@astrasyncai/verification-gateway 5.3.0 → 5.4.1

package/dist/{types-CA1ZhoaJ.d.ts → types-W-A326w3.d.mts}

@@ -1,4 +1,54 @@
-import { ObservedMetadata } from './metadata-capture.js';
+/**
+ * The captured, sanitised view of an inbound agent's request metadata. Attached
+ * to verify-access / beacon payloads as `callerMetadata.observedMetadata`.
+ */
+interface ObservedMetadata {
+    /** Header name → value, secrets removed, verbatim otherwise. */
+    headers: Record<string, string>;
+    /**
+     * Safe key-format prefix of a credential header (e.g. `sk-ant-api03`,
+     * `sk-proj`, `AIza`) — a platform signal, NEVER the secret. Absent if no
+     * credential header was present or none matched a known format.
+     */
+    apiKeyFormat?: string;
+    /**
+     * The subset of `headers` that are known platform-signal headers
+     * (`openai-organization`, `x-goog-user-project`, `anthropic-version`, …),
+     * pulled out for convenient detection + display. Values are the same
+     * sanitised strings as in `headers`.
+     */
+    platformHeaders?: Record<string, string>;
+    /**
+     * Connection-layer signals (IP, ASN, country, TLS version, HTTP version,
+     * device class, TLS fingerprint). Edge adapters populate this from the
+     * platform's native connection surface — the authoritative source. SDK
+     * adapters populate it as a fallback via {@link deriveConnectionFromHeaders}
+     * when a CDN in front of the merchant injected the equivalent headers;
+     * absent when neither source had anything.
+     */
+    connection?: Record<string, string>;
+    /**
+     * Number of cookie pairs the caller sent. The `cookie` header VALUE is a
+     * secret and is always dropped; the COUNT is a client-shape signal
+     * (browsers carry cookies, most automation carries none) that would
+     * otherwise be unobservable downstream. Absent when no cookie header
+     * arrived.
+     */
+    cookieCount?: number;
+    /**
+     * Query-string parameter NAMES (deduped, lowercased) — values are NEVER
+     * captured (they routinely carry OAuth codes, tokens, and PII, and no
+     * deny-list is complete). Names alone fingerprint client shape. Populated
+     * by the edge path, which sees the raw query string.
+     */
+    queryKeys?: string[];
+    /**
+     * Version of the capture semantics this object was produced under — see
+     * {@link CAPTURE_SCHEMA_VERSION}. Optional for backward compatibility with
+     * metadata captured before the field existed.
+     */
+    schemaVersion?: number;
+}
 
