@auth-craft/worker-d1-stack 0.1.0 → 0.2.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +75 -0
- package/README.md +201 -4
- package/assets/check/config.mjs +119 -10
- package/assets/data/snapshot.mjs +190 -0
- package/assets/engine/dev-engine.mjs +1 -0
- package/assets/manifest.json +19 -2
- package/assets/sbom/data.cdx.json +1042 -0
- package/assets/sbom/worker.cdx.json +26 -8
- package/assets/worker/worker.js +56 -56
- package/dist/check.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/check.js +3 -0
- package/dist/check.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/cli.d.ts +6 -1
- package/dist/cli.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/cli.js +262 -4
- package/dist/cli.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/commands.d.ts +12 -0
- package/dist/commands.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/commands.js +34 -2
- package/dist/commands.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/cutover.d.ts +63 -0
- package/dist/cutover.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/cutover.js +310 -0
- package/dist/cutover.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/data.d.ts +52 -0
- package/dist/data.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/data.js +131 -0
- package/dist/data.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/dev.d.ts +16 -0
- package/dist/dev.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/dev.js +80 -0
- package/dist/dev.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/init.d.ts +5 -0
- package/dist/init.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/init.js +4 -1
- package/dist/init.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/preflight.d.ts +45 -0
- package/dist/preflight.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/preflight.js +335 -0
- package/dist/preflight.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/secrets-file.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/secrets-file.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/secrets-file.js +1 -0
- package/dist/secrets-file.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/service-token.d.ts +6 -0
- package/dist/service-token.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/service-token.js +26 -0
- package/dist/service-token.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/smoke.d.ts +11 -0
- package/dist/smoke.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/smoke.js +53 -11
- package/dist/smoke.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/wrangler-runner.d.ts +8 -0
- package/dist/wrangler-runner.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/wrangler-runner.js +17 -0
- package/dist/wrangler-runner.js.map +1 -1
- package/package.json +12 -4
package/CHANGELOG.md
ADDED
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# @auth-craft/worker-d1-stack
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The package version is the auth-craft version you deploy: the Worker is prebuilt into it.
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## 0.2.0
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Moving a deployment from the Lambda app (`@auth-craft/aws-cf-stack`) to this Worker
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without signing browsers out, in one command; email through the app's existing SQS
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queue; tools for a Worker's own operation. No new D1 migration.
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**Breaking — check before upgrading:**
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- Each app now has its own refresh cookie, named as the Lambda app names them:
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`refresh_token` (customer), `refresh_token_tenant` (tenant), `refresh_token_system`
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(system). 0.1.0 used one `refresh_token` for every app, so one app's login overwrote
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another's. After upgrading, a browser signed in to the tenant or system app with the
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0.1.0 cookie signs in again once. Rename with `REFRESH_COOKIE_CUSTOMER` / `_TENANT` /
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`_SYSTEM`.
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- `REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE_NAME` with the customer / tenant / system presets is refused at
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boot (it would be ignored). It still names the cookie of `AUTH_APPS` apps without a
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`cookieName`.
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- The refresh grace window is 30 s by default (was a fixed 5 s): a refresh token replayed
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within 30 s of its rotation returns the current tokens instead of revoking the session.
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`REFRESH_TOKEN_GRACE_WINDOW_MS=5000` keeps the old behaviour.
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**Upgrade:** `npm i -D @auth-craft/worker-d1-stack@0.2.0`, remove `REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE_NAME`
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from `vars` if set (or move to `REFRESH_COOKIE_*`), `npx auth-craft-worker check
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--secrets-file .secrets`, then `deploy`.
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**Settings, as the Lambda app reads them** (README › Moving from the Lambda app):
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- `REFRESH_COOKIE_CUSTOMER` / `_TENANT` / `_SYSTEM`, `REFRESH_TOKEN_STRATEGY_CUSTOMER` /
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`_TENANT` / `_SYSTEM`, `JWT_ISSUER` (default `AUTH_SYSTEM_NAME`, as before),
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`REFRESH_TOKEN_GRACE_WINDOW_MS`, `VERIFICATION_RESEND_COOLDOWN_SECONDS` (default 60, as
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before), `TOKEN_AUD_CUSTOMER` / `_TENANT` / `_SYSTEM` (the Lambda names of
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`JWT_*_AUDIENCE`; both set must agree).
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**Moving from Lambda:**
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- `auth-craft-worker cutover`: preflight → Worker in maintenance → Lambda fence → export →
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verify → check-hashes → import → reconcile → maintenance off → smoke → your switch.
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Resumable; `--rollback` before the switch, `--rollback-after-writes` after it (the
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Worker's data into a new Lambda table). Needs `@auth-craft/aws-cf-stack` 2.2.0 for the
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fence and the table suffix.
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- `auth-craft-worker preflight --from-lambda <function>`: read-only comparison of the
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Lambda app's effective settings with the Worker's, D1 migrated and empty, relay token.
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- `auth-craft-worker data export|verify|check-hashes|import|reconcile [--local]`: the
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snapshot commands of the admin CLI, bundled (no clone of auth-craft); the D1 id,
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`EMAIL_CANONICALIZE` and MFA key ids come from `wrangler.json`. `check-hashes`: every
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password hash inside the password engine allowlist.
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- `smoke --cookie --origin <https origin>` for an app that refreshes by cookie (a refresh
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from a foreign origin must be refused); `smoke --app <id>` calls `/{id}/auth/...`.
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**Email:**
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- `EMAIL_PROVIDER=relay`: auth emails go through the email relay Lambda
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(`auth-craft-stack email-relay`, `@auth-craft/aws-cf-stack` 2.2.0) to the app's SQS
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queue, in the Lambda app's envelope, with no AWS key on Cloudflare. `EMAIL_RELAY_URL`,
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`EMAIL_RELAY_SIGNING_KEY` (secret), `EMAIL_RELAY_ISSUER`, `EMAIL_RELAY_TIMEOUT_MS`.
