ4NlVmL/R2KrwtH27rusX+3tvlDfYLtaKtndrlK8v11Bvb9drR1tL4cGqxrWZg7tgY6tHNprQq+eL4rL4oL8k0iHIcHz/vDt3AasCllbuY1HfTGPb1xPD/CwKmJt5wNhWfnZuzwDptuXZ8D7FVddgG9dnh/0ZOvyDEi3L88P5nYzH/gKP4uLNWD1k6nd9Nf6dBWOp6vzJWBVWEjsK+vxl+ovvz0CqxLW7ve91r3xQidiqNfOm3QMXjgfkfJjz87oXzFAPP/nICCvltVg8Q++MGPetaLFmi3LNZ0nV5Yq/GoWQrymIttS+Gz331ch/0KfqSjxmgorGbeQTRdV2NXuWLN6jQqtEw4VpVxUYRnvSPG+iotWWMo8AVy0wpLU11WwuZZ8PfWKCrANMsHF4QT78m9K8aIV9gXPloO4FKntMneoyZSLKmxS08WxeKbiohXuWgjhoopwW4W7VlvLL6lAX/iOqaDXqCA7nbfRhEsq+HAzvraCtxs1+f3t0sKXwS4rGShdVJFNRT0PM1iVTzLNbbnEo19sG5HsW1D5mDR5TT+S/cNdeRVlwPVH9sMipJU64rV+WIRkzOe+CRV+YD/Qzns5x2v9QEu3tvTeqh/5B/aj2D8flsu11TuXaCFW6Jpr5pJcxbXRLJbayHRt6W2fQ1OR4KIV5CrK3bGgdG3RI0s3ZQ4XVXjGmS/696Ejx9+fvEYFg3ekXJtUtixCZrpqBbsKuj0WdOmclavVI3PFa1b4z1dyzXC3IzVf2k8LWJgVyJfGgqLthhSfReozDSkui/d4qIeUC2sn+aWqYb2kwX4311KzV9Zv8uwUwbNQ37fBFoumge9qiJdsAPs9OEli/ZINntl+dq7YtyF5fj1f64X9lImgwN1evNDwS3v3/vePX579P2G/i64vH9//9unDePvnt8+/H/769b9/z7/M/6fs31/++v3DH9++fBBNh/+x7NO7n+Un9VzDLz89JXnXJoUTtHfyz/L+LCeFVjD/5bvY8j8=",
       "is_unconstrained": true,
       "name": "public_dispatch"
     },
@@ -4753,7 +4765,7 @@
       "custom_attributes": [
         "abi_public"
       ],
-      "debug_symbols": "tZvbbhs5D8ffxde50IkU2VdZLIq0TRcBgrTIth/woei7L6kDNQ4g1dWkN/HP9Pg/pETqNM6Py6eHD9//ef/4/PnLv5d3f/24fHh5fHp6/Of905eP998evzyL9cfF6R8PcHkX7y4e5S3oK7RXrvac2qu8z/JKqb2295zLa3ChveLlnXcC3guoJbgGqVsSNID+EXQLdguahRvk2IEaUOiQG3C/BWOF6FSQFVIHbuC7xXdL6JbQLVHcCBJOTK6DXBOCgDofogI1QPEw6jWYG+TQoVuoW6hb1OcKUCGpzxVSB27gYwdqEFQwKGCD6Dt0S+qW1C3QLaBuiPMJQwe9RlIgFedRgFwH8TDpNZw6UAVwsUO3+G7x3aKuVsAG6mqFpgzazhVSB24AKggKuYH6XKFbcrfkbqFuIXVDogCOHfQaurugJm8FtUi/ow8NNHsraGHItzBqpejFUQRBP0qxfZSofQTYPkLfAds12bdrtKLQC2hJVVCLdApq86Jew1pl0stZHcvyUVbHKqhFmiVrq+YkANwAtUZBgRtoFWdUUIvURS51TArcgLul3FR8Jk2/CmIhcYO0ZCp0S5DYyStI7CSOUVSLOEbZdZCmI3GMNJEqqEUcI1YLKqhFHGNN/grd4tVCCtBAO4VYATqIPyz+cBQP2SuoRfxhTSSOCtwA1JIUuAF2C3aLthiDAjegbqFu0RZjVFCLuOFdGWWcV9Su9y4URMM8rKrckMrXoCAbaqJqqgi1xPLeRSOzebNpqcnVitoxYihIhjEbpmBYxuGGOu56HfHLlNCRDbVhGpbxt2HRTYpcrFgwd6zzQsUyMzRkwzL26pAtWKwaRYjJMMWBZAhoWBpcx2hBNMzDqnnYkQ0pDiRDHtYSRcHoipgvWG6hvRdLQDoDCKJhGNYAA9kwxoFkmIY1ZUMoYqlguYUmSKwRY0E0zMNaI67IhjXiimTIw1ojVkw14lyw3ELzLNWIuSAahmGtEVdkwxpxRTJMw1ojLlgi1hlOUG8RtdVTiVgnLl/mqYZ5WEvEDdmwRNyQDHlYS8QFoUSsM6FguYW2OpSIIxUEw7K2aTiscVjjwcqGJeKGZAhhYDbEceMacUEdW6VHCqaBbEjDSsPKw8pmRR1ppSMVvRtYri1rwRJmQzSM6q9OpILZsAwr9YISm86rsqqMA4cVhxWzYQ4Dh5WGldCwLPgaQsdcFn0ND1Y29HGguVNm0o524xz9QLtxTuMWadxCpxhJG0WdZDoOa4m4IRlms5ZJU5KpIBjSsJaObciGPKxsVnZp4LCWMBuiYbRbcOkh0ArgXC7QCmDSdgAoiIY8rPXGoJuAemMsyIa6ZGlYfag4rHFYS1ND2VGUfYPOb4LFyoplfEBXUK26ggp10tU1VKiTLoafP+8ufd/z/tvLw4Nuew4bIdkefb1/eXj+dnn3/P3p6e7yv/un7+Wif7/eP5fXb/cv8qnc6uH5k7yK4OfHpweln3fj227+VQYdr8u3ZfHBJgDxSsHPFbTEmoJU0HAB6EohzBVi7C7Ew/cx3+4BdgEpmjzzIM0VUuhNmFI4CGy1otx20oq4UHDUBcLohZRu9oB06V0FiMPMA1q0YtQ8ra0os/OsFXmuEDA1gUDTflzGYN3ABH6ai4tUYJ2hqwL7WQh+kYvArvek7L3QJGTcvdaIi5aU4aR3hqyiHc9VFjkpAVhrMOS5BiwqS3entbJoZGWI18ODX+Rl8Lo5q50qJyx7GiF2N0LAhR+L7JSFXy8QWfjBoTVudkMkeoIL8tyN1VDjyAY7f0iP14PdQgKhNyhy3qoSN/IiTccatwoiRDfyE6eVFtLJSgtwvtICvkWl6T7hbKUFOltpgc9X2lLjxkqL/nSlrdy4tdJW+XVjpcX05ypNMsqPOpGzz61aSzAyNNFUIy4SVLbXtsAJPLpEmvZKYpGfgZz1yCEv3PUCI/Jb1Fpy52st+bO1lsL5Wltq3FhrKZ2utZUbt9baMr88sy39HM7yKy0ksueeojn4sf7M9BsSRCaR80zi5mIDP93OwEJEtry9MXI+zI2v3IDVKiEmtoFDDshgKrLq2HJ2WDtWTkNmAyDEVdFzb47Ah4J9LZFO7woATm4L1mGkbGGEOPVhOYI6CyNA2PPCdpnSrvP+WOYFpDTygnGWF+hWY1ew9jzmhRxq/Y5GHBo01VjXiSVXlqcv01BWG6UU2bpFHgXO2yOdrhOE03WCeLpOMJ+sk3UYN9UJ8uk6WXdqGquVlA4z9KtOzYtKEf+t2DjOE3Stgbbmcc5vaoAl19UE/Rsa0YHN0A79pka2MzJ5rrWrkUzjcMr1Wxrl4LNpIO5qoGlk/wYau36waYSw64dN9Cc0yHJMniruaQQbfmLYbdNAlmPR7/pBlmPCexpx5FjczbE48iPutseVxq4fI8fkkHlXw53XGDkmzzr3NNIYCxPynkZOfaaVJg17GnTYy26O67IJzmPjlfcWQGTjeqYcZ9Mcr6b8MNaUgabHaLzY2CdrjHTY2L9e167CGOdw+fjs4VUY3q3Wk87ZetKlY3Pe7gc5G37I++mqYSlRfgPQJADnoSyWL9KpvWJJnpEfQuFXIqtdE9m+3vPVUMq3BzPOFyikOA9mtSqFaItKfbZPc5XVxtwW6XQoN4JXCoskhRB7o0LI8+HnVyJgIjyfn7xftCrk3qjoj0Ppb7gRfR/CYDW1+OVjpjdww2YF6Vi/2aRjWoAEYREL/NFYkp1hAfjdWFK2BoG4ioX+aCwIvfQBF6uXX4jYIASY3aYIYBwiu62a7bRB2ibshmOzrYjg+XByzLvh2EknkNsWAfOEttP1EA753YYlG96B8raIzZoikt8gnEybImxHr8Bp1xNiaxOGcD4chtWEtZg3Kdm8iXE6b0Z4g98ARDz9I4DVA4KbfwWwFLn1ZwCRz/8OYOXIzT8EWC+tUuKxtMrTM36/fHqD44wKKcw2AD7FVf/aWVlM802ET8tj/hjG8WWc7SN+4Ycdbl/tD+E3nt+Q7QG8Yzf9cYNfPUdC22JizvPWWCmEnh9Ibq6wSNNsxzGZw8aj51x+vF4F/NW0e+3D8mlDSLYJCVcrkdu9sJMYQd5SyPYwzZPbURgn0oJ5yweb80WBzir4LR9CsIclOsxs+TCejl6t92/3IY5HtLAXRUymgOFsFK8U/pZ39x8fX67+F/Cnar083n94emhvP39//nj49Nv/v/ZP+v8Sfn358vHh0/eXB1U6/EPh5d1fkeJdZPj77uLL24B3ckz590+9+38=",
+      "debug_symbols": "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",
       "is_unconstrained": true,
       "name": "update"
     }
@@ -5185,5 +5197,5 @@
     }
   },
   "transpiled": true,
-  "aztec_version": "6.0.0-rc.1"
+  "aztec_version": "6.0.0-rc.2"
 }

package/artifacts/FeeJuice.json

@@ -566,51 +566,63 @@
         },
         {
           "name": "poseidon2_hash_bytes",
-          "start": 11953
+          "start": 12580
+        },
+        {
+          "name": "poseidon2_hash_bytes_matches_hash_of_packed_chunks",
+          "start": 13179
+        },
+        {
+          "name": "poseidon2_hash_bytes_ignores_trailing_zeros_in_last_chunk",
+          "start": 13418
+        },
+        {
+          "name": "poseidon2_hash_bytes_commits_to_chunk_count",
+          "start": 13638
         },
         {
           "name": "subarray_hash_matches_fixed",
-          "start": 12529
+          "start": 13869
         },
         {
           "name": "subarray_hash_matches_variable",
-          "start": 12928
+          "start": 14268
         },
         {
           "name": "subarray_hash_with_separator_matches_fixed_len_with_separator",
-          "start": 13384
+          "start": 14724
         },
         {
           "name": "smoke_sha256_to_field",
-          "start": 14009
+          "start": 15349
         },
         {
           "name": "unique_siloed_note_hash_matches_typescript",
-          "start": 15411
+          "start": 16751
         },
         {
           "name": "siloed_nullifier_matches_typescript",
-          "start": 16633
+          "start": 17973
         },
         {
