@aunucore/baileys 1.0.76 → 1.0.78

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@@ -7,8 +7,26 @@ export class GroupSessionBuilder {
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  this.senderKeyStore = senderKeyStore;
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  }
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  async process(senderKeyName, senderKeyDistributionMessage) {
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+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-168): a malformed SKDM used to be
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+ // stored without any validation — a missing/empty distribution
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+ // message produced a junk state (keyId 0, empty chain seed,
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+ // empty signing key) that passed the load-time guard, and five
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+ // of them (MAX_STATES) evicted the author's good state, after
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+ // which every legitimate message from that author failed with
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+ // 'No session found'. Refuse anything that cannot possibly
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+ // work: a numeric id and iteration, a 32-byte chain key and a
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+ // 32/33-byte signing key (our own builder emits 32 + 33).
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+ const id = senderKeyDistributionMessage.getId();
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+ const iteration = senderKeyDistributionMessage.getIteration();
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+ const chainKey = senderKeyDistributionMessage.getChainKey();
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+ const signatureKey = senderKeyDistributionMessage.getSignatureKey();
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+ if (!Number.isFinite(id) || !Number.isFinite(iteration) ||
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+ !Buffer.isBuffer(chainKey) || chainKey.length !== 32 ||
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+ !Buffer.isBuffer(signatureKey) || (signatureKey.length !== 32 && signatureKey.length !== 33)) {
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+ return;
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+ }
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  const senderKeyRecord = await this.senderKeyStore.loadSenderKey(senderKeyName);
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- senderKeyRecord.addSenderKeyState(senderKeyDistributionMessage.getId(), senderKeyDistributionMessage.getIteration(), senderKeyDistributionMessage.getChainKey(), senderKeyDistributionMessage.getSignatureKey());
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+ senderKeyRecord.addSenderKeyState(id, iteration, chainKey, signatureKey);
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  await this.senderKeyStore.storeSenderKey(senderKeyName, senderKeyRecord);
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  }
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  async create(senderKeyName) {
@@ -5,10 +5,19 @@ export class SenderChainKey {
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  constructor(iteration, chainKey) {
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  this.MESSAGE_KEY_SEED = Buffer.from([0x01]);
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  this.CHAIN_KEY_SEED = Buffer.from([0x02]);
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- this.iteration = iteration;
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+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-162/HB-180): a stored string seed is
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+ // base64 (the house format), not UTF-8 text, and a numeric
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+ // string iteration must become a number — '5' + 1 === '51'
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+ // concatenation poisoned the chain. Stored records are
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+ // sanitised at load (sender-key-record.js); this is the same
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+ // normalisation for direct constructions.
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+ this.iteration = typeof iteration === 'string' && /^-?\d+$/.test(iteration.trim()) ? Number(iteration) : iteration;
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  if (chainKey instanceof Buffer) {
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  this.chainKey = chainKey;
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  }
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+ else if (typeof chainKey === 'string') {
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+ this.chainKey = Buffer.from(chainKey, 'base64');
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+ }
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  else {
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  this.chainKey = Buffer.from(chainKey || []);
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  }
@@ -8,8 +8,10 @@ export class SenderKeyDistributionMessage extends CiphertextMessage {
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  const message = serialized.slice(1);
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  const distributionMessage = proto.SenderKeyDistributionMessage.decode(message).toJSON();
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  this.serialized = serialized;
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- this.id = distributionMessage.id;
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- this.iteration = distributionMessage.iteration;
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+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-186): same proto3 default
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+ // omission as SenderKeyMessage — normalise to 0.
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+ this.id = distributionMessage.id ?? 0;
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+ this.iteration = distributionMessage.iteration ?? 0;
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  this.chainKey =
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  typeof distributionMessage.chainKey === 'string'
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  ? Buffer.from(distributionMessage.chainKey, 'base64')
@@ -13,8 +13,15 @@ export class SenderKeyMessage extends CiphertextMessage {
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  const senderKeyMessage = proto.SenderKeyMessage.decode(message).toJSON();
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  this.serialized = serialized;
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  this.messageVersion = (version & 0xff) >> 4;
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- this.keyId = senderKeyMessage.id;
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- this.iteration = senderKeyMessage.iteration;
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+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-186/HB-217): proto3 encoders omit
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+ // default-valued fields, so a canonical peer's id 0 /
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+ // iteration 0 arrive as undefined. Normalise to 0 — an
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+ // undefined iteration made getSenderKey return the CURRENT
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+ // chain key (every comparison against undefined is false)
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+ // and an undefined keyId selected the LAST state in the
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+ // record instead of state 0.
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+ this.keyId = senderKeyMessage.id ?? 0;
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+ this.iteration = senderKeyMessage.iteration ?? 0;
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  this.ciphertext =
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  typeof senderKeyMessage.ciphertext === 'string'
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  ? Buffer.from(senderKeyMessage.ciphertext, 'base64')
@@ -1,5 +1,86 @@
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  import { BufferJSON } from '../../Utils/generics.js';
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  import { SenderKeyState } from './sender-key-state.js';
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+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-124/HB-162/HB-180/HB-197): stored sender-key
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+ // states used to be checked for EXISTENCE only — a hand-edited or
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+ // corrupt sender-key-*.json could carry a number where a seed belongs
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+ // (raw TypeError on every group decrypt/encrypt), a base64 string the
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+ // chain key decoded as UTF-8 (silently wrong keys), a string iteration
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+ // ('5' + 1 === '51' — concatenation poisoned the chain and bricked
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+ // group sends with 'Over 2000 messages into the future!'), a missing
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+ // iteration (NaN — every SKM went out with wire iteration 0 forever),
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+ // or a string/missing senderKeyId (strict === lookup always missed).
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+ // Normalise what has a documented house format (base64 strings,
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+ // numeric strings) and DROP what cannot be made valid — a dropped
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+ // state self-heals via a fresh SKDM / a fresh own state, a poisoned
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+ // one never does. Key material produced by our own serializer always
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+ // satisfies these shapes (32-byte seeds, 32/33-byte signing public).
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+ const storedSeedToBuffer = (value) => Buffer.isBuffer(value)
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+ ? value
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+ : (typeof value === 'string' ? Buffer.from(value, 'base64') : null);
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+ const storedCountToNumber = (value) => {
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+ if (typeof value === 'number') {
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+ return Number.isInteger(value) ? value : null;
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+ }
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+ if (typeof value === 'string' && /^-?\d+$/.test(value.trim())) {
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+ const n = Number(value);
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+ return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : null;
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+ }
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+ return null;
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+ };
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+ const sanitizeSenderKeyStructure = (structure) => {
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+ const chainKey = structure.senderChainKey;
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+ const signingKey = structure.senderSigningKey;
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+ if (!chainKey || typeof chainKey !== 'object' || !signingKey || typeof signingKey !== 'object') {
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+ return null;
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+ }
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+ const seed = storedSeedToBuffer(chainKey.seed);
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+ if (!seed || seed.length !== 32) {
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+ return null;
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+ }
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+ const iteration = storedCountToNumber(chainKey.iteration);
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+ if (iteration === null) {
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+ return null;
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+ }
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+ const signingPublic = storedSeedToBuffer(signingKey.public);
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+ if (!signingPublic || (signingPublic.length !== 32 && signingPublic.length !== 33)) {
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+ return null;
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+ }
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+ const cleanSigning = { public: signingPublic };
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+ if (typeof signingKey.private !== 'undefined') {
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+ const signingPrivate = storedSeedToBuffer(signingKey.private);
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+ if (!signingPrivate || signingPrivate.length !== 32) {
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+ return null;
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+ }
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+ cleanSigning.private = signingPrivate;
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+ }
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+ const keyId = storedCountToNumber(structure.senderKeyId);
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+ if (keyId === null) {
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+ return null;
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+ }
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+ // senderMessageKeys: drop individual entries that cannot be used
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+ // (HB-124 addenda) instead of dropping the whole state — the chain
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+ // itself is still good.