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**Operation:**
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- `MAINTENANCE_MODE` and `auth-craft-worker maintenance on|off|status`: every route but
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`/health` answers 503 with `Retry-After`, the cron skips, queued messages are retried.
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`/health` reports `maintenance`.
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- `auth-craft-worker bootstrap-admin --email … [--create] [--local]`: the system tenant's
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owner on D1 (the same use case as the PostgreSQL server's `bootstrap-owner`).
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- `auth-craft-worker dev [--seed-admin …]`: the Worker on your machine for end-to-end
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tests (local D1, seeded admin, a local password engine for `remote`).
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- `init --cron none|<expr>` and `POST /internal/maintenance/cleanup` (backend-sdk 0.16.0
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`runCleanup`): cleanup without a Cron Trigger; `check` warns when none is set.
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- README: the Workers Free limits shared with your app's account, with the rows per flow.
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**Requirements:** `dev --seed-admin` and `--local` need Node 22.13+ (`node:sqlite`);
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`preflight` and `cutover` need the `aws` CLI with read access to the Lambda function.
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## 0.1.0
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First release: the Worker + D1 backend, `init`, `check`, `secrets`, `migrate`, `deploy`,
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`smoke`, `version`.
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package/README.md
CHANGED
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## Requirements
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- Node.js 20+, `wrangler` 4 (`npm i -D wrangler`), `wrangler login` for real deploys.
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- Node.js 22.13+ for `dev --seed-admin` and `--local` (they use `node:sqlite`); the `aws` CLI
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for `preflight` / `cutover` (read access to the Lambda function, and SSM if it loads secrets there).
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- A D1 database: `npx wrangler d1 create auth` (note its id).
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- Workers Paid for `--password-engine local` (scrypt needs more than the Free 10 ms CPU),
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or Workers Free with `--password-engine remote` and a password engine (deploy one with
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| `secrets` | After `check`, uploads every key of the secrets file with one `wrangler secret bulk`; the JSON file exists (mode 600) only during the call. |
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| `migrate` | `wrangler d1 migrations apply DB --remote` (or `--local`). |
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| `deploy` | `check`, then migrations, then `wrangler deploy`. `--dry-run` builds and validates, uploads nothing; `--skip-migrations` leaves D1 alone. |
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| `maintenance` | `on` / `off`: writes `MAINTENANCE_MODE` to `vars` and deploys (no migrations); a failed deploy restores the file. `status` reads the file; the live Worker reports `maintenance` on `/health`. |
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| `cutover` | Move a Lambda deployment here in one resumable command, and roll back (below). |
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| `bootstrap-admin` | The system tenant's owner on this D1 (`--local` for the local one): `--email`, `--create` with `BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_PASSWORD`. Idempotent; another owner is refused. |
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| `dev` | This Worker on your machine for end-to-end tests: local D1 migrated, `--seed-admin`, `wrangler dev --local`; a local password engine when `PASSWORD_ENGINE=remote`. |
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| `preflight` | Read-only checks before moving a Lambda deployment here (below). Exit 1 if any fails. |
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| `data` | `export` / `verify` / `import` / `reconcile` a snapshot between DynamoDB (the Lambda app) or D1 and this Worker's D1 (below). |
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| `smoke` | Black-box checks of a running Worker over HTTP (below). Exit 1 if any fails. |
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| `version` | The packaged version and Worker hash. |
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`PASSWORD_ENGINE_SIGNING_KEY`, `MFA_SECRET_KEY`, `MFA_SECRET_PREVIOUS_KEYS`,
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`RESEND_API_KEY`, `RESEND_WEBHOOK_SECRET`, `GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET`, `FACEBOOK_CLIENT_SECRET`.
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## Moving from the Lambda app (`@auth-craft/aws-cf-stack`)
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The Worker reads the Lambda app's variables under the same names and defaults, so a
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deploy that copies the Lambda env keeps browsers signed in after the data move:
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| Variable | Default | |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| `REFRESH_COOKIE_CUSTOMER` / `_TENANT` / `_SYSTEM` | `refresh_token` / `refresh_token_tenant` / `refresh_token_system` | One refresh cookie per app; two apps sharing one is refused. `REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE_NAME` is refused with these presets (it applies only to `AUTH_APPS` apps without a `cookieName`). |
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| `REFRESH_TOKEN_STRATEGY_CUSTOMER` / `_TENANT` / `_SYSTEM` | `REFRESH_TOKEN_STRATEGY` | Per-app transport (`body` / `cookie` / `both`). |
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| `JWT_ISSUER` | `AUTH_SYSTEM_NAME` | `iss` of user tokens. `AUTH_SYSTEM_NAME` stays the name in emails and authenticator apps. |
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| `REFRESH_TOKEN_GRACE_WINDOW_MS` | 30000 (max 120000) | How long a just-rotated refresh token still works (reload or second tab mid-refresh). |
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| `VERIFICATION_RESEND_COOLDOWN_SECONDS` | 60 | |
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| `TOKEN_AUD_CUSTOMER` / `_TENANT` / `_SYSTEM` | the app id | The Lambda name of `JWT_*_AUDIENCE`; both set must agree. |
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The cookie, strategy and audience variables cannot be combined with `AUTH_APPS`.
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Variables of the Lambda app the Worker does not read (SMTP, DynamoDB, SSM, gateway JWT,
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the SQS envelope) are listed with the reason in the auth-craft repository
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(`apps/auth-worker-d1/test/lambda-parity.test.ts`).
