@authon/react-native-wallet 0.0.0-stage → 0.4.0

package/ios/vendor/CSecp256k1/src/scalar_impl.h

@@ -0,0 +1,321 @@
+/***********************************************************************
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Pieter Wuille                                    *
+ * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying    *
+ * file COPYING or https://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
+ ***********************************************************************/
+
+#ifndef SECP256K1_SCALAR_IMPL_H
+#define SECP256K1_SCALAR_IMPL_H
+
+#ifdef VERIFY
+#include <string.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "scalar.h"
+#include "util.h"
+
+#if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER)
+#include "scalar_low_impl.h"
+#elif defined(SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT128)
+#include "scalar_4x64_impl.h"
+#elif defined(SECP256K1_WIDEMUL_INT64)
+#include "scalar_8x32_impl.h"
+#else
+#error "Please select wide multiplication implementation"
+#endif
+
+static const secp256k1_scalar secp256k1_scalar_one = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1);
+static const secp256k1_scalar secp256k1_scalar_zero = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+
+SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_clear(secp256k1_scalar *r) {
+    secp256k1_memclear(r, sizeof(secp256k1_scalar));
+}
+
+static int secp256k1_scalar_set_b32_seckey(secp256k1_scalar *r, const unsigned char *bin) {
+    int overflow;
+    secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(r, bin, &overflow);
+
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(r);
+    return (!overflow) & (!secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(r));
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_scalar_verify(const secp256k1_scalar *r) {
+    VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(r) == 0);
+
+    (void)r;
+}
+
+#if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER)
+/* Begin of section generated by sage/gen_exhaustive_groups.sage. */
+#  if EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == 7
+#    define EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_LAMBDA 2
+#  elif EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == 13
+#    define EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_LAMBDA 9
+#  elif EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == 199
+#    define EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_LAMBDA 92
+#  else
+#    error No known lambda for the specified exhaustive test group order.
+#  endif
+/* End of section generated by sage/gen_exhaustive_groups.sage. */
+
+/**
+ * Find r1 and r2 given k, such that r1 + r2 * lambda == k mod n; unlike in the
+ * full case we don't bother making r1 and r2 be small, we just want them to be
+ * nontrivial to get full test coverage for the exhaustive tests. We therefore
+ * (arbitrarily) set r2 = k + 5 (mod n) and r1 = k - r2 * lambda (mod n).
+ */
+static void secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(secp256k1_scalar * SECP256K1_RESTRICT r1, secp256k1_scalar * SECP256K1_RESTRICT r2, const secp256k1_scalar * SECP256K1_RESTRICT k) {
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(k);
+    VERIFY_CHECK(r1 != k);
+    VERIFY_CHECK(r2 != k);
+    VERIFY_CHECK(r1 != r2);
+
+    *r2 = (*k + 5) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER;
+    *r1 = (*k + (EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - *r2) * EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_LAMBDA) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER;
+
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(r1);
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(r2);
+}
+#else
+/**
+ * The Secp256k1 curve has an endomorphism, where lambda * (x, y) = (beta * x, y), where
+ * lambda is: */
+static const secp256k1_scalar secp256k1_const_lambda = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(
+    0x5363AD4CUL, 0xC05C30E0UL, 0xA5261C02UL, 0x8812645AUL,
+    0x122E22EAUL, 0x20816678UL, 0xDF02967CUL, 0x1B23BD72UL
+);
+
+#ifdef VERIFY
+static void secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda_verify(const secp256k1_scalar *r1, const secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *k);
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Both lambda and beta are primitive cube roots of unity.  That is lamba^3 == 1 mod n and
+ * beta^3 == 1 mod p, where n is the curve order and p is the field order.
+ *
+ * Furthermore, because (X^3 - 1) = (X - 1)(X^2 + X + 1), the primitive cube roots of unity are
+ * roots of X^2 + X + 1.  Therefore lambda^2 + lamba == -1 mod n and beta^2 + beta == -1 mod p.
+ * (The other primitive cube roots of unity are lambda^2 and beta^2 respectively.)
