@astrasyncai/verification-gateway 2.4.9 → 2.4.10

package/dist/adapters/mcp.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/access-levels.ts","../../src/version.ts","../../src/verify.ts","../../src/transport/mcp-server.ts","../../src/adapters/mcp.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway - Access Level Definitions\n *\n * Defines the hierarchy and capabilities of each access level.\n *\n * v2.3.9 (defect #30): renamed `'guidance'` band → `'restricted'`. See\n * `types.ts` AccessLevel for the rationale (value-name collision with the\n * `guidance: {...}` help-payload object on VerificationResult).\n */\n\nimport type { AccessLevel, TrustLevel } from './types';\n\n/**\n * Access level hierarchy (higher number = more access)\n */\nexport const ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY: Record<AccessLevel, number> = {\n  none: 0,\n  restricted: 1,\n  'read-only': 2,\n  standard: 3,\n  full: 4,\n  internal: 5,\n};\n\n/**\n * Access level descriptions for UI\n */\nexport const ACCESS_LEVEL_DESCRIPTIONS: Record<AccessLevel, string> = {\n  none: 'No access - credentials required',\n  restricted: 'Restricted access - registration prompt only',\n  'read-only': 'Read-only access - can browse but not modify',\n  standard: 'Standard access - normal operations per PDLSS policy',\n  full: 'Full access - all operations for high-trust agents',\n  internal: 'Internal access - organization member privileges',\n};\n\n/**\n * Default trust score thresholds for access levels\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_TRUST_THRESHOLDS: Record<AccessLevel, number> = {\n  none: 0,\n  restricted: 0,\n  'read-only': 20,\n  standard: 40,\n  full: 70,\n  internal: 0, // Internal is based on org membership, not score\n};\n\n/**\n * Trust level score ranges\n */\nexport const TRUST_LEVEL_RANGES: Record<TrustLevel, { min: number; max: number }> = {\n  BRONZE: { min: 0, max: 39 },\n  SILVER: { min: 40, max: 59 },\n  GOLD: { min: 60, max: 79 },\n  PLATINUM: { min: 80, max: 100 },\n};\n\n/**\n * Determine trust level from score\n */\nexport function getTrustLevel(score: number): TrustLevel {\n  if (score >= 80) return 'PLATINUM';\n  if (score >= 60) return 'GOLD';\n  if (score >= 40) return 'SILVER';\n  return 'BRONZE';\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if access level A is greater than or equal to access level B\n */\nexport function hasMinimumAccess(actual: AccessLevel, required: AccessLevel): boolean {\n  return ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY[actual] >= ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY[required];\n}\n\n/**\n * Get the highest access level for a given trust score\n */\nexport function getAccessLevelForScore(\n  trustScore: number,\n  thresholds: Record<AccessLevel, number> = DEFAULT_TRUST_THRESHOLDS\n): AccessLevel {\n  if (trustScore >= thresholds.full) return 'full';\n  if (trustScore >= thresholds.standard) return 'standard';\n  if (trustScore >= thresholds['read-only']) return 'read-only';\n  return 'restricted';\n}\n\n/**\n * Determine access level from verification result.\n *\n * v2.3.9 (defect #30): unverified callers now return `'none'` (was\n * `'guidance'`). Denials grant zero — never a positive band.\n */\nexport function determineAccessLevel(\n  verified: boolean,\n  trustScore: number,\n  isOrgMember: boolean,\n  customThresholds?: Partial<Record<AccessLevel, number>>\n): AccessLevel {\n  if (!verified) {\n    return 'none';\n  }\n\n  if (isOrgMember) {\n    return 'internal';\n  }\n\n  const thresholds = {\n    ...DEFAULT_TRUST_THRESHOLDS,\n    ...customThresholds,\n  };\n\n  return getAccessLevelForScore(trustScore, thresholds);\n}\n\n/**\n * Access capabilities per level\n */\nexport interface AccessCapabilities {\n  canRead: boolean;\n  canWrite: boolean;\n  canDelete: boolean;\n  canAdmin: boolean;\n  canAccessInternal: boolean;\n  maxTransactionValue?: number;\n  allowedPurposes?: string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Get capabilities for an access level\n */\nexport function getCapabilities(accessLevel: AccessLevel): AccessCapabilities {\n  switch (accessLevel) {\n    case 'none':\n      return {\n        canRead: false,\n        canWrite: false,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'restricted':\n      return {\n        canRead: false,\n        canWrite: false,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'read-only':\n      return {\n        canRead: true,\n        canWrite: false,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'standard':\n      return {\n        canRead: true,\n        canWrite: true,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'full':\n      return {\n        canRead: true,\n        canWrite: true,\n        canDelete: true,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'internal':\n      return {\n        canRead: true,\n        canWrite: true,\n        canDelete: true,\n        canAdmin: true,\n        canAccessInternal: true,\n      };\n    default:\n      return {\n        canRead: false,\n        canWrite: false,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Round-13 (F14 closure / R13-7): single source-of-truth for the SDK's\n * package version emitted on verify-access bodies (and any future\n * telemetry). Bumped alongside `package.json#version` on every release.\n *\n * Why a constant rather than `import pkg from '../package.json'`:\n * - `tsconfig.json` sets `rootDir: ./src`; importing the sibling\n *   package.json fails the build with \"outside rootDir\".\n * - Build-time string replacement (tsup `define`, esbuild banner, etc.)\n *   adds toolchain coupling for a trivial gain.\n * - Embedded readonly constant works in every environment (Node, browser,\n *   bundlers, Deno) without runtime fs / network access.\n *\n * Release discipline: a CI lint can grep `package.json#version` against\n * this constant if the two ever diverge in the wild. Round-13 manual bump\n * is fine — bumping both in the release-ceremony commit keeps them\n * lockstep.\n */\nexport const SDK_VERSION = '2.4.9';\n","/**\n * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway - Core Verification Logic\n *\n * This module handles the core verification logic, calling the AstraSync API\n * and processing the response into a standardized VerificationResult.\n */\n\nimport type {\n  GatewayConfig,\n  AgentCredentials,\n  VerificationRequest,\n  VerificationResult,\n  VerifiedAgent,\n  VerifiedDeveloper,\n  VerifiedOrganization,\n  GuidanceInfo,\n  AccessLevel,\n  EnhancedVerificationResult,\n  TokenGuidance,\n  RuntimeChallengeResult,\n} from './types';\nimport { getTrustLevel, ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY } from './access-levels';\nimport { SDK_VERSION } from './version';\n\n/**\n * Default configuration values\n *\n * apiBaseUrl matches the OpenAPI authoritative server (https://astrasync.ai/api\n * for prod, https://staging.astrasync.ai/api for staging). Always include the\n * /api path prefix when overriding — registration / docs URLs are derived by\n * stripping it.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_CONFIG: Partial<GatewayConfig> = {\n  apiBaseUrl: 'https://astrasync.ai/api',\n  // v2.3.9 (defect #30): default for unconfigured callers is `'none'` (no\n  // access). Pre-rename this defaulted to `'guidance'`, which combined with\n  // a route gated at `'guidance'` to silently let unverified traffic\n  // through (`hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance') === true`).\n  defaultAccessLevel: 'none',\n  // minTrustScore + minTrustScoreForFull deprecated in v2.3.0 — server decides.\n  cacheTtl: 300, // 5 minutes\n  debug: false,\n};\n\n/**\n * Init self-test state. Fires once per process on first verify() call to warn\n * if apiBaseUrl is pointing at the wrong host (e.g. a marketing site that\n * 200s with text/html instead of the API).\n */\nlet initCheckPerformed = false;\n\n/** One-shot guard for v2.3.0 deprecation warning. */\nlet deprecationWarningShown = false;\n\nasync function performInitCheck(apiBaseUrl: string, debug?: boolean): Promise<void> {\n  initCheckPerformed = true;\n  try {\n    const probeUrl = `${apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access`;\n    // HEAD mirrors GET semantics (running the full request pipeline without a\n    // body) so the response carries the same content-type the marketing 404\n    // would return. OPTIONS often gets short-circuited by CORS-preflight\n    // handlers and returns no content-type, defeating the check.\n    const response = await fetch(probeUrl, { method: 'HEAD' });\n    const contentType = response.headers.get('content-type') ?? '';\n    if (contentType.startsWith('text/html')) {\n      console.warn(\n        `[VerificationGateway] apiBaseUrl '${apiBaseUrl}' returned HTML (content-type: ${contentType}). ` +\n          `This usually means apiBaseUrl is pointing at a marketing site instead of the API. ` +\n          `Expected: 'https://astrasync.ai/api' (prod) or 'https://staging.astrasync.ai/api' (staging). ` +\n          `Set disableInitChecks: true on GatewayConfig to silence this warning.`\n      );\n    } else if (debug) {\n      console.log(\n        `[VerificationGateway] init check passed for ${apiBaseUrl} (content-type: ${contentType})`\n      );\n    }\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (debug) {\n      console.log(`[VerificationGateway] init check failed (non-blocking): ${String(err)}`);\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Simple in-memory cache for verification results\n */\nconst verificationCache = new Map<string, { result: VerificationResult; expiresAt: number }>();\n\n/**\n * Generate cache key from credentials\n */\nfunction getCacheKey(credentials: AgentCredentials): string {\n  return `${credentials.astraId || ''}-${credentials.apiKey || ''}-${credentials.jwt || ''}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if cached result is still valid\n */\nfunction getCachedResult(credentials: AgentCredentials): VerificationResult | null {\n  const key = getCacheKey(credentials);\n  const cached = verificationCache.get(key);\n\n  if (cached && cached.expiresAt > Date.now()) {\n    return cached.result;\n  }\n\n  if (cached) {\n    verificationCache.delete(key);\n  }\n\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Cache a verification result\n */\nfunction cacheResult(\n  credentials: AgentCredentials,\n  result: VerificationResult,\n  ttlSeconds: number\n): void {\n  const key = getCacheKey(credentials);\n  verificationCache.set(key, {\n    result,\n    expiresAt: Date.now() + ttlSeconds * 1000,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Clear the verification cache\n */\nexport function clearCache(): void {\n  verificationCache.clear();\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract agent credentials from various sources\n */\nexport function extractCredentials(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  query?: Record<string, string | undefined>\n): AgentCredentials {\n  const credentials: AgentCredentials = {};\n\n  // Check for ASTRA-ID in headers (case-insensitive). Accepts the historical\n  // X-Astra-Id name plus the X-Astra-AgentId / x-astra-agent-id alias the\n  // partner asked for in #9a — both surface the same field.\n  const astraIdHeader =\n    headers['x-astra-id'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-Id'] ||\n    headers['X-ASTRA-ID'] ||\n    headers['x-astra-agentid'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-AgentId'] ||\n    headers['x-astra-agent-id'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-Agent-Id'] ||\n    headers['X-ASTRA-AGENT-ID'];\n  if (astraIdHeader) {\n    credentials.astraId = Array.isArray(astraIdHeader) ? astraIdHeader[0] : astraIdHeader;\n  }\n\n  // Check for API key in headers\n  const apiKeyHeader = headers['x-api-key'] || headers['X-Api-Key'] || headers['X-API-KEY'];\n  if (apiKeyHeader) {\n    credentials.apiKey = Array.isArray(apiKeyHeader) ? apiKeyHeader[0] : apiKeyHeader;\n  }\n\n  // Check Authorization header for Bearer token\n  const authHeader = headers['authorization'] || headers['Authorization'];\n  if (authHeader) {\n    const authValue = Array.isArray(authHeader) ? authHeader[0] : authHeader;\n    credentials.authorizationHeader = authValue;\n\n    if (authValue.startsWith('Bearer ')) {\n      credentials.jwt = authValue.slice(7);\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Check query parameters as fallback\n  if (query) {\n    if (query.astraId && !credentials.astraId) {\n      credentials.astraId = query.astraId;\n    }\n    if (query.apiKey && !credentials.apiKey) {\n      credentials.apiKey = query.apiKey;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return credentials;\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if credentials are present\n */\nexport function hasCredentials(credentials: AgentCredentials): boolean {\n  return !!(credentials.astraId || credentials.apiKey || credentials.jwt);\n}\n\n/**\n * Source of a synthesised guidance response. Round-10 split — the\n * `'no_credentials'` shape is the original (caller has no AstraSync\n * credentials, suggest registration). The `'api_error'` shape is for when\n * the verify-access HTTP call itself failed (5xx, network, etc.) — DON'T\n * tell a verified-but-currently-blocked partner to \"register your agent\".\n */\ntype GuidanceSource = 'no_credentials' | 'api_error';\n\n/**\n * Create guidance response for unverified agents or for API-error fallback.\n *\n * Round-10 (#47, O5): split source so the `register your agent` template\n * doesn't fire on transient backend failures. Also threads `correlationId`\n * through so adapter `onDenied` handlers can surface it on the merchant's\n * response body for log correlation.\n */\nfunction createGuidanceResponse(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  reason?: string,\n  options: { source?: GuidanceSource; correlationId?: string } = {}\n): VerificationResult {\n  const source = options.source ?? 