@awebai/oats 0.29.3 → 0.30.0

package/docs/design/2026-09-15-portable-souls-implementation.md

@@ -1,417 +0,0 @@
----
-type: Playbook
-status: accepted-for-implementation
-title: Portable Souls infrastructure delivery and acceptance ledger
-description: Fifteen binding decisions mapped clause by clause to dependency-ordered delivery and evidence gates; baseline retention is storage-only.
-timestamp: 2026-09-15
----
-
-# Portable Souls infrastructure implementation
-
-## Authority, scope and evidence rules
-
-Direct human authorization on 2026-09-15 permits infrastructure implementation
-and eventual deployment under the accepted constraints. It supersedes historical
-“not implementation authorized” language, not design boundaries. **Desktop feature
-work is later.** This documentation lane owns only `docs/design/`; it performs no
-commits/pushes, branch switches, live installation/activation, credential operations,
-schedulers, model/GUI launches or session control. Never integrate held capture
-patch `54b07ee`. Primary checkout, earlier roster/KB drafts and `soul/knowledge/`
-are not edit surfaces for this delivery.
-
-Binding inputs, all portable repository paths:
-
-- [Handoff: 15 decisions](2026-09-15-portable-souls-handoff.md#2-the-decisions-binding).
-- [Reconciled proposal](2026-09-14-portable-souls-and-git-workspaces.md), incorporating
-  the [complete substantive amendment](2026-09-14-portable-souls-contract-amendments.md).
-- [Landed retention contract](2026-09-14-artifact-retention-contract.md), especially
-  “Resolution and lock integration proposed next” and “Consumer migration”. Its
-  integration requirements are binding despite the historical heading.
-- [Reconciled explainer](2026-09-14-portable-souls-explainer.md); LFX examples are
-  hypothetical illustrations, not actual repositories, team setups or credentials.
-- Package engine (`package-engine-contract.md`, removed in 0.26), runtime API (`package-runtime-api.md`, removed in 0.26)
-  and [current knowledge runtime](../knowledge.md) for preserved contracts.
-  The [older knowledge brief](2026-09-13-knowledge-and-memory-direction.md) provides
-  doctrine, not a competing source/default schema or permission to auto-edit skills.
-
-**Baseline:** `428cd9af615652c4a93d754c1106674abd18545b`, branch
-`feat/portable-souls-infrastructure`. Retention source and storage tests are landed.
-Installer, lock, runtime and queued-work consumers are not migrated by that patch.
-Concurrent uncommitted foundation work is not counted here as landed or qualified.
-
-**Ledger discipline:** “documented” means the accepted clause is reconciled, not
-implemented or tested. Every unchecked box below is an acceptance obligation; none
-is checked merely because this document exists. Add exact commands, revision/tree
-identity, pass/fail/skip counts and evidence paths when a gate actually runs. A
-fixture proves only what it executes. Scaffolds are not model learning, storage
-A/B execution is not lifecycle A/B dispatch, a PR is not accepted knowledge, and
-recording team choices is not enrollment or privacy qualification.
-
-## Fifteen-decision checklist
-
-### D01 — Three responsibilities
-
-Contract: handoff decision 1; proposal §3, §10. Documentation reconciled.
-
-- [ ] Soul declares needs and sources; workspace declares admission/defaults,
-  knowledge stores, team references and catalogs; deployment resolves, installs,
-  binds credentials and keeps state. Verify each field has the right owner.
-- [ ] Source, install location, work target and team membership remain independent;
-  changing each cannot silently infer or change another.
-
-### D02 — Source-complete soul declarations
-
-Contract: decision 2; proposal §4. Documentation reconciled; nesting needs parser review.
-
-- [ ] Every intrinsic capability resolves from `git:<repo>@<selector>#<package-path>`
-  or a contained `repo:` source; selected package really exports the capability ID.
-- [ ] `repo:packages/self-serve-dev` uses the retained source **repository root**;
-  nested soul directories, cwd, installation root and work target cannot change it.
-- [ ] Reject snapshot escape and broken/escaping symlinks; retain the required
-  snapshot resources after the original source disappears.
-- [ ] `path:` is explicitly nonportable; no ambiguous `./` source spelling in
-  portable declarations or hidden upstream catalog-nickname dependency.
-
-### D03 — Requirements versus defaults
-
-Contract: decision 3; proposal §4, §12. Documentation reconciled.