+ *
+ * Let l = -1/2 + i*sqrt(3)/2, the complex root of X^2 + X + 1. We can define a ring
+ * homomorphism phi : Z[l] -> Z_n where phi(a + b*l) == a + b*lambda mod n. The kernel of phi
+ * is a lattice over Z[l] (considering Z[l] as a Z-module). This lattice is generated by a
+ * reduced basis {a1 + b1*l, a2 + b2*l} where
+ *
+ * - a1 =      {0x30,0x86,0xd2,0x21,0xa7,0xd4,0x6b,0xcd,0xe8,0x6c,0x90,0xe4,0x92,0x84,0xeb,0x15}
+ * - b1 =     -{0xe4,0x43,0x7e,0xd6,0x01,0x0e,0x88,0x28,0x6f,0x54,0x7f,0xa9,0x0a,0xbf,0xe4,0xc3}
+ * - a2 = {0x01,0x14,0xca,0x50,0xf7,0xa8,0xe2,0xf3,0xf6,0x57,0xc1,0x10,0x8d,0x9d,0x44,0xcf,0xd8}
+ * - b2 =      {0x30,0x86,0xd2,0x21,0xa7,0xd4,0x6b,0xcd,0xe8,0x6c,0x90,0xe4,0x92,0x84,0xeb,0x15}
+ *
+ * "Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography" (Hankerson, Menezes, Vanstone) gives an algorithm
+ * (algorithm 3.74) to find k1 and k2 given k, such that k1 + k2 * lambda == k mod n, and k1
+ * and k2 are small in absolute value.
+ *
+ * The algorithm computes c1 = round(b2 * k / n) and c2 = round((-b1) * k / n), and gives
+ * k1 = k - (c1*a1 + c2*a2) and k2 = -(c1*b1 + c2*b2). Instead, we use modular arithmetic, and
+ * compute r2 = k2 mod n, and r1 = k1 mod n = (k - r2 * lambda) mod n, avoiding the need for
+ * the constants a1 and a2.
+ *
+ * g1, g2 are precomputed constants used to replace division with a rounded multiplication
+ * when decomposing the scalar for an endomorphism-based point multiplication.
+ *
+ * The possibility of using precomputed estimates is mentioned in "Guide to Elliptic Curve
+ * Cryptography" (Hankerson, Menezes, Vanstone) in section 3.5.
+ *
+ * The derivation is described in the paper "Efficient Software Implementation of Public-Key
+ * Cryptography on Sensor Networks Using the MSP430X Microcontroller" (Gouvea, Oliveira, Lopez),
+ * Section 4.3 (here we use a somewhat higher-precision estimate):
+ * d = a1*b2 - b1*a2
+ * g1 = round(2^384 * b2/d)
+ * g2 = round(2^384 * (-b1)/d)
+ *
+ * (Note that d is also equal to the curve order, n, here because [a1,b1] and [a2,b2]
+ * can be found as outputs of the Extended Euclidean Algorithm on inputs n and lambda).
+ *
+ * The function below splits k into r1 and r2, such that
+ * - r1 + lambda * r2 == k (mod n)
+ * - either r1 < 2^128 or -r1 mod n < 2^128
+ * - either r2 < 2^128 or -r2 mod n < 2^128
+ *
+ * See proof below.