           "name": "siloed_private_log_first_field_matches_typescript",
-          "start": 17013
+          "start": 18353
         },
         {
           "name": "empty_l2_to_l1_message_hash_matches_typescript",
-          "start": 17423
+          "start": 18763
         },
         {
           "name": "l2_to_l1_message_hash_matches_typescript",
-          "start": 17874
+          "start": 19214
         },
         {
           "name": "poseidon2_hash_with_separator_bounded_vec_matches_non_bounded_vec_version",
-          "start": 18490
+          "start": 19830
         }
       ],
       "path": "/home/aztec-dev/aztec-packages/noir-projects/fnd/noir-protocol-circuits/crates/types/src/hash.nr",
-      "source": "mod poseidon2_chunks;\n\nuse crate::{\n    abis::{\n        contract_class_function_leaf_preimage::ContractClassFunctionLeafPreimage,\n        function_selector::FunctionSelector, nullifier::Nullifier, private_log::PrivateLog,\n        transaction::tx_request::TxRequest,\n    },\n    address::{AztecAddress, EthAddress},\n    constants::{\n        CONTRACT_CLASS_LOG_SIZE_IN_FIELDS, DOM_SEP__NOTE_HASH_NONCE,\n        DOM_SEP__PRIVATE_LOG_FIRST_FIELD, DOM_SEP__SILOED_NOTE_HASH, DOM_SEP__SILOED_NULLIFIER,\n        DOM_SEP__UNIQUE_NOTE_HASH, FUNCTION_TREE_HEIGHT, NULL_MSG_SENDER_CONTRACT_ADDRESS,\n        TWO_POW_64,\n    },\n    merkle_tree::root_from_sibling_path,\n    messaging::l2_to_l1_message::L2ToL1Message,\n    poseidon2::Poseidon2Sponge,\n    side_effect::{Counted, Scoped},\n    traits::{FromField, Hash, ToField},\n    utils::field::{field_from_bytes, field_from_bytes_32_trunc},\n};\n\npub use poseidon2_chunks::poseidon2_absorb_in_chunks_existing_sponge;\nuse poseidon2_chunks::poseidon2_absorb_in_chunks;\nuse std::embedded_curve_ops::EmbeddedCurveScalar;\n\n// TODO: refactor these into their own files: sha256, poseidon2, some protocol-specific hash computations, some merkle computations.\n\npub fn sha256_to_field<let N: u32>(bytes_to_hash: [u8; N]) -> Field {\n    let sha256_hashed = sha256::digest(bytes_to_hash);\n    let hash_in_a_field = field_from_bytes_32_trunc(sha256_hashed);\n\n    hash_in_a_field\n}\n\npub fn private_functions_root_from_siblings(\n    selector: FunctionSelector,\n    vk_hash: Field,\n    function_leaf_index: Field,\n    function_leaf_sibling_path: [Field; FUNCTION_TREE_HEIGHT],\n) -> Field {\n    let function_leaf_preimage = ContractClassFunctionLeafPreimage { selector, vk_hash };\n    let function_leaf = function_leaf_preimage.hash();\n    root_from_sibling_path(\n        function_leaf,\n        function_leaf_index,\n        function_leaf_sibling_path,\n    )\n}\n\n/// Siloing in the context of Aztec refers to the process of hashing a note hash with a contract address (this way\n/// the note hash is scoped to a specific contract). This is used to prevent intermingling of notes between contracts.\npub fn compute_siloed_note_hash(contract_address: AztecAddress, note_hash: Field) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [contract_address.to_field(), note_hash],\n        DOM_SEP__SILOED_NOTE_HASH,\n    )\n}\n\n/// Computes unique, siloed note hashes from siloed note hashes.\n///\n/// The protocol injects uniqueness into every note_hash, so that every single note_hash in the\n/// tree is unique. This prevents faerie gold attacks, where a malicious sender could create\n/// two identical note_hashes for a recipient (meaning only one would be nullifiable in future).\n///\n/// Most privacy protocols will inject the note's leaf_index (its position in the Note Hashes Tree)\n/// into the note, but this requires the creator of a note to wait until their tx is included in\n/// a block to know the note's final note hash (the unique, siloed note hash), because inserting\n/// leaves into trees is the job of a block producer.\n///\n/// We took a different approach so that the creator of a note will know each note's unique, siloed\n/// note hash before broadcasting their tx to the network.\n/// (There was also a historical requirement relating to \"chained transactions\" -- a feature that\n/// Aztec Connect had to enable notes to be spent from distinct txs earlier in the same block,\n/// and hence before an archive block root had been established for that block -- but that feature\n/// was abandoned for the Aztec Network for having too many bad tradeoffs).\n///\n/// (\n///   Edit: it is no longer true that all final note_hashes will be known by the creator of a tx\n///   before they send it to the network. If a tx makes public function calls, then _revertible_\n///   note_hashes that are created in private will not be made unique in private by the Reset circuit,\n///   but will instead be made unique by the AVM, because the `note_index_in_tx` will not be known\n///   until the AVM has executed the public functions of the tx. (See an explanation in\n///   reset_output_composer.nr for why).\n///   For some such txs, the `note_index_in_tx` might still be predictable through simulation, but\n///   for txs whose public functions create a varying number of non-revertible notes (determined at\n///   runtime), the `note_index_in_tx` will not be deterministically derivable before submitting the\n///   tx to the network.\n/// )\n///\n/// We use the `first_nullifier` of a tx as a seed of uniqueness. We have a guarantee that there will\n/// always be at least one nullifier per tx, because the init circuit will create one if one isn't\n/// created naturally by any functions of the tx. (Search \"protocol_nullifier\").\n/// We combine the `first_nullifier` with the note's index (its position within this tx's new\n/// note_hashes array) (`note_index_in_tx`) to get a truly unique value to inject into a note, which\n/// we call a `note_nonce`.\npub fn compute_unique_note_hash(note_nonce: Field, siloed_note_hash: Field) -> Field {\n    let inputs = [note_nonce, siloed_note_hash];\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(inputs, DOM_SEP__UNIQUE_NOTE_HASH)\n}\n\npub fn compute_note_hash_nonce(first_nullifier_in_tx: Field, note_index_in_tx: u32) -> Field {\n    // Hashing the first nullifier with note index in tx is guaranteed to be unique (because all nullifiers are also\n    // unique).