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+ const messageKeys = [];
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+ if (Array.isArray(structure.senderMessageKeys)) {
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+ for (const entry of structure.senderMessageKeys) {
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+ if (!entry || typeof entry !== 'object') {
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+ continue;
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+ }
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+ const mkIteration = storedCountToNumber(entry.iteration);
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+ const mkSeed = storedSeedToBuffer(entry.seed);
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+ if (mkIteration === null || !mkSeed || mkSeed.length !== 32) {
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+ continue;
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+ }
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+ messageKeys.push({ iteration: mkIteration, seed: mkSeed });
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+ }
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+ }
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+ return {
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+ senderKeyId: keyId,
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+ senderChainKey: { iteration, seed },
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+ senderSigningKey: cleanSigning,
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+ senderMessageKeys: messageKeys
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+ };
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+ };
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  export class SenderKeyRecord {
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  constructor(serialized) {
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  this.MAX_STATES = 5;
@@ -15,11 +96,18 @@ export class SenderKeyRecord {
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  // store) used to load "fine" and then throw a bare
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  // TypeError on every group send, forever (HB-69).
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  // Skip entries that cannot possibly work.
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- if (!structure || typeof structure !== 'object' ||
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- !structure.senderChainKey || !structure.senderSigningKey) {
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+ // (1.0.78, HB-124/HB-162/HB-180/HB-197): existence is
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+ // not enough — sanitise the field TYPES (see
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+ // sanitizeSenderKeyStructure above) and skip states
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+ // that stay invalid after normalisation.
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+ if (!structure || typeof structure !== 'object') {
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+ continue;
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+ }
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+ const clean = sanitizeSenderKeyStructure(structure);
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+ if (!clean) {
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  continue;
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  }
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- this.senderKeyStates.push(new SenderKeyState(null, null, null, null, null, null, structure));
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+ this.senderKeyStates.push(new SenderKeyState(null, null, null, null, null, null, clean));
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  }
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  }
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  }
@@ -9,8 +9,15 @@ import { GroupCipher, GroupSessionBuilder, SenderKeyDistributionMessage } from '
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  // (or a string in a hand-edited creds file). Anything else is a
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  // wrong-typed corrupt value, not key material.
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  const isKeyMaterial = (value) => Buffer.isBuffer(value) || typeof value === 'string';
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+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-157): string key material is base64 (the
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+ // house format) — decode it as such instead of Buffer.from()'s UTF-8,
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+ // which produced 44-byte garbage keys and failed every new session.
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+ const storedKeyToBuffer = (value) => typeof value === 'string' ? Buffer.from(value, 'base64') : value;
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  export function makeLibSignalRepository(auth) {
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  const storage = signalStorage(auth);
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+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-240): in-flight serialisation for
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+ // encryptGroupMessage, per group — see that method.
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+ const groupEncryptChains = new Map();
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  return {
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  decryptGroupMessage({ group, authorJid, msg }) {
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  const senderName = jidToSignalSenderKeyName(group, authorJid);
@@ -55,20 +62,38 @@ export function makeLibSignalRepository(auth) {
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  return { type, ciphertext: Buffer.from(body, 'binary') };
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  },
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  async encryptGroupMessage({ group, meId, data }) {
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- const senderName = jidToSignalSenderKeyName(group, meId);
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- const builder = new GroupSessionBuilder(storage);
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- const senderNameStr = senderName.toString();
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- const { [senderNameStr]: senderKey } = await auth.keys.get('sender-key', [senderNameStr]);
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- if (!senderKey) {
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- await storage.storeSenderKey(senderName, new SenderKeyRecord());
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- }
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- const senderKeyDistributionMessage = await builder.create(senderName);
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- const session = new GroupCipher(storage, senderName);
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- const ciphertext = await session.encrypt(data);
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- return {
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- ciphertext,
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- senderKeyDistributionMessage: senderKeyDistributionMessage.serialize()
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+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-240): serialise per group.
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+ // GroupSessionBuilder.create() runs OUTSIDE GroupCipher's
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+ // per-group queueJob, so two concurrent first-sends to the
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+ // same group (empty sender-key record) both created a
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+ // fresh key and overwrote each other — the loser returned
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+ // an SKDM that did not match the ciphertext it encrypted
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+ // (which used the winner's stored state), and every peer
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+ // failed that first message. Chain the whole
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+ // create+encrypt per group; different groups still run in
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+ // parallel.
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+ const run = async () => {
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+ const senderName = jidToSignalSenderKeyName(group, meId);
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+ const builder = new GroupSessionBuilder(storage);
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+ const senderNameStr = senderName.toString();
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+ const { [senderNameStr]: senderKey } = await auth.keys.get('sender-key', [senderNameStr]);
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+ if (!senderKey) {
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+ await storage.storeSenderKey(senderName, new SenderKeyRecord());
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+ }
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+ const senderKeyDistributionMessage = await builder.create(senderName);
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+ const session = new GroupCipher(storage, senderName);
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+ const ciphertext = await session.encrypt(data);
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+ return {
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+ ciphertext,
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+ senderKeyDistributionMessage: senderKeyDistributionMessage.serialize()
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+ };
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  };
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+ const prev = groupEncryptChains.get(group) ?? Promise.resolve();
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+ const chained = prev.then(run);
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+ // the stored chain must never stay rejected, or one failed
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+ // send would poison every later send to the group
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+ groupEncryptChains.set(group, chained.catch(() => { }));
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+ return chained;
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  },
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  async deleteSenderKey(group, authorJid) {
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  const senderNameStr = jidToSignalSenderKeyName(group, authorJid).toString();
@@ -133,10 +158,13 @@ function signalStorage({ creds, keys }) {
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  // classifier and misleads diagnostics. Say what is
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  // actually wrong; the 3-strike self-heal still clears
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  // the poisoned record via deleteSession.
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- if (err instanceof TypeError) {
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- throw new Error(`AunuBaileys: stored session record for ${id} is corrupt or malformed and cannot be deserialized; delete the session and re-establish it`);
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- }
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- throw err;
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+ // (1.0.78, HB-110): the conversion used to cover only
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+ // TypeError — a record with a non-v1 version throws a
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+ // plain Error('Error migrating SessionRecord') from
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+ // libsignal and escaped raw. Convert EVERY
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+ // deserialize failure; the behaviour (3-strike
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+ // self-heal) is identical, only the message improves.