'no_credentials';\n  const isApiError = source === 'api_error';\n\n  const guidance: GuidanceInfo = isApiError\n    ? {\n        message:\n          'Verification is temporarily unavailable. Retry with exponential backoff; if the issue persists, contact support with the correlationId.',\n        registrationUrl: `${config.apiBaseUrl.replace('/api', '')}/register`,\n        documentationUrl: `${config.apiBaseUrl.replace('/api', '')}/docs/agent-access`,\n        steps: [\n          'Retry the request with exponential backoff',\n          'If failures persist, share the correlationId with support',\n        ],\n      }\n    : {\n        message:\n          'This service verifies AI agents before granting access. Please register your agent with AstraSync.',\n        registrationUrl: `${config.apiBaseUrl.replace('/api', '')}/register`,\n        documentationUrl: `${config.apiBaseUrl.replace('/api', '')}/docs/agent-access`,\n        steps: [\n          'Register for an AstraSync account',\n          'Create and register your agent',\n          'Add your ASTRA-ID to request headers',\n          'Retry your request',\n        ],\n      };\n\n  return {\n    // Round-18 G4: createGuidanceResponse fires for unverified-agent path or\n    // API-error fallback. Identity is not verified (no agent resolved);\n    // policy is not evaluated (we never reached the gate).\n    identityVerified: false,\n    policyAllowed: false,\n    // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denials grant `'none'`, NEVER a positive band.\n    // Adapters additionally short-circuit on `!identityVerified ||\n    // !policyAllowed` before the gate check, but the access level still has\n    // to be honest at the data layer so downstream consumers (SDK adapters\n    // in other languages, custom integrations) inherit the correct\n    // semantics.\n    accessLevel: 'none',\n    guidance,\n    denialReasons: reason ? [reason] : ['No valid agent credentials provided'],\n    // Round-10 (#47, O5): on API-error fallback, surface a typed failure so\n    // partners (and their custom onDenied handlers) can branch on\n    // dimension. Without this, the synthesised stub was indistinguishable\n    // from a real policy deny.\n    failures: isApiError\n      ? [\n          {\n            dimension: 'verify_access.api_error',\n            message: reason ?? 'Verification temporarily unavailable',\n            guidance: guidance.message,\n          },\n        ]\n      : undefined,\n    correlationId: options.correlationId,\n    verifiedAt: new Date(),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Call the AstraSync verify-access API\n */\nasync function callVerifyAccessAPI(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest\n): Promise<{\n  success: boolean;\n  access?: {\n    allowed: boolean;\n    /**\n     * Server-decided access level. Read verbatim — do NOT remap client-side.\n     * The server resolves this from endpoint policy + agent trust score using\n     * the canonical thresholds (see backend `apps/backend/src/utils/access-levels.ts`).\n     */\n    accessLevel?: AccessLevel;\n    reason?: string;\n    /**\n     * Aggregated denial failures (v2.9.8+). Empty / absent when allowed.\n     * Each entry is `{ dimension, message, guidance? }` — see\n     * `AccessFailure` for the contract.\n     */\n    failures?: Array<{ dimension: string; message: string; guidance?: string }>;\n    requiresStepUp?: boolean;\n    requiresApproval?: boolean;\n    appliedPolicy?: {\n      boundaryName: string;\n      policyVersion: string;\n    };\n    counterparty?: {\n      id: string;\n      name: string;\n      trustScoreRequirement: number;\n    };\n  };\n  agent?: {\n    kyaAgentId: string;\n    astraId: string;\n    name: string;\n    trustScore: number;\n    trustLevel: string;\n    agentStatus: string;\n    blockchainStatus: string;\n  };\n  developer?: {\n    kyaOwnerId: string;\n    fullName: string;\n    email: string;\n    identityVerified: boolean;\n    trustScore: number;\n  };\n  organization?: {\n    name: string;\n    verified: boolean;\n    trustScore: number;\n  };\n  /**\n   * Structured explanation of the verification decision. Tells the merchant\n   * WHY (id verified? challenge passed? request within PDLSS? trust score?)\n   * without exposing thresholds, scope lists, or other-tenant counterparty\n   * membership. Empty `attestations` unless the endpoint's access policy\n   * declared `required_attestations`.\n   */\n  verificationContext?: {\n    idVerified: boolean;\n    runtimeChallenge: {\n      status: 'passed' | 'skipped' | 'failed' | 'timeout' | 'not_supported';\n      checkedAt: string | null;\n    };\n    pdlssCheck: {\n      result: 'within' | 'exceeded' | 'denied' | 'not_evaluated';\n      purpose: 'approved' | 'denied';\n      scope: 'approved' | 'denied';\n    };\n    dynamicTrustScore: number;\n    attestations: Array<{\n      type: string;\n      status: 'passed' | 'failed';\n      validUntil?: string;\n      proofType: 'reference' | 'zkp';\n      proof: string;\n    }>;\n  };\n  error?: string;\n  /**\n   * Round-10 (#47, O5): when the verify-access server response carries a\n   * correlationId on an error envelope, propagate it so the SDK can thread\n   * it through createGuidanceResponse → adapter onDenied → merchant body.\n   */\n  correlationId?: string;\n}> {\n  const { credentials, ...requestData } = request;\n\n  // Build the request body. agentId is omitted when not provided so the\n  // server treats it as an anonymous canonical-flow call (Branch A/B/C).\n  const body: Record<string, unknown> = {\n    ...(credentials.astraId && { agentId: credentials.astraId }),\n    purpose: requestData.purpose || 'general',\n  };\n\n  // Add optional fields\n  if (requestData.action) body.action = requestData.action;\n  if (requestData.resourceType) body.resourceType = requestData.resourceType;\n  if (requestData.resource) body.resource = requestData.resource;\n  if (requestData.jurisdiction) body.jurisdiction = requestData.jurisdiction;\n  if (requestData.transactionValue) body.transactionValue = requestData.transactionValue;\n  if (requestData.currency) body.currency = requestData.currency;\n  if (requestData.isSubAgentRequest) body.isSubAgentRequest = requestData.isSubAgentRequest;\n  if (requestData.parentAgentId) body.parentAgentId = requestData.parentAgentId;\n  if (requestData.subAgentDepth !== undefined) body.subAgentDepth = requestData.subAgentDepth;\n  // Handshake Protocol v10 additions\n  if (requestData.enableRuntimeChallenge)\n    body.enableRuntimeChallenge = requestData.enableRuntimeChallenge;\n  if (requestData.createSession) body.createSession = requestData.createSession;\n  if (requestData.durationRequired) body.durationRequired = requestData.durationRequired;\n  if (requestData.counterpartyType) body.counterpartyType = requestData.counterpartyType;\n  if (requestData.counterpartyUrl) body.counterpartyUrl = requestData.counterpartyUrl;\n  if (config.counterpartyId) body.counterpartyId = config.counterpartyId;\n  if (requestData.runtimeChallengeOptions)\n    body.runtimeChallengeOptions = requestData.runtimeChallengeOptions;\n  // Round-12 (F19): transport-vs-intent separation. MCP middleware sets\n  // this to 'mcp'; non-MCP callers leave it unset.\n  if (requestData.invocationProtocol) body.invocationProtocol = requestData.invocationProtocol;\n\n  // Round-13 (F14 closure / R13-7): emit the SDK package version on every\n  // verify-access body so the backend can auto-populate `kya_counterparty.\n  // sdk_version` for the calling endpoint. Body field (not User-Agent\n  // header) is the canonical channel — works in Node, browser, behind\n  // Cloudflare, and across SDK bundlers without environment-specific\n  // header gymnastics. Backend's `validation.ts:verifyAccessSchema`\n  // accepts the semver regex; the auto-pop logic is forward-only.\n  body.sdkVersion = SDK_VERSION;\n\n  // Forward caller metadata when present. Merges the legacy top-level\n  // clientIp/userAgent into the nested block for backward compatibility.\n  if (requestData.callerMetadata || requestData.clientIp || requestData.userAgent) {\n    const meta = {\n      ...(requestData.clientIp && { sourceIp: requestData.clientIp }),\n      ...(requestData.userAgent && { userAgent: requestData.userAgent }),\n      ...requestData.callerMetadata,\n    };\n    if (Object.keys(meta).length > 0) body.callerMetadata = meta;\n  }\n\n  // Build headers\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n    'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n    ...config.customHeaders,\n  };\n\n  // verify-access requires authentication. The backend's authenticate middleware\n  // accepts either a JWT or an API key (starts with kya_) via `Authorization: Bearer <token>`.\n  // Credential-supplied auth header (e.g. the agent's own token) takes priority.\n  if (credentials.authorizationHeader) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = credentials.authorizationHeader;\n  } else if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n  }\n  // Legacy header kept for compatibility with any middleware that reads it directly.\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  try {\n    const response = await fetch(`${config.apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access`, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers,\n      body: JSON.stringify(body),\n    });\n\n    const data = await response.json();\n\n    // v2.3.8 (defect #29): treat 410 Gone as a deterministic deactivated-endpoint\n    // signal. Older SDKs may treat any non-2xx as transient and retry; v2.3.8+\n    // surfaces it as a structured denial with `reason: 'endpoint_deactivated'`\n    // so callers can distinguish \"endpoint gone\" from \"endpoint denied this\".\n    if (response.status === 410) {\n      return {\n        success: true,\n        access: {\n          allowed: false,\n          accessLevel: 'none',\n          reason: 'endpoint_deactivated',\n          failures: [\n            {\n              dimension: 'endpoint.deactivated',\n              message:\n                typeof data?.message === 'string' ? data.message : 'Endpoint has been deactivated',\n              guidance:\n                typeof data?.guidance === 'string'\n                  ? data.guidance\n                  : 'Reactivate via POST /api/endpoints/{id}/reactivate, or update the URL on the calling agent.',\n            },\n          ],\n        },\n      };\n    }\n\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      // Round-10 (#47, O5): propagate correlationId on the error path too if\n      // the server happened to include one (some 5xx error envelopes carry\n      // it). Lets the SDK pass it through to the adapter onDenied handler.\n      return {\n        success: false,\n        error: data.message || data.error || `API returned ${response.status}`,\n        correlationId: typeof data?.correlationId === 'string' ? data.correlationId : undefined,\n      };\n    }\n\n    return data;\n  } catch (error) {\n    const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error';\n    return {\n      success: false,\n      error: `Failed to call verify-access API: ${message}`,\n    };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Main verification function\n */\nexport async function verify(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest\n): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n  const mergedConfig = { ...DEFAULT_CONFIG, ...config };\n\n  // One-time init self-test — fire-and-forget, never blocks verify().\n  if (!initCheckPerformed && !mergedConfig.disableInitChecks && mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl) {\n    void performInitCheck(mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl, mergedConfig.debug);\n  }\n\n  // Deprecation warning for v2.3.0 removed config fields. Fires once per process.\n  if (\n    !deprecationWarningShown &&\n    (config.minTrustScore !== undefined || config.minTrustScoreForFull !== undefined)\n  ) {\n    deprecationWarningShown = true;\n    console.warn(\n      '[VerificationGateway] minTrustScore / minTrustScoreForFull are deprecated in v2.3.0 ' +\n        'and have no effect. Server is now the single source of truth for access-level decisions ' +\n        '(the SDK reads access.accessLevel from the verify-access response). To gate access ' +\n        \"to an endpoint, configure the endpoint's trust_score_requirement server-side.\"\n    );\n  }\n\n  // v2.3.0: anonymous traffic no longer short-circuits here. We forward the\n  // request to the server with no agentId; the server applies the endpoint's\n  // unverifiedAgentPolicy and returns advisory. createGuidanceResponse remains\n  // as the offline fallback if the API itself fails (handled below).\n\n  // Check cache first\n  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl && mergedConfig.cacheTtl > 0) {\n    const cached = getCachedResult(request.credentials);\n    if (cached) {\n      if (mergedConfig.debug) {\n        console.log('[VerificationGateway] Returning cached result');\n      }\n      return cached;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Inject counterparty info from config if not already set in request\n  const enrichedRequest = { ...request };\n  if (!enrichedRequest.counterpartyUrl && mergedConfig.counterpartyUrl) {\n    enrichedRequest.counterpartyUrl = mergedConfig.counterpartyUrl;\n  }\n  if (!enrichedRequest.counterpartyType && mergedConfig.counterpartyType) {\n    enrichedRequest.counterpartyType = mergedConfig.counterpartyType;\n  }\n\n  // Call the API\n  if (mergedConfig.debug) {\n    console.log('[VerificationGateway] Calling verify-access API');\n  }\n\n  const apiResponse = await callVerifyAccessAPI(mergedConfig, enrichedRequest);\n\n  // Handle API errors\n  if (!apiResponse.success) {\n    // Round-10 (#47, O5): distinguish API errors from missing-credentials.\n    // The previous default tagged any failure with the \"register your\n    // agent\" template, which is misleading to a verified partner whose\n    // verify-access call hit a 500. The `api_error` source surfaces a\n    // typed `verify_access.api_error` failure entry instead.