@astrasyncai/verification-gateway 3.12.0 → 4.1.0

package/dist/git-trigger/git-hooks.d.mts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import { AstraSyncGateway } from '../gateway/gateway.mjs';
-import { V as VerificationDecision, P as PDLSSContext } from '../types-Djw4GLtz.mjs';
-import '../types-BntuzEEn.mjs';
+import { V as VerificationDecision, P as PDLSSContext } from '../types-DqfPU5Bl.mjs';
+import '../types-r850cOt0.mjs';
 import '../metadata-capture.mjs';
 
 /**

package/dist/git-trigger/git-hooks.d.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import { AstraSyncGateway } from '../gateway/gateway.js';
-import { V as VerificationDecision, P as PDLSSContext } from '../types-DHu7m9HI.js';
-import '../types-SDu4Llbe.js';
+import { V as VerificationDecision, P as PDLSSContext } from '../types-BLUx92FJ.js';
+import '../types-sMxBT-nM.js';
 import '../metadata-capture.js';
 
 /**

package/dist/{index-CLHdqs2M.d.ts → index-B0YHu_SP.d.ts}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { c as AstraSyncCredentials, m as ProtocolTransport } from './types-SDu4Llbe.js';
+import { c as AstraSyncCredentials, m as ProtocolTransport } from './types-sMxBT-nM.js';
 import { JWK } from 'jose';
 
 /**
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ declare function extractMcpCredentials(params: McpParams): AstraSyncCredentials
 /**
  * Protocol request -> AstraSync PDLSS purpose category mapping.
  *
- * Per spec v2.6 §7.4.3 commerce purpose mapping table, extended with MPP + x402
+ * Commerce purpose mapping table, extended with MPP + x402
  * entries (April 2026 protocol landscape).
  */
 type CommercePurpose = 'commerce.checkout.create' | 'commerce.checkout.update' | 'commerce.checkout.confirm' | 'commerce.checkout.cancel' | 'commerce.payment.execute' | 'commerce.payment.stream' | 'commerce.delegation.intent' | 'commerce.delegation.checkout' | 'commerce.delegation.payment' | 'commerce.identity_probe' | 'commerce.browsing';
@@ -158,7 +158,8 @@ declare function extractX402TransactionValue(req: X402RequestForValue): Transact
  * RFC 9421 HTTP Message Signatures parser.
  *
  * Wraps `structured-headers` (transitive dep of http-message-signatures) to
- * parse the Signature-Input and Signature Dictionary headers per RFC 9421 §2.
+ * parse the Signature-Input and Signature Dictionary headers per RFC 9421
+ * Section 2.
  *
  * Produces structured metadata (kid, algorithm, covered components, tag,
  * created/expires/nonce, signature bytes) without verifying the signature —
@@ -177,7 +178,7 @@ interface RFC9421SignatureParams {
     kid: string;
     /** Algorithm declared in the Signature-Input params (e.g. "ecdsa-p256-sha256", "ed25519"). */
     alg?: string;
-    /** Covered components, in order, per RFC 9421 §2.1. */
+    /** Covered components, in order, per RFC 9421 Section 2.1. */
     covered: string[];
     /** Base64url-encoded signature bytes extracted from the paired Signature header. */
     signatureBase64: string;
@@ -214,9 +215,9 @@ interface ResolveContext {
 /**
  * Shared nonce/signature replay-protection store for transport verifiers.
  *
- * Audit F-A1-05: every transport-signature verifier (RFC9421, VI, AP2, ACP,
- * MPP) validates a created/expires window but none consult a seen-nonce
- * cache. Any captured signed request can be replayed within the (default
+ * Rationale: every transport-signature verifier (RFC9421, VI, AP2, ACP,
+ * MPP) validates a created/expires window, but without a seen-nonce
+ * cache any captured signed request can be replayed within the (default
  * 300s, now tightened to 60s) tolerance window.
  *
  * This module ships a bounded in-memory LRU as the default. Production
@@ -264,11 +265,11 @@ interface RFC9421VerifyRequest {
 }
 interface RFC9421VerifyOptions {
     resolver: RegistryResolver;
-    /** Seconds of tolerance around created/expires. Default 60 (audit F-A1-05 tightening from 300). */
+    /** Seconds of tolerance around created/expires. Default 60 (tightened from 300). */
     clockSkewSec?: number;
     /** Injectable for deterministic tests. */
     now?: () => number;
-    /** Optional replay-protection store. Defaults to in-process LRU. Audit F-A1-05. */
+    /** Optional replay-protection store. Defaults to in-process LRU. */
     nonceStore?: NonceStore;
 }
 interface RFC9421VerifyResult {
@@ -502,8 +503,8 @@ declare function verifyStripeWebhook(payload: string, signatureHeader: string |
  * against a transaction context.
  *
  * Types 5/6/7 (budget, recurrence, agent_recurrence) extract through but
- * enforcement is deferred to the cross-merchant budget service (§3.3.15,
- * separate PR). This module returns per-constraint {ok, reason} results
+ * enforcement is deferred to the cross-merchant budget service.
+ * This module returns per-constraint {ok, reason} results
  * so a policy layer can decide hard-deny vs trust-signal.
  */
 
