@authon/react-native-wallet 0.0.0-stage → 0.1.0

package/ios/vendor/CSecp256k1/include/secp256k1.h

@@ -0,0 +1,899 @@
+#ifndef SECP256K1_H
+#define SECP256K1_H
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+/** Unless explicitly stated all pointer arguments must not be NULL.
+ *
+ * The following rules specify the order of arguments in API calls:
+ *
+ * 1. Context pointers go first, followed by output arguments, combined
+ *    output/input arguments, and finally input-only arguments.
+ * 2. Array lengths always immediately follow the argument whose length
+ *    they describe, even if this violates rule 1.
+ * 3. Within the OUT/OUTIN/IN groups, pointers to data that is typically generated
+ *    later go first. This means: signatures, public nonces, secret nonces,
+ *    messages, public keys, secret keys, tweaks.
+ * 4. Arguments that are not data pointers go last, from more complex to less
+ *    complex: function pointers, algorithm names, messages, void pointers,
+ *    counts, flags, booleans.
+ * 5. Opaque data pointers follow the function pointer they are to be passed to.
+ */
+
+/** Opaque data structure that holds context information
+ *
+ *  The primary purpose of context objects is to store randomization data for
+ *  enhanced protection against side-channel leakage. This protection is only
+ *  effective if the context is randomized after its creation. See
+ *  secp256k1_context_create for creation of contexts and
+ *  secp256k1_context_randomize for randomization.
+ *
+ *  A secondary purpose of context objects is to store pointers to callback
+ *  functions that the library will call when certain error states arise. See
+ *  secp256k1_context_set_error_callback as well as
+ *  secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback for details. Future library versions
+ *  may use context objects for additional purposes.
+ *
+ *  A constructed context can safely be used from multiple threads
+ *  simultaneously, but API calls that take a non-const pointer to a context
+ *  need exclusive access to it. In particular this is the case for
+ *  secp256k1_context_destroy, secp256k1_context_preallocated_destroy,
+ *  and secp256k1_context_randomize.
+ *
+ *  Regarding randomization, either do it once at creation time (in which case
+ *  you do not need any locking for the other calls), or use a read-write lock.
+ */
+typedef struct secp256k1_context_struct secp256k1_context;
+
+/** Opaque data structure that holds a parsed and valid public key.
+ *
+ *  The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not
+ *  guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is
+ *  however guaranteed to be 64 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved.
+ *  If you need to convert to a format suitable for storage or transmission,
+ *  use secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize and secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse. To
+ *  compare keys, use secp256k1_ec_pubkey_cmp.
+ */
+typedef struct secp256k1_pubkey {
+    unsigned char data[64];
+} secp256k1_pubkey;
+
+/** Opaque data structure that holds a parsed ECDSA signature.
+ *
+ *  The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not
+ *  guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is
+ *  however guaranteed to be 64 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved.
+ *  If you need to convert to a format suitable for storage, transmission, or
+ *  comparison, use the secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_* and
+ *  secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_* functions.
+ */
+typedef struct secp256k1_ecdsa_signature {
+    unsigned char data[64];
+} secp256k1_ecdsa_signature;
+
+/** A pointer to a function to deterministically generate a nonce.
+ *
+ * Returns: 1 if a nonce was successfully generated. 0 will cause signing to fail.
+ * Out:     nonce32:   pointer to a 32-byte array to be filled by the function.
+ * In:      msg32:     the 32-byte message hash being verified (will not be NULL)
+ *          key32:     pointer to a 32-byte secret key (will not be NULL)
+ *          algo16:    pointer to a 16-byte array describing the signature
+ *                     algorithm (will be NULL for ECDSA for compatibility).
+ *          data:      Arbitrary data pointer that is passed through.
+ *          attempt:   how many iterations we have tried to find a nonce.
+ *                     This will almost always be 0, but different attempt values
+ *                     are required to result in a different nonce.
+ *
+ * Except for test cases, this function should compute some cryptographic hash of
+ * the message, the algorithm, the key and the attempt.