\n    return createGuidanceResponse(mergedConfig, apiResponse.error, {\n      source: 'api_error',\n      correlationId: (apiResponse as { correlationId?: string }).correlationId,\n    });\n  }\n\n  // Check access result\n  if (!apiResponse.access?.allowed) {\n    // v2.9.8 (defect M1): aggregated failures across every gate that\n    // denied. Surface them on the result so the integrator can see every\n    // blocker in one go instead of the previous fail-fast cascade.\n    const aggregatedFailures = (apiResponse.access as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)\n      ?.failures as Array<{ dimension: string; message: string; guidance?: string }> | undefined;\n    // Round-18 G4: backend denied access (PDLSS or other gate); identity status\n    // depends on whether the backend resolved the caller. Read from\n    // verificationContext.idVerified; default false if absent (anonymous or\n    // identity-fail paths land here too). policyAllowed is false by definition\n    // in this branch (apiResponse.access.allowed === false).\n    const idVerifiedFromBackend =\n      (apiResponse.verificationContext as { idVerified?: boolean } | undefined)?.idVerified ===\n      true;\n    const result: EnhancedVerificationResult = {\n      identityVerified: idVerifiedFromBackend,\n      policyAllowed: false,\n      // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denials grant `'none'`, NEVER a positive band.\n      // Pre-rename this hardcoded `'guidance'`, which conflated with the\n      // colocated `guidance: {...}` help-payload object below and let\n      // denied requests pass any route gated at `'guidance'` because\n      // `hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance') === true`. Adapters now\n      // ALSO short-circuit on `!identityVerified || !policyAllowed` before\n      // the gate check — belt-and-braces.\n      accessLevel: 'none',\n      denialReasons:\n        aggregatedFailures && aggregatedFailures.length > 0\n          ? aggregatedFailures.map((f) => f.message)\n          : apiResponse.access?.reason\n            ? [apiResponse.access.reason]\n            : ['Access denied'],\n      failures: aggregatedFailures,\n      requiresStepUp: apiResponse.access?.requiresStepUp,\n      requiresApproval: apiResponse.access?.requiresApproval,\n      guidance: {\n        message: apiResponse.access?.reason || 'Access denied by PDLSS policy',\n        registrationUrl: `${mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl?.replace('/api', '')}/register`,\n        documentationUrl: `${mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl?.replace('/api', '')}/docs/pdlss`,\n      },\n      verifiedAt: new Date(),\n      // Extract sessionId so decisions can be recorded for denials too\n      sessionId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).sessionId as string | undefined,\n      // v2.3.10 (defect #34, round-4): anonymous traffic has no session →\n      // correlationId is the linking key for paired local_override events.\n      correlationId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).correlationId as string | undefined,\n      recommendation: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>)\n        .recommendation as EnhancedVerificationResult['recommendation'],\n      recommendationReasons: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).recommendationReasons as\n        | string[]\n        | undefined,\n    };\n\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  // Build successful result\n  const agent: VerifiedAgent | undefined = apiResponse.agent\n    ? {\n        astraId: apiResponse.agent.astraId,\n        name: apiResponse.agent.name,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.agent.trustScore,\n        trustLevel: getTrustLevel(apiResponse.agent.trustScore),\n        blockchainVerified: apiResponse.agent.blockchainStatus === 'verified',\n        status: apiResponse.agent.agentStatus as VerifiedAgent['status'],\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  const developer: VerifiedDeveloper | undefined = apiResponse.developer\n    ? {\n        astradId: apiResponse.developer.kyaOwnerId,\n        name: apiResponse.developer.fullName,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.developer.trustScore || 0,\n        verified: apiResponse.developer.identityVerified,\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  const organization: VerifiedOrganization | undefined = apiResponse.organization\n    ? {\n        name: apiResponse.organization.name,\n        verified: apiResponse.organization.verified,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.organization.trustScore,\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  // Verification context — structured \"why\" the merchant gets in v2.2.4+.\n  // Carries appliedPolicy (no UUIDs), pdlssCheck summary, dynamic trust score,\n  // and policy-driven attestations. Replaces the old over-sharing `pdlss` block.\n  const verificationContext = apiResponse.verificationContext;\n\n  // Server is the single source of truth for access level. SDK reads\n  // apiResponse.access.accessLevel verbatim — no client-side trust-score remap.\n  // Fallback to 'standard' if the server response is missing the field (older\n  // backend without the v2.3.0 contract); it covers the verified-access case.\n  const accessLevel: AccessLevel = apiResponse.access?.accessLevel ?? 'standard';\n\n  const result: EnhancedVerificationResult = {\n    // Round-18 G4: backend allowed access. Identity is verified (we resolved\n    // the caller to an agent) and policy passed all gates. Read idVerified\n    // from verificationContext for symmetry with the deny branch; default true\n    // on success path since `access.allowed === true` implies identity was\n    // resolvable (anonymous-allow paths flow through createGuidanceResponse).\n    identityVerified:\n      (apiResponse.verificationContext as { idVerified?: boolean } | undefined)?.idVerified !==\n      false,\n    policyAllowed: true,\n    accessLevel,\n    agent,\n    developer,\n    organization,\n    appliedPolicy: apiResponse.access?.appliedPolicy,\n    verificationContext,\n    requiresStepUp: apiResponse.access?.requiresStepUp,\n    requiresApproval: apiResponse.access?.requiresApproval,\n    verifiedAt: new Date(),\n    cacheTtl: mergedConfig.cacheTtl,\n    // Handshake Protocol v10 enhanced fields (present when backend returns them)\n    sessionId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).sessionId as string | undefined,\n    // v2.3.10 (defect #34, round-4): anonymous responses surface correlationId\n    // (no session row exists for unverified callers).\n    correlationId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).correlationId as string | undefined,\n    runtimeChallenge: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).runtimeChallenge as\n      | RuntimeChallengeResult\n      | undefined,\n    tokenGuidance: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).tokenGuidance as\n      | TokenGuidance\n      | undefined,\n    recommendation: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>)\n      .recommendation as EnhancedVerificationResult['recommendation'],\n    recommendationReasons: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).recommendationReasons as\n      | string[]\n      | undefined,\n    warningHeader: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).warningHeader as\n      | { name: string; value: string }\n      | undefined,\n  };\n\n  // Enforce AstraSync recommendation\n  if (result.recommendation === 'deny') {\n    // Round-18 G4: recommendation-driven deny lands on the success-path\n    // construction (identity was resolved). Flip policy only — identity stays\n    // verified — so adapters return 403 (re-auth won't help; the policy\n    // decision is the blocker).\n    result.policyAllowed = false;\n    result.accessLevel = 'none';\n    result.denialReasons = result.recommendationReasons || [\n      'Access denied by AstraSync recommendation',\n    ];\n    if (result.runtimeChallenge) {\n      result.guidance = {\n        message: `Verification failed: ${result.runtimeChallenge.reason || 'runtime challenge failed'}`,\n        registrationUrl: `${mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl?.replace('/api', '')}/register`,\n        documentationUrl: `${mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl?.replace('/api', '')}/docs/runtime-challenge`,\n      };\n    }\n  } else if (result.recommendation === 'step_up_required') {\n    result.requiresStepUp = true;\n    if (ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY[result.accessLevel] > ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY['read-only']) {\n      result.accessLevel = 'read-only';\n    }\n    result.denialReasons = result.recommendationReasons || ['Step-up verification required'];\n  }\n\n  // Cache the result (skip caching denials — agent may fix challenge endpoint and retry)\n  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl && mergedConfig.cacheTtl > 0 && result.recommendation !== 'deny') {\n    cacheResult(request.credentials, result, mergedConfig.cacheTtl);\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Record a counterparty's grant/deny decision for a verification session.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\n/**\n * v2.3.9 (defect #34): optional override metadata. Set when the SDK's\n * local enforcement (toolGate / methodGate / trustScore floor) rejected\n * a request the SERVER had granted. Backend emits a distinct\n * `verification.local_override` event so the activity feed surfaces the\n * divergence as a separate row.\n */\nexport interface DecisionOverride {\n  overriddenBy: 'toolGate' | 'methodGate' | 'trustScore' | 'other';\n  toolName?: string;\n  requestedLevel?: AccessLevel;\n  grantedLevel?: AccessLevel;\n}\n\nexport async function recordDecision(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  sessionId: string,\n  decision: 'granted' | 'denied',\n  reason?: string,\n  override?: DecisionOverride\n): Promise<void> {\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  await fetch(`${config.apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access/${sessionId}/decision`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers,\n    body: JSON.stringify({\n      decision,\n      reason,\n      ...(override && {\n        overriddenBy: override.overriddenBy,\n        toolName: override.toolName,\n        requestedLevel: override.requestedLevel,\n        grantedLevel: override.grantedLevel,\n      }),\n    }),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * v2.3.10 (defect #34, round-4): record a SDK-side local override for an\n * anonymous verify-access response. Anonymous traffic has no session row, so\n * `recordDecision` (above) doesn't apply — but we still need to surface the\n * dashboard-vs-runtime divergence (e.g. server granted with audit warning\n * but local toolGate floor denied) on the activity feed.\n *\n * Backend ties the resulting `verification.local_override` event back to the\n * original `verification.unverified_audit` event via `correlationId`. The\n * endpoint is sessionless — see the docstring on the backend route for the\n * abuse-mitigation rationale (rate-limited per IP).\n *\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function recordAnonymousLocalOverride(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  correlationId: string,\n  override: DecisionOverride,\n  reason?: string\n): Promise<void> {\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  await fetch(`${config.apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access/local-override`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers,\n    body: JSON.stringify({\n      correlationId,\n      reason,\n      overriddenBy: override.overriddenBy,\n      toolName: override.toolName,\n      requestedLevel: override.requestedLevel,\n      grantedLevel: override.grantedLevel,\n    }),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Fetch the per-route policy for an endpoint from the AstraSync backend.\n * v2.9.7 moved policy authority into the dashboard — the SDK no longer\n * accepts `routes` from merchant-side source code, it fetches them from\n * here on init (and refreshes periodically).\n *\n * Returns `null` when the request fails for any reason — the caller decides\n * how to fall back (the middleware allows-all when no policy is loaded so\n * a misconfigured init doesn't take down the merchant's API).\n */\nexport async function fetchRoutes(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  counterpartyId: string\n): Promise<RouteAccessConfigShape[] | null> {\n  if (!counterpartyId) return null;\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n  try {\n    const response = await fetch(\n      `${config.apiBaseUrl}/endpoints/${encodeURIComponent(counterpartyId)}/routes`,\n      { method: 'GET', headers }\n    );\n    if (!response.ok) return null;\n    const body = (await response.json()) as { data?: { routes?: RouteAccessConfigShape[] } };\n    return body.data?.routes ?? [];\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Minimal shape of an EndpointRoute as the SDK consumes it. Mirrors the\n * server's `EndpointRoute` type and the SDK's `RouteAccessConfig` — same\n * JSON moves between server and SDK unchanged.\n */\nexport interface RouteAccessConfigShape {\n  pattern: string;\n  method: string;\n  minAccessLevel: 'none' | 'restricted' | 'read-only' | 'standard' | 'full' | 'internal';\n  minTrustScore?: number;\n  requiredPurposes?: string[];\n  allowedPurposes?: string[];\n  allowedJurisdictions?: string[];\n  maxDuration?: number;\n  maxTransactionValue?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify an agent AND automatically record the grant/deny decision.\n *\n * This is the recommended entry point for counterparties that call verify()\n * directly (e.g. MCP servers) rather than using createMiddleware().\n * It adds createSession: true, then fire-and-forgets the decision.\n */\nexport async function verifyAndRecord(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest\n): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n  const mergedConfig = { ...DEFAULT_CONFIG, ...config };\n  const result = await verify(mergedConfig, { ...request, createSession: true });\n  const sessionId = (result as EnhancedVerificationResult).sessionId;\n\n  if (sessionId) {\n    // Round-18 G4: a session is \"granted\" only if identity verified AND\n    // policy allowed; either failing is a deny.