 /**
  * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway Types
@@ -228,62 +278,6 @@ interface AppliedPolicy {
     boundaryName: string;
     policyVersion: string;
 }
-/**
- * Structured "why" of a verification decision the merchant receives.
- *
- * Tells the merchant whether the agent ID was verified, whether the runtime
- * challenge succeeded, whether the request was within PDLSS, and the agent's
- * actual dynamic trust score — without exposing thresholds, scope lists, or
- * other-tenant counterparty membership.
- *
- * `attestations` is empty unless the calling endpoint's access policy
- * declared `required_attestations`. Each attestation carries a blockchain
- * proof reference (or, in the future, a full ZKP) so the merchant can verify
- * the underlying claim without seeing the raw underlying data (e.g. the
- * Persona/ConnectID transaction).
- */
-interface VerificationContext {
-    idVerified: boolean;
-    runtimeChallenge: {
-        status: 'passed' | 'skipped' | 'failed' | 'timeout' | 'not_supported';
-        checkedAt: string | null;
-    };
-    pdlssCheck: {
-        /** Outcome only — no thresholds disclosed. */
-        result: 'within' | 'exceeded' | 'denied' | 'not_evaluated';
-        /** Category-level only. */
-        purpose: 'approved' | 'denied';
-        scope: 'approved' | 'denied';
-    };
-    /** Live composite score at decision time (not the stale snapshot column). */
-    dynamicTrustScore: number;
-    attestations: Attestation[];
-}
-/**
- * Attestation returned in `VerificationContext.attestations`.
- *
- * `proofType: 'reference'` (interim) means `proof` is a blockchain txn hash
- * the merchant CAN verify against on-chain records but doesn't HAVE to.
- * `proofType: 'zkp'` (future) means `proof` is a zero-knowledge proof.
- * Wire shape is forward-compatible — clients reading 'reference' today won't
- * break when it becomes 'zkp'.
- */
-interface Attestation {
-    /** Attestation kind (e.g. `verified_human_party`). */
-    type: string;
-    status: 'passed' | 'failed';
-    /**
-     * ISO-8601 timestamp of the underlying check (when KYC/IDV/AML actually ran).
-     * Merchants compare this against their `maxAgeDays` requirement on the
-     * endpoint to enforce per-attestation freshness. Distinct from `validUntil`:
-     * `checkedAt` is when the data was sourced; `validUntil` is when the issuer
-     * stops vouching for it.
-     */
-    checkedAt: string;
-    validUntil?: string;
-    proofType: 'reference' | 'zkp';
-    proof: string;
-}
 /**
  * Guidance information for unverified agents
  */
@@ -687,42 +681,6 @@ interface ConsiderationSet {
     /** True when `items` was truncated to the cap. */
     truncated?: boolean;
 }
-/**
- * Terminal (or notable) outcome of an attempt chain, reported post-hoc via
- * `reportAttempt`. Mirrors the backend's `attemptReportSchema.outcome` 1:1.
- */
-interface AttemptOutcome {
-    kind: 'settled' | 'blocked_step_up' | 'failed' | 'high_value_action';
-    /** Dotted ACTION-axis token for the failure class, e.g. `commerce.catalog.sku_not_found` (≤128 chars). */
-    dimension?: string;
-    /** Human-readable detail (≤512 chars). */
-    reason?: string;
-    /** For `high_value_action`: the non-payment conversion type. */
-    actionType?: 'lead' | 'signup' | 'application' | 'enquiry';
-    /** Value in MAJOR units (settled amount / estimated action value), non-negative. */
-    value?: number;
-    /** ISO-4217 or settlement-asset code (3–6 alphanumeric chars). */
-    currency?: string;
-    /** Settlement rail / mandate type, e.g. `ap2.payment_mandate` (≤64 chars). */
-    rail?: string;
-}
-/**
- * Body for `POST /agents/verify-access/attempt-report`:
- * post-hoc consideration/outcome data for an attempt chain that a
- * verify-access call couldn't carry (e.g. the catalog was served from a local
- * cache, or the deny happened transport-side). Must carry `considerationSet`
- * and/or `outcome`.
- */
-interface AttemptReport {
-    /** Attempt-chain handle — `att_` + 32 lowercase hex. */
-    attemptId: string;
-    /** Merchant/endpoint the attempt targeted; falls back to `config.counterpartyId`. */
-    counterpartyId?: string;
-    /** Canonical ASTRA-* id of the acting agent, when known. */
-    agentId?: string;
-    considerationSet?: ConsiderationSet;
-    outcome?: AttemptOutcome;
-}
 /**
  * Raw commerce-protocol artifacts as verify-access accepts them (backend
  * `validation.ts` → `commerceArtifacts`). All optional; send what was
@@ -788,51 +746,6 @@ interface CommerceArtifactsPayload {
         secret: string;
     };
 }
-/**
- * Route-specific access configuration
- */
-interface RouteAccessConfig {
-    /** Route pattern (supports wildcards) */
-    pattern: string;
-    /** HTTP method (or * for all) */
-    method: string | '*';
-    /**
-     * Pass this route through unenforced (observe). The middleware skips gating
-     * on the server decision; with `evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed` set it still
-     * calls verify-access for the audit trail and populates `req.agentVerification`.
-     * Replaces the old `minAccessLevel: 'none'` sentinel (SDK 5.0.0).
-     */
-    observe?: boolean;
-    /** Minimum trust score required (optional) */
-    minTrustScore?: number;
-    /** Required purposes (optional, agent must declare one of these) */
-    requiredPurposes?: string[];
-    /** Counterparty-defined PDLSS maximums — agent requests exceeding these are rejected before calling AstraSync */
-    /** Maximum session duration in seconds the counterparty will allow */
-    maxDuration?: number;
-    /** Whitelist of allowed purposes — agent's declared purpose must be in this list */
-    allowedPurposes?: string[];
-    /** Whitelist of allowed jurisdictions */
-    allowedJurisdictions?: string[];
-    /** Maximum transaction value for this route */
-    maxTransactionValue?: number;
-    /**
-     * Backend-evaluator strict mode: when true AND
-     * `allowedPurposes` is non-empty, verify-access denies requests arriving
-     * WITHOUT a purpose. Configured in the dashboard; passed through here.
-     */
-    requirePurpose?: boolean;
-    /**
-     * SEND-mapping — not an allow-list: the PDLSS tokens the
-     * middleware STAMPS on verify-access calls matching this route, replacing
-     * the generic `data`/`data.*` method-table fallback. `purpose` = bare
-     * category noun (`shopping`, `trading`); `action` = dotted verb
-     * (`shopping.search`, `trading.execute`). Authoritative over agent-supplied
-     * headers — the dashboard is merchant policy, the way MCP toolGates are.
-     */
-    purpose?: string;
-    action?: string;
-}
 /**
  * Express middleware options.
  *
@@ -1001,73 +914,6 @@ interface SDKOptions extends GatewayConfig {
         backoffMs: number;
     };
 }
-/**
- * Token guidance returned from verify-access.
- *
- * `recommendedRateLimit` carries `requestsPerMinute` and `currency` only.
- * `maxTransactionValue` was removed in v2.2.4 — it leaked the agent's
- * spending headroom to the merchant, which is a price-discrimination signal
- * (a merchant could see the agent's autonomous threshold and price the
- * transaction just under it to capture surplus). The agent's SDK receives
- * its own limits separately for client-side budgeting; the merchant's
- * decision doesn't need amount info.
- */
-interface TokenGuidance {
-    recommendedScopes: string[];
-    recommendedTtlSeconds: number;
-    recommendedRateLimit?: {
-        requestsPerMinute: number;
-        currency?: string;
-    };
-    jurisdictionConstraints?: string[];
-    delegationAllowed: boolean;
-    maxDelegationDepth?: number;
-    safetyDefaults: {
-        writePrivilegesRequested: boolean;
-        shortLivedTokenRecommended: boolean;
-        scopeConvention: 'astrasync-canonical';
-    };
-}
-/**
- * Runtime challenge result
- */
-interface RuntimeChallengeResult {
-    status: 'passed' | 'failed' | 'skipped' | 'timeout' | 'not_supported';
-    challengeId?: string;
-    challengeSentAt?: string;
-    responseReceivedAt?: string;
-    latencyMs?: number;
-    reason?: string;
-}
-/**
- * Enhanced verification result (extends existing VerificationResult).
- *
- * - `appliedPolicy`: surfaces the boundary name + policy version that drove
- *   the decision (no UUIDs).
- * - `verificationContext`: structured "why" for the merchant — see
- *   `VerificationContext` for the full shape.
- */
-interface EnhancedVerificationResult extends VerificationResult {
-    sessionId?: string;
-    runtimeChallenge?: RuntimeChallengeResult;
-    tokenGuidance?: TokenGuidance;
-    appliedPolicy?: AppliedPolicy;
-    verificationContext?: VerificationContext;
-    recommendation?: 'grant' | 'deny' | 'step_up_required' | 'audit';
-    recommendationReasons?: string[];
-    /**
-     * v2.3.8: when an endpoint's `unverifiedAgentPolicy` is `'audit'`, the
-     * server returns the warning header to relay to the merchant's response.
-     * The Express + MCP middleware lift this into `res.setHeader(name, value)`
-     * before calling `next()`. Distinct vocabulary from the PDLSS-scope
-     * outbound `unverifiedCounterpartyPolicy: 'warn'` so raw JSON config can't
-     * conflate the two.
-     */
-    warningHeader?: {
-        name: string;
-        value: string;
-    };
-}
 /**
  * Cross-protocol credential config
  */
@@ -1088,10 +934,6 @@ interface AstraSyncCredentials {
         };
     };
 }
-/**
- * Protocol transport type
- */
-type ProtocolTransport = 'http' | 'a2a' | 'mcp';
 /**
  * Verification interstitial UI props (the React overlay shown to unverified
  * agents; user-visible title stays "AstraSync Agent Verification").
@@ -1116,7 +958,5 @@ interface VerificationInterstitialProps {
     /** Custom styles */
     className?: string;
 }
-/** @deprecated Renamed VerificationInterstitialProps in 4.1.0; alias removed next major. */
-type CommerceShieldProps = VerificationInterstitialProps;
 
