@atrib/verify 0.1.2 → 0.2.1

package/README.md

@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ This method operates on `RecommendationDocument` shapes (settlement-recommendati
 
 ### `verifyRecord(record, options): Promise<RecordVerificationResult>`
 
-Per-record verification. Verifies a single signed record's Ed25519 signature and surfaces per-record annotations defined by spec sections [§1.2.5](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#125-informed_by) ([D041](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/DECISIONS.md#d041-informed_by-linking-primitive-and-informed_by-edge-type)), [§1.2.6](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#126-provenance_token) ([D044](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/DECISIONS.md#d044-provenance_token-field-for-cross-session-causal-anchoring)), and [§8.4](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#84-coarsened-timing-posture) ([D045](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/DECISIONS.md#d045-privacy-postures-normative-spec-section)).
+Per-record verification. Verifies a single signed record's Ed25519 signature and surfaces per-record annotations defined by spec sections [§1.2.5](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#125-informed_by) ([D041](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/DECISIONS.md#d041-informed_by-linking-primitive-and-informed_by-edge-type)), [§1.2.6](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#126-provenance_token) ([D044](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/DECISIONS.md#d044-provenance_token-field-for-cross-session-causal-anchoring)), [§6.7](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#67-capability-declarations) ([D051](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/DECISIONS.md#d051-capability-scoped-records-via-directory-published-envelopes)), and [§8.4](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#84-coarsened-timing-posture) ([D045](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/DECISIONS.md#d045-privacy-postures-normative-spec-section)).
 
 ```typescript
 import { verifyRecord } from '@atrib/verify'
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ import { verifyRecord } from '@atrib/verify'
 const result = await verifyRecord(record, {
   upstreamCandidate,         // optional, for provenance_token resolution
   informedByCandidates: [],  // optional, for informed_by[] resolution
+  identityClaim,             // optional, for capability_check (caller does directory lookup)
 })
 // result: {
 //   valid: boolean
@@ -88,6 +89,7 @@ const result = await verifyRecord(record, {
 //   posture: { timestamp_granularity, timestamp_consistent, timestamp_granularity_explicit }
 //   provenance?:              { token, upstream_record_hash, upstream_resolved }
 //   informed_by_resolution?:  { resolved: string[], dangling: string[] }
+//   capability_check?:        { envelope, in_envelope, mismatches, unresolvable }
 //   warnings: string[]
 // }
 ```
@@ -96,14 +98,14 @@ const result = await verifyRecord(record, {
 
 - `provenance`: `{ token, upstream_record_hash, upstream_resolved }` per session-genesis record carrying `provenance_token` ([D044](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/DECISIONS.md#d044-provenance_token-field-for-cross-session-causal-anchoring) / [§1.2.6](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#126-provenance_token)). The 16-byte token truncation is irreversible: `upstream_record_hash` populates only when the caller supplies a candidate whose canonical-form SHA-256[:16] matches the token.
 - `informed_by_resolution`: `{ resolved: string[], dangling: string[] }` per record carrying `informed_by` ([D041](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/DECISIONS.md#d041-informed_by-linking-primitive-and-informed_by-edge-type) / [§1.2.5](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#125-informed_by)). Dangling references are flagged but do not fail verification: they signal "the verifier has not seen upstream context," not "the record is invalid."
-- `posture`: `{ timestamp_granularity, timestamp_consistent, timestamp_granularity_explicit }` ([D045](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/DECISIONS.md#d045-privacy-postures-normative-spec-section) / [§8.4](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#84-coarsened-timing-posture)). Always populated. Surfaces the declared timing granularity, whether the timestamp value structurally matches the spec's trailing-zero invariant for that granularity, and whether the field was explicitly set vs defaulted from absence.
+- `posture`: `{ timestamp_granularity, timestamp_consistent, timestamp_granularity_explicit, args_commitment_form, result_commitment_form, tool_name_form }` ([D045](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/DECISIONS.md#d045-privacy-postures-normative-spec-section) / [D061](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/DECISIONS.md#d061-add-tool_name-args_hash-result_hash-fields-to-§121) / [§8.2](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#82-opaque-name-posture) / [§8.3](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#83-salted-commitment-posture) / [§8.4](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#84-coarsened-timing-posture)). Always populated. Surfaces (a) the declared timing granularity, whether the timestamp value structurally matches the spec's trailing-zero invariant, and whether the field was explicitly set vs defaulted; (b) the structurally-detected `args_hash` / `result_hash` commitment scheme: `'salted-sha256'` when `args_salt` / `result_salt` is present, `'plain-sha256'` otherwise (the `'hmac-sha256'` variant from §8.3 is signaled out-of-band and is not structurally detectable); and (c) the §8.2 `tool_name_form`: `'hashed'` when `tool_name` matches `^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$`, `'plain'` for any other present value, `null` when the field is absent. Per D061 the §8.2 verbatim-vs-opaque distinction is NOT structurally detectable — both surface as `'plain'`.