\n    if (result.identityVerified && result.policyAllowed) {\n      recordDecision(mergedConfig, sessionId, 'granted').catch(() => {});\n    } else {\n      recordDecision(mergedConfig, sessionId, 'denied', result.denialReasons?.[0]).catch(() => {});\n    }\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Report an unregistered agent attempt (no AstraSync credentials).\n * Called by SDK adapters when an agent is redirected to /docs/agent-access.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function reportUnregisteredAttempt(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  data: {\n    counterpartyUrl: string;\n    counterpartyType?: string;\n    sourceIp?: string;\n    userAgent?: string;\n    requestPath?: string;\n    requestMethod?: string;\n  }\n): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n\n  await fetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/verification-activity/unregistered-attempt`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n    body: JSON.stringify(data),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Report a counterparty-side PDLSS pre-check failure.\n * Called by SDK adapters when the agent's requested PDLSS exceeds\n * counterparty-defined maximums BEFORE calling verify-access.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function reportCounterpartyPreCheckFailure(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  data: {\n    agentId: string;\n    counterpartyUrl: string;\n    counterpartyType?: string;\n    failures: Array<{\n      field: string;\n      requested: string | number;\n      limit: string | number | string[];\n      message: string;\n    }>;\n    requestPath?: string;\n    requestMethod?: string;\n  }\n): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n\n  await fetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/verification-activity/counterparty-pre-check-failure`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n    body: JSON.stringify(data),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Quick verification — checks credentials and policy in one call.\n *\n * Round-18 G4: return shape mirrors `VerificationResult`'s split — partners\n * writing custom handlers around `quickVerify` get the same identity/policy\n * distinction as those calling `verify()` directly. Map to HTTP status the\n * same way: `!identityVerified` → 401; `identityVerified && !policyAllowed`\n * → 403.\n */\nexport async function quickVerify(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  credentials: AgentCredentials\n): Promise<{\n  identityVerified: boolean;\n  policyAllowed: boolean;\n  accessLevel: AccessLevel;\n  reason?: string;\n}> {\n  const result = await verify(config, {\n    credentials,\n    purpose: 'verification',\n  });\n\n  return {\n    identityVerified: result.identityVerified,\n    policyAllowed: result.policyAllowed,\n    accessLevel: result.accessLevel,\n    reason: result.denialReasons?.[0],\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * MCP server-side helpers — companion to `transport/mcp.ts` (which handles the\n * agent-side `_meta.astrasync` block).\n *\n * Surfaces a body-aware policy hook the existing `createMiddleware` couldn't\n * provide — MCP traffic is JSON-RPC over a single endpoint (`/mcp`), so the\n * default route-pattern gating is too coarse: every request looks the same\n * URL-wise, but `initialize` is low-risk handshake while `tools/call` of a\n * payment tool is high-risk. Cohort-3 beta merchants flagged this 🟡 in the\n * v2.9.5 round.\n *\n * What lives here:\n *   - `parseMcpJsonRpc(body)`    — peels JSON-RPC method + tool name + agent\n *                                   id without committing to a particular MCP\n *                                   server framework.\n *   - `mcpToPdlss(parsed)`       — canonical mapping JSON-RPC method → PDLSS\n *                                   purpose / action / resource. Doc-stable\n *                                   so audits can correlate.\n *   - `mcpRiskTier(parsed)`      — recommended `minAccessLevel` per method\n *                                   so a single MCP middleware can split\n *                                   `initialize` / `tools/list` (low gate)\n *                                   from `tools/call` (high gate).\n *   - `MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER`   — header convention for the dedupe pattern\n *                                   when an MCP tool calls an inner REST hop.\n *   - `serialize/parseVerifiedHop` helpers.\n *\n * The Express MCP adapter is in `adapters/mcp.ts` and consumes these.\n */\n\nimport type { AccessLevel } from '../types';\n\n/**\n * Header carrying upstream verify-access proof so an inner-hop REST endpoint\n * can dedupe (skip verify-access when the same ASTRA-id was already verified\n * a few ms earlier). Value format:\n *\n *   {astraId};{sessionId};{checkedAt-ms}\n *\n * Receivers MUST validate that `checkedAt` is recent (≤ 60s window\n * recommended) and that `astraId` matches the agent identity claimed on the\n * inner hop. The header alone is NOT proof-of-identity — it's a dedupe\n * advisory. Pair with the existing X-Astra-Id auth.\n */\nexport const MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER = 'X-Astra-Verified-Hop';\n\n/** Default acceptable age (ms) for an X-Astra-Verified-Hop header. */\nexport const MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_MAX_AGE_MS = 60_000;\n\nexport interface VerifiedHopMarker {\n  astraId: string;\n  sessionId?: string;\n  checkedAt: number; // epoch ms\n}\n\nexport function serializeVerifiedHop(marker: VerifiedHopMarker): string {\n  return `${marker.astraId};${marker.sessionId ?? ''};${marker.checkedAt}`;\n}\n\nexport function parseVerifiedHop(value: string | undefined | null): VerifiedHopMarker | null {\n  if (!value) return null;\n  const parts = value.split(';');\n  if (parts.length !== 3) return null;\n  const [astraId, sessionId, checkedAtRaw] = parts;\n  if (!astraId) return null;\n  const checkedAt = Number(checkedAtRaw);\n  if (!Number.isFinite(checkedAt) || checkedAt <= 0) return null;\n  return {\n    astraId,\n    ...(sessionId ? { sessionId } : {}),\n    checkedAt,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when `marker.astraId` matches the inner-hop's claimed\n * ASTRA-id AND the marker is recent enough. Inner-hop middleware uses this\n * to skip a duplicate verify-access call.\n */\nexport function isVerifiedHopValidFor(\n  marker: VerifiedHopMarker | null,\n  expectedAstraId: string,\n  opts: { maxAgeMs?: number; now?: number } = {}\n): boolean {\n  if (!marker) return false;\n  if (marker.astraId !== expectedAstraId) return false;\n  const maxAge = opts.maxAgeMs ?? MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_MAX_AGE_MS;\n  const now = opts.now ?? Date.now();\n  return now - marker.checkedAt <= maxAge && now >= marker.checkedAt;\n}\n\n/**\n * Output of `parseMcpJsonRpc`. Self-describing so the middleware doesn't have\n * to re-introspect the body to figure out gating.\n */\nexport interface ParsedMcpRequest {\n  /** JSON-RPC method (e.g. `tools/call`, `initialize`, `tools/list`). */\n  method: string;\n  /** Set when method === 'tools/call'; the tool name from `params.name`. */\n  toolName?: string;\n  /** Initialize-specific protocolVersion handshake info, when present. */\n  protocolVersion?: string;\n  /**\n   * Agent id read from the body, in priority order:\n   *   1. `params._meta.astrasync.agentId` (the canonical SDK location, see\n   *      `transport/mcp.ts → setMcpMeta`)\n   *   2. `params.arguments.agent_id` (legacy / hand-written tool callers)\n   * Header-supplied id (X-Astra-Id) is read separately by the adapter and\n   * compared to this for the mismatch check.\n   */\n  agentIdFromBody?: string;\n  /**\n   * Round-12 (F19) + round-13 (R13-1): purpose extracted from the MCP body\n   * with the symmetric precedence chain. Sourced from `_meta.astrasync.purpose`\n   * (canonical SDK location) OR `params.arguments.purpose` (legacy /\n   * conventional callers). The discriminator is on `purposeSourceFromBody`.\n   * Adapter combines this with the `X-Astra-Purpose` header (header wins)\n   * before mapping; final fallback at `mcpToPdlss` is `'mcp_invoke'`.\n   */\n  purposeFromBody?: string;\n  /** Which body location resolved `purposeFromBody`. */\n  purposeSourceFromBody?: 'meta' | 'tool_argument';\n  /**\n   * Round-13 (R13-2): action extracted from the MCP body with the same\n   * symmetric chain as purpose. Sourced from `_meta.astrasync.action`\n   * (canonical) OR `params.arguments.action` (legacy). Adapter combines\n   * with the `X-Astra-Action` header (header wins) before mapping; final\n   * fallback at `mcpToPdlss` is the transport-layer default\n   * (`tools/call:<toolname>` or just `<method>`).\n   */\n  actionFromBody?: string;\n  /** Which body location resolved `actionFromBody`. */\n  actionSourceFromBody?: 'meta' | 'tool_argument';\n  /** True for handshake methods that must succeed before any tool call. */\n  isInitialize: boolean;\n  /** True for `tools/call`. */\n  isToolCall: boolean;\n  /** True for low-risk introspection (`tools/list`, `prompts/list`, etc.). */\n  isIntrospection: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Peel the JSON-RPC envelope. Returns `null` if the body isn't a JSON-RPC\n * request (callers can short-circuit with a 400 or treat as untyped traffic).\n *\n * Accepts both single-request and notification shapes. Batch requests are\n * NOT supported here — the verify-access contract is single-agent-per-call;\n * a batch body should be split before policy gating.\n */\nexport function parseMcpJsonRpc(body: unknown): ParsedMcpRequest | null {\n  if (!body || typeof body !== 'object' || Array.isArray(body)) return null;\n  const obj = body as Record<string, unknown>;\n  if (obj.jsonrpc !== '2.0' && obj.jsonrpc !== '1.0') return null;\n  const method = typeof obj.method === 'string' ? obj.method : null;\n  if (!method) return null;\n  const params = obj.params as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n\n  // Tool-name lookup. MCP `tools/call` puts the tool under `params.name`.\n  let toolName: string | undefined;\n  if (method === 'tools/call' && params && typeof params.name === 'string') {\n    toolName = params.name;\n  }\n\n  // protocolVersion only on the initialize request.\n  let protocolVersion: string | undefined;\n  if (method === 'initialize' && params && typeof params.protocolVersion === 'string') {\n    protocolVersion = params.protocolVersion;\n  }\n\n  const meta = params?._meta as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n  const astrasyncMeta = meta?.astrasync as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n  const args = params?.arguments as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n\n  // Agent-id lookup with documented precedence: _meta.astrasync.agentId\n  // wins over params.arguments.agent_id. (The argument-shape uses\n  // `agent_id` snake_case for legacy conventional callers; meta is the\n  // canonical SDK location.)\n  let agentIdFromBody: string | undefined;\n  if (astrasyncMeta && typeof astrasyncMeta.agentId === 'string') {\n    agentIdFromBody = astrasyncMeta.agentId;\n  } else if (args && typeof args.agent_id === 'string') {\n    agentIdFromBody = args.agent_id;\n  }\n\n  // Round-13 (R13-1, R13-2) — symmetric body-extraction for purpose +\n  // action. Per `feedback_symmetric_fallbacks_for_symmetric_concepts.md`:\n  // these two concepts are paired in the MCP middleware, so their\n  // fallback chains MUST mirror each other exactly. Drift between them\n  // generates the same support-ticket class repeatedly (\"I set X in\n  // arguments and it didn't take\" — happened for purpose in round-12\n  // post-F19, and was about to happen for action in round-13).\n  //\n  // Body precedence (applies to both): _meta.astrasync.<key> wins over\n  // params.arguments.<key>. The discriminator is exported alongside the\n  // value so the adapter can fold it into purposeSource / actionSource\n  // for debug logging and adoption tracking.\n  const purposeBodyResult = extractFromMcpBody(astrasyncMeta, args, 'purpose');\n  const actionBodyResult = extractFromMcpBody(astrasyncMeta, args, 'action');\n\n  const isInitialize = method === 'initialize';\n  const isToolCall = method === 'tools/call';\n  const isIntrospection =\n    method === 'tools/list' ||\n    method === 'prompts/list' ||\n    method === 'resources/list' ||\n    method === 'ping' ||\n    method === 'notifications/initialized';\n\n  return {\n    method,\n    ...(toolName ? { toolName } : {}),\n    ...(protocolVersion ? { protocolVersion } : {}),\n    ...(agentIdFromBody ? { agentIdFromBody } : {}),\n    ...(purposeBodyResult.value ? { purposeFromBody: purposeBodyResult.value } : {}),\n    ...(purposeBodyResult.source ? { purposeSourceFromBody: purposeBodyResult.source } : {}),\n    ...(actionBodyResult.value ? { actionFromBody: actionBodyResult.value } : {}),\n    ...(actionBodyResult.source ? { actionSourceFromBody: actionBodyResult.source } : {}),\n    isInitialize,\n    isToolCall,\n    isIntrospection,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Shared body-extraction helper for the symmetric purpose + action\n * fallback chain (round-13 R13-1, R13-2). Returns the resolved value AND\n * the source discriminator so adapters can fold it into per-call debug\n * logs (`purpose_source` / `action_source`).\n *\n * Precedence:\n *   1. `params._meta.astrasync.<key>` — canonical SDK location, source: 'meta'\n *   2. `params.arguments.<key>`        — legacy / conventional, source: 'tool_argument'\n *   3. neither present                 — value: undefined, source: undefined\n *\n * The HTTP-header tier (`X-Astra-<concept>`) is the adapter's job; this\n * helper only handles body sources. Adapters combine the two: header\n * wins over body. See `mcpToPdlss` for the final precedence assembly.