@astrasyncai/verification-gateway 3.1.0 → 3.2.0

package/dist/adapters/sdk.js

@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ function getCapabilities(accessLevel) {
 }
 
 // src/version.ts
-var SDK_VERSION = "3.1.0";
+var SDK_VERSION = "3.2.0";
 
 // src/well-known.ts
 var CACHE_TTL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1e3;
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ async function performInitCheck(apiBaseUrl, debug, strictInit) {
   }
 }
 var verificationCache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
-function getCacheKey(request) {
+function getCacheKey(request, counterpartyId) {
   const c = request.credentials;
   return [
     c.astraId || "",
@@ -175,6 +175,14 @@ function getCacheKey(request) {
     request.jurisdiction || "",
     request.transactionValue ?? "",
     request.currency || "",
+    // SECURITY (cross-merchant cache leak): the merchant identity is sent via
+    // `config.counterpartyId`, NOT on the request, so it was previously absent
+    // from the key — two verifies for the SAME agent/purpose/action/value but
+    // DIFFERENT merchants collided, and a grant at a permissive merchant (low
+    // trust floor) was served for a stricter one. Same bug class as the
+    // duration omission (F-A1-07). counterpartyId affects the backend verdict
+    // (trust floor / per-route policy), so it MUST key the cache.
+    counterpartyId || "",
     request.counterpartyUrl || "",
     request.counterpartyType || "",
     request.isSubAgentRequest ? "1" : "0",
@@ -198,8 +206,8 @@ function getCacheKey(request) {
     request.callerMetadata?.agentCardUrl || ""
   ].join("|");
 }
-function getCachedResult(request) {
-  const key = getCacheKey(request);
+function getCachedResult(request, counterpartyId) {
+  const key = getCacheKey(request, counterpartyId);
   const cached = verificationCache.get(key);
   if (cached && cached.expiresAt > Date.now()) {
     return cached.result;
@@ -211,9 +219,9 @@ function getCachedResult(request) {
 }
 var DEFAULT_AUTONOMOUS_TTL_SECONDS = 60;
 var DEFAULT_STEP_UP_TTL_SECONDS = 300;
-function cacheResult(request, result, configuredTtl) {
+function cacheResult(request, result, configuredTtl, counterpartyId) {
   const ttlSeconds = configuredTtl && configuredTtl > 0 ? configuredTtl : result.requiresStepUp ? DEFAULT_STEP_UP_TTL_SECONDS : DEFAULT_AUTONOMOUS_TTL_SECONDS;
-  const key = getCacheKey(request);
+  const key = getCacheKey(request, counterpartyId);
   verificationCache.set(key, {
     result,
     expiresAt: Date.now() + ttlSeconds * 1e3
@@ -374,7 +382,7 @@ async function verify(config, request) {
     );
   }
   if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0) {
-    const cached = getCachedResult(request);
+    const cached = getCachedResult(request, mergedConfig.counterpartyId);
     if (cached) {
       if (mergedConfig.debug) {
         console.log("[VerificationGateway] Returning cached result");
@@ -426,8 +434,8 @@ async function verify(config, request) {
       verifiedAt: /* @__PURE__ */ new Date(),
       // Extract sessionId so decisions can be recorded for denials too
       sessionId: apiResponse.sessionId,
-      // v2.3.10 (defect #34, round-4): anonymous traffic has no session →
-      // correlationId is the linking key for paired local_override events.
+      // Anonymous traffic has no session → correlationId is the per-attempt
+      // linking key (the sessionId-equivalent for anonymous callers).
       correlationId: apiResponse.correlationId,
       recommendation: apiResponse.recommendation,
       recommendationReasons: apiResponse.recommendationReasons
@@ -501,13 +509,10 @@ async function verify(config, request) {
     };
   } else if (result.recommendation === "step_up_required") {
     result.requiresStepUp = true;
-    if (ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY[result.accessLevel] > ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY["read-only"]) {
-      result.accessLevel = "read-only";
-    }
     result.denialReasons = result.recommendationReasons || ["Step-up verification required"];
   }
   if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0 && result.recommendation !== "deny") {
-    cacheResult(request, result, mergedConfig.cacheTtl);
+    cacheResult(request, result, mergedConfig.cacheTtl, mergedConfig.counterpartyId);
   }
   return result;
 }
@@ -580,7 +585,13 @@ var VerificationGatewayClient = class {
     return this.executeWithRetry(() => quickVerify(this.config, credentials));
   }
   /**
-   * Check if an agent has a specific access level
+   * Check if an agent has a specific access level.
+   *
+   * @deprecated 3.2.0 — the access-level band is informational only; it no
+   * longer gates in the middleware adapters (post-3.1.0 feedback #1). This
+   * explicit opt-in query still works, but prefer gating on the server-side
+   * policy decision (identity + policy + trust) or per-route `minTrustScore`.
+   * Explicit per-route condition→constraint rules are the Phase-2 successor.
    */
   async hasAccess(credentials, requiredLevel) {
     const result = await this.quickVerify(credentials);

package/dist/adapters/sdk.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/adapters/sdk.ts","../../src/access-levels.ts","../../src/version.ts","../../src/well-known.ts","../../src/verify.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway - SDK Adapter\n *\n * Direct SDK for verifying agents in any JavaScript/TypeScript environment.\n * Useful for agent-to-agent verification, serverless functions, or custom integrations.\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * import { createClient } from '@astrasyncai/verification-gateway/sdk';\n *\n * const gateway = createClient({\n *   apiBaseUrl: 'https://astrasync.ai/api',\n * });\n *\n * // Verify another agent before interacting\n * const result = await gateway.verify({\n *   astraId: 'ASTRA-abc123',\n *   purpose: 'data-exchange',\n * });\n *\n * if (result.identityVerified && result.policyAllowed && result.accessLevel !== 'none') {\n *   // Safe to interact with this agent\n * }\n * ```\n */\n\nimport type {\n  SDKOptions,\n  AgentCredentials,\n  VerificationResult,\n  VerificationRequest,\n  AccessLevel,\n  GatewayConfig,\n} from '../types';\nimport { verify as coreVerify, quickVerify as coreQuickVerify, clearCache } from '../verify';\nimport { getTrustLevel, hasMinimumAccess, getCapabilities } from '../access-levels';\nimport type { AccessCapabilities } from '../access-levels';\n\n/**\n * Verification Gateway SDK Client\n */\nexport class VerificationGatewayClient {\n  private config: GatewayConfig;\n  private timeout: number;\n  private retryConfig: { maxRetries: number; backoffMs: number };\n\n  constructor(options: SDKOptions) {\n    this.config = {\n      apiBaseUrl: options.apiBaseUrl,\n      apiKey: options.apiKey,\n      defaultAccessLevel: options.defaultAccessLevel,\n      minTrustScore: options.minTrustScore,\n      minTrustScoreForFull: options.minTrustScoreForFull,\n      cacheTtl: options.cacheTtl,\n      debug: options.debug,\n      customHeaders: options.customHeaders,\n      counterpartyUrl: options.counterpartyUrl,\n      counterpartyType: options.counterpartyType,\n    };\n\n    this.timeout = options.timeout || 10000;\n    this.retryConfig = options.retry || { maxRetries: 3, backoffMs: 1000 };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Full verification with all details\n   */\n  async verify(options: {\n    astraId?: string;\n    apiKey?: string;\n    jwt?: string;\n    purpose?: string;\n    action?: string;\n    resourceType?: string;\n    resource?: string;\n    jurisdiction?: string;\n    transactionValue?: number;\n    currency?: string;\n    isSubAgentRequest?: boolean;\n    parentAgentId?: string;\n    subAgentDepth?: number;\n    counterpartyUrl?: string;\n    counterpartyType?: string;\n  }): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n    const credentials: AgentCredentials = {\n      astraId: options.astraId,\n      apiKey: options.apiKey,\n      jwt: options.jwt,\n    };\n\n    return this.executeWithRetry(() =>\n      coreVerify(this.config, {\n        credentials,\n        purpose: options.purpose,\n        action: options.action,\n        resourceType: options.resourceType,\n        resource: options.resource,\n        jurisdiction: options.jurisdiction,\n        transactionValue: options.transactionValue,\n        currency: options.currency,\n        isSubAgentRequest: options.isSubAgentRequest,\n        parentAgentId: options.parentAgentId,\n        subAgentDepth: options.subAgentDepth,\n        counterpartyUrl: options.counterpartyUrl,\n        counterpartyType: options.counterpartyType as VerificationRequest['counterpartyType'],\n      })\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Quick verification — checks credentials and policy in one call.\n   *\n   * Round-18 G4: return shape mirrors `VerificationResult`'s identity/policy\n   * split. Map to HTTP status the same way: `!identityVerified` → 401,\n   * `identityVerified && !policyAllowed` → 403.\n   */\n  async quickVerify(credentials: { astraId?: string; apiKey?: string; jwt?: string }): Promise<{\n    identityVerified: boolean;\n    policyAllowed: boolean;\n    accessLevel: AccessLevel;\n    reason?: string;\n  }> {\n    return this.executeWithRetry(() => coreQuickVerify(this.config, credentials));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Check if an agent has a specific access level\n   */\n  async hasAccess(\n    credentials: { astraId?: string; apiKey?: string; jwt?: string },\n    requiredLevel: AccessLevel\n  ): Promise<boolean> {\n    const result = await this.quickVerify(credentials);\n    return hasMinimumAccess(result.accessLevel, requiredLevel);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Get capabilities for a verified agent\n   */\n  async getCapabilities(credentials: {\n    astraId?: string;\n    apiKey?: string;\n    jwt?: string;\n  }): Promise<AccessCapabilities> {\n    const result = await this.quickVerify(credentials);\n    return getCapabilities(result.accessLevel);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Verify a specific ASTRA-ID\n   */\n  async verifyAstraId(\n    astraId: string,\n    options?: {\n      purpose?: string;\n      action?: string;\n    }\n  ): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n    return this.verify({\n      astraId,\n      purpose: options?.purpose,\n      action: options?.action,\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Verify using an API key\n   */\n  async verifyApiKey(\n    apiKey: string,\n    options?: {\n      purpose?: string;\n      action?: string;\n    }\n  ): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n    return this.verify({\n      apiKey,\n      purpose: options?.purpose,\n      action: options?.action,\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Clear the verification cache\n   */\n  clearCache(): void {\n    clearCache();\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Execute a function with retry logic\n   */\n  private async executeWithRetry<T>(fn: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {\n    let lastError: Error | null = null;\n\n    for (let attempt = 0; attempt <= this.retryConfig.maxRetries; attempt++) {\n      try {\n        // Add timeout\n        const result = await Promise.race([\n          fn(),\n          new Promise<never>((_, reject) =>\n            setTimeout(() => reject(new Error('Request timeout')), this.timeout)\n          ),\n        ]);\n\n        return result;\n      } catch (error) {\n        lastError = error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error));\n\n        // Don't retry on last attempt\n        if (attempt < this.retryConfig.maxRetries) {\n          // Exponential backoff\n          const backoff = this.retryConfig.backoffMs * Math.pow(2, attempt);\n          await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, backoff));\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    throw lastError || new Error('Verification failed after retries');\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Create a new SDK client\n */\nexport function createClient(options: SDKOptions): VerificationGatewayClient {\n  return new VerificationGatewayClient(options);\n}\n\n/**\n * One-shot verification without creating a client\n */\nexport async function verifyOnce(\n  options: SDKOptions & {\n    astraId?: string;\n    apiKey?: string;\n    jwt?: string;\n    purpose?: string;\n    action?: string;\n  }\n): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n  const client = createClient(options);\n  return client.verify(options);\n}\n\n// Re-export utilities for convenience\nexport { getTrustLevel, hasMinimumAccess, getCapabilities };\n","/**\n * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway - Access Level Definitions\n *\n * Defines the hierarchy and capabilities of each access level.\n *\n * v2.3.9 (defect #30): renamed `'guidance'` band → `'restricted'`. See\n * `types.ts` AccessLevel for the rationale (value-name collision with the\n * `guidance: {...}` help-payload object on VerificationResult).\n */\n\nimport type { AccessLevel, TrustLevel } from './types';\n\n/**\n * Access level hierarchy (higher number = more access)\n */\nexport const ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY: Record<AccessLevel, number> = {\n  none: 0,\n  restricted: 1,\n  'read-only': 2,\n  standard: 3,\n  full: 4,\n  internal: 5,\n};\n\n/**\n * Access level descriptions for UI\n */\nexport const ACCESS_LEVEL_DESCRIPTIONS: Record<AccessLevel, string> = {\n  none: 'No access - credentials required',\n  restricted: 'Restricted access - registration prompt only',\n  'read-only': 'Read-only access - can browse but not modify',\n  standard: 'Standard access - normal operations per PDLSS policy',\n  full: 'Full access - all operations for high-trust agents',\n  internal: 'Internal access - organization member privileges',\n};\n\n/**\n * Default trust score thresholds for access levels\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_TRUST_THRESHOLDS: Record<AccessLevel, number> = {\n  none: 0,\n  restricted: 0,\n  'read-only': 20,\n  standard: 40,\n  full: 70,\n  internal: 0, // Internal is based on org membership, not score\n};\n\n/**\n * Trust level score ranges\n */\nexport const TRUST_LEVEL_RANGES: Record<TrustLevel, { min: number; max: number }> = {\n  BRONZE: { min: 0, max: 39 },\n  SILVER: { min: 40, max: 59 },\n  GOLD: { min: 60, max: 79 },\n  PLATINUM: { min: 80, max: 100 },\n};\n\n/**\n * Determine trust level from score\n */\nexport function getTrustLevel(score: number): TrustLevel {\n  if (score >= 80) return 'PLATINUM';\n  if (score >= 60) return 'GOLD';\n  if (score >= 40) return 'SILVER';\n  return 'BRONZE';\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if access level A is greater than or equal to access level B\n */\nexport function hasMinimumAccess(actual: AccessLevel, required: AccessLevel): boolean {\n  return ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY[actual] >= ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY[required];\n}\n\n/**\n * Get the highest access level for a given trust score\n */\nexport function getAccessLevelForScore(\n  trustScore: number,\n  thresholds: Record<AccessLevel, number> = DEFAULT_TRUST_THRESHOLDS\n): AccessLevel {\n  if (trustScore >= thresholds.full) return 'full';\n  if (trustScore >= thresholds.standard) return 'standard';\n  if (trustScore >= thresholds['read-only']) return 'read-only';\n  return 'restricted';\n}\n\n/**\n * Determine access level from verification result.\n *\n * v2.3.9 (defect #30): unverified callers now return `'none'` (was\n * `'guidance'`). Denials grant zero — never a positive band.