+ */
+typedef int (*secp256k1_nonce_function)(
+    unsigned char *nonce32,
+    const unsigned char *msg32,
+    const unsigned char *key32,
+    const unsigned char *algo16,
+    void *data,
+    unsigned int attempt
+);
+
+# if !defined(SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ)
+#  if defined(__GNUC__)&&defined(__GNUC_MINOR__)
+#   define SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(_maj,_min) \
+ ((__GNUC__<<16)+__GNUC_MINOR__>=((_maj)<<16)+(_min))
+#  else
+#   define SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(_maj,_min) 0
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+/*  When this header is used at build-time the SECP256K1_BUILD define needs to be set
+ *  to correctly setup export attributes and nullness checks.  This is normally done
+ *  by secp256k1.c but to guard against this header being included before secp256k1.c
+ *  has had a chance to set the define (e.g. via test harnesses that just includes
+ *  secp256k1.c) we set SECP256K1_NO_BUILD when this header is processed without the
+ *  BUILD define so this condition can be caught.
+ */
+#ifndef SECP256K1_BUILD
+# define SECP256K1_NO_BUILD
+#endif
+
+/* Symbol visibility. */
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+  /* GCC for Windows (e.g., MinGW) accepts the __declspec syntax
+   * for MSVC compatibility. A __declspec declaration implies (but is not
+   * exactly equivalent to) __attribute__ ((visibility("default"))), and so we
+   * actually want __declspec even on GCC, see "Microsoft Windows Function
+   * Attributes" in the GCC manual and the recommendations in
+   * https://gcc.gnu.org/wiki/Visibility. */
+# if defined(SECP256K1_BUILD)
+#  if defined(DLL_EXPORT) || defined(SECP256K1_DLL_EXPORT)
+    /* Building libsecp256k1 as a DLL.
+     * 1. If using Libtool, it defines DLL_EXPORT automatically.
+     * 2. In other cases, SECP256K1_DLL_EXPORT must be defined. */
+#   define SECP256K1_API extern __declspec (dllexport)
+#  else
+    /* Building libsecp256k1 as a static library on Windows.
+     * No declspec is needed, and so we would want the non-Windows-specific
+     * logic below take care of this case. However, this may result in setting
+     * __attribute__ ((visibility("default"))), which is supposed to be a noop
+     * on Windows but may trigger warnings when compiling with -flto due to a
+     * bug in GCC, see
+     * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=116478 . */
+#   define SECP256K1_API extern
+#  endif
+  /* The user must define SECP256K1_STATIC when consuming libsecp256k1 as a static
+   * library on Windows. */
+# elif !defined(SECP256K1_STATIC)
+   /* Consuming libsecp256k1 as a DLL. */
+#  define SECP256K1_API extern __declspec (dllimport)
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifndef SECP256K1_API
+/* All cases not captured by the Windows-specific logic. */
+# if defined(__GNUC__) && (__GNUC__ >= 4) && defined(SECP256K1_BUILD)
+   /* Building libsecp256k1 using GCC or compatible. */
+#  define SECP256K1_API extern __attribute__ ((visibility ("default")))
+# else
+   /* Fall back to standard C's extern. */
+#  define SECP256K1_API extern
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/* Warning attributes
+ * NONNULL is not used if SECP256K1_BUILD is set to avoid the compiler optimizing out
+ * some paranoid null checks. */
+# if defined(__GNUC__) && SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(3, 4)
+#  define SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT __attribute__ ((__warn_unused_result__))
+# else
+#  define SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT
+# endif
+# if !defined(SECP256K1_BUILD) && defined(__GNUC__) && SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(3, 4)
+#  define SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(_x)  __attribute__ ((__nonnull__(_x)))
+# else
+#  define SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(_x)
+# endif
+
+/* Attribute for marking functions, types, and variables as deprecated */
+#if !defined(SECP256K1_BUILD) && defined(__has_attribute)
+# if __has_attribute(__deprecated__)
+#  define SECP256K1_DEPRECATED(_msg) __attribute__ ((__deprecated__(_msg)))
+# else
+#  define SECP256K1_DEPRECATED(_msg)
+# endif
+#else
+# define SECP256K1_DEPRECATED(_msg)
+#endif
+
+/* All flags' lower 8 bits indicate what they're for. Do not use directly. */
+#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_MASK ((1 << 8) - 1)
+#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT (1 << 0)
+#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_COMPRESSION (1 << 1)
+/* The higher bits contain the actual data. Do not use directly. */
+#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_VERIFY (1 << 8)
+#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_SIGN (1 << 9)
+#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_DECLASSIFY (1 << 10)
+#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_COMPRESSION (1 << 8)
+
+/** Context flags to pass to secp256k1_context_create, secp256k1_context_preallocated_size, and
+ *  secp256k1_context_preallocated_create. */
+#define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT)
+
+/** Deprecated context flags. These flags are treated equivalent to SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE. */
+#define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_VERIFY)
+#define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_SIGN)
+
+/* Testing flag. Do not use. */
+#define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_DECLASSIFY (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_DECLASSIFY)
+
+/** Flag to pass to secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize. */
+#define SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_COMPRESSION | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_COMPRESSION)
+#define SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_COMPRESSION)
+
+/** Prefix byte used to tag various encoded curvepoints for specific purposes */
+#define SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_EVEN 0x02
+#define SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_ODD 0x03
+#define SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_UNCOMPRESSED 0x04
+#define SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_HYBRID_EVEN 0x06
+#define SECP256K1_TAG_PUBKEY_HYBRID_ODD 0x07
+
+/** A built-in constant secp256k1 context object with static storage duration, to be
+ *  used in conjunction with secp256k1_selftest.
