@atrib/verify 0.3.6 → 0.4.0

package/README.md

@@ -65,11 +65,11 @@ Per the [§5.8](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#58
 | `resolveEndpoint` | `string` | `https://resolve.atrib.dev/v1` | Reserved for v2 remote calculation.                                     |
 | `merchantKey`     | `string` | unset                         | Base64url Ed25519 32-byte seed. Optional. `verify()` works without it. |
 
-### `verify(doc): Promise<VerificationResult>`
+### `verify(doc, options): Promise<VerificationResult>`
 
 Independently re-runs the [§4.6](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#46-the-calculation-algorithm) calculation and verifies the document signature. Always returns a result object; never throws. Inspect `valid`, `signatureOk`, `calcMatch`, and `warnings` to understand the outcome.
 
-This method operates on `RecommendationDocument` shapes (settlement-recommendation flow per spec [§5.5.2](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#552-verify)). For verifying individual `AtribRecord`s, see `verifyRecord` below.
+This method operates on `RecommendationDocument` shapes (settlement-recommendation flow per spec [§5.5.2](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#552-verify)). When the caller supplies `ap2ViEvidence`, the verifier attaches the async AP2 / VI result as `ap2_vi_evidence`. That block is tiered and does not change the base recommendation signature or calculation checks. For verifying individual `AtribRecord`s, see `verifyRecord` below.
 
 ### `verifyRecord(record, options): Promise<RecordVerificationResult>`
 
@@ -82,6 +82,8 @@ const result = await verifyRecord(record, {
   upstreamCandidate,         // optional, for provenance_token resolution
   informedByCandidates: [],  // optional, for informed_by[] resolution
   identityClaim,             // optional, for capability_check (caller does directory lookup)
+  ap2ViEvidence,             // optional, transaction-only AP2 / VI evidence bundle
+  ap2ViEvidenceOptions,      // optional, passed to verifyAp2ViEvidenceAsync()
 })
 // result: {
 //   valid: boolean
@@ -90,6 +92,7 @@ const result = await verifyRecord(record, {
 //   provenance?:              { token, upstream_record_hash, upstream_resolved }
 //   informed_by_resolution?:  { resolved: string[], dangling: string[] }
 //   capability_check?:        { envelope, in_envelope, mismatches, unresolvable }
+//   ap2_vi_evidence?:         Ap2ViEvidenceVerification
 //   warnings: string[]
 // }
 ```
@@ -100,7 +103,8 @@ const result = await verifyRecord(record, {
 - `informed_by_resolution`: `{ resolved: string[], dangling: string[] }` per record carrying `informed_by` ([D041](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/DECISIONS.md#d041-informed_by-linking-primitive-and-informed_by-edge-type) / [§1.2.5](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#125-informed_by)). Dangling references are flagged but do not fail verification: they signal "the verifier has not seen upstream context," not "the record is invalid."
 - `posture`: `{ timestamp_granularity, timestamp_consistent, timestamp_granularity_explicit, args_commitment_form, result_commitment_form, tool_name_form }` ([D045](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/DECISIONS.md#d045-privacy-postures-normative-spec-section) / [D061](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/DECISIONS.md#d061-add-tool_name-args_hash-result_hash-fields-to-§121) / [§8.2](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#82-opaque-name-posture) / [§8.3](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#83-salted-commitment-posture) / [§8.4](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#84-coarsened-timing-posture)). Always populated. Surfaces (a) the declared timing granularity, whether the timestamp value structurally matches the spec's trailing-zero invariant, and whether the field was explicitly set vs defaulted; (b) the structurally-detected `args_hash` / `result_hash` commitment scheme: `'salted-sha256'` when `args_salt` / `result_salt` is present, `'plain-sha256'` otherwise (the `'hmac-sha256'` variant from [§8.3](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#83-salted-commitment-posture) is signaled out-of-band and is not structurally detectable); and (c) the [§8.2](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#82-opaque-name-posture) `tool_name_form`: `'hashed'` when `tool_name` matches `^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$`, `'plain'` for any other present value, `null` when the field is absent. Per [D061](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/DECISIONS.md#d061-add-tool_name-args_hash-result_hash-fields-to-121) the [§8.2](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#82-opaque-name-posture) verbatim-vs-opaque distinction is NOT structurally detectable, both surface as `'plain'`.
