@aunucore/baileys 1.0.77 → 1.0.79

package/lib/Signal/Group/group-session-builder.js

@@ -7,8 +7,26 @@ export class GroupSessionBuilder {
         this.senderKeyStore = senderKeyStore;
     }
     async process(senderKeyName, senderKeyDistributionMessage) {
+        // AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-168): a malformed SKDM used to be
+        // stored without any validation — a missing/empty distribution
+        // message produced a junk state (keyId 0, empty chain seed,
+        // empty signing key) that passed the load-time guard, and five
+        // of them (MAX_STATES) evicted the author's good state, after
+        // which every legitimate message from that author failed with
+        // 'No session found'. Refuse anything that cannot possibly
+        // work: a numeric id and iteration, a 32-byte chain key and a
+        // 32/33-byte signing key (our own builder emits 32 + 33).
+        const id = senderKeyDistributionMessage.getId();
+        const iteration = senderKeyDistributionMessage.getIteration();
+        const chainKey = senderKeyDistributionMessage.getChainKey();
+        const signatureKey = senderKeyDistributionMessage.getSignatureKey();
+        if (!Number.isFinite(id) || !Number.isFinite(iteration) ||
+            !Buffer.isBuffer(chainKey) || chainKey.length !== 32 ||
+            !Buffer.isBuffer(signatureKey) || (signatureKey.length !== 32 && signatureKey.length !== 33)) {
+            return;
+        }
         const senderKeyRecord = await this.senderKeyStore.loadSenderKey(senderKeyName);
-        senderKeyRecord.addSenderKeyState(senderKeyDistributionMessage.getId(), senderKeyDistributionMessage.getIteration(), senderKeyDistributionMessage.getChainKey(), senderKeyDistributionMessage.getSignatureKey());
+        senderKeyRecord.addSenderKeyState(id, iteration, chainKey, signatureKey);
         await this.senderKeyStore.storeSenderKey(senderKeyName, senderKeyRecord);
     }
     async create(senderKeyName) {

package/lib/Signal/Group/sender-chain-key.js

@@ -5,10 +5,19 @@ export class SenderChainKey {
     constructor(iteration, chainKey) {
         this.MESSAGE_KEY_SEED = Buffer.from([0x01]);
         this.CHAIN_KEY_SEED = Buffer.from([0x02]);
-        this.iteration = iteration;
+        // AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-162/HB-180): a stored string seed is
+        // base64 (the house format), not UTF-8 text, and a numeric
+        // string iteration must become a number — '5' + 1 === '51'
+        // concatenation poisoned the chain. Stored records are
+        // sanitised at load (sender-key-record.js); this is the same
+        // normalisation for direct constructions.
+        this.iteration = typeof iteration === 'string' && /^-?\d+$/.test(iteration.trim()) ? Number(iteration) : iteration;
         if (chainKey instanceof Buffer) {
             this.chainKey = chainKey;
         }
+        else if (typeof chainKey === 'string') {
+            this.chainKey = Buffer.from(chainKey, 'base64');
+        }
         else {
             this.chainKey = Buffer.from(chainKey || []);
         }

package/lib/Signal/Group/sender-key-distribution-message.js

@@ -8,8 +8,10 @@ export class SenderKeyDistributionMessage extends CiphertextMessage {
                 const message = serialized.slice(1);
                 const distributionMessage = proto.SenderKeyDistributionMessage.decode(message).toJSON();
                 this.serialized = serialized;
-                this.id = distributionMessage.id;
-                this.iteration = distributionMessage.iteration;
+                // AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-186): same proto3 default
+                // omission as SenderKeyMessage — normalise to 0.
+                this.id = distributionMessage.id ?? 0;
+                this.iteration = distributionMessage.iteration ?? 0;
                 this.chainKey =
                     typeof distributionMessage.chainKey === 'string'
                         ? Buffer.from(distributionMessage.chainKey, 'base64')

package/lib/Signal/Group/sender-key-message.js

@@ -13,8 +13,15 @@ export class SenderKeyMessage extends CiphertextMessage {
             const senderKeyMessage = proto.SenderKeyMessage.decode(message).toJSON();
             this.serialized = serialized;
             this.messageVersion = (version & 0xff) >> 4;
-            this.keyId = senderKeyMessage.id;
-            this.iteration = senderKeyMessage.iteration;
+            // AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-186/HB-217): proto3 encoders omit
+            // default-valued fields, so a canonical peer's id 0 /
+            // iteration 0 arrive as undefined. Normalise to 0 — an
+            // undefined iteration made getSenderKey return the CURRENT
+            // chain key (every comparison against undefined is false)
+            // and an undefined keyId selected the LAST state in the
+            // record instead of state 0.
+            this.keyId = senderKeyMessage.id ?? 0;
+            this.iteration = senderKeyMessage.iteration ?? 0;
             this.ciphertext =
                 typeof senderKeyMessage.ciphertext === 'string'
                     ? Buffer.from(senderKeyMessage.ciphertext, 'base64')

package/lib/Signal/Group/sender-key-record.js

@@ -1,5 +1,86 @@
 import { BufferJSON } from '../../Utils/generics.js';
 import { SenderKeyState } from './sender-key-state.js';
+// AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-124/HB-162/HB-180/HB-197): stored sender-key
+// states used to be checked for EXISTENCE only — a hand-edited or
+// corrupt sender-key-*.json could carry a number where a seed belongs
+// (raw TypeError on every group decrypt/encrypt), a base64 string the
+// chain key decoded as UTF-8 (silently wrong keys), a string iteration
+// ('5' + 1 === '51' — concatenation poisoned the chain and bricked
+// group sends with 'Over 2000 messages into the future!'), a missing
+// iteration (NaN — every SKM went out with wire iteration 0 forever),
+// or a string/missing senderKeyId (strict === lookup always missed).
+// Normalise what has a documented house format (base64 strings,
+// numeric strings) and DROP what cannot be made valid — a dropped
+// state self-heals via a fresh SKDM / a fresh own state, a poisoned
+// one never does. Key material produced by our own serializer always
+// satisfies these shapes (32-byte seeds, 32/33-byte signing public).
+const storedSeedToBuffer = (value) => Buffer.isBuffer(value)
+    ? value
+    : (typeof value === 'string' ? Buffer.from(value, 'base64') : null);
+const storedCountToNumber = (value) => {
+    if (typeof value === 'number') {
+        return Number.isInteger(value) ? value : null;
+    }
+    if (typeof value === 'string' && /^-?\d+$/.test(value.trim())) {
+        const n = Number(value);
+        return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : null;
+    }
+    return null;
+};
+const sanitizeSenderKeyStructure = (structure) => {
+    const chainKey = structure.senderChainKey;
+    const signingKey = structure.senderSigningKey;
+    if (!chainKey || typeof chainKey !== 'object' || !signingKey || typeof signingKey !== 'object') {
+        return null;
+    }
+    const seed = storedSeedToBuffer(chainKey.seed);
+    if (!seed || seed.length !== 32) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    const iteration = storedCountToNumber(chainKey.iteration);
+    if (iteration === null) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    const signingPublic = storedSeedToBuffer(signingKey.public);
+    if (!signingPublic || (signingPublic.length !== 32 && signingPublic.length !== 33)) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    const cleanSigning = { public: signingPublic };
+    if (typeof signingKey.private !== 'undefined') {
+        const signingPrivate = storedSeedToBuffer(signingKey.private);
+        if (!signingPrivate || signingPrivate.length !== 32) {
+            return null;
+        }
+        cleanSigning.private = signingPrivate;
+    }
+    const keyId = storedCountToNumber(structure.senderKeyId);
+    if (keyId === null) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    // senderMessageKeys: drop individual entries that cannot be used
+    // (HB-124 addenda) instead of dropping the whole state — the chain
+    // itself is still good.
+    const messageKeys = [];
+    if (Array.isArray(structure.senderMessageKeys)) {
+        for (const entry of structure.senderMessageKeys) {
+            if (!entry || typeof entry !== 'object') {
+                continue;
+            }
+            const mkIteration = storedCountToNumber(entry.iteration);
+            const mkSeed = storedSeedToBuffer(entry.seed);
+            if (mkIteration === null || !mkSeed || mkSeed.length !== 32) {
+                continue;
+            }
+            messageKeys.push({ iteration: mkIteration, seed: mkSeed });
+        }
+    }
+    return {
+        senderKeyId: keyId,
+        senderChainKey: { iteration, seed },
+        senderSigningKey: cleanSigning,
+        senderMessageKeys: messageKeys
+    };
+};
 export class SenderKeyRecord {
     constructor(serialized) {
         this.MAX_STATES = 5;
@@ -15,11 +96,18 @@ export class SenderKeyRecord {
                 // store) used to load "fine" and then throw a bare
                 // TypeError on every group send, forever (HB-69).
                 // Skip entries that cannot possibly work.
-                if (!structure || typeof structure !== 'object' ||
-                    !structure.senderChainKey || !structure.senderSigningKey) {
+                // (1.0.78, HB-124/HB-162/HB-180/HB-197): existence is
+                // not enough — sanitise the field TYPES (see
+                // sanitizeSenderKeyStructure above) and skip states
+                // that stay invalid after normalisation.
+                if (!structure || typeof structure !== 'object') {
+                    continue;
+                }
+                const clean = sanitizeSenderKeyStructure(structure);
+                if (!clean) {
                     continue;
                 }
-                this.senderKeyStates.push(new SenderKeyState(null, null, null, null, null, null, structure));
+                this.senderKeyStates.push(new SenderKeyState(null, null, null, null, null, null, clean));
             }
         }
     }