+ *
+ *  This context object offers *only limited functionality* , i.e., it cannot be used
+ *  for API functions that perform computations involving secret keys, e.g., signing
+ *  and public key generation. If this restriction applies to a specific API function,
+ *  it is mentioned in its documentation. See secp256k1_context_create if you need a
+ *  full context object that supports all functionality offered by the library.
+ *
+ *  It is highly recommended to call secp256k1_selftest before using this context.
+ */
+SECP256K1_API const secp256k1_context *secp256k1_context_static;
+
+/** Deprecated alias for secp256k1_context_static. */
+SECP256K1_API const secp256k1_context *secp256k1_context_no_precomp
+SECP256K1_DEPRECATED("Use secp256k1_context_static instead");
+
+/** Perform basic self tests (to be used in conjunction with secp256k1_context_static)
+ *
+ *  This function performs self tests that detect some serious usage errors and
+ *  similar conditions, e.g., when the library is compiled for the wrong endianness.
+ *  This is a last resort measure to be used in production. The performed tests are
+ *  very rudimentary and are not intended as a replacement for running the test
+ *  binaries.
+ *
+ *  It is highly recommended to call this before using secp256k1_context_static.
+ *  It is not necessary to call this function before using a context created with
+ *  secp256k1_context_create (or secp256k1_context_preallocated_create), which will
+ *  take care of performing the self tests.
+ *
+ *  If the tests fail, this function will call the default error handler to abort the
+ *  program (see secp256k1_context_set_error_callback).
+ */
+SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_selftest(void);
+
+
+/** Create a secp256k1 context object (in dynamically allocated memory).
+ *
+ *  This function uses malloc to allocate memory. It is guaranteed that malloc is
+ *  called at most once for every call of this function. If you need to avoid dynamic
+ *  memory allocation entirely, see secp256k1_context_static and the functions in
+ *  secp256k1_preallocated.h.
+ *
+ *  Returns: pointer to a newly created context object.
+ *  In:      flags: Always set to SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE (see below).
+ *
+ *  The only valid non-deprecated flag in recent library versions is
+ *  SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE, which will create a context sufficient for all functionality
+ *  offered by the library. All other (deprecated) flags will be treated as equivalent
+ *  to the SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE flag. Though the flags parameter primarily exists for
+ *  historical reasons, future versions of the library may introduce new flags.
+ *
+ *  If the context is intended to be used for API functions that perform computations
+ *  involving secret keys, e.g., signing and public key generation, then it is highly
+ *  recommended to call secp256k1_context_randomize on the context before calling
+ *  those API functions. This will provide enhanced protection against side-channel
+ *  leakage, see secp256k1_context_randomize for details.
+ *
+ *  Do not create a new context object for each operation, as construction and
+ *  randomization can take non-negligible time.
+ */
+SECP256K1_API secp256k1_context *secp256k1_context_create(
+    unsigned int flags
+) SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT;
+
+/** Copy a secp256k1 context object (into dynamically allocated memory).
+ *
+ *  This function uses malloc to allocate memory. It is guaranteed that malloc is
+ *  called at most once for every call of this function. If you need to avoid dynamic
+ *  memory allocation entirely, see the functions in secp256k1_preallocated.h.
+ *
+ *  Cloning secp256k1_context_static is not possible, and should not be emulated by
+ *  the caller (e.g., using memcpy). Create a new context instead.
+ *
+ *  Returns: pointer to a newly created context object.
+ *  Args:    ctx: pointer to a context to copy (not secp256k1_context_static).
+ */
+SECP256K1_API secp256k1_context *secp256k1_context_clone(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT;
+
+/** Destroy a secp256k1 context object (created in dynamically allocated memory).