\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [first_nullifier_in_tx, note_index_in_tx as Field],\n        DOM_SEP__NOTE_HASH_NONCE,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn compute_note_nonce_and_unique_note_hash(\n    siloed_note_hash: Field,\n    first_nullifier: Field,\n    note_index_in_tx: u32,\n) -> Field {\n    let note_nonce = compute_note_hash_nonce(first_nullifier, note_index_in_tx);\n    compute_unique_note_hash(note_nonce, siloed_note_hash)\n}\n\npub fn compute_siloed_nullifier(contract_address: AztecAddress, nullifier: Field) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [contract_address.to_field(), nullifier],\n        DOM_SEP__SILOED_NULLIFIER,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn create_protocol_nullifier(tx_request: TxRequest) -> Scoped<Counted<Nullifier>> {\n    // The protocol nullifier is ascribed a special side-effect counter of 1. No other side-effect\n    // can have counter 1 (see `validate_as_first_call` for that assertion). Its value is the\n    // transaction's nonce commitment (origin, chain id, version, salt): see\n    // `TxRequest::compute_protocol_nullifier_value`. The reset kernel siloes it under\n    // `NULL_MSG_SENDER_CONTRACT_ADDRESS` like every other nullifier.\n    Nullifier { value: tx_request.compute_protocol_nullifier_value(), note_hash: 0 }.count(1).scope(\n        NULL_MSG_SENDER_CONTRACT_ADDRESS,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn compute_log_tag(raw_tag: Field, dom_sep: u32) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator([raw_tag], dom_sep)\n}\n\npub fn compute_siloed_private_log_first_field(\n    contract_address: AztecAddress,\n    field: Field,\n) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [contract_address.to_field(), field],\n        DOM_SEP__PRIVATE_LOG_FIRST_FIELD,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn compute_siloed_private_log(contract_address: AztecAddress, log: PrivateLog) -> PrivateLog {\n    let mut fields = log.fields;\n    fields[0] = compute_siloed_private_log_first_field(contract_address, fields[0]);\n    PrivateLog::new(fields, log.length)\n}\n\npub fn compute_contract_class_log_hash(log: [Field; CONTRACT_CLASS_LOG_SIZE_IN_FIELDS]) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash(log)\n}\n\npub fn compute_app_siloed_secret_key(\n    master_secret_key: EmbeddedCurveScalar,\n    app_address: AztecAddress,\n    key_type_domain_separator: Field,\n) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [master_secret_key.hi, master_secret_key.lo, app_address.to_field()],\n        key_type_domain_separator,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn compute_l2_to_l1_message_hash(\n    message: Scoped<L2ToL1Message>,\n    rollup_version_id: Field,\n    chain_id: Field,\n) -> Field {\n    let contract_address_bytes: [u8; 32] = message.contract_address.to_field().to_be_bytes();\n    let recipient_bytes: [u8; 20] = message.inner.recipient.to_be_bytes();\n    let content_bytes: [u8; 32] = message.inner.content.to_be_bytes();\n    let rollup_version_id_bytes: [u8; 32] = rollup_version_id.to_be_bytes();\n    let chain_id_bytes: [u8; 32] = chain_id.to_be_bytes();\n\n    let mut bytes: [u8; 148] = std::mem::zeroed();\n    for i in 0..32 {\n        bytes[i] = contract_address_bytes[i];\n        bytes[i + 32] = rollup_version_id_bytes[i];\n        // 64 - 84 are for recipient.\n        bytes[i + 84] = chain_id_bytes[i];\n        bytes[i + 116] = content_bytes[i];\n    }\n\n    for i in 0..20 {\n        bytes[64 + i] = recipient_bytes[i];\n    }\n\n    sha256_to_field(bytes)\n}\n\n/// Computes sha256 hash of 2 input fields.\n///\n/// @returns A truncated field (i.e., the first byte is always 0).\npub fn accumulate_sha256(v0: Field, v1: Field) -> Field {\n    // Concatenate two fields into 32 x 2 = 64 bytes\n    let v0_as_bytes: [u8; 32] = v0.to_be_bytes();\n    let v1_as_bytes: [u8; 32] = v1.to_be_bytes();\n    let hash_input_flattened = v0_as_bytes.concat(v1_as_bytes);\n\n    sha256_to_field(hash_input_flattened)\n}\n\n/// Computes sha256 hash of 2 input fields, prefixed by a domain separator, so that the result cannot collide with an\n/// [`accumulate_sha256`] over the same two fields.\n///\n/// @returns A truncated field (i.e., the first byte is always 0).\npub fn accumulate_sha256_with_separator(separator: u32, v0: Field, v1: Field) -> Field {\n    // Concatenate the separator and two fields into 4 + 32 x 2 = 68 bytes\n    let separator_as_bytes: [u8; 4] = (separator as Field).to_be_bytes();\n    let v0_as_bytes: [u8; 32] = v0.to_be_bytes();\n    let v1_as_bytes: [u8; 32] = v1.to_be_bytes();\n    let hash_input_flattened = separator_as_bytes.concat(v0_as_bytes).concat(v1_as_bytes);\n\n    sha256_to_field(hash_input_flattened)\n}\n\npub fn poseidon2_hash<let N: u32>(inputs: [Field; N]) -> Field {\n    poseidon::poseidon2::Poseidon2::hash(inputs, N)\n}\n\n#[no_predicates]\npub fn poseidon2_hash_with_separator<let N: u32, T>(inputs: [Field; N], separator: T) -> Field\nwhere\n    T: ToField,\n{\n    let inputs_with_separator = [separator.to_field()].concat(inputs);\n    poseidon2_hash(inputs_with_separator)\n}\n\n/// Computes a Poseidon2 hash over a dynamic-length subarray of the given input.\n/// Only the first `in_len` fields of `input` are absorbed; any remaining fields are ignored.\n/// The caller is responsible for ensuring that the input is padded with zeros if required.\n#[no_predicates]\npub fn poseidon2_hash_subarray<let N: u32>(input: [Field; N], in_len: u32) -> Field {\n    let mut sponge = poseidon2_absorb_in_chunks(input, in_len);\n    sponge.squeeze()\n}\n\n/// Computes a Poseidon2 hash with a domain separator over a dynamic-length subarray of the given input.\n/// Only the first `in_len` fields of `input` are absorbed; any remaining fields are ignored.\n/// For `in_len == N` this is equivalent to [`poseidon2_hash_with_separator`].