@astrasyncai/verification-gateway 5.7.0 → 5.9.0

package/dist/verify.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/verify.ts","../src/version.ts","../src/http.ts","../src/trust-levels.ts","../src/well-known.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway - Core Verification Logic\n *\n * This module handles the core verification logic, calling the AstraSync API\n * and processing the response into a standardized VerificationResult.\n */\n\nimport { sdkFetch } from './http';\nimport type {\n  GatewayConfig,\n  AgentCredentials,\n  VerificationRequest,\n  VerificationResult,\n  VerifiedAgent,\n  VerifiedDeveloper,\n  VerifiedOrganization,\n  GuidanceInfo,\n  EnhancedVerificationResult,\n  TokenGuidance,\n  RuntimeChallengeResult,\n  StepUpApprovalInfo,\n  SettlementOutcomeInfo,\n  MerchantSettlementToken,\n  FulfilmentInfo,\n  SettlementArtifact,\n  AttemptReport,\n} from './types';\nimport { getTrustLevel } from './trust-levels';\nimport type { ObservedMetadata } from './metadata-capture';\nimport { SDK_VERSION } from './version';\nimport { getCachedWellKnownUrls, type WellKnownAgenticCommerce } from './well-known';\n\n/**\n * Default configuration values\n *\n * apiBaseUrl matches the OpenAPI authoritative server (https://astrasync.ai/api\n * for prod, https://staging.astrasync.ai/api for staging). Always include the\n * /api path prefix when overriding — registration / docs URLs are derived by\n * stripping it.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_CONFIG: Partial<GatewayConfig> = {\n  apiBaseUrl: 'https://astrasync.ai/api',\n  // minTrustScore + minTrustScoreForFull deprecated in v2.3.0 — server decides.\n  // cacheTtl deliberately unset. When undefined, cacheResult applies the 60s\n  // default; the caller's explicit value is honoured for cacheable results.\n  // Denials and step-up escalations are NEVER cached (3.6.0) regardless of\n  // cacheTtl. Set cacheTtl: 0 to disable caching entirely.\n  debug: false,\n};\n\n/**\n * Init self-test state. Fires once per process on first verify() call to warn\n * if apiBaseUrl is pointing at the wrong host (e.g. a marketing site that\n * 200s with text/html instead of the API).\n */\nlet initCheckPerformed = false;\n\n/** Test-only: re-arm the one-time init self-check. */\nexport function _resetInitCheck(): void {\n  initCheckPerformed = false;\n}\n\n/** One-shot guard for v2.3.0 deprecation warning. */\nlet deprecationWarningShown = false;\n\nasync function performInitCheck(\n  apiBaseUrl: string,\n  debug?: boolean,\n  strictInit?: boolean,\n  apiKey?: string\n): Promise<void> {\n  initCheckPerformed = true;\n  try {\n    const probeUrl = `${apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access`;\n    // HEAD mirrors GET semantics (running the full request pipeline without a\n    // body) so the response carries the same content-type the marketing 404\n    // would return. OPTIONS often gets short-circuited by CORS-preflight\n    // handlers and returns no content-type, defeating the check.\n    const response = await sdkFetch(probeUrl, { method: 'HEAD' });\n    const contentType = response.headers.get('content-type') ?? '';\n    if (contentType.startsWith('text/html')) {\n      const message =\n        `[VerificationGateway] apiBaseUrl '${apiBaseUrl}' returned HTML (content-type: ${contentType}). ` +\n        `This usually means apiBaseUrl is pointing at a marketing site instead of the API. ` +\n        `Expected: 'https://astrasync.ai/api' (prod) or 'https://staging.astrasync.ai/api' (staging).`;\n      // Audit F-A6-33: when strictInit is set, throw on misconfig instead\n      // of warning + continuing. Recurring footgun per\n      // `[[feedback_astrasync_api_url_canonical]]` — silent warn lets\n      // misconfigured prod deploys ship with all verify-access calls\n      // silently failing.\n      if (strictInit) {\n        throw new Error(`${message} (strictInit=true)`);\n      }\n      console.warn(`${message} Set disableInitChecks: true on GatewayConfig to silence.`);\n    } else if (debug) {\n      console.log(\n        `[VerificationGateway] init check passed for ${apiBaseUrl} (content-type: ${contentType})`\n      );\n    }\n\n    // 4.0.0: key liveness probe. A dead API key otherwise surfaces only\n    // per-request as inbound agents get turned away — the operator should\n    // learn at deploy time. 404 = older backend without self-check: silent.\n    if (apiKey) {\n      const selfCheck = await sdkFetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access/self-check`, {\n        headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${apiKey}` },\n      });\n      if (selfCheck.status === 401) {\n        const body = (await selfCheck.json().catch(() => ({}))) as {\n          code?: string;\n          message?: string;\n          remediation?: { manageUrl?: string };\n        };\n        const message =\n          `[VerificationGateway] the configured AstraSync API key was REJECTED at startup ` +\n          `(${body.code ?? 'api_key_invalid'}: ${body.message ?? 'invalid key'}). Every inbound agent ` +\n          `will be turned away until the key is rotated` +\n          (body.remediation?.manageUrl ? ` at ${body.remediation.manageUrl}` : '') +\n          `.`;\n        if (strictInit) {\n          throw new Error(`${message} (strictInit=true)`);\n        }\n        console.error(message);\n      } else if (selfCheck.ok) {\n        const body = (await selfCheck.json().catch(() => ({}))) as {\n          daysToExpiry?: number | null;\n        };\n        if (typeof body.daysToExpiry === 'number' && body.daysToExpiry <= 7) {\n          console.warn(\n            `[VerificationGateway] the configured AstraSync API key expires in ${body.daysToExpiry} day(s) — ` +\n              `rotate it at Settings → Developer Tools before integrations start failing.`\n          );\n        } else if (debug) {\n          console.log('[VerificationGateway] API key self-check passed');\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (strictInit) {\n      // strict mode propagates init failures so callers get a clear,\n      // synchronous \"your config is broken\" signal at startup.\n      throw err;\n    }\n    if (debug) {\n      console.log(`[VerificationGateway] init check failed (non-blocking): ${String(err)}`);\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Simple in-memory cache for verification results\n */\nconst verificationCache = new Map<string, { result: VerificationResult; expiresAt: number }>();\n\n/**\n * Generate cache key from the full request shape.\n *\n * Historically the key was credentials-only (`astraId-apiKey-jwt`),\n * which silently returned the cached result of a prior call even when the\n * subsequent call's purpose/action/counterparty/etc. differed. That was a\n * security gap — a warm cache could serve an allow verdict for a purpose the\n * agent hadn't actually been authorised for. Key now includes every field\n * that affects the backend verdict.\n *\n * MAINTAIN: when adding a field to VerificationRequest that affects the\n * backend verdict, add it to this key. Fields that don't affect verdict\n * (e.g. requestId, timestamps, sdkVersion) don't belong here — including\n * them would needlessly thrash the cache for repeated identical requests.\n *\n * 3.12.0 (Trust Record): `attemptId` and `considerationSet` are\n * deliberately EXCLUDED — like `callerMetadata.observedMetadata` they are\n * observational pass-through that never affects the verdict, and keying on\n * a per-attempt id would defeat verdict caching entirely. Cache hits get\n * their attemptId rewritten in verify() instead (never leak a prior\n * attempt's id from a cached result).\n */\nfunction getCacheKey(request: VerificationRequest, counterpartyId?: string): string {\n  const c = request.credentials;\n  return [\n    c.astraId || '',\n    c.apiKey || '',\n    c.jwt || '',\n    request.purpose || '',\n    request.action || '',\n    request.resourceType || '',\n    request.resource || '',\n    request.jurisdiction || '',\n    request.transactionValue ?? '',\n    request.currency || '',\n    // SECURITY (cross-merchant cache leak): the merchant identity is sent via\n    // `config.counterpartyId`, NOT on the request, so it was previously absent\n    // from the key — two verifies for the SAME agent/purpose/action/value but\n    // DIFFERENT merchants collided, and a grant at a permissive merchant (low\n    // trust floor) was served for a stricter one. Same bug class as the\n    // duration omission (F-A1-07). counterpartyId affects the backend verdict\n    // (trust floor / per-route policy), so it MUST key the cache.\n    counterpartyId || '',\n    request.counterpartyUrl || '',\n    request.counterpartyType || '',\n    request.isSubAgentRequest ? '1' : '0',\n    request.parentAgentId || '',\n    request.subAgentDepth ?? '',\n    // Audit F-A1-07: previously-missing dimensions that DO affect the\n    // backend verdict. Without these, two requests with different\n    // durations (e.g. 60s vs 86400s) collided on the same cache key and\n    // the shorter-duration allow served the longer-duration request.\n    request.durationRequired ?? '',\n    request.invocationProtocol || '',\n    request.enableRuntimeChallenge ? '1' : '0',\n    // callerMetadata fields contribute to risk model; include the ones\n    // backend reads. sourceIp/userAgent/forwardedFor change per-request\n    // so their inclusion effectively forces a re-check for any varying\n    // client (the right behavior — IP-driven anomaly scoring shouldn't\n    // be cached across IPs).\n    request.callerMetadata?.sourceIp || '',\n    request.callerMetadata?.userAgent || '',\n    request.callerMetadata?.forwardedFor || '',\n    request.callerMetadata?.agentCardUrl || '',\n    // UAT2 Bug B (5.4.1): the commerce phase and cart identity DO affect the\n    // backend verdict — the confirm leg is the ONLY leg that may execute\n    // first-party settlement. Without these, a confirm within the cache TTL of\n    // its start_checkout quote was served the cached quote-leg grant (no\n    // settlementOutcome) and never reached the backend. Same F-A1-07 bug class.\n    request.commercePhase || '',\n    request.checkoutSessionId || '',\n  ].join('|');\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if cached result is still valid\n */\nfunction getCachedResult(\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  counterpartyId?: string\n): VerificationResult | null {\n  const key = getCacheKey(request, counterpartyId);\n  const cached = verificationCache.get(key);\n\n  if (cached && cached.expiresAt > Date.now()) {\n    return cached.result;\n  }\n\n  if (cached) {\n    verificationCache.delete(key);\n  }\n\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Cache a verification result.\n *\n * 3.6.0: uniform 60s default. The earlier step-up TTL split (300s for\n * step-up verdicts) is gone — step-up verdicts are no longer cached AT ALL\n * (see the write predicate in verify()): a cached step_up_required result\n * carries a pollUrl that goes stale (consumed/expired) and, worse, keeps\n * denying retries that the owner has already approved. When `configuredTtl`\n * is set (truthy positive number), it's honoured for cacheable results.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS = 60;\n\nfunction cacheResult(\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  result: VerificationResult,\n  configuredTtl: number | undefined,\n  counterpartyId?: string\n): void {\n  const ttlSeconds = configuredTtl && configuredTtl > 0 ? configuredTtl : DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS;\n  const key = getCacheKey(request, counterpartyId);\n  verificationCache.set(key, {\n    result,\n    expiresAt: Date.now() + ttlSeconds * 1000,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Clear the verification cache\n */\nexport function clearCache(): void {\n  verificationCache.clear();\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract agent credentials from various sources\n */\nexport function extractCredentials(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  query?: Record<string, string | undefined>\n): AgentCredentials {\n  const credentials: AgentCredentials = {};\n\n  // Audit F-A1-12: ASTRA-ID shape validation. Accept only the canonical\n  // pattern (ASTRA-/ASTRAE- prefix + 1-64 url-safe chars) to prevent CRLF\n  // header injection or downstream interpolation surprises. Reject otherwise.\n  const ASTRA_ID_PATTERN = /^ASTRAE?-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64}$/;\n\n  // Check for ASTRA-ID in headers (case-insensitive). Accepts the historical\n  // X-Astra-Id name plus the X-Astra-AgentId / x-astra-agent-id alias the\n  // partner asked for in #9a — both surface the same field.\n  const astraIdHeader =\n    headers['x-astra-id'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-Id'] ||\n    headers['X-ASTRA-ID'] ||\n    headers['x-astra-agentid'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-AgentId'] ||\n    headers['x-astra-agent-id'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-Agent-Id'] ||\n    headers['X-ASTRA-AGENT-ID'];\n  if (astraIdHeader) {\n    // Audit F-A1-11: guard array-confusion. If multiple X-Astra-Id headers\n    // were sent (Express collapses to comma-joined string on most paths),\n    // take only the first canonical-shaped one.\n    const raw = Array.isArray(astraIdHeader)\n      ? astraIdHeader[0]\n      : typeof astraIdHeader === 'string'\n        ? astraIdHeader\n        : undefined;\n    if (typeof raw === 'string' && ASTRA_ID_PATTERN.test(raw)) {\n      credentials.astraId = raw;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Check for API key in headers\n  const apiKeyHeader = headers['x-api-key'] || headers['X-Api-Key'] || headers['X-API-KEY'];\n  if (apiKeyHeader) {\n    credentials.apiKey = Array.isArray(apiKeyHeader) ? apiKeyHeader[0] : apiKeyHeader;\n  }\n\n  // Check Authorization header for Bearer token.\n  // Audit F-A1-11: defensive type guard — Array.isArray gives a non-string,\n  // and Express path quirks can produce undefined despite the truthy check.\n  const authHeader = headers['authorization'] || headers['Authorization'];\n  if (authHeader) {\n    const authValue = Array.isArray(authHeader) ? authHeader[0] : authHeader;\n    if (typeof authValue === 'string') {\n      credentials.authorizationHeader = authValue;\n      if (authValue.startsWith('Bearer ')) {\n        credentials.jwt = authValue.slice(7);\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Check query parameters as fallback\n  if (query) {\n    if (query.astraId && !credentials.astraId) {\n      credentials.astraId = query.astraId;\n    }\n    if (query.apiKey && !credentials.apiKey) {\n      credentials.apiKey = query.apiKey;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return credentials;\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if credentials are present\n */\nexport function hasCredentials(credentials: AgentCredentials): boolean {\n  return !!(credentials.astraId || credentials.apiKey || credentials.jwt);\n}\n\n/**\n * Source of a synthesised guidance response. The sources are split — the\n * `'no_credentials'` shape is the original (caller has no AstraSync\n * credentials, suggest registration). The `'api_error'` shape is for when\n * the verify-access HTTP call itself failed (5xx, network, etc.) — DON'T\n * tell a verified-but-currently-blocked partner to \"register your agent\".\n *\n * 4.0.0 adds `'merchant_misconfig'`: the backend rejected THIS INTEGRATION'S\n * own API key (401 api_key_revoked/expired/invalid). Neither the agent's\n * fault nor a platform outage — retrying won't help, and the inbound agent\n * deserves to know the site operator's integration is broken (the\n * gadget-emporium failure mode: a rotated key silently 401ing every\n * credentialed agent for days).\n */\ntype GuidanceSource = 'no_credentials' | 'api_error' | 'merchant_misconfig';\n\n/**\n * MCP-connector steering (5.1.0). Present only when the backend's well-known\n * doc advertises a hosted bridge. The copy must directly counter the observed\n * model refusal (\"go register manually on the dashboard\"): registration via\n * the connector is the agent's own next action, with the human approval built\n * into the flow.\n */\nfunction mcpGuidance(urls?: WellKnownAgenticCommerce): GuidanceInfo['mcp'] {\n  if (!urls?.mcpEndpoint) return undefined;\n  return {\n    endpoint: urls.mcpEndpoint,\n    discoveryUrl: urls.mcpDiscoveryUrl,\n    message:\n      'If you are operating inside an MCP-capable host (Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor, or any MCP client), ' +\n      'add the AstraSync MCP connector instead of integrating these URLs by hand: registration through ' +\n      'the connector is KEYLESS and HUMAN-APPROVED — your human approves in an in-chat card, and you ' +\n      'never see, hold, or transmit an API key, password, or private key.',\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Create guidance response for unverified agents or for API-error fallback.\n *\n * The source is split so the `register your agent` template\n * doesn't fire on transient backend failures. Also threads `correlationId`\n * through so adapter `onDenied` handlers can surface it on the merchant's\n * response body for log correlation.