@avi770/testteam 3.0.0 → 3.2.0

package/dist/agents/111-dynamic-eval-detector.js

@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+/**
+ * Dynamic Code Execution Detector — static scan for the runtime
+ * code-evaluation primitives that turn data into executable code. If any
+ * of these ever touch attacker-influenced input, it's remote code
+ * execution; even when they don't, they're a code-smell and a CSP /
+ * audit headache.
+ *
+ * Flagged:
+ *   - 111-eval               high      eval(...)
+ *   - 111-new-function       high      new Function(...) (runtime codegen)
+ *   - 111-vm-exec            high      vm.runInContext / runInNewContext /
+ *                                       runInThisContext / compileFunction
+ *   - 111-settimeout-string  medium    setTimeout / setInterval with a
+ *                                       STRING first arg (implicit eval)
+ *   - 111-clean / 111-summary  info
+ *
+ * Persists `evidence/dynamic-eval-audit.json`. Read-only, parallel-safe,
+ * static analysis only.
+ */
+import * as fs from 'node:fs';
+import * as path from 'node:path';
+import { BaseAgent } from './base-agent.js';
+import { maskNonCode, isTestPath } from './lib/source-scan.js';
+const SRC_EXTENSIONS = new Set(['.ts', '.tsx', '.js', '.jsx', '.mjs', '.cjs']);
+const SKIP_DIRS = new Set([
+    'node_modules', '.git', 'dist', 'build', '.next', '.nuxt', 'coverage', 'reports', 'baselines', 'evidence',
+]);
+function walk(dir, results = []) {
+    if (!fs.existsSync(dir))
+        return results;
+    let entries;
+    try {
+        entries = fs.readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true });
+    }
+    catch {
+        return results;
+    }
+    for (const entry of entries) {
+        if (SKIP_DIRS.has(entry.name))
+            continue;
+        const full = path.join(dir, entry.name);
+        if (entry.isDirectory()) {
+            walk(full, results);
+        }
+        else if (entry.isFile() && SRC_EXTENSIONS.has(path.extname(entry.name))) {
+            results.push(full);
+        }
+    }
+    return results;
+}
+function relativise(absPath, root) {
+    return path.relative(root, absPath).split(path.sep).join('/');
+}
+function lineOf(content, index) {
+    return content.slice(0, index).split('\n').length;
+}
+function snippetOf(content, index) {
+    const start = content.lastIndexOf('\n', index) + 1;
+    let end = content.indexOf('\n', index);
+    if (end === -1)
+        end = content.length;
+    return content.slice(start, end).trim().slice(0, 160);
+}
+/** Scan a file for dynamic-code-execution sinks. */
+export function scanDynamicEval(content) {
+    const hits = [];
+    const seen = new Set();
+    // Match against code only — `eval`/`Function` mentioned in comments or inside
+    // string literals (e.g. this detector's own regex sources) are not sinks.
+    // Line numbers/snippets come from the original source.
+    const masked = maskNonCode(content);
+    const record = (kind, idx) => {
+        const line = lineOf(content, idx);
+        const key = `${kind}:${line}`;
+        if (seen.has(key))
+            return;
+        seen.add(key);
+        hits.push({ kind, line, snippet: snippetOf(content, idx) });
+    };
+    const patterns = [
+        // eval( — but not `.eval(` member calls on unrelated objects? Keep it
+        // strict to the global: word-boundary eval not preceded by `.`.
+        { re: /(?<![.\w])eval\s*\(/g, kind: 'eval' },
+        { re: /\bnew\s+Function\s*\(/g, kind: 'new-function' },
+        { re: /\bvm\s*\.\s*(?:runInContext|runInNewContext|runInThisContext|compileFunction)\s*\(/g, kind: 'vm-exec' },
+    ];
+    for (const { re, kind } of patterns) {
+        const r = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags);
+        let m;
+        while ((m = r.exec(masked)) !== null)
+            record(kind, m.index);
+    }
+    // setTimeout / setInterval with a STRING literal first arg → implicit eval.
+    // The masker keeps the opening quote delimiter, so this still fires.