@@ -722,8 +723,8 @@ declare function extractAP2Mandates(input: AP2MandateTripleInput): AP2MandateTri
 interface AP2VerifyInput {
     triple: AP2MandateTriple;
     /**
-     * Clock skew tolerance in seconds for expiry checks. Default 60s (audit
-     * F-A1-05 tightening from the previous 300s default).
+     * Clock skew tolerance in seconds for expiry checks. Default 60s
+     * (tightened from the previous 300s default).
      */
     clockSkewSec?: number;
     now?: () => number;
@@ -731,7 +732,6 @@ interface AP2VerifyInput {
      * Optional replay-protection store. Defaults to in-process LRU. When the
      * payment mandate carries an id, this verifier registers it as seen so
      * the same payment mandate replayed within the expiry window is rejected.
-     * Audit F-A1-05.
      */
     nonceStore?: NonceStore;
 }
@@ -780,11 +780,11 @@ interface ACPVerifyInput {
         jwk: JWK;
         alg?: ACPSignatureAlgorithm | string;
     }>;
-    /** Clock skew tolerance in seconds (default 60, audit F-A1-05 tightening from 300). */
+    /** Clock skew tolerance in seconds (default 60, tightened from 300). */
     clockSkewSec?: number;
     /** Injectable now for tests. */
     now?: () => number;
-    /** Optional replay-protection store. Defaults to in-process LRU. Audit F-A1-05. */
+    /** Optional replay-protection store. Defaults to in-process LRU. */
     nonceStore?: NonceStore;
 }
 interface ACPVerifyResult {
@@ -917,11 +917,11 @@ interface MPPVerifyInput {
     context: MPPRequestContext;
     /** Raw request body to validate BodyDigest against, if the challenge declares one. */
     rawBody?: string;
-    /** Seconds of clock-skew tolerance on challenge.expires. Default 60 (audit F-A1-05). */
+    /** Seconds of clock-skew tolerance on challenge.expires. Default 60. */
     clockSkewSec?: number;
     /** Injectable for deterministic tests. */
     now?: () => number;
-    /** Optional replay-protection store. Defaults to in-process LRU. Audit F-A1-05. */
+    /** Optional replay-protection store. Defaults to in-process LRU. */
     nonceStore?: NonceStore;
 }
 interface MPPVerifyResult {
@@ -1046,7 +1046,7 @@ interface VILayer {
 }
 interface VIVerifyInput {
     /**
-     * Layers in chain order. L1 is REQUIRED by default (audit F-A1-02) —
+     * Layers in chain order. L1 is REQUIRED by default —
      * without L1 there is no chain root and L2 can be verified against any
      * attacker-supplied key. Callers who have resolved L2's signing key by
      * a trusted out-of-band mechanism (wallet binding, prior protocol step)
@@ -1066,14 +1066,14 @@ interface VIVerifyInput {
      */
     verifySignature: (layer: VILayer, expectedKey: JWK | null) => Promise<boolean>;
     /**
-     * Clock skew tolerance in seconds for expiry checks. Default 60s (audit
-     * F-A1-05 tightening from the previous 300s default).
+     * Clock skew tolerance in seconds for expiry checks. Default 60s
+     * (tightened from the previous 300s default).
      */
     clockSkewSec?: number;
     now?: () => number;
     /**
-     * Explicit opt-in to verify a chain with L1 omitted. Audit F-A1-02 fix
-     * — defaults to false. When true, `expectedL2Key` MUST also be supplied
+     * Explicit opt-in to verify a chain with L1 omitted.
+     * Defaults to false. When true, `expectedL2Key` MUST also be supplied
      * (used as the expected signing key for L2 verification).
      */
     allowUnboundChain?: boolean;
@@ -1106,8 +1106,10 @@ declare function verifyVIChain(input: VIVerifyInput): Promise<VIVerifyResult>;
  * evaluation + trust signals into a single CommerceContext result.
  *
  * This is AstraSync whitespace: the orchestration over the library-backed
- * primitives. PR 3's Commerce Shield Lambda will call this per request;
- * the admin playground page will call it ad-hoc.
+ * primitives. The backend verify-access service is the sole per-request
+ * caller — the edge adapters forward raw artifacts to verify-access and
+ * never call this module directly. The admin transport playground also
+ * calls it ad-hoc.
  *
  * Policy:
  *  - Hard-deny (ok=false) on bad signatures, expired mandates, constraint
@@ -1201,10 +1203,11 @@ interface CommerceContext {
 declare function runCommercePipeline(input: CommercePipelineInput): Promise<CommerceContext>;
 