\n */\nfunction createGuidanceResponse(\n  _config: GatewayConfig,\n  reason?: string,\n  options: {\n    source?: GuidanceSource;\n    correlationId?: string;\n    /** 3.12.0 (Trust Record): server-echoed attempt handle, threaded like correlationId. */\n    attemptId?: string;\n    urls?: WellKnownAgenticCommerce;\n    /** 4.0.0: backend-provided remediation URLs for the merchant (misconfig source). */\n    remediation?: { docsUrl?: string; manageUrl?: string };\n  } = {}\n): VerificationResult {\n  const source = options.source ?? 'no_credentials';\n  const isApiError = source === 'api_error';\n  const isMisconfig = source === 'merchant_misconfig';\n  const urls = options.urls;\n\n  const guidance: GuidanceInfo = isMisconfig\n    ? {\n        message:\n          \"This site's AstraSync integration is misconfigured (its API key was revoked, expired, or rotated). \" +\n          'Your identity and the AstraSync platform are fine — contact the site operator. Retrying will not help.',\n        registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n        documentationUrl: options.remediation?.docsUrl ?? urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        steps: [\n          'Report the failure to the site operator — their AstraSync API key needs rotating',\n          'Do not retry: the failure is deterministic until the operator updates their key',\n        ],\n      }\n    : isApiError\n      ? {\n          message:\n            'Verification is temporarily unavailable. Retry with exponential backoff; if the issue persists, contact support with the correlationId.',\n          registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n          documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n          steps: [\n            'Retry the request with exponential backoff',\n            'If failures persist, share the correlationId with support',\n          ],\n        }\n      : {\n          message:\n            'This service verifies AI agents before granting access. Please register your agent with AstraSync.',\n          registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n          documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n          steps: [\n            // MCP steering leads when the hosted bridge is advertised — the\n            // connector is the agent-actionable path (keyless, human-approved).\n            ...(urls?.mcpEndpoint\n              ? [\n                  `Fastest path (inside an MCP host): add the AstraSync MCP connector at ${urls.mcpEndpoint} — keyless, human-approved registration`,\n                ]\n              : []),\n            'Register for an AstraSync account',\n            'Create and register your agent',\n            'Add your ASTRA-ID to request headers',\n            'Retry your request',\n          ],\n          ...(mcpGuidance(urls) && { mcp: mcpGuidance(urls) }),\n        };\n\n  return {\n    // Round-18 G4: createGuidanceResponse fires for unverified-agent path or\n    // API-error fallback. Identity is not verified (no agent resolved);\n    // policy is not evaluated (we never reached the gate).\n    identityVerified: false,\n    policyAllowed: false,\n    guidance,\n    denialReasons: reason ? [reason] : ['No valid agent credentials provided'],\n    // Round-10 (#47, O5): on API-error fallback, surface a typed failure so\n    // partners (and their custom onDenied handlers) can branch on\n    // dimension. Without this, the synthesised stub was indistinguishable\n    // from a real policy deny.\n    failures: isMisconfig\n      ? [\n          {\n            dimension: 'verify_access.merchant_misconfigured',\n            message: reason ?? 'The integration API key was rejected by AstraSync',\n            guidance: guidance.message,\n          },\n        ]\n      : isApiError\n        ? [\n            {\n              dimension: 'verify_access.api_error',\n              message: reason ?? 'Verification temporarily unavailable',\n              guidance: guidance.message,\n            },\n          ]\n        : undefined,\n    // 4.0.0: typed marker so adapters render the misconfig envelope (503 +\n    // MERCHANT_VERIFICATION_MISCONFIGURED) without string-matching.\n    ...(isMisconfig && { misconfigured: true }),\n    // 4.6.0: a transient api_error is retryable — mark it so consumers surface\n    // \"temporarily unavailable, retry\" (recommendation 'error') instead of\n    // coercing the absent recommendation to a policy 'deny'. Misconfig is\n    // deterministic and intentionally NOT marked retryable.\n    ...(isApiError && { retryable: true }),\n    correlationId: options.correlationId,\n    attemptId: options.attemptId,\n    verifiedAt: new Date(),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Call the AstraSync verify-access API\n */\nasync function callVerifyAccessAPI(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest\n): Promise<{\n  success: boolean;\n  access?: {\n    allowed: boolean;\n    reason?: string;\n    /**\n     * Aggregated denial failures (v2.9.8+). Empty / absent when allowed.\n     * Each entry is `{ dimension, message, guidance? }` — see\n     * `AccessFailure` for the contract.\n     */\n    failures?: Array<{ dimension: string; message: string; guidance?: string }>;\n    requiresStepUp?: boolean;\n    requiresApproval?: boolean;\n    appliedPolicy?: {\n      boundaryName: string;\n      policyVersion: string;\n    };\n    counterparty?: {\n      id: string;\n      name: string;\n      trustScoreRequirement: number;\n    };\n  };\n  agent?: {\n    kyaAgentId: string;\n    astraId: string;\n    name: string;\n    trustScore: number;\n    trustLevel: string;\n    agentStatus: string;\n    blockchainStatus: string;\n  };\n  developer?: {\n    kyaOwnerId: string;\n    fullName: string;\n    email: string;\n    identityVerified: boolean;\n    trustScore: number;\n  };\n  organization?: {\n    name: string;\n    verified: boolean;\n    trustScore: number;\n  };\n  /**\n   * Structured explanation of the verification decision. Tells the merchant\n   * WHY (id verified? challenge passed? request within PDLSS? trust score?)\n   * without exposing thresholds, scope lists, or other-tenant counterparty\n   * membership. Empty `attestations` unless the endpoint's access policy\n   * declared `required_attestations`.\n   */\n  verificationContext?: {\n    idVerified: boolean;\n    runtimeChallenge: {\n      status: 'passed' | 'skipped' | 'failed' | 'timeout' | 'not_configured';\n      checkedAt: string | null;\n    };\n    pdlssCheck: {\n      result: 'within' | 'exceeded' | 'denied' | 'not_evaluated';\n      purpose: 'approved' | 'denied';\n      scope: 'approved' | 'denied';\n    };\n    dynamicTrustScore: number;\n    attestations: Array<{\n      type: string;\n      status: 'passed' | 'failed';\n      /** LMAX-POC C1: underlying check timestamp for merchant freshness gates. */\n      checkedAt: string;\n      validUntil?: string;\n      proofType: 'reference' | 'zkp';\n      proof: string;\n    }>;\n  };\n  error?: string;\n  /**\n   * 4.0.0: the backend 401'd this integration's OWN API key (revoked /\n   * expired / invalid) — deterministic merchant-side misconfig, not a\n   * transient failure. `misconfigCode` carries the backend's api_key_* code\n   * and `remediation` its operator-facing URLs when present.\n   */\n  misconfig?: boolean;\n  misconfigCode?: string;\n  remediation?: { docsUrl?: string; manageUrl?: string };\n  /**\n   * When the verify-access server response carries a\n   * correlationId on an error envelope, propagate it so the SDK can thread\n   * it through createGuidanceResponse → adapter onDenied → merchant body.\n   */\n  correlationId?: string;\n  /**\n   * 3.12.0 (Trust Record): the server echoes the attempt-chain\n   * handle top-level on every response branch (error envelopes included).\n   */\n  attemptId?: string;\n}> {\n  const { credentials, ...requestData } = request;\n\n  // Build the request body. agentId is omitted when not provided so the\n  // server treats it as an anonymous canonical-flow call (Branch A/B/C).\n  const body: Record<string, unknown> = {\n    ...(credentials.astraId && { agentId: credentials.astraId }),\n    ...(requestData.purpose && { purpose: requestData.purpose }),\n  };\n\n  // Add optional fields\n  if (requestData.action) body.action = requestData.action;\n  if (requestData.resourceType) body.resourceType = requestData.resourceType;\n  if (requestData.resource) body.resource = requestData.resource;\n  if (requestData.jurisdiction) body.jurisdiction = requestData.jurisdiction;\n  if (requestData.transactionValue) body.transactionValue = requestData.transactionValue;\n  if (requestData.currency) body.currency = requestData.currency;\n  if (requestData.isSubAgentRequest) body.isSubAgentRequest = requestData.isSubAgentRequest;\n  if (requestData.parentAgentId) body.parentAgentId = requestData.parentAgentId;\n  if (requestData.subAgentDepth !== undefined) body.subAgentDepth = requestData.subAgentDepth;\n  // Handshake Protocol v10 additions\n  if (requestData.enableRuntimeChallenge)\n    body.enableRuntimeChallenge = requestData.enableRuntimeChallenge;\n  if (requestData.createSession) body.createSession = requestData.createSession;\n  if (requestData.durationRequired) body.durationRequired = requestData.durationRequired;\n  if (requestData.counterpartyType) body.counterpartyType = requestData.counterpartyType;\n  if (requestData.counterpartyUrl) body.counterpartyUrl = requestData.counterpartyUrl;\n  if (config.counterpartyId) body.counterpartyId = config.counterpartyId;\n  if (requestData.runtimeChallengeOptions)\n    body.runtimeChallengeOptions = requestData.runtimeChallengeOptions;\n  // Round-12 (F19): transport-vs-intent separation. MCP middleware sets\n  // this to 'mcp'; non-MCP callers leave it unset.\n  if (requestData.invocationProtocol) body.invocationProtocol = requestData.invocationProtocol;\n  // 5.3.0 (astra-pay): checkout-leg discriminator — first-party settlement\n  // fires only on 'confirm'; absent keeps pre-phase server behavior.\n  if (requestData.commercePhase) body.commercePhase = requestData.commercePhase;\n  // Per-cart idempotency key (checkout session id) forwarded on the confirm\n  // leg so concurrent confirms for one cart charge at most once.\n  if (requestData.checkoutSessionId) body.checkoutSessionId = requestData.checkoutSessionId;\n  // Order-plane cart lines (receipts + fulfillment email) — informational.\n  if (requestData.checkoutItems) body.checkoutItems = requestData.checkoutItems;\n  // 5.6.0 (astra-pay): transit-only fulfilment contact — echoed back in\n  // result.fulfilment for first-party confirms, never persisted server-side.\n  if (requestData.buyerEmail) body.buyerEmail = requestData.buyerEmail;\n  // 3.9.0 (§33.5 #1): raw commerce artifacts forwarded verbatim — the\n  // backend's Step 0.5 pipeline does the cryptographic verification\n  // server-side (adapters forward, never verify locally).\n  if (requestData.commerceArtifacts) body.commerceArtifacts = requestData.commerceArtifacts;\n  // 3.12.0 (Trust Record, §33.5 #3): attempt-chain handle + consideration set,\n  // forwarded skip-when-undefined (observedMetadata precedent) — pure\n  // observational pass-through; the server echoes attemptId on every branch.\n  if (requestData.attemptId) body.attemptId = requestData.attemptId;\n  if (requestData.considerationSet) body.considerationSet = requestData.considerationSet;\n\n  // Round-13 (F14 closure / R13-7): emit the SDK package version on every\n  // verify-access body so the backend can auto-populate `kya_counterparty.\n  // sdk_version` for the calling endpoint. Body field (not User-Agent\n  // header) is the canonical channel — works in Node, browser, behind\n  // Cloudflare, and across SDK bundlers without environment-specific\n  // header gymnastics. Backend's `validation.ts:verifyAccessSchema`\n  // accepts the semver regex; the auto-pop logic is forward-only.\n  body.sdkVersion = SDK_VERSION;\n\n  // Forward caller metadata when present. Merges the legacy top-level\n  // clientIp/userAgent into the nested block for backward compatibility.\n  if (requestData.callerMetadata || requestData.clientIp || requestData.userAgent) {\n    const meta = {\n      ...(requestData.clientIp && { sourceIp: requestData.clientIp }),\n      ...(requestData.userAgent && { userAgent: requestData.userAgent }),\n      ...requestData.callerMetadata,\n    };\n    if (Object.keys(meta).length > 0) body.callerMetadata = meta;\n  }\n\n  // Build headers\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n    'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n    ...config.customHeaders,\n  };\n\n  // verify-access requires authentication. Use ONLY the merchant's\n  // configured apiKey for outbound auth. Previously the caller's inbound\n  // Authorization header took priority, which pivoted the verify-access\n  // call to the caller's identity — letting an attacker who supplied\n  // their own Authorization header trigger verify-access calls under\n  // THEIR account and observe the resulting verdicts for arbitrary\n  // lookups they triggered via the merchant. Audit F-A1-10.\n  //\n  // The caller-supplied JWT (if any) is already extracted to\n  // credentials.jwt and travels in the verify-access request body so\n  // backend can evaluate it as the agent's identity claim — separate from\n  // the merchant-attribution auth on the outbound HTTPS call.\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    // Legacy header kept for compatibility with any middleware that reads it directly.\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  try {\n    // 4.0.0: hard timeout — without one, a backend that accepts the\n    // connection but never answers hangs the merchant's middleware and every\n    // inbound agent request behind it (observed live on a partner property).\n    // Timeouts land on the catch path below → api_error (fail-closed),\n    // NOT misconfig. The edge adapter races its own tighter withBudget.\n    const response = await sdkFetch(`${config.apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access`, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers,\n      body: JSON.stringify(body),\n      signal: AbortSignal.timeout(config.verifyTimeoutMs ?? 10_000),\n    });\n\n    const data = await response.json();\n\n    // v2.3.8 (defect #29): treat 410 Gone as a deterministic deactivated-endpoint\n    // signal. Older SDKs may treat any non-2xx as transient and retry; v2.3.8+\n    // surfaces it as a structured denial with `reason: 'endpoint_deactivated'`\n    // so callers can distinguish \"endpoint gone\" from \"endpoint denied this\".\n    if (response.status === 410) {\n      return {\n        success: true,\n        // 3.12.0 (Trust Record): keep the server-echoed attempt handle even on\n        // the synthesised 410 deny shape (echoed on every branch).\n        attemptId: typeof data?.attemptId === 'string' ? data.attemptId : undefined,\n        access: {\n          allowed: false,\n          reason: 'endpoint_deactivated',\n          failures: [\n            {\n              dimension: 'endpoint.deactivated',\n              message:\n                typeof data?.message === 'string' ? data.message : 'Endpoint has been deactivated',\n              guidance:\n                typeof data?.guidance === 'string'\n                  ? data.guidance\n                  : 'Reactivate via POST /api/endpoints/{id}/reactivate, or update the URL on the calling agent.',\n            },\n          ],\n        },\n      };\n    }\n\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      // 4.0.0: a 401 from verify-access can ONLY mean the backend rejected\n      // THIS INTEGRATION'S own API key — agent denials come back as 200 with\n      // access.allowed=false. Surface it as merchant-misconfig, not a\n      // transient api_error: it is deterministic until the operator rotates\n      // the key, and the \"retry with backoff\" template actively misleads.\n      // Backends ≥ this round also send code: api_key_* + remediation URLs.\n      if (response.status === 401) {\n        return {\n          success: false,\n          error: data.message || data.error || 'Integration API key rejected',\n          misconfig: true,\n          misconfigCode: typeof data?.code === 'string' ? data.code : undefined,\n          remediation:\n            data?.remediation && typeof data.remediation === 'object'\n              ? (data.remediation as { docsUrl?: string; manageUrl?: string })\n              : undefined,\n          correlationId: typeof data?.correlationId === 'string' ? data.correlationId : undefined,\n          attemptId: typeof data?.attemptId === 'string' ? data.attemptId : undefined,\n        };\n      }\n      // Round-10 (#47, O5): propagate correlationId on the error path too if\n      // the server happened to include one (some 5xx error envelopes carry\n      // it). Lets the SDK pass it through to the adapter onDenied handler.