@avesta-hq/prevention 0.3.1 → 0.3.2

package/bin/lib/hooks.js

@@ -9,6 +9,34 @@
 const fs = require('fs');
 const path = require('path');
 
+const SECRET_PATTERNS = [
+  { pattern: /sk-ant-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}/, name: "Anthropic API key" },
+  { pattern: /sk-or-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}/, name: "OpenRouter API key" },
+  { pattern: /sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}/, name: "OpenAI API key" },
+  { pattern: /AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}/, name: "AWS Access Key ID" },
+  { pattern: /ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}/, name: "GitHub Personal Access Token" },
+  { pattern: /gho_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}/, name: "GitHub OAuth token" },
+  { pattern: /glpat-[a-zA-Z0-9\-]{20,}/, name: "GitLab Personal Access Token" },
+  { pattern: /-----BEGIN[\s\w]*PRIVATE KEY-----/, name: "Private key" },
+  { pattern: /xoxb-[0-9]{10,}-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}/, name: "Slack bot token" },
+  { pattern: /xoxp-[0-9]{10,}-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}/, name: "Slack user token" },
+];
+
+const SECRET_ALLOWLIST_PATTERNS = [
+  '**/*.test.*', '**/*.spec.*', '**/*.md',
+  '**/.env.example', '**/fixtures/**', '**/mocks/**',
+  '**/__tests__/**',
+];
+
+function checkForSecrets(content) {
+  for (const { pattern, name } of SECRET_PATTERNS) {
+    if (pattern.test(content)) {
+      return { name };
+    }
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
 function readPolicy(cwd) {
   const policyPath = path.join(cwd, '.avesta', 'hook-policy.json');
   if (!fs.existsSync(policyPath)) return null;
@@ -29,6 +57,56 @@ function matchesPattern(filePath, pattern) {
   return new RegExp(regex).test(filePath);
 }
 
+/**
+ * Extract the target file path from Bash commands that write files.
+ * Catches: cat > file, echo > file, tee file, cp source dest,
+ *          cat << EOF > file, printf > file
+ * Returns the file path or null if not a file-writing command.
+ */
+function extractFileWriteTarget(command) {
+  // cat > file, cat >> file, echo > file, printf > file
+  const redirectMatch = command.match(/(?:cat|echo|printf)\s+.*?>\s*(\S+)/);
+  if (redirectMatch) return redirectMatch[1].replace(/['"]/g, '');
+
+  // cat << 'EOF' > file (heredoc with redirect)
+  const heredocRedirectMatch = command.match(/cat\s*<<\s*['"]?\w+['"]?\s*>\s*(\S+)/);
+  if (heredocRedirectMatch) return heredocRedirectMatch[1].replace(/['"]/g, '');
+
+  // cat > file << 'EOF' (redirect before heredoc)
+  const redirectHeredocMatch = command.match(/cat\s*>\s*(\S+)\s*<<\s*['"]?\w+['"]?/);
+  if (redirectHeredocMatch) return redirectHeredocMatch[1].replace(/['"]/g, '');
+
+  // tee file (without pipe, less common but possible)
+  const teeMatch = command.match(/\btee\s+(?:-a\s+)?(\S+)/);
+  if (teeMatch) return teeMatch[1].replace(/['"]/g, '');
+
+  // cp source dest — last argument is the destination
+  const cpMatch = command.match(/\bcp\s+(?:-[a-zA-Z]+\s+)*\S+\s+(\S+)\s*$/);
+  if (cpMatch) return cpMatch[1].replace(/['"]/g, '');
+
+  // mv source dest
+  const mvMatch = command.match(/\bmv\s+(?:-[a-zA-Z]+\s+)*\S+\s+(\S+)\s*$/);
+  if (mvMatch) return mvMatch[1].replace(/['"]/g, '');
+
+  return null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Extract inline content from Bash commands that embed file content.
+ * Used for secret scanning on heredocs and echo content.
+ */
+function extractBashWriteContent(command) {
+  // Heredoc content: cat << 'EOF' ... EOF or cat > file << 'EOF' ... EOF
+  const heredocMatch = command.match(/<<\s*['"]?(\w+)['"]?\s*\n([\s\S]*?)\n\1/);
+  if (heredocMatch) return heredocMatch[2];
+
+  // echo "content" > file
+  const echoMatch = command.match(/echo\s+(['"])([\s\S]*?)\1\s*>/);
+  if (echoMatch) return echoMatch[2];
+
+  return null;
+}
+
 // ── PreToolUse Hook ───────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 function hookPreToolUse() {
@@ -37,35 +115,91 @@ function hookPreToolUse() {
     const { tool_name: toolName, tool_input: toolInput = {}, cwd = process.cwd() } = data;
 
     const policy = readPolicy(cwd);
-    if (!policy) process.exit(0); // No policy = fail-open
 
     // Edit / Write enforcement
     if (toolName === 'Edit' || toolName === 'Write') {
-      const editPolicy = policy.edit_policy;
-      if (!editPolicy || editPolicy.allow_all) process.exit(0);
+      // Policy-based edit restriction (only if policy exists)
+      if (policy) {
+        const editPolicy = policy.edit_policy;
+        if (editPolicy && !editPolicy.allow_all) {
+          const filePath = toolInput.file_path || '';
+          const allowed = editPolicy.allow_patterns.some(p => matchesPattern(filePath, p));
+          if (!allowed) {
+            process.stderr.write(editPolicy.block_message || '⛔ Prevention: Edit blocked by policy.\n');
+            process.exit(2);
+          }
+        }
+      }
 