+ */
+static void secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(secp256k1_scalar * SECP256K1_RESTRICT r1, secp256k1_scalar * SECP256K1_RESTRICT r2, const secp256k1_scalar * SECP256K1_RESTRICT k) {
+    secp256k1_scalar c1, c2;
+    static const secp256k1_scalar minus_b1 = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(
+        0x00000000UL, 0x00000000UL, 0x00000000UL, 0x00000000UL,
+        0xE4437ED6UL, 0x010E8828UL, 0x6F547FA9UL, 0x0ABFE4C3UL
+    );
+    static const secp256k1_scalar minus_b2 = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(
+        0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFFUL, 0xFFFFFFFEUL,
+        0x8A280AC5UL, 0x0774346DUL, 0xD765CDA8UL, 0x3DB1562CUL
+    );
+    static const secp256k1_scalar g1 = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(
+        0x3086D221UL, 0xA7D46BCDUL, 0xE86C90E4UL, 0x9284EB15UL,
+        0x3DAA8A14UL, 0x71E8CA7FUL, 0xE893209AUL, 0x45DBB031UL
+    );
+    static const secp256k1_scalar g2 = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(
+        0xE4437ED6UL, 0x010E8828UL, 0x6F547FA9UL, 0x0ABFE4C4UL,
+        0x221208ACUL, 0x9DF506C6UL, 0x1571B4AEUL, 0x8AC47F71UL
+    );
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(k);
+    VERIFY_CHECK(r1 != k);
+    VERIFY_CHECK(r2 != k);
+    VERIFY_CHECK(r1 != r2);
+
+    /* these _var calls are constant time since the shift amount is constant */
+    secp256k1_scalar_mul_shift_var(&c1, k, &g1, 384);
+    secp256k1_scalar_mul_shift_var(&c2, k, &g2, 384);
+    secp256k1_scalar_mul(&c1, &c1, &minus_b1);
+    secp256k1_scalar_mul(&c2, &c2, &minus_b2);
+    secp256k1_scalar_add(r2, &c1, &c2);
+    secp256k1_scalar_mul(r1, r2, &secp256k1_const_lambda);
+    secp256k1_scalar_negate(r1, r1);
+    secp256k1_scalar_add(r1, r1, k);
+
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(r1);
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(r2);
+#ifdef VERIFY
+    secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda_verify(r1, r2, k);
+#endif
+}
+
+#ifdef VERIFY
+/*
+ * Proof for secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda's bounds.
+ *
+ * Let
+ *  - epsilon1 = 2^256 * |g1/2^384 - b2/d|
+ *  - epsilon2 = 2^256 * |g2/2^384 - (-b1)/d|
+ *  - c1 = round(k*g1/2^384)
+ *  - c2 = round(k*g2/2^384)
+ *
+ * Lemma 1: |c1 - k*b2/d| < 2^-1 + epsilon1
+ *
+ *    |c1 - k*b2/d|
+ *  =
+ *    |c1 - k*g1/2^384 + k*g1/2^384 - k*b2/d|
+ * <=   {triangle inequality}
+ *    |c1 - k*g1/2^384| + |k*g1/2^384 - k*b2/d|
+ *  =
+ *    |c1 - k*g1/2^384| + k*|g1/2^384 - b2/d|
+ * <    {rounding in c1 and 0 <= k < 2^256}
+ *    2^-1 + 2^256 * |g1/2^384 - b2/d|
+ *  =   {definition of epsilon1}
+ *    2^-1 + epsilon1
+ *
+ * Lemma 2: |c2 - k*(-b1)/d| < 2^-1 + epsilon2
+ *
+ *    |c2 - k*(-b1)/d|
+ *  =
+ *    |c2 - k*g2/2^384 + k*g2/2^384 - k*(-b1)/d|
+ * <=   {triangle inequality}
+ *    |c2 - k*g2/2^384| + |k*g2/2^384 - k*(-b1)/d|
+ *  =
+ *    |c2 - k*g2/2^384| + k*|g2/2^384 - (-b1)/d|
+ * <    {rounding in c2 and 0 <= k < 2^256}
+ *    2^-1 + 2^256 * |g2/2^384 - (-b1)/d|
+ *  =   {definition of epsilon2}
+ *    2^-1 + epsilon2
+ *
+ * Let
+ *  - k1 = k - c1*a1 - c2*a2
+ *  - k2 = - c1*b1 - c2*b2
+ *
+ * Lemma 3: |k1| < (a1 + a2 + 1)/2 < 2^128
+ *
+ *    |k1|
+ *  =   {definition of k1}
+ *    |k - c1*a1 - c2*a2|
+ *  =   {(a1*b2 - b1*a2)/n = 1}
+ *    |k*(a1*b2 - b1*a2)/n - c1*a1 - c2*a2|
+ *  =
+ *    |a1*(k*b2/n - c1) + a2*(k*(-b1)/n - c2)|
+ * <=   {triangle inequality}
+ *    a1*|k*b2/n - c1| + a2*|k*(-b1)/n - c2|
+ * <    {Lemma 1 and Lemma 2}
+ *    a1*(2^-1 + epsilon1) + a2*(2^-1 + epsilon2)
+ * <    {rounding up to an integer}
+ *    (a1 + a2 + 1)/2
+ * <    {rounding up to a power of 2}
+ *    2^128
+ *
+ * Lemma 4: |k2| < (-b1 + b2)/2 + 1 < 2^128
+ *
+ *    |k2|
+ *  =   {definition of k2}
+ *    |- c1*a1 - c2*a2|
+ *  =   {(b1*b2 - b1*b2)/n = 0}
+ *    |k*(b1*b2 - b1*b2)/n - c1*b1 - c2*b2|
+ *  =
+ *    |b1*(k*b2/n - c1) + b2*(k*(-b1)/n - c2)|
+ * <=   {triangle inequality}
+ *    (-b1)*|k*b2/n - c1| + b2*|k*(-b1)/n - c2|
+ * <    {Lemma 1 and Lemma 2}
+ *    (-b1)*(2^-1 + epsilon1) + b2*(2^-1 + epsilon2)
+ * <    {rounding up to an integer}
+ *    (-b1 + b2)/2 + 1
+ * <    {rounding up to a power of 2}
+ *    2^128
+ *
+ * Let
+ *  - r2 = k2 mod n
+ *  - r1 = k - r2*lambda mod n.
+ *
+ * Notice that r1 is defined such that r1 + r2 * lambda == k (mod n).
+ *
+ * Lemma 5: r1 == k1 mod n.
+ *
+ *    r1
+ * ==   {definition of r1 and r2}