\n      return {\n        success: false,\n        error: data.message || data.error || `API returned ${response.status}`,\n        correlationId: typeof data?.correlationId === 'string' ? data.correlationId : undefined,\n        attemptId: typeof data?.attemptId === 'string' ? data.attemptId : undefined,\n      };\n    }\n\n    return data;\n  } catch (error) {\n    const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error';\n    return {\n      success: false,\n      error: `Failed to call verify-access API: ${message}`,\n    };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for a single verify() call (as opposed to GatewayConfig, which is\n * per-gateway). Mirrors the Java SDK's `verify(request, bypassCache)`.\n */\nexport interface VerifyOptions {\n  /**\n   * Skip the cache READ for this call so the request is guaranteed to reach\n   * the backend (the result is still written to the cache if cacheable).\n   * Used by the step-up hold-and-poll retry: the re-verify after an approval\n   * must hit the server to redeem the single-use approval.\n   */\n  bypassCache?: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Main verification function\n */\nexport async function verify(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  options?: VerifyOptions\n): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n  const mergedConfig = { ...DEFAULT_CONFIG, ...config };\n\n  // v2.5.0: read well-known URLs from cache (prefetched by adapter at middleware creation).\n  // Synchronous — never triggers a fetch. If cache is empty, guidance URLs are empty strings.\n  const urls = mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl\n    ? getCachedWellKnownUrls(mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl)\n    : undefined;\n\n  // One-time init self-test — fire-and-forget by default, never blocks verify().\n  // Audit F-A6-33: when GatewayConfig.strictInit is set, the init promise is\n  // awaited and any failure throws synchronously so callers learn about\n  // misconfigured apiBaseUrl on the first verify() call rather than silently\n  // running with broken auth.\n  if (!initCheckPerformed && !mergedConfig.disableInitChecks && mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl) {\n    if (mergedConfig.strictInit) {\n      await performInitCheck(\n        mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl,\n        mergedConfig.debug,\n        true,\n        mergedConfig.apiKey\n      );\n    } else {\n      void performInitCheck(\n        mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl,\n        mergedConfig.debug,\n        false,\n        mergedConfig.apiKey\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Deprecation warning for v2.3.0 removed config fields. Fires once per process.\n  if (\n    !deprecationWarningShown &&\n    (config.minTrustScore !== undefined || config.minTrustScoreForFull !== undefined)\n  ) {\n    deprecationWarningShown = true;\n    console.warn(\n      '[VerificationGateway] minTrustScore / minTrustScoreForFull are deprecated in v2.3.0 ' +\n        'and have no effect. Server is now the single source of truth for access decisions ' +\n        '(verified ID + runtime challenge + PDLSS + trust score). To gate access ' +\n        \"to an endpoint, configure the endpoint's trust_score_requirement server-side.\"\n    );\n  }\n\n  // v2.3.0: anonymous traffic no longer short-circuits here. We forward the\n  // request to the server with no agentId; the server applies the endpoint's\n  // unverifiedAgentPolicy and returns advisory. createGuidanceResponse remains\n  // as the offline fallback if the API itself fails (handled below).\n\n  // Check cache first. Caching on unless caller explicitly sets cacheTtl: 0\n  // to disable. Undefined falls through to the 60s default at cacheResult\n  // write time. options.bypassCache skips the read only (hold-and-poll retry\n  // must reach the backend to redeem its approval).\n  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0 && !options?.bypassCache) {\n    const cached = getCachedResult(request, mergedConfig.counterpartyId);\n    if (cached) {\n      if (mergedConfig.debug) {\n        console.log('[VerificationGateway] Returning cached result');\n      }\n      // 3.12.0 (Trust Record, §33.5 #3): attemptId is excluded from the cache\n      // key, so the stored result may carry a PRIOR attempt's id. Overwrite it\n      // with this request's own attemptId — or drop it when this request has\n      // none — a cached verdict must never leak another attempt's handle.\n      // Shallow clone: never mutate the stored entry (a concurrent holder of\n      // the same cached object may still be reading it).\n      const hit: VerificationResult = { ...cached };\n      if (request.attemptId) {\n        hit.attemptId = request.attemptId;\n      } else {\n        delete hit.attemptId;\n      }\n      return hit;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Inject counterparty info from config if not already set in request\n  const enrichedRequest = { ...request };\n  if (!enrichedRequest.counterpartyUrl && mergedConfig.counterpartyUrl) {\n    enrichedRequest.counterpartyUrl = mergedConfig.counterpartyUrl;\n  }\n  if (!enrichedRequest.counterpartyType && mergedConfig.counterpartyType) {\n    enrichedRequest.counterpartyType = mergedConfig.counterpartyType;\n  }\n\n  // Call the API\n  if (mergedConfig.debug) {\n    console.log('[VerificationGateway] Calling verify-access API');\n  }\n\n  const apiResponse = await callVerifyAccessAPI(mergedConfig, enrichedRequest);\n\n  // 3.6.0: the server emits a top-level denialReasons array on every deny\n  // path (same strings as the failure messages). Non-empty → authoritative;\n  // absent/empty → fall back to the client-side reconstructions below.\n  const rawServerDenialReasons = (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).denialReasons;\n  const serverDenialReasons =\n    Array.isArray(rawServerDenialReasons) && rawServerDenialReasons.length > 0\n      ? (rawServerDenialReasons as string[])\n      : undefined;\n\n  // Handle API errors\n  if (!apiResponse.success) {\n    // Round-10 (#47, O5): distinguish API errors from missing-credentials.\n    // The previous default tagged any failure with the \"register your\n    // agent\" template, which is misleading to a verified partner whose\n    // verify-access call hit a 500. The `api_error` source surfaces a\n    // typed `verify_access.api_error` failure entry instead.\n    // 4.0.0: a rejected merchant key gets its own source — deterministic\n    // misconfig must not wear the \"temporarily unavailable, retry\" template.\n    return createGuidanceResponse(mergedConfig, apiResponse.error, {\n      source: apiResponse.misconfig ? 'merchant_misconfig' : 'api_error',\n      correlationId: (apiResponse as { correlationId?: string }).correlationId,\n      attemptId: (apiResponse as { attemptId?: string }).attemptId,\n      remediation: apiResponse.remediation,\n      urls,\n    });\n  }\n\n  // Check access result\n  if (!apiResponse.access?.allowed) {\n    // v2.9.8 (defect M1): aggregated failures across every gate that\n    // denied. Surface them on the result so the integrator can see every\n    // blocker in one go instead of the previous fail-fast cascade.\n    const aggregatedFailures = (apiResponse.access as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)\n      ?.failures as Array<{ dimension: string; message: string; guidance?: string }> | undefined;\n    // Round-18 G4: backend denied access (PDLSS or other gate); identity status\n    // depends on whether the backend resolved the caller. Read from\n    // verificationContext.idVerified; default false if absent (anonymous or\n    // identity-fail paths land here too). policyAllowed is false by definition\n    // in this branch (apiResponse.access.allowed === false).\n    const idVerifiedFromBackend =\n      (apiResponse.verificationContext as { idVerified?: boolean } | undefined)?.idVerified ===\n      true;\n    const result: EnhancedVerificationResult = {\n      identityVerified: idVerifiedFromBackend,\n      policyAllowed: false,\n      // 3.6.0: the server now emits top-level denialReasons on every deny\n      // path — prefer it verbatim; the failure-message reconstruction remains\n      // as the fallback for older backends.\n      denialReasons:\n        serverDenialReasons ??\n        (aggregatedFailures && aggregatedFailures.length > 0\n          ? aggregatedFailures.map((f) => f.message)\n          : apiResponse.access?.reason\n            ? [apiResponse.access.reason]\n            : ['Access denied']),\n      failures: aggregatedFailures,\n      requiresStepUp: apiResponse.access?.requiresStepUp,\n      requiresApproval: apiResponse.access?.requiresApproval,\n      guidance: {\n        message: apiResponse.access?.reason || 'Access denied by PDLSS policy',\n        registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n        documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        // 5.1.0: anonymous callers land on this branch — steer MCP-hosted\n        // agents to the connector (this is what the edge deny body surfaces).\n        ...(mcpGuidance(urls) && { mcp: mcpGuidance(urls) }),\n      },\n      verifiedAt: new Date(),\n      // Extract sessionId so decisions can be recorded for denials too\n      sessionId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).sessionId as string | undefined,\n      // Anonymous traffic has no session → correlationId is the per-attempt\n      // linking key (the sessionId-equivalent for anonymous callers).\n      correlationId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).correlationId as string | undefined,\n      // 3.12.0 (Trust Record): server echoes the attempt-chain handle on\n      // every branch — denials included (the funnel outlives one deny).\n      attemptId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).attemptId as string | undefined,\n      recommendation: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>)\n        .recommendation as EnhancedVerificationResult['recommendation'],\n      recommendationReasons: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).recommendationReasons as\n        | string[]\n        | undefined,\n      stepUpApproval: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).stepUpApproval as\n        | StepUpApprovalInfo\n        | undefined,\n      settlement: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlement as\n        | SettlementArtifact\n        | undefined,\n      settlementOutcome: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlementOutcome as\n        | SettlementOutcomeInfo\n        | undefined,\n      // 5.5.0 self-settlement: merchant-only material — passes through to the\n      // MERCHANT caller only (bridge callers strip it before the agent plane).\n      settlementToken: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlementToken as\n        | MerchantSettlementToken\n        | undefined,\n      // 5.6.0: fulfilment contact — merchant-only lane, same strip rule.\n      fulfilment: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).fulfilment as FulfilmentInfo | undefined,\n    };\n\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  // Build successful result\n  const agent: VerifiedAgent | undefined = apiResponse.agent\n    ? {\n        astraId: apiResponse.agent.astraId,\n        name: apiResponse.agent.name,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.agent.trustScore,\n        trustLevel: getTrustLevel(apiResponse.agent.trustScore),\n        blockchainVerified: apiResponse.agent.blockchainStatus === 'verified',\n        status: apiResponse.agent.agentStatus as VerifiedAgent['status'],\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  const developer: VerifiedDeveloper | undefined = apiResponse.developer\n    ? {\n        astradId: apiResponse.developer.kyaOwnerId,\n        name: apiResponse.developer.fullName,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.developer.trustScore || 0,\n        verified: apiResponse.developer.identityVerified,\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  const organization: VerifiedOrganization | undefined = apiResponse.organization\n    ? {\n        name: apiResponse.organization.name,\n        verified: apiResponse.organization.verified,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.organization.trustScore,\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  // Verification context — structured \"why\" the merchant gets in v2.2.4+.\n  // Carries appliedPolicy (no UUIDs), pdlssCheck summary, dynamic trust score,\n  // and policy-driven attestations. Replaces the old over-sharing `pdlss` block.\n  const verificationContext = apiResponse.verificationContext;\n\n  const result: EnhancedVerificationResult = {\n    // 4.5.0 (probe F1): read idVerified from verificationContext with the\n    // SAME absent⇒false default as the deny branch. The previous `!== false`\n    // default manufactured `identityVerified: true` for anonymous\n    // allow_full/allow_partial/audit responses (which allow access but omit\n    // verificationContext entirely) — the \"anonymous caller labelled\n    // verified\" defect. Every authenticated success response has carried\n    // `verificationContext.idVerified: true` since v2.2.4, so a truth claim\n    // this load-bearing must never be defaulted on.\n    identityVerified:\n      (apiResponse.verificationContext as { idVerified?: boolean } | undefined)?.idVerified ===\n      true,\n    policyAllowed: true,\n    agent,\n    developer,\n    organization,\n    appliedPolicy: apiResponse.access?.appliedPolicy,\n    verificationContext,\n    requiresStepUp: apiResponse.access?.requiresStepUp,\n    requiresApproval: apiResponse.access?.requiresApproval,\n    verifiedAt: new Date(),\n    cacheTtl: mergedConfig.cacheTtl,\n    // Handshake Protocol v10 enhanced fields (present when backend returns them)\n    sessionId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).sessionId as string | undefined,\n    // v2.3.10 (defect #34, round-4): anonymous responses surface correlationId\n    // (no session row exists for unverified callers).\n    correlationId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).correlationId as string | undefined,\n    // 3.12.0 (Trust Record): server-echoed attempt-chain handle.\n    attemptId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).attemptId as string | undefined,\n    runtimeChallenge: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).runtimeChallenge as\n      | RuntimeChallengeResult\n      | undefined,\n    tokenGuidance: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).tokenGuidance as\n      | TokenGuidance\n      | undefined,\n    recommendation: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>)\n      .recommendation as EnhancedVerificationResult['recommendation'],\n    recommendationReasons: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).recommendationReasons as\n      | string[]\n      | undefined,\n    warningHeader: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).warningHeader as\n      | { name: string; value: string }\n      | undefined,\n    stepUpApproval: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).stepUpApproval as\n      | StepUpApprovalInfo\n      | undefined,\n    settlement: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlement as\n      | SettlementArtifact\n      | undefined,\n    settlementOutcome: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlementOutcome as\n      | SettlementOutcomeInfo\n      | undefined,\n    settlementToken: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlementToken as\n      | MerchantSettlementToken\n      | undefined,\n    // 5.6.0: fulfilment contact — merchant-only lane, same strip rule.\n    fulfilment: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).fulfilment as FulfilmentInfo | undefined,\n  };\n\n  // Enforce AstraSync recommendation\n  if (result.recommendation === 'deny') {\n    // Round-18 G4: recommendation-driven deny lands on the success-path\n    // construction (identity was resolved). Flip policy only — identity stays\n    // verified — so adapters return 403 (re-auth won't help; the policy\n    // decision is the blocker).\n    result.policyAllowed = false;\n    // 3.6.0: server-sent top-level denialReasons wins; recommendationReasons\n    // reconstruction is the fallback for older backends.\n    result.denialReasons = serverDenialReasons ??\n      result.recommendationReasons ?? ['Access denied by AstraSync recommendation'];\n    result.guidance = result.runtimeChallenge\n      ? {\n          message: `Verification failed: ${result.runtimeChallenge.reason || 'runtime challenge failed'}`,\n          registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n          documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        }\n      : {\n          message: result.recommendationReasons?.[0] || 'Access denied by AstraSync recommendation',\n          registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n          documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        };\n  } else if (result.recommendation === 'step_up_required') {\n    // The escalation signal rides on `requiresStepUp` / `stepUpApproval`, not\n    // on any masquerade of the (now-removed) access band.\n    result.requiresStepUp = true;\n    result.denialReasons = serverDenialReasons ??\n      result.recommendationReasons ?? ['Step-up verification required'];\n  }\n\n  // Cache the result. Never cache denials (agent may fix challenge endpoint\n  // and retry) NOR step-up escalations (3.6.0 — the same bug the Java SDK\n  // had: a cached step_up_required verdict keeps denying retries the owner\n  // has already approved, and its pollUrl goes stale once consumed/expired).