 - `capability_check`: `{ envelope, in_envelope, mismatches, unresolvable }` ([D051](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/DECISIONS.md#d051-capability-scoped-records-via-directory-published-envelopes) / [§6.7](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#67-capability-declarations)). Populated only when the caller passes a resolved `identityClaim` in options. Checks the record's `event_type` against the envelope's `event_types` allowlist and the record's `timestamp` against `expires_at`. `tool_names` (against tool_call records), `max_amount`, and `counterparties` (against transaction records) flag `unresolvable: true` because the constraints depend on data not yet on the standard record shape (`tool_name`) or out-of-band protocol events (payment amount + counterparty). Per [§6.7.3](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#673-out-of-envelope-records) out-of-envelope is a signal, not invalidation: mismatches do not flip `valid` to false. The caller is responsible for fetching the active envelope at the record's timestamp via `@atrib/directory`'s `lookup()` (or a cached equivalent); `@atrib/verify` intentionally has no `@atrib/directory` dependency.
-- `cross_attestation`: `{ signers_count, signers_valid, missing }` ([D052](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/DECISIONS.md#d052-cross-attestation-requirement-for-transaction-records) / [§1.7.6](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#176-cross-attestation-requirement-for-transaction-records)). Populated only on transaction records (`event_type = transaction`). Each entry in `signers[]` is verified against the cross-attestation canonical bytes (JCS form with `signers: []` and the top-level `signature` field omitted, per [§1.7.6](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#176-cross-attestation-requirement-for-transaction-records)). `missing: true` when fewer than 2 signers verify, atrib's normative minimum. Per [§1.7.6](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#176-cross-attestation-requirement-for-transaction-records) missing is a SIGNAL not invalidation: `valid` stays true if the underlying signature path holds. Legacy single-signer transaction records (no `signers[]` array, only top-level `signature`) surface as `signers_count: 0, missing: true` so consumers can flag them while accepting the cryptographic validity.
+- `cross_attestation`: `{ signers_count, signers_valid, missing }` ([D052](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/DECISIONS.md#d052-cross-attestation-requirement-for-transaction-records) / [§1.7.6](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#176-cross-attestation-requirement-for-transaction-records)). Populated only on transaction records (`event_type = transaction`). Each entry in `signers[]` is verified against the cross-attestation canonical bytes (JCS form with `signers: []` and the top-level `signature` field omitted, per [§1.7.6](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#176-cross-attestation-requirement-for-transaction-records)). `signatureOk` requires a valid signer entry whose `creator_key` matches the record's top-level `creator_key`; unrelated counterparty signers do not validate the record on behalf of its creator. `missing: true` when fewer than 2 signers verify, atrib's normative minimum. Per [§1.7.6](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#176-cross-attestation-requirement-for-transaction-records) missing is a signal, not invalidation: `valid` stays true if the underlying signature path holds. Agent-side Path 2 fallback records usually surface as `signers_count: 1, missing: true` until a counterparty signs the same bytes. Legacy single-signer transaction records (no `signers[]` array, only top-level `signature`) surface as `signers_count: 0, missing: true` so consumers can flag them while accepting the cryptographic validity.
+- `ap2_vi_evidence`: the async AP2 / VI verifier result ([D094](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/DECISIONS.md#d094-ap2--vi-evidence-attaches-to-verifier-results-as-a-tiered-block) / [§5.5.4](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#554-ap2--verifiable-intent-evidence-checks)). Populated only when the caller passes `ap2ViEvidence` for a transaction record. It does not alter `valid`, `signatureOk`, or `cross_attestation`; consumers inspect `ap2_vi_evidence.valid` for AP2 authorization evidence.
 
 **Pending per-record annotations** (tracked as a Pending decision in [DECISIONS.md P005](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/DECISIONS.md#p005-reconcile-atribverify-readme-per-record-annotations-with-actual-code-surface)):
 
@@ -109,6 +113,79 @@ const result = await verifyRecord(record, {
 
 Each pending annotation is its own ADR scope when external consumers need it.
 
+### `verifyAp2ViEvidence(...)` and `verifyAp2ViEvidenceAsync(...)`
+
+AP2 / Verifiable Intent evidence checking for merchants and auditors. This runs outside the transaction detector path. It does not alter the graph, the settlement calculation, or record validity. It answers a narrower question: did the AP2 receipts and VI mandate chain form a coherent evidence bundle?