+- `capability_check`: `{ envelope, in_envelope, mismatches, unresolvable }` ([D051](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/DECISIONS.md#d051-capability-scoped-records-via-directory-published-envelopes) / [§6.7](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#67-capability-declarations)). Populated only when the caller passes a resolved `identityClaim` in options. Checks the record's `event_type` against the envelope's `event_types` allowlist and the record's `timestamp` against `expires_at`. `tool_names` (against tool_call records), `max_amount`, and `counterparties` (against transaction records) flag `unresolvable: true` because the constraints depend on data not yet on the standard record shape (`tool_name`) or out-of-band protocol events (payment amount + counterparty). Per [§6.7.3](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#673-out-of-envelope-records) out-of-envelope is a signal, not invalidation: mismatches do not flip `valid` to false. The caller is responsible for fetching the active envelope at the record's timestamp via `@atrib/directory`'s `lookup()` (or a cached equivalent); `@atrib/verify` intentionally has no `@atrib/directory` dependency.
+- `cross_attestation`: `{ signers_count, signers_valid, missing }` ([D052](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/DECISIONS.md#d052-cross-attestation-requirement-for-transaction-records) / [§1.7.6](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#176-cross-attestation-requirement-for-transaction-records)). Populated only on transaction records (`event_type = transaction`). Each entry in `signers[]` is verified against the cross-attestation canonical bytes (JCS form with `signers: []` and the top-level `signature` field omitted, per §1.7.6). `missing: true` when fewer than 2 signers verify — atrib's normative minimum. Per §1.7.6 missing is a SIGNAL not invalidation: `valid` stays true if the underlying signature path holds. Legacy single-signer transaction records (no `signers[]` array, only top-level `signature`) surface as `signers_count: 0, missing: true` so consumers can flag them while accepting the cryptographic validity.
 
 **Pending per-record annotations** (tracked as a Pending decision in [DECISIONS.md P005](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/DECISIONS.md#p005-reconcile-atribverify-readme-per-record-annotations-with-actual-code-surface)):
 
-- `capability_check` ([D051](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/DECISIONS.md#d051-capability-scoped-records-via-directory-published-envelopes) / [§6.7](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#67-capability-declarations)): requires `@atrib/directory` integration to look up the signing key's capability envelope.
-- `cross_attestation` ([D052](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/DECISIONS.md#d052-cross-attestation-requirement-for-transaction-records) / [§1.7.6](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#176-cross-attestation-requirement-for-transaction-records)): requires a `signers[]` field on `AtribRecord` plus a transaction-record canonicalization variant in `@atrib/mcp`.
 - `cross_log_proof_count` / `cross_log_threshold_met` / `cross_log_equivocation_detected` ([D050](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/DECISIONS.md#d050-cross-log-replication-for-equivocation-defense) / [§2.11](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#211-cross-log-replication)): requires multi-log proof-bundle parsing and trusted-log-set config.
-- `tool_name_form` / `args_commitment_form` ([§8.2](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#82-opaque-name-posture) / [§8.3](https://github.com/creatornader/atrib/blob/main/atrib-spec.md#83-salted-commitment-posture)): requires `tool_name`, `args_hash`, and `args_salt` fields on `AtribRecord` (the standard record shape currently exposes only the derived `content_id`).
+(Note: `tool_name_form`, `args_commitment_form`, and `result_commitment_form` per §8.2/§8.3 are all now implemented under `posture` above. D061 added `tool_name`, `args_hash`, and `result_hash` to the §1.2.1 canonical record schema, completing the structural inputs.)
 
 Each pending annotation is its own ADR scope when external consumers need it.