-export type { AccessFailure as A, CallerMetadata as C, EnhancedVerificationResult as E, FiatSettlementBinding as F, GatewayConfig as G, NextJsMiddlewareOptions as N, PDLSSInfo as P, RouteAccessConfig as R, SDKOptions as S, TokenGuidance as T, VerificationInterstitialProps as V, AgentCredentials as a, AstraSyncCredentials as b, AttemptOutcome as c, AttemptReport as d, CommerceArtifactsPayload as e, CommerceShieldProps as f, ConsiderationItem as g, ConsiderationSet as h, CounterpartyType as i, ExpressMiddlewareOptions as j, GuidanceInfo as k, ProtocolTransport as l, RuntimeChallengeResult as m, SettlementArtifact as n, SettlementArtifactBinding as o, SettlementArtifactBindingBase as p, StablecoinSettlementBinding as q, StepUpApprovalInfo as r, StepUpApprovalStatus as s, StepUpOutcome as t, TrustLevel as u, VerificationRequest as v, VerificationResult as w, VerifiedAgent as x, VerifiedDeveloper as y, VerifiedOrganization as z };
+export type { AgentCredentials as A, ExpressMiddlewareOptions as E, GatewayConfig as G, NextJsMiddlewareOptions as N, SDKOptions as S, TrustLevel as T, VerificationInterstitialProps as V, AstraSyncCredentials as a, GuidanceInfo as b, VerificationRequest as c, VerificationResult as d };