\n#[no_predicates]\npub fn poseidon2_hash_subarray_with_separator<let N: u32, T>(\n    input: [Field; N],\n    in_len: u32,\n    separator: T,\n) -> Field\nwhere\n    T: ToField,\n{\n    let inputs_with_separator = [separator.to_field()].concat(input);\n    poseidon::poseidon2::Poseidon2::hash(inputs_with_separator, in_len + 1)\n}\n\n// This function is  unconstrained because it is intended to be used in unconstrained context only as\n// in constrained contexts it would be too inefficient.\npub unconstrained fn poseidon2_hash_with_separator_bounded_vec<let N: u32, T>(\n    inputs: BoundedVec<Field, N>,\n    separator: T,\n) -> Field\nwhere\n    T: ToField,\n{\n    let in_len = inputs.len() + 1;\n    let iv: Field = (in_len as Field) * TWO_POW_64;\n    let mut sponge = Poseidon2Sponge::new(iv);\n    sponge.absorb(separator.to_field());\n\n    for i in 0..inputs.len() {\n        sponge.absorb(inputs.get(i));\n    }\n\n    sponge.squeeze()\n}\n\n#[no_predicates]\npub fn poseidon2_hash_bytes<let N: u32>(inputs: [u8; N]) -> Field {\n    let mut fields = [0; (N + 30) / 31];\n    let mut field_index = 0;\n    let mut current_field = [0; 31];\n    for i in 0..inputs.len() {\n        let index = i % 31;\n        current_field[index] = inputs[i];\n        if index == 30 {\n            fields[field_index] = field_from_bytes(current_field, false);\n            current_field = [0; 31];\n            field_index += 1;\n        }\n    }\n    if field_index != fields.len() {\n        fields[field_index] = field_from_bytes(current_field, false);\n    }\n    poseidon2_hash(fields)\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn subarray_hash_matches_fixed() {\n    let values_to_hash = [3; 17];\n    let padded = values_to_hash.concat([0; 11]);\n    let subarray_hash = poseidon2_hash_subarray(padded, values_to_hash.len());\n\n    // Hash the entire values_to_hash.\n    let fixed_len_hash = poseidon::poseidon2::Poseidon2::hash(values_to_hash, values_to_hash.len());\n\n    assert_eq(subarray_hash, fixed_len_hash);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn subarray_hash_matches_variable() {\n    let values_to_hash = [3; 17];\n    let padded = values_to_hash.concat([0; 11]);\n    let subarray_hash = poseidon2_hash_subarray(padded, values_to_hash.len());\n\n    // Hash up to values_to_hash.len() fields of the padded array.\n    let variable_len_hash = poseidon::poseidon2::Poseidon2::hash(padded, values_to_hash.len());\n\n    assert_eq(subarray_hash, variable_len_hash);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn subarray_hash_with_separator_matches_fixed_len_with_separator() {\n    let values_to_hash = [3; 17];\n    let padded = values_to_hash.concat([0; 11]);\n    let separator = 42;\n\n    assert_eq(\n        poseidon2_hash_subarray_with_separator(padded, values_to_hash.len(), separator),\n        poseidon2_hash_with_separator(values_to_hash, separator),\n    );\n    // Hashing the whole array must differ from hashing a prefix of it, even though the padding is zero.\n    assert(\n        poseidon2_hash_subarray_with_separator(padded, padded.len(), separator)\n            != poseidon2_hash_subarray_with_separator(padded, values_to_hash.len(), separator),\n    );\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn smoke_sha256_to_field() {\n    let full_buffer = [\n        0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,\n        25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47,\n        48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70,\n        71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93,\n        94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112,\n        113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130,\n        131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148,\n        149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159,\n    ];\n    let result = sha256_to_field(full_buffer);\n\n    assert(result == 0x448ebbc9e1a31220a2f3830c18eef61b9bd070e5084b7fa2a359fe729184c7);\n\n    // to show correctness of the current ver (truncate one byte) vs old ver (mod full bytes):\n    let result_bytes = sha256::digest(full_buffer);\n    let truncated_field = crate::utils::field::field_from_bytes_32_trunc(result_bytes);\n    assert(truncated_field == result);\n    let mod_res = result + (result_bytes[31] as Field);\n    assert(mod_res == 0x448ebbc9e1a31220a2f3830c18eef61b9bd070e5084b7fa2a359fe729184e0);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn unique_siloed_note_hash_matches_typescript() {\n    let inner_note_hash = 1;\n    let contract_address = AztecAddress::from_field(2);\n    let first_nullifier = 3;\n    let note_index_in_tx = 4;\n\n    let siloed_note_hash = compute_siloed_note_hash(contract_address, inner_note_hash);\n    let siloed_note_hash_from_ts =\n        0x1986a4bea3eddb1fff917d629a13e10f63f514f401bdd61838c6b475db949169;\n    assert_eq(siloed_note_hash, siloed_note_hash_from_ts);\n\n    let nonce: Field = compute_note_hash_nonce(first_nullifier, note_index_in_tx);\n    let note_hash_nonce_from_ts =\n        0x28e7799791bf066a57bb51fdd0fbcaf3f0926414314c7db515ea343f44f5d58b;\n    assert_eq(nonce, note_hash_nonce_from_ts);\n\n    let unique_siloed_note_hash_from_nonce = compute_unique_note_hash(nonce, siloed_note_hash);\n    let unique_siloed_note_hash = compute_note_nonce_and_unique_note_hash(\n        siloed_note_hash,\n        first_nullifier,\n        note_index_in_tx,\n    );\n    assert_eq(unique_siloed_note_hash_from_nonce, unique_siloed_note_hash);\n\n    let unique_siloed_note_hash_from_ts =\n        0x29949aef207b715303b24639737c17fbfeb375c1d965ecfa85c7e4f0febb7d16;\n    assert_eq(unique_siloed_note_hash, unique_siloed_note_hash_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn siloed_nullifier_matches_typescript() {\n    let contract_address = AztecAddress::from_field(123);\n    let nullifier = 456;\n\n    let res = compute_siloed_nullifier(contract_address, nullifier);\n\n    let siloed_nullifier_from_ts =\n        0x169b50336c1f29afdb8a03d955a81e485f5ac7d5f0b8065673d1e407e5877813;\n\n    assert_eq(res, siloed_nullifier_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn siloed_private_log_first_field_matches_typescript() {\n    