@attalabs/vinaya 0.3.0 → 0.4.1

package/aeg-root/enforcement.md

@@ -44,7 +44,8 @@ The same check implementations run at ring 0 and ring 1 — one codebase, two en
 | Starting the Dig (before authoring a brief) / starting Step 0 (before executing one) / **every push on a task branch before its PR exists** | Ever started work only to find out halfway it was blocked on something else? | hook | Refuses to start work until every precondition for the task is checked live and found clear. | **`verify-dispatch` CLI** (`packages/aeg-core/bin/verify-dispatch.ts` — mandated by `roles/developer.md` and `skills/brief-authoring/SKILL.md`; **now also hook-automated** — task 25) | Every dispatch precondition is re-checked live against the forge (the task's row/Issue are derived directly from a Milestone + `vinaya/tranche:<slug>`-labeled Issues as of the forge-native migration — no `origin/main` file read involved; leftover-branch detection still fetches `origin/main` for its own commit-count comparison): the task's row and Issue exist; the Issue passes the rationale gate; every `depends-on` PR is merged and no `conflicts-with` PR is open/in-flight; every named project's prior tranche is archived. (2026-07-13: the immediately-prior task's three-predicate archival bar — the row-adjacency predicate — was removed once the provenance-posting signal it existed to protect became automated.) A `NOT READY` result is a stop condition. Every `gh` call this script makes carries an explicit `-R <owner>/<repo>` (task 23) — from a linked `git worktree add` checkout, an untargeted `gh issue list`/`gh issue view`/`gh pr list` silently scopes to the wrong repo (or returns nothing), which previously produced false prior-tranche-archival blockers. **`.husky/pre-push`** now runs this gate itself on a `task/*/*` branch's first push (before a PR exists), refusing on genuine `NOT READY` and failing OPEN — loudly — when a `gh auth status` reachability probe fails or `verify-dispatch`'s own repo/token resolution fails (task 18's fail-open precedent). The gate reads only the `dispatch-readiness:` predicate, not verify-dispatch's combined exit code, which also folds in `leftover-detection` (a pre-Step-0 "safe to branch fresh" advisory that would otherwise false-block every push after the first on a task legitimately mid-flight — discovered live while building this gate). Once a PR exists, later pushes skip the gate: dispatch was already validated once. | `packages/aeg-core/bin/verify-dispatch.ts` |
 | Opening a task PR whose surface includes real code | Ever had a PR's description quietly stop matching what the code does? | event | Refuses a code-carrying pull request whose description no longer matches what it changes. | **Brief Validation — `checkPremiseCoverage`** | The PR body carries a `Premise:` block with at least one assertion (`contains`/`absent`/`sha256`) whose path falls inside the task's surface map — re-assertable at any point via `verify-dispatch --premise` or `verify-task`. | `packages/aeg-core/src/brief-validation.ts` |
 | Opening a task PR (final self-check before creation) | Ever opened a PR and only then discovered the tests were failing? | event | Runs the whole exit check before a pull request is created, so failures surface first. | **`verify-task` CLI** (`packages/aeg-core/bin/verify-task.ts` — mandated by `roles/developer.md`; **now also hook-automated** — task 25) | Typecheck, lint, tests, build, `verify-docs --pr`, and the premise coverage/recheck pair all pass, as one summary, against the PR's actual diff, before `open-pr.ts` is invoked. **`open-pr.ts` now runs this composite itself** for task branches (via `gatePlanForBranch`), invoked wholesale rather than partially re-implemented — non-task branches are unaffected (byte-identical gate set). `verify-docs --pr` runs twice on a task-branch PR-open as an accepted, measured overlap (~4s with a warm turbo cache). | `packages/aeg-core/bin/verify-task.ts` |
-| Spawning a check (`vinaya check`, ring-0 pre-push AND ring-1 CI) | Ever had a check quietly read a secret it had no business seeing, because nothing scoped what it could reach? | hook | Governs which environment variables a spawned check's child process can see, instead of every check inheriting the full parent environment unconditionally. | **Env allowlist** (`CheckSpec['env']`, `apps/vinaya/cli/src/checks/contract.ts`; construction: `buildCheckEnv`, `apps/vinaya/cli/src/checks/runner.ts`) | **⚠️ BREAKING, live (task 3):** a spawned check's child process sees only a fixed baseline (`PATH`, `LANG`, `HOME`, `HTTPS_PROXY`, `HTTP_PROXY`, `NO_PROXY`, `TMPDIR`) plus whatever its own `env` declaration (`true` / `{ optional: true }` / `{ anyOf: [...] }` / a literal string) explicitly forwards — **no longer the full parent environment.