+      // Secret scanning (always runs, regardless of policy)
       const filePath = toolInput.file_path || '';
-      const allowed = editPolicy.allow_patterns.some(p => matchesPattern(filePath, p));
-
-      if (!allowed) {
-        process.stderr.write(editPolicy.block_message || '⛔ Prevention: Edit blocked by policy.\n');
-        process.exit(2);
+      const isAllowlisted = SECRET_ALLOWLIST_PATTERNS.some(p => matchesPattern(filePath, p));
+      if (!isAllowlisted) {
+        const contentToScan = toolName === 'Edit' ? (toolInput.new_string || '') : (toolInput.content || '');
+        if (contentToScan) {
+          const secretFound = checkForSecrets(contentToScan);
+          if (secretFound) {
+            process.stderr.write(
+              `⛔ Prevention: Secret detected — ${secretFound.name}\n` +
+              `Do not hardcode secrets. Use environment variables or a secret manager.\n` +
+              `File: ${filePath}\n`
+            );
+            process.exit(2);
+          }
+        }
       }
+
       process.exit(0);
     }
 
     // Bash enforcement
     if (toolName === 'Bash') {
-      const bashPolicy = policy.bash_policy;
-      if (!bashPolicy || !bashPolicy.blocked_commands) process.exit(0);
-
       const command = toolInput.command || '';
-      for (const rule of bashPolicy.blocked_commands) {
-        if (new RegExp(rule.pattern).test(command)) {
-          process.stderr.write(rule.message || '⛔ Prevention: Command blocked by policy.\n');
+
+      // Check edit policy for Bash commands that write files
+      // This prevents bypassing Write/Edit restrictions via cat/echo/tee/cp
+      if (policy) {
+        const editPolicy = policy.edit_policy;
+        if (editPolicy && !editPolicy.allow_all) {
+          const fileWriteTarget = extractFileWriteTarget(command);
+          if (fileWriteTarget) {
+            const allowed = editPolicy.allow_patterns.some(p => matchesPattern(fileWriteTarget, p));
+            if (!allowed) {
+              process.stderr.write(
+                (editPolicy.block_message || '⛔ Prevention: File write blocked by policy.\n') +
+                `\nBlocked file: ${fileWriteTarget}\n` +
+                'Use the Write tool instead of Bash to create files.\n'
+              );
+              process.exit(2);
+            }
+          }
+        }
+
+        // Blocked command patterns (git push, etc.)
+        const bashPolicy = policy.bash_policy;
+        if (bashPolicy && bashPolicy.blocked_commands) {
+          for (const rule of bashPolicy.blocked_commands) {
+            if (new RegExp(rule.pattern).test(command)) {
+              process.stderr.write(rule.message || '⛔ Prevention: Command blocked by policy.\n');
+              process.exit(2);
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      }
+
+      // Secret scanning for Bash commands that write file content
+      const inlineContent = extractBashWriteContent(command);
+      if (inlineContent) {
+        const secretFound = checkForSecrets(inlineContent);
+        if (secretFound) {
+          process.stderr.write(
+            `⛔ Prevention: Secret detected in Bash command — ${secretFound.name}\n` +
+            `Do not hardcode secrets. Use environment variables or a secret manager.\n`
+          );
           process.exit(2);
         }
       }
+
       process.exit(0);
     }
 

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@avesta-hq/prevention",
-  "version": "0.3.1",
+  "version": "0.3.2",
   "description": "XP/CD development agent commands for Claude Code - achieve Elite DORA metrics through disciplined TDD and Continuous Delivery practices",
   "keywords": [
     "claude-code",
@@ -40,7 +40,8 @@
     "dev": "tsx src/mcp-server.ts",
     "test": "jest",
     "test:evals": "cd src/_deprecated/evals && python -m pytest test_cases/orchestrator/ -v",
-    "prebuild:assets": "tsx scripts/embed-assets.ts",
+    "generate:catalog": "tsx scripts/generate-catalog-data.ts",
+    "prebuild:assets": "tsx scripts/generate-catalog-data.ts && tsx scripts/embed-assets.ts",
     "build:binary": "npm run prebuild:assets && bun build src/mcp-server.ts --compile --outfile dist/prevention",
     "build:all": "npm run prebuild:assets && bun build src/mcp-server.ts --compile --target=bun-linux-x64 --outfile dist/prevention-linux-x64 && bun build src/mcp-server.ts --compile --target=bun-darwin-arm64 --outfile dist/prevention-darwin-arm64 && bun build src/mcp-server.ts --compile --target=bun-darwin-x64 --outfile dist/prevention-darwin-x64"
   },
@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@
     "jest": "^30.3.0",
     "ts-jest": "^29.4.6",
     "tsx": "^4.21.0",
-    "typescript": "^5.9.3"
+    "typescript": "^5.9.3",
+    "yaml": "^2.8.3"
   }
 }