+ *
+ *  The context pointer may not be used afterwards.
+ *
+ *  The context to destroy must have been created using secp256k1_context_create
+ *  or secp256k1_context_clone. If the context has instead been created using
+ *  secp256k1_context_preallocated_create or secp256k1_context_preallocated_clone, the
+ *  behaviour is undefined. In that case, secp256k1_context_preallocated_destroy must
+ *  be used instead.
+ *
+ *  Args:   ctx: pointer to a context to destroy, constructed using
+ *               secp256k1_context_create or secp256k1_context_clone
+ *               (i.e., not secp256k1_context_static).
+ */
+SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_context_destroy(
+    secp256k1_context *ctx
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1);
+
+/** Set a callback function to be called when an illegal argument is passed to
+ *  an API call. It will only trigger for violations that are mentioned
+ *  explicitly in the header.
+ *
+ *  The philosophy is that these shouldn't be dealt with through a
+ *  specific return value, as calling code should not have branches to deal with
+ *  the case that this code itself is broken.
+ *
+ *  On the other hand, during debug stage, one would want to be informed about
+ *  such mistakes, and the default (crashing) may be inadvisable.
+ *  When this callback is triggered, the API function called is guaranteed not
+ *  to cause a crash, though its return value and output arguments are
+ *  undefined.
+ *
+ *  When this function has not been called (or called with fn==NULL), then the
+ *  default handler will be used. The library provides a default handler which
+ *  writes the message to stderr and calls abort. This default handler can be
+ *  replaced at link time if the preprocessor macro
+ *  USE_EXTERNAL_DEFAULT_CALLBACKS is defined, which is the case if the build
+ *  has been configured with --enable-external-default-callbacks. Then the
+ *  following two symbols must be provided to link against:
+ *   - void secp256k1_default_illegal_callback_fn(const char *message, void *data);
+ *   - void secp256k1_default_error_callback_fn(const char *message, void *data);
+ *  The library can call these default handlers even before a proper callback data
+ *  pointer could have been set using secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback or
+ *  secp256k1_context_set_error_callback, e.g., when the creation of a context
+ *  fails. In this case, the corresponding default handler will be called with
+ *  the data pointer argument set to NULL.
+ *
+ *  Args: ctx:  pointer to a context object.
+ *  In:   fun:  pointer to a function to call when an illegal argument is
+ *              passed to the API, taking a message and an opaque pointer.
+ *              (NULL restores the default handler.)
+ *        data: the opaque pointer to pass to fun above, must be NULL for the default handler.
+ *
+ *  See also secp256k1_context_set_error_callback.
+ */
+SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(
+    secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    void (*fun)(const char *message, void *data),
+    const void *data
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1);
+
+/** Set a callback function to be called when an internal consistency check
+ *  fails.
+ *
+ *  The default callback writes an error message to stderr and calls abort
+ *  to abort the program.
+ *
+ *  This can only trigger in case of a hardware failure, miscompilation,
+ *  memory corruption, serious bug in the library, or other error would can
+ *  otherwise result in undefined behaviour. It will not trigger due to mere
+ *  incorrect usage of the API (see secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback
+ *  for that). After this callback returns, anything may happen, including
+ *  crashing.
+ *
+ *  Args: ctx:  pointer to a context object.
+ *  In:   fun:  pointer to a function to call when an internal error occurs,
+ *              taking a message and an opaque pointer (NULL restores the
+ *              default handler, see secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback
+ *              for details).
+ *        data: the opaque pointer to pass to fun above, must be NULL for the default handler.
+ *
+ *  See also secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback.
+ */
+SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(
+    secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    void (*fun)(const char *message, void *data),
+    const void *data
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1);
+
+/** Parse a variable-length public key into the pubkey object.
+ *
+ *  Returns: 1 if the public key was fully valid.
+ *           0 if the public key could not be parsed or is invalid.
+ *  Args: ctx:      pointer to a context object.
+ *  Out:  pubkey:   pointer to a pubkey object. If 1 is returned, it is set to a
+ *                  parsed version of input. If not, its value is undefined.
+ *  In:   input:    pointer to a serialized public key
+ *        inputlen: length of the array pointed to by input
+ *
+ *  This function supports parsing compressed (33 bytes, header byte 0x02 or
+ *  0x03), uncompressed (65 bytes, header byte 0x04), or hybrid (65 bytes, header
+ *  byte 0x06 or 0x07) format public keys.