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`REFRESH_TOKEN_STRATEGY` still defaults to `body` on the Worker (the Lambda app defaults
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to `cookie`): set it explicitly when copying.
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## Before the move (`preflight`)
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```bash
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npx auth-craft-worker preflight --from-lambda myapp-prod-auth-api --region ap-southeast-1 --secrets-file .secrets
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```
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Reads the Lambda's environment (`aws lambda get-function-configuration`, plus the SSM
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parameters when it loads its secrets there) and compares each setting by its effective
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value with `wrangler.json` + the secrets file: JWT public key and algorithm, issuer,
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apps and audiences, refresh cookie names, strategies and attributes, browser origins
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(the Lambda's `CORS_ORIGINS` must all be in the Worker's; behind the gateway it is a
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warning to compare by hand), identity policy, session lifetimes, grace window and
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lockout, MFA key ids, OAuth client ids and secrets. Then: D1 migrated and empty, the
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email relay accepts the Worker's token (`EMAIL_PROVIDER=relay`), and `/health` with
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`--url`. Prints check names, never values. Needs `aws` with read access to the function
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(and the SSM parameters) and `wrangler` with D1 access.
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## A new deployment's admin (`bootstrap-admin`)
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```bash
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BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_PASSWORD=... npx auth-craft-worker bootstrap-admin --email admin@example.com --create
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```
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Makes the account the owner of the system tenant (`SYSTEM_TENANT_ID`, default
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`__system__`), creating it already verified with `--create` when no account has that
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email; an existing account keeps its password, an unverified one is refused. The same
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use case as the PostgreSQL server's `auth-craft-admin bootstrap-owner`. Writes through
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the D1 REST API (`CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID` + `CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN`), or with `--local`
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into the local D1 of `wrangler dev`. A moved deployment does not need it: the admin
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comes with the snapshot.
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## Your app's end-to-end tests (`dev`)
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```bash
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# .dev.vars holds JWT_PRIVATE_KEY / JWT_PUBLIC_KEY (and other secrets) for wrangler dev
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BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_PASSWORD=... npx auth-craft-worker dev --port 8787 --seed-admin admin@example.com
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```
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Migrates the local D1, seeds the admin (Node 22.13+: it writes the local D1 file with
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`node:sqlite`), then runs `wrangler dev --local` until interrupted. With
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`PASSWORD_ENGINE=remote` it also starts the real password engine on 127.0.0.1 with a key
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made for the run and hands it to the Worker with `--var` (your `.dev.vars` is not
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changed). The local D1 persists in `.wrangler/state` between runs; delete it for a clean
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start.
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## Sharing a Workers Free account with your app
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These limits are per **account**, shared with every Worker and D1 database of the app:
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| Limit (Free, per day) | Auth's share, measured on Workers Free |
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| --- | --- |
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| 100,000 Worker requests | one per auth call (login, refresh, /auth/me, …) |
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| 5 million D1 rows read | register ~6, login ~8, wrong password ~4, refresh ~2.5, /auth/me ~1, logout ~1.5 |
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| 100,000 D1 rows written (index updates count) | register ~16, login ~5, wrong password ~1, refresh ~3.25, logout ~0.75; `AUDIT_STORE=d1` adds one per event |
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| 5 Cron Triggers | one, for cleanup; `init --cron none` and call `runCleanup` from your own cron instead |
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Rows written are the real ceiling: a user active one hour (1 login + 4 refreshes ≈ 18
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rows) leaves room for about 5,000 users a day; one with the app open eight hours
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(a refresh every 15 minutes ≈ 110 rows) for about 900, before your app's own writes. A
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cutover imports every row once (`data import --dry-run` counts them); a large
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deployment may not fit in one day on Free. Do not cut security writes (lockout counters,
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token rotation, revocation) to save quota.
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## Moving a Lambda deployment in one command (`cutover`)
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```bash
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npx auth-craft-worker cutover \
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--from-lambda myapp-prod-auth-api --region ap-southeast-1 --table myapp-prod-auth-data \
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--secrets-file .secrets --snapshot-dir ./cutover-snap \
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--fence "npx auth-craft-stack fence --stage prod --app-name myapp" \
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--switch "./deploy.sh web admin api" \
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--smoke-url https://auth.myapp.com --smoke-email smoke@myapp.com --smoke-origin https://app.myapp.com --smoke-app tenant
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# prints the plan and changes nothing; add --yes to carry it out
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```
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Steps: `preflight` → Worker deployed in maintenance → `<fence> on` (and `<fence> status`
|
|
166
|
+
must print `FENCE=on`) → `data export` → `verify` → `check-hashes` (every password hash
|
|
167
|
+
inside the engine's allowlist; `--max-n` = the engine's `PASSWORD_ENGINE_MAX_N`) →
|
|
168
|
+
`import` → `reconcile` → maintenance off → `smoke` → `--switch` (your routing change).
|
|
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|
+
|
|
170
|
+
- **Resumable.** State lives in `<snapshot-dir>.cutover.json`; a re-run skips finished
|
|
171
|
+
steps. An import that started and did not finish is never re-run blindly: reconcile
|
|
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|
+
first.
|
|
173
|
+
- **Rollback before the switch:** `cutover --rollback --snapshot-dir … --fence … --secrets-file … --yes`
|
|
174
|
+
lifts the fence and keeps the Worker in maintenance.