\n */\nfunction extractFromMcpBody(\n  astrasyncMeta: Record<string, unknown> | undefined,\n  args: Record<string, unknown> | undefined,\n  key: 'purpose' | 'action'\n): { value: string | undefined; source: 'meta' | 'tool_argument' | undefined } {\n  if (astrasyncMeta && typeof astrasyncMeta[key] === 'string') {\n    return { value: astrasyncMeta[key] as string, source: 'meta' };\n  }\n  if (args && typeof args[key] === 'string') {\n    return { value: args[key] as string, source: 'tool_argument' };\n  }\n  return { value: undefined, source: undefined };\n}\n\n/**\n * PDLSS mapping for an MCP request. The platform's PDLSS taxonomy is\n * `purpose / action / resource`; for MCP traffic the audit-useful dimensions\n * are the JSON-RPC method and (for `tools/call`) the tool name. Doc-stable so\n * dashboards and audits can correlate consistently across cohort-3 partners.\n *\n * Rules:\n *   - `purpose` is always `mcp_invoke` for MCP traffic — sets the high-level\n *     PDLSS bucket.\n *   - `action` is the JSON-RPC method, optionally `:tool_name` suffixed for\n *     `tools/call`. Lets PDLSS allowlist specific tools.\n *   - `resource` is `mcp:tool/<name>` for `tools/call`, `mcp:method/<method>`\n *     otherwise. Lets PDLSS scope on tool identity.\n */\nexport interface McpPdlssMapping {\n  purpose: string;\n  action: string;\n  resource: string;\n  /**\n   * Round-13 (R13-1 / R13-2): the resolution channel for purpose and\n   * action — disjoint enums sharing the same structure per\n   * `feedback_symmetric_fallbacks_for_symmetric_concepts.md`. Adapters\n   * log both at debug level so partners can confirm header / body\n   * pass-through, support can triage tickets, and we can watch the\n   * `default_*` / `transport_layer` decay over time as integrations\n   * mature.\n   *\n   * Round-12 (F19) used a narrower `purposeSource: 'header' |\n   * 'tool_argument' | 'default_mcp_invoke'` — round-13 widens to also\n   * carry the `_meta` source distinct from `tool_argument`, so the round-13\n   * R13-1 fallback (which now reads both `_meta.astrasync.purpose` AND\n   * `params.arguments.purpose`) can report WHICH body location resolved.\n   */\n  purposeSource: 'header' | 'meta' | 'tool_argument' | 'default_mcp_invoke';\n  actionSource: 'header' | 'meta' | 'tool_argument' | 'transport_layer';\n}\n\n/**\n * Round-13 (R13-1 + R13-2) — canonical precedence chain documented ONCE,\n * applied identically to both purpose and action. Per\n * `feedback_symmetric_fallbacks_for_symmetric_concepts.md` — drift\n * between two paired concepts generates the same support-ticket class\n * repeatedly, so the resolution order is:\n *\n *   1. `X-Astra-<concept>` HTTP header (caller's explicit override)\n *   2. `params._meta.astrasync.<concept>` body field (canonical SDK location)\n *   3. `params.arguments.<concept>` body field (legacy / conventional)\n *   4. Transport-layer default:\n *        purpose → 'mcp_invoke'\n *        action  → '<method>:<toolName>' (or just '<method>')\n *\n * The header tier is the adapter's job (it has `req.headers` access);\n * this function takes the resolved `headerPurpose` / `headerAction`\n * inputs and combines them with the body extraction already done in\n * `parseMcpJsonRpc`. The discriminator is reported on `purposeSource` /\n * `actionSource` for debug logging.\n */\nexport function mcpToPdlss(\n  parsed: ParsedMcpRequest,\n  headerPurpose?: string,\n  headerAction?: string\n): McpPdlssMapping {\n  const resource = parsed.toolName ? `mcp:tool/${parsed.toolName}` : `mcp:method/${parsed.method}`;\n\n  // Purpose resolution: header > body (_meta, then tool_argument) > default\n  let purpose: string;\n  let purposeSource: McpPdlssMapping['purposeSource'];\n  if (headerPurpose) {\n    purpose = headerPurpose;\n    purposeSource = 'header';\n  } else if (parsed.purposeFromBody && parsed.purposeSourceFromBody) {\n    purpose = parsed.purposeFromBody;\n    purposeSource = parsed.purposeSourceFromBody;\n  } else {\n    purpose = 'mcp_invoke';\n    purposeSource = 'default_mcp_invoke';\n  }\n\n  // Action resolution: identical chain, transport-layer default differs\n  let action: string;\n  let actionSource: McpPdlssMapping['actionSource'];\n  if (headerAction) {\n    action = headerAction;\n    actionSource = 'header';\n  } else if (parsed.actionFromBody && parsed.actionSourceFromBody) {\n    action = parsed.actionFromBody;\n    actionSource = parsed.actionSourceFromBody;\n  } else {\n    action = parsed.toolName ? `${parsed.method}:${parsed.toolName}` : parsed.method;\n    actionSource = 'transport_layer';\n  }\n\n  return { purpose, action, resource, purposeSource, actionSource };\n}\n\n/**\n * Recommended minimum access level per method type. The MCP middleware uses\n * this to split low-risk handshake / introspection traffic from high-risk\n * tool execution — defect (a) from the cohort-3 review.\n *\n *   - `initialize` / `notifications/initialized`        → `none`     (handshake must work for unregistered probes)\n *   - `tools/list` / `prompts/list` / `resources/list`  → `none`     (introspection is public-surface)\n *   - `ping`                                            → `none`\n *   - `resources/read`                                  → `read-only`\n *   - `tools/call`                                      → `standard` (default — overridable per-tool)\n *   - everything else                                   → `standard` (least-privilege fallback)\n */\nexport function mcpRiskTier(parsed: ParsedMcpRequest): AccessLevel {\n  if (parsed.isInitialize || parsed.method === 'notifications/initialized') return 'none';\n  if (parsed.isIntrospection) return 'none';\n  if (parsed.method === 'resources/read') return 'read-only';\n  if (parsed.isToolCall) return 'standard';\n  return 'standard';\n}\n","/**\n * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway — MCP middleware\n *\n * Express-shaped middleware tailored to the JSON-RPC body of an MCP\n * (Model Context Protocol) endpoint. Closes the cohort-3 gaps the default\n * `createMiddleware` couldn't:\n *\n *   (a) **Body-aware gating**.  All MCP traffic targets the same `/mcp` URL.\n *       The default route-pattern matcher can't tell `initialize` (low risk)\n *       from `tools/call start_checkout` (high risk). This middleware peels\n *       the JSON-RPC body and applies a per-method risk tier.\n *\n *   (b) **PDLSS mapping**.  Forwards `purpose=mcp_invoke`,\n *       `action=method[:tool]`, `resource=mcp:tool/<name>` so audit traces\n *       are stable across cohort-3 partners. See `transport/mcp-server.ts`\n *       for the exact mapping.\n *\n *   (c) **Inner-hop dedupe**.  Outbound responses set\n *       `X-Astra-Verified-Hop` so a downstream REST endpoint that the tool\n *       calls can skip a duplicate verify-access. The receiving REST\n *       middleware checks `parseVerifiedHop` and skips when valid.\n *\n *   (d) **Header-vs-body identity precedence**.  Reads ASTRA-id from\n *       `X-Astra-Id` first, body second. If both are present and disagree,\n *       returns a structured 400 by default (configurable). Pre-fix,\n *       integrators had to re-discover this on their own.\n *\n * Usage:\n *\n * ```typescript\n * import express from 'express';\n * import { createMcpMiddleware } from '@astrasyncai/verification-gateway/mcp';\n *\n * const app = express();\n * app.use(express.json());\n *\n * app.post(\n *   '/mcp',\n *   createMcpMiddleware({\n *     apiBaseUrl: 'https://astrasync.ai/api',\n *     apiKey: process.env.ASTRASYNC_API_KEY,\n *     // Optional per-tool overrides — tools not listed get the default tier\n *     // from `mcpRiskTier` (`tools/call` → 'standard').\n *     toolGates: {\n *       start_checkout: 'standard',\n *       confirm_purchase: 'full',\n *       browse_catalog: 'read-only',\n *     },\n *   }),\n *   yourMcpServerHandler,\n * );\n * ```\n */\n\nimport type { Request, Response, NextFunction, RequestHandler } from 'express';\nimport type {\n  GatewayConfig,\n  AccessLevel,\n  VerificationResult,\n  EnhancedVerificationResult,\n} from '../types';\nimport {\n  verify,\n  extractCredentials,\n  recordDecision,\n  recordAnonymousLocalOverride,\n} from '../verify';\nimport { hasMinimumAccess } from '../access-levels';\nimport {\n  parseMcpJsonRpc,\n  mcpToPdlss,\n  mcpRiskTier,\n  serializeVerifiedHop,\n  parseVerifiedHop,\n  isVerifiedHopValidFor,\n  MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER,\n  type ParsedMcpRequest,\n} from '../transport/mcp-server';\n\ndeclare global {\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-namespace\n  namespace Express {\n    interface Request {\n      mcpRequest?: ParsedMcpRequest;\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nexport interface McpMiddlewareOptions extends GatewayConfig {\n  /**\n   * Per-tool override for the minimum access level. Tools not listed inherit\n   * the default tier from `mcpRiskTier` (`tools/call` → `'standard'`). Use\n   * for high-risk tools that demand `'full'` or low-risk read-only tools.\n   */\n  toolGates?: Record<string, AccessLevel>;\n  /**\n   * Per-method override (e.g. tighten `tools/list` to `'read-only'` if you\n   * don't want unregistered probes seeing your tool catalogue). Matches by\n   * exact JSON-RPC method string.\n   */\n  methodGates?: Record<string, AccessLevel>;\n  /**\n   * What to do when the agent id supplied in the X-Astra-Id header\n   * disagrees with the agent id in the JSON-RPC body\n   * (`params._meta.astrasync.agentId` or `params.arguments.agent_id`).\n   *\n   *   - `'reject'` (default) — return 400 `AGENT_ID_MISMATCH`. Safest.\n   *   - `'prefer-header'` — log + verify against the header value. Keeps\n   *     bodies that were authored before X-Astra-Id was the canonical\n   *     identity slot working.\n   *   - `'prefer-body'` — log + verify against the body value. Useful in\n   *     reverse-proxy setups that strip auth headers.\n   */\n  onAgentIdMismatch?: 'reject' | 'prefer-header' | 'prefer-body';\n  /** Skip verification + dedupe entirely. For testing. */\n  skip?: boolean;\n  /** Custom denied handler. Defaults to a structured JSON-RPC error response. */\n  onDenied?: (result: VerificationResult, req: Request, res: Response) => void;\n  /**\n   * If `false`, don't trust an inbound `X-Astra-Verified-Hop` header (always\n   * call verify-access). Default `true` — recommended for inner-hop endpoints\n   * called by your own MCP tools.\n   */\n  trustVerifiedHop?: boolean;\n  /** Window for accepting an upstream verified-hop marker. Default 60_000ms. */\n  verifiedHopMaxAgeMs?: number;\n  /**\n   * Automatically record grant/deny decisions for every MCP call. Default\n   * `true` — matches the express adapter.\n   */\n  recordDecisions?: boolean;\n  /** Forward runtime challenge (default `true`). */\n  enableRuntimeChallenge?: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Default MCP denied handler.\n *\n * Round-10 (#47, O5): mirrors the express adapter — surfaces `failures[]`\n * and `correlationId` on the response so partners can render rich UX and\n * tie a denial to a log line. Also stamps `X-Astra-Gateway-Mode: enforced`\n * (#49/O10) so the header reliably distinguishes gate-evaluated denials\n * from gate-skipped pass-throughs.\n */\n/**\n * Round-13: shared single-value HTTP header reader. Same shape used for\n * both `X-Astra-Purpose` and `X-Astra-Action` extraction (symmetric\n * fallback chain — see `mcpToPdlss` for the full precedence rule).\n * Returns the first value if the header repeats (Express turns repeated\n * headers into an array); returns undefined when the header is absent.\n */\nfunction readSingleHeader(value: string | string[] | undefined): string | undefined {\n  if (typeof value === 'string') return value;\n  if (Array.isArray(value)) return value[0];\n  return undefined;\n}\n\nfunction defaultMcpDenied(result: VerificationResult, req: Request, res: Response): void {\n  // JSON-RPC error envelope so MCP-aware clients render it correctly.\n  const id = (req.body as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)?.id ?? null;\n  // Round-18 G4: see express.defaultOnDenied for full rationale on the\n  // identity-vs-policy split → 401/403 mapping. Same logic here so MCP\n  // clients get HTTP status semantics aligned with REST adapters.\n  const status = !result.identityVerified ? 401 : 403;\n\n  res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Mode', 'enforced');\n\n  res.status(status).json({\n    jsonrpc: '2.0',\n    id,\n    error: {\n      // JSON-RPC error codes:\n      //   -32000 → unauthorized (no identity resolved)\n      //   -32001 → insufficient access (identity OK, policy denied)\n      code: !result.identityVerified ? -32000 : -32001,\n      message: result.denialReasons?.[0] ?? 'Access denied',\n      data: {\n        accessLevel: result.accessLevel,\n        guidance: result.guidance,\n        // Round-10: aggregated per-dimension detail + correlation handle.\n        failures: result.failures,\n        correlationId: result.correlationId,\n      },\n    },\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the effective minimum access level for a parsed MCP request.\n * Order: per-tool override → per-method override → tier-default from\n * `mcpRiskTier`.\n *\n * v2.3.9 (defect #34) returns the SOURCE of the resolution alongside the\n * level so the gate-failure site can attribute a local override correctly\n * (`toolGate` / `methodGate` / `tier`) when reporting back to the\n * activity feed.\n */\nfunction resolveMinAccessLevel(\n  parsed: ParsedMcpRequest,\n  opts: { toolGates?: Record<string, AccessLevel>; methodGates?: Record<string, AccessLevel> }\n): { level: AccessLevel; source: 'toolGate' | 'methodGate' | 'tier' } {\n  if (parsed.toolName && opts.toolGates && opts.toolGates[parsed.toolName] !== undefined) {\n    return { level: opts.toolGates[parsed.toolName], source: 'toolGate' };\n  }\n  if (opts.methodGates && opts.methodGates[parsed.method] !== undefined) {\n    return { level: opts.methodGates[parsed.method], source: 'methodGate' };\n  }\n  return { level: mcpRiskTier(parsed), source: 'tier' };\n}\n\n/**\n * Create the MCP middleware. Attach AFTER `express.json()` — the body must\n * already be a parsed object.