+ */
+SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,
+    const unsigned char *input,
+    size_t inputlen
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
+
+/** Serialize a pubkey object into a serialized byte sequence.
+ *
+ *  Returns: 1 always.
+ *  Args:   ctx:        pointer to a context object.
+ *  Out:    output:     pointer to a 65-byte (if compressed==0) or 33-byte (if
+ *                      compressed==1) byte array to place the serialized key
+ *                      in.
+ *  In/Out: outputlen:  pointer to an integer which is initially set to the
+ *                      size of output, and is overwritten with the written
+ *                      size.
+ *  In:     pubkey:     pointer to a secp256k1_pubkey containing an
+ *                      initialized public key.
+ *          flags:      SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED if serialization should be in
+ *                      compressed format, otherwise SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED.
+ */
+SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    unsigned char *output,
+    size_t *outputlen,
+    const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,
+    unsigned int flags
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
+
+/** Compare two public keys using lexicographic (of compressed serialization) order
+ *
+ *  Returns: <0 if the first public key is less than the second
+ *           >0 if the first public key is greater than the second
+ *           0 if the two public keys are equal
+ *  Args: ctx:      pointer to a context object
+ *  In:   pubkey1:  first public key to compare
+ *        pubkey2:  second public key to compare
+ */
+SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_cmp(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey1,
+    const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey2
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
+
+/** Sort public keys using lexicographic (of compressed serialization) order
+ *
+ *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid. 1 otherwise.
+ *
+ *  Args:     ctx: pointer to a context object
+ *  In:   pubkeys: array of pointers to pubkeys to sort
+ *      n_pubkeys: number of elements in the pubkeys array
+ */
+SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_sort(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    const secp256k1_pubkey **pubkeys,
+    size_t n_pubkeys
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2);
+
+/** Parse an ECDSA signature in compact (64 bytes) format.
+ *
+ *  Returns: 1 when the signature could be parsed, 0 otherwise.
+ *  Args: ctx:      pointer to a context object
+ *  Out:  sig:      pointer to a signature object
+ *  In:   input64:  pointer to the 64-byte array to parse
+ *
+ *  The signature must consist of a 32-byte big endian R value, followed by a
+ *  32-byte big endian S value. If R or S fall outside of [0..order-1], the
+ *  encoding is invalid. R and S with value 0 are allowed in the encoding.
+ *
+ *  After the call, sig will always be initialized. If parsing failed or R or
+ *  S are zero, the resulting sig value is guaranteed to fail verification for
+ *  any message and public key.
+ */
+SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig,
+    const unsigned char *input64
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
+
+/** Parse a DER ECDSA signature.
+ *
+ *  Returns: 1 when the signature could be parsed, 0 otherwise.
+ *  Args: ctx:      pointer to a context object
+ *  Out:  sig:      pointer to a signature object
+ *  In:   input:    pointer to the signature to be parsed
+ *        inputlen: the length of the array pointed to be input
+ *
+ *  This function will accept any valid DER encoded signature, even if the
+ *  encoded numbers are out of range.
+ *
+ *  After the call, sig will always be initialized. If parsing failed or the
+ *  encoded numbers are out of range, signature verification with it is
+ *  guaranteed to fail for every message and public key.
+ */
+SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig,
+    const unsigned char *input,
+    size_t inputlen
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
+
+/** Serialize an ECDSA signature in DER format.
+ *
+ *  Returns: 1 if enough space was available to serialize, 0 otherwise
+ *  Args:   ctx:       pointer to a context object
+ *  Out:    output:    pointer to an array to store the DER serialization
+ *  In/Out: outputlen: pointer to a length integer. Initially, this integer
+ *                     should be set to the length of output. After the call
+ *                     it will be set to the length of the serialization (even
+ *                     if 0 was returned).
+ *  In:     sig:       pointer to an initialized signature object
+ */
+SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    unsigned char *output,
+    size_t *outputlen,
+    const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
+
+/** Serialize an ECDSA signature in compact (64 byte) format.
+ *
+ *  Returns: 1
+ *  Args:   ctx:       pointer to a context object
+ *  Out:    output64:  pointer to a 64-byte array to store the compact serialization
+ *  In:     sig:       pointer to an initialized signature object
+ *
+ *  See secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact for details about the encoding.
+ */
+SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_compact(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    unsigned char *output64,
+    const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
+
+/** Verify an ECDSA signature.