** An undeclared variable a check's own code reads is now genuinely invisible to it, not merely warned about; a `true` or unsatisfied `anyOf` declaration missing from the caller's environment synthesizes a `CheckError` and the check never spawns at all. All 15 core checks in `registry.ts` carry an audited declaration, so this repo's own core checks are unaffected — an adopter's **custom** check that reads `process.env` directly with no `env` declared will lose that access at this minor; declare `env` on it (`vinaya.config.json`'s `checks.<name>.env`) before upgrading. `vinaya check`'s prior warn-phase print (task 2) is retired now that the behavior it warned about is live; `vinaya doctor` still carries the same missing-declaration diagnostic permanently, at `info` severity, so a custom check's gap remains visible after upgrade even though `vinaya check` no longer prints it inline. | `apps/vinaya/cli/src/checks/runner.ts` |
+| Spawning a check (`vinaya check`, ring-0 pre-push AND ring-1 CI) | Ever had a check quietly read a secret it had no business seeing, because nothing scoped what it could reach? | hook | Governs which environment variables a spawned check's child process can see, instead of every check inheriting the full parent environment unconditionally. | **Env allowlist** (`CheckSpec['env']`, `apps/vinaya/cli/src/checks/contract.ts`; construction: `buildCheckEnv`, `apps/vinaya/cli/src/checks/runner.ts`) | **⚠️ BREAKING, live (task 3):** a spawned check's child process sees only a fixed baseline (`PATH`, `LANG`, `HOME`, `HTTPS_PROXY`, `HTTP_PROXY`, `NO_PROXY`, `TMPDIR`) plus whatever its own `env` declaration (`true` / `{ optional: true }` / `{ anyOf: [...] }` / a literal string) explicitly forwards — **no longer the full parent environment.** An undeclared variable a check's own code reads is now genuinely invisible to it, not merely warned about; a `true` or unsatisfied `anyOf` declaration missing from the caller's environment synthesizes a `CheckError` and the check never spawns at all. All 15 core checks in `registry.ts` carry an audited declaration, and every core check that spawns `gh` or reaches the forge through the token-resolution chain additionally forwards `GITHUB_TOKEN`/`GH_TOKEN` as `{ optional: true }` — on a CI runner those env vars are `gh`'s only authentication path, so a check that shells out without forwarding them runs unauthenticated there (hard-failing or silently degrading, depending on the bin's failure mode) while passing locally on `gh`'s keyring; the pairing is coupling-tested (`apps/vinaya/cli/tests/checks/registry-env.test.ts` detects `gh` invocations in any call shape — array-form, string-form, and template-literal — and demands both declarations). This repo's own core checks are therefore unaffected — an adopter's **custom** check that reads `process.env` directly with no `env` declared will lose that access at this minor; declare `env` on it (`vinaya.config.json`'s `checks.<name>.env`) before upgrading. `vinaya check`'s prior warn-phase print (task 2) is retired now that the behavior it warned about is live; `vinaya doctor` still carries the same missing-declaration diagnostic permanently, at `info` severity, so a custom check's gap remains visible after upgrade even though `vinaya check` no longer prints it inline. | `apps/vinaya/cli/src/checks/runner.ts` |
+| `vinaya check` / `vinaya check --plan` (a CLI mechanism, not a git hook — this row is `.husky`-free) | Ever had a config entry silently double-run alongside the core check it was meant to replace, with no way to see that from the outside? | event | Resolves core-registered and config-registered checks into one deterministic table before anything runs, instead of letting a config entry run alongside the core check it collides with, unannounced. | **Checks-side resolver** (`resolveChecks`/`isValidNamespacedKey`, `apps/vinaya/cli/src/checks/resolver.ts`) | An exact-key match against a core check ID is an **override** — a complete replacement of the spec, never a merge. A key containing exactly one `/`, both segments matching `[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*` and the `vinaya` prefix rejected as an exact segment match, is **additive**. Anything else — a bare key with no `/` matching no core ID — is a loud `FAIL_CLOSED` refusal: never silently dropped, never defaulted, never last-wins. `--plan` never resolves or prints an env *value*, only how each one resolves. **This release feeds `vinaya check --plan` / `--plan --json` only** — `vinaya check`'s real execution (`check.ts`'s flat `[...coreCheckRegistry(), ...customSpecs]` concat) is unaffected until a later task wires it in. | `apps/vinaya/cli/src/checks/resolver.ts` |
 