 

package/dist/verify-record.d.ts

@@ -9,13 +9,19 @@
  * Implemented annotations (this file):
  *   - provenance:             { token, upstream_record_hash, upstream_resolved }    (D044 / §1.2.6)
  *   - informed_by_resolution: { resolved: string[], dangling: string[] }            (D041 / §1.2.5, §3.2.4)
- *   - posture:                { timestamp_granularity, timestamp_consistent }       (D045 / §8.4)
+ *   - posture:                { timestamp_granularity, timestamp_consistent, ...}   (D045 / §8.2 / §8.3 / §8.4)
+ *   - capability_check:       { envelope, in_envelope, mismatches, unresolvable }   (D051 / §6.7)
  *
  * Pending annotations (tracked in DECISIONS.md P005):
- *   - capability_check:       D051 / §6.7  (needs @atrib/directory integration)
  *   - cross_attestation:      D052 / §1.7.6  (needs `signers[]` type addition + transaction-record signing variant in @atrib/mcp)
  *   - cross_log_*:            D050 / §2.11  (needs multi-log proof-bundle infrastructure)
- *   - tool_name_form / args_commitment_form: §8.2 / §8.3  (needs tool_name + args_hash fields on the record shape — currently only content_id is exposed)
+ *
+ * Design note on dependencies. The capability_check annotation does NOT
+ * fetch the identity claim itself; the caller does the @atrib/directory
+ * lookup and passes the resolved claim into VerifyRecordOptions. This
+ * keeps @atrib/verify lean (no WASM-bridge dep) and lets the caller
+ * decide lookup strategy (cached vs live, batch vs per-record). Same
+ * pattern as `upstreamCandidate` and `informedByCandidates`.
  */
 import { base64urlDecode, type AtribRecord } from '@atrib/mcp';
 /**
@@ -48,18 +54,108 @@ export interface InformedByAnnotation {
     dangling: string[];
 }
 /**
- * Posture surfacing for a record. Currently exposes only the timing
- * posture (§8.4); tool_name_form (§8.2) and args_commitment_form (§8.3)
- * require fields that aren't on the current AtribRecord shape.
+ * Capability-envelope shape from spec §6.7.1. All sub-fields are optional;
+ * a claim with an empty envelope (`{}`) declares no scope. The verifier
+ * reads this off the resolved IdentityClaim's `capabilities` field.
+ */
+export interface CapabilityEnvelope {
+    tool_names?: string[];
+    event_types?: string[];
+    max_amount?: {
+        currency: string;
+        value: number;
+    };
+    counterparties?: string[];
+    expires_at?: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Capability-check surfacing for a record whose signer published an
+ * IdentityClaim with a `capabilities` field (D051 / spec §6.7).
+ *
+ * Per §6.7.3: out-of-envelope is a SIGNAL, not invalidation. Records
+ * outside the envelope remain cryptographically valid; the signature
+ * verifies, log inclusion verifies. Consumers decide policy.
+ */
+export interface CapabilityCheckAnnotation {
+    /** The active envelope at the record's timestamp, or null if none. */
+    envelope: CapabilityEnvelope | null;
+    /**
+     * True iff every present envelope field accommodates the record. False
+     * when any present constraint excludes the record's content. True when
+     * envelope is null (no constraint = trivially in-envelope).
+     */
+    in_envelope: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Specific constraints the record violates, listed for debugging.
+     * Each entry is a short string like 'event_type not in allowlist' or
+     * 'expires_at exceeded'. Empty when in_envelope is true.
+     */
+    mismatches: string[];
+    /**
+     * True iff one or more checks could not be resolved out-of-band
+     * (e.g., a transaction record's amount + counterparty are not
+     * derivable without the protocol-specific payment event). Per §6.7.2
+     * the verifier MUST flag this rather than passing or failing silently.
+     */
+    unresolvable: boolean;
+}
+/**
+ * Cross-attestation surfacing for a transaction record per spec §1.7.6
+ * (D052). atrib's normative minimum is two verified signers per
+ * transaction record (typically agent + counterparty). Records below
+ * the minimum get `missing: true`; verifiers MUST flag this rather
+ * than silently passing or failing.
+ *
+ * The annotation populates ONLY for records with
+ * `event_type = https://atrib.dev/v1/types/transaction`. Other event
+ * types continue to use the standard single-signer signature path.
+ */
+export interface CrossAttestationAnnotation {
+    /**
+     * Total signers attached to the record (regardless of validity).
+     * `0` for legacy single-signer transaction records that carry only the
+     * top-level `signature` field instead of the `signers[]` array.
+     */
+    signers_count: number;
+    /**
+     * Number of signers whose Ed25519 signature successfully verifies
+     * against the cross-attestation canonical bytes (JCS form with
+     * `signers: []` and `signature` omitted, per §1.7.6).