+
+```typescript
+import { verifyAp2ViEvidence, verifyAp2ViEvidenceAsync } from '@atrib/verify'
+
+const result = verifyAp2ViEvidence({
+  trustedIssuerKeys: [issuerJwk],
+  ap2: {
+    paymentReceipt,
+    checkoutReceipt,
+    closedPaymentMandate,
+    closedCheckoutMandate,
+  },
+  vi: {
+    credentials: [
+      { layer: 'L1', sdJwt: issuerCredential },
+      { layer: 'L2', sdJwt: userMandate },
+      { layer: 'L3_PAYMENT', sdJwt: agentPaymentMandate, parentPresentation },
+      { layer: 'L3_CHECKOUT', sdJwt: agentCheckoutMandate, parentPresentation },
+    ],
+  },
+})
+```
+
+Use the async verifier when AP2 receipts arrive as compact signed JWTs:
+
+```typescript
+const result = await verifyAp2ViEvidenceAsync(
+  {
+    receiptJwtIssuers: [
+      {
+        issuer: 'https://verifier.example',
+        audience: 'merchant:checkout',
+        metadataUrl: 'https://verifier.example/.well-known/ap2',
+      },
+    ],
+    ap2: {
+      paymentReceiptJwt,
+      closedPaymentMandate,
+    },
+  },
+  { receiptJwtPolicy: 'require' },
+)
+```
+
+Checks performed when evidence is present:
+
+- AP2 PaymentReceipt / CheckoutReceipt success, required fields, and `reference` binding to a closed mandate serialization or explicit closed-mandate hash.
+- Compact AP2 receipt JWT verification with `jose`, using trusted local JWKS, `jwksUrl`, or verifier metadata containing inline `jwks` or `jwks_uri`.
+- Receipt JWT hardening for unsupported `alg`, `alg: "none"`, missing `kid`, unexpected `crit`, malformed compact JWTs, unsupported JWKS keys, duplicate `kid`, metadata precedence, issuer key isolation, and clock-edge behavior.
+- VI SD-JWT parsing for L1, L2, L3 payment, and L3 checkout credentials.
+- Async VI SD-JWT / SD-JWT VC conformance with OpenWallet `@sd-jwt/core` and `@sd-jwt/sd-jwt-vc`.
+- VI SD-JWT structural checks for duplicate disclosures, duplicate digest references, unused disclosures, unsupported `_sd_alg`, and future `nbf`.
+- ES256 signatures: L1 via trusted issuer keys, L2 via L1 `cnf.jwk`, L3 via the L2 delegated agent key.
+- `sd_hash` links, disclosure digest links, autonomous L2 `cnf.jwk` consistency, and final checkout/payment binding.
+- Typed AP2 mandate constraints: merchant allowlists, checkout line items, payment amount ranges, allowed payees, allowed payment instruments, allowed PISPs, and execution windows.
+
+The default signature policy is `require`. Missing keys or invalid signatures make `valid` false while still returning a structured result. Use `signaturePolicy: "best-effort"` for structural triage where issuer keys are not yet available.
+
+The default receipt JWT policy is also `require`. Invalid receipt JWTs make `valid` false. Use `receiptJwtPolicy: "best-effort"` when decoded receipt objects are already available and JWT verification is an advisory signal.
+
+The async verifier also defaults `sdJwtConformancePolicy` to `require` when VI credentials are present. Each credential result includes `sdJwtConformance.status`, `profile`, and an optional reason. Use `sdJwtConformancePolicy: "best-effort"` for advisory conformance checks, or `"off"` to keep the async result aligned with the decoded structural verifier. The default profile is `sd-jwt-vc`; callers may pass `sdJwtConformanceProfile: "sd-jwt"` for the core SD-JWT profile.
+
+VC type metadata and status-list fetches are explicit. If a caller enables `sdJwtVc.loadTypeMetadata` or submits credentials with VC status references, it should provide `sdJwtVc.vctFetcher` or `sdJwtVc.statusListFetcher`. The verifier does not perform hidden network fetches for those checks.