-
-- [ ] `requires` constrains every successful composition; `defaults` selects fallback
-  values within those constraints, not another configuration hierarchy.
-- [ ] Abstract requirements can use adopter providers; intrinsic implementation
-  requirements cannot be erased by operator/import/workspace defaults.
-- [ ] Conflicting sources/requirements fail with **both origins/paths** reported.
-  `messaging: any` alone supplies no software, credentials or private team.
-
-### D04 — Two authorities, no repository tier or agent-types
-
-Contract: decision 4; proposal §12. Documentation reconciled.
-
-- [ ] Resolve workspace defaults and soul declarations through **one resolver**;
-  no repository capability-default tier and no agent-types/family entity.
-- [ ] Import adoption is workspace-side, keyed by qualified source identity, not
-  short alias; spawn choice can override it only within hard constraints.
-- [ ] Exactly one workspace context is selected; publisher workspace policy cannot
-  leak into imported composition. Standalone unresolved bindings report missing.
-- [ ] Repository briefing (`agents-md-injection`) and worktree setup follow the
-  repository actually worked on, not the soul source; executable trust still applies.
-  A no-Git directory target remains valid without invented membership.
-
-### D05 — Reciprocal membership for every member kind
-
-Contract: decision 5; proposal §5–§7. Documentation reconciled.
-
-- [ ] At recorded revisions and qualified identities, operator can read workspace
-  and member, workspace admits member, and member names workspace.
-- [ ] Apply the same rule to project, experts, capabilities and knowledge repositories.
-  A fork with a copied backlink or an adjacent folder is not admitted.
-- [ ] Consuming a package, public soul or public knowledge store never implies
-  membership or needs a publisher backlink.
-- [ ] Index discovery is bounded and data-only, respects authorization context and
-  reports stale/unavailable honestly; it executes no repository script and does
-  not expose protected descriptions via broad caches/aggregate indexes.
-- [ ] Equivalent remotes can be qualified; rename/transfer/source-move cases require
-  explicit provenance, not same-filename identity substitution. Exact syntax reviewed.
-
-### D06 — External-soul import by reference
-
-Contract: decision 6; proposal §4 import section and §10. Documentation reconciled.
-
-- [ ] Accept canonical source repository, exported soul path, revision selector and
-  adopter-local alias; never copy into an adopter-maintained soul definition.
-- [ ] Retain exact source revision and full required source resources. Upstream
-  identity, exact revision and local alias are distinct; alias changes do not create
-  souls, selector changes do not themselves create new global running identities.
-- [ ] Workspace advertisement does not admit publisher; standalone prepare accepts
-  the same reference. Private sources still use existing Git access.
-- [ ] Adoption defaults map team aliases, default knowledge destinations and providers
-  within requirements. Mapping advertises, never enrolls; explicit spawn choices
-  have the same bounds. No fork/config-copy workaround is needed.
-- [ ] Persistent imported/member souls produce the same resolution shape; retain
-  their sources separately, never disguise them as ephemeral capability helpers.
-
-### D07 — Project-first expertise
-
-Contract: decision 7; proposal §9. Documentation reconciled.
-
-- [ ] Project souls live conventionally at `agents/<name>/`, several per repository
-  as needed; experts repositories serve cross-repository subjects, not compulsory
-  centralization. Role examples are named for expertise, not job assignments.
-- [ ] Canonical AGENTS.md and CLAUDE.md alias plus complete curriculum/reference
-  closure survive retention; no silent conversion to an ephemeral helper.
-
-### D08 — Knowledge at both levels, provider-neutral kernel
-
-Contract: decision 8; proposal §3 and §10. Documentation reconciled.
-
-- [ ] Workspace advertises stores/default provider; soul carries source-complete
-  locators or **explicitly inherited** bindings. Later reads/harvests need no
-  workspace fetch. Fixed sources and rebindable defaults are distinguishable.
-- [ ] Default OKF `reads` includes store+node; `owns` includes node+optional
-  destination. Absent destination inherits an explicitly selected write binding
-  or reports `needs configuration`, never silently creates a substitute.
-- [ ] Resolved addresses are store-qualified; equal leaf names in different stores
-  do not collide. Multiple owned stores work: no one-store-per-soul invariant or
-  unapproved single-write-store product limit.