+     */
+    signers_valid: number;
+    /**
+     * `true` iff `signers_valid < 2` (atrib's normative minimum). Per
+     * §1.7.6 verifiers MUST flag this; consumers decide whether to accept
+     * the record. Like §6.7's `in_envelope: false`, this is a SIGNAL not
+     * an invalidation: the underlying record may still be cryptographically
+     * valid via the legacy top-level signature.
+     */
+    missing: boolean;
+}
+/**
+ * Posture surfacing for a record. Exposes three §8 postures: timing
+ * (§8.4), args/result commitment (§8.3), and tool-name disclosure (§8.2).
  *
  * `timestamp_granularity` is the declared coarsening level (or 'ms' by
  * default when absent). `timestamp_consistent` is true iff the timestamp
  * value matches the granularity's trailing-zero invariant per spec §8.4
- * (e.g., 'min' requires `timestamp % 60000 == 0`). A consistent posture
- * means the record's coarsening claim is structurally honest; an
- * inconsistent posture means the implementation declared a granularity
- * that the timestamp doesn't satisfy, which validators and verifiers
- * MUST reject per §8.4.
+ * (e.g., 'min' requires `timestamp % 60000 == 0`).
+ *
+ * `args_commitment_form` and `result_commitment_form` are detected
+ * structurally per spec §8.3. Presence of `args_salt` indicates the
+ * salted-sha256 scheme; absence indicates the default plain-sha256
+ * scheme. The hmac-sha256 variant is structurally indistinguishable to
+ * non-key-holders (the issuer signals it out-of-band per §8.3, not via
+ * record fields), so we surface only the two structurally-detectable
+ * forms.
+ *
+ * `tool_name_form` is the §8.2 / D061 form of the optional `tool_name`
+ * field. The §8.2 verbatim-vs-opaque distinction is NOT structurally
+ * detectable (`book_flight` matches the opaque regex), so per D061 we
+ * surface only `'hashed' | 'plain' | null`: hashed when the value
+ * matches `^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$`, plain for any other present value,
+ * null when the field is absent. Consumers wanting verbatim-vs-opaque
+ * MUST use out-of-band metadata (e.g., a name registry).
  */
 export interface PostureAnnotation {
     timestamp_granularity: 'ms' | 's' | 'min' | 'h' | 'd';
@@ -74,6 +170,25 @@ export interface PostureAnnotation {
      * Surfaced separately because absence affects JCS canonical form per §1.3.
      */
     timestamp_granularity_explicit: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Detected commitment scheme for `args_hash`. 'salted-sha256' iff
+     * `args_salt` is present on the record; 'plain-sha256' otherwise. The
+     * 'hmac-sha256' variant from §8.3 is not structurally detectable.
+     */
+    args_commitment_form: 'plain-sha256' | 'salted-sha256';
+    /**
+     * Detected commitment scheme for `result_hash`. Same semantics as
+     * `args_commitment_form` but driven by `result_salt`.
+     */
+    result_commitment_form: 'plain-sha256' | 'salted-sha256';
+    /**
+     * Detected form of the optional `tool_name` field per §8.2 / D061:
+     *   - 'hashed' when value matches `^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$` (unambiguous)
+     *   - 'plain' for any other present value (verbatim and opaque-label
+     *     forms are not structurally distinguishable; both surface as plain)
+     *   - null when the field is absent (the §8.1 default posture)
+     */
+    tool_name_form: 'hashed' | 'plain' | null;
 }
 export interface RecordVerificationResult {
     /** True iff signatureOk AND no fatal warnings. */
@@ -103,8 +218,34 @@ export interface RecordVerificationResult {
      * granularity and whether the timestamp value structurally matches it.
      */
     posture: PostureAnnotation;
+    /**
+     * Capability-check annotation. Populated only when the caller passes
+     * an `identityClaim` in options. When the claim has no `capabilities`
+     * field (or an empty envelope), in_envelope is true and mismatches is
+     * empty (no constraint = trivially in-envelope per §6.7.1).
+     */
+    capability_check?: CapabilityCheckAnnotation;
+    /**
+     * Cross-attestation annotation per §1.7.6 (D052). Populated ONLY for
+     * transaction records (`event_type = https://atrib.dev/v1/types/transaction`).
+     * Surfaces signers_count, signers_valid, and missing (true when fewer
+     * than 2 signers verified). Per §1.7.6 verifiers MUST flag missing
+     * cross-attestation; consumers decide policy.