+    const timerRe = /\b(?:setTimeout|setInterval)\s*\(\s*(['"`])/g;
+    let m;
+    while ((m = timerRe.exec(masked)) !== null) {
+        record('settimeout-string', m.index);
+    }
+    return hits;
+}
+export class DynamicEvalDetectorAgent extends BaseAgent {
+    agentId = 111;
+    agentName = 'Dynamic Code Execution Detector';
+    async preFlight() {
+        const root = this.config.projectRoot ?? process.cwd();
+        if (!fs.existsSync(root)) {
+            throw new Error(`projectRoot does not exist: ${root}`);
+        }
+    }
+    async execute() {
+        const findings = [];
+        const projectRoot = this.config.projectRoot ?? process.cwd();
+        const sourceFiles = new Set();
+        const mapPath = path.join(this.runDir, 'evidence', 'connection-map.json');
+        try {
+            const map = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(mapPath, 'utf-8'));
+            for (const f of map.files) {
+                if (!f.isTest)
+                    sourceFiles.add(path.join(projectRoot, f.path));
+            }
+        }
+        catch {
+            for (const f of walk(projectRoot))
+                sourceFiles.add(f);
+        }
+        const allHits = [];
+        let filesScanned = 0;
+        for (const file of sourceFiles) {
+            if (isTestPath(file, projectRoot))
+                continue;
+            let content;
+            try {
+                content = fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf-8');
+            }
+            catch {
+                continue;
+            }
+            filesScanned++;
+            const rel = relativise(file, projectRoot);
+            for (const hit of scanDynamicEval(content)) {
+                allHits.push({ ...hit, file: rel });
+            }
+        }
+        if (allHits.length === 0) {
+            findings.push({
+                id: `${this.agentId}-clean`,
+                type: 'infra-issue',
+                severity: 'info',
+                agentId: this.agentId,
+                module: 'dynamic-eval-detector',
+                description: `Scanned ${filesScanned} non-test file(s) — no eval / new Function / vm exec / string-timer sinks found.`,
+            });
+            this.persistAudit(projectRoot, filesScanned, allHits);
+            return findings;
+        }
+        for (const hit of allHits.slice(0, 100)) {
+            findings.push(this.toFinding(hit));
+        }
+        this.persistAudit(projectRoot, filesScanned, allHits);
+        const count = (k) => allHits.filter((h) => h.kind === k).length;
+        findings.push({
+            id: `${this.agentId}-summary`,
+            type: 'infra-issue',
+            severity: 'info',
+            agentId: this.agentId,
+            module: 'dynamic-eval-detector',
+            description: `Dynamic-eval audit: ${count('eval')} eval, ${count('new-function')} new Function, ${count('vm-exec')} vm exec, ${count('settimeout-string')} string-timer, across ${filesScanned} file(s).`,
+        });
+        return findings;
+    }
+    toFinding(hit) {
+        const slug = `${hit.file.replace(/[^\w]/g, '_')}-${hit.line}`;
+        const base = { agentId: this.agentId, module: 'dynamic-eval-detector', file: hit.file, line: hit.line };
+        switch (hit.kind) {
+            case 'eval':
+                return {
+                    ...base,
+                    id: `${this.agentId}-eval-${slug}`,
+                    type: 'code-bug-security',
+                    severity: 'high',
+                    description: `eval() at ${hit.file}:${hit.line} executes a string as code. If any part of the string is attacker-influenced this is RCE; even otherwise it's a code smell and blocks a strict CSP. Replace with explicit logic (JSON.parse, a lookup table, etc.). \`${hit.snippet}\``,
+                };
+            case 'new-function':
+                return {
+                    ...base,
+                    id: `${this.agentId}-new-function-${slug}`,
+                    type: 'code-bug-security',
+                    severity: 'high',
+                    description: `new Function() at ${hit.file}:${hit.line} compiles a string into a function at runtime — same risk profile as eval(). Avoid runtime codegen on any dynamic input. \`${hit.snippet}\``,
+                };
+            case 'vm-exec':
+                return {
+                    ...base,
+                    id: `${this.agentId}-vm-exec-${slug}`,