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+ throw new Error(`AunuBaileys: stored session record for ${id} is corrupt or malformed and cannot be deserialized; delete the session and re-establish it`);
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  }
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  }
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  },
@@ -164,8 +192,8 @@ function signalStorage({ creds, keys }) {
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  return undefined;
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  }
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  return {
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- privKey: Buffer.from(key.private),
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- pubKey: Buffer.from(key.public)
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+ privKey: storedKeyToBuffer(key.private),
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+ pubKey: storedKeyToBuffer(key.public)
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  };
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  }
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  },
@@ -184,8 +212,8 @@ function signalStorage({ creds, keys }) {
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  throw new Error('AunuBaileys: creds.signedPreKey is missing or incomplete — the auth state is incomplete or corrupt; restore a full backup or pair again');
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  }
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  return {
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- privKey: Buffer.from(key.keyPair.private),
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- pubKey: Buffer.from(key.keyPair.public)
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+ privKey: storedKeyToBuffer(key.keyPair.private),
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+ pubKey: storedKeyToBuffer(key.keyPair.public)
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  };
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  },
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  loadSenderKey: async (senderKeyName) => {
@@ -212,7 +240,7 @@ function signalStorage({ creds, keys }) {
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  throw new Error('Our signed identity key is missing or incomplete — the auth state is corrupt; re-pair the device');
213
241
  }
214
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  return {
215
- privKey: Buffer.from(signedIdentityKey.private),
243
+ privKey: storedKeyToBuffer(signedIdentityKey.private),
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  pubKey: generateSignalPubKey(signedIdentityKey.public)
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  };
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  }
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import Long from 'long';
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  import { proto } from '../../WAProto/index.js';
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  import { DEFAULT_CACHE_TTLS, KEY_BUNDLE_TYPE, MIN_PREKEY_COUNT } from '../Defaults/index.js';
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  import { WAMessageStatus, WAMessageStubType } from '../Types/index.js';
8
- import { aesDecryptCTR, aesEncryptGCM, cleanMessage, Curve, decodeMediaRetryNode, decodeMessageNode, decryptMessageNode, delay, derivePairingCodeKey, encodeBigEndian, encodeSignedDeviceIdentity, getCallStatusFromNode, getHistoryMsg, getNextPreKeys, getStatusFromReceiptType, hkdf, isBadMacError, isUnrecoverableSessionError, MISSING_KEYS_ERROR_TEXT, NACK_REASONS, NO_MESSAGE_FOUND_ERROR_TEXT, buildCallControlStanza, parseRetryReceiptSession, setBotMessageSecret, unixTimestampSeconds, xmppPreKey, xmppSignedPreKey } from '../Utils/index.js';
8
+ import { aesDecryptCTR, aesEncryptGCM, cleanMessage, Curve, decodeMediaRetryNode, decodeMessageNode, decryptMessageNode, delay, derivePairingCodeKey, encodeBigEndian, encodeSignedDeviceIdentity, getCallStatusFromNode, getHistoryMsg, getNextPreKeys, getStatusFromReceiptType, hkdf, isBadMacError, isSenderKeyUnavailableError, isUnrecoverableSessionError, keyMaterialToBuffer, MISSING_KEYS_ERROR_TEXT, NACK_REASONS, NO_MESSAGE_FOUND_ERROR_TEXT, buildCallControlStanza, parseRetryReceiptSession, setBotMessageSecret, unixTimestampSeconds, xmppPreKey, xmppSignedPreKey } from '../Utils/index.js';
9
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  import { makeMutex } from '../Utils/make-mutex.js';
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  import { sentMessageCacheFor } from '../Utils/sent-message-cache.js';
11
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  import { createOfflineNodeQueue } from '../Utils/offline-queue.js';
@@ -545,7 +545,10 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config) => {
545
545
  info: 'link_code_pairing_key_bundle_encryption_key'
546
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  });
547
547
  const encryptPayload = Buffer.concat([
548
- Buffer.from(authState.creds.signedIdentityKey.public),
548
+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-157): a string identity key
549
+ // is base64 — Buffer.from() decoded it as UTF-8 and
550
+ // put a 44-byte garbage identity in the payload.
551
+ keyMaterialToBuffer(authState.creds.signedIdentityKey.public),
549
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  primaryIdentityPublicKey,
550
553
  random
551
554
  ]);
@@ -923,6 +926,16 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config) => {
923
926
  // sender key saja tidak menyentuh sesi E2E yang
924
927
  // rusak. Kelas ini direset SEKETIKA.
925
928
  const sessionLayerFailure = isUnrecoverableSessionError(msg?.messageStubParameters?.[0]);
929
+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-223): a group
930
+ // failure where the sender key is simply
931
+ // absent (or the skmsg payload itself is
932
+ // malformed) says nothing about the
933
+ // author's E2E session — do not count it
934
+ // toward the session reset and do not
935
+ // report it as a healable failure; the
936
+ // retry receipt below is the whole fix,
937
+ // it makes the peer redistribute its key.
938
+ const senderKeyUnavailable = isGroupMsg && isSenderKeyUnavailableError(msg?.messageStubParameters?.[0]);
926
939
  let healed = false;
927
940
  const resetE2ESession = async () => {
928
941
  await signalRepository.deleteSession(author);
@@ -933,7 +946,10 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config) => {
933
946
  await signalRepository.deleteSession(alt);
934
947
  }
935
948
  };
936
- if (sessionLayerFailure) {
949
+ if (senderKeyUnavailable) {
950
+ logger.debug({ author, addr, group: msg.key.remoteJid }, 'aunu: group decrypt failed because the sender key is unavailable or the skmsg is malformed; retry receipt only, no session reset');
951
+ }
952
+ else if (sessionLayerFailure) {
937
953
  await resetE2ESession();
938
954
  if (isGroupMsg) {
939
955
  await signalRepository.deleteSenderKey(msg.key.remoteJid, author);
@@ -977,6 +993,7 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config) => {
977
993
  // AunuBaileys: structured decrypt-failure event so
978
994
  // consumers can alert and aggregate on Bad MAC
979
995
  // floods (B-01) instead of parsing log lines.
996
+ if (!senderKeyUnavailable) {
980
997
  ev.emit('messages.decrypt-failure', {
981
998
  remoteJid: msg.key.remoteJid,
982
999
  author,
@@ -988,6 +1005,7 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config) => {
988
1005
  messageId: node.attrs.id,
989
1006
  timestamp: Date.now()
990
1007
  });
1008
+ }
991
1009
  }
992
1010
  catch (healErr) {
993
1011
  logger.debug({ err: healErr }, 'aunu: session self-heal step failed, continuing with normal retry');
@@ -334,12 +334,23 @@ export const makeMessagesSocket = (config) => {
334
334
  // the transport to reopen, bounded by connectTimeoutMs; a connection
335
335
  // that closes for good still fails fast via waitForSocketOpen itself.
336
336
  const waitMs = config.connectTimeoutMs ?? 60000;
337
- await Promise.race([
338
- waitForSocketOpen(),
339
- delay(waitMs).then(() => {
340
- throw new Boom(`Timed out waiting ${waitMs}ms for the connection to open before sending`, { statusCode: 408 }); // 408 = DisconnectReason.timedOut
341
- })
342
- ]);
337
+ const openWait = waitForSocketOpen();
338
+ try {
339
+ await Promise.race([
340
+ openWait,
341
+ delay(waitMs).then(() => {
342
+ throw new Boom(`Timed out waiting ${waitMs}ms for the connection to open before sending`, { statusCode: 408 }); // 408 = DisconnectReason.timedOut
343
+ })
344
+ ]);
345
+ }
346
+ catch (err) {
347
+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.77, HB-167): when the timeout wins,
348
+ // the socket-open waiter is still pending — detach its
349
+ // ws listeners now instead of leaving three behind per
350
+ // failed send until the socket settles on its own.