 **Documentation coverage, specifically** (a historical pain point): the code→document ownership rule is enforced at *two* prevention chokepoints — at every push (over the branch's cumulative change set) and again at pull-request creation and editing. A change to owned code cannot be published, let alone turned into a pull request, without its owning document.
 
@@ -72,8 +73,8 @@ Every pull request, on open and on every push, re-runs the same checks in CI:
 | Test-plan state | Ever merged a PR with an unchecked "did you test this" box? | ci | Re-checks that the pull request’s test plan is genuinely ticked. | Unticked test-plan boxes block merge readiness | `packages/aeg-core/bin/verify-test-plan.ts` |
 | Typecheck + unit tests | Ever had a change silently break something it wasn't even touching? | ci | Re-runs the type checker and the unit tests for every package this change can reach. | Packages affected by this PR's diff, plus their full transitive-dependent set (`turbo --affected`; application builds are verified by the deployment pipeline). A diff touching no package (docs/workflow-only) runs 0 packages — sound, since repo-file gates like `verify-docs`/coherence run in their own jobs regardless (task 27) | `.github/workflows/ci.yml` |
 | Conventions | Ever opened a PR full of inconsistent formatting and naming? | ci | Re-checks formatting and naming against the repo’s own conventions. | Lint/format, commit-message grammar, no hardcoded UI colors | `.github/workflows/forge-lifecycle.yml` |
-| AI review | Ever wished every PR got a second pair of eyes, even at 2am? | ci | Puts an automated reviewer on every pull request, whatever the hour. | Posts a judgment review of the change. Its own posting is still advisory (nothing requires this specific job to run or comment) — but if its comment carries a clear `APPROVE`/`REQUEST_CHANGES`/`LGTM` marker, that comment now counts toward the Review gate below, same as any human or dispatched reviewer's comment (the gate is source-agnostic — it reads every PR comment, not just this job's) | `.github/workflows/claude-code-review.yml` |
-| Review gate | Ever had a PR merge with nobody actually approving it? | ci | Holds the merge until the required review verdicts actually exist. | Required, blocking: a task-branch PR must carry a clean code-reviewer `APPROVE` verdict comment AND a clean security-review `PASS` verdict comment before merge — reusing `extractCodeReviewVerdict`/`extractSecurityReviewVerdict` (`packages/aeg-core/src/verdict-extraction.ts`), extracted out of the post-merge Archivist's `archive-task.ts` so both the pre-merge gate and the post-merge provenance assembly read the identical detection logic (one implementation, two call sites). Picks the MOST RECENT comment carrying a clear value, not the first comment merely matching the loose marker pattern — fixed live during this task, since the original single-verdict `.find()` broke on real multi-comment PRs (a `REQUEST_CHANGES` verdict followed by fixes and a later clean `APPROVE`, or the post-merge provenance comment's own DANGLING-note prose, which contains the word "verdict" and would otherwise poison a naive first-match search). A principal-actor-verified `vinaya/waiver:review` label (the same `isWaiverLabelActorVerified` pattern, now parameterized by label name and reused — not duplicated — for this second label) skips the requirement for one PR; label presence alone is never sufficient. **Tool-layer protection extended** (`check-forge-gates.sh`): mutating `vinaya/waiver:review` from an agent session is denied, exactly like `vinaya/waiver:docs` — without this, an agent sharing the Principal's own `gh` credential could self-apply the waiver and inherit the Principal's identity on the labeling event, defeating actor verification entirely (confirmed live during this task before the hook was extended). Non-task branches (plan PRs) bypass — a plan PR touching only topology files has no code to review. Going-forward only: never re-evaluates already-merged history. | `packages/aeg-core/bin/verify-review-gate.ts` |
+| AI review | Ever wished every PR got a second pair of eyes, even at 2am? | ci | Puts an automated reviewer on every pull request, whatever the hour. | Posts a judgment review of the change. **Advisory only, including its verdict markers** (ruled 2026-08-09, verdict-author verification): the Review gate below counts a verdict comment only when its author is on the principal allowlist, and this job posts under a bot identity — deliberately excluded, because the job reads the PR's own content, so a crafted PR can steer what it writes; letting its `APPROVE` gate merges would re-open the forged-verdict channel author verification closes. In practice this changes nothing: the gate has only ever flipped on principal-identity verdicts. The bot's review remains visible input to the human/dispatched reviews | `.github/workflows/claude-code-review.yml` |
+| Review gate | Ever had a PR merge with nobody actually approving it? | ci | Holds the merge until the required review verdicts actually exist. | Required, blocking: a task-branch PR must carry a clean code-reviewer `APPROVE` verdict comment AND a clean security-review `PASS` verdict comment before merge — reusing `extractCodeReviewVerdict`/`extractSecurityReviewVerdict` (`packages/aeg-core/src/verdict-extraction.ts`), extracted out of the post-merge Archivist's `archive-task.ts` so both the pre-merge gate and the post-merge provenance assembly read the identical detection logic (one implementation, two call sites). Picks the MOST RECENT comment carrying a clear value, not the first comment merely matching the loose marker pattern — fixed live during this task, since the original single-verdict `.find()` broke on real multi-comment PRs (a `REQUEST_CHANGES` verdict followed by fixes and a later clean `APPROVE`, or the post-merge provenance comment's own DANGLING-note prose, which contains the word "verdict" and would otherwise poison a naive first-match search). **Verdict authors are verified** (2026-08-09): only comments whose author is on the principal allowlist (`PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST` — the same trust anchor the waiver actor-check uses) participate in verdict extraction; forged, bot, and unresolvable-author comments are ignored, never fatal — a later forged `APPROVE` can no longer override a real `REQUEST_CHANGES`. A principal-actor-verified `vinaya/waiver:review` label (the same `isWaiverLabelActorVerified` pattern, now parameterized by label name and reused — not duplicated — for this second label) skips the requirement for one PR; label presence alone is never sufficient. **Tool-layer protection extended** (`check-forge-gates.sh`): mutating `vinaya/waiver:review` from an agent session is denied, exactly like `vinaya/waiver:docs` — without this, an agent sharing the Principal's own `gh` credential could self-apply the waiver and inherit the Principal's identity on the labeling event, defeating actor verification entirely (confirmed live during this task before the hook was extended). Non-task branches (plan PRs) bypass — a plan PR touching only topology files has no code to review. Going-forward only: never re-evaluates already-merged history. | `packages/aeg-core/bin/verify-review-gate.ts` |
 | G1 — implementation exists | Ever read about a safeguard that turned out not to actually exist? | ci | Re-checks that every gate the doctrine describes has real code behind it. | Every ring's non-empty `implementation` cell on this very page resolves to a real path on disk — makes this page's registry columns load-bearing instead of decorative. | `packages/aeg-core/bin/verify-registry.ts` |
 | G2 — no orphan hook/CLI | Ever found a script nobody remembers the purpose of? | ci | Re-checks that every hook and CLI in the repo is one the doctrine claims. | Every file under `.husky/*`, `.claude/hooks/*.sh`, `packages/aeg-core/bin/*.ts` is named by some row's `implementation` — the inverse direction of G1: no enforcement mechanism exists off-page. | `packages/aeg-core/bin/verify-registry.ts` |
 | G3 — no seventh way into GitHub | Ever discovered a backdoor that skipped all your checks? | ci | Re-checks that no route into GitHub exists beyond the ones the doctrine gates. | Every file making the exact class of GitHub-mutating call `.claude/hooks/check-forge-gates.sh` itself gates (PR/Issue create, PR/Issue body/title edit, `gh api` create/edit, raw curl/wget writes) is named by some Ring-0 row's `implementation` — a mutating call outside that set would be an unguarded hole in the prevention model. | `packages/aeg-core/bin/verify-registry.ts` |