+                    type: 'code-bug-security',
+                    severity: 'high',
+                    description: `vm code execution at ${hit.file}:${hit.line}. Node's vm module is NOT a security sandbox — untrusted code run here can escape. If the source is ever attacker-influenced, treat as RCE. \`${hit.snippet}\``,
+                };
+            case 'settimeout-string':
+                return {
+                    ...base,
+                    id: `${this.agentId}-settimeout-string-${slug}`,
+                    type: 'code-bug-security',
+                    severity: 'medium',
+                    description: `setTimeout/setInterval with a string argument at ${hit.file}:${hit.line} is an implicit eval() of that string. Pass a function reference instead. \`${hit.snippet}\``,
+                };
+        }
+    }
+    persistAudit(projectRoot, filesScanned, hits) {
+        const audit = {
+            version: 1,
+            generatedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
+            projectRoot,
+            filesScanned,
+            hits,
+        };
+        try {
+            const evidenceDir = path.join(this.runDir, 'evidence');
+            fs.mkdirSync(evidenceDir, { recursive: true });
+            fs.writeFileSync(path.join(evidenceDir, 'dynamic-eval-audit.json'), JSON.stringify(audit, null, 2), 'utf-8');
+            this.addEvidence({
+                type: 'report',
+                path: 'evidence/dynamic-eval-audit.json',
+                description: `Dynamic-eval audit: ${hits.length} sink(s) across ${filesScanned} file(s)`,
+            });
+        }
+        catch {
+            // non-fatal
+        }
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=111-dynamic-eval-detector.js.map

package/dist/agents/111-dynamic-eval-detector.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/agents/112-taint-tracker.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+/**
+ * Cross-File Taint Tracker — bounded 1-hop interprocedural taint analysis.
+ *
+ * The single-file security scanners (#107 open-redirect, #108 SQLi,
+ * #109 path-traversal, #110 mass-assignment, #111 dynamic-eval) only fire
+ * when an attacker-controlled value and a dangerous sink appear in the SAME
+ * expression. Real code launders request data through helper functions, so
+ * the source and the sink live in different places:
+ *
+ *     // routes/user.ts
+ *     app.get('/u', (req, res) => res.json(runQuery(req.query.id)));   // source
+ *     // db/helpers.ts
+ *     export function runQuery(id) {                                   // tainted param
+ *       return db.$queryRawUnsafe(`SELECT * FROM u WHERE id = ${id}`); // sink
+ *     }
+ *
+ * Neither line alone trips a line-level scanner. This agent connects them:
+ *
+ *   1. Find "sink-wrapper" functions: a standalone function (declaration or
+ *      `const fn = (…) =>`) whose body reaches a dangerous sink
+ *      (sql / eval / command / fs-path / redirect) using one of its own
+ *      parameters. The tainted parameter slot is recorded.
+ *   2. Find call sites of those wrappers anywhere in the codebase whose
+ *      argument in the dangerous slot is request-tainted — `req`/`request`/
+ *      `.body`/`.query`/`.params`, either directly or via a local variable
+ *      assigned from such.
+ *   3. Emit a flow: source(call site) → wrapper(param) → sink.
+ *
+ * Bounded to ONE hop (source → wrapper → sink) to stay linear and
+ * low-false-positive: a finding requires BOTH a confirmed sink-wrapper AND a
+ * confirmed taint source reaching its dangerous slot. Cross-file flows (call
+ * site and sink in different files) are the headline; same-file 1-hop flows
+ * the line scanners miss are also reported.
+ *
+ * Known limitations (kept deliberately, to bound false positives): only
+ * standalone functions and `const fn = …` arrows are treated as wrappers
+ * (class/object methods are not), and taint is followed a single hop.
+ *
+ * Findings:
+ *   - 112-taint-flow   high   code-bug-security
+ *   - 112-clean / 112-summary  info
+ *
+ * Persists `evidence/taint-analysis.json`. Read-only, parallel-safe, static.
+ */
+import type { Finding } from '../core/types.js';
+import { BaseAgent } from './base-agent.js';
+/**
+ * Request-input taint markers — kept in sync with the line-level scanners.
+ * `req`/`request` + the `.body`/`.query`/`.params` accessors also cover Koa
+ * (`ctx.request.body`, `ctx.params`) and Hapi (`request.payload`).