+     */
+    cross_attestation?: CrossAttestationAnnotation;
     warnings: string[];
 }
+/**
+ * Resolved identity claim for capability-check input. This is the SHAPE
+ * @atrib/verify needs from a directory lookup, NOT the @atrib/directory
+ * type itself (avoids a hard package dep). Callers pass either:
+ *   - the @atrib/directory `IdentityClaim` (structurally compatible), or
+ *   - a hand-constructed object with this shape (e.g., from a cache)
+ */
+export interface ResolvedIdentityClaim {
+    creator_key: string;
+    capabilities?: CapabilityEnvelope;
+}
 export interface VerifyRecordOptions {
     /**
      * Candidate upstream record for provenance_token resolution. If
@@ -123,6 +264,19 @@ export interface VerifyRecordOptions {
      * not invalidating.
      */
     informedByCandidates?: AtribRecord[];
+    /**
+     * Resolved identity claim for the record's `creator_key`, used for
+     * capability_check (D051 / §6.7). When supplied, verifyRecord populates
+     * `capability_check` on the result. The claim should be the active
+     * envelope at the record's timestamp per §6.7.2 step 1; the caller
+     * is responsible for picking the right historical version when the
+     * envelope has rotated. When omitted, capability_check is not surfaced.
+     *
+     * Caller is responsible for fetching this via @atrib/directory's
+     * lookup() or a cached equivalent. @atrib/verify intentionally does
+     * NOT depend on @atrib/directory.
+     */
+    identityClaim?: ResolvedIdentityClaim;
 }
 /**
  * Verify one signed record.
@@ -135,6 +289,41 @@ export interface VerifyRecordOptions {
 export declare function verifyRecord(record: AtribRecord, options?: VerifyRecordOptions): Promise<RecordVerificationResult>;
 declare function resolveProvenance(token: string, upstreamCandidate: AtribRecord | undefined): ProvenanceAnnotation;
 declare function resolveInformedBy(entries: string[], candidates: AtribRecord[], warnings: string[]): InformedByAnnotation;
+/**
+ * Capability-check derivation per spec §6.7.2.
+ *
+ * The signer's claim may declare a capability envelope. We check the
+ * record against each present sub-field of the envelope and report any
+ * mismatches. The caller is responsible for supplying the ACTIVE envelope
+ * at the record's timestamp (i.e., picking the right historical version
+ * when capabilities have rotated per §6.7.4).
+ *
+ * Per §6.7.3 mismatches are SIGNALS, not invalidation. We don't push
+ * mismatches into `warnings` (which would set `valid: false`); they go
+ * into the structured `mismatches[]` field for consumer policy to weigh.
+ *
+ * For transaction records with `max_amount` or `counterparties`
+ * constraints, we set `unresolvable: true`. The protocol-specific
+ * transaction event isn't accessible to @atrib/verify; the caller would
+ * need to provide the resolved amount + counterparty out-of-band, which
+ * is a future-API extension if a real consumer needs it.
+ */
+declare function resolveCapabilityCheck(record: AtribRecord, claim: ResolvedIdentityClaim, _warnings: string[]): CapabilityCheckAnnotation;
+/**
+ * Cross-attestation derivation per spec §1.7.6 (D052).
+ *
+ * For each entry in `record.signers`, verify the Ed25519 signature
+ * against the cross-attestation canonical bytes (JCS form with
+ * `signers: []` and the top-level `signature` field omitted). Count
+ * valid signatures; flag `missing: true` when fewer than 2 verify.
+ *
+ * Per §1.7.6 mismatches are SIGNALS, not invalidation: missing
+ * cross-attestation does NOT push to `warnings[]` (which would flip
+ * `valid` to false). The legacy top-level `signature` (already
+ * verified above by `verifyRecordSignature`) keeps the record
+ * cryptographically valid; cross_attestation is a policy signal.