package/dist/{types-eSqHyFFH.d.mts → types-W-A326w3.d.ts}

@@ -1,4 +1,54 @@
-import { ObservedMetadata } from './metadata-capture.mjs';
+/**
+ * The captured, sanitised view of an inbound agent's request metadata. Attached
+ * to verify-access / beacon payloads as `callerMetadata.observedMetadata`.
+ */
+interface ObservedMetadata {
+    /** Header name → value, secrets removed, verbatim otherwise. */
+    headers: Record<string, string>;
+    /**
+     * Safe key-format prefix of a credential header (e.g. `sk-ant-api03`,
+     * `sk-proj`, `AIza`) — a platform signal, NEVER the secret. Absent if no
+     * credential header was present or none matched a known format.
+     */
+    apiKeyFormat?: string;
+    /**
+     * The subset of `headers` that are known platform-signal headers
+     * (`openai-organization`, `x-goog-user-project`, `anthropic-version`, …),
+     * pulled out for convenient detection + display. Values are the same
+     * sanitised strings as in `headers`.
+     */
+    platformHeaders?: Record<string, string>;
+    /**
+     * Connection-layer signals (IP, ASN, country, TLS version, HTTP version,
+     * device class, TLS fingerprint). Edge adapters populate this from the
+     * platform's native connection surface — the authoritative source. SDK
+     * adapters populate it as a fallback via {@link deriveConnectionFromHeaders}
+     * when a CDN in front of the merchant injected the equivalent headers;
+     * absent when neither source had anything.
+     */
+    connection?: Record<string, string>;
+    /**
+     * Number of cookie pairs the caller sent. The `cookie` header VALUE is a
+     * secret and is always dropped; the COUNT is a client-shape signal
+     * (browsers carry cookies, most automation carries none) that would
+     * otherwise be unobservable downstream. Absent when no cookie header
+     * arrived.
+     */
+    cookieCount?: number;
+    /**
+     * Query-string parameter NAMES (deduped, lowercased) — values are NEVER
+     * captured (they routinely carry OAuth codes, tokens, and PII, and no
+     * deny-list is complete). Names alone fingerprint client shape. Populated
+     * by the edge path, which sees the raw query string.
+     */
+    queryKeys?: string[];
+    /**
+     * Version of the capture semantics this object was produced under — see
+     * {@link CAPTURE_SCHEMA_VERSION}. Optional for backward compatibility with
+     * metadata captured before the field existed.
+     */
+    schemaVersion?: number;
+}
 