 /**
- * Pluggable extractor registry for PR 3 Commerce Shield Lambda@Edge.
+ * Pluggable extractor registry for the Trusted Agent Gateway edge
+ * adapters and other callers that need a curated extractor set.
  *
  * Built-in extractors (VI, UCP, ACP, RFC 9421, MPP, x402, Stripe webhook)
- * are NOT auto-registered. PR 3 Lambda imports this module, picks the set
+ * are NOT auto-registered. A caller imports this module, picks the set
  * it wants, and calls registerTransportExtractor() for each.
  *
  * Re-registering by name replaces the prior extractor (idempotent).

package/dist/{index-DME3w3lf.d.mts → index-BPEBlOsE.d.mts}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { c as AstraSyncCredentials, m as ProtocolTransport } from './types-BntuzEEn.mjs';
+import { c as AstraSyncCredentials, m as ProtocolTransport } from './types-r850cOt0.mjs';
 import { JWK } from 'jose';
 
 /**
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ declare function extractMcpCredentials(params: McpParams): AstraSyncCredentials
 /**
  * Protocol request -> AstraSync PDLSS purpose category mapping.
  *
- * Per spec v2.6 §7.4.3 commerce purpose mapping table, extended with MPP + x402
+ * Commerce purpose mapping table, extended with MPP + x402
  * entries (April 2026 protocol landscape).
  */
 type CommercePurpose = 'commerce.checkout.create' | 'commerce.checkout.update' | 'commerce.checkout.confirm' | 'commerce.checkout.cancel' | 'commerce.payment.execute' | 'commerce.payment.stream' | 'commerce.delegation.intent' | 'commerce.delegation.checkout' | 'commerce.delegation.payment' | 'commerce.identity_probe' | 'commerce.browsing';
@@ -158,7 +158,8 @@ declare function extractX402TransactionValue(req: X402RequestForValue): Transact
  * RFC 9421 HTTP Message Signatures parser.
  *
  * Wraps `structured-headers` (transitive dep of http-message-signatures) to
- * parse the Signature-Input and Signature Dictionary headers per RFC 9421 §2.
+ * parse the Signature-Input and Signature Dictionary headers per RFC 9421
+ * Section 2.
  *
  * Produces structured metadata (kid, algorithm, covered components, tag,
  * created/expires/nonce, signature bytes) without verifying the signature —
@@ -177,7 +178,7 @@ interface RFC9421SignatureParams {
     kid: string;
     /** Algorithm declared in the Signature-Input params (e.g. "ecdsa-p256-sha256", "ed25519"). */
     alg?: string;
-    /** Covered components, in order, per RFC 9421 §2.1. */
+    /** Covered components, in order, per RFC 9421 Section 2.1. */
     covered: string[];
     /** Base64url-encoded signature bytes extracted from the paired Signature header. */
     signatureBase64: string;
@@ -214,9 +215,9 @@ interface ResolveContext {
 /**
  * Shared nonce/signature replay-protection store for transport verifiers.
  *
- * Audit F-A1-05: every transport-signature verifier (RFC9421, VI, AP2, ACP,
- * MPP) validates a created/expires window but none consult a seen-nonce
- * cache. Any captured signed request can be replayed within the (default
+ * Rationale: every transport-signature verifier (RFC9421, VI, AP2, ACP,
+ * MPP) validates a created/expires window, but without a seen-nonce
+ * cache any captured signed request can be replayed within the (default
  * 300s, now tightened to 60s) tolerance window.
  *
  * This module ships a bounded in-memory LRU as the default. Production
@@ -264,11 +265,11 @@ interface RFC9421VerifyRequest {
 }
 interface RFC9421VerifyOptions {
     resolver: RegistryResolver;
-    /** Seconds of tolerance around created/expires. Default 60 (audit F-A1-05 tightening from 300). */
+    /** Seconds of tolerance around created/expires. Default 60 (tightened from 300). */
     clockSkewSec?: number;
     /** Injectable for deterministic tests. */
     now?: () => number;
-    /** Optional replay-protection store. Defaults to in-process LRU. Audit F-A1-05. */
+    /** Optional replay-protection store. Defaults to in-process LRU. */
     nonceStore?: NonceStore;
 }
 interface RFC9421VerifyResult {
@@ -502,8 +503,8 @@ declare function verifyStripeWebhook(payload: string, signatureHeader: string |
  * against a transaction context.
  *
  * Types 5/6/7 (budget, recurrence, agent_recurrence) extract through but
- * enforcement is deferred to the cross-merchant budget service (§3.3.15,
- * separate PR). This module returns per-constraint {ok, reason} results
+ * enforcement is deferred to the cross-merchant budget service.
+ * This module returns per-constraint {ok, reason} results
  * so a policy layer can decide hard-deny vs trust-signal.
  */
 