+
+The default constraint policy is `require`. Failed, unresolved, or unsupported disclosed AP2 constraints make `valid` false. Use `constraintPolicy: "best-effort"` to keep those findings advisory, or `"off"` to skip them. The lower-level `evaluateAp2ViConstraints(input, disclosures?)` helper is exported for decoded mandate material and fixture replay.
+
+The local AP2 / VI evidence corpus lives under `packages/agent/test/fixtures/ap2/`. It includes signed immediate evidence, signed autonomous success evidence, a decoded constraint replay case, and a named autonomous negative matrix. The crypto conformance corpus lives under `spec/conformance/ap2-vi-crypto/`. It pins offline JOSE, JWKS, metadata, SD-JWT, and clock-edge cases for the async verifier.
+
+The same evidence bundle can be passed to `verifyRecord(record, { ap2ViEvidence, ap2ViEvidenceOptions })` for transaction records or to `verifier.verify(doc, { ap2ViEvidence, ap2ViEvidenceOptions })` for settlement recommendation verification. Both APIs attach the result as `ap2_vi_evidence`; neither API fetches AP2 / VI material on its own.
+
 ### `calculate(options): Promise<RecommendationDocument>`
 
 Post-hoc calculation when no agent SDK was present. Always returns a fully-shaped document, unsigned with a warning if the merchant key is missing.
@@ -122,6 +199,9 @@ For advanced use (custom calculators, alternative signing flows), the package al
 - `isValidPolicy(doc)`: schema check for `PolicyDocument`
 - `signRecommendation(unsigned, privateKey)`: JCS + Ed25519 signing
 - `verifyRecommendationSignature(doc, publicKey)`: signature verification
+- `evaluateAp2ViConstraints(input, disclosures?)`: decoded AP2 open-mandate constraint checking
+- `verifyAp2ViEvidence(bundle, options?)`: decoded AP2 / VI receipt and mandate-chain evidence checking
+- `verifyAp2ViEvidenceAsync(bundle, options?)`: compact AP2 receipt JWT verification, async VI SD-JWT / VC conformance, plus decoded evidence checks. `verifyRecord()` and `AtribVerifier.verify()` call this when supplied with `ap2ViEvidence`
 - `recommendationSigningInput(doc)`: the canonical bytes that get signed
 - `distributionsMatch(a, b)`: float-tolerant equality (within `1e-9` per recipient)
 - `fetchGraph(endpoint, contextId, treeSize?)`, `fetchSessionPolicyRecord`, `fetchPolicyDocument`
@@ -149,7 +229,7 @@ The merchant's payment pipeline never crashes because of an atrib problem. It ju
 
 ## Test coverage
 
-184 tests across 10 test files covering the [§4.6](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#46-the-calculation-algorithm) calculation algorithm, graph endpoint client, JCS canonicalization, Ed25519 signing, settlement recommendations, policy templates, policy builder, calculation edge cases, property-based testing with fast-check, and full `verify()` / `calculate()` paths including [§5.8](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#58-degradation-contract) degradation.
+The test suite covers the [§4.6](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#46-the-calculation-algorithm) calculation algorithm, graph endpoint client, JCS canonicalization, Ed25519 signing, settlement recommendations, policy templates, policy builder, calculation edge cases, property-based testing with fast-check, AP2 / VI evidence checking, AP2 / VI crypto conformance, tiered AP2 / VI verifier attachment, and full `verify()` / `calculate()` paths including [§5.8](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#58-degradation-contract) degradation.
 
 Run them with `pnpm --filter @atrib/verify test`.
 
@@ -162,6 +242,7 @@ Run them with `pnpm --filter @atrib/verify test`.
 | [§4.6](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#46-the-calculation-algorithm)         | Pure calculation algorithm                           |
 | [§4.7](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#47-settlement-recommendation-document)         | Recommendation document signing/verification         |
 | [§5.5](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#55-atribverify-merchant-verification-library)         | `AtribVerifier` class. `verify()` and `calculate()` |
+| [§5.5.4](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#554-ap2--verifiable-intent-evidence-checks) | AP2 / VI evidence checks                             |
 | [§5.8](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#58-degradation-contract)         | Degradation contract; failures never break the host |
 
 The full protocol spec is at [`atrib-spec.md`](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md).