-- [ ] Each node has one explicit steward and each promoted concept an explicit
-  destination. Steward, proposing harvester and accepting maintainer remain distinct;
-  multiple proposers are not conflicting ownership. Git delivery is PR-only,
-  public or private, and acceptance requires merge-visible evidence.
-- [ ] A public read never publishes adopter notes/captures. Write destination and
-  publication intent are explicit; do not invent a disclosure/ACL engine here.
-- [ ] Kernel envelope retains effective **non-secret**, provider-owned configuration
-  and binding provenance with separate credential references. An alternate provider
-  reports its own configuration/readiness without implementing OKF nodes or harvest.
-
-### D09 — Private-first choices, provider qualification required
-
-Contract: decision 9; proposal §12. Documentation reconciled; provider gate unqualified.
-
-- [ ] Messaging-enabled private key uses provider-resolvable **human identity plus
-  qualified workspace identity**, reused across the human's machines. OS username,
-  checkout path or agent alias is insufficient. Standalone has an explicit context key.
-- [ ] Child and scheduled instances inherit responsible human; messaging-disabled
-  workers create no team. Required missing provider/bindings block readiness.
-- [ ] Wider memberships are opt-in per instance; an explicit wider set replaces
-  wider defaults and preserves private floor. Alias map alone never enrolls.
-- [ ] One global instance identity supports multiple membership credentials and
-  survives widening/narrowing; local process/session/deployment-record IDs and
-  team-qualified addresses are not replacement global identity keys.
-- [ ] A **named messaging owner** qualifies catalog visibility, live-instance
-  visibility, inbound contact and conversation-history access **separately**.
-  Wider membership exposes neither earlier private history nor other private
-  instances; ordinary members versus host/service administrators are distinguished.
-- [ ] Before that qualification, record choices only and explicitly claim **no
-  provider privacy guarantee**. No blanket readiness based on fields being present.
-
-### D10 — One default provider per slot, v1 simplification
-
-Contract: decision 10; proposal §12. Documentation reconciled; simultaneous test open.
-
-- [ ] Knowledge/messaging/tasks have zero or one default provider per slot in v1;
-  document this as a product simplification, not a universal capability limitation.
-- [ ] Examine simultaneous Jira + GitHub: default interface plus service integration
-  versus named bindings. Record review outcome before choosing either; do not
-  claim solved or build a generalized multi-provider solver by assumption.
-
-### D11 — Captured managed composition and retention
-
-Contract: decision 11; proposal §10–§11; retention contract. Documentation reconciled.
-
-- [ ] Resolve channel/pin once per transaction, consistently across all references;
-  captured resolution includes soul snapshot, capability closure, helpers, commands,
-  hooks and managed runtime resources, non-secret configuration and provenance.
-- [ ] Several artifacts per capability coexist, one artifact per capability ID per
-  instance; incompatible closure paths fail with both origins, no newest-wins rule.
-- [ ] Publish every required artifact then commit a **complete** resolution before
-  launch; failure may leave unreferenced valid trees, never a selectable partial record.
-- [ ] Instance and independent queued work retain exact references outside homes;
-  launch/restart/retire/recovery/generated commands/runtime packages/helpers use
-  those roots after source/home deletion, never today's ambient config/lock.
-- [ ] Retain conservatively while instances, pending jobs or supported recovery
-  paths reference source trees, artifacts and records; no elaborate GC initially.
-- [ ] Immutability is OATS-managed software only, not knowledge contents, credentials,
-  membership, work repo, services or host tools. Credential rotation and authorized
-  membership change do not silently upgrade software; rollback does not undo external
-  writes and shared external-state compatibility belongs to providers.
-- [ ] Recurring schedules state capture versus explicit later reprepare policy;
-  capture remains proposed pending review. Already queued executions never advance.
-
-### D12 — Trust and explicit freshness
-
-Contract: decision 12; proposal §11. Documentation reconciled.
-
-- [ ] Commands, hooks **or environment (`env`)** make a capability executable;
-  changed executable artifact integrity/revision needs fresh approval. Retention,
-  catalog identity, publisher continuity and a local download confer none.
-- [ ] Declarative skills receive bounded visible change notices without adding an
-  execution-approval gate; unchanged artifacts need not lose approval merely for
-  unrelated source-repository changes.