\n */\nexport function determineAccessLevel(\n  verified: boolean,\n  trustScore: number,\n  isOrgMember: boolean,\n  customThresholds?: Partial<Record<AccessLevel, number>>\n): AccessLevel {\n  if (!verified) {\n    return 'none';\n  }\n\n  if (isOrgMember) {\n    return 'internal';\n  }\n\n  const thresholds = {\n    ...DEFAULT_TRUST_THRESHOLDS,\n    ...customThresholds,\n  };\n\n  return getAccessLevelForScore(trustScore, thresholds);\n}\n\n/**\n * Access capabilities per level\n */\nexport interface AccessCapabilities {\n  canRead: boolean;\n  canWrite: boolean;\n  canDelete: boolean;\n  canAdmin: boolean;\n  canAccessInternal: boolean;\n  maxTransactionValue?: number;\n  allowedPurposes?: string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Get capabilities for an access level\n */\nexport function getCapabilities(accessLevel: AccessLevel): AccessCapabilities {\n  switch (accessLevel) {\n    case 'none':\n      return {\n        canRead: false,\n        canWrite: false,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'restricted':\n      return {\n        canRead: false,\n        canWrite: false,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'read-only':\n      return {\n        canRead: true,\n        canWrite: false,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'standard':\n      return {\n        canRead: true,\n        canWrite: true,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'full':\n      return {\n        canRead: true,\n        canWrite: true,\n        canDelete: true,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'internal':\n      return {\n        canRead: true,\n        canWrite: true,\n        canDelete: true,\n        canAdmin: true,\n        canAccessInternal: true,\n      };\n    default:\n      return {\n        canRead: false,\n        canWrite: false,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Round-13 (F14 closure / R13-7): single source-of-truth for the SDK's\n * package version emitted on verify-access bodies (and any future\n * telemetry). Bumped alongside `package.json#version` on every release.\n *\n * Why a constant rather than `import pkg from '../package.json'`:\n * - `tsconfig.json` sets `rootDir: ./src`; importing the sibling\n *   package.json fails the build with \"outside rootDir\".\n * - Build-time string replacement (tsup `define`, esbuild banner, etc.)\n *   adds toolchain coupling for a trivial gain.\n * - Embedded readonly constant works in every environment (Node, browser,\n *   bundlers, Deno) without runtime fs / network access.\n *\n * Release discipline: a CI lint can grep `package.json#version` against\n * this constant if the two ever diverge in the wild. Round-13 manual bump\n * is fine — bumping both in the release-ceremony commit keeps them\n * lockstep.\n */\nexport const SDK_VERSION = '3.1.0';\n","/**\n * SDK-side discovery of canonical platform URLs via `/.well-known/agentic-commerce`.\n *\n * Fire-and-forget pre-fetch at middleware creation; first verify() awaits\n * the in-flight promise if it hasn't resolved. 60-minute TTL with\n * stale-while-revalidate background refresh.\n */\n\nexport interface WellKnownAgenticCommerce {\n  registrationUrl: string;\n  documentationUrl: string;\n  verifyAccessUrl: string;\n}\n\ninterface CacheEntry {\n  data: WellKnownAgenticCommerce;\n  fetchedAt: number;\n}\n\nconst CACHE_TTL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 60 minutes\n\nconst cache = new Map<string, CacheEntry>();\nconst inflight = new Map<string, Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce>>();\n\nfunction wellKnownUrl(apiBaseUrl: string): string {\n  // apiBaseUrl is typically 'https://astrasync.ai/api' — strip the /api suffix\n  // to get the platform root, then append /.well-known/agentic-commerce.\n  const base = apiBaseUrl.replace(/\\/api\\/?$/, '');\n  return `${base}/.well-known/agentic-commerce`;\n}\n\nasync function fetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl: string): Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce> {\n  const url = wellKnownUrl(apiBaseUrl);\n  const response = await fetch(url, {\n    method: 'GET',\n    headers: { Accept: 'application/json' },\n    signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5000),\n  });\n  if (!response.ok) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `AstraSync platform must expose /.well-known/agentic-commerce; ` +\n        `got ${response.status} from ${url}. SDK cannot initialise without it.`\n    );\n  }\n  const data = (await response.json()) as Record<string, unknown>;\n  if (!data.registrationUrl || !data.documentationUrl || !data.verifyAccessUrl) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `/.well-known/agentic-commerce response missing required fields ` +\n        `(registrationUrl, documentationUrl, verifyAccessUrl).`\n    );\n  }\n  return data as unknown as WellKnownAgenticCommerce;\n}\n\n/**\n * Start a background fetch. Returns the promise for callers that need\n * to await it (first verify() call).\n */\nexport function prefetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl: string): Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce> {\n  const existing = inflight.get(apiBaseUrl);\n  if (existing) return existing;\n\n  const promise = fetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl)\n    .then((data) => {\n      cache.set(apiBaseUrl, { data, fetchedAt: Date.now() });\n      inflight.delete(apiBaseUrl);\n      return data;\n    })\n    .catch((err) => {\n      inflight.delete(apiBaseUrl);\n      throw err;\n    });\n\n  inflight.set(apiBaseUrl, promise);\n  return promise;\n}\n\n/**\n * Get cached well-known URLs. If stale, triggers a background refresh\n * and returns stale data (stale-while-revalidate). If no cache exists,\n * awaits the in-flight fetch or starts a new one.\n */\nexport async function getWellKnownUrls(apiBaseUrl: string): Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce> {\n  const entry = cache.get(apiBaseUrl);\n\n  if (entry) {\n    if (Date.now() - entry.fetchedAt > CACHE_TTL_MS) {\n      // Stale — trigger background refresh, return stale data\n      prefetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl).catch(() => {\n        // Background refresh failed — stale data remains until next request\n      });\n    }\n    return entry.data;\n  }\n\n  // No cache — must await\n  const pending = inflight.get(apiBaseUrl);\n  if (pending) return pending;\n\n  return prefetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl);\n}\n\n/**\n * Synchronous cache read — returns cached URLs or undefined.\n * Never triggers a fetch. Used by verify() to avoid extra HTTP calls\n * in the hot path; adapters are responsible for prefetching.\n */\nexport function getCachedWellKnownUrls(apiBaseUrl: string): WellKnownAgenticCommerce | undefined {\n  return cache.get(apiBaseUrl)?.data;\n}\n\n/** Reset cache — for testing only. */\nexport function _resetWellKnownCache(): void {\n  cache.clear();\n  inflight.clear();\n}\n","/**\n * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway - Core Verification Logic\n *\n * This module handles the core verification logic, calling the AstraSync API\n * and processing the response into a standardized VerificationResult.\n */\n\nimport type {\n  GatewayConfig,\n  AgentCredentials,\n  VerificationRequest,\n  VerificationResult,\n  VerifiedAgent,\n  VerifiedDeveloper,\n  VerifiedOrganization,\n  GuidanceInfo,\n  AccessLevel,\n  EnhancedVerificationResult,\n  TokenGuidance,\n  RuntimeChallengeResult,\n} from './types';\nimport { getTrustLevel, ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY } from './access-levels';\nimport { SDK_VERSION } from './version';\nimport { getCachedWellKnownUrls, type WellKnownAgenticCommerce } from './well-known';\n\n/**\n * Default configuration values\n *\n * apiBaseUrl matches the OpenAPI authoritative server (https://astrasync.ai/api\n * for prod, https://staging.astrasync.ai/api for staging). Always include the\n * /api path prefix when overriding — registration / docs URLs are derived by\n * stripping it.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_CONFIG: Partial<GatewayConfig> = {\n  apiBaseUrl: 'https://astrasync.ai/api',\n  // v2.3.9 (defect #30): default for unconfigured callers is `'none'` (no\n  // access). Pre-rename this defaulted to `'guidance'`, which combined with\n  // a route gated at `'guidance'` to silently let unverified traffic\n  // through (`hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance') === true`).\n  defaultAccessLevel: 'none',\n  // minTrustScore + minTrustScoreForFull deprecated in v2.3.0 — server decides.\n  // Round-18.5 F4: cacheTtl deliberately unset. When undefined, cacheResult\n  // applies the split default (60s autonomous / 300s step-up). When the\n  // caller sets cacheTtl explicitly, that value is honoured uniformly.\n  // Set cacheTtl: 0 to disable caching entirely.\n  debug: false,\n};\n\n/**\n * Init self-test state. Fires once per process on first verify() call to warn\n * if apiBaseUrl is pointing at the wrong host (e.g. a marketing site that\n * 200s with text/html instead of the API).\n */\nlet initCheckPerformed = false;\n\n/** One-shot guard for v2.3.0 deprecation warning. */\nlet deprecationWarningShown = false;\n\nasync function performInitCheck(\n  apiBaseUrl: string,\n  debug?: boolean,\n  strictInit?: boolean\n): Promise<void> {\n  initCheckPerformed = true;\n  try {\n    const probeUrl = `${apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access`;\n    // HEAD mirrors GET semantics (running the full request pipeline without a\n    // body) so the response carries the same content-type the marketing 404\n    // would return. OPTIONS often gets short-circuited by CORS-preflight\n    // handlers and returns no content-type, defeating the check.\n    const response = await fetch(probeUrl, { method: 'HEAD' });\n    const contentType = response.headers.get('content-type') ?? '';\n    if (contentType.startsWith('text/html')) {\n      const message =\n        `[VerificationGateway] apiBaseUrl '${apiBaseUrl}' returned HTML (content-type: ${contentType}). ` +\n        `This usually means apiBaseUrl is pointing at a marketing site instead of the API. ` +\n        `Expected: 'https://astrasync.ai/api' (prod) or 'https://staging.astrasync.ai/api' (staging).`;\n      // Audit F-A6-33: when strictInit is set, throw on misconfig instead\n      // of warning + continuing. Recurring footgun per\n      // `[[feedback_astrasync_api_url_canonical]]` — silent warn lets\n      // misconfigured prod deploys ship with all verify-access calls\n      // silently failing.\n      if (strictInit) {\n        throw new Error(`${message} (strictInit=true)`);\n      }\n      console.warn(`${message} Set disableInitChecks: true on GatewayConfig to silence.`);\n    } else if (debug) {\n      console.log(\n        `[VerificationGateway] init check passed for ${apiBaseUrl} (content-type: ${contentType})`\n      );\n    }\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (strictInit) {\n      // strict mode propagates init failures so callers get a clear,\n      // synchronous \"your config is broken\" signal at startup.\n      throw err;\n    }\n    if (debug) {\n      console.log(`[VerificationGateway] init check failed (non-blocking): ${String(err)}`);\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Simple in-memory cache for verification results\n */\nconst verificationCache = new Map<string, { result: VerificationResult; expiresAt: number }>();\n\n/**\n * Generate cache key from the full request shape.\n *\n * Round-18.5 F4: pre-fix the key was credentials-only (`astraId-apiKey-jwt`),\n * which silently returned the cached result of a prior call even when the\n * subsequent call's purpose/action/counterparty/etc. differed. That was a\n * security gap — a warm cache could serve an allow verdict for a purpose the\n * agent hadn't actually been authorised for. Key now includes every field\n * that affects the backend verdict.\n *\n * MAINTAIN: when adding a field to VerificationRequest that affects the\n * backend verdict, add it to this key. Fields that don't affect verdict\n * (e.g. requestId, timestamps, sdkVersion) don't belong here — including\n * them would needlessly thrash the cache for repeated identical requests.\n */\nfunction getCacheKey(request: VerificationRequest): string {\n  const c = request.credentials;\n  return [\n    c.astraId || '',\n    c.apiKey || '',\n    c.jwt || '',\n    request.purpose || '',\n    request.action || '',\n    request.resourceType || '',\n    request.resource || '',\n    request.jurisdiction || '',\n    request.transactionValue ?? '',\n    request.currency || '',\n    request.counterpartyUrl || '',\n    request.counterpartyType || '',\n    request.isSubAgentRequest ? '1' : '0',\n    request.parentAgentId || '',\n    request.subAgentDepth ?? '',\n    // Audit F-A1-07: previously-missing dimensions that DO affect the\n    // backend verdict. Without these, two requests with different\n    // durations (e.g. 60s vs 86400s) collided on the same cache key and\n    // the shorter-duration allow served the longer-duration request.\n    request.durationRequired ?? '',\n    request.invocationProtocol || '',\n    request.enableRuntimeChallenge ? '1' : '0',\n    // callerMetadata fields contribute to risk model; include the ones\n    // backend reads. sourceIp/userAgent/forwardedFor change per-request\n    // so their inclusion effectively forces a re-check for any varying\n    // client (the right behavior — IP-driven anomaly scoring shouldn't\n    // be cached across IPs).\n    request.callerMetadata?.sourceIp || '',\n    request.callerMetadata?.userAgent || '',\n    request.callerMetadata?.forwardedFor || '',\n    request.callerMetadata?.agentCardUrl || '',\n  ].join('|');\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if cached result is still valid\n */\nfunction getCachedResult(request: VerificationRequest): VerificationResult | null {\n  const key = getCacheKey(request);\n  const cached = verificationCache.get(key);\n\n  if (cached && cached.expiresAt > Date.now()) {\n    return cached.result;\n  }\n\n  if (cached) {\n    verificationCache.delete(key);\n  }\n\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Cache a verification result.\n *\n * Round-18.5 F4: TTL splits by step-up status when the caller hasn't pinned\n * `configuredTtl` explicitly. Autonomous verdicts cache for 60s (faster\n * policy-update propagation, better security posture); step-up verdicts cache\n * for 300s (matches human-paced approval cycles, prevents thrashing during\n * the user-action window). When `configuredTtl` is set (truthy positive\n * number), it's honoured uniformly for back-compat with partners pinning a\n * specific TTL today.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_AUTONOMOUS_TTL_SECONDS = 60;\nconst DEFAULT_STEP_UP_TTL_SECONDS = 300;\n\nfunction cacheResult(\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  result: VerificationResult,\n  configuredTtl: number | undefined\n): void {\n  const ttlSeconds =\n    configuredTtl && configuredTtl > 0\n      ? configuredTtl\n      : result.requiresStepUp\n        ? DEFAULT_STEP_UP_TTL_SECONDS\n        : DEFAULT_AUTONOMOUS_TTL_SECONDS;\n  const key = getCacheKey(request);\n  verificationCache.set(key, {\n    result,\n    expiresAt: Date.now() + ttlSeconds * 1000,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Clear the verification cache\n */\nexport function clearCache(): void {\n  verificationCache.clear();\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract agent credentials from various sources\n */\nexport function extractCredentials(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  query?: Record<string, string | undefined>\n): AgentCredentials {\n  const credentials: AgentCredentials = {};\n\n  // Audit F-A1-12: ASTRA-ID shape validation. Accept only the canonical\n  // pattern (ASTRA-/ASTRAE- prefix + 1-64 url-safe chars) to prevent CRLF\n  // header injection or downstream interpolation surprises. Reject otherwise.\n  const ASTRA_ID_PATTERN = /^ASTRAE?-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64}$/;\n\n  // Check for ASTRA-ID in headers (case-insensitive). Accepts the historical\n  // X-Astra-Id name plus the X-Astra-AgentId / x-astra-agent-id alias the\n  // partner asked for in #9a — both surface the same field.\n  const astraIdHeader =\n    headers['x-astra-id'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-Id'] ||\n    headers['X-ASTRA-ID'] ||\n    headers['x-astra-agentid'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-AgentId'] ||\n    headers['x-astra-agent-id'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-Agent-Id'] ||\n    headers['X-ASTRA-AGENT-ID'];\n  if (astraIdHeader) {\n    // Audit F-A1-11: guard array-confusion. If multiple X-Astra-Id headers\n    // were sent (Express collapses to comma-joined string on most paths),\n    // take only the first canonical-shaped one.\n    const raw = Array.isArray(astraIdHeader)\n      ? astraIdHeader[0]\n      : typeof astraIdHeader === 'string'\n        ? astraIdHeader\n        : undefined;\n    if (typeof raw === 'string' && ASTRA_ID_PATTERN.test(raw)) {\n      credentials.astraId = raw;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Check for API key in headers\n  const apiKeyHeader = headers['x-api-key'] || headers['X-Api-Key'] || headers['X-API-KEY'];\n  if (apiKeyHeader) {\n    credentials.apiKey = Array.isArray(apiKeyHeader) ? apiKeyHeader[0] : apiKeyHeader;\n  }\n\n  // Check Authorization header for Bearer token.