package/lib/Signal/libsignal.js

@@ -9,8 +9,15 @@ import { GroupCipher, GroupSessionBuilder, SenderKeyDistributionMessage } from '
 // (or a string in a hand-edited creds file). Anything else is a
 // wrong-typed corrupt value, not key material.
 const isKeyMaterial = (value) => Buffer.isBuffer(value) || typeof value === 'string';
+// AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-157): string key material is base64 (the
+// house format) — decode it as such instead of Buffer.from()'s UTF-8,
+// which produced 44-byte garbage keys and failed every new session.
+const storedKeyToBuffer = (value) => typeof value === 'string' ? Buffer.from(value, 'base64') : value;
 export function makeLibSignalRepository(auth) {
     const storage = signalStorage(auth);
+    // AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-240): in-flight serialisation for
+    // encryptGroupMessage, per group — see that method.
+    const groupEncryptChains = new Map();
     return {
         decryptGroupMessage({ group, authorJid, msg }) {
             const senderName = jidToSignalSenderKeyName(group, authorJid);
@@ -55,20 +62,38 @@ export function makeLibSignalRepository(auth) {
             return { type, ciphertext: Buffer.from(body, 'binary') };
         },
         async encryptGroupMessage({ group, meId, data }) {
-            const senderName = jidToSignalSenderKeyName(group, meId);
-            const builder = new GroupSessionBuilder(storage);
-            const senderNameStr = senderName.toString();
-            const { [senderNameStr]: senderKey } = await auth.keys.get('sender-key', [senderNameStr]);
-            if (!senderKey) {
-                await storage.storeSenderKey(senderName, new SenderKeyRecord());
-            }
-            const senderKeyDistributionMessage = await builder.create(senderName);
-            const session = new GroupCipher(storage, senderName);
-            const ciphertext = await session.encrypt(data);
-            return {
-                ciphertext,
-                senderKeyDistributionMessage: senderKeyDistributionMessage.serialize()
+            // AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-240): serialise per group.
+            // GroupSessionBuilder.create() runs OUTSIDE GroupCipher's
+            // per-group queueJob, so two concurrent first-sends to the
+            // same group (empty sender-key record) both created a
+            // fresh key and overwrote each other — the loser returned
+            // an SKDM that did not match the ciphertext it encrypted
+            // (which used the winner's stored state), and every peer
+            // failed that first message. Chain the whole
+            // create+encrypt per group; different groups still run in
+            // parallel.
+            const run = async () => {
+                const senderName = jidToSignalSenderKeyName(group, meId);
+                const builder = new GroupSessionBuilder(storage);
+                const senderNameStr = senderName.toString();
+                const { [senderNameStr]: senderKey } = await auth.keys.get('sender-key', [senderNameStr]);
+                if (!senderKey) {
+                    await storage.storeSenderKey(senderName, new SenderKeyRecord());
+                }
+                const senderKeyDistributionMessage = await builder.create(senderName);
+                const session = new GroupCipher(storage, senderName);
+                const ciphertext = await session.encrypt(data);
+                return {
+                    ciphertext,
+                    senderKeyDistributionMessage: senderKeyDistributionMessage.serialize()
+                };
             };
+            const prev = groupEncryptChains.get(group) ?? Promise.resolve();
+            const chained = prev.then(run);
+            // the stored chain must never stay rejected, or one failed
+            // send would poison every later send to the group
+            groupEncryptChains.set(group, chained.catch(() => { }));
+            return chained;
         },
         async deleteSenderKey(group, authorJid) {
             const senderNameStr = jidToSignalSenderKeyName(group, authorJid).toString();
@@ -133,10 +158,13 @@ function signalStorage({ creds, keys }) {
                     // classifier and misleads diagnostics. Say what is
                     // actually wrong; the 3-strike self-heal still clears
                     // the poisoned record via deleteSession.
-                    if (err instanceof TypeError) {
-                        throw new Error(`AunuBaileys: stored session record for ${id} is corrupt or malformed and cannot be deserialized; delete the session and re-establish it`);
-                    }
-                    throw err;
+                    // (1.0.78, HB-110): the conversion used to cover only
+                    // TypeError — a record with a non-v1 version throws a
+                    // plain Error('Error migrating SessionRecord') from
+                    // libsignal and escaped raw. Convert EVERY
+                    // deserialize failure; the behaviour (3-strike
+                    // self-heal) is identical, only the message improves.
+                    throw new Error(`AunuBaileys: stored session record for ${id} is corrupt or malformed and cannot be deserialized; delete the session and re-establish it`);
                 }
             }
         },
@@ -164,8 +192,8 @@ function signalStorage({ creds, keys }) {
                     return undefined;
                 }
                 return {
-                    privKey: Buffer.from(key.private),
-                    pubKey: Buffer.from(key.public)
+                    privKey: storedKeyToBuffer(key.private),
+                    pubKey: storedKeyToBuffer(key.public)
                 };
             }
         },
@@ -184,8 +212,8 @@ function signalStorage({ creds, keys }) {
                 throw new Error('AunuBaileys: creds.signedPreKey is missing or incomplete — the auth state is incomplete or corrupt; restore a full backup or pair again');
             }
             return {
-                privKey: Buffer.from(key.keyPair.private),
-                pubKey: Buffer.from(key.keyPair.public)
+                privKey: storedKeyToBuffer(key.keyPair.private),
+                pubKey: storedKeyToBuffer(key.keyPair.public)
             };
         },
         loadSenderKey: async (senderKeyName) => {
@@ -212,7 +240,7 @@ function signalStorage({ creds, keys }) {
                 throw new Error('Our signed identity key is missing or incomplete — the auth state is corrupt; re-pair the device');
             }
             return {
-                privKey: Buffer.from(signedIdentityKey.private),
+                privKey: storedKeyToBuffer(signedIdentityKey.private),
                 pubKey: generateSignalPubKey(signedIdentityKey.public)
             };
         }