|
|
175
|
+
- **From the first command of `--switch` on**, users may have written to the Worker (a
|
|
176
|
+
switch deploys several things one after the other), so `--rollback` is refused. A
|
|
177
|
+
failed switch puts the Worker back in maintenance; fix and re-run (it resumes at the
|
|
178
|
+
switch), or `cutover --rollback-after-writes --snapshot-dir <new> --fence … --lambda-deploy
|
|
179
|
+
"LAMBDA_DYNAMODB_TABLE_SUFFIX=-r1 npx auth-craft-stack lambda --stage prod" --table
|
|
180
|
+
myapp-prod-auth-data-r1 --region … --switch-back "…" --secrets-file … --yes`: Worker
|
|
181
|
+
into maintenance, its data exported, the Lambda deployed onto a new empty table (still
|
|
182
|
+
fenced, checked), imported, reconciled, fence off, your switch back.
|
|
183
|
+
- **The smoke account must be a dedicated account**, never a real user's: a smoke login
|
|
184
|
+
is one more session, and with `maxConcurrentSessions` it pushes out that user's oldest
|
|
185
|
+
session.
|
|
186
|
+
- **Not carried by the snapshot:** pending verification and reset links, sign-in and MFA
|
|
187
|
+
codes (users request them again), rate-limit counters, the Worker's email logs and
|
|
188
|
+
suppressions. Sessions, lockouts and MFA authenticators are carried. Do it at a quiet
|
|
189
|
+
hour.
|
|
190
|
+
|
|
191
|
+
Rehearsed locally in the auth-craft repository (`pnpm --filter
|
|
192
|
+
@auth-craft/worker-d1-stack test:release`): the real Lambda app on DynamoDB Local, this
|
|
193
|
+
package's Worker in Miniflare, the bundled snapshot CLI; a browser keeps both sessions,
|
|
194
|
+
and a password changed on the Worker comes back through `--rollback-after-writes`.
|
|
195
|
+
|
|
196
|
+
## Moving the data (`data`)
|
|
197
|
+
|
|
198
|
+
The snapshot commands of the auth-craft admin CLI, bundled: encrypted by default (no
|
|
199
|
+
plaintext fallback), every type preflighted before the first write, reconciled after,
|
|
200
|
+
and only into an empty store. The D1 database id (`DB` binding), `EMAIL_CANONICALIZE` and
|
|
201
|
+
the MFA key ids are read from `wrangler.json` (and `--secrets-file` when the MFA keys are
|
|
202
|
+
secrets), so the data matches the Worker that will serve it.
|
|
203
|
+
|
|
204
|
+
```bash
|
|
205
|
+
export MIGRATION_SNAPSHOT_KEY_FILE=~/keys/snapshot.key # 64 hex chars, mode 600, outside the snapshot dir
|
|
206
|
+
export CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID=... CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN=... # D1 edit
|
|
207
|
+
# writers fenced first (Lambda: `auth-craft-stack fence on`)
|
|
208
|
+
npx auth-craft-worker data export ./snap --from dynamodb --table myapp-prod-auth-data --region ap-southeast-1 --write-fence
|
|
209
|
+
npx auth-craft-worker data verify ./snap
|
|
210
|
+
npx auth-craft-worker data import ./snap --write-fence --dry-run --secrets-file .secrets
|
|
211
|
+
npx auth-craft-worker data import ./snap --write-fence --secrets-file .secrets # imports, then reconciles
|
|
212
|
+
npx auth-craft-worker data reconcile ./snap --write-fence
|
|
213
|
+
```
|
|
214
|
+
|
|
215
|
+
For a rollback, `export --from d1` and `import --to dynamodb --table <new empty table>`.
|
|
216
|
+
`--write-fence` only confirms that writers are stopped; it stops nothing. Challenges,
|
|
217
|
+
email logs and suppressions are not carried (see the auth-craft SNAPSHOT.md).
|
|
218
|
+
|
|
219
|
+
## Maintenance mode
|
|
220
|
+
|
|
221
|
+
`auth-craft-worker maintenance on` deploys the Worker with `MAINTENANCE_MODE=true`: every
|
|
222
|
+
route but `/health` answers `503 SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE` with `Retry-After: 30` (webhooks and
|
|
223
|
+
internal routes included), the cleanup cron skips, and queued messages are retried
|
|
224
|
+
instead of processed. It is the Worker side of a write fence (a data move into or out of
|
|
225
|
+
its D1). A queued message retried past the queue's `max_retries` goes to the dead-letter
|
|
226
|
+
queue, and a sign-in code expires anyway (`EMAIL_MAX_AGE_MINUTES`): keep maintenance
|
|
227
|
+
windows short. Inbound mail (Email Routing) is still handled.
|
|
228
|
+
|
|
229
|
+
## Email through your SQS queue (`EMAIL_PROVIDER=relay`)
|
|
230
|
+
|
|
231
|
+
For an app that already renders and sends its auth emails from an SQS queue (as with
|
|
232
|
+
the Lambda app's `EMAIL_MODE=queue`): deploy the relay with `auth-craft-stack
|
|
233
|
+
email-relay --queue-arn <arn>` from `@auth-craft/aws-cf-stack` and set
|
|
234
|
+
|
|
235
|
+
| Variable | |
|
|
236
|
+
| --- | --- |
|
|
237
|
+
| `EMAIL_PROVIDER=relay` | |
|
|
238
|
+
| `EMAIL_MODE` | `direct` (recommended: SQS is already a durable queue; no Queue operations on Workers Free) or `queue` |
|
|
239
|
+
| `EMAIL_RELAY_URL` | the relay's URL (https) |
|
|
240
|
+
| `EMAIL_RELAY_SIGNING_KEY` | secret: Ed25519 private JWK; the relay holds its public part |
|
|
241
|
+
| `EMAIL_RELAY_ISSUER` | default `PASSWORD_ENGINE_ISSUER`, else `AUTH_SYSTEM_NAME`; must match the relay |
|
|
242
|
+
| `EMAIL_RELAY_TIMEOUT_MS` | default 5000 (includes a cold start of the relay) |
|
|
243
|
+
|
|
244
|
+
The Worker does not render: the relay queues the request in the Lambda app's envelope
|
|
245
|
+
and your consumer renders and sends. `EMAIL_FROM` is not needed. Suppressions set on the
|
|
246
|
+
Worker still apply (a suppressed address is never forwarded and the caller cannot tell);
|
|
247
|
+
bounces and complaints are your consumer's. A refused token or an SQS configuration error
|
|
248
|
+
is recorded `failed`, a throttled or unreachable relay is retried.