\n  // Escalations stay uncached even when the caller pins an explicit cacheTtl.\n  const escalates =\n    result.requiresStepUp === true ||\n    result.requiresApproval === true ||\n    result.recommendation === 'step_up_required';\n  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0 && result.recommendation !== 'deny' && !escalates) {\n    cacheResult(request, result, mergedConfig.cacheTtl, mergedConfig.counterpartyId);\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Record a counterparty's grant/deny decision for a verification session.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function recordDecision(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  sessionId: string,\n  decision: 'granted' | 'denied',\n  reason?: string\n): Promise<void> {\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  await sdkFetch(`${config.apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access/${sessionId}/decision`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers,\n    body: JSON.stringify({ decision, reason }),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Report post-hoc consideration/outcome data for an attempt chain (Trust\n * Record). Use when the signal never reached verify-access: a\n * catalog served from a local cache, a transport-side deny (sku not found,\n * over budget), or a terminal outcome (settled / blocked on step-up).\n * Authenticated with the same credentials as verify(); the backend responds\n * 202 and folds the data into the attempt chain keyed by `attemptId`.\n *\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed, never throws.\n */\nexport async function reportAttempt(config: GatewayConfig, report: AttemptReport): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  // counterpartyId resolution mirrors reportUnregisteredAttempt: an explicit\n  // report value wins; otherwise attribute to the configured endpoint.\n  const body = {\n    ...report,\n    ...(!report.counterpartyId &&\n      config.counterpartyId && { counterpartyId: config.counterpartyId }),\n  };\n\n  await sdkFetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access/attempt-report`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers,\n    body: JSON.stringify(body),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Fetch the per-route policy for an endpoint from the AstraSync backend.\n * v2.9.7 moved policy authority into the dashboard — the SDK no longer\n * accepts `routes` from merchant-side source code, it fetches them from\n * here on init (and refreshes periodically).\n *\n * Returns `null` when the request fails for any reason — the caller decides\n * how to fall back (the middleware allows-all when no policy is loaded so\n * a misconfigured init doesn't take down the merchant's API).\n */\nexport async function fetchRoutes(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  counterpartyId: string\n): Promise<RouteAccessConfigShape[] | null> {\n  if (!counterpartyId) return null;\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n  try {\n    const response = await sdkFetch(\n      `${config.apiBaseUrl}/endpoints/${encodeURIComponent(counterpartyId)}/routes`,\n      { method: 'GET', headers }\n    );\n    if (!response.ok) return null;\n    const body = (await response.json()) as { data?: { routes?: RouteAccessConfigShape[] } };\n    return body.data?.routes ?? [];\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Minimal shape of an EndpointRoute as the SDK consumes it. Mirrors the\n * server's `EndpointRoute` type and the SDK's `RouteAccessConfig` — same\n * JSON moves between server and SDK unchanged.\n */\nexport interface RouteAccessConfigShape {\n  pattern: string;\n  method: string;\n  /** Pass through unenforced (observe). Replaces `minAccessLevel: 'none'`. */\n  observe?: boolean;\n  minTrustScore?: number;\n  requiredPurposes?: string[];\n  allowedPurposes?: string[];\n  allowedJurisdictions?: string[];\n  maxDuration?: number;\n  maxTransactionValue?: number;\n  requirePurpose?: boolean;\n  /** Send-mapping — see RouteAccessConfig in types.ts. */\n  purpose?: string;\n  action?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify an agent AND automatically record the grant/deny decision.\n *\n * This is the recommended entry point for counterparties that call verify()\n * directly (e.g. MCP servers) rather than using createMiddleware().\n * It adds createSession: true, then fire-and-forgets the decision.\n */\nexport async function verifyAndRecord(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  options?: VerifyOptions\n): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n  const mergedConfig = { ...DEFAULT_CONFIG, ...config };\n  const result = await verify(mergedConfig, { ...request, createSession: true }, options);\n  const sessionId = (result as EnhancedVerificationResult).sessionId;\n\n  if (sessionId) {\n    // Round-18 G4: a session is \"granted\" only if identity verified AND\n    // policy allowed; either failing is a deny.\n    if (result.identityVerified && result.policyAllowed) {\n      recordDecision(mergedConfig, sessionId, 'granted').catch(() => {});\n    } else {\n      recordDecision(mergedConfig, sessionId, 'denied', result.denialReasons?.[0]).catch(() => {});\n    }\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Report an unregistered agent attempt (no AstraSync credentials).\n * Called by SDK adapters when an agent is redirected to /docs/agent-access.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function reportUnregisteredAttempt(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  data: {\n    /**\n     * 3.6.0: optional — the backend attributes by counterpartyId first (sent\n     * from config below) and requires at least ONE of counterpartyId/URL.\n     * A null/undefined URL is omitted from the body, not sent as null.\n     */\n    counterpartyUrl?: string;\n    counterpartyType?: string;\n    sourceIp?: string;\n    userAgent?: string;\n    requestPath?: string;\n    requestMethod?: string;\n    /**\n     * 3.9.0 — edge-adapter evidence fields, persisted into the\n     * event's eventData by the backend: `protocol` = detected transport/\n     * credential protocol; `evidence` = light crypto-free detection detail.\n     */\n    protocol?: string;\n    evidence?: Record<string, unknown>;\n    /**\n     * Maximal metadata capture — the full sanitised metadata for an\n     * unregistered caller (every signal legitimately visible on the wire).\n     * Persisted into eventData; feeds platform attribution and (via\n     * correlationId) registration auto-fill. Fire-and-forget, so free.\n     */\n    observedMetadata?: ObservedMetadata;\n  }\n): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n\n  const { counterpartyUrl, ...rest } = data;\n  const body = {\n    ...rest,\n    ...(counterpartyUrl && { counterpartyUrl }),\n    ...(config.counterpartyId && { counterpartyId: config.counterpartyId }),\n  };\n\n  await sdkFetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/verification-activity/unregistered-attempt`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n    body: JSON.stringify(body),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Report a counterparty-side PDLSS pre-check failure.\n * Called by SDK adapters when the agent's requested PDLSS exceeds\n * counterparty-defined maximums BEFORE calling verify-access.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function reportCounterpartyPreCheckFailure(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  data: {\n    agentId: string;\n    counterpartyUrl: string;\n    counterpartyType?: string;\n    failures: Array<{\n      field: string;\n      requested: string | number;\n      limit: string | number | string[];\n      message: string;\n    }>;\n    requestPath?: string;\n    requestMethod?: string;\n  }\n): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n\n  await sdkFetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/verification-activity/counterparty-pre-check-failure`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n    body: JSON.stringify(data),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Quick verification — checks credentials and policy in one call.\n *\n * The return shape mirrors `VerificationResult`'s split — partners\n * writing custom handlers around `quickVerify` get the same identity/policy\n * distinction as those calling `verify()` directly. Map to HTTP status the\n * same way: `!identityVerified` → 401; `identityVerified && !policyAllowed`\n * → 403.\n */\nexport async function quickVerify(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  credentials: AgentCredentials\n): Promise<{\n  identityVerified: boolean;\n  policyAllowed: boolean;\n  reason?: string;\n}> {\n  const result = await verify(config, {\n    credentials,\n    purpose: 'verification',\n  });\n\n  return {\n    identityVerified: result.identityVerified,\n    policyAllowed: result.policyAllowed,\n    reason: result.denialReasons?.[0],\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Single source-of-truth for the SDK's\n * package version emitted on verify-access bodies (and any future\n * telemetry). Bumped alongside `package.json#version` on every release.\n *\n * Why a constant rather than `import pkg from '../package.json'`:\n * - `tsconfig.json` sets `rootDir: ./src`; importing the sibling\n *   package.json fails the build with \"outside rootDir\".\n * - Build-time string replacement (tsup `define`, esbuild banner, etc.)\n *   adds toolchain coupling for a trivial gain.\n * - Embedded readonly constant works in every environment (Node, browser,\n *   bundlers, Deno) without runtime fs / network access.\n *\n * Release discipline: a CI lint can grep `package.json#version` against\n * this constant if the two ever diverge in the wild. A manual bump\n * is fine — bumping both in the release-ceremony commit keeps them\n * lockstep.\n */\nexport const SDK_VERSION = '5.7.0';\n","/**\n * Shared outbound-HTTP wrapper — every request the SDK makes to the\n * AstraSync backend (or anywhere else) goes through `sdkFetch` so it\n * carries an identifying User-Agent.\n *\n * Why: Node's global fetch defaults to `user-agent: node`, which is\n * indistinguishable from every other Node client on the wire. Visit\n * Intelligence observed our own SDK/beacon traffic as anonymous \"node\"\n * visits. Self-identification is the platform's own medicine.\n *\n * Browser note: some browsers filter the User-Agent request header\n * silently (never throwing), so this is a no-op there — which is correct:\n * in a browser the page's real UA is the honest identity.\n */\n\nimport { SDK_VERSION } from './version';\n\nexport const SDK_USER_AGENT = `astrasync-sdk/${SDK_VERSION}`;\n\n/**\n * Add the SDK User-Agent without changing the SHAPE of the caller's headers\n * (plain records stay plain records) — interceptors, adapters, and tests\n * read `init.headers` as a record, and `Headers` would also lowercase names.\n */\nfunction withUserAgent(initHeaders: HeadersInit | undefined): HeadersInit {\n  if (!initHeaders) return { 'user-agent': SDK_USER_AGENT };\n  if (initHeaders instanceof Headers) {\n    const copy = new Headers(initHeaders);\n    if (!copy.has('user-agent')) copy.set('user-agent', SDK_USER_AGENT);\n    return copy;\n  }\n  if (Array.isArray(initHeaders)) {\n    const has = initHeaders.some(([name]) => name.toLowerCase() === 'user-agent');\n    return has ? initHeaders : [...initHeaders, ['user-agent', SDK_USER_AGENT]];\n  }\n  const has = Object.keys(initHeaders).some((name) => name.toLowerCase() === 'user-agent');\n  return has ? initHeaders : { 'user-agent': SDK_USER_AGENT, ...initHeaders };\n}\n\nexport const sdkFetch: typeof fetch = (input, init) =>\n  fetch(input, { ...init, headers: withUserAgent(init?.headers) });\n","/**\n * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway — Trust Level helpers.\n *\n * SDK 5.0.0: the `accessLevel` band (`none`/`restricted`/`read-only`/`standard`/\n * `full`/`internal`) was removed entirely — it never gated the access decision\n * (the server does, from a verified ID + runtime challenge + PDLSS match + trust\n * score). What remains here is the coarse trust-level badge derived from the\n * numeric trust score, used only for display.\n */\n\nimport type { TrustLevel } from './types';\n\n/**\n * Trust level score ranges\n */\nexport const TRUST_LEVEL_RANGES: Record<TrustLevel, { min: number; max: number }> = {\n  BRONZE: { min: 0, max: 39 },\n  SILVER: { min: 40, max: 59 },\n  GOLD: { min: 60, max: 79 },\n  PLATINUM: { min: 80, max: 100 },\n};\n\n/**\n * Determine trust level from score\n */\nexport function getTrustLevel(score: number): TrustLevel {\n  if (score >= 80) return 'PLATINUM';\n  if (score >= 60) return 'GOLD';\n  if (score >= 40) return 'SILVER';\n  return 'BRONZE';\n}\n","import { sdkFetch } from './http';\n/**\n * SDK-side discovery of canonical platform URLs via `/.well-known/agentic-commerce`.\n *\n * Fire-and-forget pre-fetch at middleware creation; first verify() awaits\n * the in-flight promise if it hasn't resolved. 60-minute TTL with\n * stale-while-revalidate background refresh.\n */\n\nexport interface WellKnownAgenticCommerce {\n  registrationUrl: string;\n  documentationUrl: string;\n  verifyAccessUrl: string;\n  /** 5.1.0: hosted AstraSync MCP bridge endpoint (absent on self-hosted backends). */\n  mcpEndpoint?: string;\n  /** 5.1.0: bridge connector-discovery doc (absent on self-hosted backends). */\n  mcpDiscoveryUrl?: string;\n}\n\ninterface CacheEntry {\n  data: WellKnownAgenticCommerce;\n  fetchedAt: number;\n}\n\nconst CACHE_TTL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 60 minutes\n\nconst cache = new Map<string, CacheEntry>();\nconst inflight = new Map<string, Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce>>();\n\nfunction wellKnownUrl(apiBaseUrl: string): string {\n  // apiBaseUrl is typically 'https://astrasync.ai/api' — strip the /api suffix\n  // to get the platform root, then append /.well-known/agentic-commerce.\n  const base = apiBaseUrl.replace(/\\/api\\/?$/, '');\n  return `${base}/.well-known/agentic-commerce`;\n}\n\nasync function fetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl: string): Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce> {\n  const url = wellKnownUrl(apiBaseUrl);\n  const response = await sdkFetch(url, {\n    method: 'GET',\n    headers: { Accept: 'application/json' },\n    signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5000),\n  });\n  if (!response.ok) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `AstraSync platform must expose /.well-known/agentic-commerce; ` +\n        `got ${response.status} from ${url}. SDK cannot initialise without it.`\n    );\n  }\n  const data = (await response.json()) as Record<string, unknown>;\n  if (!data.registrationUrl || !data.documentationUrl || !data.verifyAccessUrl) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `/.well-known/agentic-commerce response missing required fields ` +\n        `(registrationUrl, documentationUrl, verifyAccessUrl).`\n    );\n  }\n  return data as unknown as WellKnownAgenticCommerce;\n}\n\n/**\n * Start a background fetch. Returns the promise for callers that need\n * to await it (first verify() call).\n */\nexport function prefetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl: string): Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce> {\n  const existing = inflight.get(apiBaseUrl);\n  if (existing) return existing;\n\n  const promise = fetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl)\n    .then((data) => {\n      cache.set(apiBaseUrl, { data, fetchedAt: Date.now() });\n      inflight.delete(apiBaseUrl);\n      return data;\n    })\n    .catch((err) => {\n      inflight.delete(apiBaseUrl);\n      throw err;\n    });\n\n  inflight.set(apiBaseUrl, promise);\n  return promise;\n}\n\n/**\n * Get cached well-known URLs. If stale, triggers a background refresh\n * and returns stale data (stale-while-revalidate). If no cache exists,\n * awaits the in-flight fetch or starts a new one.\n */\nexport async function getWellKnownUrls(apiBaseUrl: string): Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce> {\n  const entry = cache.get(apiBaseUrl);\n\n  if (entry) {\n    if (Date.now() - entry.fetchedAt > CACHE_TTL_MS) {\n      // Stale — trigger background refresh, return stale data\n      prefetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl).catch(() => {\n        // Background refresh failed — stale data remains until next request\n      });\n    }\n    return entry.data;\n  }\n\n  // No cache — must await\n  const pending = inflight.get(apiBaseUrl);\n  if (pending) return pending;\n\n  return prefetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl);\n}\n\n/**\n * Synchronous cache read — returns cached URLs or undefined.\n * Never triggers a fetch. Used by verify() to avoid extra HTTP calls\n * in the hot path; adapters are responsible for prefetching.\n */\nexport function getCachedWellKnownUrls(apiBaseUrl: string): WellKnownAgenticCommerce | undefined {\n  return cache.get(apiBaseUrl)?.data;\n}\n\n/** Reset cache — for testing only. */\nexport function _resetWellKnownCache(): void {\n  cache.clear();\n  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Always include the\n * /api path prefix when overriding — registration / docs URLs are derived by\n * stripping it.