package/lib/Socket/chats.js

@@ -189,7 +189,15 @@ export const makeChatsSocket = (config) => {
         if (!jid) {
             throw new Boom('Illegal no-jid profile update. Please specify either your ID or the ID of the chat you wish to update');
         }
-        if (jidNormalizedUser(jid) !== jidNormalizedUser(authState.creds.me.id)) {
+        // AunuBaileys (1.0.79, HB-125): creds.me is undefined until
+        // pairing completes (and again after a pairing rollback) —
+        // the bare deref below threw a raw TypeError for a host
+        // calling too early. Fail like the guarded send paths.
+        const meId = authState.creds.me?.id;
+        if (!meId) {
+            throw new Boom('Not authenticated');
+        }
+        if (jidNormalizedUser(jid) !== jidNormalizedUser(meId)) {
             targetJid = jidNormalizedUser(jid); // in case it is someone other than us
         }
         else {
@@ -219,7 +227,13 @@ export const makeChatsSocket = (config) => {
         if (!jid) {
             throw new Boom('Illegal no-jid profile update. Please specify either your ID or the ID of the chat you wish to update');
         }
-        if (jidNormalizedUser(jid) !== jidNormalizedUser(authState.creds.me.id)) {
+        // AunuBaileys (1.0.79, HB-125): same bare creds.me.id deref
+        // as updateProfilePicture — same guard.
+        const meId = authState.creds.me?.id;
+        if (!meId) {
+            throw new Boom('Not authenticated');
+        }
+        if (jidNormalizedUser(jid) !== jidNormalizedUser(meId)) {
             targetJid = jidNormalizedUser(jid); // in case it is someone other than us
         }
         else {
@@ -529,6 +543,13 @@ export const makeChatsSocket = (config) => {
     };
     const sendPresenceUpdate = async (type, toJid) => {
         const me = authState.creds.me;
+        // AunuBaileys (1.0.79, HB-125): me is undefined until pairing
+        // completes; both branches below deref it bare (me.name in
+        // this one, me.lid/me.id in the chatstate branch) and threw
+        // a raw TypeError for an early host call.
+        if (!me?.id) {
+            throw new Boom('Not authenticated');
+        }
         if (type === 'available' || type === 'unavailable') {
             if (!me.name) {
                 logger.warn('no name present, ignoring presence update request...');
@@ -851,7 +872,12 @@ export const makeChatsSocket = (config) => {
         }
         ev.emit('messages.upsert', { messages: [msg], type });
         if (!!msg.pushName) {
-            let jid = msg.key.fromMe ? authState.creds.me.id : msg.key.participant || msg.key.remoteJid;
+            // AunuBaileys (1.0.79, HB-125): me?.id — a fromMe message
+            // with a pushName processed before pairing completes
+            // threw a raw TypeError here; jidNormalizedUser maps an
+            // undefined jid to '' and the fromMe path does not use
+            // the computed jid for anything but normalisation.
+            let jid = msg.key.fromMe ? authState.creds.me?.id : msg.key.participant || msg.key.remoteJid;
             jid = jidNormalizedUser(jid);
             if (!msg.key.fromMe) {
                 ev.emit('contacts.update', [{ id: jid, notify: msg.pushName, verifiedName: msg.verifiedBizName }]);

package/lib/Socket/communities.js

@@ -246,6 +246,11 @@ export const makeCommunitiesSocket = (config) => {
          */
         communityAcceptInviteV4: ev.createBufferedFunction(async (key, inviteMessage) => {
             key = typeof key === 'string' ? { remoteJid: key } : key;
+            // AunuBaileys (1.0.79, HB-125): same bare creds.me.id
+            // deref as groupAcceptInviteV4 — same guard.
+            if (!authState.creds.me?.id) {
+                throw new Boom('Not authenticated');
+            }
             const results = await communityQuery(inviteMessage.groupJid, 'set', [
                 {
                     tag: 'accept',

package/lib/Socket/groups.js

@@ -207,6 +207,13 @@ export const makeGroupsSocket = (config) => {
          */
         groupAcceptInviteV4: ev.createBufferedFunction(async (key, inviteMessage) => {
             key = typeof key === 'string' ? { remoteJid: key } : key;
+            // AunuBaileys (1.0.79, HB-125): creds.me.id is
+            // dereferenced for the stub message below (and inside
+            // processMessage); before pairing completes it threw a
+            // raw TypeError. Fail before any network work.
+            if (!authState.creds.me?.id) {
+                throw new Boom('Not authenticated');
+            }
             const results = await groupQuery(inviteMessage.groupJid, 'set', [
                 {
                     tag: 'accept',