\n  // Audit F-A1-11: defensive type guard — Array.isArray gives a non-string,\n  // and Express path quirks can produce undefined despite the truthy check.\n  const authHeader = headers['authorization'] || headers['Authorization'];\n  if (authHeader) {\n    const authValue = Array.isArray(authHeader) ? authHeader[0] : authHeader;\n    if (typeof authValue === 'string') {\n      credentials.authorizationHeader = authValue;\n      if (authValue.startsWith('Bearer ')) {\n        credentials.jwt = authValue.slice(7);\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Check query parameters as fallback\n  if (query) {\n    if (query.astraId && !credentials.astraId) {\n      credentials.astraId = query.astraId;\n    }\n    if (query.apiKey && !credentials.apiKey) {\n      credentials.apiKey = query.apiKey;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return credentials;\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if credentials are present\n */\nexport function hasCredentials(credentials: AgentCredentials): boolean {\n  return !!(credentials.astraId || credentials.apiKey || credentials.jwt);\n}\n\n/**\n * Source of a synthesised guidance response. Round-10 split — the\n * `'no_credentials'` shape is the original (caller has no AstraSync\n * credentials, suggest registration). The `'api_error'` shape is for when\n * the verify-access HTTP call itself failed (5xx, network, etc.) — DON'T\n * tell a verified-but-currently-blocked partner to \"register your agent\".\n */\ntype GuidanceSource = 'no_credentials' | 'api_error';\n\n/**\n * Create guidance response for unverified agents or for API-error fallback.\n *\n * Round-10 (#47, O5): split source so the `register your agent` template\n * doesn't fire on transient backend failures. Also threads `correlationId`\n * through so adapter `onDenied` handlers can surface it on the merchant's\n * response body for log correlation.\n */\nfunction createGuidanceResponse(\n  _config: GatewayConfig,\n  reason?: string,\n  options: { source?: GuidanceSource; correlationId?: string; urls?: WellKnownAgenticCommerce } = {}\n): VerificationResult {\n  const source = options.source ?? 'no_credentials';\n  const isApiError = source === 'api_error';\n  const urls = options.urls;\n\n  const guidance: GuidanceInfo = isApiError\n    ? {\n        message:\n          'Verification is temporarily unavailable. Retry with exponential backoff; if the issue persists, contact support with the correlationId.',\n        registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n        documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        steps: [\n          'Retry the request with exponential backoff',\n          'If failures persist, share the correlationId with support',\n        ],\n      }\n    : {\n        message:\n          'This service verifies AI agents before granting access. Please register your agent with AstraSync.',\n        registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n        documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        steps: [\n          'Register for an AstraSync account',\n          'Create and register your agent',\n          'Add your ASTRA-ID to request headers',\n          'Retry your request',\n        ],\n      };\n\n  return {\n    // Round-18 G4: createGuidanceResponse fires for unverified-agent path or\n    // API-error fallback. Identity is not verified (no agent resolved);\n    // policy is not evaluated (we never reached the gate).\n    identityVerified: false,\n    policyAllowed: false,\n    // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denials grant `'none'`, NEVER a positive band.\n    // Adapters additionally short-circuit on `!identityVerified ||\n    // !policyAllowed` before the gate check, but the access level still has\n    // to be honest at the data layer so downstream consumers (SDK adapters\n    // in other languages, custom integrations) inherit the correct\n    // semantics.\n    accessLevel: 'none',\n    guidance,\n    denialReasons: reason ? [reason] : ['No valid agent credentials provided'],\n    // Round-10 (#47, O5): on API-error fallback, surface a typed failure so\n    // partners (and their custom onDenied handlers) can branch on\n    // dimension. Without this, the synthesised stub was indistinguishable\n    // from a real policy deny.\n    failures: isApiError\n      ? [\n          {\n            dimension: 'verify_access.api_error',\n            message: reason ?? 'Verification temporarily unavailable',\n            guidance: guidance.message,\n          },\n        ]\n      : undefined,\n    correlationId: options.correlationId,\n    verifiedAt: new Date(),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Call the AstraSync verify-access API\n */\nasync function callVerifyAccessAPI(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest\n): Promise<{\n  success: boolean;\n  access?: {\n    allowed: boolean;\n    /**\n     * Server-decided access level. Read verbatim — do NOT remap client-side.\n     * The server resolves this from endpoint policy + agent trust score using\n     * the canonical thresholds (see backend `apps/backend/src/utils/access-levels.ts`).\n     */\n    accessLevel?: AccessLevel;\n    reason?: string;\n    /**\n     * Aggregated denial failures (v2.9.8+). Empty / absent when allowed.\n     * Each entry is `{ dimension, message, guidance? }` — see\n     * `AccessFailure` for the contract.\n     */\n    failures?: Array<{ dimension: string; message: string; guidance?: string }>;\n    requiresStepUp?: boolean;\n    requiresApproval?: boolean;\n    appliedPolicy?: {\n      boundaryName: string;\n      policyVersion: string;\n    };\n    counterparty?: {\n      id: string;\n      name: string;\n      trustScoreRequirement: number;\n    };\n  };\n  agent?: {\n    kyaAgentId: string;\n    astraId: string;\n    name: string;\n    trustScore: number;\n    trustLevel: string;\n    agentStatus: string;\n    blockchainStatus: string;\n  };\n  developer?: {\n    kyaOwnerId: string;\n    fullName: string;\n    email: string;\n    identityVerified: boolean;\n    trustScore: number;\n  };\n  organization?: {\n    name: string;\n    verified: boolean;\n    trustScore: number;\n  };\n  /**\n   * Structured explanation of the verification decision. Tells the merchant\n   * WHY (id verified? challenge passed? request within PDLSS? trust score?)\n   * without exposing thresholds, scope lists, or other-tenant counterparty\n   * membership. Empty `attestations` unless the endpoint's access policy\n   * declared `required_attestations`.\n   */\n  verificationContext?: {\n    idVerified: boolean;\n    runtimeChallenge: {\n      status: 'passed' | 'skipped' | 'failed' | 'timeout' | 'not_supported';\n      checkedAt: string | null;\n    };\n    pdlssCheck: {\n      result: 'within' | 'exceeded' | 'denied' | 'not_evaluated';\n      purpose: 'approved' | 'denied';\n      scope: 'approved' | 'denied';\n    };\n    dynamicTrustScore: number;\n    attestations: Array<{\n      type: string;\n      status: 'passed' | 'failed';\n      validUntil?: string;\n      proofType: 'reference' | 'zkp';\n      proof: string;\n    }>;\n  };\n  error?: string;\n  /**\n   * Round-10 (#47, O5): when the verify-access server response carries a\n   * correlationId on an error envelope, propagate it so the SDK can thread\n   * it through createGuidanceResponse → adapter onDenied → merchant body.\n   */\n  correlationId?: string;\n}> {\n  const { credentials, ...requestData } = request;\n\n  // Build the request body. agentId is omitted when not provided so the\n  // server treats it as an anonymous canonical-flow call (Branch A/B/C).\n  const body: Record<string, unknown> = {\n    ...(credentials.astraId && { agentId: credentials.astraId }),\n    ...(requestData.purpose && { purpose: requestData.purpose }),\n  };\n\n  // Add optional fields\n  if (requestData.action) body.action = requestData.action;\n  if (requestData.resourceType) body.resourceType = requestData.resourceType;\n  if (requestData.resource) body.resource = requestData.resource;\n  if (requestData.jurisdiction) body.jurisdiction = requestData.jurisdiction;\n  if (requestData.transactionValue) body.transactionValue = requestData.transactionValue;\n  if (requestData.currency) body.currency = requestData.currency;\n  if (requestData.isSubAgentRequest) body.isSubAgentRequest = requestData.isSubAgentRequest;\n  if (requestData.parentAgentId) body.parentAgentId = requestData.parentAgentId;\n  if (requestData.subAgentDepth !== undefined) body.subAgentDepth = requestData.subAgentDepth;\n  // Handshake Protocol v10 additions\n  if (requestData.enableRuntimeChallenge)\n    body.enableRuntimeChallenge = requestData.enableRuntimeChallenge;\n  if (requestData.createSession) body.createSession = requestData.createSession;\n  if (requestData.durationRequired) body.durationRequired = requestData.durationRequired;\n  if (requestData.counterpartyType) body.counterpartyType = requestData.counterpartyType;\n  if (requestData.counterpartyUrl) body.counterpartyUrl = requestData.counterpartyUrl;\n  if (config.counterpartyId) body.counterpartyId = config.counterpartyId;\n  if (requestData.runtimeChallengeOptions)\n    body.runtimeChallengeOptions = requestData.runtimeChallengeOptions;\n  // Round-12 (F19): transport-vs-intent separation. MCP middleware sets\n  // this to 'mcp'; non-MCP callers leave it unset.\n  if (requestData.invocationProtocol) body.invocationProtocol = requestData.invocationProtocol;\n\n  // Round-13 (F14 closure / R13-7): emit the SDK package version on every\n  // verify-access body so the backend can auto-populate `kya_counterparty.\n  // sdk_version` for the calling endpoint. Body field (not User-Agent\n  // header) is the canonical channel — works in Node, browser, behind\n  // Cloudflare, and across SDK bundlers without environment-specific\n  // header gymnastics. Backend's `validation.ts:verifyAccessSchema`\n  // accepts the semver regex; the auto-pop logic is forward-only.\n  body.sdkVersion = SDK_VERSION;\n\n  // Forward caller metadata when present. Merges the legacy top-level\n  // clientIp/userAgent into the nested block for backward compatibility.\n  if (requestData.callerMetadata || requestData.clientIp || requestData.userAgent) {\n    const meta = {\n      ...(requestData.clientIp && { sourceIp: requestData.clientIp }),\n      ...(requestData.userAgent && { userAgent: requestData.userAgent }),\n      ...requestData.callerMetadata,\n    };\n    if (Object.keys(meta).length > 0) body.callerMetadata = meta;\n  }\n\n  // Build headers\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n    'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n    ...config.customHeaders,\n  };\n\n  // verify-access requires authentication. Use ONLY the merchant's\n  // configured apiKey for outbound auth. Previously the caller's inbound\n  // Authorization header took priority, which pivoted the verify-access\n  // call to the caller's identity — letting an attacker who supplied\n  // their own Authorization header trigger verify-access calls under\n  // THEIR account and observe the resulting verdicts for arbitrary\n  // lookups they triggered via the merchant. Audit F-A1-10.\n  //\n  // The caller-supplied JWT (if any) is already extracted to\n  // credentials.jwt and travels in the verify-access request body so\n  // backend can evaluate it as the agent's identity claim — separate from\n  // the merchant-attribution auth on the outbound HTTPS call.\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    // Legacy header kept for compatibility with any middleware that reads it directly.\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  try {\n    const response = await fetch(`${config.apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access`, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers,\n      body: JSON.stringify(body),\n    });\n\n    const data = await response.json();\n\n    // v2.3.8 (defect #29): treat 410 Gone as a deterministic deactivated-endpoint\n    // signal. Older SDKs may treat any non-2xx as transient and retry; v2.3.8+\n    // surfaces it as a structured denial with `reason: 'endpoint_deactivated'`\n    // so callers can distinguish \"endpoint gone\" from \"endpoint denied this\".\n    if (response.status === 410) {\n      return {\n        success: true,\n        access: {\n          allowed: false,\n          accessLevel: 'none',\n          reason: 'endpoint_deactivated',\n          failures: [\n            {\n              dimension: 'endpoint.deactivated',\n              message:\n                typeof data?.message === 'string' ? data.message : 'Endpoint has been deactivated',\n              guidance:\n                typeof data?.guidance === 'string'\n                  ? data.guidance\n                  : 'Reactivate via POST /api/endpoints/{id}/reactivate, or update the URL on the calling agent.',\n            },\n          ],\n        },\n      };\n    }\n\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      // Round-10 (#47, O5): propagate correlationId on the error path too if\n      // the server happened to include one (some 5xx error envelopes carry\n      // it). Lets the SDK pass it through to the adapter onDenied handler.\n      return {\n        success: false,\n        error: data.message || data.error || `API returned ${response.status}`,\n        correlationId: typeof data?.correlationId === 'string' ? data.correlationId : undefined,\n      };\n    }\n\n    return data;\n  } catch (error) {\n    const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error';\n    return {\n      success: false,\n      error: `Failed to call verify-access API: ${message}`,\n    };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Main verification function\n */\nexport async function verify(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest\n): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n  const mergedConfig = { ...DEFAULT_CONFIG, ...config };\n\n  // v2.5.0: read well-known URLs from cache (prefetched by adapter at middleware creation).\n  // Synchronous — never triggers a fetch. If cache is empty, guidance URLs are empty strings.\n  const urls = mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl\n    ? getCachedWellKnownUrls(mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl)\n    : undefined;\n\n  // One-time init self-test — fire-and-forget by default, never blocks verify().\n  // Audit F-A6-33: when GatewayConfig.strictInit is set, the init promise is\n  // awaited and any failure throws synchronously so callers learn about\n  // misconfigured apiBaseUrl on the first verify() call rather than silently\n  // running with broken auth.\n  if (!initCheckPerformed && !mergedConfig.disableInitChecks && mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl) {\n    if (mergedConfig.strictInit) {\n      await performInitCheck(mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl, mergedConfig.debug, true);\n    } else {\n      void performInitCheck(mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl, mergedConfig.debug, false);\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Deprecation warning for v2.3.0 removed config fields. Fires once per process.\n  if (\n    !deprecationWarningShown &&\n    (config.minTrustScore !== undefined || config.minTrustScoreForFull !== undefined)\n  ) {\n    deprecationWarningShown = true;\n    console.warn(\n      '[VerificationGateway] minTrustScore / minTrustScoreForFull are deprecated in v2.3.0 ' +\n        'and have no effect. Server is now the single source of truth for access-level decisions ' +\n        '(the SDK reads access.accessLevel from the verify-access response). To gate access ' +\n        \"to an endpoint, configure the endpoint's trust_score_requirement server-side.\"\n    );\n  }\n\n  // v2.3.0: anonymous traffic no longer short-circuits here. We forward the\n  // request to the server with no agentId; the server applies the endpoint's\n  // unverifiedAgentPolicy and returns advisory. createGuidanceResponse remains\n  // as the offline fallback if the API itself fails (handled below).\n\n  // Check cache first. Round-18.5 F4: caching on unless caller explicitly\n  // sets cacheTtl: 0 to disable. Undefined falls through to the split default\n  // (60s autonomous / 300s step-up) at cacheResult write time.