+ *    k - k2*lambda
+ * ==   {definition of k2}
+ *    k - (- c1*b1 - c2*b2)*lambda
+ * ==
+ *    k + c1*b1*lambda + c2*b2*lambda
+ * ==  {a1 + b1*lambda == 0 mod n and a2 + b2*lambda == 0 mod n}
+ *    k - c1*a1 - c2*a2
+ * ==  {definition of k1}
+ *    k1
+ *
+ * From Lemma 3, Lemma 4, Lemma 5 and the definition of r2, we can conclude that
+ *
+ *  - either r1 < 2^128 or -r1 mod n < 2^128
+ *  - either r2 < 2^128 or -r2 mod n < 2^128.
+ *
+ * Q.E.D.
+ */
+static void secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda_verify(const secp256k1_scalar *r1, const secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *k) {
+    secp256k1_scalar s;
+    unsigned char buf1[32];
+    unsigned char buf2[32];
+
+    /* (a1 + a2 + 1)/2 is 0xa2a8918ca85bafe22016d0b917e4dd77 */
+    static const unsigned char k1_bound[32] = {
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0xa2, 0xa8, 0x91, 0x8c, 0xa8, 0x5b, 0xaf, 0xe2, 0x20, 0x16, 0xd0, 0xb9, 0x17, 0xe4, 0xdd, 0x77
+    };
+
+    /* (-b1 + b2)/2 + 1 is 0x8a65287bd47179fb2be08846cea267ed */
+    static const unsigned char k2_bound[32] = {
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+        0x8a, 0x65, 0x28, 0x7b, 0xd4, 0x71, 0x79, 0xfb, 0x2b, 0xe0, 0x88, 0x46, 0xce, 0xa2, 0x67, 0xed
+    };
+
+    secp256k1_scalar_mul(&s, &secp256k1_const_lambda, r2);
+    secp256k1_scalar_add(&s, &s, r1);
+    VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_eq(&s, k));
+
+    secp256k1_scalar_negate(&s, r1);
+    secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(buf1, r1);
+    secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(buf2, &s);
+    VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(buf1, k1_bound, 32) < 0 || secp256k1_memcmp_var(buf2, k1_bound, 32) < 0);
+
+    secp256k1_scalar_negate(&s, r2);
+    secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(buf1, r2);
+    secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(buf2, &s);
+    VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_memcmp_var(buf1, k2_bound, 32) < 0 || secp256k1_memcmp_var(buf2, k2_bound, 32) < 0);
+}
+#endif /* VERIFY */
+#endif /* !defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) */
+
+#endif /* SECP256K1_SCALAR_IMPL_H */

package/ios/vendor/CSecp256k1/src/scalar_low.h

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/***********************************************************************
+ * Copyright (c) 2015, 2022 Andrew Poelstra, Pieter Wuille             *
+ * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying    *
+ * file COPYING or https://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
+ ***********************************************************************/
+
+#ifndef SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_H
+#define SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+/** A scalar modulo the group order of the secp256k1 curve. */
+typedef uint32_t secp256k1_scalar;
+
+/* A compile-time constant equal to 2^32 (modulo order). */
+#define SCALAR_2P32 ((0xffffffffUL % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) + 1U)
+
+/* Compute a*2^32 + b (modulo order). */
+#define SCALAR_HORNER(a, b) (((uint64_t)(a) * SCALAR_2P32 + (b)) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER)
+
+/* Evaluates to the provided 256-bit constant reduced modulo order. */
+#define SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(d7, d6, d5, d4, d3, d2, d1, d0) SCALAR_HORNER(SCALAR_HORNER(SCALAR_HORNER(SCALAR_HORNER(SCALAR_HORNER(SCALAR_HORNER(SCALAR_HORNER((d7), (d6)), (d5)), (d4)), (d3)), (d2)), (d1)), (d0))
+
+#endif /* SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_H */

package/ios/vendor/CSecp256k1/src/scalar_low_impl.h

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+/***********************************************************************
+ * Copyright (c) 2015 Andrew Poelstra                                  *
+ * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying    *
+ * file COPYING or https://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
+ ***********************************************************************/
+
+#ifndef SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_IMPL_H
+#define SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_IMPL_H
+
+#include "checkmem.h"
+#include "scalar.h"
+#include "util.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_is_even(const secp256k1_scalar *a) {