 /**
  * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway Types
@@ -228,62 +278,6 @@ interface AppliedPolicy {
     boundaryName: string;
     policyVersion: string;
 }
-/**
- * Structured "why" of a verification decision the merchant receives.
- *
- * Tells the merchant whether the agent ID was verified, whether the runtime
- * challenge succeeded, whether the request was within PDLSS, and the agent's
- * actual dynamic trust score — without exposing thresholds, scope lists, or
- * other-tenant counterparty membership.
- *
- * `attestations` is empty unless the calling endpoint's access policy
- * declared `required_attestations`. Each attestation carries a blockchain
- * proof reference (or, in the future, a full ZKP) so the merchant can verify
- * the underlying claim without seeing the raw underlying data (e.g. the
- * Persona/ConnectID transaction).
- */
-interface VerificationContext {
-    idVerified: boolean;
-    runtimeChallenge: {
-        status: 'passed' | 'skipped' | 'failed' | 'timeout' | 'not_supported';
-        checkedAt: string | null;
-    };
-    pdlssCheck: {
-        /** Outcome only — no thresholds disclosed. */
-        result: 'within' | 'exceeded' | 'denied' | 'not_evaluated';
-        /** Category-level only. */
-        purpose: 'approved' | 'denied';
-        scope: 'approved' | 'denied';
-    };
-    /** Live composite score at decision time (not the stale snapshot column). */
-    dynamicTrustScore: number;
-    attestations: Attestation[];
-}
-/**
- * Attestation returned in `VerificationContext.attestations`.
- *
- * `proofType: 'reference'` (interim) means `proof` is a blockchain txn hash
- * the merchant CAN verify against on-chain records but doesn't HAVE to.
- * `proofType: 'zkp'` (future) means `proof` is a zero-knowledge proof.
- * Wire shape is forward-compatible — clients reading 'reference' today won't
- * break when it becomes 'zkp'.
- */
-interface Attestation {
-    /** Attestation kind (e.g. `verified_human_party`). */
-    type: string;
-    status: 'passed' | 'failed';
-    /**
-     * ISO-8601 timestamp of the underlying check (when KYC/IDV/AML actually ran).
-     * Merchants compare this against their `maxAgeDays` requirement on the
-     * endpoint to enforce per-attestation freshness. Distinct from `validUntil`:
-     * `checkedAt` is when the data was sourced; `validUntil` is when the issuer
-     * stops vouching for it.
-     */
-    checkedAt: string;
-    validUntil?: string;
-    proofType: 'reference' | 'zkp';
-    proof: string;
-}
 /**
  * Guidance information for unverified agents
  */
@@ -687,42 +681,6 @@ interface ConsiderationSet {
     /** True when `items` was truncated to the cap. */
     truncated?: boolean;
 }
-/**
- * Terminal (or notable) outcome of an attempt chain, reported post-hoc via
- * `reportAttempt`. Mirrors the backend's `attemptReportSchema.outcome` 1:1.
- */
-interface AttemptOutcome {
-    kind: 'settled' | 'blocked_step_up' | 'failed' | 'high_value_action';
-    /** Dotted ACTION-axis token for the failure class, e.g. `commerce.catalog.sku_not_found` (≤128 chars). */
-    dimension?: string;
-    /** Human-readable detail (≤512 chars). */
-    reason?: string;
-    /** For `high_value_action`: the non-payment conversion type. */
-    actionType?: 'lead' | 'signup' | 'application' | 'enquiry';
-    /** Value in MAJOR units (settled amount / estimated action value), non-negative. */
-    value?: number;
-    /** ISO-4217 or settlement-asset code (3–6 alphanumeric chars). */
-    currency?: string;
-    /** Settlement rail / mandate type, e.g. `ap2.payment_mandate` (≤64 chars). */
-    rail?: string;
-}
-/**
- * Body for `POST /agents/verify-access/attempt-report`:
- * post-hoc consideration/outcome data for an attempt chain that a
- * verify-access call couldn't carry (e.g. the catalog was served from a local
- * cache, or the deny happened transport-side). Must carry `considerationSet`
- * and/or `outcome`.
- */
-interface AttemptReport {
-    /** Attempt-chain handle — `att_` + 32 lowercase hex. */
-    attemptId: string;
-    /** Merchant/endpoint the attempt targeted; falls back to `config.counterpartyId`. */
-    counterpartyId?: string;
-    /** Canonical ASTRA-* id of the acting agent, when known. */
-    agentId?: string;
-    considerationSet?: ConsiderationSet;
-    outcome?: AttemptOutcome;
-}
 /**
  * Raw commerce-protocol artifacts as verify-access accepts them (backend
  * `validation.ts` → `commerceArtifacts`). All optional; send what was
@@ -788,51 +746,6 @@ interface CommerceArtifactsPayload {
         secret: string;
     };
 }
-/**
- * Route-specific access configuration
- */
-interface RouteAccessConfig {
-    /** Route pattern (supports wildcards) */
-    pattern: string;
-    /** HTTP method (or * for all) */
-    method: string | '*';
-    /**
-     * Pass this route through unenforced (observe). The middleware skips gating
-     * on the server decision; with `evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed` set it still
