@astratra/security 1.1.1 → 1.3.0

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package/README.md CHANGED
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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  # @astratra/security
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  Primitives de sécurité applicative pour l'authentification, l'autorisation,
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- le rate limiting, une CSP configurable, un WAF heuristique et
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+ le CORS, le rate limiting, une CSP configurable, un WAF heuristique et
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  WebAuthn/passkeys — génériques et découplées de toute base de données, ORM
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  ou liste de rôles fixe. Dépend de `@astratra/core`.
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@@ -9,6 +9,28 @@ Partout où un vrai projet a besoin de persistance (révocation de session,
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  stockage de credentials WebAuthn, alerte de brute-force), c'est un
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  callback/adapter injecté, jamais un appel base de données codé en dur.
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+ ## CORS
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+
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+ ```js
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+ const { createCorsMiddleware } = require('@astratra/security');
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+
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+ // À monter EN PREMIER, avant tout autre middleware — les en-têtes CORS,
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+ // y compris sur la réponse de preflight OPTIONS, doivent être posés avant
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+ // qu'un autre handler ne puisse court-circuiter la requête.
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+ app.use(createCorsMiddleware({
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+ allowedOrigins: (process.env.CORS_ORIGIN || '').split(',').filter(Boolean)
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+ }));
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+ ```
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+
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+ Astratra n'impose aucune politique CORS fixe — les origines autorisées sont
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+ spécifiques à chaque projet. `@astratra/saas-kit` expose cette primitive via
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+ `options.cors`, montée automatiquement au bon endroit — voir son README.
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+
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+ Origines `http://127.0.0.1`/`http://localhost` (tout port) autorisées par
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+ défaut hors `NODE_ENV=production`, désactivable via `allowDevOrigins: false`.
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+ `credentials: false` retire `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials` si tu n'as
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+ pas besoin des cookies cross-origin.
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+
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  ## Auth JWT + RBAC
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  ```js
@@ -67,6 +89,31 @@ n'est jamais actif tout seul dans ce package. `@astratra/saas-kit` le monte
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  par défaut sur ses routes protégées, avec bypass automatique pour les
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  clients `Authorization: Bearer`.
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+ **Piège classique** : si tu ne montes `createCsrfMiddleware` que sur tes
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+ routes mutantes (POST/PATCH/DELETE — le réflexe naturel), la toute première
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+ requête mutante d'un client émet elle-même le cookie CSRF *dans sa propre
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+ réponse* — le client ne peut jamais l'avoir lu à temps, donc elle échoue
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+ systématiquement avec `403 Invalid CSRF token`, même avec des identifiants
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+ valides. Le cookie doit exister *avant* la première requête mutante.
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+
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+ `createCsrfCookiePrimer(options)` résout ça : il amorce le cookie sur toute
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+ requête sûre (GET/HEAD/OPTIONS) sans jamais valider de token, à monter une
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+ seule fois, globalement, avant toutes les routes.
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+
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+ ```js
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+ app.use(cookieParserMiddleware());
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+ app.use(createCsrfCookiePrimer()); // amorce le cookie sur tout GET, avant les routes
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+
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+ // ensuite, comme avant : createCsrfMiddleware() valide sur tes routes mutantes
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+ app.use('/api', authMiddleware, createCsrfMiddleware({
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+ skip: (req) => Boolean(req.headers.authorization?.startsWith('Bearer '))
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+ }));
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+ ```
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+
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+ Les deux vérifient le cookie déjà mis en file sur la même réponse avant d'en
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+ émettre un nouveau — les monter tous les deux sur la même requête ne pose
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+ jamais deux cookies différents.