package/lib/Socket/messages-recv.js

@@ -5,13 +5,17 @@ import Long from 'long';
 import { proto } from '../../WAProto/index.js';
 import { DEFAULT_CACHE_TTLS, KEY_BUNDLE_TYPE, MIN_PREKEY_COUNT } from '../Defaults/index.js';
 import { WAMessageStatus, WAMessageStubType } from '../Types/index.js';
-import { aesDecryptCTR, aesEncryptGCM, cleanMessage, Curve, decodeMediaRetryNode, decodeMessageNode, decryptMessageNode, delay, derivePairingCodeKey, encodeBigEndian, encodeSignedDeviceIdentity, getCallStatusFromNode, getHistoryMsg, getNextPreKeys, getStatusFromReceiptType, hkdf, isBadMacError, isUnrecoverableSessionError, MISSING_KEYS_ERROR_TEXT, NACK_REASONS, NO_MESSAGE_FOUND_ERROR_TEXT, buildCallControlStanza, parseRetryReceiptSession, setBotMessageSecret, unixTimestampSeconds, xmppPreKey, xmppSignedPreKey } from '../Utils/index.js';
+import { aesDecryptCTR, aesEncryptGCM, cleanMessage, Curve, decodeMediaRetryNode, decodeMessageNode, decryptMessageNode, delay, derivePairingCodeKey, encodeBigEndian, encodeSignedDeviceIdentity, getCallStatusFromNode, getHistoryMsg, getNextPreKeys, getStatusFromReceiptType, hkdf, isBadMacError, isSenderKeyUnavailableError, isUnrecoverableSessionError, keyMaterialToBuffer, MISSING_KEYS_ERROR_TEXT, NACK_REASONS, NO_MESSAGE_FOUND_ERROR_TEXT, buildCallControlStanza, parseRetryReceiptSession, setBotMessageSecret, unixTimestampSeconds, xmppPreKey, xmppSignedPreKey } from '../Utils/index.js';
 import { makeMutex } from '../Utils/make-mutex.js';
 import { sentMessageCacheFor } from '../Utils/sent-message-cache.js';
 import { createOfflineNodeQueue } from '../Utils/offline-queue.js';
 import { areJidsSameUser, getAllBinaryNodeChildren, getBinaryNodeChild, getBinaryNodeChildBuffer, getBinaryNodeChildren, getBinaryNodeChildString, isJidGroup, isJidStatusBroadcast, isJidUser, isLidUser, jidDecode, jidNormalizedUser, S_WHATSAPP_NET } from '../WABinary/index.js';
 import { extractGroupMetadata } from './groups.js';
 import { makeMessagesSocket } from './messages-send.js';
+/** AunuBaileys (1.0.79, HB-201): the HB-98 key-material test — key
+ * material is a Buffer (or a base64 string in a hand-edited creds
+ * file); anything else is a wrong-typed corrupt value. */
+const isKeyMaterial = (value) => Buffer.isBuffer(value) || typeof value === 'string';
 /** AunuBaileys: classify an <unavailable/> placeholder — 'bot' when a
  * <bot/> child rides along, 'hosted' when the node says so, otherwise
  * the unavailable type attribute (e.g. 'view_once'). */
@@ -82,6 +86,13 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config) => {
     // AunuBaileys: terima panggilan masuk (node kontrol <accept>) — pasangan
     // rejectCall bawaan; media VOIP-nya sendiri di luar cakupan protokol chat.
     const acceptCall = async (callId, callFrom) => {
+        // AunuBaileys (1.0.79, HB-172): creds.me.id was dereferenced
+        // bare in the stanza literal — a host auto-accepting a call
+        // before pairing completes got a raw TypeError instead of
+        // the guarded failure the neighbouring helpers give.
+        if (!authState.creds.me?.id) {
+            throw new Boom('Not authenticated');
+        }
         await query(buildCallControlStanza({
             from: authState.creds.me.id,
             to: callFrom,
@@ -92,6 +103,11 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config) => {
     };
     // AunuBaileys: akhiri panggilan yang sedang berjalan (<terminate>).
     const terminateCall = async (callId, callFrom, reason = 'user-terminated') => {
+        // AunuBaileys (1.0.79, HB-172): same bare creds.me.id deref
+        // as acceptCall — guard first.
+        if (!authState.creds.me?.id) {
+            throw new Boom('Not authenticated');
+        }
         await query(buildCallControlStanza({
             from: authState.creds.me.id,
             to: callFrom,
@@ -102,6 +118,11 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config) => {
         }));
     };
     const rejectCall = async (callId, callFrom) => {
+        // AunuBaileys (1.0.79, HB-172): same bare creds.me.id deref
+        // as acceptCall — guard first.
+        if (!authState.creds.me?.id) {
+            throw new Boom('Not authenticated');
+        }
         const stanza = {
             tag: 'call',
             attrs: {
@@ -144,9 +165,28 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config) => {
             logger.debug({ retryCount, msgId }, 'reached retry limit');
             return;
         }
+        const { account, signedPreKey, signedIdentityKey: identityKey } = authState.creds;
+        // AunuBaileys (1.0.79, HB-201 + addendum HB-80): the receipt
+        // built below always embeds creds.registrationId, and from
+        // the second retry on it also embeds the identity and
+        // signed-pre-key material — all of it dereferenced bare
+        // inside the transaction callback. With a partial creds
+        // restore those derefs threw TypeError AFTER the retry
+        // counter above had already been consumed: the receipt was
+        // never sent, the counter was burned, and every later retry
+        // failed at the same spot until the cap left the message a
+        // stub forever. (A missing registrationId was worse — it
+        // silently encoded as 00000000.) Validate BEFORE the
+        // increment and fail descriptively: the counter is only
+        // spent on a receipt that can actually be built.
+        if (!Number.isFinite(authState.creds.registrationId)) {
+            throw new Error('AunuBaileys: creds.registrationId is missing or invalid — cannot send a retry receipt; restore a full backup or pair again');
+        }
+        if ((retryCount >= 1 || forceIncludeKeys) && (!isKeyMaterial(identityKey?.public) || !isKeyMaterial(signedPreKey?.keyPair?.public) || !isKeyMaterial(signedPreKey?.signature) || typeof signedPreKey?.keyId === 'undefined')) {
+            throw new Error('AunuBaileys: creds.signedIdentityKey / creds.signedPreKey are missing or incomplete — cannot include keys in the retry receipt; restore a full backup or pair again');
+        }
         retryCount += 1;
         msgRetryCache.set(key, retryCount);
-        const { account, signedPreKey, signedIdentityKey: identityKey } = authState.creds;
         if (retryCount === 1) {
             // AunuBaileys (1.0.70): requestPlaceholderResend waits 5s
             // for the message to arrive by other means — awaiting it
@@ -206,7 +246,7 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config) => {
                     attrs: {},
                     content: [
                         { tag: 'type', attrs: {}, content: Buffer.from(KEY_BUNDLE_TYPE) },
-                        { tag: 'identity', attrs: {}, content: identityKey.public },
+                        { tag: 'identity', attrs: {}, content: keyMaterialToBuffer(identityKey.public) },
                         xmppPreKey(key, +keyId),
                         xmppSignedPreKey(signedPreKey),
                         { tag: 'device-identity', attrs: {}, content: deviceIdentity }
@@ -545,7 +585,10 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config) => {
                     info: 'link_code_pairing_key_bundle_encryption_key'
                 });
                 const encryptPayload = Buffer.concat([
-                    Buffer.from(authState.creds.signedIdentityKey.public),
+                    // AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-157): a string identity key
+                    // is base64 — Buffer.from() decoded it as UTF-8 and
+                    // put a 44-byte garbage identity in the payload.
+                    keyMaterialToBuffer(authState.creds.signedIdentityKey.public),
                     primaryIdentityPublicKey,
                     random
                 ]);
@@ -923,6 +966,16 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config) => {
                                         // sender key saja tidak menyentuh sesi E2E yang
                                         // rusak. Kelas ini direset SEKETIKA.
                                         const sessionLayerFailure = isUnrecoverableSessionError(msg?.messageStubParameters?.[0]);
+                                        // AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-223): a group
+                                        // failure where the sender key is simply
+                                        // absent (or the skmsg payload itself is
+                                        // malformed) says nothing about the
+                                        // author's E2E session — do not count it
+                                        // toward the session reset and do not
+                                        // report it as a healable failure; the
+                                        // retry receipt below is the whole fix,
+                                        // it makes the peer redistribute its key.
+                                        const senderKeyUnavailable = isGroupMsg && isSenderKeyUnavailableError(msg?.messageStubParameters?.[0]);
                                         let healed = false;
                                         const resetE2ESession = async () => {
                                             await signalRepository.deleteSession(author);
@@ -933,7 +986,10 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config) => {
                                                 await signalRepository.deleteSession(alt);
                                             }
                                         };
-                                        if (sessionLayerFailure) {
+                                        if (senderKeyUnavailable) {
+                                            logger.debug({ author, addr, group: msg.key.remoteJid }, 'aunu: group decrypt failed because the sender key is unavailable or the skmsg is malformed; retry receipt only, no session reset');
+                                        }
+                                        else if (sessionLayerFailure) {
                                             await resetE2ESession();
                                             if (isGroupMsg) {
                                                 await signalRepository.deleteSenderKey(msg.key.remoteJid, author);
@@ -977,6 +1033,7 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config) => {
                                         // AunuBaileys: structured decrypt-failure event so
                                         // consumers can alert and aggregate on Bad MAC
                                         // floods (B-01) instead of parsing log lines.
+                                        if (!senderKeyUnavailable) {
                                         ev.emit('messages.decrypt-failure', {
                                             remoteJid: msg.key.remoteJid,
                                             author,
@@ -988,6 +1045,7 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config) => {
                                             messageId: node.attrs.id,
                                             timestamp: Date.now()
                                         });
+                                        }
                                     }
                                     catch (healErr) {
                                         logger.debug({ err: healErr }, 'aunu: session self-heal step failed, continuing with normal retry');
@@ -1024,7 +1082,14 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config) => {
                         // vanished silently if the retry also failed
                         // (HB-90; upstream v7 falls through to the
                         // upsert for exactly this reason).
-                        cleanMessage(msg, authState.creds.me.id);
+                        // AunuBaileys (1.0.79, HB-131): me?.id — in
+                        // the pre-success window creds.me is still
+                        // undefined and the bare deref threw AFTER the
+                        // retry receipt had already been fired: the
+                        // stub was never upserted and the stanza was
+                        // NACKed 500 (delivered + failed). cleanMessage
+                        // tolerates an undefined meId.
+                        cleanMessage(msg, authState.creds.me?.id);
                         await upsertMessage(msg, node.attrs.offline ? 'append' : 'notify');
                     }
                     else {
@@ -1062,7 +1127,12 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config) => {
                             await sendReceipt(jid, undefined, [msg.key.id], 'hist_sync');
                         }
                     }
-                    cleanMessage(msg, authState.creds.me.id);
+                    // AunuBaileys (1.0.79, HB-131): me?.id — the
+                    // bare deref threw here AFTER sendReceipt had
+                    // already gone out, NACKing a delivered message
+                    // 500 and bursting redeliveries until CB:success
+                    // landed. cleanMessage tolerates undefined.
+                    cleanMessage(msg, authState.creds.me?.id);
                     await upsertMessage(msg, node.attrs.offline ? 'append' : 'notify');
                 })
             ]);