-- [ ] Explicit prepare/update refreshes once per transaction; show available-unapproved
-  beside last-approved usable, never “latest” for the latter. Offline/stale/failure
-  states remain visible; failed required updates do not claim successful refresh.
-- [ ] No daemon, unattended trust or unattended approval in v1. Any future bounded
-  policy is a separate product decision, not a shortcut around an approval prompt.
-
-### D13 — Versioned mode-aware digest at migration
-
-Contract: decision 13; retention “Storage API implemented in this patch”. Documentation reconciled.
-
-- [ ] New digest covers file bytes, symlink targets and regular-file executable flag
-  normalized from owner execute, `(mode & 0o100) !== 0`, identically for Git and `path:`.
-- [ ] Versioning unambiguously distinguishes formats; old bytes/symlink digests remain
-  verifiable and are never reinterpreted as covering modes or silently reapproved.
-- [ ] Group/other execute and all other mode bits are outside identity. Retention
-  preserves modes, never rewrites them or infers entrypoints by parsing free-form
-  command/hook strings. This models execution by the owning deployment operator,
-  not arbitrary OS principals. New wire spelling requires schema review.
-
-### D14 — Explicit, honest migration
-
-Contract: decision 14; retention “Consumer migration”. Documentation reconciled.
-
-- [ ] One explicit store/lock migration verifies existing flat artifacts and preserves
-  those exact inputs, not refetched moving-source substitutes for overwritten history.
-- [ ] Existing instances/jobs report `reconstructed`, `partial` or `unknown`, with
-  evidence and unresolved inputs. Partial/unknown cannot pass complete readiness
-  in CLI or later Desktop; running sessions remain intact, restart boundary chosen
-  by their owners.
-- [ ] Follow all five consumer steps: (1) schema/store migration, (2) acquisition and
-  preparation retention, (3) new instance/job captured references, (4) evidence-based
-  old-record migration, (5) remove mutable lookups and update diagnostics/removal.
-  No permanent dual resolver/store model.
-- [ ] Check acquisition, restoration, trust, discovery, spawn, launch, retirement,
-  package/CLI diagnostics and scheduler/operation callers. A path in metadata is
-  not proof of retained implementation. Preserve typed absence/invalid/drift refusals
-  and never silently repair damaged retained trees or records.
-
-### D15 — No new infrastructure
-
-Contract: decision 15; proposal §6–§8. Documentation reconciled.
-
-- [ ] Git hosting, selected messaging provider and existing machines are sufficient;
-  no registry, discovery daemon or OATS user/permission database is introduced.
-- [ ] Standalone/no-Git deployment uses the same explicit-scope APIs, not a fake
-  workspace or parent-directory authority scan. Only required source closure is
-  acquired; optional caches are optimizations, not authority or activation.
-
-## Dependency-ordered delivery plan
-
-Owners here are **responsibilities**, not assignments to a deployment/person.
-Parallel code work may proceed only at settled interfaces; synthesis and adversarial
-review bind the exact combined tree. Documentation status does not approve syntax.
-
-| Stage | Prerequisites | Deliverable / boundary | Acceptance evidence needed | Ledger at baseline |
-|---|---|---|---|---|
-| P0 — Documentation reconciliation | Full handoff, amendment and landed contract | Maintainer: reconcile proposal/explainer/handoff, preserve public amendment, this ledger | Link/fence/checklist/provenance checks; independent clause review | Documentation checks and final read-only review passed; receipt below |
-| P1 — Acyclic artifact mechanics | Retention contract; P0 constraints | Foundation: shared copy/digest/publication leaf; core and retention consume it without a cycle; no policy/lifecycle in leaf | Dependency graph/import tests and original retention tests; behavior-preserving baseline digest | Pending acceptance; concurrent code edits not certified here |
-| P2 — Versioned records and source custody | P1; schema review | Resolution/storage: explicit-scope records outside homes; separate source retention; exact identity/revision/alias; per-choice provenance and constraints; provider-neutral payload; typed refusals | Invalid/partial/prototype-safe record tests, source resource closure and deletion, atomic publication and damaged-tree refusal | Pending; wire versions/paths require review |
-| P3 — Soul declarations | P0; source/parser review coordinated with P2 | Parser: git/repo/path, requires/defaults, fixed versus rebindable knowledge, aliases; no type/repository tier | Nested-source base/containment, conflict origins, missing bindings, source completeness | Pending; examples are not schemas |
-| P4 — Workspace and discovery | P3 identities; canonical-remote review | Discovery: reciprocal members of every kind, bounded data-only exports, stores/defaults/catalogs/import advertisements | Two layouts, uncloned/inaccessible/forked/renamed sources, authorization-context cache tests | Pending |
-| P5 — Import and bounded composition | P2–P4 | Resolver: by-reference import, qualified adoption defaults, same standalone reference, one workspace, work-target briefing | Same public soul unchanged in org and no-Git standalone; source identity/revision/alias; no copy or false membership | Pending |