let contract_address = AztecAddress::from_field(123);\n    let field = 456;\n    let res = compute_siloed_private_log_first_field(contract_address, field);\n\n    let siloed_private_log_first_field_from_ts =\n        0x29480984f7b9257fded523d50addbcfc8d1d33adcf2db73ef3390a8fd5cdffaa;\n\n    assert_eq(res, siloed_private_log_first_field_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn empty_l2_to_l1_message_hash_matches_typescript() {\n    // All zeroes\n    let res = compute_l2_to_l1_message_hash(\n        L2ToL1Message { recipient: EthAddress::zero(), content: 0 }.scope(AztecAddress::from_field(\n            0,\n        )),\n        0,\n        0,\n    );\n\n    let empty_l2_to_l1_msg_hash_from_ts =\n        0x003b18c58c739716e76429634a61375c45b3b5cd470c22ab6d3e14cee23dd992;\n\n    assert_eq(res, empty_l2_to_l1_msg_hash_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn l2_to_l1_message_hash_matches_typescript() {\n    let message = L2ToL1Message { recipient: EthAddress::from_field(1), content: 2 }.scope(\n        AztecAddress::from_field(3),\n    );\n    let version = 4;\n    let chainId = 5;\n\n    let hash = compute_l2_to_l1_message_hash(message, version, chainId);\n\n    // The following value was generated by `yarn-project/stdlib/src/hash/hash.test.ts`\n    let l2_to_l1_message_hash_from_ts =\n        0x0081edf209e087ad31b3fd24263698723d57190bd1d6e9fe056fc0c0a68ee661;\n\n    assert_eq(hash, l2_to_l1_message_hash_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nunconstrained fn poseidon2_hash_with_separator_bounded_vec_matches_non_bounded_vec_version() {\n    let inputs = BoundedVec::<Field, 4>::from_array([1, 2, 3]);\n    let separator = 42;\n\n    // Hash using bounded vec version\n    let bounded_result = poseidon2_hash_with_separator_bounded_vec(inputs, separator);\n\n    // Hash using regular version\n    let regular_result = poseidon2_hash_with_separator([1, 2, 3], separator);\n\n    // Results should match\n    assert_eq(bounded_result, regular_result);\n}\n"
+      "source": "mod poseidon2_chunks;\n\nuse crate::{\n    abis::{\n        contract_class_function_leaf_preimage::ContractClassFunctionLeafPreimage,\n        function_selector::FunctionSelector, nullifier::Nullifier, private_log::PrivateLog,\n        transaction::tx_request::TxRequest,\n    },\n    address::{AztecAddress, EthAddress},\n    constants::{\n        CONTRACT_CLASS_LOG_SIZE_IN_FIELDS, DOM_SEP__NOTE_HASH_NONCE,\n        DOM_SEP__PRIVATE_LOG_FIRST_FIELD, DOM_SEP__SILOED_NOTE_HASH, DOM_SEP__SILOED_NULLIFIER,\n        DOM_SEP__UNIQUE_NOTE_HASH, FUNCTION_TREE_HEIGHT, NULL_MSG_SENDER_CONTRACT_ADDRESS,\n        TWO_POW_64,\n    },\n    merkle_tree::root_from_sibling_path,\n    messaging::l2_to_l1_message::L2ToL1Message,\n    poseidon2::Poseidon2Sponge,\n    side_effect::{Counted, Scoped},\n    traits::{FromField, Hash, ToField},\n    utils::field::{field_from_bytes, field_from_bytes_32_trunc},\n};\n\npub use poseidon2_chunks::poseidon2_absorb_in_chunks_existing_sponge;\nuse poseidon2_chunks::poseidon2_absorb_in_chunks;\nuse std::embedded_curve_ops::EmbeddedCurveScalar;\n\n// TODO: refactor these into their own files: sha256, poseidon2, some protocol-specific hash computations, some merkle computations.\n\npub fn sha256_to_field<let N: u32>(bytes_to_hash: [u8; N]) -> Field {\n    let sha256_hashed = sha256::digest(bytes_to_hash);\n    let hash_in_a_field = field_from_bytes_32_trunc(sha256_hashed);\n\n    hash_in_a_field\n}\n\npub fn private_functions_root_from_siblings(\n    selector: FunctionSelector,\n    vk_hash: Field,\n    function_leaf_index: Field,\n    function_leaf_sibling_path: [Field; FUNCTION_TREE_HEIGHT],\n) -> Field {\n    let function_leaf_preimage = ContractClassFunctionLeafPreimage { selector, vk_hash };\n    let function_leaf = function_leaf_preimage.hash();\n    root_from_sibling_path(\n        function_leaf,\n        function_leaf_index,\n        function_leaf_sibling_path,\n    )\n}\n\n/// Siloing in the context of Aztec refers to the process of hashing a note hash with a contract address (this way\n/// the note hash is scoped to a specific contract). This is used to prevent intermingling of notes between contracts.\npub fn compute_siloed_note_hash(contract_address: AztecAddress, note_hash: Field) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [contract_address.to_field(), note_hash],\n        DOM_SEP__SILOED_NOTE_HASH,\n    )\n}\n\n/// Computes unique, siloed note hashes from siloed note hashes.\n///\n/// The protocol injects uniqueness into every note_hash, so that every single note_hash in the\n/// tree is unique. This prevents faerie gold attacks, where a malicious sender could create\n/// two identical note_hashes for a recipient (meaning only one would be nullifiable in future).\n///\n/// Most privacy protocols will inject the note's leaf_index (its position in the Note Hashes Tree)\n/// into the note, but this requires the creator of a note to wait until their tx is included in\n/// a block to know the note's final note hash (the unique, siloed note hash), because inserting\n/// leaves into trees is the job of a block producer.\n///\n/// We took a different approach so that the creator of a note will know each note's unique, siloed\n/// note hash before broadcasting their tx to the network.\n/// (There was also a historical requirement relating to \"chained transactions\" -- a feature that\n/// Aztec Connect had to enable notes to be spent from distinct txs earlier in the same block,\n/// and hence before an archive block root had been established for that block -- but that feature\n/// was abandoned for the Aztec Network for having too many bad tradeoffs).\n///\n/// (\n///   Edit: it is no longer true that all final note_hashes will be known by the creator of a tx\n///   before they send it to the network. If a tx makes public function calls, then _revertible_\n///   note_hashes that are created in private will not be made unique in private by the Reset circuit,\n///   but will instead be made unique by the AVM, because the `note_index_in_tx` will not be known\n///   until the AVM has executed the public functions of the tx. (See an explanation in\n///   reset_output_composer.nr for why).