351
+ openWait.cancel?.();
352
+ throw err;
353
+ }
343
354
  }
344
355
  // AunuBaileys (1.0.68): fail with a clear Boom instead of a raw
345
356
  // TypeError when sending before pairing completes or with a
@@ -528,7 +539,17 @@ export const makeMessagesSocket = (config) => {
528
539
  attrs: { v: '2', type: 'skmsg' },
529
540
  content: ciphertext
530
541
  });
531
- await authState.keys.set({ 'sender-key-memory': { [jid]: senderKeyMap } });
542
+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-132/HB-155): persist the map
543
+ // only when it was actually loaded from the store
544
+ // (same condition as the load above). A participant-
545
+ // targeted send starts from {} without loading, so
546
+ // writing its partial map back overwrote the full
547
+ // memo — and silently undid sendMessagesAgain's
548
+ // deliberate null, which exists to force a full
549
+ // redistribution on the next normal send.
550
+ if (!participant && !isStatus) {
551
+ await authState.keys.set({ 'sender-key-memory': { [jid]: senderKeyMap } });
552
+ }
532
553
  }
533
554
  else {
534
555
  const meUser = jidDecode(meId)?.user;
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import { executeWMexQuery } from './mex.js';
9
9
  import { makeLIDStore } from '../Utils/lid-store.js';
10
10
  import { createIgnoreFilter } from '../Utils/ignore-filter.js';
11
11
  import { QueryIds, XWAPaths } from '../Types/index.js';
12
- import { addTransactionCapability, aesEncryptCTR, bindWaitForConnectionUpdate, bytesToCrockford, configureSuccessfulPairing, Curve, derivePairingCodeKey, generateLoginNode, generateMdTagPrefix, generateRegistrationNode, getCodeFromWSError, getErrorCodeFromStreamError, getNextPreKeysNode, getPlatformId, fetchLatestWaWebVersion, makeEventBuffer, makeNoiseHandler, promiseTimeout } from '../Utils/index.js';
12
+ import { addTransactionCapability, aesEncryptCTR, bindWaitForConnectionUpdate, bytesToCrockford, configureSuccessfulPairing, Curve, derivePairingCodeKey, generateLoginNode, generateMdTagPrefix, generateRegistrationNode, getCodeFromWSError, getErrorCodeFromStreamError, getNextPreKeysNode, getPlatformId, fetchLatestWaWebVersion, keyMaterialToBuffer, makeEventBuffer, makeNoiseHandler, promiseTimeout } from '../Utils/index.js';
13
13
  import { assertNodeErrorFree, binaryNodeToString, encodeBinaryNode, getBinaryNodeChild, getBinaryNodeChildren, jidEncode, S_WHATSAPP_NET } from '../WABinary/index.js';
14
14
  import { WebSocketClient } from './Client/index.js';
15
15
  /**
@@ -92,6 +92,15 @@ export const makeSocket = (config) => {
92
92
  let epoch = 1;
93
93
  let keepAliveReq;
94
94
  let qrTimer;
95
+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.77, HB-243): true while a pair-device QR chain
96
+ // is cycling — a duplicate pair-device IQ must not start a second
97
+ // chain on the shared qrTimer slot.
98
+ let qrChainActive = false;
99
+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.77, HB-213): resolved when the Noise handshake
100
+ // completes (finishInit in validateConnection), so the pairing
101
+ // request can wait for an encrypted channel.
102
+ let resolveHandshakeComplete;
103
+ const handshakeComplete = new Promise((resolve) => { resolveHandshakeComplete = resolve; });
95
104
  let closed = false;
96
105
  let lastDisconnectError;
97
106
  const uqTagId = generateMdTagPrefix();
@@ -226,6 +235,7 @@ export const makeSocket = (config) => {
226
235
  }
227
236
  }).finish());
228
237
  noise.finishInit();
238
+ resolveHandshakeComplete?.();
229
239
  startKeepAliveRequest();
230
240
  };
231
241
  const getAvailablePreKeysOnServer = async () => {
@@ -278,12 +288,17 @@ export const makeSocket = (config) => {
278
288
  await uploadPreKeys();
279
289
  }
280
290
  };
291
+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.77, HB-156): decodeFrame invocations must never
292
+ // overlap — the noise handler slices ONE shared inBytes buffer, so
293
+ // two concurrent calls interleave and deliver stanzas out of wire
294
+ // order. Every WS message is chained through a single queue.
295
+ let frameDecodeChain = Promise.resolve();
281
296
  const onMessageReceived = (data) => {
282
297
  // AunuBaileys (1.0.67): decodeFrame is async — a malformed frame
283
298
  // (bad GCM tag, truncated binary node) or a throwing frame
284
299
  // listener must not become an unhandled rejection that kills
285
300
  // the process; route failures to onUnexpectedError instead.
286
- Promise.resolve(noise.decodeFrame(data, frame => {
301
+ frameDecodeChain = frameDecodeChain.then(() => noise.decodeFrame(data, frame => {
287
302
  // reset ping timeout
288
303
  lastDateRecv = new Date();
289
304
  let anyTriggered = false;
@@ -311,7 +326,20 @@ export const makeSocket = (config) => {
311
326
  logger.debug({ unhandled: true, msgId, fromMe: false, frame }, 'communication recv');
312
327
  }
313
328
  }
314
- })).catch(err => onUnexpectedError(err, 'onMessageReceived'));
329
+ })).catch(err => {
330
+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.77, HB-185/HB-207): a frame-layer failure
331
+ // (oversize header, GCM decrypt failure) leaves the noise
332
+ // stream unrecoverable — the header is never consumed, or
333
+ // the read counter desyncs so every later frame fails too.
334
+ // End the connection so the host reconnects at once instead
335
+ // of wedging until the keep-alive watchdog notices (~65s).