-| P6 — Explicit preparation transaction | P1–P5 | Acquisition/resolution: select once, publish artifacts, commit complete record before launch; preserve trust/host requirements; no implicit provider default | Failure injection before publication/commit/launch, available-unapproved vs last-approved, env-only gate, visible declarative changes, separate readiness | Pending |
-| P7 — Coordinated consumer/migration boundary | P2/P6; reviewed lock/digest migration | Lifecycle: implement retention contract steps 1–5 as one migration; wire acquisition/restore/trust/CLI and all dispatch consumers; no ambient substitutions | A/B end-to-end lifecycle/queued job after source deletion, legacy status evidence, old/new digest tests, referenced-removal protection | Pending; no scheduler activation |
-| P8 — CLI/provider readiness | P5–P7 | CLI and provider owners: show provenance/choices/missing configuration, reconstructed/partial/unknown; alternate knowledge payload | JSON/text diagnostic contract checks; alternate provider is not forced into OKF; explicit store-qualified default payload | Pending |
-| P9 — Messaging qualification | Named owner; P5–P8; approved provider test plan | Messaging owner: human/context identity, private reuse, wider choices, global identity continuity and four grants | Two humans on two hosts each; child inheritance; widen/narrow; discovery/contact/history/admin limits; messaging-disabled and standalone cases | **Unqualified**; choices only until evidence |
-| P10 — Operational rollout | Exact-tree infrastructure review and applicable P1–P9 gates | Deployment owner: deliberate release/install/migration with preserved running sessions and separate operational evidence | Required scaffold-only probes/retirement when authorized for that lane, installed-consumer tests, honest missing/unqualified status; no capture-patch integration | Not performed by this documentation lane |
-| Later — Desktop features | Infrastructure APIs/readiness and separate feature delivery | Desktop owner consumes same records and diagnostics, never promotes partial/unknown to complete | Later GUI acceptance; cannot substitute for infrastructure or messaging proof | **Later**, not this phase |
-
-P2 and P3 can refine syntax together; neither silently standardizes examples before
-parser review. P7 can be built incrementally, but consumers must not be declared
-migrated until the coordinated boundary is complete. P9 does not block recording
-choices or honest incomplete CLI diagnostics; it blocks enrollment/privacy claims.
-P10 is not permission for this documentation lane to perform any live operation.
-Simultaneous Jira/GitHub must be investigated before any related solver/binding
-extension; no stage chooses its answer here.
-
-## Acceptance ledger
-
-| Gate | Falsification / required observation | Evidence state |
-|---|---|---|
-| A0 — Retention prerequisite | A/B trees execute their own storage-test payload after removing original source, flat store and lock; damaged entries not repaired | Landed source/tests at baseline, per retention contract; not rerun or widened into runtime proof by this document |
-| A1 — Portable adoption | Same public soul unchanged in organization and no-Git standalone; no publisher workspace; public read and explicit adopter write destination; source/revision/alias independently verified | Pending executable acceptance |
-| A2 — Private-first | Two humans, two hosts each; inherited child, same private key across hosts, wider set replace/narrow, stable global identity; four grants separately qualified; no silent knowledge-binding change | Unqualified; named messaging owner required, no privacy guarantee |
-| A3 — A/B runtime | Old instance AND independent queued work run A's lifecycle/recovery after source removal while new work uses approved B; no ambient latest lookup | Pending; storage A0 is insufficient |
-| A4 — Resolution/trust failure | Conflict provenance, missing bindings, env-only approval, no selectable partial record; explicit refresh notices and no unattended trust | Pending |
-| A5 — Knowledge neutrality | Store-qualified nodes/destinations, multi-store stewardship, PR versus acceptance, public reads not publication; alternate provider configuration without OKF semantics | Pending |
-| A6 — Migration/digest | Old evidence graded, overwritten artifact honestly unrecoverable, running sessions preserved; versioned owner-execute digest with old-format verification | Pending |
-| A7 — Discovery/access | Reciprocal admission every kind; forks/unadmitted excluded; bounded data-only indexes and protected descriptions/authorization caches; no new registry | Pending |
-| A8 — Documentation consistency | Full amendment coverage; 15 decisions; portable links; no stale operational/privacy claims; illustrative YAML not presented as final schema | **Passed for documentation only**; validation and final review receipt below |
-
-No live acceptance, deployment, model learning or GUI evidence is manufactured by
-this ledger. Consumer/API paths must be inspected at the actual tested revision;
-this plan is not an instruction to bypass protected current sessions or trust.