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+
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  ## Révocation de session JWT
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  ```js
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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  {
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  "name": "@astratra/security",
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- "version": "1.1.1",
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+ "version": "1.3.0",
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  "description": "Generic authentication and security middleware for Astratra workspaces.",
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  "engines": {
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  "node": ">=20"
package/src/cors.js ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
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+ const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_HEADERS = 'content-type, authorization, x-csrf-token';
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+ const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_METHODS = 'GET,POST,PATCH,PUT,DELETE,OPTIONS';
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+
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+ const isAllowedDevOrigin = (origin) => {
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+ if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production') return false;
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+ try {
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+ const url = new URL(origin);
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+ return ['127.0.0.1', 'localhost'].includes(url.hostname);
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+ } catch {
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+ return false;
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+ }
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+ };
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+
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+ /**
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+ * CORS middleware. Astratra intentionally has no fixed opinion on which
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+ * origins to allow — that's project-specific — but leaving CORS entirely
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+ * unaddressed pushed every consumer (including create-astratra-app's own
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+ * generated template) to hand-roll the same ~15 lines. This promotes that
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+ * proven logic into a shared, configurable primitive, matching the pattern
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+ * already used for createWafMiddleware / createCspMiddleware.
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+ *
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+ * Passing `options.cors` to createSaasApp mounts this as the FIRST
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+ * middleware, ahead of everything else — CORS headers, including on the
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+ * preflight OPTIONS response, must be set before any other handler can
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+ * short-circuit the request. Omit `options.cors` and nothing changes.
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+ */
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+ const createCorsMiddleware = (options = {}) => {
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+ const allowed = new Set(options.allowedOrigins || []);
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+ const allowDevOrigins = options.allowDevOrigins !== false;
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+ const allowCredentials = options.credentials !== false;
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+ const allowedHeaders = options.allowedHeaders || DEFAULT_ALLOWED_HEADERS;
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+ const allowedMethods = options.allowedMethods || DEFAULT_ALLOWED_METHODS;
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+
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+ return (req, res, next) => {
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+ const origin = req.headers && (req.headers.origin || req.headers.Origin);
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+ if (origin && (allowed.has(origin) || (allowDevOrigins && isAllowedDevOrigin(origin)))) {
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+ res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', origin);
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+ res.setHeader('Vary', 'Origin');
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+ if (allowCredentials) {
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+ res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Credentials', 'true');
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+ }
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+ }
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+ res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Headers', allowedHeaders);
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+ res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Methods', allowedMethods);
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+
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+ if (String(req.method || 'GET').toUpperCase() === 'OPTIONS') {
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+ res.status(204).end();
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+ return;
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+ }
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+ return next();
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+ };
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+ };
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+
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+ module.exports = {
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+ createCorsMiddleware
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+ };
package/src/csrf.js CHANGED
@@ -47,6 +47,26 @@ const cookieValue = (req, name) => {
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  return parsed[name];
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  };
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+ // A Set-Cookie queued earlier in the SAME response (e.g. by
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+ // createCsrfCookiePrimer running ahead of a route's own createCsrfMiddleware)
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+ // never shows up in req.cookies — that only reflects cookies the client sent
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+ // on THIS request. Without this check, two CSRF-aware middlewares on one
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+ // request/response pair would each mint and queue their own token.
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+ const queuedCookieValue = (res, name) => {
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+ if (typeof res.getHeader !== 'function') return undefined;
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+ const current = res.getHeader('Set-Cookie');
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+ if (!current) return undefined;
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+ const cookies = Array.isArray(current) ? current : [current];
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+ for (const cookie of cookies) {
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+ const [pair] = String(cookie).split(';');
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+ const index = pair.indexOf('=');
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+ if (index !== -1 && pair.slice(0, index).trim() === name) {
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+ return pair.slice(index + 1).trim();
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+ }
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+ }
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+ return undefined;
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+ };
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+
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  const headerValue = (req, name) => {
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  if (typeof req.get === 'function') return req.get(name);
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  const headers = req.headers || {};
@@ -77,7 +97,7 @@ const createCsrfMiddleware = (options = {}) => {
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  return next();
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  }
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- let token = cookieValue(req, cookieName);
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+ let token = cookieValue(req, cookieName) || queuedCookieValue(res, cookieName);
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  if (!token) {
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  token = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
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  setCsrfCookie(res, token, { ...options, name: cookieName });
@@ -96,7 +116,40 @@ const createCsrfMiddleware = (options = {}) => {
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  };
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  };
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+ /**
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+ * Issues the CSRF cookie on any safe request (GET/HEAD/OPTIONS) without
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+ * ever validating a token. Meant to be mounted once, globally, ahead of
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+ * all routes — so the double-submit cookie exists by the time a client
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+ * makes its first mutating request, regardless of which routes happen to
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+ * mount `createCsrfMiddleware` themselves.