@@ -722,8 +723,8 @@ declare function extractAP2Mandates(input: AP2MandateTripleInput): AP2MandateTri
 interface AP2VerifyInput {
     triple: AP2MandateTriple;
     /**
-     * Clock skew tolerance in seconds for expiry checks. Default 60s (audit
-     * F-A1-05 tightening from the previous 300s default).
+     * Clock skew tolerance in seconds for expiry checks. Default 60s
+     * (tightened from the previous 300s default).
      */
     clockSkewSec?: number;
     now?: () => number;
@@ -731,7 +732,6 @@ interface AP2VerifyInput {
      * Optional replay-protection store. Defaults to in-process LRU. When the
      * payment mandate carries an id, this verifier registers it as seen so
      * the same payment mandate replayed within the expiry window is rejected.
-     * Audit F-A1-05.
      */
     nonceStore?: NonceStore;
 }
@@ -780,11 +780,11 @@ interface ACPVerifyInput {
         jwk: JWK;
         alg?: ACPSignatureAlgorithm | string;
     }>;
-    /** Clock skew tolerance in seconds (default 60, audit F-A1-05 tightening from 300). */
+    /** Clock skew tolerance in seconds (default 60, tightened from 300). */
     clockSkewSec?: number;
     /** Injectable now for tests. */
     now?: () => number;
-    /** Optional replay-protection store. Defaults to in-process LRU. Audit F-A1-05. */
+    /** Optional replay-protection store. Defaults to in-process LRU. */
     nonceStore?: NonceStore;
 }
 interface ACPVerifyResult {
@@ -917,11 +917,11 @@ interface MPPVerifyInput {
     context: MPPRequestContext;
     /** Raw request body to validate BodyDigest against, if the challenge declares one. */
     rawBody?: string;
-    /** Seconds of clock-skew tolerance on challenge.expires. Default 60 (audit F-A1-05). */
+    /** Seconds of clock-skew tolerance on challenge.expires. Default 60. */
     clockSkewSec?: number;
     /** Injectable for deterministic tests. */
     now?: () => number;
-    /** Optional replay-protection store. Defaults to in-process LRU. Audit F-A1-05. */
+    /** Optional replay-protection store. Defaults to in-process LRU. */
     nonceStore?: NonceStore;
 }
 interface MPPVerifyResult {
@@ -1046,7 +1046,7 @@ interface VILayer {
 }
 interface VIVerifyInput {
     /**
-     * Layers in chain order. L1 is REQUIRED by default (audit F-A1-02) —
+     * Layers in chain order. L1 is REQUIRED by default —
      * without L1 there is no chain root and L2 can be verified against any
      * attacker-supplied key. Callers who have resolved L2's signing key by
      * a trusted out-of-band mechanism (wallet binding, prior protocol step)
@@ -1066,14 +1066,14 @@ interface VIVerifyInput {
      */
     verifySignature: (layer: VILayer, expectedKey: JWK | null) => Promise<boolean>;
     /**
-     * Clock skew tolerance in seconds for expiry checks. Default 60s (audit
-     * F-A1-05 tightening from the previous 300s default).
+     * Clock skew tolerance in seconds for expiry checks. Default 60s
+     * (tightened from the previous 300s default).
      */
     clockSkewSec?: number;
     now?: () => number;
     /**
-     * Explicit opt-in to verify a chain with L1 omitted. Audit F-A1-02 fix
-     * — defaults to false. When true, `expectedL2Key` MUST also be supplied
+     * Explicit opt-in to verify a chain with L1 omitted.
+     * Defaults to false. When true, `expectedL2Key` MUST also be supplied
      * (used as the expected signing key for L2 verification).
      */
     allowUnboundChain?: boolean;
@@ -1106,8 +1106,10 @@ declare function verifyVIChain(input: VIVerifyInput): Promise<VIVerifyResult>;
  * evaluation + trust signals into a single CommerceContext result.
  *
  * This is AstraSync whitespace: the orchestration over the library-backed
- * primitives. PR 3's Commerce Shield Lambda will call this per request;
- * the admin playground page will call it ad-hoc.
+ * primitives. The backend verify-access service is the sole per-request
+ * caller — the edge adapters forward raw artifacts to verify-access and
+ * never call this module directly. The admin transport playground also
+ * calls it ad-hoc.
  *
  * Policy:
  *  - Hard-deny (ok=false) on bad signatures, expired mandates, constraint
@@ -1201,10 +1203,11 @@ interface CommerceContext {
 declare function runCommercePipeline(input: CommercePipelineInput): Promise<CommerceContext>;
 