\n  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0) {\n    const cached = getCachedResult(request);\n    if (cached) {\n      if (mergedConfig.debug) {\n        console.log('[VerificationGateway] Returning cached result');\n      }\n      return cached;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Inject counterparty info from config if not already set in request\n  const enrichedRequest = { ...request };\n  if (!enrichedRequest.counterpartyUrl && mergedConfig.counterpartyUrl) {\n    enrichedRequest.counterpartyUrl = mergedConfig.counterpartyUrl;\n  }\n  if (!enrichedRequest.counterpartyType && mergedConfig.counterpartyType) {\n    enrichedRequest.counterpartyType = mergedConfig.counterpartyType;\n  }\n\n  // Call the API\n  if (mergedConfig.debug) {\n    console.log('[VerificationGateway] Calling verify-access API');\n  }\n\n  const apiResponse = await callVerifyAccessAPI(mergedConfig, enrichedRequest);\n\n  // Handle API errors\n  if (!apiResponse.success) {\n    // Round-10 (#47, O5): distinguish API errors from missing-credentials.\n    // The previous default tagged any failure with the \"register your\n    // agent\" template, which is misleading to a verified partner whose\n    // verify-access call hit a 500. The `api_error` source surfaces a\n    // typed `verify_access.api_error` failure entry instead.\n    return createGuidanceResponse(mergedConfig, apiResponse.error, {\n      source: 'api_error',\n      correlationId: (apiResponse as { correlationId?: string }).correlationId,\n      urls,\n    });\n  }\n\n  // Check access result\n  if (!apiResponse.access?.allowed) {\n    // v2.9.8 (defect M1): aggregated failures across every gate that\n    // denied. Surface them on the result so the integrator can see every\n    // blocker in one go instead of the previous fail-fast cascade.\n    const aggregatedFailures = (apiResponse.access as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)\n      ?.failures as Array<{ dimension: string; message: string; guidance?: string }> | undefined;\n    // Round-18 G4: backend denied access (PDLSS or other gate); identity status\n    // depends on whether the backend resolved the caller. Read from\n    // verificationContext.idVerified; default false if absent (anonymous or\n    // identity-fail paths land here too). policyAllowed is false by definition\n    // in this branch (apiResponse.access.allowed === false).\n    const idVerifiedFromBackend =\n      (apiResponse.verificationContext as { idVerified?: boolean } | undefined)?.idVerified ===\n      true;\n    const result: EnhancedVerificationResult = {\n      identityVerified: idVerifiedFromBackend,\n      policyAllowed: false,\n      // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denials grant `'none'`, NEVER a positive band.\n      // Pre-rename this hardcoded `'guidance'`, which conflated with the\n      // colocated `guidance: {...}` help-payload object below and let\n      // denied requests pass any route gated at `'guidance'` because\n      // `hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance') === true`. Adapters now\n      // ALSO short-circuit on `!identityVerified || !policyAllowed` before\n      // the gate check — belt-and-braces.\n      accessLevel: 'none',\n      denialReasons:\n        aggregatedFailures && aggregatedFailures.length > 0\n          ? aggregatedFailures.map((f) => f.message)\n          : apiResponse.access?.reason\n            ? [apiResponse.access.reason]\n            : ['Access denied'],\n      failures: aggregatedFailures,\n      requiresStepUp: apiResponse.access?.requiresStepUp,\n      requiresApproval: apiResponse.access?.requiresApproval,\n      guidance: {\n        message: apiResponse.access?.reason || 'Access denied by PDLSS policy',\n        registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n        documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n      },\n      verifiedAt: new Date(),\n      // Extract sessionId so decisions can be recorded for denials too\n      sessionId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).sessionId as string | undefined,\n      // v2.3.10 (defect #34, round-4): anonymous traffic has no session →\n      // correlationId is the linking key for paired local_override events.\n      correlationId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).correlationId as string | undefined,\n      recommendation: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>)\n        .recommendation as EnhancedVerificationResult['recommendation'],\n      recommendationReasons: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).recommendationReasons as\n        | string[]\n        | undefined,\n    };\n\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  // Build successful result\n  const agent: VerifiedAgent | undefined = apiResponse.agent\n    ? {\n        astraId: apiResponse.agent.astraId,\n        name: apiResponse.agent.name,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.agent.trustScore,\n        trustLevel: getTrustLevel(apiResponse.agent.trustScore),\n        blockchainVerified: apiResponse.agent.blockchainStatus === 'verified',\n        status: apiResponse.agent.agentStatus as VerifiedAgent['status'],\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  const developer: VerifiedDeveloper | undefined = apiResponse.developer\n    ? {\n        astradId: apiResponse.developer.kyaOwnerId,\n        name: apiResponse.developer.fullName,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.developer.trustScore || 0,\n        verified: apiResponse.developer.identityVerified,\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  const organization: VerifiedOrganization | undefined = apiResponse.organization\n    ? {\n        name: apiResponse.organization.name,\n        verified: apiResponse.organization.verified,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.organization.trustScore,\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  // Verification context — structured \"why\" the merchant gets in v2.2.4+.\n  // Carries appliedPolicy (no UUIDs), pdlssCheck summary, dynamic trust score,\n  // and policy-driven attestations. Replaces the old over-sharing `pdlss` block.\n  const verificationContext = apiResponse.verificationContext;\n\n  // Server is the single source of truth for access level. SDK reads\n  // apiResponse.access.accessLevel verbatim — no client-side trust-score remap.\n  // Fallback to 'standard' if the server response is missing the field (older\n  // backend without the v2.3.0 contract); it covers the verified-access case.\n  const accessLevel: AccessLevel = apiResponse.access?.accessLevel ?? 'standard';\n\n  const result: EnhancedVerificationResult = {\n    // Round-18 G4: backend allowed access. Identity is verified (we resolved\n    // the caller to an agent) and policy passed all gates. Read idVerified\n    // from verificationContext for symmetry with the deny branch; default true\n    // on success path since `access.allowed === true` implies identity was\n    // resolvable (anonymous-allow paths flow through createGuidanceResponse).\n    identityVerified:\n      (apiResponse.verificationContext as { idVerified?: boolean } | undefined)?.idVerified !==\n      false,\n    policyAllowed: true,\n    accessLevel,\n    agent,\n    developer,\n    organization,\n    appliedPolicy: apiResponse.access?.appliedPolicy,\n    verificationContext,\n    requiresStepUp: apiResponse.access?.requiresStepUp,\n    requiresApproval: apiResponse.access?.requiresApproval,\n    verifiedAt: new Date(),\n    cacheTtl: mergedConfig.cacheTtl,\n    // Handshake Protocol v10 enhanced fields (present when backend returns them)\n    sessionId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).sessionId as string | undefined,\n    // v2.3.10 (defect #34, round-4): anonymous responses surface correlationId\n    // (no session row exists for unverified callers).\n    correlationId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).correlationId as string | undefined,\n    runtimeChallenge: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).runtimeChallenge as\n      | RuntimeChallengeResult\n      | undefined,\n    tokenGuidance: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).tokenGuidance as\n      | TokenGuidance\n      | undefined,\n    recommendation: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>)\n      .recommendation as EnhancedVerificationResult['recommendation'],\n    recommendationReasons: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).recommendationReasons as\n      | string[]\n      | undefined,\n    warningHeader: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).warningHeader as\n      | { name: string; value: string }\n      | undefined,\n  };\n\n  // Enforce AstraSync recommendation\n  if (result.recommendation === 'deny') {\n    // Round-18 G4: recommendation-driven deny lands on the success-path\n    // construction (identity was resolved). Flip policy only — identity stays\n    // verified — so adapters return 403 (re-auth won't help; the policy\n    // decision is the blocker).\n    result.policyAllowed = false;\n    result.accessLevel = 'none';\n    result.denialReasons = result.recommendationReasons || [\n      'Access denied by AstraSync recommendation',\n    ];\n    result.guidance = result.runtimeChallenge\n      ? {\n          message: `Verification failed: ${result.runtimeChallenge.reason || 'runtime challenge failed'}`,\n          registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n          documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        }\n      : {\n          message: result.recommendationReasons?.[0] || 'Access denied by AstraSync recommendation',\n          registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n          documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        };\n  } else if (result.recommendation === 'step_up_required') {\n    result.requiresStepUp = true;\n    if (ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY[result.accessLevel] > ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY['read-only']) {\n      result.accessLevel = 'read-only';\n    }\n    result.denialReasons = result.recommendationReasons || ['Step-up verification required'];\n  }\n\n  // Cache the result (skip caching denials — agent may fix challenge endpoint\n  // and retry). Round-18.5 F4: cacheResult applies split default (60s/300s)\n  // when configuredTtl is undefined; honours the caller's value when set.\n  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0 && result.recommendation !== 'deny') {\n    cacheResult(request, result, mergedConfig.cacheTtl);\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Record a counterparty's grant/deny decision for a verification session.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\n/**\n * v2.3.9 (defect #34): optional override metadata. Set when the SDK's\n * local enforcement (toolGate / methodGate / trustScore floor) rejected\n * a request the SERVER had granted. Backend emits a distinct\n * `verification.local_override` event so the activity feed surfaces the\n * divergence as a separate row.\n */\nexport interface DecisionOverride {\n  overriddenBy: 'toolGate' | 'methodGate' | 'trustScore' | 'other';\n  toolName?: string;\n  requestedLevel?: AccessLevel;\n  grantedLevel?: AccessLevel;\n}\n\nexport async function recordDecision(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  sessionId: string,\n  decision: 'granted' | 'denied',\n  reason?: string,\n  override?: DecisionOverride\n): Promise<void> {\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  await fetch(`${config.apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access/${sessionId}/decision`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers,\n    body: JSON.stringify({\n      decision,\n      reason,\n      ...(override && {\n        overriddenBy: override.overriddenBy,\n        toolName: override.toolName,\n        requestedLevel: override.requestedLevel,\n        grantedLevel: override.grantedLevel,\n      }),\n    }),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * v2.3.10 (defect #34, round-4): record a SDK-side local override for an\n * anonymous verify-access response. Anonymous traffic has no session row, so\n * `recordDecision` (above) doesn't apply — but we still need to surface the\n * dashboard-vs-runtime divergence (e.g. server granted with audit warning\n * but local toolGate floor denied) on the activity feed.\n *\n * Backend ties the resulting `verification.local_override` event back to the\n * original `verification.unverified_audit` event via `correlationId`. The\n * endpoint is sessionless — see the docstring on the backend route for the\n * abuse-mitigation rationale (rate-limited per IP).\n *\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function recordAnonymousLocalOverride(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  correlationId: string,\n  override: DecisionOverride,\n  reason?: string\n): Promise<void> {\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  await fetch(`${config.apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access/local-override`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers,\n    body: JSON.stringify({\n      correlationId,\n      reason,\n      overriddenBy: override.overriddenBy,\n      toolName: override.toolName,\n      requestedLevel: override.requestedLevel,\n      grantedLevel: override.grantedLevel,\n    }),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Fetch the per-route policy for an endpoint from the AstraSync backend.\n * v2.9.7 moved policy authority into the dashboard — the SDK no longer\n * accepts `routes` from merchant-side source code, it fetches them from\n * here on init (and refreshes periodically).\n *\n * Returns `null` when the request fails for any reason — the caller decides\n * how to fall back (the middleware allows-all when no policy is loaded so\n * a misconfigured init doesn't take down the merchant's API).\n */\nexport async function fetchRoutes(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  counterpartyId: string\n): Promise<RouteAccessConfigShape[] | null> {\n  if (!counterpartyId) return null;\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n  try {\n    const response = await fetch(\n      `${config.apiBaseUrl}/endpoints/${encodeURIComponent(counterpartyId)}/routes`,\n      { method: 'GET', headers }\n    );\n    if (!response.ok) return null;\n    const body = (await response.json()) as { data?: { routes?: RouteAccessConfigShape[] } };\n    return body.data?.routes ?? [];\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Minimal shape of an EndpointRoute as the SDK consumes it. Mirrors the\n * server's `EndpointRoute` type and the SDK's `RouteAccessConfig` — same\n * JSON moves between server and SDK unchanged.\n */\nexport interface RouteAccessConfigShape {\n  pattern: string;\n  method: string;\n  minAccessLevel: 'none' | 'restricted' | 'read-only' | 'standard' | 'full' | 'internal';\n  minTrustScore?: number;\n  requiredPurposes?: string[];\n  allowedPurposes?: string[];\n  allowedJurisdictions?: string[];\n  maxDuration?: number;\n  maxTransactionValue?: number;\n  requirePurpose?: boolean;\n  /** Send-mapping (Bug 14, §4.6) — see RouteAccessConfig in types.ts. */\n  purpose?: string;\n  action?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify an agent AND automatically record the grant/deny decision.\n *\n * This is the recommended entry point for counterparties that call verify()\n * directly (e.g. MCP servers) rather than using createMiddleware().\n * It adds createSession: true, then fire-and-forgets the decision.\n */\nexport async function verifyAndRecord(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest\n): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n  const mergedConfig = { ...DEFAULT_CONFIG, ...config };\n  const result = await verify(mergedConfig, { ...request, createSession: true });\n  const sessionId = (result as EnhancedVerificationResult).sessionId;\n\n  if (sessionId) {\n    // Round-18 G4: a session is \"granted\" only if identity verified AND\n    // policy allowed; either failing is a deny.\n    if (result.identityVerified && result.policyAllowed) {\n      recordDecision(mergedConfig, sessionId, 'granted').catch(() => {});\n    } else {\n      recordDecision(mergedConfig, sessionId, 'denied', result.denialReasons?.[0]).catch(() => {});\n    }\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Report an unregistered agent attempt (no AstraSync credentials).\n * Called by SDK adapters when an agent is redirected to /docs/agent-access.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function reportUnregisteredAttempt(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  data: {\n    counterpartyUrl: string;\n    counterpartyType?: string;\n    sourceIp?: string;\n    userAgent?: string;\n    requestPath?: string;\n    requestMethod?: string;\n  }\n): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n\n  await fetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/verification-activity/unregistered-attempt`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n    body: JSON.stringify(data),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Report a counterparty-side PDLSS pre-check failure.