package/aeg-root/glossary.md

@@ -21,6 +21,10 @@ Vinaya uses a handful of words in a specific, non-obvious sense — on the pages
 
 **Ratification** — Sign-off, from the person ultimately accountable for the product, on a decision or a piece of work that would be hard to undo. Higher-impact changes wait for a scheduled sign-off window rather than merging the moment they're technically ready.
 
+**Registry ID / rendering ID** — Two names for the same role that can differ. The registry ID is the config key an adopter uses to claim or add a role — namespaced for an additive one. The rendering ID is the role file's own `role_id`, always slash-free, what every diagram and downstream reader actually sees. An override's rendering ID must equal its registry ID exactly; an additive role's rendering ID must equal the key's segment after the `/`.
+
+**Resolution state** — One of three states — `default`, `overridden`, or `additive` — that every check or role ID resolves to. `default` means shipped-and-unmodified; `overridden` means a config entry currently claims that ID and satisfies its contract; `additive` means a wholly new, namespaced entry the shipped product has no opinion on.
+
 **Seam** — The handoff point between two people or roles, where one produces something — a document, a decision, a record — and the other consumes it. Each seam is written down once, in its own place, so both sides can agree on exactly what crosses it.
 
 **Step 0** — The literal first command someone runs before touching any code on a task: the one that creates that task's own isolated copy of the repository and its own branch. Nothing else happens until this command has run.

package/aeg-root/roles/reviewer.md

@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ If you discover something that needs a decision above review authority — the b
 
 Phase 10 (Review) in `process.md`. The order is: **code-reviewer pass (you) → security pass (`roles/security.md`) → Principal code review → Brief Author spec review → merge.** Your verdict feeds the human reviews; it does not replace them.
 
-**Your verdict is also a mechanical merge gate (the review-gate tranche, task 1).** A required, blocking CI check (`packages/aeg-core/bin/verify-review-gate.ts`) reads every PR comment for a clean `APPROVE` verdict — `REQUEST CHANGES`, a missing verdict, or an unclear one all fail the check and block merge, same as this repo's own security pass. This is not advisory: it is the same enforcement class as typecheck or lint. A principal can waive it for one PR with an actor-verified `vinaya/waiver:review` label (`aeg-root/enforcement.md`) — label presence alone is never sufficient.
+**Your verdict is also a mechanical merge gate (the review-gate tranche, task 1).** A required, blocking CI check (`packages/aeg-core/bin/verify-review-gate.ts`) reads every PR comment from a **principal-allowlisted author** (verdict-author verification, 2026-08-09 — bot and unknown-author comments are ignored) for a clean `APPROVE` verdict — `REQUEST CHANGES`, a missing verdict, or an unclear one all fail the check and block merge, same as this repo's own security pass. This is not advisory: it is the same enforcement class as typecheck or lint. A principal can waive it for one PR with an actor-verified `vinaya/waiver:review` label (`aeg-root/enforcement.md`) — label presence alone is never sufficient.
 
 ## Turn-end: report your tokens in the verdict comment
 

package/aeg-root/roles/security.md

@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ A security finding that implies a product/architecture decision (e.g., "the whol
 
 Phase 10 (Review) in `process.md`: code-reviewer pass → **security pass (you)** → Principal code review → Brief Author spec review → merge.
 