336
+ if (err?.isFrameFatal) {
337
+ end(err);
338
+ }
339
+ else {
340
+ onUnexpectedError(err, 'onMessageReceived');
341
+ }
342
+ });
315
343
  };
316
344
  // AunuBaileys: socket end handlers (pola v7) + fetch Mex (dari @itsliaaa/baileys)
317
345
  const socketEndHandlers = [];
@@ -329,6 +357,7 @@ export const makeSocket = (config) => {
329
357
  logger.info({ trace: error?.stack }, error ? 'connection errored' : 'connection closed');
330
358
  clearInterval(keepAliveReq);
331
359
  clearTimeout(qrTimer);
360
+ qrChainActive = false;
332
361
  ws.removeAllListeners('close');
333
362
  ws.removeAllListeners('open');
334
363
  ws.removeAllListeners('message');
@@ -354,16 +383,20 @@ export const makeSocket = (config) => {
354
383
  ev.removeAllListeners('connection.update');
355
384
  ev.destroy?.();
356
385
  };
357
- const waitForSocketOpen = async () => {
386
+ const waitForSocketOpen = () => {
358
387
  if (ws.isOpen) {
359
- return;
388
+ const resolved = Promise.resolve();
389
+ resolved.cancel = () => { };
390
+ return resolved;
360
391
  }
361
392
  if (ws.isClosed || ws.isClosing) {
362
- throw new Boom('Connection Closed', { statusCode: DisconnectReason.connectionClosed });
393
+ const rejected = Promise.reject(new Boom('Connection Closed', { statusCode: DisconnectReason.connectionClosed }));
394
+ rejected.cancel = () => { };
395
+ return rejected;
363
396
  }
364
397
  let onOpen;
365
398
  let onClose;
366
- await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
399
+ const promise = new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
367
400
  onOpen = () => resolve(undefined);
368
401
  onClose = mapWebSocketError(reject);
369
402
  ws.on('open', onOpen);
@@ -374,6 +407,16 @@ export const makeSocket = (config) => {
374
407
  ws.off('close', onClose);
375
408
  ws.off('error', onClose);
376
409
  });
410
+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.77, HB-167/HB-179): a caller that stops
411
+ // waiting (its own timeout won the race) can detach these
412
+ // listeners immediately instead of leaving them on the ws
413
+ // emitter until the socket happens to open/close/error.
414
+ promise.cancel = () => {
415
+ ws.off('open', onOpen);
416
+ ws.off('close', onClose);
417
+ ws.off('error', onClose);
418
+ };
419
+ return promise;
377
420
  };
378
421
  const keepAliveTick = () => {
379
422
  if (!lastDateRecv) {
@@ -501,15 +544,55 @@ export const makeSocket = (config) => {
501
544
  reject(new Boom(`requestPairingCode: socket did not open within ${PAIRING_READY_TIMEOUT_MS / 1000}s (last disconnect: ${describeLastDisconnect()})`, { statusCode: DisconnectReason.timedOut }));
502
545
  }, PAIRING_READY_TIMEOUT_MS);
503
546
  });
547
+ const rawOpenWait = waitForSocketOpen();
504
548
  try {
505
549
  await Promise.race([
506
- waitForSocketOpen().catch(() => {
550
+ rawOpenWait.catch(() => {
507
551
  throw new Boom(`requestPairingCode: connection closed while waiting for the socket to open (last disconnect: ${describeLastDisconnect()})`, { statusCode: DisconnectReason.connectionClosed });
508
552
  }),
509
553
  closedWhileWaiting,
510
554
  timedOut
511
555
  ]);
512
556
  }
557
+ finally {
558
+ clearTimeout(timer);
559
+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.77, HB-179): if the timeout or the close
560
+ // guard won the race, the socket-open waiter is still
561
+ // pending — detach its ws listeners now instead of leaving
562
+ // them behind until the socket settles on its own.
563
+ rawOpenWait.cancel?.();
564
+ if (onUpdate) {
565
+ try {
566
+ ev.off('connection.update', onUpdate);
567
+ }
568
+ catch { }
569
+ }
570
+ }
571
+ };
572
+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.77, HB-213): the pairing IQ must not leave
573
+ // before the Noise handshake completes — encodeFrame encrypts
574
+ // only once the handshake is finished, so an early IQ travels as
575
+ // a plaintext binary node; a strict server kills the connection
576
+ // over it while requestPairingCode still resolves with the code.
577
+ const waitForHandshakeComplete = async () => {
578
+ let onUpdate;
579
+ const closedWhileWaiting = new Promise((_, reject) => {
580
+ onUpdate = (update) => {
581
+ if (update.connection === 'close') {
582
+ reject(new Boom(`requestPairingCode: connection closed while waiting for the handshake to complete (last disconnect: ${describeLastDisconnect()})`, { statusCode: DisconnectReason.connectionClosed }));
583
+ }
584
+ };
585
+ ev.on('connection.update', onUpdate);
586
+ });
587
+ let timer;
588
+ const timedOut = new Promise((_, reject) => {
589
+ timer = setTimeout(() => {
590
+ reject(new Boom(`requestPairingCode: handshake did not complete within ${PAIRING_READY_TIMEOUT_MS / 1000}s (last disconnect: ${describeLastDisconnect()})`, { statusCode: DisconnectReason.timedOut }));
591
+ }, PAIRING_READY_TIMEOUT_MS);
592
+ });
593
+ try {
594
+ await Promise.race([handshakeComplete, closedWhileWaiting, timedOut]);
595
+ }
513
596
  finally {
514
597
  clearTimeout(timer);
515
598
  if (onUpdate) {
@@ -534,13 +617,20 @@ export const makeSocket = (config) => {
534
617
  pairingCodeRequestInFlight = true;
535
618
  try {
536
619
  await waitForPairingReady();
620
+ await waitForHandshakeComplete();
537
621
  authState.creds.pairingCode = pairingCode;
538
622
  authState.creds.me = {
539
623
  id: jidEncode(phoneNumber, 's.whatsapp.net'),
540
624
  name: '~'
541
625
  };
542
626
  ev.emit('creds.update', authState.creds);
543
- await sendNode({
627
+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.77, HB-191): query(), not sendNode() — the
628
+ // companion_hello result must be awaited and error-checked.
629
+ // sendNode resolved when the bytes hit the wire, so a server
630
+ // rejection left the optimistic creds.me/pairingCode persisted
631
+ // and sent the next boot into a 401 loop; a rejection now
632
+ // lands in the catch below, which rolls the creds back.
633
+ await query({
544
634
  tag: 'iq',
545
635
  attrs: {
546
636
  to: S_WHATSAPP_NET,
@@ -644,6 +734,16 @@ export const makeSocket = (config) => {
644
734
  }
645
735
  });
646
736
  ws.on('error', mapWebSocketError(end));
737
+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.77, HB-189): the ws client forwards
738
+ // 'unexpected-response', which suppresses ws's own handshake
739
+ // abort — without a listener here a non-101 response (403/502,
740
+ // ISP intercept page) wedges the socket in 'connecting' forever:
741
+ // no open, no error, no close, and the host never reconnects.
742
+ ws.on('unexpected-response', (_req, res) => {
743
+ const code = res?.statusCode;
744
+ const statusCode = Number.isFinite(code) && code >= 400 && code <= 599 ? code : 500;
745
+ end(new Boom(`Unexpected server response: ${code}`, { statusCode }));
746
+ });
647
747
  ws.on('close', () => end(new Boom('Connection Terminated', { statusCode: DisconnectReason.connectionClosed })));
648
748
  // the server terminated the connection
649
749
  ws.on('CB:xmlstreamend', () => end(new Boom('Connection Terminated by Server', { statusCode: DisconnectReason.connectionClosed })));
@@ -662,14 +762,28 @@ export const makeSocket = (config) => {
662
762
  }
663
763
  };
664
764
  await sendNode(iq);
765
+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.77, HB-243): a duplicate pair-device IQ
766
+ // (server retry) must not start a parallel QR chain — both
767
+ // chains share the single qrTimer slot, so the orphaned first
768
+ // chain keeps cycling after login and its ref exhaustion ends
769
+ // the healthy, freshly logged-in connection.