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(a);
+
+    return !(*a & 1);
+}
+
+SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_set_int(secp256k1_scalar *r, unsigned int v) {
+    *r = v % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER;
+
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(r);
+}
+
+SECP256K1_INLINE static uint32_t secp256k1_scalar_get_bits_limb32(const secp256k1_scalar *a, unsigned int offset, unsigned int count) {
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(a);
+
+    VERIFY_CHECK(count > 0 && count <= 32);
+    if (offset < 32) {
+        return (*a >> offset) & (0xFFFFFFFF >> (32 - count));
+    } else {
+        return 0;
+    }
+}
+
+SECP256K1_INLINE static uint32_t secp256k1_scalar_get_bits_var(const secp256k1_scalar *a, unsigned int offset, unsigned int count) {
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(a);
+
+    return secp256k1_scalar_get_bits_limb32(a, offset, count);
+}
+
+SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_check_overflow(const secp256k1_scalar *a) { return *a >= EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; }
+
+static int secp256k1_scalar_add(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) {
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(a);
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(b);
+
+    *r = (*a + *b) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER;
+
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(r);
+    return *r < *b;
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(secp256k1_scalar *r, unsigned int bit, int flag) {
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(r);
+
+    if (flag && bit < 32)
+        *r += ((uint32_t)1 << bit);
+
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(r);
+    VERIFY_CHECK(bit < 32);
+    /* Verify that adding (1 << bit) will not overflow any in-range scalar *r by overflowing the underlying uint32_t. */
+    VERIFY_CHECK(((uint32_t)1 << bit) - 1 <= UINT32_MAX - EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER);
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(secp256k1_scalar *r, const unsigned char *b32, int *overflow) {
+    int i;
+    int over = 0;
+    *r = 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+        *r = (*r * 0x100) + b32[i];
+        if (*r >= EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) {
+            over = 1;
+            *r %= EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER;
+        }
+    }
+    if (overflow) *overflow = over;
+
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(r);
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(unsigned char *bin, const secp256k1_scalar* a) {
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(a);
+
+    memset(bin, 0, 32);
+    bin[28] = *a >> 24; bin[29] = *a >> 16; bin[30] = *a >> 8; bin[31] = *a;
+}
+
+SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(const secp256k1_scalar *a) {
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(a);
+
+    return *a == 0;
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_scalar_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a) {
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(a);
+
+    if (*a == 0) {
+        *r = 0;
+    } else {
+        *r = EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - *a;
+    }
+
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(r);
+}
+
+SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_is_one(const secp256k1_scalar *a) {
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(a);
+
+    return *a == 1;
+}
+
+static int secp256k1_scalar_is_high(const secp256k1_scalar *a) {
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(a);
+
+    return *a > EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER / 2;
+}
+
+static int secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(secp256k1_scalar *r, int flag) {
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(r);
+
+    if (flag) secp256k1_scalar_negate(r, r);
+
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(r);
+    return flag ? -1 : 1;
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_scalar_mul(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) {
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(a);
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(b);
+
+    *r = (*a * *b) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER;
+
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(r);