+ */
+declare function resolveCrossAttestation(record: AtribRecord): Promise<CrossAttestationAnnotation>;
 declare function detectPosture(record: AtribRecord, warnings: string[]): PostureAnnotation;
 export declare const __test_only__: {
     PROVENANCE_TOKEN_PATTERN: RegExp;
@@ -142,6 +331,8 @@ export declare const __test_only__: {
     GRANULARITY_MULTIPLIER: Record<"s" | "ms" | "min" | "h" | "d", number>;
     resolveProvenance: typeof resolveProvenance;
     resolveInformedBy: typeof resolveInformedBy;
+    resolveCapabilityCheck: typeof resolveCapabilityCheck;
+    resolveCrossAttestation: typeof resolveCrossAttestation;
     detectPosture: typeof detectPosture;
     base64urlDecode: typeof base64urlDecode;
 };

package/dist/verify-record.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/verify-record.js

@@ -10,17 +10,29 @@
  * Implemented annotations (this file):
  *   - provenance:             { token, upstream_record_hash, upstream_resolved }    (D044 / §1.2.6)
  *   - informed_by_resolution: { resolved: string[], dangling: string[] }            (D041 / §1.2.5, §3.2.4)
- *   - posture:                { timestamp_granularity, timestamp_consistent }       (D045 / §8.4)
+ *   - posture:                { timestamp_granularity, timestamp_consistent, ...}   (D045 / §8.2 / §8.3 / §8.4)
+ *   - capability_check:       { envelope, in_envelope, mismatches, unresolvable }   (D051 / §6.7)
  *
  * Pending annotations (tracked in DECISIONS.md P005):
- *   - capability_check:       D051 / §6.7  (needs @atrib/directory integration)
  *   - cross_attestation:      D052 / §1.7.6  (needs `signers[]` type addition + transaction-record signing variant in @atrib/mcp)
  *   - cross_log_*:            D050 / §2.11  (needs multi-log proof-bundle infrastructure)
- *   - tool_name_form / args_commitment_form: §8.2 / §8.3  (needs tool_name + args_hash fields on the record shape — currently only content_id is exposed)
+ *
+ * Design note on dependencies. The capability_check annotation does NOT
+ * fetch the identity claim itself; the caller does the @atrib/directory
+ * lookup and passes the resolved claim into VerifyRecordOptions. This
+ * keeps @atrib/verify lean (no WASM-bridge dep) and lets the caller
+ * decide lookup strategy (cached vs live, batch vs per-record). Same
+ * pattern as `upstreamCandidate` and `informedByCandidates`.
  */
-import { base64urlDecode, base64urlEncode, canonicalRecord, hexEncode, sha256, verifyRecord as verifyRecordSignature, } from '@atrib/mcp';
+import { base64urlDecode, base64urlEncode, canonicalCrossAttestationInput, canonicalRecord, hexEncode, sha256, verifyRecord as verifyRecordSignature, } from '@atrib/mcp';
+import * as ed from '@noble/ed25519';
 const PROVENANCE_TOKEN_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{22}$/;
 const SHA256_REF_PATTERN = /^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$/;
+// §8.2 hashed tool_name form per D061. The verbatim and opaque-label forms
+// are NOT structurally distinguishable (the spec's verbatim example
+// `book_flight` also matches the opaque regex), so this is the only
+// regex-detectable form.
+const TOOL_NAME_HASHED_PATTERN = /^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$/;
 const GRANULARITY_MULTIPLIER = {
     ms: 1,
     s: 1000,
@@ -38,14 +50,31 @@ const GRANULARITY_MULTIPLIER = {
  */
 export async function verifyRecord(record, options = {}) {
     const warnings = [];
+    // §1.2.1 + §1.7.6: the top-level `signature` field is OPTIONAL on
+    // transaction records that carry the `signers[]` array. Skip the
+    // legacy single-sig check when (a) the record is a transaction AND
+    // (b) signers[] is present and non-empty. The cross_attestation
+    // annotation below covers signature verification per signer.
+    const isTransaction = record.event_type === 'https://atrib.dev/v1/types/transaction';
+    const hasSignersArray = Array.isArray(record.signers) && record.signers.length > 0;
+    const skipLegacySignatureCheck = isTransaction && hasSignersArray;
     let signatureOk = false;
-    try {
-        signatureOk = await verifyRecordSignature(record);
-        if (!signatureOk)
-            warnings.push('signature verification failed');
+    if (skipLegacySignatureCheck) {
+        // §1.7.6: signature validity for transaction records lives in
+        // cross_attestation, not signatureOk. We treat signatureOk as true
+        // here so consumers' valid-bit logic isn't broken; the actual
+        // multi-sig validity is exposed via cross_attestation.signers_valid.
+        signatureOk = true;
     }
-    catch (err) {
-        warnings.push(`signature verification error: ${err.message}`);
+    else {
+        try {
+            signatureOk = await verifyRecordSignature(record);
+            if (!signatureOk)
+                warnings.push('signature verification failed');
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            warnings.push(`signature verification error: ${err.message}`);
+        }
     }
     const result = {
         valid: false,
@@ -67,6 +96,17 @@ export async function verifyRecord(record, options = {}) {
     if (record.informed_by && record.informed_by.length > 0) {
         result.informed_by_resolution = resolveInformedBy(record.informed_by, options.informedByCandidates ?? [], warnings);
     }
+    // capability_check (D051 / §6.7) — surface only when caller supplied a
+    // resolved identity claim. We do not look up the claim ourselves to
+    // avoid coupling @atrib/verify to @atrib/directory's WASM bridge.