770
+ if (qrChainActive) {
771
+ logger.warn('ignoring duplicate pair-device IQ: a QR chain is already running');
772
+ return;
773
+ }
774
+ qrChainActive = true;
665
775
  const pairDeviceNode = getBinaryNodeChild(stanza, 'pair-device');
666
776
  const refNodes = getBinaryNodeChildren(pairDeviceNode, 'ref');
667
- const noiseKeyB64 = Buffer.from(creds.noiseKey.public).toString('base64');
668
- const identityKeyB64 = Buffer.from(creds.signedIdentityKey.public).toString('base64');
777
+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-157): a string key is base64 already —
778
+ // Buffer.from() re-encoded its UTF-8 bytes, putting a wrong
779
+ // noise/identity key into every QR code.
780
+ const noiseKeyB64 = keyMaterialToBuffer(creds.noiseKey.public).toString('base64');
781
+ const identityKeyB64 = keyMaterialToBuffer(creds.signedIdentityKey.public).toString('base64');
669
782
  const advB64 = creds.advSecretKey;
670
783
  let qrMs = qrTimeout || 60000; // time to let a QR live
671
784
  const genPairQR = () => {
672
785
  if (!ws.isOpen) {
786
+ qrChainActive = false;
673
787
  return;
674
788
  }
675
789
  const refNode = refNodes.shift();
@@ -726,6 +840,7 @@ export const makeSocket = (config) => {
726
840
  await sendPassiveIq('active');
727
841
  logger.info('opened connection to WA');
728
842
  clearTimeout(qrTimer); // will never happen in all likelyhood -- but just in case WA sends success on first try
843
+ qrChainActive = false;
729
844
  ev.emit('creds.update', { me: { ...authState.creds.me, lid: node.attrs.lid } });
730
845
  ev.emit('connection.update', { connection: 'open' });
731
846
  }
@@ -737,9 +852,9 @@ export const makeSocket = (config) => {
737
852
  // AunuBaileys (1.0.71): 405 client_too_old — fetch the live WA Web
738
853
  // build so the caller's reconnect uses it (donor: violetix
739
854
  // lib/Socket/socket.js CB:failure handler). Only for static versions;
740
- // a resolver function re-resolves on the next connect anyway. The
741
- // connection.update signal is best-effort: end() may already have
742
- // torn the listeners down by the time the fetch lands.
855
+ // a resolver function re-resolves on the next connect anyway. Both
856
+ // 405 paths (CB:failure and CB:stream:error) await this before
857
+ // end(), so the clientTooOld signal reaches the host first.
743
858
  const handleClientTooOld = async () => {
744
859
  if (typeof config.version === 'function') {
745
860
  return;
@@ -759,11 +874,16 @@ export const makeSocket = (config) => {
759
874
  logger.warn({ err }, 'failed to fetch the latest WA Web version after a 405');
760
875
  }
761
876
  };
762
- ws.on('CB:stream:error', (node) => {
877
+ ws.on('CB:stream:error', async (node) => {
763
878
  logger.error({ node }, 'stream errored out');
764
879
  const { reason, statusCode } = getErrorCodeFromStreamError(node);
765
880
  if (statusCode === 405) {
766
- void handleClientTooOld();
881
+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.77, HB-148): awaited like the CB:failure
882
+ // path (1.0.72) — firing it void let end() tear the
883
+ // connection.update listeners down before the version
884
+ // fetch landed, so the clientTooOld signal never reached
885
+ // the host and a 405 looked like any other disconnect.
886
+ await handleClientTooOld();
767
887
  }
768
888
  end(new Boom(`Stream Errored (${reason})`, { statusCode, data: node }));
769
889
  });
@@ -802,7 +922,7 @@ export const makeSocket = (config) => {
802
922
  if (offlineDrainBatches >= OFFLINE_DRAIN_MAX_BATCHES) {
803
923
  stopOfflineDrain();
804
924
  logger.warn({ batches: offlineDrainBatches }, 'offline drain hit the batch cap; remaining backlog waits for the next reconnect');
805
- return;
925
+ return false;
806
926
  }
807
927
  offlineDrainBatches += 1;
808
928
  // AunuBaileys (1.0.70): a floating sendNode here could reject
@@ -812,12 +932,19 @@ export const makeSocket = (config) => {
812
932
  attrs: {},
813
933
  content: [{ tag: 'offline_batch', attrs: { count: '100' } }]
814
934
  }).catch(err => logger.warn({ err }, 'failed to request offline batch'));
935
+ return true;
815
936
  };
816
937
  const scheduleOfflineDrain = () => {
817
938
  stopOfflineDrain();
818
939
  offlineDrainTimer = setTimeout(() => {
819
- requestOfflineBatch();
820
- scheduleOfflineDrain();
940
+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.77, HB-109): stop re-arming at the batch
941
+ // cap — the unconditional re-schedule used to undo
942
+ // requestOfflineBatch's stopOfflineDrain(), so when the
943
+ // terminal offline bulletin never arrived the cap warning
944
+ // repeated every 500ms for the life of the socket.
945
+ if (requestOfflineBatch()) {
946
+ scheduleOfflineDrain();
947
+ }
821
948
  }, OFFLINE_DRAIN_INTERVAL_MS);
822
949
  };
823
950
  ws.on('CB:ib,,offline_preview', (node) => {
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
1
1
  import type { KeyPair } from '../Types/index.js';
2
+ export declare const keyMaterialToBuffer: (key: unknown) => unknown;
2
3
  /** prefix version byte to the pub keys, required for some curve crypto functions */
3
4
  export declare const generateSignalPubKey: (pubKey: Uint8Array | Buffer) => Uint8Array<ArrayBufferLike> | Buffer<ArrayBufferLike>;
4
5
  export declare const Curve: {
@@ -4,6 +4,18 @@ import * as libsignal from 'libsignal';
4
4
  import { KEY_BUNDLE_TYPE } from '../Defaults/index.js';
5
5
  // insure browser & node compatibility
6
6
  const { subtle } = globalThis.crypto;
7
+ /**
8
+ * AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-157): the house format for string key
9
+ * material is base64 (that is how advSecretKey and every displayed
10
+ * key are stored), but several consumers decoded strings with plain
11
+ * Buffer.from() — UTF-8 — producing wrong-length garbage keys.
12
+ * Decode strings as base64 everywhere; Buffers pass through and
13
+ * anything else is returned untouched so the callers' own type
14
+ * guards (HB-98) still fire.
15
+ */
16
+ export const keyMaterialToBuffer = (key) => Buffer.isBuffer(key)
17
+ ? key
18
+ : (typeof key === 'string' ? Buffer.from(key, 'base64') : key);
7
19
  /** prefix version byte to the pub keys, required for some curve crypto functions */
8
20
  export const generateSignalPubKey = (pubKey) => {
9
21
  // AunuBaileys (1.0.74): HB-98 — a wrong-typed public key (e.g. a
@@ -14,7 +26,7 @@ export const generateSignalPubKey = (pubKey) => {
14
26
  if (!Buffer.isBuffer(pubKey) && typeof pubKey !== 'string') {
15
27
  throw new Error('AunuBaileys: invalid public key material — the auth state is incomplete or corrupt; restore a full backup or pair again');
16
28
  }
17
- const buf = typeof pubKey === 'string' ? Buffer.from(pubKey) : pubKey;
29
+ const buf = keyMaterialToBuffer(pubKey);
18
30
  return buf.length === 33 ? buf : Buffer.concat([KEY_BUNDLE_TYPE, buf]);
19
31
  };
20
32
  export const Curve = {
@@ -27,10 +39,16 @@ export const Curve = {
27
39
  };
28
40
  },
29
41
  sharedKey: (privateKey, publicKey) => {
30
- const shared = libsignal.curve.calculateAgreement(generateSignalPubKey(publicKey), privateKey);
42
+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-214): the private key used to be
43
+ // passed to libsignal RAW — a base64-string private key in a
44
+ // hand-edited/migrated creds file died as
45
+ // 'Invalid private key type: String' at every handshake,
46
+ // pairing and pair-success call site. Decode it like every
47
+ // other key material (HB-157).