-     * calls verify-access for the audit trail and populates `req.agentVerification`.
-     * Replaces the old `minAccessLevel: 'none'` sentinel (SDK 5.0.0).
-     */
-    observe?: boolean;
-    /** Minimum trust score required (optional) */
-    minTrustScore?: number;
-    /** Required purposes (optional, agent must declare one of these) */
-    requiredPurposes?: string[];
-    /** Counterparty-defined PDLSS maximums — agent requests exceeding these are rejected before calling AstraSync */
-    /** Maximum session duration in seconds the counterparty will allow */
-    maxDuration?: number;
-    /** Whitelist of allowed purposes — agent's declared purpose must be in this list */
-    allowedPurposes?: string[];
-    /** Whitelist of allowed jurisdictions */
-    allowedJurisdictions?: string[];
-    /** Maximum transaction value for this route */
-    maxTransactionValue?: number;
-    /**
-     * Backend-evaluator strict mode: when true AND
-     * `allowedPurposes` is non-empty, verify-access denies requests arriving
-     * WITHOUT a purpose. Configured in the dashboard; passed through here.
-     */
-    requirePurpose?: boolean;
-    /**
-     * SEND-mapping — not an allow-list: the PDLSS tokens the
-     * middleware STAMPS on verify-access calls matching this route, replacing
-     * the generic `data`/`data.*` method-table fallback. `purpose` = bare
-     * category noun (`shopping`, `trading`); `action` = dotted verb
-     * (`shopping.search`, `trading.execute`). Authoritative over agent-supplied
-     * headers — the dashboard is merchant policy, the way MCP toolGates are.
-     */
-    purpose?: string;
-    action?: string;
-}
 /**
  * Express middleware options.
  *
@@ -1001,73 +914,6 @@ interface SDKOptions extends GatewayConfig {
         backoffMs: number;
     };
 }
-/**
- * Token guidance returned from verify-access.
- *
- * `recommendedRateLimit` carries `requestsPerMinute` and `currency` only.
- * `maxTransactionValue` was removed in v2.2.4 — it leaked the agent's
- * spending headroom to the merchant, which is a price-discrimination signal
- * (a merchant could see the agent's autonomous threshold and price the
- * transaction just under it to capture surplus). The agent's SDK receives
- * its own limits separately for client-side budgeting; the merchant's
- * decision doesn't need amount info.
- */
-interface TokenGuidance {
-    recommendedScopes: string[];
-    recommendedTtlSeconds: number;
-    recommendedRateLimit?: {
-        requestsPerMinute: number;
-        currency?: string;
-    };
-    jurisdictionConstraints?: string[];
-    delegationAllowed: boolean;
-    maxDelegationDepth?: number;
-    safetyDefaults: {
-        writePrivilegesRequested: boolean;
-        shortLivedTokenRecommended: boolean;
-        scopeConvention: 'astrasync-canonical';
-    };
-}
-/**
- * Runtime challenge result
- */
-interface RuntimeChallengeResult {
-    status: 'passed' | 'failed' | 'skipped' | 'timeout' | 'not_supported';
-    challengeId?: string;
-    challengeSentAt?: string;
-    responseReceivedAt?: string;
-    latencyMs?: number;
-    reason?: string;
-}
-/**
- * Enhanced verification result (extends existing VerificationResult).
- *
- * - `appliedPolicy`: surfaces the boundary name + policy version that drove
- *   the decision (no UUIDs).
- * - `verificationContext`: structured "why" for the merchant — see
- *   `VerificationContext` for the full shape.
- */
-interface EnhancedVerificationResult extends VerificationResult {
-    sessionId?: string;
-    runtimeChallenge?: RuntimeChallengeResult;
-    tokenGuidance?: TokenGuidance;
-    appliedPolicy?: AppliedPolicy;
-    verificationContext?: VerificationContext;
-    recommendation?: 'grant' | 'deny' | 'step_up_required' | 'audit';
-    recommendationReasons?: string[];
-    /**
-     * v2.3.8: when an endpoint's `unverifiedAgentPolicy` is `'audit'`, the
-     * server returns the warning header to relay to the merchant's response.
-     * The Express + MCP middleware lift this into `res.setHeader(name, value)`
-     * before calling `next()`. Distinct vocabulary from the PDLSS-scope
-     * outbound `unverifiedCounterpartyPolicy: 'warn'` so raw JSON config can't
-     * conflate the two.
-     */
-    warningHeader?: {
-        name: string;
-        value: string;
-    };
-}
 /**
  * Cross-protocol credential config
  */
@@ -1088,10 +934,6 @@ interface AstraSyncCredentials {
         };
     };
 }
-/**
- * Protocol transport type
- */
-type ProtocolTransport = 'http' | 'a2a' | 'mcp';
 /**
  * Verification interstitial UI props (the React overlay shown to unverified
  * agents; user-visible title stays "AstraSync Agent Verification").
@@ -1116,7 +958,5 @@ interface VerificationInterstitialProps {
     /** Custom styles */
     className?: string;
 }
-/** @deprecated Renamed VerificationInterstitialProps in 4.1.0; alias removed next major. */
-type CommerceShieldProps = VerificationInterstitialProps;
 