+    if (options.identityClaim) {
+        result.capability_check = resolveCapabilityCheck(record, options.identityClaim, warnings);
+    }
+    // cross_attestation (D052 / §1.7.6) — surface only on transaction records.
+    // Other event types continue to use the standard single-signer path.
+    if (record.event_type === 'https://atrib.dev/v1/types/transaction') {
+        result.cross_attestation = await resolveCrossAttestation(record);
+    }
     result.valid = signatureOk && warnings.length === 0;
     return result;
 }
@@ -106,6 +146,128 @@ function resolveInformedBy(entries, candidates, warnings) {
     }
     return { resolved, dangling };
 }
+/**
+ * Capability-check derivation per spec §6.7.2.
+ *
+ * The signer's claim may declare a capability envelope. We check the
+ * record against each present sub-field of the envelope and report any
+ * mismatches. The caller is responsible for supplying the ACTIVE envelope
+ * at the record's timestamp (i.e., picking the right historical version
+ * when capabilities have rotated per §6.7.4).
+ *
+ * Per §6.7.3 mismatches are SIGNALS, not invalidation. We don't push
+ * mismatches into `warnings` (which would set `valid: false`); they go
+ * into the structured `mismatches[]` field for consumer policy to weigh.
+ *
+ * For transaction records with `max_amount` or `counterparties`
+ * constraints, we set `unresolvable: true`. The protocol-specific
+ * transaction event isn't accessible to @atrib/verify; the caller would
+ * need to provide the resolved amount + counterparty out-of-band, which
+ * is a future-API extension if a real consumer needs it.
+ */
+function resolveCapabilityCheck(record, claim, _warnings) {
+    const envelope = claim.capabilities ?? null;
+    // Empty envelope or absent capabilities field: no constraint declared.
+    // Per §6.7.1: "A claim with `capabilities: {}` declares no scope."
+    if (!envelope || Object.keys(envelope).length === 0) {
+        return { envelope: null, in_envelope: true, mismatches: [], unresolvable: false };
+    }
+    const mismatches = [];
+    let unresolvable = false;
+    // expires_at: envelope expired when the record's timestamp is after the cutoff.
+    // Per §6.7.2: expired envelope is "treated as having no constraint and flagged
+    // separately" — we add the mismatch but don't treat it as out-of-envelope on
+    // its own; other sub-fields still apply if present.
+    if (typeof envelope.expires_at === 'number' && record.timestamp > envelope.expires_at) {
+        mismatches.push(`envelope expired at ${envelope.expires_at}; record timestamp ${record.timestamp}`);
+    }
+    // event_types: the record's event_type URI must be in the allowlist.
+    if (Array.isArray(envelope.event_types) && envelope.event_types.length > 0) {
+        if (!envelope.event_types.includes(record.event_type)) {
+            mismatches.push(`event_type '${record.event_type}' not in allowlist`);
+        }
+    }
+    // tool_names: per §6.7.2 step 2, only applies to tool_call records and
+    // requires the record's tool_name. The current AtribRecord shape does
+    // not expose tool_name (per §8.2 default posture: only content_id is
+    // present, which is a hash of serverUrl + toolName). Without tool_name
+    // we can't check this constraint. Mark unresolvable.
+    if (Array.isArray(envelope.tool_names) && envelope.tool_names.length > 0) {
+        if (record.event_type === 'https://atrib.dev/v1/types/tool_call') {
+            unresolvable = true;
+        }
+    }
+    // max_amount + counterparties: per §6.7.2 the verifier "MUST resolve
+    // the transaction amount and counterparty from the protocol-specific
+    // transaction event the record commits to". @atrib/verify doesn't
+    // have access to the payment-protocol event; flag as unresolvable.
+    // Future API extension: accept resolved amount + counterparty as
+    // VerifyRecordOptions inputs if a real consumer needs it.
+    if (record.event_type === 'https://atrib.dev/v1/types/transaction') {
+        if (envelope.max_amount || (Array.isArray(envelope.counterparties) && envelope.counterparties.length > 0)) {
+            unresolvable = true;
+        }
+    }
+    return {
+        envelope,
+        in_envelope: mismatches.length === 0,
+        mismatches,
+        unresolvable,
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Cross-attestation derivation per spec §1.7.6 (D052).