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_CONFIG: Partial<GatewayConfig> = {\n  apiBaseUrl: 'https://astrasync.ai/api',\n  // minTrustScore + minTrustScoreForFull deprecated in v2.3.0 — server decides.\n  // cacheTtl deliberately unset. When undefined, cacheResult applies the 60s\n  // default; the caller's explicit value is honoured for cacheable results.\n  // Denials and step-up escalations are NEVER cached (3.6.0) regardless of\n  // cacheTtl. Set cacheTtl: 0 to disable caching entirely.\n  debug: false,\n};\n\n/**\n * Init self-test state. Fires once per process on first verify() call to warn\n * if apiBaseUrl is pointing at the wrong host (e.g. a marketing site that\n * 200s with text/html instead of the API).\n */\nlet initCheckPerformed = false;\n\n/** Test-only: re-arm the one-time init self-check. */\nexport function _resetInitCheck(): void {\n  initCheckPerformed = false;\n}\n\n/** One-shot guard for v2.3.0 deprecation warning. */\nlet deprecationWarningShown = false;\n\nasync function performInitCheck(\n  apiBaseUrl: string,\n  debug?: boolean,\n  strictInit?: boolean,\n  apiKey?: string\n): Promise<void> {\n  initCheckPerformed = true;\n  try {\n    const probeUrl = `${apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access`;\n    // HEAD mirrors GET semantics (running the full request pipeline without a\n    // body) so the response carries the same content-type the marketing 404\n    // would return. OPTIONS often gets short-circuited by CORS-preflight\n    // handlers and returns no content-type, defeating the check.\n    const response = await sdkFetch(probeUrl, { method: 'HEAD' });\n    const contentType = response.headers.get('content-type') ?? '';\n    if (contentType.startsWith('text/html')) {\n      const message =\n        `[VerificationGateway] apiBaseUrl '${apiBaseUrl}' returned HTML (content-type: ${contentType}). ` +\n        `This usually means apiBaseUrl is pointing at a marketing site instead of the API. ` +\n        `Expected: 'https://astrasync.ai/api' (prod) or 'https://staging.astrasync.ai/api' (staging).`;\n      // Audit F-A6-33: when strictInit is set, throw on misconfig instead\n      // of warning + continuing. Recurring footgun per\n      // `[[feedback_astrasync_api_url_canonical]]` — silent warn lets\n      // misconfigured prod deploys ship with all verify-access calls\n      // silently failing.\n      if (strictInit) {\n        throw new Error(`${message} (strictInit=true)`);\n      }\n      console.warn(`${message} Set disableInitChecks: true on GatewayConfig to silence.`);\n    } else if (debug) {\n      console.log(\n        `[VerificationGateway] init check passed for ${apiBaseUrl} (content-type: ${contentType})`\n      );\n    }\n\n    // 4.0.0: key liveness probe. A dead API key otherwise surfaces only\n    // per-request as inbound agents get turned away — the operator should\n    // learn at deploy time. 404 = older backend without self-check: silent.\n    if (apiKey) {\n      const selfCheck = await sdkFetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access/self-check`, {\n        headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${apiKey}` },\n      });\n      if (selfCheck.status === 401) {\n        const body = (await selfCheck.json().catch(() => ({}))) as {\n          code?: string;\n          message?: string;\n          remediation?: { manageUrl?: string };\n        };\n        const message =\n          `[VerificationGateway] the configured AstraSync API key was REJECTED at startup ` +\n          `(${body.code ?? 'api_key_invalid'}: ${body.message ?? 'invalid key'}). Every inbound agent ` +\n          `will be turned away until the key is rotated` +\n          (body.remediation?.manageUrl ? ` at ${body.remediation.manageUrl}` : '') +\n          `.`;\n        if (strictInit) {\n          throw new Error(`${message} (strictInit=true)`);\n        }\n        console.error(message);\n      } else if (selfCheck.ok) {\n        const body = (await selfCheck.json().catch(() => ({}))) as {\n          daysToExpiry?: number | null;\n        };\n        if (typeof body.daysToExpiry === 'number' && body.daysToExpiry <= 7) {\n          console.warn(\n            `[VerificationGateway] the configured AstraSync API key expires in ${body.daysToExpiry} day(s) — ` +\n              `rotate it at Settings → Developer Tools before integrations start failing.`\n          );\n        } else if (debug) {\n          console.log('[VerificationGateway] API key self-check passed');\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (strictInit) {\n      // strict mode propagates init failures so callers get a clear,\n      // synchronous \"your config is broken\" signal at startup.\n      throw err;\n    }\n    if (debug) {\n      console.log(`[VerificationGateway] init check failed (non-blocking): ${String(err)}`);\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Simple in-memory cache for verification results\n */\nconst verificationCache = new Map<string, { result: VerificationResult; expiresAt: number }>();\n\n/**\n * Generate cache key from the full request shape.\n *\n * Historically the key was credentials-only (`astraId-apiKey-jwt`),\n * which silently returned the cached result of a prior call even when the\n * subsequent call's purpose/action/counterparty/etc. differed. That was a\n * security gap — a warm cache could serve an allow verdict for a purpose the\n * agent hadn't actually been authorised for. Key now includes every field\n * that affects the backend verdict.\n *\n * MAINTAIN: when adding a field to VerificationRequest that affects the\n * backend verdict, add it to this key. Fields that don't affect verdict\n * (e.g. requestId, timestamps, sdkVersion) don't belong here — including\n * them would needlessly thrash the cache for repeated identical requests.\n *\n * 3.12.0 (Trust Record): `attemptId` and `considerationSet` are\n * deliberately EXCLUDED — like `callerMetadata.observedMetadata` they are\n * observational pass-through that never affects the verdict, and keying on\n * a per-attempt id would defeat verdict caching entirely. Cache hits get\n * their attemptId rewritten in verify() instead (never leak a prior\n * attempt's id from a cached result).\n */\nfunction getCacheKey(request: VerificationRequest, counterpartyId?: string): string {\n  const c = request.credentials;\n  return [\n    c.astraId || '',\n    c.apiKey || '',\n    c.jwt || '',\n    request.purpose || '',\n    request.action || '',\n    request.resourceType || '',\n    request.resource || '',\n    request.jurisdiction || '',\n    request.transactionValue ?? '',\n    request.currency || '',\n    // SECURITY (cross-merchant cache leak): the merchant identity is sent via\n    // `config.counterpartyId`, NOT on the request, so it was previously absent\n    // from the key — two verifies for the SAME agent/purpose/action/value but\n    // DIFFERENT merchants collided, and a grant at a permissive merchant (low\n    // trust floor) was served for a stricter one. Same bug class as the\n    // duration omission (F-A1-07). counterpartyId affects the backend verdict\n    // (trust floor / per-route policy), so it MUST key the cache.\n    counterpartyId || '',\n    request.counterpartyUrl || '',\n    request.counterpartyType || '',\n    request.isSubAgentRequest ? '1' : '0',\n    request.parentAgentId || '',\n    request.subAgentDepth ?? '',\n    // Audit F-A1-07: previously-missing dimensions that DO affect the\n    // backend verdict. Without these, two requests with different\n    // durations (e.g. 60s vs 86400s) collided on the same cache key and\n    // the shorter-duration allow served the longer-duration request.\n    request.durationRequired ?? '',\n    request.invocationProtocol || '',\n    request.enableRuntimeChallenge ? '1' : '0',\n    // callerMetadata fields contribute to risk model; include the ones\n    // backend reads. sourceIp/userAgent/forwardedFor change per-request\n    // so their inclusion effectively forces a re-check for any varying\n    // client (the right behavior — IP-driven anomaly scoring shouldn't\n    // be cached across IPs).\n    request.callerMetadata?.sourceIp || '',\n    request.callerMetadata?.userAgent || '',\n    request.callerMetadata?.forwardedFor || '',\n    request.callerMetadata?.agentCardUrl || '',\n    // UAT2 Bug B (5.4.1): the commerce phase and cart identity DO affect the\n    // backend verdict — the confirm leg is the ONLY leg that may execute\n    // first-party settlement. Without these, a confirm within the cache TTL of\n    // its start_checkout quote was served the cached quote-leg grant (no\n    // settlementOutcome) and never reached the backend. Same F-A1-07 bug class.\n    request.commercePhase || '',\n    request.checkoutSessionId || '',\n  ].join('|');\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if cached result is still valid\n */\nfunction getCachedResult(\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  counterpartyId?: string\n): VerificationResult | null {\n  const key = getCacheKey(request, counterpartyId);\n  const cached = verificationCache.get(key);\n\n  if (cached && cached.expiresAt > Date.now()) {\n    return cached.result;\n  }\n\n  if (cached) {\n    verificationCache.delete(key);\n  }\n\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Cache a verification result.\n *\n * 3.6.0: uniform 60s default. The earlier step-up TTL split (300s for\n * step-up verdicts) is gone — step-up verdicts are no longer cached AT ALL\n * (see the write predicate in verify()): a cached step_up_required result\n * carries a pollUrl that goes stale (consumed/expired) and, worse, keeps\n * denying retries that the owner has already approved. When `configuredTtl`\n * is set (truthy positive number), it's honoured for cacheable results.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS = 60;\n\nfunction cacheResult(\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  result: VerificationResult,\n  configuredTtl: number | undefined,\n  counterpartyId?: string\n): void {\n  const ttlSeconds = configuredTtl && configuredTtl > 0 ? configuredTtl : DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS;\n  const key = getCacheKey(request, counterpartyId);\n  verificationCache.set(key, {\n    result,\n    expiresAt: Date.now() + ttlSeconds * 1000,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Clear the verification cache\n */\nexport function clearCache(): void {\n  verificationCache.clear();\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract agent credentials from various sources\n */\nexport function extractCredentials(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  query?: Record<string, string | undefined>\n): AgentCredentials {\n  const credentials: AgentCredentials = {};\n\n  // Audit F-A1-12: ASTRA-ID shape validation. Accept only the canonical\n  // pattern (ASTRA-/ASTRAE- prefix + 1-64 url-safe chars) to prevent CRLF\n  // header injection or downstream interpolation surprises. Reject otherwise.\n  const ASTRA_ID_PATTERN = /^ASTRAE?-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64}$/;\n\n  // Check for ASTRA-ID in headers (case-insensitive). Accepts the historical\n  // X-Astra-Id name plus the X-Astra-AgentId / x-astra-agent-id alias the\n  // partner asked for in #9a — both surface the same field.\n  const astraIdHeader =\n    headers['x-astra-id'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-Id'] ||\n    headers['X-ASTRA-ID'] ||\n    headers['x-astra-agentid'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-AgentId'] ||\n    headers['x-astra-agent-id'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-Agent-Id'] ||\n    headers['X-ASTRA-AGENT-ID'];\n  if (astraIdHeader) {\n    // Audit F-A1-11: guard array-confusion. If multiple X-Astra-Id headers\n    // were sent (Express collapses to comma-joined string on most paths),\n    // take only the first canonical-shaped one.\n    const raw = Array.isArray(astraIdHeader)\n      ? astraIdHeader[0]\n      : typeof astraIdHeader === 'string'\n        ? astraIdHeader\n        : undefined;\n    if (typeof raw === 'string' && ASTRA_ID_PATTERN.test(raw)) {\n      credentials.astraId = raw;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Check for API key in headers\n  const apiKeyHeader = headers['x-api-key'] || headers['X-Api-Key'] || headers['X-API-KEY'];\n  if (apiKeyHeader) {\n    credentials.apiKey = Array.isArray(apiKeyHeader) ? apiKeyHeader[0] : apiKeyHeader;\n  }\n\n  // Check Authorization header for Bearer token.\n  // Audit F-A1-11: defensive type guard — Array.isArray gives a non-string,\n  // and Express path quirks can produce undefined despite the truthy check.\n  const authHeader = headers['authorization'] || headers['Authorization'];\n  if (authHeader) {\n    const authValue = Array.isArray(authHeader) ? authHeader[0] : authHeader;\n    if (typeof authValue === 'string') {\n      credentials.authorizationHeader = authValue;\n      if (authValue.startsWith('Bearer ')) {\n        credentials.jwt = authValue.slice(7);\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Check query parameters as fallback\n  if (query) {\n    if (query.astraId && !credentials.astraId) {\n      credentials.astraId = query.astraId;\n    }\n    if (query.apiKey && !credentials.apiKey) {\n      credentials.apiKey = query.apiKey;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return credentials;\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if credentials are present\n */\nexport function hasCredentials(credentials: AgentCredentials): boolean {\n  return !!(credentials.astraId || credentials.apiKey || credentials.jwt);\n}\n\n/**\n * Source of a synthesised guidance response. The sources are split — the\n * `'no_credentials'` shape is the original (caller has no AstraSync\n * credentials, suggest registration). The `'api_error'` shape is for when\n * the verify-access HTTP call itself failed (5xx, network, etc.) — DON'T\n * tell a verified-but-currently-blocked partner to \"register your agent\".\n *\n * 4.0.0 adds `'merchant_misconfig'`: the backend rejected THIS INTEGRATION'S\n * own API key (401 api_key_revoked/expired/invalid). Neither the agent's\n * fault nor a platform outage — retrying won't help, and the inbound agent\n * deserves to know the site operator's integration is broken (the\n * gadget-emporium failure mode: a rotated key silently 401ing every\n * credentialed agent for days).\n */\ntype GuidanceSource = 'no_credentials' | 'api_error' | 'merchant_misconfig';\n\n/**\n * MCP-connector steering (5.1.0). Present only when the backend's well-known\n * doc advertises a hosted bridge. The copy must directly counter the observed\n * model refusal (\"go register manually on the dashboard\"): registration via\n * the connector is the agent's own next action, with the human approval built\n * into the flow.\n */\nfunction mcpGuidance(urls?: WellKnownAgenticCommerce): GuidanceInfo['mcp'] {\n  if (!urls?.mcpEndpoint) return undefined;\n  return {\n    endpoint: urls.mcpEndpoint,\n    discoveryUrl: urls.mcpDiscoveryUrl,\n    message:\n      'If you are operating inside an MCP-capable host (Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor, or any MCP client), ' +\n      'add the AstraSync MCP connector instead of integrating these URLs by hand: registration through ' +\n      'the connector is KEYLESS and HUMAN-APPROVED — your human approves in an in-chat card, and you ' +\n      'never see, hold, or transmit an API key, password, or private key.',\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Create guidance response for unverified agents or for API-error fallback.\n *\n * The source is split so the `register your agent` template\n * doesn't fire on transient backend failures. Also threads `correlationId`\n * through so adapter `onDenied` handlers can surface it on the merchant's\n * response body for log correlation.\n */\nfunction createGuidanceResponse(\n  _config: GatewayConfig,\n  reason?: string,\n  options: {\n    source?: GuidanceSource;\n    correlationId?: string;\n    /** 3.12.0 (Trust Record): server-echoed attempt handle, threaded like correlationId. */\n    attemptId?: string;\n    urls?: WellKnownAgenticCommerce;\n    /** 4.0.0: backend-provided remediation URLs for the merchant (misconfig source). */\n    remediation?: { docsUrl?: string; manageUrl?: string };\n  } = {}\n): VerificationResult {\n  const source = options.source ?? 