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_scalar_split_128(secp256k1_scalar *r1, secp256k1_scalar *r2, const secp256k1_scalar *a) {
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(a);
+
+    *r1 = *a;
+    *r2 = 0;
+
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(r1);
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(r2);
+}
+
+SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_eq(const secp256k1_scalar *a, const secp256k1_scalar *b) {
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(a);
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(b);
+
+    return *a == *b;
+}
+
+static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_scalar_cmov(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a, int flag) {
+    uint32_t mask0, mask1;
+    volatile int vflag = flag;
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(a);
+    SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_CHECK_VERIFY(r, sizeof(*r));
+
+    mask0 = vflag + ~((uint32_t)0);
+    mask1 = ~mask0;
+    *r = (*r & mask0) | (*a & mask1);
+
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(r);
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_scalar_inverse(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *x) {
+    int i;
+    uint32_t res = 0;
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(x);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER; i++) {
+        if ((i * *x) % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == 1) {
+            res = i;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* If this VERIFY_CHECK triggers we were given a noninvertible scalar (and thus
+     * have a composite group order; fix it in exhaustive_tests.c). */
+    VERIFY_CHECK(res != 0);
+    *r = res;
+
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(r);
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *x) {
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(x);
+
+    secp256k1_scalar_inverse(r, x);
+
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(r);
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_scalar_half(secp256k1_scalar *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a) {
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(a);
+
+    *r = (*a + ((-(uint32_t)(*a & 1)) & EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER)) >> 1;
+
+    SECP256K1_SCALAR_VERIFY(r);
+}
+
+#endif /* SECP256K1_SCALAR_REPR_IMPL_H */

package/ios/vendor/CSecp256k1/src/scratch.h

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/***********************************************************************
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Andrew Poelstra                                  *
+ * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying    *
+ * file COPYING or https://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
+ ***********************************************************************/
+
+#ifndef SECP256K1_SCRATCH_H
+#define SECP256K1_SCRATCH_H
+
+/* The typedef is used internally; the struct name is used in the public API
+ * (where it is exposed as a different typedef) */
+typedef struct secp256k1_scratch_space_struct {
+    /** guard against interpreting this object as other types */
+    unsigned char magic[8];
+    /** actual allocated data */
+    void *data;
+    /** amount that has been allocated (i.e. `data + offset` is the next
+     *  available pointer)  */
+    size_t alloc_size;
+    /** maximum size available to allocate */
+    size_t max_size;
+} secp256k1_scratch;
+
+typedef struct secp256k1_scratch_space_struct secp256k1_scratch_space;
+
+static secp256k1_scratch* secp256k1_scratch_create(const secp256k1_callback* error_callback, size_t max_size);
+
+static void secp256k1_scratch_destroy(const secp256k1_callback* error_callback, secp256k1_scratch* scratch);
+
+/** Returns an opaque object used to "checkpoint" a scratch space. Used
+ *  with `secp256k1_scratch_apply_checkpoint` to undo allocations. */
+static size_t secp256k1_scratch_checkpoint(const secp256k1_callback* error_callback, const secp256k1_scratch* scratch);
+
+/** Applies a check point received from `secp256k1_scratch_checkpoint`,
+ *  undoing all allocations since that point. */
+static void secp256k1_scratch_apply_checkpoint(const secp256k1_callback* error_callback, secp256k1_scratch* scratch, size_t checkpoint);
+
+/** Returns the maximum allocation the scratch space will allow */
