@astrasyncai/verification-gateway 3.0.0 → 3.2.0

package/dist/browser/background.mjs

@@ -3287,14 +3287,6 @@ function verifyLocal(evaluator, context) {
 }
 
 // src/access-levels.ts
-var ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY = {
-  none: 0,
-  restricted: 1,
-  "read-only": 2,
-  standard: 3,
-  full: 4,
-  internal: 5
-};
 function getTrustLevel(score) {
   if (score >= 80) return "PLATINUM";
   if (score >= 60) return "GOLD";
@@ -3303,7 +3295,7 @@ function getTrustLevel(score) {
 }
 
 // src/version.ts
-var SDK_VERSION = "3.0.0";
+var SDK_VERSION = "3.2.0";
 
 // src/well-known.ts
 var CACHE_TTL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1e3;
@@ -3356,7 +3348,7 @@ async function performInitCheck(apiBaseUrl, debug, strictInit) {
   }
 }
 var verificationCache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
-function getCacheKey(request) {
+function getCacheKey(request, counterpartyId) {
   const c = request.credentials;
   return [
     c.astraId || "",
@@ -3369,6 +3361,14 @@ function getCacheKey(request) {
     request.jurisdiction || "",
     request.transactionValue ?? "",
     request.currency || "",
+    // SECURITY (cross-merchant cache leak): the merchant identity is sent via
+    // `config.counterpartyId`, NOT on the request, so it was previously absent
+    // from the key — two verifies for the SAME agent/purpose/action/value but
+    // DIFFERENT merchants collided, and a grant at a permissive merchant (low
+    // trust floor) was served for a stricter one. Same bug class as the
+    // duration omission (F-A1-07). counterpartyId affects the backend verdict
+    // (trust floor / per-route policy), so it MUST key the cache.
+    counterpartyId || "",
     request.counterpartyUrl || "",
     request.counterpartyType || "",
     request.isSubAgentRequest ? "1" : "0",
@@ -3392,8 +3392,8 @@ function getCacheKey(request) {
     request.callerMetadata?.agentCardUrl || ""
   ].join("|");
 }
-function getCachedResult(request) {
-  const key = getCacheKey(request);
+function getCachedResult(request, counterpartyId) {
+  const key = getCacheKey(request, counterpartyId);
   const cached = verificationCache.get(key);
   if (cached && cached.expiresAt > Date.now()) {
     return cached.result;
@@ -3405,9 +3405,9 @@ function getCachedResult(request) {
 }
 var DEFAULT_AUTONOMOUS_TTL_SECONDS = 60;
 var DEFAULT_STEP_UP_TTL_SECONDS = 300;
-function cacheResult(request, result, configuredTtl) {
+function cacheResult(request, result, configuredTtl, counterpartyId) {
   const ttlSeconds = configuredTtl && configuredTtl > 0 ? configuredTtl : result.requiresStepUp ? DEFAULT_STEP_UP_TTL_SECONDS : DEFAULT_AUTONOMOUS_TTL_SECONDS;
-  const key = getCacheKey(request);
+  const key = getCacheKey(request, counterpartyId);
   verificationCache.set(key, {
     result,
     expiresAt: Date.now() + ttlSeconds * 1e3
@@ -3565,7 +3565,7 @@ async function verify(config, request) {
     );
   }
   if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0) {
-    const cached = getCachedResult(request);
+    const cached = getCachedResult(request, mergedConfig.counterpartyId);
     if (cached) {
       if (mergedConfig.debug) {
         console.log("[VerificationGateway] Returning cached result");
@@ -3617,8 +3617,8 @@ async function verify(config, request) {
       verifiedAt: /* @__PURE__ */ new Date(),
       // Extract sessionId so decisions can be recorded for denials too
       sessionId: apiResponse.sessionId,
-      // v2.3.10 (defect #34, round-4): anonymous traffic has no session →
-      // correlationId is the linking key for paired local_override events.
+      // Anonymous traffic has no session → correlationId is the per-attempt
+      // linking key (the sessionId-equivalent for anonymous callers).
       correlationId: apiResponse.correlationId,
       recommendation: apiResponse.recommendation,
       recommendationReasons: apiResponse.recommendationReasons
@@ -3692,13 +3692,10 @@ async function verify(config, request) {
     };
   } else if (result.recommendation === "step_up_required") {
     result.requiresStepUp = true;
-    if (ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY[result.accessLevel] > ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY["read-only"]) {
-      result.accessLevel = "read-only";
-    }
     result.denialReasons = result.recommendationReasons || ["Step-up verification required"];
   }
   if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0 && result.recommendation !== "deny") {
-    cacheResult(request, result, mergedConfig.cacheTtl);
+    cacheResult(request, result, mergedConfig.cacheTtl, mergedConfig.counterpartyId);
   }
   return result;
 }