\n///   For some such txs, the `note_index_in_tx` might still be predictable through simulation, but\n///   for txs whose public functions create a varying number of non-revertible notes (determined at\n///   runtime), the `note_index_in_tx` will not be deterministically derivable before submitting the\n///   tx to the network.\n/// )\n///\n/// We use the `first_nullifier` of a tx as a seed of uniqueness. We have a guarantee that there will\n/// always be at least one nullifier per tx, because the init circuit will create one if one isn't\n/// created naturally by any functions of the tx. (Search \"protocol_nullifier\").\n/// We combine the `first_nullifier` with the note's index (its position within this tx's new\n/// note_hashes array) (`note_index_in_tx`) to get a truly unique value to inject into a note, which\n/// we call a `note_nonce`.\npub fn compute_unique_note_hash(note_nonce: Field, siloed_note_hash: Field) -> Field {\n    let inputs = [note_nonce, siloed_note_hash];\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(inputs, DOM_SEP__UNIQUE_NOTE_HASH)\n}\n\npub fn compute_note_hash_nonce(first_nullifier_in_tx: Field, note_index_in_tx: u32) -> Field {\n    // Hashing the first nullifier with note index in tx is guaranteed to be unique (because all nullifiers are also\n    // unique).\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [first_nullifier_in_tx, note_index_in_tx as Field],\n        DOM_SEP__NOTE_HASH_NONCE,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn compute_note_nonce_and_unique_note_hash(\n    siloed_note_hash: Field,\n    first_nullifier: Field,\n    note_index_in_tx: u32,\n) -> Field {\n    let note_nonce = compute_note_hash_nonce(first_nullifier, note_index_in_tx);\n    compute_unique_note_hash(note_nonce, siloed_note_hash)\n}\n\npub fn compute_siloed_nullifier(contract_address: AztecAddress, nullifier: Field) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [contract_address.to_field(), nullifier],\n        DOM_SEP__SILOED_NULLIFIER,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn create_protocol_nullifier(tx_request: TxRequest) -> Scoped<Counted<Nullifier>> {\n    // The protocol nullifier is ascribed a special side-effect counter of 1. No other side-effect\n    // can have counter 1 (see `validate_as_first_call` for that assertion). Its value is the\n    // transaction's nonce commitment (origin, chain id, version, salt): see\n    // `TxRequest::compute_protocol_nullifier_value`. The reset kernel siloes it under\n    // `NULL_MSG_SENDER_CONTRACT_ADDRESS` like every other nullifier.\n    Nullifier { value: tx_request.compute_protocol_nullifier_value(), note_hash: 0 }.count(1).scope(\n        NULL_MSG_SENDER_CONTRACT_ADDRESS,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn compute_log_tag(raw_tag: Field, dom_sep: u32) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator([raw_tag], dom_sep)\n}\n\npub fn compute_siloed_private_log_first_field(\n    contract_address: AztecAddress,\n    field: Field,\n) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [contract_address.to_field(), field],\n        DOM_SEP__PRIVATE_LOG_FIRST_FIELD,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn compute_siloed_private_log(contract_address: AztecAddress, log: PrivateLog) -> PrivateLog {\n    let mut fields = log.fields;\n    fields[0] = compute_siloed_private_log_first_field(contract_address, fields[0]);\n    PrivateLog::new(fields, log.length)\n}\n\npub fn compute_contract_class_log_hash(log: [Field; CONTRACT_CLASS_LOG_SIZE_IN_FIELDS]) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash(log)\n}\n\npub fn compute_app_siloed_secret_key(\n    master_secret_key: EmbeddedCurveScalar,\n    app_address: AztecAddress,\n    key_type_domain_separator: Field,\n) -> Field {\n    poseidon2_hash_with_separator(\n        [master_secret_key.hi, master_secret_key.lo, app_address.to_field()],\n        key_type_domain_separator,\n    )\n}\n\npub fn compute_l2_to_l1_message_hash(\n    message: Scoped<L2ToL1Message>,\n    rollup_version_id: Field,\n    chain_id: Field,\n) -> Field {\n    let contract_address_bytes: [u8; 32] = message.contract_address.to_field().to_be_bytes();\n    let recipient_bytes: [u8; 20] = message.inner.recipient.to_be_bytes();\n    let content_bytes: [u8; 32] = message.inner.content.to_be_bytes();\n    let rollup_version_id_bytes: [u8; 32] = rollup_version_id.to_be_bytes();\n    let chain_id_bytes: [u8; 32] = chain_id.to_be_bytes();\n\n    let mut bytes: [u8; 148] = std::mem::zeroed();\n    for i in 0..32 {\n        bytes[i] = contract_address_bytes[i];\n        bytes[i + 32] = rollup_version_id_bytes[i];\n        // 64 - 84 are for recipient.\n        bytes[i + 84] = chain_id_bytes[i];\n        bytes[i + 116] = content_bytes[i];\n    }\n\n    for i in 0..20 {\n        bytes[64 + i] = recipient_bytes[i];\n    }\n\n    sha256_to_field(bytes)\n}\n\n/// Computes sha256 hash of 2 input fields.\n///\n/// @returns A truncated field (i.e., the first byte is always 0).\npub fn accumulate_sha256(v0: Field, v1: Field) -> Field {\n    // Concatenate two fields into 32 x 2 = 64 bytes\n    let v0_as_bytes: [u8; 32] = v0.to_be_bytes();\n    let v1_as_bytes: [u8; 32] = v1.to_be_bytes();\n    let hash_input_flattened = v0_as_bytes.concat(v1_as_bytes);\n\n    sha256_to_field(hash_input_flattened)\n}\n\n/// Computes sha256 hash of 2 input fields, prefixed by a domain separator, so that the result cannot collide with an\n/// [`accumulate_sha256`] over the same two fields.\n///\n/// @returns A truncated field (i.e., the first byte is always 0).