48
+ const shared = libsignal.curve.calculateAgreement(generateSignalPubKey(publicKey), keyMaterialToBuffer(privateKey));
31
49
  return Buffer.from(shared);
32
50
  },
33
- sign: (privateKey, buf) => libsignal.curve.calculateSignature(privateKey, buf),
51
+ sign: (privateKey, buf) => libsignal.curve.calculateSignature(keyMaterialToBuffer(privateKey), buf),
34
52
  verify: (pubKey, message, signature) => {
35
53
  try {
36
54
  libsignal.curve.verifySignature(generateSignalPubKey(pubKey), message, signature);
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ export declare const getBotRecentSecretsChatCount: () => number;
7
7
  export declare const NO_MESSAGE_FOUND_ERROR_TEXT = "Message absent from node";
8
8
  export declare const isUnrecoverableSessionError: (text: unknown) => boolean;
9
9
  export declare const isBadMacError: (text: unknown) => boolean;
10
+ export declare const isSenderKeyUnavailableError: (text: unknown) => boolean;
10
11
  export declare const MISSING_KEYS_ERROR_TEXT = "Key used already or never filled";
11
12
  export declare const NACK_REASONS: {
12
13
  ParsingError: number;
@@ -429,4 +429,19 @@ export const isUnrecoverableSessionError = (text) => typeof text === 'string' &&
429
429
  * classic symptom of a desynchronised ratchet on either side.
430
430
  */
431
431
  export const isBadMacError = (text) => typeof text === 'string' && /bad mac/i.test(text);
432
+ /**
433
+ * AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-223): true when a GROUP decrypt failure says
434
+ * nothing about the author's 1-1 E2E session — the sender key simply
435
+ * is not here yet (no record, or no state for that author: they just
436
+ * joined, or our own self-heal deleted it), or the skmsg payload
437
+ * itself is malformed (proto decode error, signature shape). Counting
438
+ * these toward the 3-strike session reset deleted healthy E2E
439
+ * sessions and reported a misleading `healed: true`; the only correct
440
+ * response is the retry receipt, which makes the peer redistribute
441
+ * its sender key. The CIPHERTEXT stub upsert still happens.
442
+ */
443
+ export const isSenderKeyUnavailableError = (text) => typeof text === 'string' &&
444
+ (/no session found to decrypt message|no senderkeyrecord found for decryption/i.test(text) ||
445
+ /^invalid signature!?$/i.test(text.trim()) ||
446
+ /invalid wire type|index out of range/i.test(text));
432
447
  //# sourceMappingURL=decode-wa-message.js.map
@@ -374,6 +374,16 @@ export const getCallStatusFromNode = ({ tag, attrs }) => {
374
374
  };
375
375
  const UNEXPECTED_SERVER_CODE_TEXT = 'Unexpected server response: ';
376
376
  export const getCodeFromWSError = (error) => {
377
+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.77, HB-133): an error that already carries a
378
+ // valid Boom status code keeps it. Re-deriving the code from the
379
+ // message text lost real codes — promiseTimeout's Boom
380
+ // 'Timed Out' (408) was re-wrapped as a 500 by mapWebSocketError
381
+ // because the textual timeout check below is case-sensitive
382
+ // ('Timed Out' vs 'timed out').
383
+ const existingCode = error?.output?.statusCode;
384
+ if (Number.isFinite(existingCode) && existingCode >= 400 && existingCode <= 599) {
385
+ return existingCode;
386
+ }
377
387
  let statusCode = 500;
378
388
  if (error?.message?.includes(UNEXPECTED_SERVER_CODE_TEXT)) {
379
389
  const code = +error?.message.slice(UNEXPECTED_SERVER_CODE_TEXT.length);
@@ -385,7 +395,7 @@ export const getCodeFromWSError = (error) => {
385
395
  // AunuBaileys (1.0.67): error.code can be numeric (e.g. WS close
386
396
  // 1006) — only call startsWith on strings.
387
397
  (typeof error?.code === 'string' && error.code.startsWith('E')) ||
388
- error?.message?.includes('timed out')) {
398
+ error?.message?.toLowerCase().includes('timed out')) {
389
399
  // handle ETIMEOUT, ENOTFOUND etc
390
400
  statusCode = 408;
391
401
  }
@@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ const generateIV = (counter) => {
15
15
  // corrupt header either wedges the stream forever (size 0: the header
16
16
  // is never consumed, so every later call re-reads it) or buffers
17
17
  // without bound waiting for megabytes that never arrive. Fail loudly
18
- // instead: the socket ends (the caller routes the throw to
19
- // onUnexpectedError) and the host reconnects.
18
+ // instead: the throw is marked frame-fatal (1.0.77, HB-185) and the
19
+ // caller ends the socket, so the host reconnects at once.
20
20
  const MAX_NOISE_FRAME_SIZE = 10 * 1024 * 1024;
21
21
  export const makeNoiseHandler = ({ keyPair: { private: privateKey, public: publicKey }, NOISE_HEADER, logger, routingInfo }) => {
22
22
  logger = logger.child({ class: 'ns' });
@@ -161,23 +161,55 @@ export const makeNoiseHandler = ({ keyPair: { private: privateKey, public: publi
161
161
  }
162
162
  if (size > MAX_NOISE_FRAME_SIZE) {
163
163
  // AunuBaileys (1.0.73, HB-91): never wait for a
164
- // frame that cannot exist — throw so the socket
165
- // ends instead of buffering without bound until
166
- // the keep-alive watchdog kills the connection
167
- // ~65s later.
168
- throw new Boom(`noise frame too large: ${size} bytes`, { statusCode: 400 });
164
+ // frame that cannot exist. (1.0.77, HB-185): the
165
+ // throw alone did NOT end the socket — the caller
166
+ // only logged it, the header was never consumed,
167
+ // and the stream wedged until the keep-alive
168
+ // watchdog fired ~65s later. Marked frame-fatal:
169
+ // the caller now ends the connection on it.