+ *
+ * The `(?!\s*\()` after the accessors disambiguates a request PROPERTY ACCESS
+ * (`req.query.id`, `ctx.params`, `request.body`) from a same-named METHOD CALL —
+ * notably TypeORM / query-builder `queryRunner.query(sql)` / `conn.params(...)`,
+ * which would otherwise false-positive as request input. (No real request accessor
+ * is invoked as `.query(`/`.params(`/`.body(`, so excluding the call form is loss-free.)
+ * This is the prerequisite for safely recognising NestJS class-method sink-wrappers,
+ * which were reverted earlier precisely because of this collision.
+ *
+ * NB: bare `args`/`payload` (GraphQL resolver args / queue payloads) false-
+ * positive on their pervasive non-request use (`execFile(cmd, args)`), so they
+ * aren't here. GraphQL resolver args are handled separately via
+ * `extractResolvers` (below), which gates `args` as a taint source on a
+ * distinctive 3/4-arg resolver signature `(parent, args, context|info, …)`.
+ * Queue `payload` remains a deferred gap (no equally distinctive shape).
+ */
+export declare const REQUEST_RE: RegExp;
+export type SinkKind = 'sql' | 'eval' | 'command' | 'fs-path' | 'redirect' | 'ssrf';
+export interface SourceFile {
+    path: string;
+    content: string;
+}
+export interface SinkWrapper {
+    fnName: string;
+    file: string;
+    declLine: number;
+    paramName: string;
+    paramSlot: number;
+    sinkKind: SinkKind;
+    sinkLine: number;
+}
+export interface TaintFlow {
+    callFile: string;
+    callLine: number;
+    wrapperFn: string;
+    paramSlot: number;
+    sinkFile: string;
+    sinkKind: SinkKind;
+    crossFile: boolean;
+    snippet: string;
+    /** True when the flow is a GraphQL resolver whose args reach a sink within its own body. */
+    resolverDirect?: boolean;
+}
+export interface TaintAnalysisResult {
+    wrappers: SinkWrapper[];
+    flows: TaintFlow[];
+}
+export interface TaintAnalysisAudit {
+    version: 1;
+    generatedAt: string;
+    projectRoot: string;
+    filesScanned: number;
+    wrappers: number;
+    flows: TaintFlow[];
+}
+/** String-aware balanced-delimiter reader. Returns the slice including delimiters. */
+export declare function readBalanced(content: string, openIdx: number, open: string, close: string): {
+    text: string;
+    end: number;
+} | null;
+/** Split a parenthesised argument list (incl. the outer parens) into top-level pieces. */
+export declare function splitArgs(parenText: string): string[];
+/**
+ * Identifiers actually *bound* (introduced into scope) by a destructuring pattern.
+ * For object patterns, a `key:` to the left of a colon is a property name, not a
+ * binding — only the right-hand side is bound (`{ a: b }` binds `b`, not `a`;
+ * shorthand `{ a }` binds `a`). Array patterns bind every identifier. This keeps
+ * a renamed property key (`{ input: cmd }` → `cmd`, never `input`) from being
+ * mistaken for an in-scope taint name (adversarial-review FP-2).
+ */
+export declare function destructuredBindings(pattern: string, kind: '{' | '['): string[];
+export interface FnDef {
+    name: string;
+    paramSlots: string[][];
+    bodyText: string;
+    bodyOpenIdx: number;
+    declLine: number;
+}
+export declare function extractFunctions(content: string): FnDef[];
+/** A single class method, with decorator-derived taint sources resolved. */
+export interface ClassMethod {
+    name: string;
+    paramSlots: string[][];
+    /** Identifiers bound by a NestJS request-source decorator (@Body/@Query/…). */
+    sourceParamIds: string[];
+    bodyText: string;
+    /** Absolute offset of the method body `{` in the (masked) file content. */
+    bodyAbsIdx: number;
+    bodyStart: number;
+    bodyEnd: number;
+}
+export interface ClassInfo {
+    name: string;
+    methods: ClassMethod[];
+    bodyStart: number;
+    bodyEnd: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Extract class declarations and their methods. Used by the NestJS pass to find
+ * class-method sink-wrappers and decorator-bound request sources. Standalone
+ * functions remain the job of `extractFunctions`.