+ *
+ *  Returns: 1: correct signature
+ *           0: incorrect or unparseable signature
+ *  Args:    ctx:       pointer to a context object
+ *  In:      sig:       the signature being verified.
+ *           msghash32: the 32-byte message hash being verified.
+ *                      The verifier must make sure to apply a cryptographic
+ *                      hash function to the message by itself and not accept an
+ *                      msghash32 value directly. Otherwise, it would be easy to
+ *                      create a "valid" signature without knowledge of the
+ *                      secret key. See also
+ *                      https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/a/81116/35586 for more
+ *                      background on this topic.
+ *           pubkey:    pointer to an initialized public key to verify with.
+ *
+ * To avoid accepting malleable signatures, only ECDSA signatures in lower-S
+ * form are accepted.
+ *
+ * If you need to accept ECDSA signatures from sources that do not obey this
+ * rule, apply secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize to the signature prior to
+ * verification, but be aware that doing so results in malleable signatures.
+ *
+ * For details, see the comments for that function.
+ */
+SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig,
+    const unsigned char *msghash32,
+    const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
+
+/** Convert a signature to a normalized lower-S form.
+ *
+ *  Returns: 1 if sigin was not normalized, 0 if it already was.
+ *  Args: ctx:    pointer to a context object
+ *  Out:  sigout: pointer to a signature to fill with the normalized form,
+ *                or copy if the input was already normalized. (can be NULL if
+ *                you're only interested in whether the input was already
+ *                normalized).
+ *  In:   sigin:  pointer to a signature to check/normalize (can be identical to sigout)
+ *
+ *  With ECDSA a third-party can forge a second distinct signature of the same
+ *  message, given a single initial signature, but without knowing the key. This
+ *  is done by negating the S value modulo the order of the curve, 'flipping'
+ *  the sign of the random point R which is not included in the signature.
+ *
+ *  Forgery of the same message isn't universally problematic, but in systems
+ *  where message malleability or uniqueness of signatures is important this can
+ *  cause issues. This forgery can be blocked by all verifiers forcing signers
+ *  to use a normalized form.
+ *
+ *  The lower-S form reduces the size of signatures slightly on average when
+ *  variable length encodings (such as DER) are used and is cheap to verify,
+ *  making it a good choice. Security of always using lower-S is assured because
+ *  anyone can trivially modify a signature after the fact to enforce this
+ *  property anyway.
+ *
+ *  The lower S value is always between 0x1 and
+ *  0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF5D576E7357A4501DDFE92F46681B20A0,
+ *  inclusive.
+ *
+ *  No other forms of ECDSA malleability are known and none seem likely, but
+ *  there is no formal proof that ECDSA, even with this additional restriction,
+ *  is free of other malleability. Commonly used serialization schemes will also
+ *  accept various non-unique encodings, so care should be taken when this
+ *  property is required for an application.
+ *
+ *  The secp256k1_ecdsa_sign function will by default create signatures in the
+ *  lower-S form, and secp256k1_ecdsa_verify will not accept others. In case
+ *  signatures come from a system that cannot enforce this property,
+ *  secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize must be called before verification.
+ */
+SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sigout,
+    const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sigin
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
+
+/** An implementation of RFC6979 (using HMAC-SHA256) as nonce generation function.
+ * If a data pointer is passed, it is assumed to be a pointer to 32 bytes of
+ * extra entropy.
+ */
+SECP256K1_API const secp256k1_nonce_function secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979;
+
+/** A default safe nonce generation function (currently equal to secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979). */
+SECP256K1_API const secp256k1_nonce_function secp256k1_nonce_function_default;
+
+/** Create an ECDSA signature.
+ *
+ *  Returns: 1: signature created
+ *           0: the nonce generation function failed, or the secret key was invalid.
+ *  Args:    ctx:       pointer to a context object (not secp256k1_context_static).
+ *  Out:     sig:       pointer to an array where the signature will be placed.
+ *  In:      msghash32: the 32-byte message hash being signed.
+ *           seckey:    pointer to a 32-byte secret key.
+ *           noncefp:   pointer to a nonce generation function. If NULL,
+ *                      secp256k1_nonce_function_default is used.
+ *           ndata:     pointer to arbitrary data used by the nonce generation function
+ *                      (can be NULL). If it is non-NULL and
+ *                      secp256k1_nonce_function_default is used, then ndata must be a
+ *                      pointer to 32-bytes of additional data.
+ *
+ * The created signature is always in lower-S form. See
+ * secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize for more details.