170
+ const err = new Boom(`noise frame too large: ${size} bytes`, { statusCode: 400 });
171
+ err.isFrameFatal = true;
172
+ throw err;
169
173
  }
170
174
  if (inBytes.length < size + 3) {
171
175
  break;
172
176
  }
173
177
  let frame = inBytes.slice(3, size + 3);
174
178
  inBytes = inBytes.slice(size + 3);
179
+ let decoded = true;
175
180
  if (isFinished) {
176
- const result = decrypt(frame);
177
- frame = await decodeBinaryNode(result);
181
+ let result;
182
+ try {
183
+ result = decrypt(frame);
184
+ }
185
+ catch (err) {
186
+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.77, HB-207): a GCM failure
187
+ // leaves readCounter behind the server's
188
+ // counter, so every later frame decrypts with
189
+ // the wrong IV and fails too — the stream can
190
+ // never resync. Frame-fatal: the caller ends
191
+ // the connection instead of losing every
192
+ // inbound message until the watchdog fires.
193
+ err.isFrameFatal = true;
194
+ throw err;
195
+ }
196
+ try {
197
+ frame = await decodeBinaryNode(result);
198
+ }
199
+ catch (err) {
200
+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.77): stanza-level corruption
201
+ // is NOT fatal — the frame was consumed and the
202
+ // counter advanced, so the stream is still in
203
+ // sync. Log and skip the frame instead of
204
+ // aborting the rest of the buffered frames.
205
+ logger.error({ err }, 'failed to decode a stanza; skipping the frame');
206
+ decoded = false;
207
+ }
208
+ }
209
+ if (decoded) {
210
+ logger.trace({ msg: frame?.attrs?.id }, 'recv frame');
211
+ onFrame(frame);
178
212
  }
179
- logger.trace({ msg: frame?.attrs?.id }, 'recv frame');
180
- onFrame(frame);
181
213
  size = getBytesSize();
182
214
  }
183
215
  }
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  import { KEY_BUNDLE_TYPE } from '../Defaults/index.js';
2
2
  import { assertNodeErrorFree, getBinaryNodeChild, getBinaryNodeChildBuffer, getBinaryNodeChildren, getBinaryNodeChildUInt, jidDecode, S_WHATSAPP_NET } from '../WABinary/index.js';
3
- import { Curve, generateSignalPubKey } from './crypto.js';
3
+ import { Curve, generateSignalPubKey, keyMaterialToBuffer } from './crypto.js';
4
4
  import { encodeBigEndian } from './generics.js';
5
5
  // AunuBaileys (1.0.74): HB-98 — key material is only ever a Buffer
6
6
  // (or a string in a hand-edited creds file). Anything else is a
@@ -52,10 +52,13 @@ export const generateOrGetPreKeys = (creds, range) => {
52
52
  export const xmppSignedPreKey = (key) => ({
53
53
  tag: 'skey',
54
54
  attrs: {},
55
+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-157): key material may be a base64 string
56
+ // in a hand-edited creds file — the node writer would otherwise
57
+ // publish the base64 TEXT as the key bytes.
55
58
  content: [
56
59
  { tag: 'id', attrs: {}, content: encodeBigEndian(key.keyId, 3) },
57
- { tag: 'value', attrs: {}, content: key.keyPair.public },
58
- { tag: 'signature', attrs: {}, content: key.signature }
60
+ { tag: 'value', attrs: {}, content: keyMaterialToBuffer(key.keyPair.public) },
61
+ { tag: 'signature', attrs: {}, content: keyMaterialToBuffer(key.signature) }
59
62
  ]
60
63
  });
61
64
  export const xmppPreKey = (pair, id) => ({
@@ -63,7 +66,7 @@ export const xmppPreKey = (pair, id) => ({
63
66
  attrs: {},
64
67
  content: [
65
68
  { tag: 'id', attrs: {}, content: encodeBigEndian(id, 3) },
66
- { tag: 'value', attrs: {}, content: pair.public }
69
+ { tag: 'value', attrs: {}, content: keyMaterialToBuffer(pair.public) }
67
70
  ]
68
71
  });
69
72
  /** AunuBaileys: parse the E2E key bundle embedded in a retry receipt.
@@ -239,7 +242,7 @@ export const getNextPreKeysNode = async (state, count) => {
239
242
  content: [
240
243
  { tag: 'registration', attrs: {}, content: encodeBigEndian(creds.registrationId) },
241
244
  { tag: 'type', attrs: {}, content: KEY_BUNDLE_TYPE },
242
- { tag: 'identity', attrs: {}, content: creds.signedIdentityKey.public },
245
+ { tag: 'identity', attrs: {}, content: keyMaterialToBuffer(creds.signedIdentityKey.public) },
243
246
  { tag: 'list', attrs: {}, content: Object.keys(preKeys).map(k => xmppPreKey(preKeys[+k], +k)) },
244
247
  xmppSignedPreKey(creds.signedPreKey)
245
248
  ]
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import { createHash } from 'crypto';
3
3
  import { proto } from '../../WAProto/index.js';
4
4
  import { KEY_BUNDLE_TYPE } from '../Defaults/index.js';
5
5
  import { getBinaryNodeChild, jidDecode, S_WHATSAPP_NET } from '../WABinary/index.js';
6
- import { Curve, hmacSign } from './crypto.js';
6
+ import { Curve, hmacSign, keyMaterialToBuffer } from './crypto.js';
7
7
  import { encodeBigEndian } from './generics.js';
8
8
  import { createSignalIdentity } from './signal.js';
9
9
  // AunuBaileys (1.0.74): HB-98 — key material is only ever a Buffer
@@ -147,12 +147,14 @@ export const configureSuccessfulPairing = (stanza, { advSecretKey, signedIdentit
147
147
  }
148
148
  const account = proto.ADVSignedDeviceIdentity.decode(details);
149
149
  const { accountSignatureKey, accountSignature, details: deviceDetails } = account;
150
- const accountMsg = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([6, 0]), deviceDetails, signedIdentityKey.public]);
150
+ // AunuBaileys (1.0.78, HB-157): a string identity key is base64 —
151
+ // the raw concat used to die with a TypeError on string creds.
152
+ const accountMsg = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([6, 0]), deviceDetails, keyMaterialToBuffer(signedIdentityKey.public)]);
151
153
  if (!Curve.verify(accountSignatureKey, accountMsg, accountSignature)) {
152
154
  throw new Boom('Failed to verify account signature');
153
155
  }
154
156
  const devicePrefix = isHostedAccount ? Buffer.from([6, 6]) : Buffer.from([6, 1]);
155
- const deviceMsg = Buffer.concat([devicePrefix, deviceDetails, signedIdentityKey.public, accountSignatureKey]);
157
+ const deviceMsg = Buffer.concat([devicePrefix, deviceDetails, keyMaterialToBuffer(signedIdentityKey.public), accountSignatureKey]);
156
158
  account.deviceSignature = Curve.sign(signedIdentityKey.private, deviceMsg);
157
159
  const identity = createSignalIdentity(jid, accountSignatureKey);
158
160
  const accountEnc = encodeSignedDeviceIdentity(account, false);
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "@aunucore/baileys",
3
3
  "type": "module",
4
- "version": "1.0.76",
4
+ "version": "1.0.78",
5
5
  "description": "AunuBaileys — the self-healing WhatsApp Web API for Node.js. Bad MAC and \"2000 messages into the future\" errors repair themselves, LID and phone-number identities stay in sync, anti-ban is built in, pairing codes are custom — plus 29 experimental features no other Baileys fork ships: invisible watermarks, per-person tag-all cards, side-profile text, ghost mentions and more. ESM, CJS and full TypeScript types.",
6
6
  "keywords": [
7
7
  "whatsapp",