-**Your verdict is also a mechanical merge gate (the review-gate tranche, task 1).** A required, blocking CI check (`packages/aeg-core/bin/verify-review-gate.ts`) reads every PR comment for a clean `PASS` verdict — `FAIL`, a missing verdict, or an unclear one all fail the check and block merge, same as the code-reviewer pass. This is not advisory: it is the same enforcement class as typecheck or lint. A principal can waive it for one PR with an actor-verified `vinaya/waiver:review` label (`aeg-root/enforcement.md`) — label presence alone is never sufficient.
+**Your verdict is also a mechanical merge gate (the review-gate tranche, task 1).** A required, blocking CI check (`packages/aeg-core/bin/verify-review-gate.ts`) reads every PR comment from a **principal-allowlisted author** (verdict-author verification, 2026-08-09 — bot and unknown-author comments are ignored) for a clean `PASS` verdict — `FAIL`, a missing verdict, or an unclear one all fail the check and block merge, same as the code-reviewer pass. This is not advisory: it is the same enforcement class as typecheck or lint. A principal can waive it for one PR with an actor-verified `vinaya/waiver:review` label (`aeg-root/enforcement.md`) — label presence alone is never sufficient.
 
 ## Turn-end: report your tokens in the verdict comment
 

package/dist/checks/bin/check-branch-topology.js

@@ -2170,8 +2170,11 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
       waived: true
     };
   }
-  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(input.comments);
-  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(input.comments);
+  const verified = input.comments.filter((c) => c.author !== null && PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author));
+  const ignoredCount = input.comments.filter((c) => (c.author === null || !PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author)) && c.body.includes("VERDICT")).length;
+  const verifiedBodies = verified.map((c) => c.body);
+  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
+  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
   const codeReviewClean = codeReview.value === "APPROVE";
   const securityClean = security.value === "PASS";
   if (codeReviewClean && securityClean) {
@@ -2186,9 +2189,10 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
     problems.push(`code-reviewer verdict is not a clean APPROVE (found: ${codeReview.value})`);
   if (!securityClean)
     problems.push(`security-review verdict is not a clean PASS (found: ${security.value})`);
+  const ignoredNote = ignoredCount > 0 ? ` ${ignoredCount} verdict-shaped comment(s) from authors outside the principal allowlist were ignored.` : "";
   return {
     verdict: "fail",
-    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).`,
+    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).${ignoredNote}`,
     waived: false
   };
 }

package/dist/checks/bin/check-brief-shape.js

@@ -2167,8 +2167,11 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
       waived: true
     };
   }
-  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(input.comments);
-  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(input.comments);
+  const verified = input.comments.filter((c) => c.author !== null && PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author));
+  const ignoredCount = input.comments.filter((c) => (c.author === null || !PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author)) && c.body.includes("VERDICT")).length;
+  const verifiedBodies = verified.map((c) => c.body);
+  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
+  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
   const codeReviewClean = codeReview.value === "APPROVE";
   const securityClean = security.value === "PASS";
   if (codeReviewClean && securityClean) {
@@ -2183,9 +2186,10 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
     problems.push(`code-reviewer verdict is not a clean APPROVE (found: ${codeReview.value})`);
   if (!securityClean)
     problems.push(`security-review verdict is not a clean PASS (found: ${security.value})`);
+  const ignoredNote = ignoredCount > 0 ? ` ${ignoredCount} verdict-shaped comment(s) from authors outside the principal allowlist were ignored.` : "";
   return {
     verdict: "fail",
-    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).`,
+    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).${ignoredNote}`,
     waived: false
   };
 }

package/dist/checks/bin/check-closes-n.js

@@ -2170,8 +2170,11 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
       waived: true
     };
   }
-  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(input.comments);
-  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(input.comments);
+  const verified = input.comments.filter((c) => c.author !== null && PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author));
+  const ignoredCount = input.comments.filter((c) => (c.author === null || !PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author)) && c.body.includes("VERDICT")).length;
+  const verifiedBodies = verified.map((c) => c.body);
+  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
+  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
   const codeReviewClean = codeReview.value === "APPROVE";
   const securityClean = security.value === "PASS";
   if (codeReviewClean && securityClean) {
@@ -2186,9 +2189,10 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
     problems.push(`code-reviewer verdict is not a clean APPROVE (found: ${codeReview.value})`);
   if (!securityClean)
     problems.push(`security-review verdict is not a clean PASS (found: ${security.value})`);
+  const ignoredNote = ignoredCount > 0 ? ` ${ignoredCount} verdict-shaped comment(s) from authors outside the principal allowlist were ignored.` : "";
   return {
     verdict: "fail",
-    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).`,
+    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).${ignoredNote}`,
     waived: false
   };
 }

package/dist/checks/bin/check-coherence.js

@@ -2171,8 +2171,11 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
       waived: true
     };
   }
-  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(input.comments);
-  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(input.comments);
+  const verified = input.comments.filter((c) => c.author !== null && PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author));
+  const ignoredCount = input.comments.filter((c) => (c.author === null || !PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author)) && c.body.includes("VERDICT")).length;
+  const verifiedBodies = verified.map((c) => c.body);
+  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
+  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
   const codeReviewClean = codeReview.value === "APPROVE";
   const securityClean = security.value === "PASS";
   if (codeReviewClean && securityClean) {
@@ -2187,9 +2190,10 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
     problems.push(`code-reviewer verdict is not a clean APPROVE (found: ${codeReview.value})`);
   if (!securityClean)
     problems.push(`security-review verdict is not a clean PASS (found: ${security.value})`);
+  const ignoredNote = ignoredCount > 0 ? ` ${ignoredCount} verdict-shaped comment(s) from authors outside the principal allowlist were ignored.` : "";
   return {
     verdict: "fail",
-    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).`,
+    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).${ignoredNote}`,
     waived: false
   };
 }