+ */
+SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig,
+    const unsigned char *msghash32,
+    const unsigned char *seckey,
+    secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp,
+    const void *ndata
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
+
+/** Verify an elliptic curve secret key.
+ *
+ *  A secret key is valid if it is not 0 and less than the secp256k1 curve order
+ *  when interpreted as an integer (most significant byte first). The
+ *  probability of choosing a 32-byte string uniformly at random which is an
+ *  invalid secret key is negligible. However, if it does happen it should
+ *  be assumed that the randomness source is severely broken and there should
+ *  be no retry.
+ *
+ *  Returns: 1: secret key is valid
+ *           0: secret key is invalid
+ *  Args:    ctx: pointer to a context object.
+ *  In:      seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key.
+ */
+SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    const unsigned char *seckey
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2);
+
+/** Compute the public key for a secret key.
+ *
+ *  Returns: 1: secret was valid, public key stores.
+ *           0: secret was invalid, try again.
+ *  Args:    ctx:    pointer to a context object (not secp256k1_context_static).
+ *  Out:     pubkey: pointer to the created public key.
+ *  In:      seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key.
+ */
+SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,
+    const unsigned char *seckey
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
+
+/** Negates a secret key in place.
+ *
+ *  Returns: 0 if the given secret key is invalid according to
+ *           secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify. 1 otherwise
+ *  Args:   ctx:    pointer to a context object
+ *  In/Out: seckey: pointer to the 32-byte secret key to be negated. If the
+ *                  secret key is invalid according to
+ *                  secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify, this function returns 0 and
+ *                  seckey will be set to some unspecified value.
+ */
+SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_seckey_negate(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    unsigned char *seckey
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2);
+
+/** Same as secp256k1_ec_seckey_negate, but DEPRECATED. Will be removed in
+ *  future versions. */
+SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_privkey_negate(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    unsigned char *seckey
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2)
+  SECP256K1_DEPRECATED("Use secp256k1_ec_seckey_negate instead");
+
+/** Negates a public key in place.
+ *
+ *  Returns: 1 always
+ *  Args:   ctx:        pointer to a context object
+ *  In/Out: pubkey:     pointer to the public key to be negated.
+ */
+SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2);
+
+/** Tweak a secret key by adding tweak to it.
+ *
+ *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid or the resulting secret key would be
+ *           invalid (only when the tweak is the negation of the secret key). 1
+ *           otherwise.
+ *  Args:    ctx:   pointer to a context object.
+ *  In/Out: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key. If the secret key is
+ *                  invalid according to secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify, this
+ *                  function returns 0. seckey will be set to some unspecified
+ *                  value if this function returns 0.
+ *  In:    tweak32: pointer to a 32-byte tweak, which must be valid according to
+ *                  secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify or 32 zero bytes. For uniformly
+ *                  random 32-byte tweaks, the chance of being invalid is
+ *                  negligible (around 1 in 2^128).
+ */
+SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    unsigned char *seckey,
+    const unsigned char *tweak32
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
+
+/** Same as secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add, but DEPRECATED. Will be removed in
+ *  future versions. */
+SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    unsigned char *seckey,
+    const unsigned char *tweak32
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3)
+  SECP256K1_DEPRECATED("Use secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add instead");
+
+/** Tweak a public key by adding tweak times the generator to it.
+ *
+ *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid or the resulting public key would be
+ *           invalid (only when the tweak is the negation of the corresponding
+ *           secret key). 1 otherwise.
+ *  Args:    ctx:   pointer to a context object.
+ *  In/Out: pubkey: pointer to a public key object. pubkey will be set to an
+ *                  invalid value if this function returns 0.
+ *  In:    tweak32: pointer to a 32-byte tweak, which must be valid according to
+ *                  secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify or 32 zero bytes. For uniformly
+ *                  random 32-byte tweaks, the chance of being invalid is
+ *                  negligible (around 1 in 2^128).
+ */
+SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,
+    const unsigned char *tweak32
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
+
+/** Tweak a secret key by multiplying it by a tweak.
+ *
+ *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid. 1 otherwise.
+ *  Args:   ctx:    pointer to a context object.
+ *  In/Out: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key. If the secret key is
+ *                  invalid according to secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify, this
+ *                  function returns 0. seckey will be set to some unspecified
+ *                  value if this function returns 0.