'no_credentials';\n  const isApiError = source === 'api_error';\n  const isMisconfig = source === 'merchant_misconfig';\n  const urls = options.urls;\n\n  const guidance: GuidanceInfo = isMisconfig\n    ? {\n        message:\n          \"This site's AstraSync integration is misconfigured (its API key was revoked, expired, or rotated). \" +\n          'Your identity and the AstraSync platform are fine — contact the site operator. Retrying will not help.',\n        registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n        documentationUrl: options.remediation?.docsUrl ?? urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        steps: [\n          'Report the failure to the site operator — their AstraSync API key needs rotating',\n          'Do not retry: the failure is deterministic until the operator updates their key',\n        ],\n      }\n    : isApiError\n      ? {\n          message:\n            'Verification is temporarily unavailable. Retry with exponential backoff; if the issue persists, contact support with the correlationId.',\n          registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n          documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n          steps: [\n            'Retry the request with exponential backoff',\n            'If failures persist, share the correlationId with support',\n          ],\n        }\n      : {\n          message:\n            'This service verifies AI agents before granting access. Please register your agent with AstraSync.',\n          registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n          documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n          steps: [\n            // MCP steering leads when the hosted bridge is advertised — the\n            // connector is the agent-actionable path (keyless, human-approved).\n            ...(urls?.mcpEndpoint\n              ? [\n                  `Fastest path (inside an MCP host): add the AstraSync MCP connector at ${urls.mcpEndpoint} — keyless, human-approved registration`,\n                ]\n              : []),\n            'Register for an AstraSync account',\n            'Create and register your agent',\n            'Add your ASTRA-ID to request headers',\n            'Retry your request',\n          ],\n          ...(mcpGuidance(urls) && { mcp: mcpGuidance(urls) }),\n        };\n\n  return {\n    // Round-18 G4: createGuidanceResponse fires for unverified-agent path or\n    // API-error fallback. Identity is not verified (no agent resolved);\n    // policy is not evaluated (we never reached the gate).\n    identityVerified: false,\n    policyAllowed: false,\n    guidance,\n    denialReasons: reason ? [reason] : ['No valid agent credentials provided'],\n    // Round-10 (#47, O5): on API-error fallback, surface a typed failure so\n    // partners (and their custom onDenied handlers) can branch on\n    // dimension. Without this, the synthesised stub was indistinguishable\n    // from a real policy deny.\n    failures: isMisconfig\n      ? [\n          {\n            dimension: 'verify_access.merchant_misconfigured',\n            message: reason ?? 'The integration API key was rejected by AstraSync',\n            guidance: guidance.message,\n          },\n        ]\n      : isApiError\n        ? [\n            {\n              dimension: 'verify_access.api_error',\n              message: reason ?? 'Verification temporarily unavailable',\n              guidance: guidance.message,\n            },\n          ]\n        : undefined,\n    // 4.0.0: typed marker so adapters render the misconfig envelope (503 +\n    // MERCHANT_VERIFICATION_MISCONFIGURED) without string-matching.\n    ...(isMisconfig && { misconfigured: true }),\n    // 4.6.0: a transient api_error is retryable — mark it so consumers surface\n    // \"temporarily unavailable, retry\" (recommendation 'error') instead of\n    // coercing the absent recommendation to a policy 'deny'. Misconfig is\n    // deterministic and intentionally NOT marked retryable.\n    ...(isApiError && { retryable: true }),\n    correlationId: options.correlationId,\n    attemptId: options.attemptId,\n    verifiedAt: new Date(),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Call the AstraSync verify-access API\n */\nasync function callVerifyAccessAPI(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest\n): Promise<{\n  success: boolean;\n  access?: {\n    allowed: boolean;\n    reason?: string;\n    /**\n     * Aggregated denial failures (v2.9.8+). Empty / absent when allowed.\n     * Each entry is `{ dimension, message, guidance? }` — see\n     * `AccessFailure` for the contract.\n     */\n    failures?: Array<{ dimension: string; message: string; guidance?: string }>;\n    requiresStepUp?: boolean;\n    requiresApproval?: boolean;\n    appliedPolicy?: {\n      boundaryName: string;\n      policyVersion: string;\n    };\n    counterparty?: {\n      id: string;\n      name: string;\n      trustScoreRequirement: number;\n    };\n  };\n  agent?: {\n    kyaAgentId: string;\n    astraId: string;\n    name: string;\n    trustScore: number;\n    trustLevel: string;\n    agentStatus: string;\n    blockchainStatus: string;\n  };\n  developer?: {\n    kyaOwnerId: string;\n    fullName: string;\n    email: string;\n    identityVerified: boolean;\n    trustScore: number;\n  };\n  organization?: {\n    name: string;\n    verified: boolean;\n    trustScore: number;\n  };\n  /**\n   * Structured explanation of the verification decision. Tells the merchant\n   * WHY (id verified? challenge passed? request within PDLSS? trust score?)\n   * without exposing thresholds, scope lists, or other-tenant counterparty\n   * membership. Empty `attestations` unless the endpoint's access policy\n   * declared `required_attestations`.\n   */\n  verificationContext?: {\n    idVerified: boolean;\n    runtimeChallenge: {\n      status: 'passed' | 'skipped' | 'failed' | 'timeout' | 'not_configured';\n      checkedAt: string | null;\n    };\n    pdlssCheck: {\n      result: 'within' | 'exceeded' | 'denied' | 'not_evaluated';\n      purpose: 'approved' | 'denied';\n      scope: 'approved' | 'denied';\n    };\n    dynamicTrustScore: number;\n    attestations: Array<{\n      type: string;\n      status: 'passed' | 'failed';\n      /** LMAX-POC C1: underlying check timestamp for merchant freshness gates. */\n      checkedAt: string;\n      validUntil?: string;\n      proofType: 'reference' | 'zkp';\n      proof: string;\n    }>;\n  };\n  error?: string;\n  /**\n   * 4.0.0: the backend 401'd this integration's OWN API key (revoked /\n   * expired / invalid) — deterministic merchant-side misconfig, not a\n   * transient failure. `misconfigCode` carries the backend's api_key_* code\n   * and `remediation` its operator-facing URLs when present.\n   */\n  misconfig?: boolean;\n  misconfigCode?: string;\n  remediation?: { docsUrl?: string; manageUrl?: string };\n  /**\n   * When the verify-access server response carries a\n   * correlationId on an error envelope, propagate it so the SDK can thread\n   * it through createGuidanceResponse → adapter onDenied → merchant body.\n   */\n  correlationId?: string;\n  /**\n   * 3.12.0 (Trust Record): the server echoes the attempt-chain\n   * handle top-level on every response branch (error envelopes included).\n   */\n  attemptId?: string;\n}> {\n  const { credentials, ...requestData } = request;\n\n  // Build the request body. agentId is omitted when not provided so the\n  // server treats it as an anonymous canonical-flow call (Branch A/B/C).\n  const body: Record<string, unknown> = {\n    ...(credentials.astraId && { agentId: credentials.astraId }),\n    ...(requestData.purpose && { purpose: requestData.purpose }),\n  };\n\n  // Add optional fields\n  if (requestData.action) body.action = requestData.action;\n  if (requestData.resourceType) body.resourceType = requestData.resourceType;\n  if (requestData.resource) body.resource = requestData.resource;\n  if (requestData.jurisdiction) body.jurisdiction = requestData.jurisdiction;\n  if (requestData.transactionValue) body.transactionValue = requestData.transactionValue;\n  if (requestData.currency) body.currency = requestData.currency;\n  if (requestData.isSubAgentRequest) body.isSubAgentRequest = requestData.isSubAgentRequest;\n  if (requestData.parentAgentId) body.parentAgentId = requestData.parentAgentId;\n  if (requestData.subAgentDepth !== undefined) body.subAgentDepth = requestData.subAgentDepth;\n  // Handshake Protocol v10 additions\n  if (requestData.enableRuntimeChallenge)\n    body.enableRuntimeChallenge = requestData.enableRuntimeChallenge;\n  if (requestData.createSession) body.createSession = requestData.createSession;\n  if (requestData.durationRequired) body.durationRequired = requestData.durationRequired;\n  if (requestData.counterpartyType) body.counterpartyType = requestData.counterpartyType;\n  if (requestData.counterpartyUrl) body.counterpartyUrl = requestData.counterpartyUrl;\n  if (config.counterpartyId) body.counterpartyId = config.counterpartyId;\n  if (requestData.runtimeChallengeOptions)\n    body.runtimeChallengeOptions = requestData.runtimeChallengeOptions;\n  // Round-12 (F19): transport-vs-intent separation. MCP middleware sets\n  // this to 'mcp'; non-MCP callers leave it unset.\n  if (requestData.invocationProtocol) body.invocationProtocol = requestData.invocationProtocol;\n  // 5.3.0 (astra-pay): checkout-leg discriminator — first-party settlement\n  // fires only on 'confirm'; absent keeps pre-phase server behavior.\n  if (requestData.commercePhase) body.commercePhase = requestData.commercePhase;\n  // Per-cart idempotency key (checkout session id) forwarded on the confirm\n  // leg so concurrent confirms for one cart charge at most once.\n  if (requestData.checkoutSessionId) body.checkoutSessionId = requestData.checkoutSessionId;\n  // Order-plane cart lines (receipts + fulfillment email) — informational.\n  if (requestData.checkoutItems) body.checkoutItems = requestData.checkoutItems;\n  // 5.6.0 (astra-pay): transit-only fulfilment contact — echoed back in\n  // result.fulfilment for first-party confirms, never persisted server-side.\n  if (requestData.buyerEmail) body.buyerEmail = requestData.buyerEmail;\n  // 3.9.0 (§33.5 #1): raw commerce artifacts forwarded verbatim — the\n  // backend's Step 0.5 pipeline does the cryptographic verification\n  // server-side (adapters forward, never verify locally).\n  if (requestData.commerceArtifacts) body.commerceArtifacts = requestData.commerceArtifacts;\n  // 3.12.0 (Trust Record, §33.5 #3): attempt-chain handle + consideration set,\n  // forwarded skip-when-undefined (observedMetadata precedent) — pure\n  // observational pass-through; the server echoes attemptId on every branch.\n  if (requestData.attemptId) body.attemptId = requestData.attemptId;\n  if (requestData.considerationSet) body.considerationSet = requestData.considerationSet;\n\n  // Round-13 (F14 closure / R13-7): emit the SDK package version on every\n  // verify-access body so the backend can auto-populate `kya_counterparty.\n  // sdk_version` for the calling endpoint. Body field (not User-Agent\n  // header) is the canonical channel — works in Node, browser, behind\n  // Cloudflare, and across SDK bundlers without environment-specific\n  // header gymnastics. Backend's `validation.ts:verifyAccessSchema`\n  // accepts the semver regex; the auto-pop logic is forward-only.\n  body.sdkVersion = SDK_VERSION;\n\n  // Forward caller metadata when present. Merges the legacy top-level\n  // clientIp/userAgent into the nested block for backward compatibility.\n  if (requestData.callerMetadata || requestData.clientIp || requestData.userAgent) {\n    const meta = {\n      ...(requestData.clientIp && { sourceIp: requestData.clientIp }),\n      ...(requestData.userAgent && { userAgent: requestData.userAgent }),\n      ...requestData.callerMetadata,\n    };\n    if (Object.keys(meta).length > 0) body.callerMetadata = meta;\n  }\n\n  // Build headers\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n    'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n    ...config.customHeaders,\n  };\n\n  // verify-access requires authentication. Use ONLY the merchant's\n  // configured apiKey for outbound auth. Previously the caller's inbound\n  // Authorization header took priority, which pivoted the verify-access\n  // call to the caller's identity — letting an attacker who supplied\n  // their own Authorization header trigger verify-access calls under\n  // THEIR account and observe the resulting verdicts for arbitrary\n  // lookups they triggered via the merchant. Audit F-A1-10.\n  //\n  // The caller-supplied JWT (if any) is already extracted to\n  // credentials.jwt and travels in the verify-access request body so\n  // backend can evaluate it as the agent's identity claim — separate from\n  // the merchant-attribution auth on the outbound HTTPS call.\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    // Legacy header kept for compatibility with any middleware that reads it directly.\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  try {\n    // 4.0.0: hard timeout — without one, a backend that accepts the\n    // connection but never answers hangs the merchant's middleware and every\n    // inbound agent request behind it (observed live on a partner property).\n    // Timeouts land on the catch path below → api_error (fail-closed),\n    // NOT misconfig. The edge adapter races its own tighter withBudget.\n    const response = await sdkFetch(`${config.apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access`, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers,\n      body: JSON.stringify(body),\n      signal: AbortSignal.timeout(config.verifyTimeoutMs ?? 10_000),\n    });\n\n    const data = await response.json();\n\n    // v2.3.8 (defect #29): treat 410 Gone as a deterministic deactivated-endpoint\n    // signal. Older SDKs may treat any non-2xx as transient and retry; v2.3.8+\n    // surfaces it as a structured denial with `reason: 'endpoint_deactivated'`\n    // so callers can distinguish \"endpoint gone\" from \"endpoint denied this\".\n    if (response.status === 410) {\n      return {\n        success: true,\n        // 3.12.0 (Trust Record): keep the server-echoed attempt handle even on\n        // the synthesised 410 deny shape (echoed on every branch).\n        attemptId: typeof data?.attemptId === 'string' ? data.attemptId : undefined,\n        access: {\n          allowed: false,\n          reason: 'endpoint_deactivated',\n          failures: [\n            {\n              dimension: 'endpoint.deactivated',\n              message:\n                typeof data?.message === 'string' ? data.message : 'Endpoint has been deactivated',\n              guidance:\n                typeof data?.guidance === 'string'\n                  ? data.guidance\n                  : 'Reactivate via POST /api/endpoints/{id}/reactivate, or update the URL on the calling agent.',\n            },\n          ],\n        },\n      };\n    }\n\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      // 4.0.0: a 401 from verify-access can ONLY mean the backend rejected\n      // THIS INTEGRATION'S own API key — agent denials come back as 200 with\n      // access.allowed=false. Surface it as merchant-misconfig, not a\n      // transient api_error: it is deterministic until the operator rotates\n      // the key, and the \"retry with backoff\" template actively misleads.\n      // Backends ≥ this round also send code: api_key_* + remediation URLs.\n      if (response.status === 401) {\n        return {\n          success: false,\n          error: data.message || data.error || 'Integration API key rejected',\n          misconfig: true,\n          misconfigCode: typeof data?.code === 'string' ? data.code : undefined,\n          remediation:\n            data?.remediation && typeof data.remediation === 'object'\n              ? (data.remediation as { docsUrl?: string; manageUrl?: string })\n              : undefined,\n          correlationId: typeof data?.correlationId === 'string' ? data.correlationId : undefined,\n          attemptId: typeof data?.attemptId === 'string' ? data.attemptId : undefined,\n        };\n      }\n      // Round-10 (#47, O5): propagate correlationId on the error path too if\n      // the server happened to include one (some 5xx error envelopes carry\n      // it). Lets the SDK pass it through to the adapter onDenied handler.\n      return {\n        success: false,\n        error: data.message || data.error || `API returned ${response.status}`,\n        correlationId: typeof data?.correlationId === 'string' ? data.correlationId : undefined,\n        attemptId: typeof data?.attemptId === 'string' ? data.attemptId : undefined,\n      };\n    }\n\n    return data;\n  } catch (error) {\n    const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error';\n    return {\n      success: false,\n      error: `Failed to call verify-access API: ${message}`,\n    };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for a single verify() call (as opposed to GatewayConfig, which is\n * per-gateway). Mirrors the Java SDK's `verify(request, bypassCache)`.\n */\nexport interface VerifyOptions {\n  /**\n   * Skip the cache READ for this call so the request is guaranteed to reach\n   * the backend (the result is still written to the cache if cacheable).\n   * Used by the step-up hold-and-poll retry: the re-verify after an approval\n   * must hit the server to redeem the single-use approval.\n   */\n  bypassCache?: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Main verification function\n */\nexport async function verify(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  options?: VerifyOptions\n): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n  const mergedConfig = { ...DEFAULT_CONFIG, ...config };\n\n  // v2.5.0: read well-known URLs from cache (prefetched by adapter at middleware creation).\n  // Synchronous — never triggers a fetch. If cache is empty, guidance URLs are empty strings.