\n * Called by SDK adapters when the agent's requested PDLSS exceeds\n * counterparty-defined maximums BEFORE calling verify-access.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function reportCounterpartyPreCheckFailure(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  data: {\n    agentId: string;\n    counterpartyUrl: string;\n    counterpartyType?: string;\n    failures: Array<{\n      field: string;\n      requested: string | number;\n      limit: string | number | string[];\n      message: string;\n    }>;\n    requestPath?: string;\n    requestMethod?: string;\n  }\n): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n\n  await fetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/verification-activity/counterparty-pre-check-failure`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n    body: JSON.stringify(data),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Quick verification — checks credentials and policy in one call.\n *\n * Round-18 G4: return shape mirrors `VerificationResult`'s split — partners\n * writing custom handlers around `quickVerify` get the same identity/policy\n * distinction as those calling `verify()` directly. Map to HTTP status the\n * same way: `!identityVerified` → 401; `identityVerified && !policyAllowed`\n * → 403.\n */\nexport async function quickVerify(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  credentials: AgentCredentials\n): Promise<{\n  identityVerified: boolean;\n  policyAllowed: boolean;\n  accessLevel: AccessLevel;\n  reason?: string;\n}> {\n  const result = await verify(config, {\n    credentials,\n    purpose: 'verification',\n  });\n\n  return {\n    identityVerified: result.identityVerified,\n    policyAllowed: result.policyAllowed,\n    accessLevel: result.accessLevel,\n    reason: result.denialReasons?.[0],\n  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Map to HTTP status the same way: `!identityVerified` → 401,\n   * `identityVerified && !policyAllowed` → 403.\n   */\n  async quickVerify(credentials: { astraId?: string; apiKey?: string; jwt?: string }): Promise<{\n    identityVerified: boolean;\n    policyAllowed: boolean;\n    accessLevel: AccessLevel;\n    reason?: string;\n  }> {\n    return this.executeWithRetry(() => coreQuickVerify(this.config, credentials));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Check if an agent has a specific access level.\n   *\n   * @deprecated 3.2.0 — the access-level band is informational only; it no\n   * longer gates in the middleware adapters (post-3.1.0 feedback #1). This\n   * explicit opt-in query still works, but prefer gating on the server-side\n   * policy decision (identity + policy + trust) or per-route `minTrustScore`.\n   * Explicit per-route condition→constraint rules are the Phase-2 successor.\n   */\n  async hasAccess(\n    credentials: { astraId?: string; apiKey?: string; jwt?: string },\n    requiredLevel: AccessLevel\n  ): Promise<boolean> {\n    const result = await this.quickVerify(credentials);\n    return hasMinimumAccess(result.accessLevel, requiredLevel);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Get capabilities for a verified agent\n   */\n  async getCapabilities(credentials: {\n    astraId?: string;\n    apiKey?: string;\n    jwt?: string;\n  }): Promise<AccessCapabilities> {\n    const result = await this.quickVerify(credentials);\n    return getCapabilities(result.accessLevel);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Verify a specific ASTRA-ID\n   */\n  async verifyAstraId(\n    astraId: string,\n    options?: {\n      purpose?: string;\n      action?: string;\n    }\n  ): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n    return this.verify({\n      astraId,\n      purpose: options?.purpose,\n      action: options?.action,\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Verify using an API key\n   */\n  async verifyApiKey(\n    apiKey: string,\n    options?: {\n      purpose?: string;\n      action?: string;\n    }\n  ): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n    return this.verify({\n      apiKey,\n      purpose: options?.purpose,\n      action: options?.action,\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Clear the verification cache\n   */\n  clearCache(): void {\n    clearCache();\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Execute a function with retry logic\n   */\n  private async executeWithRetry<T>(fn: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {\n    let lastError: Error | null = null;\n\n    for (let attempt = 0; attempt <= this.retryConfig.maxRetries; attempt++) {\n      try {\n        // Add timeout\n        const result = await Promise.race([\n          fn(),\n          new Promise<never>((_, reject) =>\n            setTimeout(() => reject(new Error('Request timeout')), this.timeout)\n          ),\n        ]);\n\n        return result;\n      } catch (error) {\n        lastError = error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error));\n\n        // Don't retry on last attempt\n        if (attempt < this.retryConfig.maxRetries) {\n          // Exponential backoff\n          const backoff = this.retryConfig.backoffMs * Math.pow(2, attempt);\n          await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, backoff));\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    throw lastError || new Error('Verification failed after retries');\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Create a new SDK client\n */\nexport function createClient(options: SDKOptions): VerificationGatewayClient {\n  return new VerificationGatewayClient(options);\n}\n\n/**\n * One-shot verification without creating a client\n */\nexport async function verifyOnce(\n  options: SDKOptions & {\n    astraId?: string;\n    apiKey?: string;\n    jwt?: string;\n    purpose?: string;\n    action?: string;\n  }\n): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n  const client = createClient(options);\n  return client.verify(options);\n}\n\n// Re-export utilities for convenience\nexport { getTrustLevel, hasMinimumAccess, getCapabilities };\n","/**\n * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway - Access Level Definitions\n *\n * Defines the hierarchy and capabilities of each access level.\n *\n * v2.3.9 (defect #30): renamed `'guidance'` band → `'restricted'`. See\n * `types.ts` AccessLevel for the rationale (value-name collision with the\n * `guidance: {...}` help-payload object on VerificationResult).\n */\n\nimport type { AccessLevel, TrustLevel } from './types';\n\n/**\n * Access level hierarchy (higher number = more access)\n */\nexport const ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY: Record<AccessLevel, number> = {\n  none: 0,\n  restricted: 1,\n  'read-only': 2,\n  standard: 3,\n  full: 4,\n  internal: 5,\n};\n\n/**\n * Access level descriptions for UI\n */\nexport const ACCESS_LEVEL_DESCRIPTIONS: Record<AccessLevel, string> = {\n  none: 'No access - credentials required',\n  restricted: 'Restricted access - registration prompt only',\n  'read-only': 'Read-only access - can browse but not modify',\n  standard: 'Standard access - normal operations per PDLSS policy',\n  full: 'Full access - all operations for high-trust agents',\n  internal: 'Internal access - organization member privileges',\n};\n\n/**\n * Default trust score thresholds for access levels\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_TRUST_THRESHOLDS: Record<AccessLevel, number> = {\n  none: 0,\n  restricted: 0,\n  'read-only': 20,\n  standard: 40,\n  full: 70,\n  internal: 0, // Internal is based on org membership, not score\n};\n\n/**\n * Trust level score ranges\n */\nexport const TRUST_LEVEL_RANGES: Record<TrustLevel, { min: number; max: number }> = {\n  BRONZE: { min: 0, max: 39 },\n  SILVER: { min: 40, max: 59 },\n  GOLD: { min: 60, max: 79 },\n  PLATINUM: { min: 80, max: 100 },\n};\n\n/**\n * Determine trust level from score\n */\nexport function getTrustLevel(score: number): TrustLevel {\n  if (score >= 80) return 'PLATINUM';\n  if (score >= 60) return 'GOLD';\n  if (score >= 40) return 'SILVER';\n  return 'BRONZE';\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if access level A is greater than or equal to access level B.\n *\n * @deprecated 3.2.0 — the access-level band is informational only and no\n * longer gates in the middleware adapters (post-3.1.0 feedback #1). Retained\n * for explicit opt-in queries and back-compat. Prefer the server-side policy\n * decision (identity + policy + trust) or per-route `minTrustScore`.\n */\nexport function hasMinimumAccess(actual: AccessLevel, required: AccessLevel): boolean {\n  return ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY[actual] >= ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY[required];\n}\n\n/**\n * Get the highest access level for a given trust score\n */\nexport function getAccessLevelForScore(\n  trustScore: number,\n  thresholds: Record<AccessLevel, number> = DEFAULT_TRUST_THRESHOLDS\n): AccessLevel {\n  if (trustScore >= thresholds.full) return 'full';\n  if (trustScore >= thresholds.standard) return 'standard';\n  if (trustScore >= thresholds['read-only']) return 'read-only';\n  return 'restricted';\n}\n\n/**\n * Determine access level from verification result.\n *\n * v2.3.9 (defect #30): unverified callers now return `'none'` (was\n * `'guidance'`). Denials grant zero — never a positive band.\n */\nexport function determineAccessLevel(\n  verified: boolean,\n  trustScore: number,\n  isOrgMember: boolean,\n  customThresholds?: Partial<Record<AccessLevel, number>>\n): AccessLevel {\n  if (!verified) {\n    return 'none';\n  }\n\n  if (isOrgMember) {\n    return 'internal';\n  }\n\n  const thresholds = {\n    ...DEFAULT_TRUST_THRESHOLDS,\n    ...customThresholds,\n  };\n\n  return getAccessLevelForScore(trustScore, thresholds);\n}\n\n/**\n * Access capabilities per level\n */\nexport interface AccessCapabilities {\n  canRead: boolean;\n  canWrite: boolean;\n  canDelete: boolean;\n  canAdmin: boolean;\n  canAccessInternal: boolean;\n  maxTransactionValue?: number;\n  allowedPurposes?: string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Get capabilities for an access level\n */\nexport function getCapabilities(accessLevel: AccessLevel): AccessCapabilities {\n  switch (accessLevel) {\n    case 'none':\n      return {\n        canRead: false,\n        canWrite: false,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'restricted':\n      return {\n        canRead: false,\n        canWrite: false,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'read-only':\n      return {\n        canRead: true,\n        canWrite: false,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'standard':\n      return {\n        canRead: true,\n        canWrite: true,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'full':\n      return {\n        canRead: true,\n        canWrite: true,\n        canDelete: true,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'internal':\n      return {\n        canRead: true,\n        canWrite: true,\n        canDelete: true,\n        canAdmin: true,\n        canAccessInternal: true,\n      };\n    default:\n      return {\n        canRead: false,\n        canWrite: false,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Round-13 (F14 closure / R13-7): single source-of-truth for the SDK's\n * package version emitted on verify-access bodies (and any future\n * telemetry). Bumped alongside `package.json#version` on every release.\n *\n * Why a constant rather than `import pkg from '../package.json'`:\n * - `tsconfig.json` sets `rootDir: ./src`; importing the sibling\n *   package.json fails the build with \"outside rootDir\".\n * - Build-time string replacement (tsup `define`, esbuild banner, etc.)\n *   adds toolchain coupling for a trivial gain.\n * - Embedded readonly constant works in every environment (Node, browser,\n *   bundlers, Deno) without runtime fs / network access.\n *\n * Release discipline: a CI lint can grep `package.json#version` against\n * this constant if the two ever diverge in the wild. Round-13 manual bump\n * is fine — bumping both in the release-ceremony commit keeps them\n * lockstep.\n */\nexport const SDK_VERSION = '3.2.0';\n","/**\n * SDK-side discovery of canonical platform URLs via `/.well-known/agentic-commerce`.\n *\n * Fire-and-forget pre-fetch at middleware creation; first verify() awaits\n * the in-flight promise if it hasn't resolved. 60-minute TTL with\n * stale-while-revalidate background refresh.\n */\n\nexport interface WellKnownAgenticCommerce {\n  registrationUrl: string;\n  documentationUrl: string;\n  verifyAccessUrl: string;\n}\n\ninterface CacheEntry {\n  data: WellKnownAgenticCommerce;\n  fetchedAt: number;\n}\n\nconst CACHE_TTL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 60 minutes\n\nconst cache = new Map<string, CacheEntry>();\nconst inflight = new Map<string, Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce>>();\n\nfunction wellKnownUrl(apiBaseUrl: string): string {\n  // apiBaseUrl is typically 'https://astrasync.ai/api' — strip the /api suffix\n  // to get the platform root, then append /.well-known/agentic-commerce.\n  const base = apiBaseUrl.replace(/\\/api\\/?$/, '');\n  return `${base}/.well-known/agentic-commerce`;\n}\n\nasync function fetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl: string): Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce> {\n  const url = wellKnownUrl(apiBaseUrl);\n  const response = await fetch(url, {\n    method: 'GET',\n    headers: { Accept: 'application/json' },\n    signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5000),\n  });\n  if (!response.ok) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `AstraSync platform must expose /.well-known/agentic-commerce; ` +\n        `got ${response.status} from ${url}. SDK cannot initialise without it.`\n    );\n  }\n  const data = (await response.json()) as Record<string, unknown>;\n  if (!data.registrationUrl || !data.documentationUrl || !data.verifyAccessUrl) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `/.well-known/agentic-commerce response missing required fields ` +\n        `(registrationUrl, documentationUrl, verifyAccessUrl).`\n    );\n  }\n  return data as unknown as WellKnownAgenticCommerce;\n}\n\n/**\n * Start a background fetch. Returns the promise for callers that need\n * to await it (first verify() call).\n */\nexport function prefetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl: string): Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce> {\n  const existing = inflight.get(apiBaseUrl);\n  if (existing) return existing;\n\n  const promise = fetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl)\n    .then((data) => {\n      cache.set(apiBaseUrl, { data, fetchedAt: Date.now() });\n      inflight.delete(apiBaseUrl);\n      return data;\n    })\n    .catch((err) => {\n      inflight.delete(apiBaseUrl);\n      throw err;\n    });\n\n  inflight.set(apiBaseUrl, promise);\n  return promise;\n}\n\n/**\n * Get cached well-known URLs. If stale, triggers a background refresh\n * and returns stale data (stale-while-revalidate). If no cache exists,\n * awaits the in-flight fetch or starts a new one.\n */\nexport async function getWellKnownUrls(apiBaseUrl: string): Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce> {\n  const entry = cache.get(apiBaseUrl);\n\n  if (entry) {\n    if (Date.now() - entry.fetchedAt > CACHE_TTL_MS) {\n      // Stale — trigger background refresh, return stale data\n      prefetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl).catch(() => {\n        // Background refresh failed — stale data remains until next request\n      });\n    }\n    return entry.data;\n  }\n\n  // No cache — must await\n  const pending = inflight.get(apiBaseUrl);\n  if (pending) return pending;\n\n  return prefetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl);\n}\n\n/**\n * Synchronous cache read — returns cached URLs or undefined.\n * Never triggers a fetch. Used by verify() to avoid extra HTTP calls\n * in the hot path; adapters are responsible for prefetching.