\n */\nexport function createMcpMiddleware(options: McpMiddlewareOptions): RequestHandler {\n  const {\n    toolGates,\n    methodGates,\n    onAgentIdMismatch = 'reject',\n    skip = false,\n    onDenied = defaultMcpDenied,\n    trustVerifiedHop = true,\n    verifiedHopMaxAgeMs,\n    recordDecisions,\n    enableRuntimeChallenge = true,\n    ...config\n  } = options;\n\n  return async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction): Promise<void> => {\n    try {\n      if (skip) return next();\n\n      const parsed = parseMcpJsonRpc(req.body);\n      if (!parsed) {\n        // Not a JSON-RPC body. Either the route is misconfigured or the\n        // client sent a non-MCP payload. We don't 400 here — let the actual\n        // MCP server handler render its own error so the middleware doesn't\n        // pre-empt valid framework error shapes.\n        if (config.setPassThroughHeader) {\n          // Round-10 (#49, O10): `unenforced` describes the GATE state, not\n          // the downstream response. Renamed from the ambiguous\n          // `pass-through` (which partners read as \"request succeeded\").\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Mode', 'unenforced');\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Reason', 'non-jsonrpc-body');\n        }\n        return next();\n      }\n      req.mcpRequest = parsed;\n\n      // ── Identity reconciliation (defect d) ─────────────────────────────\n      // Header value is the SDK-canonical slot; body slot exists for legacy\n      // hand-written tool callers and the MCP `_meta.astrasync.agentId`\n      // convention.\n      const headerRaw = req.headers['x-astra-id'] ?? req.headers['x-astra-agentid'];\n      const headerAstraId =\n        typeof headerRaw === 'string'\n          ? headerRaw\n          : Array.isArray(headerRaw)\n            ? headerRaw[0]\n            : undefined;\n      const bodyAstraId = parsed.agentIdFromBody;\n\n      let effectiveAstraId: string | undefined;\n      if (headerAstraId && bodyAstraId && headerAstraId !== bodyAstraId) {\n        if (onAgentIdMismatch === 'reject') {\n          const id = (req.body as Record<string, unknown>)?.id ?? null;\n          res.status(400).json({\n            jsonrpc: '2.0',\n            id,\n            error: {\n              code: -32602,\n              message: 'AGENT_ID_MISMATCH',\n              data: {\n                detail:\n                  'The agent id in the X-Astra-Id header disagrees with params._meta.astrasync.agentId / params.arguments.agent_id. Reconcile before calling the tool — see https://astrasync.ai/docs/mcp-integration#identity-reconciliation.',\n                headerAstraId,\n                bodyAstraId,\n              },\n            },\n          });\n          return;\n        }\n        effectiveAstraId = onAgentIdMismatch === 'prefer-header' ? headerAstraId : bodyAstraId;\n      } else {\n        effectiveAstraId = headerAstraId ?? bodyAstraId;\n      }\n\n      // ── Inner-hop dedupe (defect c) ────────────────────────────────────\n      // If a trusted upstream MCP hop already verified this exact ASTRA-id\n      // a few ms ago, we accept the marker and skip a redundant verify-access\n      // call. Only valid when the header is fresh AND matches the agent id\n      // we resolved above.\n      if (trustVerifiedHop && effectiveAstraId) {\n        const hopRaw = req.headers[MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER.toLowerCase()];\n        const hopValue =\n          typeof hopRaw === 'string' ? hopRaw : Array.isArray(hopRaw) ? hopRaw[0] : undefined;\n        const marker = parseVerifiedHop(hopValue);\n        if (\n          isVerifiedHopValidFor(marker, effectiveAstraId, {\n            ...(verifiedHopMaxAgeMs !== undefined ? { maxAgeMs: verifiedHopMaxAgeMs } : {}),\n          })\n        ) {\n          // Skip verify-access — pass straight through. Don't re-emit the\n          // header since the MCP framework will issue the response (the\n          // outer hop already tagged it for any further inner hops).\n          return next();\n        }\n      }\n\n      // ── Resolve gating ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n      const { level: minAccessLevel, source: gateSource } = resolveMinAccessLevel(parsed, {\n        toolGates,\n        methodGates,\n      });\n\n      // ── Build verify-access request ────────────────────────────────────\n      // Round-13 (R13-5) — credentials extraction hoisted above the\n      // mcp-tier-none short-circuit (mirrors round-12 F9 express adapter\n      // restructure). The `evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed` flag lets the\n      // caller turn unenforced tier-none calls into evaluated-not-enforced\n      // calls when credentials are present, so the agent verification\n      // result populates `req.agentVerification` for tier-aware handler\n      // rendering (e.g. anonymous vs verified MCP tool listings).\n      const credentials = extractCredentials(\n        req.headers as Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n        req.query as Record<string, string | undefined>\n      );\n      // Override the SDK's default credential extraction with the resolved\n      // ASTRA-id so the verify-access call sees the post-precedence value\n      // (defect d). When neither header nor body supplied an id, the SDK's\n      // anonymous-canonical-flow handles it.\n      if (effectiveAstraId) credentials.astraId = effectiveAstraId;\n\n      // Risk tier `none` short-circuit. Default behaviour: skip\n      // verify-access (handshake / introspection must work for\n      // unregistered probes). With `evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed: true`\n      // AND credentials present, fall through to verify-access for the\n      // audit trail; the post-verify gate-skipping branch below handles\n      // the rendering side. Round-12 F9 parity (closes the round-12\n      // deferral).\n      const shouldEnforce = minAccessLevel !== 'none';\n      if (\n        minAccessLevel === 'none' &&\n        (!config.evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed || !credentials.astraId)\n      ) {\n        if (config.setPassThroughHeader) {\n          // Round-10 (#49, O10): `unenforced` describes the GATE state, not\n          // the downstream response.\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Mode', 'unenforced');\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Reason', 'mcp-tier-none');\n        }\n        return next();\n      }\n\n      // Round-12 (F19) + round-13 (R13-1, R13-2): symmetric purpose+action\n      // resolution. Per `feedback_symmetric_fallbacks_for_symmetric_concepts.md`,\n      // both concepts share the precedence chain documented at\n      // `mcpToPdlss`:\n      //   header → _meta.astrasync.<concept> → params.arguments.<concept> → default\n      //\n      // Round-12 shipped purpose with `header → _meta → default`;\n      // round-13 R13-1 closed the `params.arguments.purpose` fallback\n      // gap. Round-13 R13-2 ships action with the same full chain in\n      // one round (not staggered) to pre-empt the parallel \"I set\n      // action in arguments and it didn't take\" support tickets.\n      const headerPurpose = readSingleHeader(req.headers['x-astra-purpose']);\n      const headerAction = readSingleHeader(req.headers['x-astra-action']);\n      const pdlss = mcpToPdlss(parsed, headerPurpose, headerAction);\n\n      // Telemetry: debug log per resolution. Adoption tracking, support\n      // triage, and the `default_*` / `transport_layer` decay signals\n      // all read this. Both purpose and action emit their source so we\n      // can spot which integration path each partner is using.\n      if (config.debug) {\n        // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n        console.debug('[mcp-middleware] pdlss resolved', {\n          purpose_source: pdlss.purposeSource,\n          resolved_purpose: pdlss.purpose,\n          action_source: pdlss.actionSource,\n          resolved_action: pdlss.action,\n        });\n      }\n\n      const counterpartyUrl =\n        config.counterpartyUrl || `${req.protocol}://${req.get('host')}${req.path}`;\n      const shouldRecordDecisions = recordDecisions !== false;\n\n      const result = await verify(config, {\n        credentials,\n        purpose: pdlss.purpose,\n        action: pdlss.action,\n        resource: pdlss.resource,\n        // Round-12 (F19): mark transport protocol separately from intent.\n        // The MCP middleware always sets this to 'mcp'; non-MCP callers\n        // leave it unset (server-side default is 'rest').\n        invocationProtocol: 'mcp',\n        createSession: shouldRecordDecisions,\n        counterpartyUrl,\n        counterpartyType: config.counterpartyType || 'mcp_server',\n        enableRuntimeChallenge,\n        callerMetadata: {\n          sourceIp: req.ip,\n          userAgent: req.headers['user-agent'] as string | undefined,\n          host: req.headers.host as string | undefined,\n        },\n      });\n\n      req.agentVerification = result;\n      const sessionId = (result as EnhancedVerificationResult).sessionId;\n      const correlationId = (result as EnhancedVerificationResult).correlationId;\n\n      // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denied verifications short-circuit BEFORE the\n      // gate-level comparison. See express.ts for the full rationale —\n      // mirroring it here so the MCP path inherits the same belt-and-braces\n      // protection against access-level/help-payload conflation.\n      // Round-18 G4: short-circuit on either axis failing.\n      if (!result.identityVerified || !result.policyAllowed) {\n        if (shouldRecordDecisions && sessionId) {\n          recordDecision(config, sessionId, 'denied', result.denialReasons?.[0]).catch(() => {});\n        }\n        onDenied(result, req, res);\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // Round-13 (R13-5): evaluation-without-enforcement parity with the\n      // express F9 adapter. When the route is `none` but we ran\n      // verify-access because `evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed: true` AND\n      // credentials were present, skip the gates and call next() — the\n      // result is on `req.agentVerification` for the MCP handler to\n      // render tier-aware responses (e.g. anonymous vs verified\n      // tool-listing on the same `/mcp` endpoint).\n      if (!shouldEnforce) {\n        if (config.setPassThroughHeader) {\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Mode', 'enforced');\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Reason', 'evaluated-not-enforced');\n        }\n        if (shouldRecordDecisions && sessionId) {\n          recordDecision(config, sessionId, 'granted').catch(() => {});\n        }\n        return next();\n      }\n\n      if (!hasMinimumAccess(result.accessLevel, minAccessLevel)) {\n        // Round-12 (F12): synthesise the structured failure entry so the\n        // partner-facing response carries the same shape as every other\n        // denial dimension. Guidance positions step-up only — increasing\n        // trust score or lowering the route floor both read as gaming the\n        // gate. Step-up flow ships separately this month.\n        const insufficientFailure = {\n          dimension: 'access_level.insufficient',\n          message: `Tool requires accessLevel '${minAccessLevel}'; agent has '${result.accessLevel}'.`,\n          guidance:\n            \"Request elevated access via step-up verification (coming soon — ships this month). Step-up lets the agent owner approve a one-time elevation for this specific counterparty + purpose without changing the agent's baseline trust score.\",\n        };\n        result.failures = [...(result.failures ?? []), insufficientFailure];\n        result.denialReasons = [...(result.denialReasons ?? []), insufficientFailure.message];\n\n        // v2.3.9 (defect #34): server granted but local enforcement\n        // (toolGate / methodGate / tier floor) is rejecting. Record this\n        // as a local override so the activity feed surfaces the\n        // dashboard-vs-runtime divergence as a distinct event.\n        //\n        // v2.3.10 (defect #34, round-4): anonymous traffic has no session\n        // → fall back to `correlationId` and the sessionless local-override\n        // endpoint. Authenticated traffic still uses sessionId/recordDecision.\n        if (shouldRecordDecisions) {\n          const overrideKind: 'toolGate' | 'methodGate' | 'other' =\n            gateSource === 'toolGate'\n              ? 'toolGate'\n              : gateSource === 'methodGate'\n                ? 'methodGate'\n                : 'other';\n          const override = {\n            overriddenBy: overrideKind,\n            ...(parsed.toolName && { toolName: parsed.toolName }),\n            requestedLevel: minAccessLevel,\n            grantedLevel: result.accessLevel,\n          };\n          if (sessionId) {\n            recordDecision(config, sessionId, 'denied', result.denialReasons?.[0], override).catch(\n              () => {}\n            );\n          } else if (correlationId) {\n            recordAnonymousLocalOverride(\n              config,\n              correlationId,\n              override,\n              result.denialReasons?.[0]\n            ).catch(() => {});\n          }\n        }\n        onDenied(result, req, res);\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // ── Tag the outbound response with X-Astra-Verified-Hop ────────────\n      // Inner-hop REST endpoints called by this tool can read the header\n      // and skip a duplicate verify-access. We set it on the response so\n      // downstream proxies see it; tools that perform fetch() to an inner\n      // hop should also forward it themselves (the MCP server framework\n      // controls outbound calls — out of scope here).\n      if (effectiveAstraId) {\n        res.setHeader(\n          MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER,\n          serializeVerifiedHop({\n            astraId: effectiveAstraId,\n            ...(sessionId ? { sessionId } : {}),\n            checkedAt: Date.now(),\n          })\n        );\n      }\n\n      if (shouldRecordDecisions && sessionId) {\n        recordDecision(config, sessionId, 'granted').catch(() => {});\n      }\n      // v2.3.8 (defect #26): relay X-Astra-Unverified-Warning when the\n      // server returned an audit-mode advisory.