 /**
- * Pluggable extractor registry for PR 3 Commerce Shield Lambda@Edge.
+ * Pluggable extractor registry for the Trusted Agent Gateway edge
+ * adapters and other callers that need a curated extractor set.
  *
  * Built-in extractors (VI, UCP, ACP, RFC 9421, MPP, x402, Stripe webhook)
- * are NOT auto-registered. PR 3 Lambda imports this module, picks the set
+ * are NOT auto-registered. A caller imports this module, picks the set
  * it wants, and calls registerTransportExtractor() for each.
  *
  * Re-registering by name replaces the prior extractor (idempotent).

package/dist/{index-CqydB4ks.d.mts → index-DQb5-_1X.d.mts}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { c as AstraSyncCredentials, m as ProtocolTransport, G as GatewayConfig } from './types-BntuzEEn.mjs';
+import { c as AstraSyncCredentials, m as ProtocolTransport, G as GatewayConfig } from './types-r850cOt0.mjs';
 
 /**
  * AgentClient — Credential Presentation

package/dist/{index-BG62SXso.d.ts → index-T1aBoUcc.d.ts}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { c as AstraSyncCredentials, m as ProtocolTransport, G as GatewayConfig } from './types-SDu4Llbe.js';
+import { c as AstraSyncCredentials, m as ProtocolTransport, G as GatewayConfig } from './types-sMxBT-nM.js';
 