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+ *
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+ * Without this, a route that only wires `createCsrfMiddleware` on its
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+ * mutating handlers (POST/PATCH/DELETE) issues the cookie in the SAME
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+ * response as the request that needed it validated — the client can never
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+ * have read it in time, so the very first mutating request always fails
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+ * with "Invalid CSRF token."
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+ */
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+ const createCsrfCookiePrimer = (options = {}) => {
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+ const cookieName = options.name || DEFAULT_CSRF_COOKIE_NAME;
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+
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+ return (req, res, next) => {
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+ const method = String(req.method || 'GET').toUpperCase();
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+ if (!SAFE_METHODS.has(method)) {
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+ return next();
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+ }
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+ if (options.skip && options.skip(req)) {
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+ return next();
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+ }
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+ if (!cookieValue(req, cookieName) && !queuedCookieValue(res, cookieName)) {
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+ const token = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
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+ setCsrfCookie(res, token, { ...options, name: cookieName });
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+ }
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+ return next();
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+ };
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+ };
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+
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  module.exports = {
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  DEFAULT_CSRF_COOKIE_NAME,
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- createCsrfMiddleware
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+ createCsrfMiddleware,
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+ createCsrfCookiePrimer
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  };
package/src/index.d.ts CHANGED
@@ -22,6 +22,25 @@ export type NextFunction = (error?: unknown) => unknown;
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  export type RequestHandler = (req: RequestLike, res: ResponseLike, next: NextFunction) => unknown;
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  export type Awaitable<T> = T | Promise<T>;
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+ export interface CorsMiddlewareOptions {
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+ /** Explicit list of allowed origins (exact match on the Origin header). */
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+ allowedOrigins?: string[];
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+ /** Allow http(s)://127.0.0.1|localhost:* outside NODE_ENV=production. Default true. */
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+ allowDevOrigins?: boolean;
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+ /** Sets Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true. Default true (matches cookie-based sessions). */
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+ credentials?: boolean;
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+ allowedHeaders?: string;
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+ allowedMethods?: string;
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+ }
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+
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+ /**
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+ * Astratra has no fixed opinion on which origins to allow — that's
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+ * project-specific — but leaves this primitive available rather than
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+ * making every consumer hand-roll it. Mount first, ahead of every other
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+ * middleware, so CORS headers apply to the preflight OPTIONS response too.
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+ */
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+ export function createCorsMiddleware(options?: CorsMiddlewareOptions): RequestHandler;
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+
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  export interface AuthMiddlewareOptions<TDecoded = Record<string, unknown>> {
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  secret: string;
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  legacySecret?: string;
@@ -75,6 +94,14 @@ export interface CsrfMiddlewareOptions {
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  export function createCsrfMiddleware(options?: CsrfMiddlewareOptions): RequestHandler;
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+ /**
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+ * Issues the CSRF cookie on safe requests (GET/HEAD/OPTIONS) without ever
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+ * validating a token. Mount once, globally, ahead of all routes so the
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+ * double-submit cookie exists before a client's first mutating request —
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+ * see createCsrfMiddleware's README section on double-submit CSRF.
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+ */
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+ export function createCsrfCookiePrimer(options?: Pick<CsrfMiddlewareOptions, 'name' | 'sameSite' | 'secure' | 'path' | 'domain' | 'skip'>): RequestHandler;
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+
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  export interface RateLimitStore {
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  init?(options: unknown): unknown;
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  increment?(...args: unknown[]): unknown;
package/src/index.js CHANGED
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
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  module.exports = {
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+ ...require('./cors'),
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  ...require('./jwtAuth'),
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  ...require('./rateLimiters'),
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  ...require('./waf'),