-export type { AccessFailure as A, CallerMetadata as C, EnhancedVerificationResult as E, FiatSettlementBinding as F, GatewayConfig as G, NextJsMiddlewareOptions as N, PDLSSInfo as P, RouteAccessConfig as R, SDKOptions as S, TokenGuidance as T, VerificationInterstitialProps as V, AgentCredentials as a, AstraSyncCredentials as b, AttemptOutcome as c, AttemptReport as d, CommerceArtifactsPayload as e, CommerceShieldProps as f, ConsiderationItem as g, ConsiderationSet as h, CounterpartyType as i, ExpressMiddlewareOptions as j, GuidanceInfo as k, ProtocolTransport as l, RuntimeChallengeResult as m, SettlementArtifact as n, SettlementArtifactBinding as o, SettlementArtifactBindingBase as p, StablecoinSettlementBinding as q, StepUpApprovalInfo as r, StepUpApprovalStatus as s, StepUpOutcome as t, TrustLevel as u, VerificationRequest as v, VerificationResult as w, VerifiedAgent as x, VerifiedDeveloper as y, VerifiedOrganization as z };
+export type { AgentCredentials as A, ExpressMiddlewareOptions as E, GatewayConfig as G, NextJsMiddlewareOptions as N, SDKOptions as S, TrustLevel as T, VerificationInterstitialProps as V, AstraSyncCredentials as a, GuidanceInfo as b, VerificationRequest as c, VerificationResult as d };