\npub fn accumulate_sha256_with_separator(separator: u32, v0: Field, v1: Field) -> Field {\n    // Concatenate the separator and two fields into 4 + 32 x 2 = 68 bytes\n    let separator_as_bytes: [u8; 4] = (separator as Field).to_be_bytes();\n    let v0_as_bytes: [u8; 32] = v0.to_be_bytes();\n    let v1_as_bytes: [u8; 32] = v1.to_be_bytes();\n    let hash_input_flattened = separator_as_bytes.concat(v0_as_bytes).concat(v1_as_bytes);\n\n    sha256_to_field(hash_input_flattened)\n}\n\npub fn poseidon2_hash<let N: u32>(inputs: [Field; N]) -> Field {\n    poseidon::poseidon2::Poseidon2::hash(inputs, N)\n}\n\n#[no_predicates]\npub fn poseidon2_hash_with_separator<let N: u32, T>(inputs: [Field; N], separator: T) -> Field\nwhere\n    T: ToField,\n{\n    let inputs_with_separator = [separator.to_field()].concat(inputs);\n    poseidon2_hash(inputs_with_separator)\n}\n\n/// Computes a Poseidon2 hash over a dynamic-length subarray of the given input.\n/// Only the first `in_len` fields of `input` are absorbed; any remaining fields are ignored.\n/// The caller is responsible for ensuring that the input is padded with zeros if required.\n#[no_predicates]\npub fn poseidon2_hash_subarray<let N: u32>(input: [Field; N], in_len: u32) -> Field {\n    let mut sponge = poseidon2_absorb_in_chunks(input, in_len);\n    sponge.squeeze()\n}\n\n/// Computes a Poseidon2 hash with a domain separator over a dynamic-length subarray of the given input.\n/// Only the first `in_len` fields of `input` are absorbed; any remaining fields are ignored.\n/// For `in_len == N` this is equivalent to [`poseidon2_hash_with_separator`].\n#[no_predicates]\npub fn poseidon2_hash_subarray_with_separator<let N: u32, T>(\n    input: [Field; N],\n    in_len: u32,\n    separator: T,\n) -> Field\nwhere\n    T: ToField,\n{\n    let inputs_with_separator = [separator.to_field()].concat(input);\n    poseidon::poseidon2::Poseidon2::hash(inputs_with_separator, in_len + 1)\n}\n\n// This function is  unconstrained because it is intended to be used in unconstrained context only as\n// in constrained contexts it would be too inefficient.\npub unconstrained fn poseidon2_hash_with_separator_bounded_vec<let N: u32, T>(\n    inputs: BoundedVec<Field, N>,\n    separator: T,\n) -> Field\nwhere\n    T: ToField,\n{\n    let in_len = inputs.len() + 1;\n    let iv: Field = (in_len as Field) * TWO_POW_64;\n    let mut sponge = Poseidon2Sponge::new(iv);\n    sponge.absorb(separator.to_field());\n\n    for i in 0..inputs.len() {\n        sponge.absorb(inputs.get(i));\n    }\n\n    sponge.squeeze()\n}\n\n/// Computes a Poseidon2 hash of a fixed string, such as a function signature or a domain separator name.\n///\n/// The bytes are packed into 31-byte little-endian chunks, one `Field` per chunk, and the result is\n/// [`poseidon2_hash`] of those fields.\n///\n/// The hash commits to the number of chunks but not to the byte length `N`: zero bytes at the end of the last chunk\n/// do not change the result, so `[1]`, `[1, 0]` and `[1, 0, ..., 0]` (31 bytes) all hash to the same value. Do not\n/// use this to commit to variable-length data, e.g. a payload zero-padded to a maximum length, unless the length is\n/// bound separately.\n#[no_predicates]\npub fn poseidon2_hash_bytes<let N: u32>(inputs: [u8; N]) -> Field {\n    let mut fields = [0; (N + 30) / 31];\n    let mut field_index = 0;\n    let mut current_field = [0; 31];\n    for i in 0..inputs.len() {\n        let index = i % 31;\n        current_field[index] = inputs[i];\n        if index == 30 {\n            fields[field_index] = field_from_bytes(current_field, false);\n            current_field = [0; 31];\n            field_index += 1;\n        }\n    }\n    if field_index != fields.len() {\n        fields[field_index] = field_from_bytes(current_field, false);\n    }\n    poseidon2_hash(fields)\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn poseidon2_hash_bytes_matches_hash_of_packed_chunks() {\n    let mut bytes = [0; 32];\n    bytes[0] = 1;\n    bytes[1] = 2;\n    bytes[31] = 3;\n\n    assert_eq(poseidon2_hash_bytes(bytes), poseidon2_hash([1 + 2 * 256, 3]));\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn poseidon2_hash_bytes_ignores_trailing_zeros_in_last_chunk() {\n    let hash = poseidon2_hash_bytes([1]);\n\n    assert_eq(poseidon2_hash_bytes([1, 0]), hash);\n    assert_eq(poseidon2_hash_bytes([1].concat([0; 30])), hash);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn poseidon2_hash_bytes_commits_to_chunk_count() {\n    let one_chunk: [u8; 31] = [1].concat([0; 30]);\n    let two_chunks: [u8; 32] = [1].concat([0; 31]);\n\n    assert(poseidon2_hash_bytes(one_chunk) != poseidon2_hash_bytes(two_chunks));\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn subarray_hash_matches_fixed() {\n    let values_to_hash = [3; 17];\n    let padded = values_to_hash.concat([0; 11]);\n    let subarray_hash = poseidon2_hash_subarray(padded, values_to_hash.len());\n\n    // Hash the entire values_to_hash.\n    let fixed_len_hash = poseidon::poseidon2::Poseidon2::hash(values_to_hash, values_to_hash.len());\n\n    assert_eq(subarray_hash, fixed_len_hash);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn subarray_hash_matches_variable() {\n    let values_to_hash = [3; 17];\n    let padded = values_to_hash.concat([0; 11]);\n    let subarray_hash = poseidon2_hash_subarray(padded, values_to_hash.len());\n\n    // Hash up to values_to_hash.len() fields of the padded array.\n    let variable_len_hash = poseidon::poseidon2::Poseidon2::hash(padded, values_to_hash.len());\n\n    assert_eq(subarray_hash, variable_len_hash);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn subarray_hash_with_separator_matches_fixed_len_with_separator() {\n    let values_to_hash = [3; 17];\n    let padded = values_to_hash.concat([0; 11]);\n    let separator = 42;\n\n    assert_eq(\n        poseidon2_hash_subarray_with_separator(padded, values_to_hash.len(), separator),\n        poseidon2_hash_with_separator(values_to_hash, separator),\n    );\n    // Hashing the whole array must differ from hashing a prefix of it, even though the padding is zero.