 /**
  * AgentClient — Credential Presentation

package/dist/index.d.mts

@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
-import { G as GatewayConfig, s as StepUpApprovalInfo, u as StepUpOutcome, t as StepUpApprovalStatus, E as EnhancedVerificationResult, A as AccessFailure } from './types-BntuzEEn.mjs';
-export { a as AccessLevel, b as AgentCredentials, c as AstraSyncCredentials, d as AttemptOutcome, e as AttemptReport, C as CallerMetadata, f as CommerceArtifactsPayload, g as CommerceShieldProps, h as ConsiderationItem, i as ConsiderationSet, j as CounterpartyType, k as ExpressMiddlewareOptions, F as FiatSettlementBinding, l as GuidanceInfo, N as NextJsMiddlewareOptions, P as PDLSSInfo, m as ProtocolTransport, R as RouteAccessConfig, n as RuntimeChallengeResult, S as SDKOptions, o as SettlementArtifact, p as SettlementArtifactBinding, q as SettlementArtifactBindingBase, r as StablecoinSettlementBinding, T as TokenGuidance, v as TrustLevel, V as VerificationRequest, w as VerificationResult, x as VerifiedAgent, y as VerifiedDeveloper, z as VerifiedOrganization } from './types-BntuzEEn.mjs';
-export { A as ACCESS_LEVEL_DESCRIPTIONS, a as ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY, b as AccessCapabilities, D as DEFAULT_TRUST_THRESHOLDS, T as TRUST_LEVEL_RANGES, d as determineAccessLevel, g as getAccessLevelForScore, e as getCapabilities, f as getTrustLevel, h as hasMinimumAccess, s as sdk } from './sdk-Bn6bj7kt.mjs';
+import { G as GatewayConfig, s as StepUpApprovalInfo, u as StepUpOutcome, t as StepUpApprovalStatus, E as EnhancedVerificationResult, A as AccessFailure } from './types-r850cOt0.mjs';
+export { a as AccessLevel, b as AgentCredentials, c as AstraSyncCredentials, d as AttemptOutcome, e as AttemptReport, C as CallerMetadata, f as CommerceArtifactsPayload, g as CommerceShieldProps, h as ConsiderationItem, i as ConsiderationSet, j as CounterpartyType, k as ExpressMiddlewareOptions, F as FiatSettlementBinding, l as GuidanceInfo, N as NextJsMiddlewareOptions, P as PDLSSInfo, m as ProtocolTransport, R as RouteAccessConfig, n as RuntimeChallengeResult, S as SDKOptions, o as SettlementArtifact, p as SettlementArtifactBinding, q as SettlementArtifactBindingBase, r as StablecoinSettlementBinding, T as TokenGuidance, v as TrustLevel, V as VerificationInterstitialProps, w as VerificationRequest, x as VerificationResult, y as VerifiedAgent, z as VerifiedDeveloper, B as VerifiedOrganization } from './types-r850cOt0.mjs';
+export { A as ACCESS_LEVEL_DESCRIPTIONS, a as ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY, b as AccessCapabilities, D as DEFAULT_TRUST_THRESHOLDS, T as TRUST_LEVEL_RANGES, d as determineAccessLevel, g as getAccessLevelForScore, e as getCapabilities, f as getTrustLevel, h as hasMinimumAccess, s as sdk } from './sdk-CbTNIkAa.mjs';
 export { VerifyOptions, clearCache, extractCredentials, fetchRoutes, hasCredentials, quickVerify, reportAttempt, reportUnregisteredAttempt, verify } from './verify.mjs';
-export { e as express } from './express-B39o89gf.mjs';
-export { n as nextjs } from './nextjs-D74W7wt-.mjs';
-export { aR as extractMcpCredentials, bg as setMcpMeta, b1 as transport } from './index-DME3w3lf.mjs';
+export { e as express } from './express-D_4hTn5Z.mjs';
+export { n as nextjs } from './nextjs-WyeVr2Kp.mjs';
+export { aR as extractMcpCredentials, bg as setMcpMeta, b1 as transport } from './index-BPEBlOsE.mjs';
 export { McpMiddlewareOptions, ToolGateConfig, createMcpMiddleware } from './adapters/mcp.mjs';
 export { AgentProtocol, AgentRecord, AstraSync, AstraSyncConfig, AstraSyncError, AuthenticationError, BuildGuidanceParams, FrameworkConfig, GuidanceEnvelope, HealthResponse, KYDRequiredError, ModelConfig, PDLSSConfig, PDLSSDuration, PDLSSLimits, PDLSSPurpose, PDLSSScope, PDLSSSelfInstantiation, PendingRegistrationResponse, PollRegistrationResult, RegisterOptions, RegisterResult, RegistrationDeniedError, RegistrationExpiredError, RegistrationResponse, RegistrationTimeoutError, VerifyResponse, WaitForApprovalOptions, buildGuidance } from './registration/index.mjs';
-export { A as AgentClient, C as ChallengeHandler, i as agent, r as recordDecision } from './index-CqydB4ks.mjs';
+export { A as AgentClient, C as ChallengeHandler, i as agent, r as recordDecision } from './index-DQb5-_1X.mjs';
 export { DEFAULT_EDGE_CONFIG, EdgeConfig, EdgeMode, EdgePathRule, EdgeVerificationDepth, FetchEdgeConfigResult, FetchEdgeConfigSuccess, _resetEdgeConfigCache, degradeToObserve, fetchEdgeConfig, getEdgeConfig, isEdgeConfig, matchEdgePathRule } from './edge-config.mjs';
 export { DynamicPlatformFingerprint, PLATFORM_AGENT_SIGNATURES, PlatformAgentVendor, PlatformDetectionInput, PlatformFingerprint, PlatformSignatureDef, detectPlatformFingerprint, matchPlatformSignature } from './platform-signatures.mjs';
-export { MAX_HEADERS, MAX_HEADER_VALUE_BYTES, MAX_TOTAL_BYTES, ObservedMetadata, SanitizeHeadersResult, extractApiKeyFormat, extractPlatformHeaders, sanitizeHeaders } from './metadata-capture.mjs';
+export { CAPTURE_SCHEMA_VERSION, MAX_HEADERS, MAX_HEADER_VALUE_BYTES, MAX_TOTAL_BYTES, ObservedMetadata, SanitizeHeadersResult, buildSdkObservedMetadata, deriveConnectionFromHeaders, extractApiKeyFormat, extractPlatformHeaders, sanitizeHeaders } from './metadata-capture.mjs';
 import 'express';
 import 'next/server';
 import 'jose';
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ declare function getWellKnownUrls(apiBaseUrl: string): Promise<WellKnownAgenticC
 declare function getCachedWellKnownUrls(apiBaseUrl: string): WellKnownAgenticCommerce | undefined;
 