package/dist/ui/index.d.mts

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
-import { V as VerificationInterstitialProps, w as VerificationResult, a as AgentCredentials, k as GuidanceInfo, u as TrustLevel } from '../types-eSqHyFFH.mjs';
-import '../metadata-capture.mjs';
+import { V as VerificationInterstitialProps, d as VerificationResult, A as AgentCredentials, b as GuidanceInfo, T as TrustLevel } from '../types-W-A326w3.mjs';
 
 /**
  * AstraSync Verification Interstitial Component

package/dist/ui/index.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
-import { V as VerificationInterstitialProps, w as VerificationResult, a as AgentCredentials, k as GuidanceInfo, u as TrustLevel } from '../types-CA1ZhoaJ.js';
-import '../metadata-capture.js';
+import { V as VerificationInterstitialProps, d as VerificationResult, A as AgentCredentials, b as GuidanceInfo, T as TrustLevel } from '../types-W-A326w3.js';
 
 /**
  * AstraSync Verification Interstitial Component

package/dist/verify.d.mts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { a as AgentCredentials, G as GatewayConfig, d as AttemptReport, v as VerificationRequest, w as VerificationResult } from './types-eSqHyFFH.mjs';
+import { A as AgentCredentials, G as GatewayConfig, a as AttemptReport, V as VerificationRequest, c as VerificationResult } from './types-DJMU5g7Z.mjs';
 import { ObservedMetadata } from './metadata-capture.mjs';
 
 /**

package/dist/verify.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { a as AgentCredentials, G as GatewayConfig, d as AttemptReport, v as VerificationRequest, w as VerificationResult } from './types-CA1ZhoaJ.js';
+import { A as AgentCredentials, G as GatewayConfig, a as AttemptReport, V as VerificationRequest, c as VerificationResult } from './types-D28h1384.js';
 import { ObservedMetadata } from './metadata-capture.js';
 
 /**

package/dist/verify.js

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ __export(verify_exports, {
 module.exports = __toCommonJS(verify_exports);
 
 // src/version.ts
-var SDK_VERSION = "5.3.0";
+var SDK_VERSION = "5.4.1";
 
 // src/http.ts
 var SDK_USER_AGENT = `astrasync-sdk/${SDK_VERSION}`;
@@ -176,7 +176,14 @@ function getCacheKey(request, counterpartyId) {
     request.callerMetadata?.sourceIp || "",
     request.callerMetadata?.userAgent || "",
     request.callerMetadata?.forwardedFor || "",
-    request.callerMetadata?.agentCardUrl || ""
+    request.callerMetadata?.agentCardUrl || "",
+    // UAT2 Bug B (5.4.1): the commerce phase and cart identity DO affect the
+    // backend verdict — the confirm leg is the ONLY leg that may execute
+    // first-party settlement. Without these, a confirm within the cache TTL of
+    // its start_checkout quote was served the cached quote-leg grant (no
+    // settlementOutcome) and never reached the backend. Same F-A1-07 bug class.
+    request.commercePhase || "",
+    request.checkoutSessionId || ""
   ].join("|");
 }
 function getCachedResult(request, counterpartyId) {