package/lib/Socket/messages-send.js

@@ -539,7 +539,17 @@ export const makeMessagesSocket = (config) => {
                     attrs: { v: '2', type: 'skmsg' },
                     content: ciphertext
                 });
-                await authState.keys.set({ 'sender-key-memory': { [jid]: senderKeyMap } });
+                // AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-132/HB-155): persist the map
+                // only when it was actually loaded from the store
+                // (same condition as the load above). A participant-
+                // targeted send starts from {} without loading, so
+                // writing its partial map back overwrote the full
+                // memo — and silently undid sendMessagesAgain's
+                // deliberate null, which exists to force a full
+                // redistribution on the next normal send.
+                if (!participant && !isStatus) {
+                    await authState.keys.set({ 'sender-key-memory': { [jid]: senderKeyMap } });
+                }
             }
             else {
                 const meUser = jidDecode(meId)?.user;

package/lib/Socket/socket.js

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import { executeWMexQuery } from './mex.js';
 import { makeLIDStore } from '../Utils/lid-store.js';
 import { createIgnoreFilter } from '../Utils/ignore-filter.js';
 import { QueryIds, XWAPaths } from '../Types/index.js';
-import { addTransactionCapability, aesEncryptCTR, bindWaitForConnectionUpdate, bytesToCrockford, configureSuccessfulPairing, Curve, derivePairingCodeKey, generateLoginNode, generateMdTagPrefix, generateRegistrationNode, getCodeFromWSError, getErrorCodeFromStreamError, getNextPreKeysNode, getPlatformId, fetchLatestWaWebVersion, makeEventBuffer, makeNoiseHandler, promiseTimeout } from '../Utils/index.js';
+import { addTransactionCapability, aesEncryptCTR, bindWaitForConnectionUpdate, bytesToCrockford, configureSuccessfulPairing, Curve, derivePairingCodeKey, generateLoginNode, generateMdTagPrefix, generateRegistrationNode, getCodeFromWSError, getErrorCodeFromStreamError, getNextPreKeysNode, getPlatformId, fetchLatestWaWebVersion, keyMaterialToBuffer, makeEventBuffer, makeNoiseHandler, promiseTimeout } from '../Utils/index.js';
 import { assertNodeErrorFree, binaryNodeToString, encodeBinaryNode, getBinaryNodeChild, getBinaryNodeChildren, jidEncode, S_WHATSAPP_NET } from '../WABinary/index.js';
 import { WebSocketClient } from './Client/index.js';
 /**
@@ -774,8 +774,11 @@ export const makeSocket = (config) => {
         qrChainActive = true;
         const pairDeviceNode = getBinaryNodeChild(stanza, 'pair-device');
         const refNodes = getBinaryNodeChildren(pairDeviceNode, 'ref');
-        const noiseKeyB64 = Buffer.from(creds.noiseKey.public).toString('base64');
-        const identityKeyB64 = Buffer.from(creds.signedIdentityKey.public).toString('base64');
+        // AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-157): a string key is base64 already —
+        // Buffer.from() re-encoded its UTF-8 bytes, putting a wrong
+        // noise/identity key into every QR code.
+        const noiseKeyB64 = keyMaterialToBuffer(creds.noiseKey.public).toString('base64');
+        const identityKeyB64 = keyMaterialToBuffer(creds.signedIdentityKey.public).toString('base64');
         const advB64 = creds.advSecretKey;
         let qrMs = qrTimeout || 60000; // time to let a QR live
         const genPairQR = () => {

package/lib/Utils/auth-utils.js

@@ -96,8 +96,16 @@ export const addTransactionCapability = (state, logger, { maxCommitRetries, dela
     // commit attempt. Fall back per-field to the Defaults values, and
     // clamp retries to at least 1 so an explicit 0 means exactly one
     // attempt, matching host intent.
-    const commitRetries = Math.max(1, maxCommitRetries ?? 10);
-    const commitDelayMs = delayBetweenTriesMs ?? 3000;
+    // AunuBaileys (1.0.79, addendum HB-104): the ?? fallback lets NaN
+    // through (Math.max(1, NaN) is NaN — the commit loop below then
+    // runs ZERO times and every mutating transaction throws without
+    // a single attempt) and lets Infinity through (the loop never
+    // ends on a failing store and wedges the transaction mutex —
+    // the whole key store deadlocks until restart). Sanitise at the
+    // boundary: retries must be a finite integer, clamped to 1..10;
+    // a non-finite or negative delay falls back to the default.
+    const commitRetries = Number.isFinite(maxCommitRetries) ? Math.min(10, Math.max(1, Math.floor(maxCommitRetries))) : 10;
+    const commitDelayMs = Number.isFinite(delayBetweenTriesMs) && delayBetweenTriesMs >= 0 ? delayBetweenTriesMs : 3000;
     // number of queries made to the DB during the transaction
     // only there for logging purposes
     let dbQueriesInTransaction = 0;
@@ -114,6 +122,20 @@ export const addTransactionCapability = (state, logger, { maxCommitRetries, dela
     const transactionContext = new AsyncLocalStorage();
     const runTransaction = async (work) => {
         let result;
+        // AunuBaileys (1.0.79, HB-236): a nested transaction joins the
+        // running one and SHARES its cache/mutations — snapshot both
+        // when entering a nested frame. If the nested work throws,
+        // the snapshot is restored before the error propagates (see
+        // the catch below): without it, an outer frame that catches
+        // the throw would commit the inner frame's partial writes as
+        // if nothing had failed — the only "rollback" was a throw
+        // escaping the OUTERMOST frame.
+        const snapshot = transactionsInProgress > 0
+            ? {
+                cache: Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(transactionCache).map(([type, dict]) => [type, { ...dict }])),
+                mutations: Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(mutations).map(([type, dict]) => [type, { ...dict }]))
+            }
+            : undefined;
         transactionsInProgress += 1;
         if (transactionsInProgress === 1) {
             logger.trace('entering transaction');
@@ -159,6 +181,17 @@ export const addTransactionCapability = (state, logger, { maxCommitRetries, dela
                 }
             }
         }
+        catch (error) {
+            // AunuBaileys (1.0.79, HB-236): roll a failed NESTED frame
+            // back to its entry snapshot (see above); the outermost
+            // frame needs no restore — the finally below resets the
+            // shared state outright.
+            if (snapshot) {
+                transactionCache = snapshot.cache;
+                mutations = snapshot.mutations;
+            }
+            throw error;
+        }
         finally {
             transactionsInProgress -= 1;
             if (transactionsInProgress === 0) {
@@ -173,7 +206,14 @@ export const addTransactionCapability = (state, logger, { maxCommitRetries, dela
         get: async (type, ids) => {
             if (isInTransaction()) {
                 const dict = transactionCache[type];
-                const idsRequiringFetch = dict ? ids.filter(item => typeof dict[item] === 'undefined') : ids;
+                // AunuBaileys (1.0.79, HB-233): cache PRESENCE — not
+                // the value — decides whether a fetch is needed. A
+                // key explicitly set to undefined in this transaction
+                // is a deletion marker; the typeof test could not
+                // tell it from "never fetched", so get re-read the
+                // stale persisted value and resurrected a record the
+                // transaction itself had just deleted.
+                const idsRequiringFetch = dict ? ids.filter(item => !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(dict, item)) : ids;
                 // only fetch if there are any items to fetch
                 if (idsRequiringFetch.length) {
                     dbQueriesInTransaction += 1;

package/lib/Utils/crypto.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import type { KeyPair } from '../Types/index.js';
+export declare const keyMaterialToBuffer: (key: unknown) => unknown;
 /** prefix version byte to the pub keys, required for some curve crypto functions */
 export declare const generateSignalPubKey: (pubKey: Uint8Array | Buffer) => Uint8Array<ArrayBufferLike> | Buffer<ArrayBufferLike>;
 export declare const Curve: {