package/dist/ap2-vi-evidence.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+import type { StatusListFetcher, StatusValidator, VcTFetcher } from '@sd-jwt/sd-jwt-vc';
+export type ViCredentialLayer = 'L1' | 'L2' | 'L3_PAYMENT' | 'L3_CHECKOUT';
+export type ViMode = 'immediate' | 'autonomous' | 'unknown';
+export type SdJwtConformancePolicy = 'require' | 'best-effort' | 'off';
+export type SdJwtConformanceProfile = 'sd-jwt' | 'sd-jwt-vc';
+export type Ap2ConstraintPolicy = 'require' | 'best-effort' | 'off';
+export type Ap2ConstraintDomain = 'checkout' | 'payment';
+export type Ap2ConstraintCheckStatus = 'passed' | 'failed' | 'unresolved' | 'unsupported';
+export type Ap2ConstraintEvaluationStatus = 'passed' | 'failed' | 'unresolved' | 'not_applicable' | 'not_checked';
+export interface ViCredentialInput {
+    layer: ViCredentialLayer;
+    sdJwt: string;
+    parentPresentation?: string;
+}
+export interface Ap2EvidenceInput {
+    paymentReceipt?: unknown;
+    checkoutReceipt?: unknown;
+    paymentReceiptJwt?: string;
+    checkoutReceiptJwt?: string;
+    checkoutPayload?: unknown;
+    closedPaymentMandate?: string;
+    closedCheckoutMandate?: string;
+    closedPaymentMandateHash?: string;
+    closedCheckoutMandateHash?: string;
+}
+export interface Ap2ReceiptJwtIssuer {
+    issuer?: string;
+    audience?: string | string[];
+    jwks?: JsonWebKey[] | {
+        keys: JsonWebKey[];
+    };
+    jwksUrl?: string;
+    metadataUrl?: string;
+}
+export interface SdJwtVcConformanceOptions {
+    loadTypeMetadata?: boolean;
+    vctFetcher?: VcTFetcher;
+    statusListFetcher?: StatusListFetcher;
+    statusValidator?: StatusValidator;
+    maxVctExtendsDepth?: number;
+}
+export interface Ap2ViEvidenceBundle {
+    ap2?: Ap2EvidenceInput;
+    vi?: {
+        credentials?: ViCredentialInput[];
+    };
+    trustedIssuerKeys?: JsonWebKey[];
+    receiptJwtIssuers?: Ap2ReceiptJwtIssuer[];
+}
+export interface VerifyAp2ViEvidenceOptions {
+    trustedIssuerKeys?: JsonWebKey[];
+    receiptJwtIssuers?: Ap2ReceiptJwtIssuer[];
+    receiptJwtPolicy?: 'require' | 'best-effort';
+    signaturePolicy?: 'require' | 'best-effort';
+    sdJwtConformancePolicy?: SdJwtConformancePolicy;
+    sdJwtConformanceProfile?: SdJwtConformanceProfile;
+    constraintPolicy?: Ap2ConstraintPolicy;
+    sdJwtVc?: SdJwtVcConformanceOptions;
+    nowSeconds?: number;
+    clockSkewSeconds?: number;
+    fetch?: typeof fetch;
+}
+export interface SignatureCheck {
+    status: 'verified' | 'invalid' | 'not_checked';
+    reason?: string;
+}
+export interface SdJwtConformanceCheck {
+    status: 'verified' | 'invalid' | 'not_checked';
+    profile: SdJwtConformanceProfile | null;
+    reason?: string;
+}
+export interface ViCredentialCheck {
+    layer: ViCredentialLayer;
+    alg: string | null;
+    typ: string | null;
+    kid: string | null;
+    signature: SignatureCheck;
+    sdJwtConformance: SdJwtConformanceCheck;
+    sdHashOk: boolean | null;
+    disclosuresOk: boolean | null;
+    mandateVcts: string[];
+}
+export interface Ap2ReceiptCheck {
+    present: boolean;
+    status: string | null;
+    success: boolean;
+    reference: string | null;
+    referenceOk: boolean | null;
+    missingFields: string[];
+    jwt?: Ap2ReceiptJwtCheck;
+}
+export interface Ap2ReceiptJwtCheck {
+    present: boolean;
+    verified: boolean;
+    issuer: string | null;
+    kid: string | null;
+    alg: string | null;
+    jwksSource: 'static' | 'jwks_url' | 'metadata' | null;
+    error?: string;
+}
+export interface Ap2MandateConstraintCheck {
+    type: string;
+    domain: Ap2ConstraintDomain;
+    status: Ap2ConstraintCheckStatus;
+    reason?: string;
+}
+export interface Ap2MandateConstraintEvaluation {
+    status: Ap2ConstraintEvaluationStatus;
+    checks: Ap2MandateConstraintCheck[];
+}
+export interface Ap2MandateConstraintInput {
+    openCheckoutMandates?: unknown[];
+    closedCheckoutMandates?: unknown[];
+    openPaymentMandates?: unknown[];
+    closedPaymentMandates?: unknown[];
+    checkoutPayload?: unknown;
+    nowSeconds?: number;
+}
+export interface Ap2EvidenceCheck {
+    paymentReceipt?: Ap2ReceiptCheck;
+    checkoutReceipt?: Ap2ReceiptCheck;
+}
+export interface ViEvidenceCheck {
+    mode: ViMode;
+    credentials: ViCredentialCheck[];
+    delegationOk: boolean | null;