package/dist/checks/bin/check-dead-branch-push.js

@@ -2170,8 +2170,11 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
       waived: true
     };
   }
-  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(input.comments);
-  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(input.comments);
+  const verified = input.comments.filter((c) => c.author !== null && PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author));
+  const ignoredCount = input.comments.filter((c) => (c.author === null || !PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author)) && c.body.includes("VERDICT")).length;
+  const verifiedBodies = verified.map((c) => c.body);
+  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
+  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
   const codeReviewClean = codeReview.value === "APPROVE";
   const securityClean = security.value === "PASS";
   if (codeReviewClean && securityClean) {
@@ -2186,9 +2189,10 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
     problems.push(`code-reviewer verdict is not a clean APPROVE (found: ${codeReview.value})`);
   if (!securityClean)
     problems.push(`security-review verdict is not a clean PASS (found: ${security.value})`);
+  const ignoredNote = ignoredCount > 0 ? ` ${ignoredCount} verdict-shaped comment(s) from authors outside the principal allowlist were ignored.` : "";
   return {
     verdict: "fail",
-    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).`,
+    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).${ignoredNote}`,
     waived: false
   };
 }

package/dist/checks/bin/check-dispatch-readiness.js

@@ -2171,8 +2171,11 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
       waived: true
     };
   }
-  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(input.comments);
-  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(input.comments);
+  const verified = input.comments.filter((c) => c.author !== null && PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author));
+  const ignoredCount = input.comments.filter((c) => (c.author === null || !PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author)) && c.body.includes("VERDICT")).length;
+  const verifiedBodies = verified.map((c) => c.body);
+  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
+  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
   const codeReviewClean = codeReview.value === "APPROVE";
   const securityClean = security.value === "PASS";
   if (codeReviewClean && securityClean) {
@@ -2187,9 +2190,10 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
     problems.push(`code-reviewer verdict is not a clean APPROVE (found: ${codeReview.value})`);
   if (!securityClean)
     problems.push(`security-review verdict is not a clean PASS (found: ${security.value})`);
+  const ignoredNote = ignoredCount > 0 ? ` ${ignoredCount} verdict-shaped comment(s) from authors outside the principal allowlist were ignored.` : "";
   return {
     verdict: "fail",
-    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).`,
+    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).${ignoredNote}`,
     waived: false
   };
 }

package/dist/checks/bin/check-doc-coverage-push.js

@@ -2171,8 +2171,11 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
       waived: true
     };
   }
-  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(input.comments);
-  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(input.comments);
+  const verified = input.comments.filter((c) => c.author !== null && PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author));
+  const ignoredCount = input.comments.filter((c) => (c.author === null || !PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author)) && c.body.includes("VERDICT")).length;
+  const verifiedBodies = verified.map((c) => c.body);
+  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
+  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
   const codeReviewClean = codeReview.value === "APPROVE";
   const securityClean = security.value === "PASS";
   if (codeReviewClean && securityClean) {
@@ -2187,9 +2190,10 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
     problems.push(`code-reviewer verdict is not a clean APPROVE (found: ${codeReview.value})`);
   if (!securityClean)
     problems.push(`security-review verdict is not a clean PASS (found: ${security.value})`);
+  const ignoredNote = ignoredCount > 0 ? ` ${ignoredCount} verdict-shaped comment(s) from authors outside the principal allowlist were ignored.` : "";
   return {
     verdict: "fail",
-    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).`,
+    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).${ignoredNote}`,
     waived: false
   };
 }

package/dist/checks/bin/check-doc-coverage.js

@@ -2172,8 +2172,11 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
       waived: true
     };
   }
-  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(input.comments);
-  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(input.comments);
+  const verified = input.comments.filter((c) => c.author !== null && PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author));
+  const ignoredCount = input.comments.filter((c) => (c.author === null || !PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author)) && c.body.includes("VERDICT")).length;
+  const verifiedBodies = verified.map((c) => c.body);
+  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
+  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
   const codeReviewClean = codeReview.value === "APPROVE";
   const securityClean = security.value === "PASS";
   if (codeReviewClean && securityClean) {
@@ -2188,9 +2191,10 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
     problems.push(`code-reviewer verdict is not a clean APPROVE (found: ${codeReview.value})`);
   if (!securityClean)
     problems.push(`security-review verdict is not a clean PASS (found: ${security.value})`);
+  const ignoredNote = ignoredCount > 0 ? ` ${ignoredCount} verdict-shaped comment(s) from authors outside the principal allowlist were ignored.` : "";
   return {
     verdict: "fail",
-    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).`,
+    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).${ignoredNote}`,
     waived: false
   };
 }