|
|
249
|
+
|
|
60
250
|
## Email delivery events (Cloudflare Email Service)
|
|
61
251
|
|
|
62
252
|
With `--email-queue` and `EMAIL_PROVIDER=cloudflare`, subscribe the Worker's email queue
|
|
@@ -69,13 +259,18 @@ complaining mailbox. Soft bounces and deferrals change nothing.
|
|
|
69
259
|
## Smoke after a deploy
|
|
70
260
|
|
|
71
261
|
`smoke` needs a verified account without MFA on that deployment (create it once and keep
|
|
72
|
-
it for smoke runs) and `REFRESH_TOKEN_STRATEGY=body` or `both
|
|
262
|
+
it for smoke runs) and `REFRESH_TOKEN_STRATEGY=body` or `both`, or `--cookie --origin
|
|
263
|
+
https://app.example.com` for an app that refreshes by cookie (the origin must be one of
|
|
264
|
+
`CORS_ORIGINS`). `--app tenant` sends every auth call to `/tenant/auth/...`, the router a
|
|
265
|
+
Pages proxy locked to that app reaches. The password comes from
|
|
73
266
|
`AUTH_CRAFT_SMOKE_PASSWORD`, never the command line; `AUTH_CRAFT_SMOKE_GATEWAY_SECRET`
|
|
74
267
|
is sent as `X-Gateway-Secret` if something sits in front of the Worker. It checks, in
|
|
75
268
|
order: `/health` answers with the `PASSWORD_ENGINE` you name (anything else stops the
|
|
76
269
|
run); an undeclared app is refused; a wrong password is `INVALID_CREDENTIALS`, not 503
|
|
77
270
|
(the hasher or the engine is reachable); login; `/auth/me` with and without the token;
|
|
78
|
-
refresh rotates; logout ends the session; a foreign origin is not allowed by CORS.
|
|
271
|
+
refresh rotates; logout ends the session; a foreign origin is not allowed by CORS. With
|
|
272
|
+
`--cookie`, also: a refresh carrying the cookie from a foreign origin is refused and sets
|
|
273
|
+
no cookie (CSRF), refresh rotates the app's cookie, logout clears it. A run
|
|
79
274
|
leaves one logged-out session and no failed attempt. It prints check names, never
|
|
80
275
|
tokens, passwords or bodies.
|
|
81
276
|
|
|
@@ -85,14 +280,16 @@ tokens, passwords or bodies.
|
|
|
85
280
|
`pnpm --filter @auth-craft/worker-d1-stack smoke:local` (`scripts/smoke-local.mjs`): for
|
|
86
281
|
each engine mode, `init` → `check` → `migrate --local` → the real `wrangler dev` → `smoke`,
|
|
87
282
|
with a real password engine on localhost for `remote`; a smoke naming the other mode must
|
|
88
|
-
fail.
|
|
283
|
+
fail. The tenant app refreshes by cookie there: `smoke --cookie --app tenant` must pass
|
|
284
|
+
from an allowed origin and fail from any other. No Cloudflare account is used: releases are not verified against a real deployment.
|
|
89
285
|
|
|
90
286
|
## What is inside
|
|
91
287
|
|
|
92
288
|
- `assets/worker/worker.js` — the Worker, built by the auth-craft app's own build.
|
|
93
289
|
- `assets/migrations/` — D1 migrations, applied in order, additive.
|
|
94
290
|
- `assets/check/config.mjs` — the Worker's config loader, used by `check`.
|
|
95
|
-
- `assets/
|
|
291
|
+
- `assets/data/snapshot.mjs` — the admin CLI's snapshot commands, used by `data`.
|
|
292
|
+
- `assets/sbom/worker.cdx.json`, `assets/sbom/data.cdx.json` — CycloneDX SBOMs of both bundles.
|
|
96
293
|
- `assets/manifest.json` — version, Worker SHA-256, migrations, known variables.