 /**
- * Round-13 (F14 closure / R13-7): single source-of-truth for the SDK's
+ * Single source-of-truth for the SDK's
  * package version emitted on verify-access bodies (and any future
  * telemetry). Bumped alongside `package.json#version` on every release.
  *
@@ -141,10 +141,10 @@ declare function getCachedWellKnownUrls(apiBaseUrl: string): WellKnownAgenticCom
  *   bundlers, Deno) without runtime fs / network access.
  *
  * Release discipline: a CI lint can grep `package.json#version` against
- * this constant if the two ever diverge in the wild. Round-13 manual bump
+ * this constant if the two ever diverge in the wild. A manual bump
  * is fine — bumping both in the release-ceremony commit keeps them
  * lockstep.
  */
-declare const SDK_VERSION = "3.12.0";
+declare const SDK_VERSION = "4.1.0";
 
 export { EnhancedVerificationResult, GatewayConfig, type SettlementDecision, type SettlementRequest, StepUpApprovalInfo, StepUpApprovalStatus, StepUpOutcome, SDK_VERSION as VERSION, type WellKnownAgenticCommerce, authorizeSettlement, awaitStepUpApproval, getCachedWellKnownUrls, getWellKnownUrls, pollStepUpStatus, prefetchWellKnown };

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
-import { G as GatewayConfig, s as StepUpApprovalInfo, u as StepUpOutcome, t as StepUpApprovalStatus, E as EnhancedVerificationResult, A as AccessFailure } from './types-SDu4Llbe.js';
-export { a as AccessLevel, b as AgentCredentials, c as AstraSyncCredentials, d as AttemptOutcome, e as AttemptReport, C as CallerMetadata, f as CommerceArtifactsPayload, g as CommerceShieldProps, h as ConsiderationItem, i as ConsiderationSet, j as CounterpartyType, k as ExpressMiddlewareOptions, F as FiatSettlementBinding, l as GuidanceInfo, N as NextJsMiddlewareOptions, P as PDLSSInfo, m as ProtocolTransport, R as RouteAccessConfig, n as RuntimeChallengeResult, S as SDKOptions, o as SettlementArtifact, p as SettlementArtifactBinding, q as SettlementArtifactBindingBase, r as StablecoinSettlementBinding, T as TokenGuidance, v as TrustLevel, V as VerificationRequest, w as VerificationResult, x as VerifiedAgent, y as VerifiedDeveloper, z as VerifiedOrganization } from './types-SDu4Llbe.js';
-export { A as ACCESS_LEVEL_DESCRIPTIONS, a as ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY, b as AccessCapabilities, D as DEFAULT_TRUST_THRESHOLDS, T as TRUST_LEVEL_RANGES, d as determineAccessLevel, g as getAccessLevelForScore, e as getCapabilities, f as getTrustLevel, h as hasMinimumAccess, s as sdk } from './sdk-CT7gdkfR.js';
+import { G as GatewayConfig, s as StepUpApprovalInfo, u as StepUpOutcome, t as StepUpApprovalStatus, E as EnhancedVerificationResult, A as AccessFailure } from './types-sMxBT-nM.js';
+export { a as AccessLevel, b as AgentCredentials, c as AstraSyncCredentials, d as AttemptOutcome, e as AttemptReport, C as CallerMetadata, f as CommerceArtifactsPayload, g as CommerceShieldProps, h as ConsiderationItem, i as ConsiderationSet, j as CounterpartyType, k as ExpressMiddlewareOptions, F as FiatSettlementBinding, l as GuidanceInfo, N as NextJsMiddlewareOptions, P as PDLSSInfo, m as ProtocolTransport, R as RouteAccessConfig, n as RuntimeChallengeResult, S as SDKOptions, o as SettlementArtifact, p as SettlementArtifactBinding, q as SettlementArtifactBindingBase, r as StablecoinSettlementBinding, T as TokenGuidance, v as TrustLevel, V as VerificationInterstitialProps, w as VerificationRequest, x as VerificationResult, y as VerifiedAgent, z as VerifiedDeveloper, B as VerifiedOrganization } from './types-sMxBT-nM.js';
+export { A as ACCESS_LEVEL_DESCRIPTIONS, a as ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY, b as AccessCapabilities, D as DEFAULT_TRUST_THRESHOLDS, T as TRUST_LEVEL_RANGES, d as determineAccessLevel, g as getAccessLevelForScore, e as getCapabilities, f as getTrustLevel, h as hasMinimumAccess, s as sdk } from './sdk-QeX0Z8Ho.js';