+static size_t secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(const secp256k1_callback* error_callback, const secp256k1_scratch* scratch, size_t n_objects);
+
+/** Returns a pointer into the most recently allocated frame, or NULL if there is insufficient available space */
+static void *secp256k1_scratch_alloc(const secp256k1_callback* error_callback, secp256k1_scratch* scratch, size_t n);
+
+#endif

package/ios/vendor/CSecp256k1/src/scratch_impl.h

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+/***********************************************************************
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Andrew Poelstra                                  *
+ * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying    *
+ * file COPYING or https://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
+ ***********************************************************************/
+
+#ifndef SECP256K1_SCRATCH_IMPL_H
+#define SECP256K1_SCRATCH_IMPL_H
+
+#include "util.h"
+#include "scratch.h"
+
+static secp256k1_scratch* secp256k1_scratch_create(const secp256k1_callback* error_callback, size_t size) {
+    const size_t base_alloc = ROUND_TO_ALIGN(sizeof(secp256k1_scratch));
+    void *alloc = checked_malloc(error_callback, base_alloc + size);
+    secp256k1_scratch* ret = (secp256k1_scratch *)alloc;
+    if (ret != NULL) {
+        memset(ret, 0, sizeof(*ret));
+        memcpy(ret->magic, "scratch", 8);
+        ret->data = (void *) ((char *) alloc + base_alloc);
+        ret->max_size = size;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_scratch_destroy(const secp256k1_callback* error_callback, secp256k1_scratch* scratch) {
+    if (scratch != NULL) {
+        if (secp256k1_memcmp_var(scratch->magic, "scratch", 8) != 0) {
+            secp256k1_callback_call(error_callback, "invalid scratch space");
+            return;
+        }
+        VERIFY_CHECK(scratch->alloc_size == 0); /* all checkpoints should be applied */
+        memset(scratch->magic, 0, sizeof(scratch->magic));
+        free(scratch);
+    }
+}
+
+static size_t secp256k1_scratch_checkpoint(const secp256k1_callback* error_callback, const secp256k1_scratch* scratch) {
+    if (secp256k1_memcmp_var(scratch->magic, "scratch", 8) != 0) {
+        secp256k1_callback_call(error_callback, "invalid scratch space");
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return scratch->alloc_size;
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_scratch_apply_checkpoint(const secp256k1_callback* error_callback, secp256k1_scratch* scratch, size_t checkpoint) {
+    if (secp256k1_memcmp_var(scratch->magic, "scratch", 8) != 0) {
+        secp256k1_callback_call(error_callback, "invalid scratch space");
+        return;
+    }
+    if (checkpoint > scratch->alloc_size) {
+        secp256k1_callback_call(error_callback, "invalid checkpoint");
+        return;
+    }
+    scratch->alloc_size = checkpoint;
+}
+
+static size_t secp256k1_scratch_max_allocation(const secp256k1_callback* error_callback, const secp256k1_scratch* scratch, size_t objects) {
+    if (secp256k1_memcmp_var(scratch->magic, "scratch", 8) != 0) {
+        secp256k1_callback_call(error_callback, "invalid scratch space");
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /* Ensure that multiplication will not wrap around */
+    if (ALIGNMENT > 1 && objects > SIZE_MAX/(ALIGNMENT - 1)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (scratch->max_size - scratch->alloc_size <= objects * (ALIGNMENT - 1)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return scratch->max_size - scratch->alloc_size - objects * (ALIGNMENT - 1);
+}
+
+static void *secp256k1_scratch_alloc(const secp256k1_callback* error_callback, secp256k1_scratch* scratch, size_t size) {
+    void *ret;
+    size_t rounded_size;
+
+    rounded_size = ROUND_TO_ALIGN(size);
+    /* Check that rounding did not wrap around */
+    if (rounded_size < size) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    size = rounded_size;
+
+    if (secp256k1_memcmp_var(scratch->magic, "scratch", 8) != 0) {
+        secp256k1_callback_call(error_callback, "invalid scratch space");
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (size > scratch->max_size - scratch->alloc_size) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    ret = (void *) ((char *) scratch->data + scratch->alloc_size);
+    memset(ret, 0, size);
+    scratch->alloc_size += size;
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#endif