\n */\nexport function getCachedWellKnownUrls(apiBaseUrl: string): WellKnownAgenticCommerce | undefined {\n  return cache.get(apiBaseUrl)?.data;\n}\n\n/** Reset cache — for testing only. */\nexport function _resetWellKnownCache(): void {\n  cache.clear();\n  inflight.clear();\n}\n","/**\n * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway - Core Verification Logic\n *\n * This module handles the core verification logic, calling the AstraSync API\n * and processing the response into a standardized VerificationResult.\n */\n\nimport type {\n  GatewayConfig,\n  AgentCredentials,\n  VerificationRequest,\n  VerificationResult,\n  VerifiedAgent,\n  VerifiedDeveloper,\n  VerifiedOrganization,\n  GuidanceInfo,\n  AccessLevel,\n  EnhancedVerificationResult,\n  TokenGuidance,\n  RuntimeChallengeResult,\n} from './types';\nimport { getTrustLevel } from './access-levels';\nimport { SDK_VERSION } from './version';\nimport { getCachedWellKnownUrls, type WellKnownAgenticCommerce } from './well-known';\n\n/**\n * Default configuration values\n *\n * apiBaseUrl matches the OpenAPI authoritative server (https://astrasync.ai/api\n * for prod, https://staging.astrasync.ai/api for staging). Always include the\n * /api path prefix when overriding — registration / docs URLs are derived by\n * stripping it.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_CONFIG: Partial<GatewayConfig> = {\n  apiBaseUrl: 'https://astrasync.ai/api',\n  // v2.3.9 (defect #30): default for unconfigured callers is `'none'` (no\n  // access). Pre-rename this defaulted to `'guidance'`, which combined with\n  // a route gated at `'guidance'` to silently let unverified traffic\n  // through (`hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance') === true`).\n  defaultAccessLevel: 'none',\n  // minTrustScore + minTrustScoreForFull deprecated in v2.3.0 — server decides.\n  // Round-18.5 F4: cacheTtl deliberately unset. When undefined, cacheResult\n  // applies the split default (60s autonomous / 300s step-up). When the\n  // caller sets cacheTtl explicitly, that value is honoured uniformly.\n  // Set cacheTtl: 0 to disable caching entirely.\n  debug: false,\n};\n\n/**\n * Init self-test state. Fires once per process on first verify() call to warn\n * if apiBaseUrl is pointing at the wrong host (e.g. a marketing site that\n * 200s with text/html instead of the API).\n */\nlet initCheckPerformed = false;\n\n/** One-shot guard for v2.3.0 deprecation warning. */\nlet deprecationWarningShown = false;\n\nasync function performInitCheck(\n  apiBaseUrl: string,\n  debug?: boolean,\n  strictInit?: boolean\n): Promise<void> {\n  initCheckPerformed = true;\n  try {\n    const probeUrl = `${apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access`;\n    // HEAD mirrors GET semantics (running the full request pipeline without a\n    // body) so the response carries the same content-type the marketing 404\n    // would return. OPTIONS often gets short-circuited by CORS-preflight\n    // handlers and returns no content-type, defeating the check.\n    const response = await fetch(probeUrl, { method: 'HEAD' });\n    const contentType = response.headers.get('content-type') ?? '';\n    if (contentType.startsWith('text/html')) {\n      const message =\n        `[VerificationGateway] apiBaseUrl '${apiBaseUrl}' returned HTML (content-type: ${contentType}). ` +\n        `This usually means apiBaseUrl is pointing at a marketing site instead of the API. ` +\n        `Expected: 'https://astrasync.ai/api' (prod) or 'https://staging.astrasync.ai/api' (staging).`;\n      // Audit F-A6-33: when strictInit is set, throw on misconfig instead\n      // of warning + continuing. Recurring footgun per\n      // `[[feedback_astrasync_api_url_canonical]]` — silent warn lets\n      // misconfigured prod deploys ship with all verify-access calls\n      // silently failing.\n      if (strictInit) {\n        throw new Error(`${message} (strictInit=true)`);\n      }\n      console.warn(`${message} Set disableInitChecks: true on GatewayConfig to silence.`);\n    } else if (debug) {\n      console.log(\n        `[VerificationGateway] init check passed for ${apiBaseUrl} (content-type: ${contentType})`\n      );\n    }\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (strictInit) {\n      // strict mode propagates init failures so callers get a clear,\n      // synchronous \"your config is broken\" signal at startup.\n      throw err;\n    }\n    if (debug) {\n      console.log(`[VerificationGateway] init check failed (non-blocking): ${String(err)}`);\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Simple in-memory cache for verification results\n */\nconst verificationCache = new Map<string, { result: VerificationResult; expiresAt: number }>();\n\n/**\n * Generate cache key from the full request shape.\n *\n * Round-18.5 F4: pre-fix the key was credentials-only (`astraId-apiKey-jwt`),\n * which silently returned the cached result of a prior call even when the\n * subsequent call's purpose/action/counterparty/etc. differed. That was a\n * security gap — a warm cache could serve an allow verdict for a purpose the\n * agent hadn't actually been authorised for. Key now includes every field\n * that affects the backend verdict.\n *\n * MAINTAIN: when adding a field to VerificationRequest that affects the\n * backend verdict, add it to this key. Fields that don't affect verdict\n * (e.g. requestId, timestamps, sdkVersion) don't belong here — including\n * them would needlessly thrash the cache for repeated identical requests.\n */\nfunction getCacheKey(request: VerificationRequest, counterpartyId?: string): string {\n  const c = request.credentials;\n  return [\n    c.astraId || '',\n    c.apiKey || '',\n    c.jwt || '',\n    request.purpose || '',\n    request.action || '',\n    request.resourceType || '',\n    request.resource || '',\n    request.jurisdiction || '',\n    request.transactionValue ?? '',\n    request.currency || '',\n    // SECURITY (cross-merchant cache leak): the merchant identity is sent via\n    // `config.counterpartyId`, NOT on the request, so it was previously absent\n    // from the key — two verifies for the SAME agent/purpose/action/value but\n    // DIFFERENT merchants collided, and a grant at a permissive merchant (low\n    // trust floor) was served for a stricter one. Same bug class as the\n    // duration omission (F-A1-07). counterpartyId affects the backend verdict\n    // (trust floor / per-route policy), so it MUST key the cache.\n    counterpartyId || '',\n    request.counterpartyUrl || '',\n    request.counterpartyType || '',\n    request.isSubAgentRequest ? '1' : '0',\n    request.parentAgentId || '',\n    request.subAgentDepth ?? '',\n    // Audit F-A1-07: previously-missing dimensions that DO affect the\n    // backend verdict. Without these, two requests with different\n    // durations (e.g. 60s vs 86400s) collided on the same cache key and\n    // the shorter-duration allow served the longer-duration request.\n    request.durationRequired ?? '',\n    request.invocationProtocol || '',\n    request.enableRuntimeChallenge ? '1' : '0',\n    // callerMetadata fields contribute to risk model; include the ones\n    // backend reads. sourceIp/userAgent/forwardedFor change per-request\n    // so their inclusion effectively forces a re-check for any varying\n    // client (the right behavior — IP-driven anomaly scoring shouldn't\n    // be cached across IPs).\n    request.callerMetadata?.sourceIp || '',\n    request.callerMetadata?.userAgent || '',\n    request.callerMetadata?.forwardedFor || '',\n    request.callerMetadata?.agentCardUrl || '',\n  ].join('|');\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if cached result is still valid\n */\nfunction getCachedResult(\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  counterpartyId?: string\n): VerificationResult | null {\n  const key = getCacheKey(request, counterpartyId);\n  const cached = verificationCache.get(key);\n\n  if (cached && cached.expiresAt > Date.now()) {\n    return cached.result;\n  }\n\n  if (cached) {\n    verificationCache.delete(key);\n  }\n\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Cache a verification result.\n *\n * Round-18.5 F4: TTL splits by step-up status when the caller hasn't pinned\n * `configuredTtl` explicitly. Autonomous verdicts cache for 60s (faster\n * policy-update propagation, better security posture); step-up verdicts cache\n * for 300s (matches human-paced approval cycles, prevents thrashing during\n * the user-action window). When `configuredTtl` is set (truthy positive\n * number), it's honoured uniformly for back-compat with partners pinning a\n * specific TTL today.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_AUTONOMOUS_TTL_SECONDS = 60;\nconst DEFAULT_STEP_UP_TTL_SECONDS = 300;\n\nfunction cacheResult(\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  result: VerificationResult,\n  configuredTtl: number | undefined,\n  counterpartyId?: string\n): void {\n  const ttlSeconds =\n    configuredTtl && configuredTtl > 0\n      ? configuredTtl\n      : result.requiresStepUp\n        ? DEFAULT_STEP_UP_TTL_SECONDS\n        : DEFAULT_AUTONOMOUS_TTL_SECONDS;\n  const key = getCacheKey(request, counterpartyId);\n  verificationCache.set(key, {\n    result,\n    expiresAt: Date.now() + ttlSeconds * 1000,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Clear the verification cache\n */\nexport function clearCache(): void {\n  verificationCache.clear();\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract agent credentials from various sources\n */\nexport function extractCredentials(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  query?: Record<string, string | undefined>\n): AgentCredentials {\n  const credentials: AgentCredentials = {};\n\n  // Audit F-A1-12: ASTRA-ID shape validation. Accept only the canonical\n  // pattern (ASTRA-/ASTRAE- prefix + 1-64 url-safe chars) to prevent CRLF\n  // header injection or downstream interpolation surprises. Reject otherwise.\n  const ASTRA_ID_PATTERN = /^ASTRAE?-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64}$/;\n\n  // Check for ASTRA-ID in headers (case-insensitive). Accepts the historical\n  // X-Astra-Id name plus the X-Astra-AgentId / x-astra-agent-id alias the\n  // partner asked for in #9a — both surface the same field.\n  const astraIdHeader =\n    headers['x-astra-id'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-Id'] ||\n    headers['X-ASTRA-ID'] ||\n    headers['x-astra-agentid'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-AgentId'] ||\n    headers['x-astra-agent-id'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-Agent-Id'] ||\n    headers['X-ASTRA-AGENT-ID'];\n  if (astraIdHeader) {\n    // Audit F-A1-11: guard array-confusion. If multiple X-Astra-Id headers\n    // were sent (Express collapses to comma-joined string on most paths),\n    // take only the first canonical-shaped one.\n    const raw = Array.isArray(astraIdHeader)\n      ? astraIdHeader[0]\n      : typeof astraIdHeader === 'string'\n        ? astraIdHeader\n        : undefined;\n    if (typeof raw === 'string' && ASTRA_ID_PATTERN.test(raw)) {\n      credentials.astraId = raw;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Check for API key in headers\n  const apiKeyHeader = headers['x-api-key'] || headers['X-Api-Key'] || headers['X-API-KEY'];\n  if (apiKeyHeader) {\n    credentials.apiKey = Array.isArray(apiKeyHeader) ? apiKeyHeader[0] : apiKeyHeader;\n  }\n\n  // Check Authorization header for Bearer token.\n  // Audit F-A1-11: defensive type guard — Array.isArray gives a non-string,\n  // and Express path quirks can produce undefined despite the truthy check.\n  const authHeader = headers['authorization'] || headers['Authorization'];\n  if (authHeader) {\n    const authValue = Array.isArray(authHeader) ? authHeader[0] : authHeader;\n    if (typeof authValue === 'string') {\n      credentials.authorizationHeader = authValue;\n      if (authValue.startsWith('Bearer ')) {\n        credentials.jwt = authValue.slice(7);\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Check query parameters as fallback\n  if (query) {\n    if (query.astraId && !credentials.astraId) {\n      credentials.astraId = query.astraId;\n    }\n    if (query.apiKey && !credentials.apiKey) {\n      credentials.apiKey = query.apiKey;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return credentials;\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if credentials are present\n */\nexport function hasCredentials(credentials: AgentCredentials): boolean {\n  return !!(credentials.astraId || credentials.apiKey || credentials.jwt);\n}\n\n/**\n * Source of a synthesised guidance response. Round-10 split — the\n * `'no_credentials'` shape is the original (caller has no AstraSync\n * credentials, suggest registration). The `'api_error'` shape is for when\n * the verify-access HTTP call itself failed (5xx, network, etc.) — DON'T\n * tell a verified-but-currently-blocked partner to \"register your agent\".\n */\ntype GuidanceSource = 'no_credentials' | 'api_error';\n\n/**\n * Create guidance response for unverified agents or for API-error fallback.\n *\n * Round-10 (#47, O5): split source so the `register your agent` template\n * doesn't fire on transient backend failures. Also threads `correlationId`\n * through so adapter `onDenied` handlers can surface it on the merchant's\n * response body for log correlation.\n */\nfunction createGuidanceResponse(\n  _config: GatewayConfig,\n  reason?: string,\n  options: { source?: GuidanceSource; correlationId?: string; urls?: WellKnownAgenticCommerce } = {}\n): VerificationResult {\n  const source = options.source ?? 'no_credentials';\n  const isApiError = source === 'api_error';\n  const urls = options.urls;\n\n  const guidance: GuidanceInfo = isApiError\n    ? {\n        message:\n          'Verification is temporarily unavailable. Retry with exponential backoff; if the issue persists, contact support with the correlationId.',\n        registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n        documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        steps: [\n          'Retry the request with exponential backoff',\n          'If failures persist, share the correlationId with support',\n        ],\n      }\n    : {\n        message:\n          'This service verifies AI agents before granting access. Please register your agent with AstraSync.',\n        registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n        documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        steps: [\n          'Register for an AstraSync account',\n          'Create and register your agent',\n          'Add your ASTRA-ID to request headers',\n          'Retry your request',\n        ],\n      };\n\n  return {\n    // Round-18 G4: createGuidanceResponse fires for unverified-agent path or\n    // API-error fallback. Identity is not verified (no agent resolved);\n    // policy is not evaluated (we never reached the gate).\n    identityVerified: false,\n    policyAllowed: false,\n    // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denials grant `'none'`, NEVER a positive band.\n    // Adapters additionally short-circuit on `!identityVerified ||\n    // !policyAllowed` before the gate check, but the access level still has\n    // to be honest at the data layer so downstream consumers (SDK adapters\n    // in other languages, custom integrations) inherit the correct\n    // semantics.\n    accessLevel: 'none',\n    guidance,\n    denialReasons: reason ? [reason] : ['No valid agent credentials provided'],\n    // Round-10 (#47, O5): on API-error fallback, surface a typed failure so\n    // partners (and their custom onDenied handlers) can branch on\n    // dimension. Without this, the synthesised stub was indistinguishable\n    // from a real policy deny.\n    failures: isApiError\n      ? [\n          {\n            dimension: 'verify_access.api_error',\n            message: reason ?? 'Verification temporarily unavailable',\n            guidance: guidance.message,\n          },\n        ]\n      : undefined,\n    correlationId: options.correlationId,\n    verifiedAt: new Date(),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Call the AstraSync verify-access API\n */\nasync function callVerifyAccessAPI(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest\n): Promise<{\n  success: boolean;\n  access?: {\n    allowed: boolean;\n    /**\n     * Server-decided access level. Read verbatim — do NOT remap client-side.\n     * The server resolves this from endpoint policy + agent trust score using\n     * the canonical thresholds (see backend `apps/backend/src/utils/access-levels.ts`).\n     */\n    accessLevel?: AccessLevel;\n    reason?: string;\n    /**\n     * Aggregated denial failures (v2.9.8+). Empty / absent when allowed.\n     * Each entry is `{ dimension, message, guidance? }` — see\n     * `AccessFailure` for the contract.