\n  const urls = mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl\n    ? getCachedWellKnownUrls(mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl)\n    : undefined;\n\n  // One-time init self-test — fire-and-forget by default, never blocks verify().\n  // Audit F-A6-33: when GatewayConfig.strictInit is set, the init promise is\n  // awaited and any failure throws synchronously so callers learn about\n  // misconfigured apiBaseUrl on the first verify() call rather than silently\n  // running with broken auth.\n  if (!initCheckPerformed && !mergedConfig.disableInitChecks && mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl) {\n    if (mergedConfig.strictInit) {\n      await performInitCheck(\n        mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl,\n        mergedConfig.debug,\n        true,\n        mergedConfig.apiKey\n      );\n    } else {\n      void performInitCheck(\n        mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl,\n        mergedConfig.debug,\n        false,\n        mergedConfig.apiKey\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Deprecation warning for v2.3.0 removed config fields. Fires once per process.\n  if (\n    !deprecationWarningShown &&\n    (config.minTrustScore !== undefined || config.minTrustScoreForFull !== undefined)\n  ) {\n    deprecationWarningShown = true;\n    console.warn(\n      '[VerificationGateway] minTrustScore / minTrustScoreForFull are deprecated in v2.3.0 ' +\n        'and have no effect. Server is now the single source of truth for access decisions ' +\n        '(verified ID + runtime challenge + PDLSS + trust score). To gate access ' +\n        \"to an endpoint, configure the endpoint's trust_score_requirement server-side.\"\n    );\n  }\n\n  // v2.3.0: anonymous traffic no longer short-circuits here. We forward the\n  // request to the server with no agentId; the server applies the endpoint's\n  // unverifiedAgentPolicy and returns advisory. createGuidanceResponse remains\n  // as the offline fallback if the API itself fails (handled below).\n\n  // Check cache first. Caching on unless caller explicitly sets cacheTtl: 0\n  // to disable. Undefined falls through to the 60s default at cacheResult\n  // write time. options.bypassCache skips the read only (hold-and-poll retry\n  // must reach the backend to redeem its approval).\n  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0 && !options?.bypassCache) {\n    const cached = getCachedResult(request, mergedConfig.counterpartyId);\n    if (cached) {\n      if (mergedConfig.debug) {\n        console.log('[VerificationGateway] Returning cached result');\n      }\n      // 3.12.0 (Trust Record, §33.5 #3): attemptId is excluded from the cache\n      // key, so the stored result may carry a PRIOR attempt's id. Overwrite it\n      // with this request's own attemptId — or drop it when this request has\n      // none — a cached verdict must never leak another attempt's handle.\n      // Shallow clone: never mutate the stored entry (a concurrent holder of\n      // the same cached object may still be reading it).\n      const hit: VerificationResult = { ...cached };\n      if (request.attemptId) {\n        hit.attemptId = request.attemptId;\n      } else {\n        delete hit.attemptId;\n      }\n      return hit;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Inject counterparty info from config if not already set in request\n  const enrichedRequest = { ...request };\n  if (!enrichedRequest.counterpartyUrl && mergedConfig.counterpartyUrl) {\n    enrichedRequest.counterpartyUrl = mergedConfig.counterpartyUrl;\n  }\n  if (!enrichedRequest.counterpartyType && mergedConfig.counterpartyType) {\n    enrichedRequest.counterpartyType = mergedConfig.counterpartyType;\n  }\n\n  // Call the API\n  if (mergedConfig.debug) {\n    console.log('[VerificationGateway] Calling verify-access API');\n  }\n\n  const apiResponse = await callVerifyAccessAPI(mergedConfig, enrichedRequest);\n\n  // 3.6.0: the server emits a top-level denialReasons array on every deny\n  // path (same strings as the failure messages). Non-empty → authoritative;\n  // absent/empty → fall back to the client-side reconstructions below.\n  const rawServerDenialReasons = (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).denialReasons;\n  const serverDenialReasons =\n    Array.isArray(rawServerDenialReasons) && rawServerDenialReasons.length > 0\n      ? (rawServerDenialReasons as string[])\n      : undefined;\n\n  // Handle API errors\n  if (!apiResponse.success) {\n    // Round-10 (#47, O5): distinguish API errors from missing-credentials.\n    // The previous default tagged any failure with the \"register your\n    // agent\" template, which is misleading to a verified partner whose\n    // verify-access call hit a 500. The `api_error` source surfaces a\n    // typed `verify_access.api_error` failure entry instead.\n    // 4.0.0: a rejected merchant key gets its own source — deterministic\n    // misconfig must not wear the \"temporarily unavailable, retry\" template.\n    return createGuidanceResponse(mergedConfig, apiResponse.error, {\n      source: apiResponse.misconfig ? 'merchant_misconfig' : 'api_error',\n      correlationId: (apiResponse as { correlationId?: string }).correlationId,\n      attemptId: (apiResponse as { attemptId?: string }).attemptId,\n      remediation: apiResponse.remediation,\n      urls,\n    });\n  }\n\n  // Check access result\n  if (!apiResponse.access?.allowed) {\n    // v2.9.8 (defect M1): aggregated failures across every gate that\n    // denied. Surface them on the result so the integrator can see every\n    // blocker in one go instead of the previous fail-fast cascade.\n    const aggregatedFailures = (apiResponse.access as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)\n      ?.failures as Array<{ dimension: string; message: string; guidance?: string }> | undefined;\n    // Round-18 G4: backend denied access (PDLSS or other gate); identity status\n    // depends on whether the backend resolved the caller. Read from\n    // verificationContext.idVerified; default false if absent (anonymous or\n    // identity-fail paths land here too). policyAllowed is false by definition\n    // in this branch (apiResponse.access.allowed === false).\n    const idVerifiedFromBackend =\n      (apiResponse.verificationContext as { idVerified?: boolean } | undefined)?.idVerified ===\n      true;\n    const result: EnhancedVerificationResult = {\n      identityVerified: idVerifiedFromBackend,\n      policyAllowed: false,\n      // 3.6.0: the server now emits top-level denialReasons on every deny\n      // path — prefer it verbatim; the failure-message reconstruction remains\n      // as the fallback for older backends.\n      denialReasons:\n        serverDenialReasons ??\n        (aggregatedFailures && aggregatedFailures.length > 0\n          ? aggregatedFailures.map((f) => f.message)\n          : apiResponse.access?.reason\n            ? [apiResponse.access.reason]\n            : ['Access denied']),\n      failures: aggregatedFailures,\n      requiresStepUp: apiResponse.access?.requiresStepUp,\n      requiresApproval: apiResponse.access?.requiresApproval,\n      guidance: {\n        message: apiResponse.access?.reason || 'Access denied by PDLSS policy',\n        registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n        documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        // 5.1.0: anonymous callers land on this branch — steer MCP-hosted\n        // agents to the connector (this is what the edge deny body surfaces).\n        ...(mcpGuidance(urls) && { mcp: mcpGuidance(urls) }),\n      },\n      verifiedAt: new Date(),\n      // Extract sessionId so decisions can be recorded for denials too\n      sessionId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).sessionId as string | undefined,\n      // Anonymous traffic has no session → correlationId is the per-attempt\n      // linking key (the sessionId-equivalent for anonymous callers).\n      correlationId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).correlationId as string | undefined,\n      // 3.12.0 (Trust Record): server echoes the attempt-chain handle on\n      // every branch — denials included (the funnel outlives one deny).\n      attemptId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).attemptId as string | undefined,\n      recommendation: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>)\n        .recommendation as EnhancedVerificationResult['recommendation'],\n      recommendationReasons: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).recommendationReasons as\n        | string[]\n        | undefined,\n      stepUpApproval: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).stepUpApproval as\n        | StepUpApprovalInfo\n        | undefined,\n      settlement: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlement as\n        | SettlementArtifact\n        | undefined,\n      settlementOutcome: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlementOutcome as\n        | SettlementOutcomeInfo\n        | undefined,\n      // 5.5.0 self-settlement: merchant-only material — passes through to the\n      // MERCHANT caller only (bridge callers strip it before the agent plane).\n      settlementToken: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlementToken as\n        | MerchantSettlementToken\n        | undefined,\n      // 5.6.0: fulfilment contact — merchant-only lane, same strip rule.\n      fulfilment: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).fulfilment as FulfilmentInfo | undefined,\n    };\n\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  // Build successful result\n  const agent: VerifiedAgent | undefined = apiResponse.agent\n    ? {\n        astraId: apiResponse.agent.astraId,\n        name: apiResponse.agent.name,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.agent.trustScore,\n        trustLevel: getTrustLevel(apiResponse.agent.trustScore),\n        blockchainAnchored: apiResponse.agent.blockchainStatus === 'anchored',\n        status: apiResponse.agent.agentStatus as VerifiedAgent['status'],\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  const developer: VerifiedDeveloper | undefined = apiResponse.developer\n    ? {\n        astradId: apiResponse.developer.kyaOwnerId,\n        name: apiResponse.developer.fullName,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.developer.trustScore || 0,\n        verified: apiResponse.developer.identityVerified,\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  const organization: VerifiedOrganization | undefined = apiResponse.organization\n    ? {\n        name: apiResponse.organization.name,\n        verified: apiResponse.organization.verified,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.organization.trustScore,\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  // Verification context — structured \"why\" the merchant gets in v2.2.4+.\n  // Carries appliedPolicy (no UUIDs), pdlssCheck summary, dynamic trust score,\n  // and policy-driven attestations. Replaces the old over-sharing `pdlss` block.\n  const verificationContext = apiResponse.verificationContext;\n\n  const result: EnhancedVerificationResult = {\n    // 4.5.0 (probe F1): read idVerified from verificationContext with the\n    // SAME absent⇒false default as the deny branch. The previous `!== false`\n    // default manufactured `identityVerified: true` for anonymous\n    // allow_full/allow_partial/audit responses (which allow access but omit\n    // verificationContext entirely) — the \"anonymous caller labelled\n    // verified\" defect. Every authenticated success response has carried\n    // `verificationContext.idVerified: true` since v2.2.4, so a truth claim\n    // this load-bearing must never be defaulted on.\n    identityVerified:\n      (apiResponse.verificationContext as { idVerified?: boolean } | undefined)?.idVerified ===\n      true,\n    policyAllowed: true,\n    agent,\n    developer,\n    organization,\n    appliedPolicy: apiResponse.access?.appliedPolicy,\n    verificationContext,\n    requiresStepUp: apiResponse.access?.requiresStepUp,\n    requiresApproval: apiResponse.access?.requiresApproval,\n    verifiedAt: new Date(),\n    cacheTtl: mergedConfig.cacheTtl,\n    // Handshake Protocol v10 enhanced fields (present when backend returns them)\n    sessionId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).sessionId as string | undefined,\n    // v2.3.10 (defect #34, round-4): anonymous responses surface correlationId\n    // (no session row exists for unverified callers).\n    correlationId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).correlationId as string | undefined,\n    // 3.12.0 (Trust Record): server-echoed attempt-chain handle.\n    attemptId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).attemptId as string | undefined,\n    runtimeChallenge: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).runtimeChallenge as\n      | RuntimeChallengeResult\n      | undefined,\n    tokenGuidance: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).tokenGuidance as\n      | TokenGuidance\n      | undefined,\n    recommendation: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>)\n      .recommendation as EnhancedVerificationResult['recommendation'],\n    recommendationReasons: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).recommendationReasons as\n      | string[]\n      | undefined,\n    warningHeader: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).warningHeader as\n      | { name: string; value: string }\n      | undefined,\n    stepUpApproval: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).stepUpApproval as\n      | StepUpApprovalInfo\n      | undefined,\n    settlement: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlement as\n      | SettlementArtifact\n      | undefined,\n    settlementOutcome: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlementOutcome as\n      | SettlementOutcomeInfo\n      | undefined,\n    settlementToken: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlementToken as\n      | MerchantSettlementToken\n      | undefined,\n    // 5.6.0: fulfilment contact — merchant-only lane, same strip rule.\n    fulfilment: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).fulfilment as FulfilmentInfo | undefined,\n  };\n\n  // Enforce AstraSync recommendation\n  if (result.recommendation === 'deny') {\n    // Round-18 G4: recommendation-driven deny lands on the success-path\n    // construction (identity was resolved). Flip policy only — identity stays\n    // verified — so adapters return 403 (re-auth won't help; the policy\n    // decision is the blocker).\n    result.policyAllowed = false;\n    // 3.6.0: server-sent top-level denialReasons wins; recommendationReasons\n    // reconstruction is the fallback for older backends.\n    result.denialReasons = serverDenialReasons ??\n      result.recommendationReasons ?? ['Access denied by AstraSync recommendation'];\n    result.guidance = result.runtimeChallenge\n      ? {\n          message: `Verification failed: ${result.runtimeChallenge.reason || 'runtime challenge failed'}`,\n          registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n          documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        }\n      : {\n          message: result.recommendationReasons?.[0] || 'Access denied by AstraSync recommendation',\n          registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n          documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        };\n  } else if (result.recommendation === 'step_up_required') {\n    // The escalation signal rides on `requiresStepUp` / `stepUpApproval`, not\n    // on any masquerade of the (now-removed) access band.\n    result.requiresStepUp = true;\n    result.denialReasons = serverDenialReasons ??\n      result.recommendationReasons ?? ['Step-up verification required'];\n  }\n\n  // Cache the result. Never cache denials (agent may fix challenge endpoint\n  // and retry) NOR step-up escalations (3.6.0 — the same bug the Java SDK\n  // had: a cached step_up_required verdict keeps denying retries the owner\n  // has already approved, and its pollUrl goes stale once consumed/expired).\n  // Escalations stay uncached even when the caller pins an explicit cacheTtl.\n  const escalates =\n    result.requiresStepUp === true ||\n    result.requiresApproval === true ||\n    result.recommendation === 'step_up_required';\n  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0 && result.recommendation !== 'deny' && !escalates) {\n    cacheResult(request, result, mergedConfig.cacheTtl, mergedConfig.counterpartyId);\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Record a counterparty's grant/deny decision for a verification session.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function recordDecision(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  sessionId: string,\n  decision: 'granted' | 'denied',\n  reason?: string\n): Promise<void> {\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  await sdkFetch(`${config.apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access/${sessionId}/decision`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers,\n    body: JSON.stringify({ decision, reason }),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Report post-hoc consideration/outcome data for an attempt chain (Trust\n * Record). Use when the signal never reached verify-access: a\n * catalog served from a local cache, a transport-side deny (sku not found,\n * over budget), or a terminal outcome (settled / blocked on step-up).