+ */
+export declare function extractClasses(content: string): ClassInfo[];
+export declare function isResolverSignature(fn: FnDef): boolean;
+export interface ResolverInfo {
+    fn: FnDef;
+    bodyStart: number;
+    bodyEnd: number;
+    /** Identifiers bound by the args slot — `['args']`, or destructured names like `['id', 'name']`. */
+    taintedNames: readonly string[];
+}
+export declare function extractResolvers(content: string): ResolverInfo[];
+/**
+ * The subset of a resolver's `taintedNames` that is NOT shadowed at `callOffset`
+ * by a parameter binding inside the resolver body. A nested
+ * `function f(args) {…}`, an assigned arrow `const g = (args) => …`, OR an inline
+ * callback `items.map(args => …)` all rebind `args`, so a sink call inside them
+ * uses the inner param — not the resolver's client input — and crediting resolver
+ * taint there is a false positive (adversarial-review FP-1 + Codex inline-callback
+ * follow-up). `callOffset` is an absolute offset into the same (masked) content
+ * `extractResolvers` was given.
+ */
+/**
+ * The subset of `names` NOT shadowed by a nested fn/arrow scope enclosing `callOffset`.
+ * `bodyText` is the enclosing scope's (masked) source and `base` its absolute offset.
+ * Shared by the resolver and NestJS passes so both ignore a request-source name that a
+ * nested callback parameter rebinds — e.g. `items.map(body => this.run(body.id))`, where
+ * the inner `body` is the callback's local, not the request body.
+ */
+export declare function unshadowedAt(bodyText: string, base: number, names: readonly string[], callOffset: number): readonly string[];
+export declare function unshadowedResolverTaint(resolver: ResolverInfo, callOffset: number): readonly string[];
+export interface SinkSpec {
+    kind: SinkKind;
+    re: RegExp;
+}
+/**
+ * Sink call signatures. Each must end with `(` so the argument list can be
+ * read. `.exec(`/`.query(` member forms are intentionally NOT matched as
+ * commands (they collide with `RegExp.exec` etc.); bare `exec`/`spawn`
+ * (child_process via destructuring) are.
+ */
+export declare const SINK_SPECS: readonly SinkSpec[];
+/** True if `ident` appears as a standalone (non-member) identifier in `text`. */
+export declare function identAppears(text: string, ident: string): boolean;
+/**
+ * For redirect sinks: a request param used only as a URL base — `new URL(path,
+ * req.url)` / `req.origin` — isn't the redirect target (the literal path is).
+ * Returns true when every appearance of `ident` is such a base accessor, so it
+ * shouldn't be treated as a tainted redirect target. A bare use or a user-input
+ * accessor (`.query`/`.nextUrl`/…) returns false → still flagged.
+ */
+export declare function appearsOnlyAsUrlBase(text: string, ident: string): boolean;
+/** Find every (parameter-slot → sink) pair inside one function body. */
+export declare function sinksUsingParams(fn: FnDef, fileContent: string): Array<{
+    slot: number;
+    paramName: string;
+    kind: SinkKind;
+    sinkLine: number;
+    sinkOffset: number;
+}>;
+/** Collect local variables assigned directly from request input within a file. */
+export declare function taintedLocals(content: string): Set<string>;
+export declare function isTainted(argText: string, locals: Set<string>): boolean;
+/**
+ * Run the full analysis over an in-memory set of source files.
+ * Pure and deterministic — the agent is a thin wrapper around this.
+ */
+export declare function analyzeTaint(files: SourceFile[]): TaintAnalysisResult;
+export declare class CrossFileTaintTrackerAgent extends BaseAgent {
+    readonly agentId = 112;
+    readonly agentName = "Cross-File Taint Tracker";
+    protected preFlight(): Promise<void>;
+    protected execute(): Promise<Finding[]>;
+    private persistAudit;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=112-taint-tracker.d.ts.map

package/dist/agents/112-taint-tracker.d.ts.map

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