\n     */\n    failures?: Array<{ dimension: string; message: string; guidance?: string }>;\n    requiresStepUp?: boolean;\n    requiresApproval?: boolean;\n    appliedPolicy?: {\n      boundaryName: string;\n      policyVersion: string;\n    };\n    counterparty?: {\n      id: string;\n      name: string;\n      trustScoreRequirement: number;\n    };\n  };\n  agent?: {\n    kyaAgentId: string;\n    astraId: string;\n    name: string;\n    trustScore: number;\n    trustLevel: string;\n    agentStatus: string;\n    blockchainStatus: string;\n  };\n  developer?: {\n    kyaOwnerId: string;\n    fullName: string;\n    email: string;\n    identityVerified: boolean;\n    trustScore: number;\n  };\n  organization?: {\n    name: string;\n    verified: boolean;\n    trustScore: number;\n  };\n  /**\n   * Structured explanation of the verification decision. Tells the merchant\n   * WHY (id verified? challenge passed? request within PDLSS? trust score?)\n   * without exposing thresholds, scope lists, or other-tenant counterparty\n   * membership. Empty `attestations` unless the endpoint's access policy\n   * declared `required_attestations`.\n   */\n  verificationContext?: {\n    idVerified: boolean;\n    runtimeChallenge: {\n      status: 'passed' | 'skipped' | 'failed' | 'timeout' | 'not_supported';\n      checkedAt: string | null;\n    };\n    pdlssCheck: {\n      result: 'within' | 'exceeded' | 'denied' | 'not_evaluated';\n      purpose: 'approved' | 'denied';\n      scope: 'approved' | 'denied';\n    };\n    dynamicTrustScore: number;\n    attestations: Array<{\n      type: string;\n      status: 'passed' | 'failed';\n      validUntil?: string;\n      proofType: 'reference' | 'zkp';\n      proof: string;\n    }>;\n  };\n  error?: string;\n  /**\n   * Round-10 (#47, O5): when the verify-access server response carries a\n   * correlationId on an error envelope, propagate it so the SDK can thread\n   * it through createGuidanceResponse → adapter onDenied → merchant body.\n   */\n  correlationId?: string;\n}> {\n  const { credentials, ...requestData } = request;\n\n  // Build the request body. agentId is omitted when not provided so the\n  // server treats it as an anonymous canonical-flow call (Branch A/B/C).\n  const body: Record<string, unknown> = {\n    ...(credentials.astraId && { agentId: credentials.astraId }),\n    ...(requestData.purpose && { purpose: requestData.purpose }),\n  };\n\n  // Add optional fields\n  if (requestData.action) body.action = requestData.action;\n  if (requestData.resourceType) body.resourceType = requestData.resourceType;\n  if (requestData.resource) body.resource = requestData.resource;\n  if (requestData.jurisdiction) body.jurisdiction = requestData.jurisdiction;\n  if (requestData.transactionValue) body.transactionValue = requestData.transactionValue;\n  if (requestData.currency) body.currency = requestData.currency;\n  if (requestData.isSubAgentRequest) body.isSubAgentRequest = requestData.isSubAgentRequest;\n  if (requestData.parentAgentId) body.parentAgentId = requestData.parentAgentId;\n  if (requestData.subAgentDepth !== undefined) body.subAgentDepth = requestData.subAgentDepth;\n  // Handshake Protocol v10 additions\n  if (requestData.enableRuntimeChallenge)\n    body.enableRuntimeChallenge = requestData.enableRuntimeChallenge;\n  if (requestData.createSession) body.createSession = requestData.createSession;\n  if (requestData.durationRequired) body.durationRequired = requestData.durationRequired;\n  if (requestData.counterpartyType) body.counterpartyType = requestData.counterpartyType;\n  if (requestData.counterpartyUrl) body.counterpartyUrl = requestData.counterpartyUrl;\n  if (config.counterpartyId) body.counterpartyId = config.counterpartyId;\n  if (requestData.runtimeChallengeOptions)\n    body.runtimeChallengeOptions = requestData.runtimeChallengeOptions;\n  // Round-12 (F19): transport-vs-intent separation. MCP middleware sets\n  // this to 'mcp'; non-MCP callers leave it unset.\n  if (requestData.invocationProtocol) body.invocationProtocol = requestData.invocationProtocol;\n\n  // Round-13 (F14 closure / R13-7): emit the SDK package version on every\n  // verify-access body so the backend can auto-populate `kya_counterparty.\n  // sdk_version` for the calling endpoint. Body field (not User-Agent\n  // header) is the canonical channel — works in Node, browser, behind\n  // Cloudflare, and across SDK bundlers without environment-specific\n  // header gymnastics. Backend's `validation.ts:verifyAccessSchema`\n  // accepts the semver regex; the auto-pop logic is forward-only.\n  body.sdkVersion = SDK_VERSION;\n\n  // Forward caller metadata when present. Merges the legacy top-level\n  // clientIp/userAgent into the nested block for backward compatibility.\n  if (requestData.callerMetadata || requestData.clientIp || requestData.userAgent) {\n    const meta = {\n      ...(requestData.clientIp && { sourceIp: requestData.clientIp }),\n      ...(requestData.userAgent && { userAgent: requestData.userAgent }),\n      ...requestData.callerMetadata,\n    };\n    if (Object.keys(meta).length > 0) body.callerMetadata = meta;\n  }\n\n  // Build headers\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n    'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n    ...config.customHeaders,\n  };\n\n  // verify-access requires authentication. Use ONLY the merchant's\n  // configured apiKey for outbound auth. Previously the caller's inbound\n  // Authorization header took priority, which pivoted the verify-access\n  // call to the caller's identity — letting an attacker who supplied\n  // their own Authorization header trigger verify-access calls under\n  // THEIR account and observe the resulting verdicts for arbitrary\n  // lookups they triggered via the merchant. Audit F-A1-10.\n  //\n  // The caller-supplied JWT (if any) is already extracted to\n  // credentials.jwt and travels in the verify-access request body so\n  // backend can evaluate it as the agent's identity claim — separate from\n  // the merchant-attribution auth on the outbound HTTPS call.\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    // Legacy header kept for compatibility with any middleware that reads it directly.\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  try {\n    const response = await fetch(`${config.apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access`, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers,\n      body: JSON.stringify(body),\n    });\n\n    const data = await response.json();\n\n    // v2.3.8 (defect #29): treat 410 Gone as a deterministic deactivated-endpoint\n    // signal. Older SDKs may treat any non-2xx as transient and retry; v2.3.8+\n    // surfaces it as a structured denial with `reason: 'endpoint_deactivated'`\n    // so callers can distinguish \"endpoint gone\" from \"endpoint denied this\".\n    if (response.status === 410) {\n      return {\n        success: true,\n        access: {\n          allowed: false,\n          accessLevel: 'none',\n          reason: 'endpoint_deactivated',\n          failures: [\n            {\n              dimension: 'endpoint.deactivated',\n              message:\n                typeof data?.message === 'string' ? data.message : 'Endpoint has been deactivated',\n              guidance:\n                typeof data?.guidance === 'string'\n                  ? data.guidance\n                  : 'Reactivate via POST /api/endpoints/{id}/reactivate, or update the URL on the calling agent.',\n            },\n          ],\n        },\n      };\n    }\n\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      // Round-10 (#47, O5): propagate correlationId on the error path too if\n      // the server happened to include one (some 5xx error envelopes carry\n      // it). Lets the SDK pass it through to the adapter onDenied handler.\n      return {\n        success: false,\n        error: data.message || data.error || `API returned ${response.status}`,\n        correlationId: typeof data?.correlationId === 'string' ? data.correlationId : undefined,\n      };\n    }\n\n    return data;\n  } catch (error) {\n    const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error';\n    return {\n      success: false,\n      error: `Failed to call verify-access API: ${message}`,\n    };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Main verification function\n */\nexport async function verify(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest\n): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n  const mergedConfig = { ...DEFAULT_CONFIG, ...config };\n\n  // v2.5.0: read well-known URLs from cache (prefetched by adapter at middleware creation).\n  // Synchronous — never triggers a fetch. If cache is empty, guidance URLs are empty strings.\n  const urls = mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl\n    ? getCachedWellKnownUrls(mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl)\n    : undefined;\n\n  // One-time init self-test — fire-and-forget by default, never blocks verify().\n  // Audit F-A6-33: when GatewayConfig.strictInit is set, the init promise is\n  // awaited and any failure throws synchronously so callers learn about\n  // misconfigured apiBaseUrl on the first verify() call rather than silently\n  // running with broken auth.\n  if (!initCheckPerformed && !mergedConfig.disableInitChecks && mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl) {\n    if (mergedConfig.strictInit) {\n      await performInitCheck(mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl, mergedConfig.debug, true);\n    } else {\n      void performInitCheck(mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl, mergedConfig.debug, false);\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Deprecation warning for v2.3.0 removed config fields. Fires once per process.\n  if (\n    !deprecationWarningShown &&\n    (config.minTrustScore !== undefined || config.minTrustScoreForFull !== undefined)\n  ) {\n    deprecationWarningShown = true;\n    console.warn(\n      '[VerificationGateway] minTrustScore / minTrustScoreForFull are deprecated in v2.3.0 ' +\n        'and have no effect. Server is now the single source of truth for access-level decisions ' +\n        '(the SDK reads access.accessLevel from the verify-access response). To gate access ' +\n        \"to an endpoint, configure the endpoint's trust_score_requirement server-side.\"\n    );\n  }\n\n  // v2.3.0: anonymous traffic no longer short-circuits here. We forward the\n  // request to the server with no agentId; the server applies the endpoint's\n  // unverifiedAgentPolicy and returns advisory. createGuidanceResponse remains\n  // as the offline fallback if the API itself fails (handled below).\n\n  // Check cache first. Round-18.5 F4: caching on unless caller explicitly\n  // sets cacheTtl: 0 to disable. Undefined falls through to the split default\n  // (60s autonomous / 300s step-up) at cacheResult write time.\n  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0) {\n    const cached = getCachedResult(request, mergedConfig.counterpartyId);\n    if (cached) {\n      if (mergedConfig.debug) {\n        console.log('[VerificationGateway] Returning cached result');\n      }\n      return cached;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Inject counterparty info from config if not already set in request\n  const enrichedRequest = { ...request };\n  if (!enrichedRequest.counterpartyUrl && mergedConfig.counterpartyUrl) {\n    enrichedRequest.counterpartyUrl = mergedConfig.counterpartyUrl;\n  }\n  if (!enrichedRequest.counterpartyType && mergedConfig.counterpartyType) {\n    enrichedRequest.counterpartyType = mergedConfig.counterpartyType;\n  }\n\n  // Call the API\n  if (mergedConfig.debug) {\n    console.log('[VerificationGateway] Calling verify-access API');\n  }\n\n  const apiResponse = await callVerifyAccessAPI(mergedConfig, enrichedRequest);\n\n  // Handle API errors\n  if (!apiResponse.success) {\n    // Round-10 (#47, O5): distinguish API errors from missing-credentials.\n    // The previous default tagged any failure with the \"register your\n    // agent\" template, which is misleading to a verified partner whose\n    // verify-access call hit a 500. The `api_error` source surfaces a\n    // typed `verify_access.api_error` failure entry instead.\n    return createGuidanceResponse(mergedConfig, apiResponse.error, {\n      source: 'api_error',\n      correlationId: (apiResponse as { correlationId?: string }).correlationId,\n      urls,\n    });\n  }\n\n  // Check access result\n  if (!apiResponse.access?.allowed) {\n    // v2.9.8 (defect M1): aggregated failures across every gate that\n    // denied. Surface them on the result so the integrator can see every\n    // blocker in one go instead of the previous fail-fast cascade.\n    const aggregatedFailures = (apiResponse.access as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)\n      ?.failures as Array<{ dimension: string; message: string; guidance?: string }> | undefined;\n    // Round-18 G4: backend denied access (PDLSS or other gate); identity status\n    // depends on whether the backend resolved the caller. Read from\n    // verificationContext.idVerified; default false if absent (anonymous or\n    // identity-fail paths land here too). policyAllowed is false by definition\n    // in this branch (apiResponse.access.allowed === false).\n    const idVerifiedFromBackend =\n      (apiResponse.verificationContext as { idVerified?: boolean } | undefined)?.idVerified ===\n      true;\n    const result: EnhancedVerificationResult = {\n      identityVerified: idVerifiedFromBackend,\n      policyAllowed: false,\n      // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denials grant `'none'`, NEVER a positive band.\n      // Pre-rename this hardcoded `'guidance'`, which conflated with the\n      // colocated `guidance: {...}` help-payload object below and let\n      // denied requests pass any route gated at `'guidance'` because\n      // `hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance') === true`. Adapters now\n      // ALSO short-circuit on `!identityVerified || !policyAllowed` before\n      // the gate check — belt-and-braces.\n      accessLevel: 'none',\n      denialReasons:\n        aggregatedFailures && aggregatedFailures.length > 0\n          ? aggregatedFailures.map((f) => f.message)\n          : apiResponse.access?.reason\n            ? [apiResponse.access.reason]\n            : ['Access denied'],\n      failures: aggregatedFailures,\n      requiresStepUp: apiResponse.access?.requiresStepUp,\n      requiresApproval: apiResponse.access?.requiresApproval,\n      guidance: {\n        message: apiResponse.access?.reason || 'Access denied by PDLSS policy',\n        registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n        documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n      },\n      verifiedAt: new Date(),\n      // Extract sessionId so decisions can be recorded for denials too\n      sessionId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).sessionId as string | undefined,\n      // Anonymous traffic has no session → correlationId is the per-attempt\n      // linking key (the sessionId-equivalent for anonymous callers).\n      correlationId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).correlationId as string | undefined,\n      recommendation: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>)\n        .recommendation as EnhancedVerificationResult['recommendation'],\n      recommendationReasons: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).recommendationReasons as\n        | string[]\n        | undefined,\n    };\n\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  // Build successful result\n  const agent: VerifiedAgent | undefined = apiResponse.agent\n    ? {\n        astraId: apiResponse.agent.astraId,\n        name: apiResponse.agent.name,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.agent.trustScore,\n        trustLevel: getTrustLevel(apiResponse.agent.trustScore),\n        blockchainVerified: apiResponse.agent.blockchainStatus === 'verified',\n        status: apiResponse.agent.agentStatus as VerifiedAgent['status'],\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  const developer: VerifiedDeveloper | undefined = apiResponse.developer\n    ? {\n        astradId: apiResponse.developer.kyaOwnerId,\n        name: apiResponse.developer.fullName,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.developer.trustScore || 0,\n        verified: apiResponse.developer.identityVerified,\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  const organization: VerifiedOrganization | undefined = apiResponse.organization\n    ? {\n        name: apiResponse.organization.name,\n        verified: apiResponse.organization.verified,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.organization.trustScore,\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  // Verification context — structured \"why\" the merchant gets in v2.2.4+.