\n * Authenticated with the same credentials as verify(); the backend responds\n * 202 and folds the data into the attempt chain keyed by `attemptId`.\n *\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed, never throws.\n */\nexport async function reportAttempt(config: GatewayConfig, report: AttemptReport): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  // counterpartyId resolution mirrors reportUnregisteredAttempt: an explicit\n  // report value wins; otherwise attribute to the configured endpoint.\n  const body = {\n    ...report,\n    ...(!report.counterpartyId &&\n      config.counterpartyId && { counterpartyId: config.counterpartyId }),\n  };\n\n  await sdkFetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access/attempt-report`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers,\n    body: JSON.stringify(body),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Fetch the per-route policy for an endpoint from the AstraSync backend.\n * v2.9.7 moved policy authority into the dashboard — the SDK no longer\n * accepts `routes` from merchant-side source code, it fetches them from\n * here on init (and refreshes periodically).\n *\n * Returns `null` when the request fails for any reason — the caller decides\n * how to fall back (the middleware allows-all when no policy is loaded so\n * a misconfigured init doesn't take down the merchant's API).\n */\nexport async function fetchRoutes(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  counterpartyId: string\n): Promise<RouteAccessConfigShape[] | null> {\n  if (!counterpartyId) return null;\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n  try {\n    const response = await sdkFetch(\n      `${config.apiBaseUrl}/endpoints/${encodeURIComponent(counterpartyId)}/routes`,\n      { method: 'GET', headers }\n    );\n    if (!response.ok) return null;\n    const body = (await response.json()) as { data?: { routes?: RouteAccessConfigShape[] } };\n    return body.data?.routes ?? [];\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Minimal shape of an EndpointRoute as the SDK consumes it. Mirrors the\n * server's `EndpointRoute` type and the SDK's `RouteAccessConfig` — same\n * JSON moves between server and SDK unchanged.\n */\nexport interface RouteAccessConfigShape {\n  pattern: string;\n  method: string;\n  /** Pass through unenforced (observe). Replaces `minAccessLevel: 'none'`. */\n  observe?: boolean;\n  minTrustScore?: number;\n  requiredPurposes?: string[];\n  allowedPurposes?: string[];\n  allowedJurisdictions?: string[];\n  maxDuration?: number;\n  maxTransactionValue?: number;\n  requirePurpose?: boolean;\n  /** Send-mapping — see RouteAccessConfig in types.ts. */\n  purpose?: string;\n  action?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify an agent AND automatically record the grant/deny decision.\n *\n * This is the recommended entry point for counterparties that call verify()\n * directly (e.g. MCP servers) rather than using createMiddleware().\n * It adds createSession: true, then fire-and-forgets the decision.\n */\nexport async function verifyAndRecord(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  options?: VerifyOptions\n): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n  const mergedConfig = { ...DEFAULT_CONFIG, ...config };\n  const result = await verify(mergedConfig, { ...request, createSession: true }, options);\n  const sessionId = (result as EnhancedVerificationResult).sessionId;\n\n  if (sessionId) {\n    // Round-18 G4: a session is \"granted\" only if identity verified AND\n    // policy allowed; either failing is a deny.\n    if (result.identityVerified && result.policyAllowed) {\n      recordDecision(mergedConfig, sessionId, 'granted').catch(() => {});\n    } else {\n      recordDecision(mergedConfig, sessionId, 'denied', result.denialReasons?.[0]).catch(() => {});\n    }\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Report an unregistered agent attempt (no AstraSync credentials).\n * Called by SDK adapters when an agent is redirected to /docs/agent-access.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function reportUnregisteredAttempt(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  data: {\n    /**\n     * 3.6.0: optional — the backend attributes by counterpartyId first (sent\n     * from config below) and requires at least ONE of counterpartyId/URL.\n     * A null/undefined URL is omitted from the body, not sent as null.\n     */\n    counterpartyUrl?: string;\n    counterpartyType?: string;\n    sourceIp?: string;\n    userAgent?: string;\n    requestPath?: string;\n    requestMethod?: string;\n    /**\n     * VI uplift Part 3 — attempt-chain handle (`att_<32hex>`, from the\n     * X-Astra-Attempt-Id header or an `?astra_attempt=` deep link). Joins\n     * the beacon into the agent's research chain. Attribution only.\n     */\n    attemptId?: string;\n    /** First-class referer (traffic-source reporting). */\n    referer?: string;\n    /** The caller's Accept header (surface-classifier input). */\n    accept?: string;\n    /** Self-declared platform from X-Astra-Source (attribution, never trust). */\n    declaredSource?: string;\n    /**\n     * 3.9.0 — edge-adapter evidence fields, persisted into the\n     * event's eventData by the backend: `protocol` = detected transport/\n     * credential protocol; `evidence` = light crypto-free detection detail.\n     */\n    protocol?: string;\n    evidence?: Record<string, unknown>;\n    /**\n     * Maximal metadata capture — the full sanitised metadata for an\n     * unregistered caller (every signal legitimately visible on the wire).\n     * Persisted into eventData; feeds platform attribution and (via\n     * correlationId) registration auto-fill. Fire-and-forget, so free.\n     */\n    observedMetadata?: ObservedMetadata;\n  }\n): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n\n  const { counterpartyUrl, ...rest } = data;\n  const body = {\n    ...rest,\n    ...(counterpartyUrl && { counterpartyUrl }),\n    ...(config.counterpartyId && { counterpartyId: config.counterpartyId }),\n  };\n\n  await sdkFetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/verification-activity/unregistered-attempt`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n    body: JSON.stringify(body),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Report a counterparty-side PDLSS pre-check failure.\n * Called by SDK adapters when the agent's requested PDLSS exceeds\n * counterparty-defined maximums BEFORE calling verify-access.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function reportCounterpartyPreCheckFailure(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  data: {\n    agentId: string;\n    counterpartyUrl: string;\n    counterpartyType?: string;\n    failures: Array<{\n      field: string;\n      requested: string | number;\n      limit: string | number | string[];\n      message: string;\n    }>;\n    requestPath?: string;\n    requestMethod?: string;\n  }\n): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n\n  await sdkFetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/verification-activity/counterparty-pre-check-failure`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n    body: JSON.stringify(data),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Quick verification — checks credentials and policy in one call.\n *\n * The return shape mirrors `VerificationResult`'s split — partners\n * writing custom handlers around `quickVerify` get the same identity/policy\n * distinction as those calling `verify()` directly. Map to HTTP status the\n * same way: `!identityVerified` → 401; `identityVerified && !policyAllowed`\n * → 403.\n */\nexport async function quickVerify(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  credentials: AgentCredentials\n): Promise<{\n  identityVerified: boolean;\n  policyAllowed: boolean;\n  reason?: string;\n}> {\n  const result = await verify(config, {\n    credentials,\n    purpose: 'verification',\n  });\n\n  return {\n    identityVerified: result.identityVerified,\n    policyAllowed: result.policyAllowed,\n    reason: result.denialReasons?.[0],\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Single source-of-truth for the SDK's\n * package version emitted on verify-access bodies (and any future\n * telemetry). Bumped alongside `package.json#version` on every release.\n *\n * Why a constant rather than `import pkg from '../package.json'`:\n * - `tsconfig.json` sets `rootDir: ./src`; importing the sibling\n *   package.json fails the build with \"outside rootDir\".\n * - Build-time string replacement (tsup `define`, esbuild banner, etc.)\n *   adds toolchain coupling for a trivial gain.\n * - Embedded readonly constant works in every environment (Node, browser,\n *   bundlers, Deno) without runtime fs / network access.\n *\n * Release discipline: a CI lint can grep `package.json#version` against\n * this constant if the two ever diverge in the wild. A manual bump\n * is fine — bumping both in the release-ceremony commit keeps them\n * lockstep.\n */\nexport const SDK_VERSION = '5.9.0';\n","/**\n * Shared outbound-HTTP wrapper — every request the SDK makes to the\n * AstraSync backend (or anywhere else) goes through `sdkFetch` so it\n * carries an identifying User-Agent.\n *\n * Why: Node's global fetch defaults to `user-agent: node`, which is\n * indistinguishable from every other Node client on the wire. Visit\n * Intelligence observed our own SDK/beacon traffic as anonymous \"node\"\n * visits. Self-identification is the platform's own medicine.\n *\n * Browser note: some browsers filter the User-Agent request header\n * silently (never throwing), so this is a no-op there — which is correct:\n * in a browser the page's real UA is the honest identity.\n */\n\nimport { SDK_VERSION } from './version';\n\nexport const SDK_USER_AGENT = `astrasync-sdk/${SDK_VERSION}`;\n\n/**\n * Add the SDK User-Agent without changing the SHAPE of the caller's headers\n * (plain records stay plain records) — interceptors, adapters, and tests\n * read `init.headers` as a record, and `Headers` would also lowercase names.\n */\nfunction withUserAgent(initHeaders: HeadersInit | undefined): HeadersInit {\n  if (!initHeaders) return { 'user-agent': SDK_USER_AGENT };\n  if (initHeaders instanceof Headers) {\n    const copy = new Headers(initHeaders);\n    if (!copy.has('user-agent')) copy.set('user-agent', SDK_USER_AGENT);\n    return copy;\n  }\n  if (Array.isArray(initHeaders)) {\n    const has = initHeaders.some(([name]) => name.toLowerCase() === 'user-agent');\n    return has ? initHeaders : [...initHeaders, ['user-agent', SDK_USER_AGENT]];\n  }\n  const has = Object.keys(initHeaders).some((name) => name.toLowerCase() === 'user-agent');\n  return has ? initHeaders : { 'user-agent': SDK_USER_AGENT, ...initHeaders };\n}\n\nexport const sdkFetch: typeof fetch = (input, init) =>\n  fetch(input, { ...init, headers: withUserAgent(init?.headers) });\n","/**\n * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway — Trust Level helpers.\n *\n * SDK 5.0.0: the `accessLevel` band (`none`/`restricted`/`read-only`/`standard`/\n * `full`/`internal`) was removed entirely — it never gated the access decision\n * (the server does, from a verified ID + runtime challenge + PDLSS match + trust\n * score). What remains here is the coarse trust-level badge derived from the\n * numeric trust score, used only for display.\n */\n\nimport type { TrustLevel } from './types';\n\n/**\n * Trust level score ranges\n */\nexport const TRUST_LEVEL_RANGES: Record<TrustLevel, { min: number; max: number }> = {\n  BRONZE: { min: 0, max: 39 },\n  SILVER: { min: 40, max: 59 },\n  GOLD: { min: 60, max: 79 },\n  PLATINUM: { min: 80, max: 100 },\n};\n\n/**\n * Determine trust level from score\n */\nexport function getTrustLevel(score: number): TrustLevel {\n  if (score >= 80) return 'PLATINUM';\n  if (score >= 60) return 'GOLD';\n  if (score >= 40) return 'SILVER';\n  return 'BRONZE';\n}\n","import { sdkFetch } from './http';\n/**\n * SDK-side discovery of canonical platform URLs via `/.well-known/agentic-commerce`.\n *\n * Fire-and-forget pre-fetch at middleware creation; first verify() awaits\n * the in-flight promise if it hasn't resolved. 60-minute TTL with\n * stale-while-revalidate background refresh.\n */\n\nexport interface WellKnownAgenticCommerce {\n  registrationUrl: string;\n  documentationUrl: string;\n  verifyAccessUrl: string;\n  /** 5.1.0: hosted AstraSync MCP bridge endpoint (absent on self-hosted backends). */\n  mcpEndpoint?: string;\n  /** 5.1.0: bridge connector-discovery doc (absent on self-hosted backends). */\n  mcpDiscoveryUrl?: string;\n}\n\ninterface CacheEntry {\n  data: WellKnownAgenticCommerce;\n  fetchedAt: number;\n}\n\nconst CACHE_TTL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 60 minutes\n\nconst cache = new Map<string, CacheEntry>();\nconst inflight = new Map<string, Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce>>();\n\nfunction wellKnownUrl(apiBaseUrl: string): string {\n  // apiBaseUrl is typically 'https://astrasync.ai/api' — strip the /api suffix\n  // to get the platform root, then append /.well-known/agentic-commerce.\n  const base = apiBaseUrl.replace(/\\/api\\/?$/, '');\n  return `${base}/.well-known/agentic-commerce`;\n}\n\nasync function fetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl: string): Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce> {\n  const url = wellKnownUrl(apiBaseUrl);\n  const response = await sdkFetch(url, {\n    method: 'GET',\n    headers: { Accept: 'application/json' },\n    signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5000),\n  });\n  if (!response.ok) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `AstraSync platform must expose /.well-known/agentic-commerce; ` +\n        `got ${response.status} from ${url}. SDK cannot initialise without it.`\n    );\n  }\n  const data = (await response.json()) as Record<string, unknown>;\n  if (!data.registrationUrl || !data.documentationUrl || !data.verifyAccessUrl) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `/.well-known/agentic-commerce response missing required fields ` +\n        `(registrationUrl, documentationUrl, verifyAccessUrl).`\n    );\n  }\n  return data as unknown as WellKnownAgenticCommerce;\n}\n\n/**\n * Start a background fetch. Returns the promise for callers that need\n * to await it (first verify() call).\n */\nexport function prefetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl: string): Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce> {\n  const existing = inflight.get(apiBaseUrl);\n  if (existing) return existing;\n\n  const promise = fetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl)\n    .then((data) => {\n      cache.set(apiBaseUrl, { data, fetchedAt: Date.now() });\n      inflight.delete(apiBaseUrl);\n      return data;\n    })\n    .catch((err) => {\n      inflight.delete(apiBaseUrl);\n      throw err;\n    });\n\n  inflight.set(apiBaseUrl, promise);\n  return promise;\n}\n\n/**\n * Get cached well-known URLs. If stale, triggers a background refresh\n * and returns stale data (stale-while-revalidate). If no cache exists,\n * awaits the in-flight fetch or starts a new one.\n */\nexport async function getWellKnownUrls(apiBaseUrl: string): Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce> {\n  const entry = cache.get(apiBaseUrl);\n\n  if (entry) {\n    if (Date.now() - entry.fetchedAt > CACHE_TTL_MS) {\n      // Stale — trigger background refresh, return stale data\n      prefetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl).catch(() => {\n        // Background refresh failed — stale data remains until next request\n      });\n    }\n    return entry.data;\n  }\n\n  // No cache — must await\n  const pending = inflight.get(apiBaseUrl);\n  if (pending) return pending;\n\n  return prefetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl);\n}\n\n/**\n * Synchronous cache read — returns cached URLs or undefined.\n * Never triggers a fetch. Used by verify() to avoid extra HTTP calls\n * in the hot path; adapters are responsible for prefetching.\n */\nexport function getCachedWellKnownUrls(apiBaseUrl: string): WellKnownAgenticCommerce | undefined {\n  return cache.get(apiBaseUrl)?.data;\n}\n\n/** Reset cache — for testing only. */\nexport function _resetWellKnownCache(): void {\n  cache.clear();\n  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package/dist/verify.mjs

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 // src/version.ts
-var SDK_VERSION = "5.7.0";
+var SDK_VERSION = "5.9.0";
 
 // src/http.ts
 var SDK_USER_AGENT = `astrasync-sdk/${SDK_VERSION}`;
@@ -508,7 +508,7 @@ async function verify(config, request, options) {
     name: apiResponse.agent.name,
     trustScore: apiResponse.agent.trustScore,
     trustLevel: getTrustLevel(apiResponse.agent.trustScore),
-    blockchainVerified: apiResponse.agent.blockchainStatus === "verified",
+    blockchainAnchored: apiResponse.agent.blockchainStatus === "anchored",
     status: apiResponse.agent.agentStatus
   } : void 0;
   const developer = apiResponse.developer ? {