|
|
97
294
|
|
|
98
295
|
Verified locally only, by design: `wrangler deploy --dry-run` with the real wrangler, and
|
package/assets/check/config.mjs
CHANGED
|
@@ -1510,6 +1510,8 @@ var DEFAULTS = {
|
|
|
1510
1510
|
ACCESS_TOKEN_LIFETIME_MINUTES: "15",
|
|
1511
1511
|
REFRESH_TOKEN_LIFETIME_MINUTES: "10080",
|
|
1512
1512
|
VERIFICATION_CODE_LIFETIME_MINUTES: "10",
|
|
1513
|
+
VERIFICATION_RESEND_COOLDOWN_SECONDS: "60",
|
|
1514
|
+
REFRESH_TOKEN_GRACE_WINDOW_MS: "30000",
|
|
1513
1515
|
REFRESH_TOKEN_STRATEGY: "body",
|
|
1514
1516
|
REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE_NAME: "refresh_token",
|
|
1515
1517
|
REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE_HTTP_ONLY: "true",
|
|
@@ -1537,6 +1539,7 @@ var DEFAULTS = {
|
|
|
1537
1539
|
EMAIL_INBOUND_MAX_BYTES: "26214400",
|
|
1538
1540
|
EMAIL_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS: "30",
|
|
1539
1541
|
PASSWORD_ENGINE_TIMEOUT_MS: "3000",
|
|
1542
|
+
EMAIL_RELAY_TIMEOUT_MS: "5000",
|
|
1540
1543
|
FACEBOOK_REDIRECT_URI: "http://localhost:8787/auth/oauth/facebook/callback",
|
|
1541
1544
|
GOOGLE_REDIRECT_URI: "http://localhost:8787/auth/oauth/google/callback",
|
|
1542
1545
|
AUDIT_ENABLED: "true",
|
|
@@ -1555,6 +1558,11 @@ var EnvReader = class {
|
|
|
1555
1558
|
if (typeof value === "string" && value !== "") return value;
|
|
1556
1559
|
return DEFAULTS[name] ?? "";
|
|
1557
1560
|
}
|
|
1561
|
+
/** Set by the operator (not a default). */
|
|
1562
|
+
explicit(name) {
|
|
1563
|
+
const value = this.env[name];
|
|
1564
|
+
return typeof value === "string" && value !== "";
|
|
1565
|
+
}
|
|
1558
1566
|
optional(name) {
|
|
1559
1567
|
const value = this.str(name);
|
|
1560
1568
|
return value === "" ? void 0 : value;
|
|
@@ -1590,17 +1598,48 @@ var EnvReader = class {
|
|
|
1590
1598
|
}
|
|
1591
1599
|
};
|
|
1592
1600
|
var normalizePath = (raw) => raw ? (raw.startsWith("/") ? raw : `/${raw}`).replace(/\/+$/, "") : "";
|
|
1593
|
-
var PRESET_APP_VARS = [
|
|
1601
|
+
var PRESET_APP_VARS = [
|
|
1602
|
+
"JWT_CUSTOMER_AUDIENCE",
|
|
1603
|
+
"JWT_TENANT_AUDIENCE",
|
|
1604
|
+
"JWT_SYSTEM_AUDIENCE",
|
|
1605
|
+
"TOKEN_AUD_CUSTOMER",
|
|
1606
|
+
"TOKEN_AUD_TENANT",
|
|
1607
|
+
"TOKEN_AUD_SYSTEM",
|
|
1608
|
+
"REFRESH_COOKIE_CUSTOMER",
|
|
1609
|
+
"REFRESH_COOKIE_TENANT",
|
|
1610
|
+
"REFRESH_COOKIE_SYSTEM",
|
|
1611
|
+
"REFRESH_TOKEN_STRATEGY_CUSTOMER",
|
|
1612
|
+
"REFRESH_TOKEN_STRATEGY_TENANT",
|
|
1613
|
+
"REFRESH_TOKEN_STRATEGY_SYSTEM"
|
|
1614
|
+
];
|
|
1615
|
+
var STRATEGIES2 = ["body", "cookie", "both"];
|
|
1616
|
+
function readRefreshTokenStrategy(r) {
|
|
1617
|
+
const global = r.oneOf("REFRESH_TOKEN_STRATEGY", STRATEGIES2);
|
|
1618
|
+
const perApp = {
|
|
1619
|
+
customer: r.optional("REFRESH_TOKEN_STRATEGY_CUSTOMER"),
|
|
1620
|
+
tenant: r.optional("REFRESH_TOKEN_STRATEGY_TENANT"),
|
|
1621
|
+
system: r.optional("REFRESH_TOKEN_STRATEGY_SYSTEM")
|
|
1622
|
+
};
|
|
1623
|
+
if (Object.values(perApp).every((v) => v === void 0)) return global;
|
|
1624
|
+
const pick = (name, value) => value === void 0 ? global : r.oneOf(name, STRATEGIES2);
|
|
1625
|
+
return {
|
|
1626
|
+
customer: pick("REFRESH_TOKEN_STRATEGY_CUSTOMER", perApp.customer),
|
|
1627
|
+
tenant: pick("REFRESH_TOKEN_STRATEGY_TENANT", perApp.tenant),
|
|
1628
|
+
system: pick("REFRESH_TOKEN_STRATEGY_SYSTEM", perApp.system)
|
|
1629
|
+
};
|
|
1630
|
+
}
|
|
1631
|
+
var usesCookie = (strategy) => (typeof strategy === "string" ? [strategy] : Object.values(strategy)).some((s) => s !== "body");
|
|
1594
1632
|
function loadWorkerConfig(env) {
|
|
1595
1633
|
const r = new EnvReader(env);
|
|
1596
|
-
const refreshTokenStrategy = r
|
|
1634
|
+
const refreshTokenStrategy = readRefreshTokenStrategy(r);
|
|
1597
1635
|
const config = {
|
|
1598
1636
|
nodeEnv: r.oneOf("NODE_ENV", ["production", "staging", "development", "test"]),
|
|
1599
1637
|
basePath: normalizePath(r.str("APP_BASE_PATH")),
|
|
1600
1638
|
jwt: {
|
|
1601
1639
|
algorithm: r.oneOf("JWT_ALGORITHM", ["EdDSA", "HS256", "HS384", "HS512"]),