-
-## Documentation validation receipt
-
-Validation on 2026-09-15, documentation only:
-
-- Inline Python static validator: **5 files**, **48 local links/anchors**, **15
-  balanced fenced blocks** before adding the reproducible command below; handoff
-  decisions **1–15** and checklist sections **D01–D15** present; trailing-whitespace
-  and private-path/credential-marker scans passed. This is not a general secret scan.
-- The appendix's substantive text was compared byte-for-byte with the complete
-  supplied amendment from its “Section 3” heading onward: **identical**. Its SHA-256
-  is `053118e61807a4d4d57a0de12a96833c7de76f0fc7d29df0ff49ade646b83e50`.
-  The checksum permits future verification without an ignored source file.
-- The final reproducible public-only command below ran via `bash -e -c` and
-  **passed: 5 files, 48 links/anchors, 16 fenced blocks, 15 decisions/checklists**,
-  plus the substantive amendment checksum. No parser/runtime behavior was tested.
-- `git diff --check -- docs/design` and
-  `git diff --exit-code -- docs/design/2026-09-14-artifact-retention-contract.md`
-  **passed** for tracked whitespace and preservation of the landed contract.
-  The separate new-file whitespace loop below also passed for all five documents.
-- Read-only workflow `binding_design_review`: full clause/amendment/retention review
-  passed; explainer review returned three concrete inconsistencies (unconditional
-  B selection, approval per source revision rather than changed artifact, and
-  publication equated with launch). All three were corrected.
-- Read-only workflow `binding_design_final_review`: **passed with no findings**.
-  The reviewer read all five documents, rechecked the full explainer and all three
-  fixes, and independently confirmed the appendix checksum, trailing whitespace
-  and unchanged retention contract. Documentation acceptance only; runtime work,
-  parser/schema approval and provider qualification are still separate gates.
-
-No parser acceptance, lifecycle test, model learning, deployment or provider privacy
-claim follows from these checks. The landed retention contract remains unchanged.
-Runtime/full repository tests belong to the foundation/consumer lanes and are not
-claimed run by this documentation task.
-
-Reproducible **public-only documentation check**, from the implementation worktree
-root (checks these five files, not implementation behavior):
-
-```bash
-python3 - <<'PY'
-from pathlib import Path
-import hashlib, re
-root = Path('docs/design')
-files = sorted(root.glob('*portable-souls*.md'))
-assert len(files) == 5
-links = blocks = 0
-for path in files:
-    text = path.read_text()
-    assert text.endswith('\n') and not text.endswith('\n\n'), path
-    assert all(line == line.rstrip() for line in text.splitlines()), path
-    # Track Markdown fences, not inline backticks in the displayed checker.
-    fence = None
-    for line in text.splitlines():
-        match = re.match(r'^(`{3,})(.*)$', line)
-        if match and fence is None:
-            fence = match[1]
-            blocks += 1
-        elif match and match[1] == fence and not match[2]:
-            fence = None
-    assert fence is None, path
-    for target in re.findall(r'\[[^\]\n]+\]\(([^\s)]+)\)', text):
-        if re.match(r'^[a-z]+://', target):
-            continue
-        name, _, anchor = target.partition('#')
-        destination = path.parent / name if name else path
-        assert destination.exists(), (path, target)
-        if anchor:
-            headings = re.findall(r'^#{1,6} (.+)$', destination.read_text(), re.M)
-            slugs = [re.sub(r'[^\w\- ]', '', h.lower()).replace(' ', '-') for h in headings]
-            assert anchor in slugs, (path, target)
-        links += 1
-    # This is a narrow marker check, not a credential-discovery operation.