\n      const enhancedResult = result as EnhancedVerificationResult;\n      if (enhancedResult.warningHeader) {\n        res.setHeader(enhancedResult.warningHeader.name, enhancedResult.warningHeader.value);\n      }\n      next();\n    } catch (error) {\n      // Fail open by default — the underlying MCP server handler still\n      // exists and can apply its own access control. A logger hook is a\n      // future enhancement.\n      // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n      console.error('[VerificationGateway/MCP] Middleware error:', error);\n      next();\n    }\n  };\n}\n\n// Re-export the helpers so consumers can mix-and-match (e.g. read the\n// verified-hop header themselves on a custom inner-hop handler).\nexport {\n  parseMcpJsonRpc,\n  mcpToPdlss,\n  mcpRiskTier,\n  serializeVerifiedHop,\n  parseVerifiedHop,\n  isVerifiedHopValidFor,\n  MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER,\n};\nexport type { ParsedMcpRequest } from 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See\n * `types.ts` AccessLevel for the rationale (value-name collision with the\n * `guidance: {...}` help-payload object on VerificationResult).\n */\n\nimport type { AccessLevel, TrustLevel } from './types';\n\n/**\n * Access level hierarchy (higher number = more access)\n */\nexport const ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY: Record<AccessLevel, number> = {\n  none: 0,\n  restricted: 1,\n  'read-only': 2,\n  standard: 3,\n  full: 4,\n  internal: 5,\n};\n\n/**\n * Access level descriptions for UI\n */\nexport const ACCESS_LEVEL_DESCRIPTIONS: Record<AccessLevel, string> = {\n  none: 'No access - credentials required',\n  restricted: 'Restricted access - registration prompt only',\n  'read-only': 'Read-only access - can browse but not modify',\n  standard: 'Standard access - normal operations per PDLSS policy',\n  full: 'Full access - all operations for high-trust agents',\n  internal: 'Internal access - organization member privileges',\n};\n\n/**\n * Default trust score thresholds for access levels\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_TRUST_THRESHOLDS: Record<AccessLevel, number> = {\n  none: 0,\n  restricted: 0,\n  'read-only': 20,\n  standard: 40,\n  full: 70,\n  internal: 0, // Internal is based on org membership, not score\n};\n\n/**\n * Trust level score ranges\n */\nexport const TRUST_LEVEL_RANGES: Record<TrustLevel, { min: number; max: number }> = {\n  BRONZE: { min: 0, max: 39 },\n  SILVER: { min: 40, max: 59 },\n  GOLD: { min: 60, max: 79 },\n  PLATINUM: { min: 80, max: 100 },\n};\n\n/**\n * Determine trust level from score\n */\nexport function getTrustLevel(score: number): TrustLevel {\n  if (score >= 80) return 'PLATINUM';\n  if (score >= 60) return 'GOLD';\n  if (score >= 40) return 'SILVER';\n  return 'BRONZE';\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if access level A is greater than or equal to access level B\n */\nexport function hasMinimumAccess(actual: AccessLevel, required: AccessLevel): boolean {\n  return ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY[actual] >= ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY[required];\n}\n\n/**\n * Get the highest access level for a given trust score\n */\nexport function getAccessLevelForScore(\n  trustScore: number,\n  thresholds: Record<AccessLevel, number> = DEFAULT_TRUST_THRESHOLDS\n): AccessLevel {\n  if (trustScore >= thresholds.full) return 'full';\n  if (trustScore >= thresholds.standard) return 'standard';\n  if (trustScore >= thresholds['read-only']) return 'read-only';\n  return 'restricted';\n}\n\n/**\n * Determine access level from verification result.\n *\n * v2.3.9 (defect #30): unverified callers now return `'none'` (was\n * `'guidance'`). Denials grant zero — never a positive band.\n */\nexport function determineAccessLevel(\n  verified: boolean,\n  trustScore: number,\n  isOrgMember: boolean,\n  customThresholds?: Partial<Record<AccessLevel, number>>\n): AccessLevel {\n  if (!verified) {\n    return 'none';\n  }\n\n  if (isOrgMember) {\n    return 'internal';\n  }\n\n  const thresholds = {\n    ...DEFAULT_TRUST_THRESHOLDS,\n    ...customThresholds,\n  };\n\n  return getAccessLevelForScore(trustScore, thresholds);\n}\n\n/**\n * Access capabilities per level\n */\nexport interface AccessCapabilities {\n  canRead: boolean;\n  canWrite: boolean;\n  canDelete: boolean;\n  canAdmin: boolean;\n  canAccessInternal: boolean;\n  maxTransactionValue?: number;\n  allowedPurposes?: string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Get capabilities for an access level\n */\nexport function getCapabilities(accessLevel: AccessLevel): AccessCapabilities {\n  switch (accessLevel) {\n    case 'none':\n      return {\n        canRead: false,\n        canWrite: false,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'restricted':\n      return {\n        canRead: false,\n        canWrite: false,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'read-only':\n      return {\n        canRead: true,\n        canWrite: false,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'standard':\n      return {\n        canRead: true,\n        canWrite: true,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'full':\n      return {\n        canRead: true,\n        canWrite: true,\n        canDelete: true,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'internal':\n      return {\n        canRead: true,\n        canWrite: true,\n        canDelete: true,\n        canAdmin: true,\n        canAccessInternal: true,\n      };\n    default:\n      return {\n        canRead: false,\n        canWrite: false,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Round-13 (F14 closure / R13-7): single source-of-truth for the SDK's\n * package version emitted on verify-access bodies (and any future\n * telemetry). Bumped alongside `package.json#version` on every release.\n *\n * Why a constant rather than `import pkg from '../package.json'`:\n * - `tsconfig.json` sets `rootDir: ./src`; importing the sibling\n *   package.json fails the build with \"outside rootDir\".\n * - Build-time string replacement (tsup `define`, esbuild banner, etc.)\n *   adds toolchain coupling for a trivial gain.\n * - Embedded readonly constant works in every environment (Node, browser,\n *   bundlers, Deno) without runtime fs / network access.\n *\n * Release discipline: a CI lint can grep `package.json#version` against\n * this constant if the two ever diverge in the wild. Round-13 manual bump\n * is fine — bumping both in the release-ceremony commit keeps them\n * lockstep.\n */\nexport const SDK_VERSION = '2.4.10';\n","/**\n * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway - Core Verification Logic\n *\n * This module handles the core verification logic, calling the AstraSync API\n * and processing the response into a standardized VerificationResult.\n */\n\nimport type {\n  GatewayConfig,\n  AgentCredentials,\n  VerificationRequest,\n  VerificationResult,\n  VerifiedAgent,\n  VerifiedDeveloper,\n  VerifiedOrganization,\n  GuidanceInfo,\n  AccessLevel,\n  EnhancedVerificationResult,\n  TokenGuidance,\n  RuntimeChallengeResult,\n} from './types';\nimport { getTrustLevel, ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY } from './access-levels';\nimport { SDK_VERSION } from './version';\n\n/**\n * Default configuration values\n *\n * apiBaseUrl matches the OpenAPI authoritative server (https://astrasync.ai/api\n * for prod, https://staging.astrasync.ai/api for staging). Always include the\n * /api path prefix when overriding — registration / docs URLs are derived by\n * stripping it.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_CONFIG: Partial<GatewayConfig> = {\n  apiBaseUrl: 'https://astrasync.ai/api',\n  // v2.3.9 (defect #30): default for unconfigured callers is `'none'` (no\n  // access). Pre-rename this defaulted to `'guidance'`, which combined with\n  // a route gated at `'guidance'` to silently let unverified traffic\n  // through (`hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance') === true`).\n  defaultAccessLevel: 'none',\n  // minTrustScore + minTrustScoreForFull deprecated in v2.3.0 — server decides.\n  // Round-18.5 F4: cacheTtl deliberately unset. When undefined, cacheResult\n  // applies the split default (60s autonomous / 300s step-up). When the\n  // caller sets cacheTtl explicitly, that value is honoured uniformly.\n  // Set cacheTtl: 0 to disable caching entirely.\n  debug: false,\n};\n\n/**\n * Init self-test state. Fires once per process on first verify() call to warn\n * if apiBaseUrl is pointing at the wrong host (e.g. a marketing site that\n * 200s with text/html instead of the API).\n */\nlet initCheckPerformed = false;\n\n/** One-shot guard for v2.3.0 deprecation warning. */\nlet deprecationWarningShown = false;\n\nasync function performInitCheck(apiBaseUrl: string, debug?: boolean): Promise<void> {\n  initCheckPerformed = true;\n  try {\n    const probeUrl = `${apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access`;\n    // HEAD mirrors GET semantics (running the full request pipeline without a\n    // body) so the response carries the same content-type the marketing 404\n    // would return. OPTIONS often gets short-circuited by CORS-preflight\n    // handlers and returns no content-type, defeating the check.\n    const response = await fetch(probeUrl, { method: 'HEAD' });\n    const contentType = response.headers.get('content-type') ?? '';\n    if (contentType.startsWith('text/html')) {\n      console.warn(\n        `[VerificationGateway] apiBaseUrl '${apiBaseUrl}' returned HTML (content-type: ${contentType}). ` +\n          `This usually means apiBaseUrl is pointing at a marketing site instead of the API. ` +\n          `Expected: 'https://astrasync.ai/api' (prod) or 'https://staging.astrasync.ai/api' (staging). ` +\n          `Set disableInitChecks: true on GatewayConfig to silence this warning.`\n      );\n    } else if (debug) {\n      console.log(\n        `[VerificationGateway] init check passed for ${apiBaseUrl} (content-type: ${contentType})`\n      );\n    }\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (debug) {\n      console.log(`[VerificationGateway] init check failed (non-blocking): ${String(err)}`);\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Simple in-memory cache for verification results\n */\nconst verificationCache = new Map<string, { result: VerificationResult; expiresAt: number }>();\n\n/**\n * Generate cache key from the full request shape.\n *\n * Round-18.5 F4: pre-fix the key was credentials-only (`astraId-apiKey-jwt`),\n * which silently returned the cached result of a prior call even when the\n * subsequent call's purpose/action/counterparty/etc. differed. That was a\n * security gap — a warm cache could serve an allow verdict for a purpose the\n * agent hadn't actually been authorised for. Key now includes every field\n * that affects the backend verdict.\n *\n * MAINTAIN: when adding a field to VerificationRequest that affects the\n * backend verdict, add it to this key. Fields that don't affect verdict\n * (e.g. requestId, timestamps, sdkVersion) don't belong here — including\n * them would needlessly thrash the cache for repeated identical requests.\n */\nfunction getCacheKey(request: VerificationRequest): string {\n  const c = request.credentials;\n  return [\n    c.astraId || '',\n    c.apiKey || '',\n    c.jwt || '',\n    request.purpose || '',\n    request.action || '',\n    request.resourceType || '',\n    request.resource || '',\n    request.jurisdiction || '',\n    request.transactionValue ?? '',\n    request.currency || '',\n    request.counterpartyUrl || '',\n    request.counterpartyType || '',\n    request.isSubAgentRequest ? '1' : '0',\n    request.parentAgentId || '',\n    request.subAgentDepth ?? '',\n  ].join('|');\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if cached result is still valid\n */\nfunction getCachedResult(request: VerificationRequest): VerificationResult | null {\n  const key = getCacheKey(request);\n  const cached = verificationCache.get(key);\n\n  if (cached && cached.expiresAt > Date.now()) {\n    return cached.result;\n  }\n\n  if (cached) {\n    verificationCache.delete(key);\n  }\n\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Cache a verification result.\n *\n * Round-18.5 F4: TTL splits by step-up status when the caller hasn't pinned\n * `configuredTtl` explicitly. Autonomous verdicts cache for 60s (faster\n * policy-update propagation, better security posture); step-up verdicts cache\n * for 300s (matches human-paced approval cycles, prevents thrashing during\n * the user-action window). When `configuredTtl` is set (truthy positive\n * number), it's honoured uniformly for back-compat with partners pinning a\n * specific TTL today.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_AUTONOMOUS_TTL_SECONDS = 60;\nconst DEFAULT_STEP_UP_TTL_SECONDS = 300;\n\nfunction cacheResult(\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  result: VerificationResult,\n  configuredTtl: number | undefined\n): void {\n  const ttlSeconds =\n    configuredTtl && configuredTtl > 0\n      ? configuredTtl\n      : result.requiresStepUp\n        ? DEFAULT_STEP_UP_TTL_SECONDS\n        : DEFAULT_AUTONOMOUS_TTL_SECONDS;\n  const key = getCacheKey(request);\n  verificationCache.set(key, {\n    result,\n    expiresAt: Date.now() + ttlSeconds * 1000,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Clear the verification cache\n */\nexport function clearCache(): void {\n  verificationCache.clear();\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract agent credentials from various sources\n */\nexport function extractCredentials(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  query?: Record<string, string | undefined>\n): AgentCredentials {\n  const credentials: AgentCredentials = {};\n\n  // Check for ASTRA-ID in headers (case-insensitive). Accepts the historical\n  // X-Astra-Id name plus the X-Astra-AgentId / x-astra-agent-id alias the\n  // partner asked for in #9a — both surface the same field.