|
|
1602
1640
|
privateKey: r.required("JWT_PRIVATE_KEY"),
|
|
1603
|
-
publicKey: r.required("JWT_PUBLIC_KEY")
|
|
1641
|
+
publicKey: r.required("JWT_PUBLIC_KEY"),
|
|
1642
|
+
issuer: r.optional("JWT_ISSUER") ?? r.str("AUTH_SYSTEM_NAME")
|
|
1604
1643
|
},
|
|
1605
1644
|
auth: {
|
|
1606
1645
|
systemName: r.str("AUTH_SYSTEM_NAME"),
|
|
@@ -1622,6 +1661,8 @@ function loadWorkerConfig(env) {
|
|
|
1622
1661
|
lockoutDurationMinutes: r.int("LOCKOUT_DURATION_MINUTES", 1),
|
|
1623
1662
|
verifySessionOnAuth: r.bool("VERIFY_SESSION_ON_AUTH"),
|
|
1624
1663
|
systemTenantId: r.str("SYSTEM_TENANT_ID"),
|
|
1664
|
+
refreshTokenGraceWindowMs: r.int("REFRESH_TOKEN_GRACE_WINDOW_MS"),
|
|
1665
|
+
verificationResendCooldownSeconds: r.int("VERIFICATION_RESEND_COOLDOWN_SECONDS"),
|
|
1625
1666
|
corsOrigins: r.list("CORS_ORIGINS"),
|
|
1626
1667
|
dynamicOrigins: { enabled: r.bool("CORS_ORIGINS_DYNAMIC"), cacheSeconds: r.int("CORS_ORIGINS_CACHE_SECONDS", 1) },
|
|
1627
1668
|
gatewaySecret: r.str("GATEWAY_SECRET"),
|
|
@@ -1632,10 +1673,11 @@ function loadWorkerConfig(env) {
|
|
|
1632
1673
|
email: readEmail(r),
|
|
1633
1674
|
oauth: {},
|
|
1634
1675
|
features: { auditEnabled: r.bool("AUDIT_ENABLED"), deviceTracking: r.bool("DEVICE_TRACKING") },
|
|
1676
|
+
maintenance: r.bool("MAINTENANCE_MODE"),
|
|
1635
1677
|
audit: { store: r.oneOf("AUDIT_STORE", ["log", "d1"]), retentionDays: r.int("AUDIT_RETENTION_DAYS", 1) },
|
|
1636
1678
|
mfaSecretKeys: readMfaSecretKeys(r, env)
|
|
1637
1679
|
};
|
|
1638
|
-
if (refreshTokenStrategy
|
|
1680
|
+
if (usesCookie(refreshTokenStrategy)) {
|
|
1639
1681
|
config.auth.refreshTokenCookie = {
|
|
1640
1682
|
name: r.str("REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE_NAME"),
|
|
1641
1683
|
httpOnly: r.bool("REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE_HTTP_ONLY"),
|
|
@@ -1646,6 +1688,9 @@ function loadWorkerConfig(env) {
|
|
|
1646
1688
|
...r.optional("REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE_DOMAIN") && { domain: r.str("REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE_DOMAIN") }
|
|
1647
1689
|
};
|
|
1648
1690
|
}
|
|
1691
|
+
if (config.security.refreshTokenGraceWindowMs > 12e4) {
|
|
1692
|
+
r.issues.push("REFRESH_TOKEN_GRACE_WINDOW_MS: at most 120000 (a replayed refresh token works that long)");
|
|
1693
|
+
}
|
|
1649
1694
|
readAudiencesAndApps(r, config);
|
|
1650
1695
|
readInternal(r, config);
|
|
1651
1696
|
readOAuth(r, config);
|
|
@@ -1716,10 +1761,18 @@ function readEmail(r) {
|
|
|
1716
1761
|
if (mode === "console") return email;
|
|
1717
1762
|
const raw = r.str("EMAIL_PROVIDER");
|
|
1718
1763
|
if (raw === "") {
|
|
1719
|
-
r.issues.push(`EMAIL_PROVIDER: required with EMAIL_MODE=${mode} (resend | cloudflare)`);
|
|
1764
|
+
r.issues.push(`EMAIL_PROVIDER: required with EMAIL_MODE=${mode} (resend | cloudflare | relay)`);
|
|
1765
|
+
return email;
|
|
1766
|
+
}
|
|
1767
|
+
email.provider = r.oneOf("EMAIL_PROVIDER", ["resend", "cloudflare", "relay"]);
|
|
1768
|
+
if (email.provider === "relay") {
|
|
1769
|
+
email.relay = readRelay(r);
|
|
1770
|
+
const from2 = r.optional("EMAIL_FROM");
|
|
1771
|
+
if (from2 !== void 0 && !EMAIL_FROM.test(from2))
|
|
1772
|
+
r.issues.push('EMAIL_FROM: must be an address or "Name <address>"');
|
|
1773
|
+
email.from = from2 ?? "";
|
|
1720
1774
|
return email;
|
|
1721
1775
|
}
|
|
1722
|
-
email.provider = r.oneOf("EMAIL_PROVIDER", ["resend", "cloudflare"]);
|
|
1723
1776
|
if (email.provider === "resend") email.resendApiKey = r.required("RESEND_API_KEY");
|
|
1724
1777
|
const from = r.required("EMAIL_FROM");
|
|
1725
1778
|
if (from && !EMAIL_FROM.test(from)) r.issues.push('EMAIL_FROM: must be an address or "Name <address>"');
|
|
@@ -1731,6 +1784,29 @@ function readEmail(r) {
|
|
|
1731
1784
|
}
|
|
1732
1785
|
return email;
|
|
1733
1786
|
}
|
|
1787
|
+
function readRelay(r) {
|
|
1788
|
+
const url = r.required("EMAIL_RELAY_URL");
|
|
1789
|
+
if (url && !/^https:\/\//.test(url) && !/^http:\/\/(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1)(:\d+)?(\/|$)/.test(url)) {