package/dist/checks/bin/check-first-push-dispatch.js

@@ -2170,8 +2170,11 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
       waived: true
     };
   }
-  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(input.comments);
-  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(input.comments);
+  const verified = input.comments.filter((c) => c.author !== null && PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author));
+  const ignoredCount = input.comments.filter((c) => (c.author === null || !PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author)) && c.body.includes("VERDICT")).length;
+  const verifiedBodies = verified.map((c) => c.body);
+  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
+  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
   const codeReviewClean = codeReview.value === "APPROVE";
   const securityClean = security.value === "PASS";
   if (codeReviewClean && securityClean) {
@@ -2186,9 +2189,10 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
     problems.push(`code-reviewer verdict is not a clean APPROVE (found: ${codeReview.value})`);
   if (!securityClean)
     problems.push(`security-review verdict is not a clean PASS (found: ${security.value})`);
+  const ignoredNote = ignoredCount > 0 ? ` ${ignoredCount} verdict-shaped comment(s) from authors outside the principal allowlist were ignored.` : "";
   return {
     verdict: "fail",
-    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).`,
+    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).${ignoredNote}`,
     waived: false
   };
 }

package/dist/checks/bin/check-issue-assignment.js

@@ -2170,8 +2170,11 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
       waived: true
     };
   }
-  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(input.comments);
-  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(input.comments);
+  const verified = input.comments.filter((c) => c.author !== null && PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author));
+  const ignoredCount = input.comments.filter((c) => (c.author === null || !PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author)) && c.body.includes("VERDICT")).length;
+  const verifiedBodies = verified.map((c) => c.body);
+  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
+  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
   const codeReviewClean = codeReview.value === "APPROVE";
   const securityClean = security.value === "PASS";
   if (codeReviewClean && securityClean) {
@@ -2186,9 +2189,10 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
     problems.push(`code-reviewer verdict is not a clean APPROVE (found: ${codeReview.value})`);
   if (!securityClean)
     problems.push(`security-review verdict is not a clean PASS (found: ${security.value})`);
+  const ignoredNote = ignoredCount > 0 ? ` ${ignoredCount} verdict-shaped comment(s) from authors outside the principal allowlist were ignored.` : "";
   return {
     verdict: "fail",
-    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).`,
+    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).${ignoredNote}`,
     waived: false
   };
 }

package/dist/checks/bin/check-no-disk-state.js

@@ -2170,8 +2170,11 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
       waived: true
     };
   }
-  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(input.comments);
-  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(input.comments);
+  const verified = input.comments.filter((c) => c.author !== null && PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author));
+  const ignoredCount = input.comments.filter((c) => (c.author === null || !PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author)) && c.body.includes("VERDICT")).length;
+  const verifiedBodies = verified.map((c) => c.body);
+  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
+  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
   const codeReviewClean = codeReview.value === "APPROVE";
   const securityClean = security.value === "PASS";
   if (codeReviewClean && securityClean) {
@@ -2186,9 +2189,10 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
     problems.push(`code-reviewer verdict is not a clean APPROVE (found: ${codeReview.value})`);
   if (!securityClean)
     problems.push(`security-review verdict is not a clean PASS (found: ${security.value})`);
+  const ignoredNote = ignoredCount > 0 ? ` ${ignoredCount} verdict-shaped comment(s) from authors outside the principal allowlist were ignored.` : "";
   return {
     verdict: "fail",
-    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).`,
+    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).${ignoredNote}`,
     waived: false
   };
 }

package/dist/checks/bin/check-reader-resolvable-prose.js

@@ -2172,8 +2172,11 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
       waived: true
     };
   }
-  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(input.comments);
-  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(input.comments);
+  const verified = input.comments.filter((c) => c.author !== null && PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author));
+  const ignoredCount = input.comments.filter((c) => (c.author === null || !PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author)) && c.body.includes("VERDICT")).length;
+  const verifiedBodies = verified.map((c) => c.body);
+  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
+  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
   const codeReviewClean = codeReview.value === "APPROVE";
   const securityClean = security.value === "PASS";
   if (codeReviewClean && securityClean) {
@@ -2188,9 +2191,10 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
     problems.push(`code-reviewer verdict is not a clean APPROVE (found: ${codeReview.value})`);
   if (!securityClean)
     problems.push(`security-review verdict is not a clean PASS (found: ${security.value})`);
+  const ignoredNote = ignoredCount > 0 ? ` ${ignoredCount} verdict-shaped comment(s) from authors outside the principal allowlist were ignored.` : "";
   return {
     verdict: "fail",
-    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).`,
+    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).${ignoredNote}`,
     waived: false
   };
 }