-    forbidden = ['/' + 'Users/', 'instances/' + 'oats-expert', 'juan.' + 'aweb.ai']
-    assert all(marker not in text for marker in forbidden), path
-handoff = (root / '2026-09-15-portable-souls-handoff.md').read_text()
-body = handoff.split('## 2. The decisions (binding)\n')[1].split('## 3.')[0]
-assert re.findall(r'^(\d+)\. ', body, re.M) == [str(i) for i in range(1, 16)]
-ledger = (root / '2026-09-15-portable-souls-implementation.md').read_text()
-assert re.findall(r'^### D(\d\d) ', ledger, re.M) == [f'{i:02}' for i in range(1, 16)]
-appendix = (root / '2026-09-14-portable-souls-contract-amendments.md').read_text()
-marker = '## Section 3: responsibilities and knowledge'
-body = marker + appendix.split(marker, 1)[1]
-assert hashlib.sha256(body.encode()).hexdigest() == '053118e61807a4d4d57a0de12a96833c7de76f0fc7d29df0ff49ade646b83e50'
-print(f'PASS: {len(files)} files, {links} links/anchors, {blocks} fenced blocks; 15 decisions, 15 checklists; amendment checksum')
-PY
-for file in docs/design/*portable-souls*.md; do
-  status=0
-  output=$(git diff --no-index --check /dev/null "$file" 2>&1) || status=$?
-  # --no-index may return 1 for differences even without whitespace errors.
-  test -z "$output" && test "$status" -le 1 || { printf '%s\n' "$output"; exit 1; }
-done
-git diff --check -- docs/design
-git diff --exit-code -- docs/design/2026-09-14-artifact-retention-contract.md
-```

package/docs/design/2026-09-15-selection-lock-and-approval.md

@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
-# Selection lock and approval — implementation boundary
-
-The new private API in `lib/portable-lock.mjs` implements selection lock v3.
-It is not yet connected to the public package CLI or migration. Old v1/v2
-readers and `docs/oats-lock.schema.json` retain their existing interpretation.
-The new structural schema is `docs/oats-lock-v3.schema.json`; changing the old
-public CLI/schema to admit it remains an explicit consumer-cutover gate.
-
-## Future selections, not historical authority
-
-A lock has `lockfileVersion: 3`, `artifactSets` and `selections`. Artifact sets
-reuse `validateArtifactSet`; their keys hash the canonical complete set.
-Selection keys hash the normalized `{source,path}` request through the same
-source and canonical-JSON codecs used by captured records. Each non-null
-`current` or `available` reference must name an existing set with one matching
-root package and its complete dependency closure. Direct local-capability
-captures belong in resolutions, not fabricated package selections.
-
-Multiple sets can contain different versions of the same capability. This is
-not a multi-version composition within one instance. A captured resolution
-embeds its own selected set; reading it never consults this mutable lock.
-
-`current` and `available` are distinct. A failed/offline refresh can preserve
-both A and B while recording failure, without claiming either is latest.
-`observedAt` is the last successful observation's canonical UTC ISO timestamp,
-not an automatically generated timestamp for a failed refresh. No lock field
-can grant trust. Preparation must verify actual resources and exact approval
-before selecting executable B; writing a syntactically valid lock is neither
-that verification nor consent. A pin to B cannot silently fall back to A.
-
-## Explicit scope and compare-and-swap
-
-`readLock3(deployment)` returns `{lock,integrity}`; both are null if absent.
-The integrity is a versioned canonical-JSON CAS token, not executable trust.
-Malformed, noncanonical, symlinked and unsupported files refuse. Old versions
-require their explicit evidence/migration reader; even an empty v1 file is not
-silently treated as a fresh v3 deployment.
-
-`writeLock3(deployment, expectedPreviousIntegrity, next)` validates the whole
-next snapshot and compares the exact previous token under a cooperative scope
-guard. It commits the entire snapshot atomically or reports `selection-changed`;
-no implicit row merging or artifact/record deletion occurs. First publication
-is no-replace. Identical snapshots may be kept, but a stale expected token still
-refuses. Staging is private and ignored before publication.