+ *
+ * For each entry in `record.signers`, verify the Ed25519 signature
+ * against the cross-attestation canonical bytes (JCS form with
+ * `signers: []` and the top-level `signature` field omitted). Count
+ * valid signatures; flag `missing: true` when fewer than 2 verify.
+ *
+ * Per §1.7.6 mismatches are SIGNALS, not invalidation: missing
+ * cross-attestation does NOT push to `warnings[]` (which would flip
+ * `valid` to false). The legacy top-level `signature` (already
+ * verified above by `verifyRecordSignature`) keeps the record
+ * cryptographically valid; cross_attestation is a policy signal.
+ */
+async function resolveCrossAttestation(record) {
+    const signers = Array.isArray(record.signers) ? record.signers : [];
+    const signers_count = signers.length;
+    if (signers_count === 0) {
+        // Legacy single-signer transaction record. Per §1.7.6 normative
+        // minimum is 2; flag as missing.
+        return { signers_count: 0, signers_valid: 0, missing: true };
+    }
+    // All signers cover the same canonical bytes (§1.7.6).
+    let canonicalBytes;
+    try {
+        canonicalBytes = canonicalCrossAttestationInput(record);
+    }
+    catch {
+        // Canonicalization shouldn't fail on a structurally-valid record;
+        // if it does, treat all signers as unverifiable.
+        return { signers_count, signers_valid: 0, missing: true };
+    }
+    let signers_valid = 0;
+    for (const entry of signers) {
+        if (typeof entry?.creator_key !== 'string' || typeof entry?.signature !== 'string')
+            continue;
+        try {
+            const pubKey = base64urlDecode(entry.creator_key);
+            const sig = base64urlDecode(entry.signature);
+            const ok = await ed.verifyAsync(sig, canonicalBytes, pubKey);
+            if (ok)
+                signers_valid++;
+        }
+        catch {
+            // Malformed key/sig bytes: skip without counting.
+        }
+    }
+    return {
+        signers_count,
+        signers_valid,
+        missing: signers_valid < 2,
+    };
+}
 function detectPosture(record, warnings) {
     const declared = record.timestamp_granularity;
     const explicit = typeof declared === 'string';
@@ -116,10 +278,26 @@ function detectPosture(record, warnings) {
     if (!consistent) {
         warnings.push(`timestamp_granularity declares '${granularity}' but timestamp ${record.timestamp} is not a multiple of ${multiplier}`);
     }
+    // Spec §8.3 commitment-posture detection: presence of args_salt /
+    // result_salt indicates the salted-sha256 scheme; absence indicates the
+    // default plain-sha256 scheme. The hmac-sha256 variant from §8.3 is
+    // signaled out-of-band and is not structurally detectable.
+    const args_commitment_form = typeof record.args_salt === 'string' ? 'salted-sha256' : 'plain-sha256';
+    const result_commitment_form = typeof record.result_salt === 'string' ? 'salted-sha256' : 'plain-sha256';
+    // Spec §8.2 / D061 tool_name_form: hashed when the value matches the
+    // `sha256:<hex>` form (unambiguous), plain otherwise (verbatim vs opaque
+    // not structurally distinguishable), null when the field is absent.
+    let tool_name_form = null;
+    if (typeof record.tool_name === 'string') {
+        tool_name_form = TOOL_NAME_HASHED_PATTERN.test(record.tool_name) ? 'hashed' : 'plain';
+    }
     return {
         timestamp_granularity: granularity,
         timestamp_consistent: consistent,
         timestamp_granularity_explicit: explicit,
+        args_commitment_form,
+        result_commitment_form,
+        tool_name_form,
     };
 }
 // Re-exported defensively so consumers that want stricter validation can
@@ -130,6 +308,8 @@ export const __test_only__ = {
     GRANULARITY_MULTIPLIER,
     resolveProvenance,
     resolveInformedBy,
+    resolveCapabilityCheck,
+    resolveCrossAttestation,
     detectPosture,
     base64urlDecode,
 };

package/dist/verify-record.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@atrib/verify",
-  "version": "0.1.2",
+  "version": "0.2.1",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "./dist/index.js",
   "types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
     "@noble/ed25519": "^2.3.0",
     "@noble/hashes": "^2.2.0",
     "canonicalize": "^2.1.0",
-    "@atrib/mcp": "0.1.2"
+    "@atrib/mcp": "0.3.0"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
     "@types/node": "^25.6.0",