+ *  In:    tweak32: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. If the tweak is invalid according to
+ *                  secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify, this function returns 0. For
+ *                  uniformly random 32-byte arrays the chance of being invalid
+ *                  is negligible (around 1 in 2^128).
+ */
+SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_mul(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    unsigned char *seckey,
+    const unsigned char *tweak32
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
+
+/** Same as secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_mul, but DEPRECATED. Will be removed in
+ *  future versions. */
+SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    unsigned char *seckey,
+    const unsigned char *tweak32
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3)
+  SECP256K1_DEPRECATED("Use secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_mul instead");
+
+/** Tweak a public key by multiplying it by a tweak value.
+ *
+ *  Returns: 0 if the arguments are invalid. 1 otherwise.
+ *  Args:    ctx:   pointer to a context object.
+ *  In/Out: pubkey: pointer to a public key object. pubkey will be set to an
+ *                  invalid value if this function returns 0.
+ *  In:    tweak32: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. If the tweak is invalid according to
+ *                  secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify, this function returns 0. For
+ *                  uniformly random 32-byte arrays the chance of being invalid
+ *                  is negligible (around 1 in 2^128).
+ */
+SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,
+    const unsigned char *tweak32
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
+
+/** Randomizes the context to provide enhanced protection against side-channel leakage.
+ *
+ *  Returns: 1: randomization successful
+ *           0: error
+ *  Args:    ctx:       pointer to a context object (not secp256k1_context_static).
+ *  In:      seed32:    pointer to a 32-byte random seed (NULL resets to initial state).
+ *
+ * While secp256k1 code is written and tested to be constant-time no matter what
+ * secret values are, it is possible that a compiler may output code which is not,
+ * and also that the CPU may not emit the same radio frequencies or draw the same
+ * amount of power for all values. Randomization of the context shields against
+ * side-channel observations which aim to exploit secret-dependent behaviour in
+ * certain computations which involve secret keys.
+ *
+ * It is highly recommended to call this function on contexts returned from
+ * secp256k1_context_create or secp256k1_context_clone (or from the corresponding
+ * functions in secp256k1_preallocated.h) before using these contexts to call API
+ * functions that perform computations involving secret keys, e.g., signing and
+ * public key generation. It is possible to call this function more than once on
+ * the same context, and doing so before every few computations involving secret
+ * keys is recommended as a defense-in-depth measure. Randomization of the static
+ * context secp256k1_context_static is not supported.
+ *
+ * Currently, the random seed is mainly used for blinding multiplications of a
+ * secret scalar with the elliptic curve base point. Multiplications of this
+ * kind are performed by exactly those API functions which are documented to
+ * require a context that is not secp256k1_context_static. As a rule of thumb,
+ * these are all functions which take a secret key (or a keypair) as an input.
+ * A notable exception to that rule is the ECDH module, which relies on a different
+ * kind of elliptic curve point multiplication and thus does not benefit from
+ * enhanced protection against side-channel leakage currently.
+ */
+SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_context_randomize(
+    secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    const unsigned char *seed32
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1);
+
+/** Add a number of public keys together.
+ *
+ *  Returns: 1: the sum of the public keys is valid.
+ *           0: the sum of the public keys is not valid.
+ *  Args:   ctx:        pointer to a context object.
+ *  Out:    out:        pointer to a public key object for placing the resulting public key.
+ *  In:     ins:        pointer to array of pointers to public keys.
+ *          n:          the number of public keys to add together (must be at least 1).
+ */
+SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    secp256k1_pubkey *out,
+    const secp256k1_pubkey * const *ins,
+    size_t n
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
+
+/** Compute a tagged hash as defined in BIP-340.
+ *
+ *  This is useful for creating a message hash and achieving domain separation
+ *  through an application-specific tag. This function returns
+ *  SHA256(SHA256(tag)||SHA256(tag)||msg). Therefore, tagged hash
+ *  implementations optimized for a specific tag can precompute the SHA256 state
+ *  after hashing the tag hashes.
+ *
+ *  Returns: 1 always.
+ *  Args:    ctx: pointer to a context object
+ *  Out:  hash32: pointer to a 32-byte array to store the resulting hash
+ *  In:      tag: pointer to an array containing the tag
+ *        taglen: length of the tag array
+ *           msg: pointer to an array containing the message
+ *        msglen: length of the message array
+ */
+SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_tagged_sha256(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    unsigned char *hash32,
+    const unsigned char *tag,
+    size_t taglen,
+    const unsigned char *msg,
+    size_t msglen
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* SECP256K1_H */