|
|
1790
|
+
r.issues.push("EMAIL_RELAY_URL: must be https (sign-in codes travel in the body)");
|
|
1791
|
+
}
|
|
1792
|
+
const signingKey = r.required("EMAIL_RELAY_SIGNING_KEY");
|
|
1793
|
+
if (signingKey) {
|
|
1794
|
+
try {
|
|
1795
|
+
const jwk = JSON.parse(signingKey);
|
|
1796
|
+
if (jwk.kty !== "OKP" || jwk.crv !== "Ed25519" || typeof jwk.d !== "string") {
|
|
1797
|
+
r.issues.push("EMAIL_RELAY_SIGNING_KEY: must be an Ed25519 private JWK");
|
|
1798
|
+
}
|
|
1799
|
+
} catch {
|
|
1800
|
+
r.issues.push("EMAIL_RELAY_SIGNING_KEY: must be JSON (Ed25519 private JWK)");
|
|
1801
|
+
}
|
|
1802
|
+
}
|
|
1803
|
+
return {
|
|
1804
|
+
url,
|
|
1805
|
+
signingKey,
|
|
1806
|
+
issuer: r.optional("EMAIL_RELAY_ISSUER") ?? r.optional("PASSWORD_ENGINE_ISSUER") ?? r.str("AUTH_SYSTEM_NAME"),
|
|
1807
|
+
timeoutMs: r.int("EMAIL_RELAY_TIMEOUT_MS", 100)
|
|
1808
|
+
};
|
|
1809
|
+
}
|
|
1734
1810
|
function readMfaSecretKeys(r, env) {
|
|
1735
1811
|
const strings = {};
|
|
1736
1812
|
for (const name of ["MFA_SECRET_KEY", "MFA_SECRET_KEY_ID", "MFA_SECRET_PREVIOUS_KEYS"]) {
|
|
@@ -1744,20 +1820,53 @@ function readMfaSecretKeys(r, env) {
|
|
|
1744
1820
|
return null;
|
|
1745
1821
|
}
|
|
1746
1822
|
}
|
|
1823
|
+
function readAudience(r, worker, lambda, label) {
|
|
1824
|
+
if (worker !== void 0 && lambda !== void 0 && worker !== lambda)
|
|
1825
|
+
r.issues.push(`${label}: set one (they differ)`);
|
|
1826
|
+
return worker ?? lambda;
|
|
1827
|
+
}
|
|
1747
1828
|
function readAudiencesAndApps(r, config) {
|
|
1748
|
-
const customer =
|
|
1749
|
-
|
|
1750
|
-
|
|
1829
|
+
const customer = readAudience(
|
|
1830
|
+
r,
|
|
1831
|
+
r.optional("JWT_CUSTOMER_AUDIENCE"),
|
|
1832
|
+
r.optional("TOKEN_AUD_CUSTOMER"),
|
|
1833
|
+
"JWT_CUSTOMER_AUDIENCE / TOKEN_AUD_CUSTOMER"
|
|
1834
|
+
);
|
|
1835
|
+
const tenant = readAudience(
|
|
1836
|
+
r,
|
|
1837
|
+
r.optional("JWT_TENANT_AUDIENCE"),
|
|
1838
|
+
r.optional("TOKEN_AUD_TENANT"),
|
|
1839
|
+
"JWT_TENANT_AUDIENCE / TOKEN_AUD_TENANT"
|
|
1840
|
+
);
|
|
1841
|
+
const system = readAudience(
|
|
1842
|
+
r,
|
|
1843
|
+
r.optional("JWT_SYSTEM_AUDIENCE"),
|
|
1844
|
+
r.optional("TOKEN_AUD_SYSTEM"),
|
|
1845
|
+
"JWT_SYSTEM_AUDIENCE / TOKEN_AUD_SYSTEM"
|
|
1846
|
+
);
|
|
1751
1847
|
const raw = r.optional("AUTH_APPS");
|
|
1752
1848
|
const defaultApp = r.optional("AUTH_DEFAULT_APP");
|
|
1753
1849
|
if (raw === void 0) {
|
|
1754
1850
|
if (defaultApp !== void 0) r.issues.push("AUTH_DEFAULT_APP: needs AUTH_APPS");
|
|
1755
1851
|
const audiences = { customer: customer ?? "customer", tenant: tenant ?? "tenant", system: system ?? "system" };
|
|
1756
|
-
config.security.tokenAudiences = audiences;
|
|
1757
1852
|
const values = Object.values(audiences);
|
|
1758
1853
|
if (new Set(values).size !== values.length) {
|
|
1759
1854
|
r.issues.push("JWT_CUSTOMER_AUDIENCE / JWT_TENANT_AUDIENCE / JWT_SYSTEM_AUDIENCE: must differ");
|
|
1760
1855
|
}
|
|
1856
|
+
const cookieNames = {
|
|
1857
|
+
customer: r.optional("REFRESH_COOKIE_CUSTOMER") ?? "refresh_token",
|
|
1858
|
+
tenant: r.optional("REFRESH_COOKIE_TENANT") ?? "refresh_token_tenant",
|
|
1859
|
+
system: r.optional("REFRESH_COOKIE_SYSTEM") ?? "refresh_token_system"
|
|
1860
|
+
};
|
|
1861
|
+
if (new Set(Object.values(cookieNames)).size !== 3) {
|
|
1862
|
+
r.issues.push("REFRESH_COOKIE_CUSTOMER / REFRESH_COOKIE_TENANT / REFRESH_COOKIE_SYSTEM: must differ");
|
|
1863
|
+
}
|
|
1864
|
+
if (r.explicit("REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE_NAME")) {
|
|
1865
|
+
r.issues.push(
|
|
1866
|
+
"REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE_NAME: not used by the customer / tenant / system apps; set REFRESH_COOKIE_CUSTOMER / _TENANT / _SYSTEM"
|
|
1867
|
+
);
|
|
1868
|
+
}
|
|
1869
|
+
config.security.tokenAudiences = { ...audiences, cookieNames };
|
|
1761
1870
|
return;
|
|
1762
1871
|
}
|
|
1763
1872
|
const mixed = PRESET_APP_VARS.filter((name) => r.optional(name) !== void 0);
|