-
-All new portable-state writers use `portable-state.mjs`. A held/crashed guard
-is not auto-reaped; recovery is explicit. This serializes cooperating new
-writers, not legacy operations, hostile host processes or power loss. A live
-legacy cutover still needs the separately reviewed migration barrier. No such
-cutover or live lock write was performed while implementing this module.
-
-`portable-files.mjs` shares the bounded descriptor-backed metadata read with
-captured records, preserving their size/identity/content-change checks.
-
-## Separate exact-artifact approval
-
-`lib/artifact-approvals.mjs` owns `.agents/portable/approvals.json`. Its closed
-version-1 ledger is keyed by capability ID, then integrity format and full digest.
-Every entry must agree with its keys and carry explicit operator provenance.
-Legacy digests, source/provider declarations and captured approval flags cannot
-supply this new authority. Missing ledger means no approvals; malformed existing
-metadata refuses, never repairs itself from a selection lock.
-
-`approveCapturedCapability(deployment, resolution, id, operatorOrigin)` is the
-record-addressed approval writer. It verifies the retained record, selected artifact
-and provenance, then preserves previous approvals under the same scope write guard.
-Prospective `approveAvailableCapability(deployment, artifactSet, id, operatorOrigin)`
-uses an exact content-addressed set already in lock v3, verifies its retained artifact
-and installation provenance with the SAME proof, and runs the complete kernel manifest
-codec before that same ledger writer. This breaks the legitimate ordering cycle:
-provider normalization code needs approval BEFORE a complete resolution can be built.
-No partial resolution is fabricated for approval. The CLI spelling is
-`oats trust <id> --deployment <absolute scope> --artifact-set <sha256-set-id>`;
-artifact-set selectors authorize no command execution and cannot mix with resolution
-selectors. Approval itself still grants neither binding readiness nor enrollment.
-There is no bulk caller-supplied ledger overwrite or approval during discovery.
-Approving B neither revokes nor rewrites A. Repeating A keeps its original receipt.
-
-`inspectCapturedApprovals` verifies retained inputs and reads current local
-approval authority without consulting current selections/configuration. It returns
-per-capability facts, not a dispatch permit. Helpers have dedicated record checks.
-The existing command/hook/environment classifier was extracted byte-identically
-from core into `capability-execution.mjs`; both callers use it. An environment-only
-artifact needs approval, and owner-execute changes require a new exact approval.
-Declarative-only changes have no executable gate; they remain visible as changed
-artifact identities. No approval for an unrelated managed harness resource follows
-from a capability's approval.
-
-All mutable publication uses an active synchronous scope-write context; saved or
-fabricated contexts cannot publish after the guard is released. This is an internal
-coordination safeguard, not a hostile-host permission system. Full manifest/launch
-validation, action-specific trust checks, explicit CLI consent and runtime/provider
-qualification still belong to the forthcoming preparation/dispatch integration.
-
-## Shared structural schemas
-
-`docs/portable.schema.json` owns the shared value definitions. The thin
-`captured-resolution.schema.json`, `oats-lock-v3.schema.json` and
-`artifact-approvals.schema.json` reference them without copying their types.
-Generate with `node scripts/portable-schemas.mjs --write`; invocation without
-`--write` checks drift. All four schemas compile offline. Existing current-format
-schemas are unchanged; publishing these new wire schemas does not activate them
-in the old installer or CLI.
-
-Schema acceptance is structural, not a replacement for strict bounded decoding,
-canonical source parsing, choice replay, cross-reference/digest equality, graph
-closure, source/provenance verification or provider non-secret classification.
-The existing launch/manifest codecs still own their complete contracts. Real
-captured-record, lock and approval fixtures are checked against these schemas;
-a separate test checks deterministic generation and authority/credential boundaries.
-
-## Verification so far
-
-Four focused tests cover A/B selection and failed-refresh visibility, canonical
-keys/root correlation, full-snapshot CAS/legacy/symlink/guard refusal, and two
-independent concurrent first writers. Existing captured-record and scaffold-only
-spawn/inspect/retire tests cover the shared read-helper extraction. Two focused
-captured-approval tests cover source-deleted A/B coexistence, poisoned current trust,
-key/format refusal, environment-only gating, owner-execute changes and declarative
-no-op. Two existing package-engine trust/environment regressions cover the classifier
-extraction. These qualify the tested storage/approval boundaries, not public CLI
-consent, complete preparation, native dispatch or live migration.