package/dist/checks/bin/check-registry-gates.js

@@ -2172,8 +2172,11 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
       waived: true
     };
   }
-  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(input.comments);
-  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(input.comments);
+  const verified = input.comments.filter((c) => c.author !== null && PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author));
+  const ignoredCount = input.comments.filter((c) => (c.author === null || !PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author)) && c.body.includes("VERDICT")).length;
+  const verifiedBodies = verified.map((c) => c.body);
+  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
+  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
   const codeReviewClean = codeReview.value === "APPROVE";
   const securityClean = security.value === "PASS";
   if (codeReviewClean && securityClean) {
@@ -2188,9 +2191,10 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
     problems.push(`code-reviewer verdict is not a clean APPROVE (found: ${codeReview.value})`);
   if (!securityClean)
     problems.push(`security-review verdict is not a clean PASS (found: ${security.value})`);
+  const ignoredNote = ignoredCount > 0 ? ` ${ignoredCount} verdict-shaped comment(s) from authors outside the principal allowlist were ignored.` : "";
   return {
     verdict: "fail",
-    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).`,
+    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).${ignoredNote}`,
     waived: false
   };
 }

package/dist/checks/bin/check-review-gate.js

@@ -2170,8 +2170,11 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
       waived: true
     };
   }
-  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(input.comments);
-  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(input.comments);
+  const verified = input.comments.filter((c) => c.author !== null && PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author));
+  const ignoredCount = input.comments.filter((c) => (c.author === null || !PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author)) && c.body.includes("VERDICT")).length;
+  const verifiedBodies = verified.map((c) => c.body);
+  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
+  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
   const codeReviewClean = codeReview.value === "APPROVE";
   const securityClean = security.value === "PASS";
   if (codeReviewClean && securityClean) {
@@ -2186,9 +2189,10 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
     problems.push(`code-reviewer verdict is not a clean APPROVE (found: ${codeReview.value})`);
   if (!securityClean)
     problems.push(`security-review verdict is not a clean PASS (found: ${security.value})`);
+  const ignoredNote = ignoredCount > 0 ? ` ${ignoredCount} verdict-shaped comment(s) from authors outside the principal allowlist were ignored.` : "";
   return {
     verdict: "fail",
-    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).`,
+    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).${ignoredNote}`,
     waived: false
   };
 }
@@ -2868,7 +2872,11 @@ function main() {
   }
   const labels = pr.labels.map((l) => l.name);
   const waiverLabelActor = labels.includes(WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW) ? fetchWaiverLabelActor(prNumber, WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW) : null;
-  const result = checkReviewGate({ comments: pr.comments.map((c) => c.body), labels, waiverLabelActor });
+  const result = checkReviewGate({
+    comments: pr.comments.map((c) => ({ body: c.body, author: c.author?.login ?? null })),
+    labels,
+    waiverLabelActor
+  });
   if (result.verdict === "fail") {
     emitCheckError({
       schema: CHECK_SCHEMA_VERSION,

package/dist/checks/bin/check-single-plan-pr.js

@@ -2170,8 +2170,11 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
       waived: true
     };
   }
-  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(input.comments);
-  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(input.comments);
+  const verified = input.comments.filter((c) => c.author !== null && PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author));
+  const ignoredCount = input.comments.filter((c) => (c.author === null || !PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author)) && c.body.includes("VERDICT")).length;
+  const verifiedBodies = verified.map((c) => c.body);
+  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
+  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
   const codeReviewClean = codeReview.value === "APPROVE";
   const securityClean = security.value === "PASS";
   if (codeReviewClean && securityClean) {
@@ -2186,9 +2189,10 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
     problems.push(`code-reviewer verdict is not a clean APPROVE (found: ${codeReview.value})`);
   if (!securityClean)
     problems.push(`security-review verdict is not a clean PASS (found: ${security.value})`);
+  const ignoredNote = ignoredCount > 0 ? ` ${ignoredCount} verdict-shaped comment(s) from authors outside the principal allowlist were ignored.` : "";
   return {
     verdict: "fail",
-    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).`,
+    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).${ignoredNote}`,
     waived: false
   };
 }

package/dist/checks/bin/check-test-plan.js

@@ -2167,8 +2167,11 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
       waived: true
     };
   }
-  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(input.comments);
-  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(input.comments);
+  const verified = input.comments.filter((c) => c.author !== null && PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author));
+  const ignoredCount = input.comments.filter((c) => (c.author === null || !PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST.includes(c.author)) && c.body.includes("VERDICT")).length;
+  const verifiedBodies = verified.map((c) => c.body);
+  const codeReview = extractCodeReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
+  const security = extractSecurityReviewVerdict(verifiedBodies);
   const codeReviewClean = codeReview.value === "APPROVE";
   const securityClean = security.value === "PASS";
   if (codeReviewClean && securityClean) {
@@ -2183,9 +2186,10 @@ function checkReviewGate(input) {
     problems.push(`code-reviewer verdict is not a clean APPROVE (found: ${codeReview.value})`);
   if (!securityClean)
     problems.push(`security-review verdict is not a clean PASS (found: ${security.value})`);
+  const ignoredNote = ignoredCount > 0 ? ` ${ignoredCount} verdict-shaped comment(s) from authors outside the principal allowlist were ignored.` : "";
   return {
     verdict: "fail",
-    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).`,
+    reason: `${problems.join("; ")}. A principal can apply an actor-verified \`${WAIVER_LABEL_REVIEW}\` label to skip this requirement, or post the missing/clean verdict comment(s).${ignoredNote}`,
     waived: false
   };
 }