package/lib/Utils/crypto.js

@@ -4,6 +4,18 @@ import * as libsignal from 'libsignal';
 import { KEY_BUNDLE_TYPE } from '../Defaults/index.js';
 // insure browser & node compatibility
 const { subtle } = globalThis.crypto;
+/**
+ * AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-157): the house format for string key
+ * material is base64 (that is how advSecretKey and every displayed
+ * key are stored), but several consumers decoded strings with plain
+ * Buffer.from() — UTF-8 — producing wrong-length garbage keys.
+ * Decode strings as base64 everywhere; Buffers pass through and
+ * anything else is returned untouched so the callers' own type
+ * guards (HB-98) still fire.
+ */
+export const keyMaterialToBuffer = (key) => Buffer.isBuffer(key)
+    ? key
+    : (typeof key === 'string' ? Buffer.from(key, 'base64') : key);
 /** prefix version byte to the pub keys, required for some curve crypto functions */
 export const generateSignalPubKey = (pubKey) => {
     // AunuBaileys (1.0.74): HB-98 — a wrong-typed public key (e.g. a
@@ -14,7 +26,7 @@ export const generateSignalPubKey = (pubKey) => {
     if (!Buffer.isBuffer(pubKey) && typeof pubKey !== 'string') {
         throw new Error('AunuBaileys: invalid public key material — the auth state is incomplete or corrupt; restore a full backup or pair again');
     }
-    const buf = typeof pubKey === 'string' ? Buffer.from(pubKey) : pubKey;
+    const buf = keyMaterialToBuffer(pubKey);
     return buf.length === 33 ? buf : Buffer.concat([KEY_BUNDLE_TYPE, buf]);
 };
 export const Curve = {
@@ -27,10 +39,16 @@ export const Curve = {
         };
     },
     sharedKey: (privateKey, publicKey) => {
-        const shared = libsignal.curve.calculateAgreement(generateSignalPubKey(publicKey), privateKey);
+        // AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-214): the private key used to be
+        // passed to libsignal RAW — a base64-string private key in a
+        // hand-edited/migrated creds file died as
+        // 'Invalid private key type: String' at every handshake,
+        // pairing and pair-success call site. Decode it like every
+        // other key material (HB-157).
+        const shared = libsignal.curve.calculateAgreement(generateSignalPubKey(publicKey), keyMaterialToBuffer(privateKey));
         return Buffer.from(shared);
     },
-    sign: (privateKey, buf) => libsignal.curve.calculateSignature(privateKey, buf),
+    sign: (privateKey, buf) => libsignal.curve.calculateSignature(keyMaterialToBuffer(privateKey), buf),
     verify: (pubKey, message, signature) => {
         try {
             libsignal.curve.verifySignature(generateSignalPubKey(pubKey), message, signature);

package/lib/Utils/decode-wa-message.d.ts

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ export declare const getBotRecentSecretsChatCount: () => number;
 export declare const NO_MESSAGE_FOUND_ERROR_TEXT = "Message absent from node";
 export declare const isUnrecoverableSessionError: (text: unknown) => boolean;
 export declare const isBadMacError: (text: unknown) => boolean;
+export declare const isSenderKeyUnavailableError: (text: unknown) => boolean;
 export declare const MISSING_KEYS_ERROR_TEXT = "Key used already or never filled";
 export declare const NACK_REASONS: {
     ParsingError: number;

package/lib/Utils/decode-wa-message.js

@@ -429,4 +429,19 @@ export const isUnrecoverableSessionError = (text) => typeof text === 'string' &&
  * classic symptom of a desynchronised ratchet on either side.
  */
 export const isBadMacError = (text) => typeof text === 'string' && /bad mac/i.test(text);
+/**
+ * AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-223): true when a GROUP decrypt failure says
+ * nothing about the author's 1-1 E2E session — the sender key simply
+ * is not here yet (no record, or no state for that author: they just
+ * joined, or our own self-heal deleted it), or the skmsg payload
+ * itself is malformed (proto decode error, signature shape). Counting
+ * these toward the 3-strike session reset deleted healthy E2E
+ * sessions and reported a misleading `healed: true`; the only correct
+ * response is the retry receipt, which makes the peer redistribute
+ * its sender key. The CIPHERTEXT stub upsert still happens.
+ */
+export const isSenderKeyUnavailableError = (text) => typeof text === 'string' &&
+    (/no session found to decrypt message|no senderkeyrecord found for decryption/i.test(text) ||
+        /^invalid signature!?$/i.test(text.trim()) ||
+        /invalid wire type|index out of range/i.test(text));
 //# sourceMappingURL=decode-wa-message.js.map

package/lib/Utils/noise-handler.js

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import { Boom } from '@hapi/boom';
 import { proto } from '../../WAProto/index.js';
 import { NOISE_MODE, WA_CERT_DETAILS } from '../Defaults/index.js';
 import { decodeBinaryNode } from '../WABinary/index.js';
-import { aesDecryptGCM, aesEncryptGCM, Curve, hkdf, sha256 } from './crypto.js';
+import { aesDecryptGCM, aesEncryptGCM, Curve, hkdf, keyMaterialToBuffer, sha256 } from './crypto.js';
 const generateIV = (counter) => {
     const iv = new ArrayBuffer(12);
     new DataView(iv).setUint32(8, counter);
@@ -94,6 +94,30 @@ export const makeNoiseHandler = ({ keyPair: { private: privateKey, public: publi
             if (!noiseKey?.public || !noiseKey?.private) {
                 throw new Error('AunuBaileys: creds.noiseKey is missing or incomplete — the auth state is incomplete or corrupt; restore a full backup or pair again');
             }
+            // AunuBaileys (1.0.79, addendum HB-102): the truthiness
+            // check above lets a WRONG-TYPED noiseKey through — a
+            // number/object died as a bare TypeError inside
+            // aesEncryptGCM, and a base64 string was silently
+            // encrypted as UTF-8 bytes, so the server received a
+            // garbage public key and the handshake failed remotely
+            // with no local diagnosis. Normalise with
+            // keyMaterialToBuffer (the HB-157 house rule) and
+            // require real 32-byte keys.
+            const noisePublic = keyMaterialToBuffer(noiseKey.public);
+            const noisePrivate = keyMaterialToBuffer(noiseKey.private);
+            if (!Buffer.isBuffer(noisePublic) || noisePublic.length !== 32 || !Buffer.isBuffer(noisePrivate) || noisePrivate.length !== 32) {
+                throw new Error('AunuBaileys: creds.noiseKey is malformed (public/private must be 32-byte keys) — the auth state is incomplete or corrupt; restore a full backup or pair again');
+            }
+            // AunuBaileys (1.0.79, HB-238): the first handshake frame
+            // is plaintext, so an intercepting middlebox (ISP
+            // intercept page, broken proxy) can deliver a decoded
+            // handshake with NO serverHello at all — the derefs
+            // below then threw a bare TypeError and the host
+            // reconnect-looped on it. Fail descriptively, in the
+            // HB-80/HB-102 style.
+            if (!serverHello || typeof serverHello !== 'object' || !(serverHello.ephemeral instanceof Uint8Array) || !(serverHello.static instanceof Uint8Array) || !(serverHello.payload instanceof Uint8Array)) {
+                throw new Error('AunuBaileys: the server handshake is malformed — serverHello or its encrypted parts are missing (the connection may have been intercepted); reconnecting will retry');
+            }
             authenticate(serverHello.ephemeral);
             await mixIntoKey(Curve.sharedKey(privateKey, serverHello.ephemeral));
             const decStaticContent = decrypt(serverHello.static);
@@ -104,8 +128,8 @@ export const makeNoiseHandler = ({ keyPair: { private: privateKey, public: publi
             if (issuerSerial !== WA_CERT_DETAILS.SERIAL) {
                 throw new Boom('certification match failed', { statusCode: 400 });
             }
-            const keyEnc = encrypt(noiseKey.public);
-            await mixIntoKey(Curve.sharedKey(noiseKey.private, serverHello.ephemeral));
+            const keyEnc = encrypt(noisePublic);
+            await mixIntoKey(Curve.sharedKey(noisePrivate, serverHello.ephemeral));
             return keyEnc;
         },
         encodeFrame: (data) => {