+    checkoutPaymentBindingOk: boolean | null;
+    constraints: Ap2MandateConstraintEvaluation;
+}
+export interface Ap2ViEvidenceVerification {
+    valid: boolean;
+    transactionAccepted: boolean;
+    ap2: Ap2EvidenceCheck;
+    vi: ViEvidenceCheck;
+    errors: string[];
+    warnings: string[];
+}
+export declare function evaluateAp2ViConstraints(input: Ap2MandateConstraintInput, disclosures?: Map<string, unknown>): Ap2MandateConstraintEvaluation;
+export declare function verifyAp2ViEvidence(bundle: Ap2ViEvidenceBundle, options?: VerifyAp2ViEvidenceOptions): Ap2ViEvidenceVerification;
+export declare function verifyAp2ViEvidenceAsync(bundle: Ap2ViEvidenceBundle, options?: VerifyAp2ViEvidenceOptions): Promise<Ap2ViEvidenceVerification>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=ap2-vi-evidence.d.ts.map

package/dist/ap2-vi-evidence.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"ap2-vi-evidence.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/ap2-vi-evidence.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAOA,OAAO,KAAK,EAEV,iBAAiB,EACjB,eAAe,EACf,UAAU,EACX,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAA;AAW1B,MAAM,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,YAAY,GAAG,aAAa,CAAA;AAC1E,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,WAAW,GAAG,YAAY,GAAG,SAAS,CAAA;AAC3D,MAAM,MAAM,sBAAsB,GAAG,SAAS,GAAG,aAAa,GAAG,KAAK,CAAA;AACtE,MAAM,MAAM,uBAAuB,GAAG,QAAQ,GAAG,WAAW,CAAA;AAC5D,MAAM,MAAM,mBAAmB,GAAG,SAAS,GAAG,aAAa,GAAG,KAAK,CAAA;AACnE,MAAM,MAAM,mBAAmB,GAAG,UAAU,GAAG,SAAS,CAAA;AACxD,MAAM,MAAM,wBAAwB,GAAG,QAAQ,GAAG,QAAQ,GAAG,YAAY,GAAG,aAAa,CAAA;AACzF,MAAM,MAAM,6BAA6B,GACrC,QAAQ,GACR,QAAQ,GACR,YAAY,GACZ,gBAAgB,GAChB,aAAa,CAAA;AAEjB,MAAM,WAAW,iBAAiB;IAChC,KAAK,EAAE,iBAAiB,CAAA;IACxB,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACb,kBAAkB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CAC5B;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,gBAAgB;IAC/B,cAAc,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAA;IACxB,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAA;IACzB,iBAAiB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IAC1B,kBAAkB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IAC3B,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAA;IACzB,oBAAoB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IAC7B,qBAAqB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IAC9B,wBAAwB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACjC,yBAAyB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CACnC;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,mBAAmB;IAClC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACf,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,EAAE,CAAA;IAC5B,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,GAAG;QAAE,IAAI,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,CAAA;KAAE,CAAA;IAC5C,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IAChB,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CACrB;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,yBAAyB;IACxC,gBAAgB,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAA;IAC1B,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,UAAU,CAAA;IACvB,iBAAiB,CAAC,EAAE,iBAAiB,CAAA;IACrC,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,eAAe,CAAA;IACjC,kBAAkB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CAC5B;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,mBAAmB;IAClC,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAA;IACtB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE;QACH,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAA;KAClC,CAAA;IACD,iBAAiB,CAAC,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,CAAA;IAChC,iBAAiB,CAAC,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,CAAA;CAC1C;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,0BAA0B;IACzC,iBAAiB,CAAC,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,CAAA;IAChC,iBAAiB,CAAC,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,CAAA;IACzC,gBAAgB,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,GAAG,aAAa,CAAA;IAC5C,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,GAAG,aAAa,CAAA;IAC3C,sBAAsB,CAAC,EAAE,sBAAsB,CAAA;IAC/C,uBAAuB,CAAC,EAAE,uBAAuB,CAAA;IACjD,gBAAgB,CAAC,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAA;IACtC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,yBAAyB,CAAA;IACnC,