 export { VerifyOptions, clearCache, extractCredentials, fetchRoutes, hasCredentials, quickVerify, reportAttempt, reportUnregisteredAttempt, verify } from './verify.js';
-export { e as express } from './express-BuxKNO_q.js';
-export { n as nextjs } from './nextjs-Ddlw_J1J.js';
-export { aR as extractMcpCredentials, bg as setMcpMeta, b1 as transport } from './index-CLHdqs2M.js';
+export { e as express } from './express-BVd1_3FE.js';
+export { n as nextjs } from './nextjs-w7RTbP1P.js';
+export { aR as extractMcpCredentials, bg as setMcpMeta, b1 as transport } from './index-B0YHu_SP.js';
 export { McpMiddlewareOptions, ToolGateConfig, createMcpMiddleware } from './adapters/mcp.js';
 export { AgentProtocol, AgentRecord, AstraSync, AstraSyncConfig, AstraSyncError, AuthenticationError, BuildGuidanceParams, FrameworkConfig, GuidanceEnvelope, HealthResponse, KYDRequiredError, ModelConfig, PDLSSConfig, PDLSSDuration, PDLSSLimits, PDLSSPurpose, PDLSSScope, PDLSSSelfInstantiation, PendingRegistrationResponse, PollRegistrationResult, RegisterOptions, RegisterResult, RegistrationDeniedError, RegistrationExpiredError, RegistrationResponse, RegistrationTimeoutError, VerifyResponse, WaitForApprovalOptions, buildGuidance } from './registration/index.js';
-export { A as AgentClient, C as ChallengeHandler, i as agent, r as recordDecision } from './index-BG62SXso.js';
+export { A as AgentClient, C as ChallengeHandler, i as agent, r as recordDecision } from './index-T1aBoUcc.js';
 export { DEFAULT_EDGE_CONFIG, EdgeConfig, EdgeMode, EdgePathRule, EdgeVerificationDepth, FetchEdgeConfigResult, FetchEdgeConfigSuccess, _resetEdgeConfigCache, degradeToObserve, fetchEdgeConfig, getEdgeConfig, isEdgeConfig, matchEdgePathRule } from './edge-config.js';
 export { DynamicPlatformFingerprint, PLATFORM_AGENT_SIGNATURES, PlatformAgentVendor, PlatformDetectionInput, PlatformFingerprint, PlatformSignatureDef, detectPlatformFingerprint, matchPlatformSignature } from './platform-signatures.js';
-export { MAX_HEADERS, MAX_HEADER_VALUE_BYTES, MAX_TOTAL_BYTES, ObservedMetadata, SanitizeHeadersResult, extractApiKeyFormat, extractPlatformHeaders, sanitizeHeaders } from './metadata-capture.js';
+export { CAPTURE_SCHEMA_VERSION, MAX_HEADERS, MAX_HEADER_VALUE_BYTES, MAX_TOTAL_BYTES, ObservedMetadata, SanitizeHeadersResult, buildSdkObservedMetadata, deriveConnectionFromHeaders, extractApiKeyFormat, extractPlatformHeaders, sanitizeHeaders } from './metadata-capture.js';
 import 'express';
 import 'next/server';
 import 'jose';
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ declare function getWellKnownUrls(apiBaseUrl: string): Promise<WellKnownAgenticC
 declare function getCachedWellKnownUrls(apiBaseUrl: string): WellKnownAgenticCommerce | undefined;
 
 /**
- * Round-13 (F14 closure / R13-7): single source-of-truth for the SDK's
+ * Single source-of-truth for the SDK's
  * package version emitted on verify-access bodies (and any future
  * telemetry). Bumped alongside `package.json#version` on every release.
  *
@@ -141,10 +141,10 @@ declare function getCachedWellKnownUrls(apiBaseUrl: string): WellKnownAgenticCom
  *   bundlers, Deno) without runtime fs / network access.
  *
  * Release discipline: a CI lint can grep `package.json#version` against
- * this constant if the two ever diverge in the wild. Round-13 manual bump
+ * this constant if the two ever diverge in the wild. A manual bump
  * is fine — bumping both in the release-ceremony commit keeps them
  * lockstep.
  */
-declare const SDK_VERSION = "3.12.0";
+declare const SDK_VERSION = "4.1.0";
 
 export { EnhancedVerificationResult, GatewayConfig, type SettlementDecision, type SettlementRequest, StepUpApprovalInfo, StepUpApprovalStatus, StepUpOutcome, SDK_VERSION as VERSION, type WellKnownAgenticCommerce, authorizeSettlement, awaitStepUpApproval, getCachedWellKnownUrls, getWellKnownUrls, pollStepUpStatus, prefetchWellKnown };