package/lib/Utils/process-message.js

@@ -100,7 +100,13 @@ export function decryptPollVote({ encPayload, encIv }, { pollCreatorJid, pollMsg
     }
 }
 const processMessage = async (message, { shouldProcessHistoryMsg, placeholderResendCache, ev, creds, keyStore, logger, options }) => {
-    const meId = creds.me.id;
+    // AunuBaileys (1.0.79, HB-131): creds.me is undefined until
+    // pairing completes; the bare deref threw a TypeError for any
+    // message/notification processed in that window (reached via
+    // upsertMessage, which does not pass cleanMessage first). Every
+    // consumer of meId below (isRealMessage, areJidsSameUser,
+    // jidNormalizedUser) already tolerates undefined.
+    const meId = creds.me?.id;
     const { accountSettings } = creds;
     const chat = { id: jidNormalizedUser(getChatId(message.key)) };
     const isRealMsg = isRealMessage(message, meId);

package/lib/Utils/signal.js

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import { KEY_BUNDLE_TYPE } from '../Defaults/index.js';
 import { assertNodeErrorFree, getBinaryNodeChild, getBinaryNodeChildBuffer, getBinaryNodeChildren, getBinaryNodeChildUInt, jidDecode, S_WHATSAPP_NET } from '../WABinary/index.js';
-import { Curve, generateSignalPubKey } from './crypto.js';
+import { Curve, generateSignalPubKey, keyMaterialToBuffer } from './crypto.js';
 import { encodeBigEndian } from './generics.js';
 // AunuBaileys (1.0.74): HB-98 — key material is only ever a Buffer
 // (or a string in a hand-edited creds file). Anything else is a
@@ -52,10 +52,13 @@ export const generateOrGetPreKeys = (creds, range) => {
 export const xmppSignedPreKey = (key) => ({
     tag: 'skey',
     attrs: {},
+    // AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-157): key material may be a base64 string
+    // in a hand-edited creds file — the node writer would otherwise
+    // publish the base64 TEXT as the key bytes.
     content: [
         { tag: 'id', attrs: {}, content: encodeBigEndian(key.keyId, 3) },
-        { tag: 'value', attrs: {}, content: key.keyPair.public },
-        { tag: 'signature', attrs: {}, content: key.signature }
+        { tag: 'value', attrs: {}, content: keyMaterialToBuffer(key.keyPair.public) },
+        { tag: 'signature', attrs: {}, content: keyMaterialToBuffer(key.signature) }
     ]
 });
 export const xmppPreKey = (pair, id) => ({
@@ -63,7 +66,7 @@ export const xmppPreKey = (pair, id) => ({
     attrs: {},
     content: [
         { tag: 'id', attrs: {}, content: encodeBigEndian(id, 3) },
-        { tag: 'value', attrs: {}, content: pair.public }
+        { tag: 'value', attrs: {}, content: keyMaterialToBuffer(pair.public) }
     ]
 });
 /** AunuBaileys: parse the E2E key bundle embedded in a retry receipt.
@@ -228,6 +231,12 @@ export const getNextPreKeysNode = async (state, count) => {
     if (!isKeyMaterial(creds.signedIdentityKey?.public) || !isKeyMaterial(creds.signedPreKey?.keyPair?.public) || !isKeyMaterial(creds.signedPreKey?.signature) || typeof creds.signedPreKey?.keyId === 'undefined') {
         throw new Error('AunuBaileys: creds.signedIdentityKey / creds.signedPreKey are missing or incomplete — the auth state is incomplete or corrupt; restore a full backup or pair again');
     }
+    // AunuBaileys (1.0.79, addendum HB-80): same gap as
+    // generateRegistrationNode — a missing registrationId silently
+    // became registration 00000000 in the node below.
+    if (!Number.isFinite(creds.registrationId)) {
+        throw new Error('AunuBaileys: creds.registrationId is missing or invalid — the auth state is incomplete or corrupt; restore a full backup or pair again');
+    }
     const { update, preKeys } = await getNextPreKeys(state, count);
     const node = {
         tag: 'iq',
@@ -239,7 +248,7 @@ export const getNextPreKeysNode = async (state, count) => {
         content: [
             { tag: 'registration', attrs: {}, content: encodeBigEndian(creds.registrationId) },
             { tag: 'type', attrs: {}, content: KEY_BUNDLE_TYPE },
-            { tag: 'identity', attrs: {}, content: creds.signedIdentityKey.public },
+            { tag: 'identity', attrs: {}, content: keyMaterialToBuffer(creds.signedIdentityKey.public) },
             { tag: 'list', attrs: {}, content: Object.keys(preKeys).map(k => xmppPreKey(preKeys[+k], +k)) },
             xmppSignedPreKey(creds.signedPreKey)
         ]

package/lib/Utils/use-multi-file-auth-state.js

@@ -36,6 +36,21 @@ const getFileLock = (path) => {
  * Again, I wouldn't endorse this for any production level use other than perhaps a bot.
  * Would recommend writing an auth state for use with a proper SQL or No-SQL DB
  * */
+// AunuBaileys (1.0.79, HB-151): the shape a complete creds state
+// must have at load. Key material follows the HB-98 test (a Buffer,
+// or a base64 string in a hand-edited file); the ids must be finite
+// numbers. Anything else is a partial/corrupt restore, not a state
+// the socket can run on.
+const isCredsKeyPair = (kp) => !!kp && typeof kp === 'object' && (Buffer.isBuffer(kp.private) || typeof kp.private === 'string') && (Buffer.isBuffer(kp.public) || typeof kp.public === 'string');
+const isValidCredsShape = (creds) => !!creds &&
+    typeof creds === 'object' &&
+    !Array.isArray(creds) &&
+    isCredsKeyPair(creds.noiseKey) &&
+    isCredsKeyPair(creds.signedIdentityKey) &&
+    isCredsKeyPair(creds.signedPreKey?.keyPair) &&
+    (Buffer.isBuffer(creds.signedPreKey?.signature) || typeof creds.signedPreKey?.signature === 'string') &&
+    Number.isFinite(creds.signedPreKey?.keyId) &&
+    Number.isFinite(creds.registrationId);
 export const useMultiFileAuthState = async (folder, logger) => {
     // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
     const writeData = async (data, file) => {
@@ -118,7 +133,21 @@ export const useMultiFileAuthState = async (folder, logger) => {
         await mkdir(folder, { recursive: true });
     }
     const fixFileName = (file) => file?.replace(/\//g, '__')?.replace(/:/g, '-');
-    const creds = (await readData('creds.json')) || initAuthCreds();
+    const storedCreds = await readData('creds.json');
+    // AunuBaileys (1.0.79, HB-151): a creds.json that parses to {} /
+    // a partial object / a non-object used to be accepted as a
+    // complete auth state (it is truthy), and every downstream
+    // consumer then failed in its own way — reconnect loops with
+    // misleading TypeErrors, indistinguishable from a lib bug.
+    // Validate at this one load choke point; a present-but-invalid
+    // creds is discarded loudly, exactly like a corrupt-JSON file
+    // since 1.0.63.
+    const creds = isValidCredsShape(storedCreds) ? storedCreds : (() => {
+        if (storedCreds) {
+            logger?.error({ file: 'creds.json' }, 'aunu: creds.json does not have the shape of a complete auth state — discarding it and starting fresh; restore a full backup or pair again');
+        }
+        return initAuthCreds();
+    })();
     let credsWriteInFlight = null;
     let credsWriteQueued = false;
     return {