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACnB,gBAAgB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACzB,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAA;CACrB;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,cAAc;IAC7B,MAAM,EAAE,UAAU,GAAG,SAAS,GAAG,aAAa,CAAA;IAC9C,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CAChB;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,qBAAqB;IACpC,MAAM,EAAE,UAAU,GAAG,SAAS,GAAG,aAAa,CAAA;IAC9C,OAAO,EAAE,uBAAuB,GAAG,IAAI,CAAA;IACvC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CAChB;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,iBAAiB;IAChC,KAAK,EAAE,iBAAiB,CAAA;IACxB,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAA;IAClB,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAA;IAClB,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAA;IAClB,SAAS,EAAE,cAAc,CAAA;IACzB,gBAAgB,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAA;IACvC,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,GAAG,IAAI,CAAA;IACxB,aAAa,EAAE,OAAO,GAAG,IAAI,CAAA;IAC7B,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAA;CACtB;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,eAAe;IAC9B,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,CAAA;IAChB,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAA;IACrB,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,CAAA;IAChB,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAA;IACxB,WAAW,EAAE,OAAO,GAAG,IAAI,CAAA;IAC3B,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAA;IACvB,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,kBAAkB,CAAA;CACzB;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,kBAAkB;IACjC,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,CAAA;IAChB,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,CAAA;IACjB,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAA;IACrB,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAA;IAClB,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAA;IAClB,UAAU,EAAE,QAAQ,GAAG,UAAU,GAAG,UAAU,GAAG,IAAI,CAAA;IACrD,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CACf;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,yBAAyB;IACxC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACZ,MAAM,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAA;IAC3B,MAAM,EAAE,wBAAwB,CAAA;IAChC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CAChB;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,8BAA8B;IAC7C,MAAM,EAAE,6BAA6B,CAAA;IACrC,MAAM,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,CAAA;CACpC;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,yBAAyB;IACxC,oBAAoB,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,CAAA;IAChC,sBAAsB,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,CAAA;IAClC,mBAAmB,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,CAAA;IAC/B,qBAAqB,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,CAAA;IACjC,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAA;IACzB,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CACpB;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,gBAAgB;IAC/B,cAAc,CAAC,EAAE,eAAe,CAAA;IAChC,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,eAAe,CAAA;CAClC;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,eAAe;IAC9B,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACZ,WAAW,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAA;IAChC,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,GAAG,IAAI,CAAA;IAC5B,wBAAwB,EAAE,OAAO,GAAG,IAAI,CAAA;IACxC,WAAW,EAAE,8BAA8B,CAAA;CAC5C;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,yBAAyB;IACxC,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,CAAA;IACd,mBAAmB,EAAE,OAAO,CAAA;IAC5B,GAAG,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAA;IACrB,EAAE,EAAE,eAAe,CAAA;IACnB,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAA;IAChB,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAA;CACnB;AAyhBD,wBAAgB,wBAAwB,CACtC,KAAK,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAChC,WAAW,GAAE,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAa,GAC5C,8BAA8B,CAiDhC;AA8tBD,wBAAgB,mBAAmB,CACjC,MAAM,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAC3B,OAAO,GAAE,0BAA+B,GACvC,yBAAyB,CA+I3B;AAED,wBAAsB,wBAAwB,CAC5C,MAAM,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAC3B,OAAO,GAAE,0BAA+B,GACvC,OAAO,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC,CA2GpC"}