\n  // Carries appliedPolicy (no UUIDs), pdlssCheck summary, dynamic trust score,\n  // and policy-driven attestations. Replaces the old over-sharing `pdlss` block.\n  const verificationContext = apiResponse.verificationContext;\n\n  // Server is the single source of truth for access level. SDK reads\n  // apiResponse.access.accessLevel verbatim — no client-side trust-score remap.\n  // Fallback to 'standard' if the server response is missing the field (older\n  // backend without the v2.3.0 contract); it covers the verified-access case.\n  const accessLevel: AccessLevel = apiResponse.access?.accessLevel ?? 'standard';\n\n  const result: EnhancedVerificationResult = {\n    // Round-18 G4: backend allowed access. Identity is verified (we resolved\n    // the caller to an agent) and policy passed all gates. Read idVerified\n    // from verificationContext for symmetry with the deny branch; default true\n    // on success path since `access.allowed === true` implies identity was\n    // resolvable (anonymous-allow paths flow through createGuidanceResponse).\n    identityVerified:\n      (apiResponse.verificationContext as { idVerified?: boolean } | undefined)?.idVerified !==\n      false,\n    policyAllowed: true,\n    accessLevel,\n    agent,\n    developer,\n    organization,\n    appliedPolicy: apiResponse.access?.appliedPolicy,\n    verificationContext,\n    requiresStepUp: apiResponse.access?.requiresStepUp,\n    requiresApproval: apiResponse.access?.requiresApproval,\n    verifiedAt: new Date(),\n    cacheTtl: mergedConfig.cacheTtl,\n    // Handshake Protocol v10 enhanced fields (present when backend returns them)\n    sessionId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).sessionId as string | undefined,\n    // v2.3.10 (defect #34, round-4): anonymous responses surface correlationId\n    // (no session row exists for unverified callers).\n    correlationId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).correlationId as string | undefined,\n    runtimeChallenge: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).runtimeChallenge as\n      | RuntimeChallengeResult\n      | undefined,\n    tokenGuidance: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).tokenGuidance as\n      | TokenGuidance\n      | undefined,\n    recommendation: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>)\n      .recommendation as EnhancedVerificationResult['recommendation'],\n    recommendationReasons: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).recommendationReasons as\n      | string[]\n      | undefined,\n    warningHeader: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).warningHeader as\n      | { name: string; value: string }\n      | undefined,\n  };\n\n  // Enforce AstraSync recommendation\n  if (result.recommendation === 'deny') {\n    // Round-18 G4: recommendation-driven deny lands on the success-path\n    // construction (identity was resolved). Flip policy only — identity stays\n    // verified — so adapters return 403 (re-auth won't help; the policy\n    // decision is the blocker).\n    result.policyAllowed = false;\n    result.accessLevel = 'none';\n    result.denialReasons = result.recommendationReasons || [\n      'Access denied by AstraSync recommendation',\n    ];\n    result.guidance = result.runtimeChallenge\n      ? {\n          message: `Verification failed: ${result.runtimeChallenge.reason || 'runtime challenge failed'}`,\n          registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n          documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        }\n      : {\n          message: result.recommendationReasons?.[0] || 'Access denied by AstraSync recommendation',\n          registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n          documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        };\n  } else if (result.recommendation === 'step_up_required') {\n    // 3.2.0 (post-3.1.0 feedback): do NOT overwrite accessLevel to 'read-only'\n    // here. The prior masquerade manufactured a phantom trust-band cap that\n    // looked like a low-trust ceiling when the real signal is \"step-up\n    // required\" — it caused a downstream misdiagnosis. Leave the real band\n    // intact (informational) and let `requiresStepUp` carry the signal.\n    result.requiresStepUp = true;\n    result.denialReasons = result.recommendationReasons || ['Step-up verification required'];\n  }\n\n  // Cache the result (skip caching denials — agent may fix challenge endpoint\n  // and retry). Round-18.5 F4: cacheResult applies split default (60s/300s)\n  // when configuredTtl is undefined; honours the caller's value when set.\n  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0 && result.recommendation !== 'deny') {\n    cacheResult(request, result, mergedConfig.cacheTtl, mergedConfig.counterpartyId);\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Record a counterparty's grant/deny decision for a verification session.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function recordDecision(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  sessionId: string,\n  decision: 'granted' | 'denied',\n  reason?: string\n): Promise<void> {\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  await fetch(`${config.apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access/${sessionId}/decision`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers,\n    body: JSON.stringify({ decision, reason }),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Fetch the per-route policy for an endpoint from the AstraSync backend.\n * v2.9.7 moved policy authority into the dashboard — the SDK no longer\n * accepts `routes` from merchant-side source code, it fetches them from\n * here on init (and refreshes periodically).\n *\n * Returns `null` when the request fails for any reason — the caller decides\n * how to fall back (the middleware allows-all when no policy is loaded so\n * a misconfigured init doesn't take down the merchant's API).\n */\nexport async function fetchRoutes(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  counterpartyId: string\n): Promise<RouteAccessConfigShape[] | null> {\n  if (!counterpartyId) return null;\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n  try {\n    const response = await fetch(\n      `${config.apiBaseUrl}/endpoints/${encodeURIComponent(counterpartyId)}/routes`,\n      { method: 'GET', headers }\n    );\n    if (!response.ok) return null;\n    const body = (await response.json()) as { data?: { routes?: RouteAccessConfigShape[] } };\n    return body.data?.routes ?? [];\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Minimal shape of an EndpointRoute as the SDK consumes it. Mirrors the\n * server's `EndpointRoute` type and the SDK's `RouteAccessConfig` — same\n * JSON moves between server and SDK unchanged.\n */\nexport interface RouteAccessConfigShape {\n  pattern: string;\n  method: string;\n  /** @deprecated 3.2.0 — band no longer gates; optional, ignored. Use minTrustScore. */\n  minAccessLevel?: 'none' | 'restricted' | 'read-only' | 'standard' | 'full' | 'internal';\n  minTrustScore?: number;\n  requiredPurposes?: string[];\n  allowedPurposes?: string[];\n  allowedJurisdictions?: string[];\n  maxDuration?: number;\n  maxTransactionValue?: number;\n  requirePurpose?: boolean;\n  /** Send-mapping (Bug 14, §4.6) — see RouteAccessConfig in types.ts. */\n  purpose?: string;\n  action?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify an agent AND automatically record the grant/deny decision.\n *\n * This is the recommended entry point for counterparties that call verify()\n * directly (e.g. MCP servers) rather than using createMiddleware().\n * It adds createSession: true, then fire-and-forgets the decision.\n */\nexport async function verifyAndRecord(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest\n): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n  const mergedConfig = { ...DEFAULT_CONFIG, ...config };\n  const result = await verify(mergedConfig, { ...request, createSession: true });\n  const sessionId = (result as EnhancedVerificationResult).sessionId;\n\n  if (sessionId) {\n    // Round-18 G4: a session is \"granted\" only if identity verified AND\n    // policy allowed; either failing is a deny.\n    if (result.identityVerified && result.policyAllowed) {\n      recordDecision(mergedConfig, sessionId, 'granted').catch(() => {});\n    } else {\n      recordDecision(mergedConfig, sessionId, 'denied', result.denialReasons?.[0]).catch(() => {});\n    }\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Report an unregistered agent attempt (no AstraSync credentials).\n * Called by SDK adapters when an agent is redirected to /docs/agent-access.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function reportUnregisteredAttempt(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  data: {\n    counterpartyUrl: string;\n    counterpartyType?: string;\n    sourceIp?: string;\n    userAgent?: string;\n    requestPath?: string;\n    requestMethod?: string;\n  }\n): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n\n  await fetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/verification-activity/unregistered-attempt`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n    body: JSON.stringify(data),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Report a counterparty-side PDLSS pre-check failure.\n * Called by SDK adapters when the agent's requested PDLSS exceeds\n * counterparty-defined maximums BEFORE calling verify-access.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function reportCounterpartyPreCheckFailure(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  data: {\n    agentId: string;\n    counterpartyUrl: string;\n    counterpartyType?: string;\n    failures: Array<{\n      field: string;\n      requested: string | number;\n      limit: string | number | string[];\n      message: string;\n    }>;\n    requestPath?: string;\n    requestMethod?: string;\n  }\n): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n\n  await fetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/verification-activity/counterparty-pre-check-failure`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n    body: JSON.stringify(data),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Quick verification — checks credentials and policy in one call.\n *\n * Round-18 G4: return shape mirrors `VerificationResult`'s split — partners\n * writing custom handlers around `quickVerify` get the same identity/policy\n * distinction as those calling `verify()` directly. Map to HTTP status the\n * same way: `!identityVerified` → 401; `identityVerified && !policyAllowed`\n * → 403.\n */\nexport async function quickVerify(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  credentials: AgentCredentials\n): Promise<{\n  identityVerified: boolean;\n  policyAllowed: boolean;\n  accessLevel: AccessLevel;\n  reason?: string;\n}> {\n  const result = await verify(config, {\n    credentials,\n    purpose: 'verification',\n  });\n\n  return {\n    identityVerified: result.identityVerified,\n    policyAllowed: result.policyAllowed,\n    accessLevel: result.accessLevel,\n    reason: result.denialReasons?.[0],\n  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package/dist/adapters/sdk.mjs

@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ function getCapabilities(accessLevel) {
 }
 
 // src/version.ts
-var SDK_VERSION = "3.1.0";
+var SDK_VERSION = "3.2.0";
 
 // src/well-known.ts
 var CACHE_TTL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1e3;
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ async function performInitCheck(apiBaseUrl, debug, strictInit) {
   }
 }
 var verificationCache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
-function getCacheKey(request) {
+function getCacheKey(request, counterpartyId) {
   const c = request.credentials;
   return [
     c.astraId || "",
@@ -144,6 +144,14 @@ function getCacheKey(request) {
     request.jurisdiction || "",
     request.transactionValue ?? "",
     request.currency || "",
+    // SECURITY (cross-merchant cache leak): the merchant identity is sent via
+    // `config.counterpartyId`, NOT on the request, so it was previously absent
+    // from the key — two verifies for the SAME agent/purpose/action/value but
+    // DIFFERENT merchants collided, and a grant at a permissive merchant (low
+    // trust floor) was served for a stricter one. Same bug class as the
+    // duration omission (F-A1-07). counterpartyId affects the backend verdict
+    // (trust floor / per-route policy), so it MUST key the cache.
+    counterpartyId || "",
     request.counterpartyUrl || "",
     request.counterpartyType || "",
     request.isSubAgentRequest ? "1" : "0",
@@ -167,8 +175,8 @@ function getCacheKey(request) {
     request.callerMetadata?.agentCardUrl || ""
   ].join("|");
 }
-function getCachedResult(request) {
-  const key = getCacheKey(request);
+function getCachedResult(request, counterpartyId) {
+  const key = getCacheKey(request, counterpartyId);
   const cached = verificationCache.get(key);
   if (cached && cached.expiresAt > Date.now()) {
     return cached.result;
@@ -180,9 +188,9 @@ function getCachedResult(request) {
 }
 var DEFAULT_AUTONOMOUS_TTL_SECONDS = 60;
 var DEFAULT_STEP_UP_TTL_SECONDS = 300;
-function cacheResult(request, result, configuredTtl) {
+function cacheResult(request, result, configuredTtl, counterpartyId) {
   const ttlSeconds = configuredTtl && configuredTtl > 0 ? configuredTtl : result.requiresStepUp ? DEFAULT_STEP_UP_TTL_SECONDS : DEFAULT_AUTONOMOUS_TTL_SECONDS;
-  const key = getCacheKey(request);
+  const key = getCacheKey(request, counterpartyId);
   verificationCache.set(key, {
     result,
     expiresAt: Date.now() + ttlSeconds * 1e3
@@ -343,7 +351,7 @@ async function verify(config, request) {
     );
   }
   if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0) {
-    const cached = getCachedResult(request);
+    const cached = getCachedResult(request, mergedConfig.counterpartyId);
     if (cached) {
       if (mergedConfig.debug) {
         console.log("[VerificationGateway] Returning cached result");
@@ -395,8 +403,8 @@ async function verify(config, request) {
       verifiedAt: /* @__PURE__ */ new Date(),
       // Extract sessionId so decisions can be recorded for denials too
       sessionId: apiResponse.sessionId,
-      // v2.3.10 (defect #34, round-4): anonymous traffic has no session →
-      // correlationId is the linking key for paired local_override events.
+      // Anonymous traffic has no session → correlationId is the per-attempt
+      // linking key (the sessionId-equivalent for anonymous callers).
       correlationId: apiResponse.correlationId,
       recommendation: apiResponse.recommendation,
       recommendationReasons: apiResponse.recommendationReasons
@@ -470,13 +478,10 @@ async function verify(config, request) {
     };
   } else if (result.recommendation === "step_up_required") {
     result.requiresStepUp = true;
-    if (ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY[result.accessLevel] > ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY["read-only"]) {
-      result.accessLevel = "read-only";
-    }
     result.denialReasons = result.recommendationReasons || ["Step-up verification required"];
   }
   if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0 && result.recommendation !== "deny") {
-    cacheResult(request, result, mergedConfig.cacheTtl);
+    cacheResult(request, result, mergedConfig.cacheTtl, mergedConfig.counterpartyId);
   }
   return result;
 }
@@ -549,7 +554,13 @@ var VerificationGatewayClient = class {
     return this.executeWithRetry(() => quickVerify(this.config, credentials));
   }
   /**
-   * Check if an agent has a specific access level
+   * Check if an agent has a specific access level.
+   *
+   * @deprecated 3.2.0 — the access-level band is informational only; it no
+   * longer gates in the middleware adapters (post-3.1.0 feedback #1). This
+   * explicit opt-in query still works, but prefer gating on the server-side
+   * policy decision (identity + policy + trust) or per-route `minTrustScore`.
+   * Explicit per-route condition→constraint rules are the Phase-2 successor.
    */
   async hasAccess(credentials, requiredLevel) {
     const result = await this.quickVerify(credentials);