package/lib/Utils/validate-connection.js

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import { createHash } from 'crypto';
 import { proto } from '../../WAProto/index.js';
 import { KEY_BUNDLE_TYPE } from '../Defaults/index.js';
 import { getBinaryNodeChild, jidDecode, S_WHATSAPP_NET } from '../WABinary/index.js';
-import { Curve, hmacSign } from './crypto.js';
+import { Curve, hmacSign, keyMaterialToBuffer } from './crypto.js';
 import { encodeBigEndian } from './generics.js';
 import { createSignalIdentity } from './signal.js';
 // AunuBaileys (1.0.74): HB-98 — key material is only ever a Buffer
@@ -60,7 +60,21 @@ export const generateLoginNode = (userJid, config) => {
     if (!decoded) {
         throw new Boom(`Invalid own JID for login node: ${userJid}`, { statusCode: 400 });
     }
-    const { user, device } = decoded;
+    const { user, device, server } = decoded;
+    // AunuBaileys (1.0.79, HB-234): the HB-43 guard above only
+    // checks that the JID decodes — a non-numeric user
+    // ('abc@s.whatsapp.net') was then silently coerced by +user to
+    // username 0 (or clamped to int64-max on a 26-digit overflow)
+    // and the login node went out carrying a WRONG identity,
+    // looping on server rejects. Validate the parts: the user must
+    // be all digits, non-zero and within int64 range; the server
+    // must be the user server; and a present device must be a
+    // finite number (jidDecode's +device turns 'xx' into NaN,
+    // which protobuf then silently encoded as 0).
+    const userValue = /^\d+$/.test(user) ? BigInt(user) : 0n;
+    if (userValue <= 0n || userValue > 9223372036854775807n || server !== 's.whatsapp.net' || (typeof device !== 'undefined' && !Number.isFinite(device))) {
+        throw new Boom(`Invalid own JID for login node: ${userJid}`, { statusCode: 400 });
+    }
     const payload = {
         ...getClientPayload(config),
         passive: false,
@@ -83,6 +97,14 @@ export const generateRegistrationNode = ({ registrationId, signedPreKey, signedI
     if (!isKeyMaterial(signedIdentityKey?.public) || !isKeyMaterial(signedPreKey?.keyPair?.public) || typeof signedPreKey?.keyId === 'undefined' || !isKeyMaterial(signedPreKey?.signature)) {
         throw new Error('AunuBaileys: creds.signedIdentityKey / creds.signedPreKey are missing or incomplete — the auth state is incomplete or corrupt; restore a full backup or pair again');
     }
+    // AunuBaileys (1.0.79, addendum HB-80): registrationId was NOT
+    // part of the guard — encodeBigEndian(undefined) does not
+    // throw, it silently produces eRegid 00000000, so a partial
+    // creds restore registered with a bogus registration id and
+    // no local signal at all.
+    if (!Number.isFinite(registrationId)) {
+        throw new Error('AunuBaileys: creds.registrationId is missing or invalid — the auth state is incomplete or corrupt; restore a full backup or pair again');
+    }
     // the app version needs to be md5 hashed
     // and passed in
     const safeVersion = Array.isArray(config.version) && config.version.length ? config.version : [2, 3000, 1043857760];
@@ -128,6 +150,14 @@ export const generateRegistrationNode = ({ registrationId, signedPreKey, signedI
 };
 export const configureSuccessfulPairing = (stanza, { advSecretKey, signedIdentityKey, signalIdentities }) => {
     const msgId = stanza.attrs.id;
+    // AunuBaileys (1.0.79, HB-80 sub-instance): the creds fields are
+    // dereferenced bare below (Buffer.from(advSecretKey, 'base64'),
+    // the identity concat/sign) — a partial creds died as a bare
+    // TypeError inside the pair-success handler. Fail descriptively,
+    // like the registration guards.
+    if (typeof advSecretKey !== 'string' || !advSecretKey || !isKeyMaterial(signedIdentityKey?.public) || !isKeyMaterial(signedIdentityKey?.private)) {
+        throw new Error('AunuBaileys: creds.advSecretKey / creds.signedIdentityKey are missing or incomplete — the auth state is incomplete or corrupt; restore a full backup or pair again');
+    }
     const pairSuccessNode = getBinaryNodeChild(stanza, 'pair-success');
     const deviceIdentityNode = getBinaryNodeChild(pairSuccessNode, 'device-identity');
     const platformNode = getBinaryNodeChild(pairSuccessNode, 'platform');
@@ -138,6 +168,19 @@ export const configureSuccessfulPairing = (stanza, { advSecretKey, signedIdentit
     }
     const bizName = businessNode?.attrs.name;
     const jid = deviceNode.attrs.jid;
+    // AunuBaileys (1.0.79, HB-239): a pair-success stanza without a
+    // device jid used to store me.id = undefined SILENTLY — pairing
+    // "succeeded", and the NEXT boot took the login path and looped
+    // on the HB-43 Boom 400 forever. Reject the stanza here, where
+    // the defect is. The addendum: a device-identity node without
+    // content died as protobufjs' bare 'Error: illegal buffer' —
+    // same missing-guard class, same fix.
+    if (typeof jid !== 'string' || !jid) {
+        throw new Boom('Missing jid on the device node in pair success stanza', { data: stanza });
+    }
+    if (!deviceIdentityNode.content?.length) {
+        throw new Boom('Missing content on the device-identity node in pair success stanza', { data: stanza });
+    }
     const { details, hmac, accountType } = proto.ADVSignedDeviceIdentityHMAC.decode(deviceIdentityNode.content);
     const isHostedAccount = accountType !== undefined && accountType === proto.ADVEncryptionType.HOSTED;
     const hmacPrefix = isHostedAccount ? Buffer.from([6, 5]) : Buffer.alloc(0);
@@ -147,12 +190,14 @@ export const configureSuccessfulPairing = (stanza, { advSecretKey, signedIdentit
     }
     const account = proto.ADVSignedDeviceIdentity.decode(details);
     const { accountSignatureKey, accountSignature, details: deviceDetails } = account;
-    const accountMsg = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([6, 0]), deviceDetails, signedIdentityKey.public]);
+    // AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-157): a string identity key is base64 —
+    // the raw concat used to die with a TypeError on string creds.
+    const accountMsg = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([6, 0]), deviceDetails, keyMaterialToBuffer(signedIdentityKey.public)]);
     if (!Curve.verify(accountSignatureKey, accountMsg, accountSignature)) {
         throw new Boom('Failed to verify account signature');
     }
     const devicePrefix = isHostedAccount ? Buffer.from([6, 6]) : Buffer.from([6, 1]);
-    const deviceMsg = Buffer.concat([devicePrefix, deviceDetails, signedIdentityKey.public, accountSignatureKey]);
+    const deviceMsg = Buffer.concat([devicePrefix, deviceDetails, keyMaterialToBuffer(signedIdentityKey.public), accountSignatureKey]);
     account.deviceSignature = Curve.sign(signedIdentityKey.private, deviceMsg);
     const identity = createSignalIdentity(jid, accountSignatureKey);
     const accountEnc = encodeSignedDeviceIdentity(account, false);

package/package.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "name": "@aunucore/baileys",
   "type": "module",
-  "version": "1.0.77",
+  "version": "1.0.79",
   "description": "AunuBaileys — the self-healing WhatsApp Web API for Node.js. Bad MAC and \"2000 messages into the future\" errors repair themselves, LID and phone-number identities stay in sync, anti-ban is built in, pairing codes are custom — plus 29 experimental features no other Baileys fork ships: invisible watermarks, per-person tag-all cards, side-profile text, ghost mentions and more. ESM, CJS and full TypeScript types.",
   "keywords": [
     "whatsapp",