\n    assert(\n        poseidon2_hash_subarray_with_separator(padded, padded.len(), separator)\n            != poseidon2_hash_subarray_with_separator(padded, values_to_hash.len(), separator),\n    );\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn smoke_sha256_to_field() {\n    let full_buffer = [\n        0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,\n        25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47,\n        48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70,\n        71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93,\n        94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112,\n        113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130,\n        131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148,\n        149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159,\n    ];\n    let result = sha256_to_field(full_buffer);\n\n    assert(result == 0x448ebbc9e1a31220a2f3830c18eef61b9bd070e5084b7fa2a359fe729184c7);\n\n    // to show correctness of the current ver (truncate one byte) vs old ver (mod full bytes):\n    let result_bytes = sha256::digest(full_buffer);\n    let truncated_field = crate::utils::field::field_from_bytes_32_trunc(result_bytes);\n    assert(truncated_field == result);\n    let mod_res = result + (result_bytes[31] as Field);\n    assert(mod_res == 0x448ebbc9e1a31220a2f3830c18eef61b9bd070e5084b7fa2a359fe729184e0);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn unique_siloed_note_hash_matches_typescript() {\n    let inner_note_hash = 1;\n    let contract_address = AztecAddress::from_field(2);\n    let first_nullifier = 3;\n    let note_index_in_tx = 4;\n\n    let siloed_note_hash = compute_siloed_note_hash(contract_address, inner_note_hash);\n    let siloed_note_hash_from_ts =\n        0x1986a4bea3eddb1fff917d629a13e10f63f514f401bdd61838c6b475db949169;\n    assert_eq(siloed_note_hash, siloed_note_hash_from_ts);\n\n    let nonce: Field = compute_note_hash_nonce(first_nullifier, note_index_in_tx);\n    let note_hash_nonce_from_ts =\n        0x28e7799791bf066a57bb51fdd0fbcaf3f0926414314c7db515ea343f44f5d58b;\n    assert_eq(nonce, note_hash_nonce_from_ts);\n\n    let unique_siloed_note_hash_from_nonce = compute_unique_note_hash(nonce, siloed_note_hash);\n    let unique_siloed_note_hash = compute_note_nonce_and_unique_note_hash(\n        siloed_note_hash,\n        first_nullifier,\n        note_index_in_tx,\n    );\n    assert_eq(unique_siloed_note_hash_from_nonce, unique_siloed_note_hash);\n\n    let unique_siloed_note_hash_from_ts =\n        0x29949aef207b715303b24639737c17fbfeb375c1d965ecfa85c7e4f0febb7d16;\n    assert_eq(unique_siloed_note_hash, unique_siloed_note_hash_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn siloed_nullifier_matches_typescript() {\n    let contract_address = AztecAddress::from_field(123);\n    let nullifier = 456;\n\n    let res = compute_siloed_nullifier(contract_address, nullifier);\n\n    let siloed_nullifier_from_ts =\n        0x169b50336c1f29afdb8a03d955a81e485f5ac7d5f0b8065673d1e407e5877813;\n\n    assert_eq(res, siloed_nullifier_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn siloed_private_log_first_field_matches_typescript() {\n    let contract_address = AztecAddress::from_field(123);\n    let field = 456;\n    let res = compute_siloed_private_log_first_field(contract_address, field);\n\n    let siloed_private_log_first_field_from_ts =\n        0x29480984f7b9257fded523d50addbcfc8d1d33adcf2db73ef3390a8fd5cdffaa;\n\n    assert_eq(res, siloed_private_log_first_field_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn empty_l2_to_l1_message_hash_matches_typescript() {\n    // All zeroes\n    let res = compute_l2_to_l1_message_hash(\n        L2ToL1Message { recipient: EthAddress::zero(), content: 0 }.scope(AztecAddress::from_field(\n            0,\n        )),\n        0,\n        0,\n    );\n\n    let empty_l2_to_l1_msg_hash_from_ts =\n        0x003b18c58c739716e76429634a61375c45b3b5cd470c22ab6d3e14cee23dd992;\n\n    assert_eq(res, empty_l2_to_l1_msg_hash_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nfn l2_to_l1_message_hash_matches_typescript() {\n    let message = L2ToL1Message { recipient: EthAddress::from_field(1), content: 2 }.scope(\n        AztecAddress::from_field(3),\n    );\n    let version = 4;\n    let chainId = 5;\n\n    let hash = compute_l2_to_l1_message_hash(message, version, chainId);\n\n    // The following value was generated by `yarn-project/stdlib/src/hash/hash.test.ts`\n    let l2_to_l1_message_hash_from_ts =\n        0x0081edf209e087ad31b3fd24263698723d57190bd1d6e9fe056fc0c0a68ee661;\n\n    assert_eq(hash, l2_to_l1_message_hash_from_ts);\n}\n\n#[test]\nunconstrained fn poseidon2_hash_with_separator_bounded_vec_matches_non_bounded_vec_version() {\n    let inputs = BoundedVec::<Field, 4>::from_array([1, 2, 3]);\n    let separator = 42;\n\n    // Hash using bounded vec version\n    let bounded_result = poseidon2_hash_with_separator_bounded_vec(inputs, separator);\n\n    // Hash using regular version\n    let regular_result = poseidon2_hash_with_separator([1, 2, 3], separator);\n\n    // Results should match\n    assert_eq(bounded_result, regular_result);\n}\n"
     },
     "181": {
       "function_locations": [
@@ -7094,5 +7106,5 @@
     }
   },
   "transpiled": true,
-  "aztec_version": "6.0.0-rc.1"
+  "aztec_version": "6.0.0-rc.2"
 }

package/package.json

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
   "name": "@aztec-labs/protocol-contracts",
   "homepage": "https://github.com/AztecProtocol/aztec-packages/tree/master/yarn-project/protocol-contracts",
   "description": "Canonical Noir contracts for the Aztec Network",
-  "version": "6.0.0-rc.1",
+  "version": "6.0.0-rc.2",
   "type": "module",
   "exports": {
     ".": "./dest/index.js",
@@ -73,15 +73,15 @@
     ]
   },
   "dependencies": {
-    "@aztec-labs/constants": "6.0.0-rc.1",
-    "@aztec-labs/foundation": "6.0.0-rc.1",
-    "@aztec-labs/stdlib": "6.0.0-rc.1",
+    "@aztec-labs/constants": "6.0.0-rc.2",
+    "@aztec-labs/foundation": "6.0.0-rc.2",
+    "@aztec-labs/stdlib": "6.0.0-rc.2",
     "lodash.chunk": "^4.2.0",
     "lodash.omit": "^4.5.0",
     "tslib": "^2.4.0"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
-    "@aztec-foundation/protocol-contracts-artifacts": "6.0.0-rc.1",
+    "@aztec-foundation/protocol-contracts-artifacts": "6.0.0-rc.5",
     "@jest/globals": "^30.0.0",
     "@types/jest": "^30.0.0",
     "@types/lodash.chunk": "^4.2.9",