\n  const astraIdHeader =\n    headers['x-astra-id'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-Id'] ||\n    headers['X-ASTRA-ID'] ||\n    headers['x-astra-agentid'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-AgentId'] ||\n    headers['x-astra-agent-id'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-Agent-Id'] ||\n    headers['X-ASTRA-AGENT-ID'];\n  if (astraIdHeader) {\n    credentials.astraId = Array.isArray(astraIdHeader) ? astraIdHeader[0] : astraIdHeader;\n  }\n\n  // Check for API key in headers\n  const apiKeyHeader = headers['x-api-key'] || headers['X-Api-Key'] || headers['X-API-KEY'];\n  if (apiKeyHeader) {\n    credentials.apiKey = Array.isArray(apiKeyHeader) ? apiKeyHeader[0] : apiKeyHeader;\n  }\n\n  // Check Authorization header for Bearer token\n  const authHeader = headers['authorization'] || headers['Authorization'];\n  if (authHeader) {\n    const authValue = Array.isArray(authHeader) ? authHeader[0] : authHeader;\n    credentials.authorizationHeader = authValue;\n\n    if (authValue.startsWith('Bearer ')) {\n      credentials.jwt = authValue.slice(7);\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Check query parameters as fallback\n  if (query) {\n    if (query.astraId && !credentials.astraId) {\n      credentials.astraId = query.astraId;\n    }\n    if (query.apiKey && !credentials.apiKey) {\n      credentials.apiKey = query.apiKey;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return credentials;\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if credentials are present\n */\nexport function hasCredentials(credentials: AgentCredentials): boolean {\n  return !!(credentials.astraId || credentials.apiKey || credentials.jwt);\n}\n\n/**\n * Source of a synthesised guidance response. Round-10 split — the\n * `'no_credentials'` shape is the original (caller has no AstraSync\n * credentials, suggest registration). The `'api_error'` shape is for when\n * the verify-access HTTP call itself failed (5xx, network, etc.) — DON'T\n * tell a verified-but-currently-blocked partner to \"register your agent\".\n */\ntype GuidanceSource = 'no_credentials' | 'api_error';\n\n/**\n * Create guidance response for unverified agents or for API-error fallback.\n *\n * Round-10 (#47, O5): split source so the `register your agent` template\n * doesn't fire on transient backend failures. Also threads `correlationId`\n * through so adapter `onDenied` handlers can surface it on the merchant's\n * response body for log correlation.\n */\nfunction createGuidanceResponse(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  reason?: string,\n  options: { source?: GuidanceSource; correlationId?: string } = {}\n): VerificationResult {\n  const source = options.source ?? 'no_credentials';\n  const isApiError = source === 'api_error';\n\n  const guidance: GuidanceInfo = isApiError\n    ? {\n        message:\n          'Verification is temporarily unavailable. Retry with exponential backoff; if the issue persists, contact support with the correlationId.',\n        registrationUrl: `${config.apiBaseUrl.replace('/api', '')}/register`,\n        documentationUrl: `${config.apiBaseUrl.replace('/api', '')}/docs/agent-access`,\n        steps: [\n          'Retry the request with exponential backoff',\n          'If failures persist, share the correlationId with support',\n        ],\n      }\n    : {\n        message:\n          'This service verifies AI agents before granting access. Please register your agent with AstraSync.',\n        registrationUrl: `${config.apiBaseUrl.replace('/api', '')}/register`,\n        documentationUrl: `${config.apiBaseUrl.replace('/api', '')}/docs/agent-access`,\n        steps: [\n          'Register for an AstraSync account',\n          'Create and register your agent',\n          'Add your ASTRA-ID to request headers',\n          'Retry your request',\n        ],\n      };\n\n  return {\n    // Round-18 G4: createGuidanceResponse fires for unverified-agent path or\n    // API-error fallback. Identity is not verified (no agent resolved);\n    // policy is not evaluated (we never reached the gate).\n    identityVerified: false,\n    policyAllowed: false,\n    // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denials grant `'none'`, NEVER a positive band.\n    // Adapters additionally short-circuit on `!identityVerified ||\n    // !policyAllowed` before the gate check, but the access level still has\n    // to be honest at the data layer so downstream consumers (SDK adapters\n    // in other languages, custom integrations) inherit the correct\n    // semantics.\n    accessLevel: 'none',\n    guidance,\n    denialReasons: reason ? [reason] : ['No valid agent credentials provided'],\n    // Round-10 (#47, O5): on API-error fallback, surface a typed failure so\n    // partners (and their custom onDenied handlers) can branch on\n    // dimension. Without this, the synthesised stub was indistinguishable\n    // from a real policy deny.\n    failures: isApiError\n      ? [\n          {\n            dimension: 'verify_access.api_error',\n            message: reason ?? 'Verification temporarily unavailable',\n            guidance: guidance.message,\n          },\n        ]\n      : undefined,\n    correlationId: options.correlationId,\n    verifiedAt: new Date(),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Call the AstraSync verify-access API\n */\nasync function callVerifyAccessAPI(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest\n): Promise<{\n  success: boolean;\n  access?: {\n    allowed: boolean;\n    /**\n     * Server-decided access level. Read verbatim — do NOT remap client-side.\n     * The server resolves this from endpoint policy + agent trust score using\n     * the canonical thresholds (see backend `apps/backend/src/utils/access-levels.ts`).\n     */\n    accessLevel?: AccessLevel;\n    reason?: string;\n    /**\n     * Aggregated denial failures (v2.9.8+). Empty / absent when allowed.\n     * Each entry is `{ dimension, message, guidance? }` — see\n     * `AccessFailure` for the contract.\n     */\n    failures?: Array<{ dimension: string; message: string; guidance?: string }>;\n    requiresStepUp?: boolean;\n    requiresApproval?: boolean;\n    appliedPolicy?: {\n      boundaryName: string;\n      policyVersion: string;\n    };\n    counterparty?: {\n      id: string;\n      name: string;\n      trustScoreRequirement: number;\n    };\n  };\n  agent?: {\n    kyaAgentId: string;\n    astraId: string;\n    name: string;\n    trustScore: number;\n    trustLevel: string;\n    agentStatus: string;\n    blockchainStatus: string;\n  };\n  developer?: {\n    kyaOwnerId: string;\n    fullName: string;\n    email: string;\n    identityVerified: boolean;\n    trustScore: number;\n  };\n  organization?: {\n    name: string;\n    verified: boolean;\n    trustScore: number;\n  };\n  /**\n   * Structured explanation of the verification decision. Tells the merchant\n   * WHY (id verified? challenge passed? request within PDLSS? trust score?)\n   * without exposing thresholds, scope lists, or other-tenant counterparty\n   * membership. Empty `attestations` unless the endpoint's access policy\n   * declared `required_attestations`.\n   */\n  verificationContext?: {\n    idVerified: boolean;\n    runtimeChallenge: {\n      status: 'passed' | 'skipped' | 'failed' | 'timeout' | 'not_supported';\n      checkedAt: string | null;\n    };\n    pdlssCheck: {\n      result: 'within' | 'exceeded' | 'denied' | 'not_evaluated';\n      purpose: 'approved' | 'denied';\n      scope: 'approved' | 'denied';\n    };\n    dynamicTrustScore: number;\n    attestations: Array<{\n      type: string;\n      status: 'passed' | 'failed';\n      validUntil?: string;\n      proofType: 'reference' | 'zkp';\n      proof: string;\n    }>;\n  };\n  error?: string;\n  /**\n   * Round-10 (#47, O5): when the verify-access server response carries a\n   * correlationId on an error envelope, propagate it so the SDK can thread\n   * it through createGuidanceResponse → adapter onDenied → merchant body.\n   */\n  correlationId?: string;\n}> {\n  const { credentials, ...requestData } = request;\n\n  // Build the request body. agentId is omitted when not provided so the\n  // server treats it as an anonymous canonical-flow call (Branch A/B/C).\n  const body: Record<string, unknown> = {\n    ...(credentials.astraId && { agentId: credentials.astraId }),\n    purpose: requestData.purpose || 'general',\n  };\n\n  // Add optional fields\n  if (requestData.action) body.action = requestData.action;\n  if (requestData.resourceType) body.resourceType = requestData.resourceType;\n  if (requestData.resource) body.resource = requestData.resource;\n  if (requestData.jurisdiction) body.jurisdiction = requestData.jurisdiction;\n  if (requestData.transactionValue) body.transactionValue = requestData.transactionValue;\n  if (requestData.currency) body.currency = requestData.currency;\n  if (requestData.isSubAgentRequest) body.isSubAgentRequest = requestData.isSubAgentRequest;\n  if (requestData.parentAgentId) body.parentAgentId = requestData.parentAgentId;\n  if (requestData.subAgentDepth !== undefined) body.subAgentDepth = requestData.subAgentDepth;\n  // Handshake Protocol v10 additions\n  if (requestData.enableRuntimeChallenge)\n    body.enableRuntimeChallenge = requestData.enableRuntimeChallenge;\n  if (requestData.createSession) body.createSession = requestData.createSession;\n  if (requestData.durationRequired) body.durationRequired = requestData.durationRequired;\n  if (requestData.counterpartyType) body.counterpartyType = requestData.counterpartyType;\n  if (requestData.counterpartyUrl) body.counterpartyUrl = requestData.counterpartyUrl;\n  if (config.counterpartyId) body.counterpartyId = config.counterpartyId;\n  if (requestData.runtimeChallengeOptions)\n    body.runtimeChallengeOptions = requestData.runtimeChallengeOptions;\n  // Round-12 (F19): transport-vs-intent separation. MCP middleware sets\n  // this to 'mcp'; non-MCP callers leave it unset.\n  if (requestData.invocationProtocol) body.invocationProtocol = requestData.invocationProtocol;\n\n  // Round-13 (F14 closure / R13-7): emit the SDK package version on every\n  // verify-access body so the backend can auto-populate `kya_counterparty.\n  // sdk_version` for the calling endpoint. Body field (not User-Agent\n  // header) is the canonical channel — works in Node, browser, behind\n  // Cloudflare, and across SDK bundlers without environment-specific\n  // header gymnastics. Backend's `validation.ts:verifyAccessSchema`\n  // accepts the semver regex; the auto-pop logic is forward-only.\n  body.sdkVersion = SDK_VERSION;\n\n  // Forward caller metadata when present. Merges the legacy top-level\n  // clientIp/userAgent into the nested block for backward compatibility.\n  if (requestData.callerMetadata || requestData.clientIp || requestData.userAgent) {\n    const meta = {\n      ...(requestData.clientIp && { sourceIp: requestData.clientIp }),\n      ...(requestData.userAgent && { userAgent: requestData.userAgent }),\n      ...requestData.callerMetadata,\n    };\n    if (Object.keys(meta).length > 0) body.callerMetadata = meta;\n  }\n\n  // Build headers\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n    'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n    ...config.customHeaders,\n  };\n\n  // verify-access requires authentication. The backend's authenticate middleware\n  // accepts either a JWT or an API key (starts with kya_) via `Authorization: Bearer <token>`.\n  // Credential-supplied auth header (e.g. the agent's own token) takes priority.\n  if (credentials.authorizationHeader) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = credentials.authorizationHeader;\n  } else if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n  }\n  // Legacy header kept for compatibility with any middleware that reads it directly.\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  try {\n    const response = await fetch(`${config.apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access`, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers,\n      body: JSON.stringify(body),\n    });\n\n    const data = await response.json();\n\n    // v2.3.8 (defect #29): treat 410 Gone as a deterministic deactivated-endpoint\n    // signal. Older SDKs may treat any non-2xx as transient and retry; v2.3.8+\n    // surfaces it as a structured denial with `reason: 'endpoint_deactivated'`\n    // so callers can distinguish \"endpoint gone\" from \"endpoint denied this\".\n    if (response.status === 410) {\n      return {\n        success: true,\n        access: {\n          allowed: false,\n          accessLevel: 'none',\n          reason: 'endpoint_deactivated',\n          failures: [\n            {\n              dimension: 'endpoint.deactivated',\n              message:\n                typeof data?.message === 'string' ? data.message : 'Endpoint has been deactivated',\n              guidance:\n                typeof data?.guidance === 'string'\n                  ? data.guidance\n                  : 'Reactivate via POST /api/endpoints/{id}/reactivate, or update the URL on the calling agent.',\n            },\n          ],\n        },\n      };\n    }\n\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      // Round-10 (#47, O5): propagate correlationId on the error path too if\n      // the server happened to include one (some 5xx error envelopes carry\n      // it). Lets the SDK pass it through to the adapter onDenied handler.\n      return {\n        success: false,\n        error: data.message || data.error || `API returned ${response.status}`,\n        correlationId: typeof data?.correlationId === 'string' ? data.correlationId : undefined,\n      };\n    }\n\n    return data;\n  } catch (error) {\n    const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error';\n    return {\n      success: false,\n      error: `Failed to call verify-access API: ${message}`,\n    };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Main verification function\n */\nexport async function verify(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest\n): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n  const mergedConfig = { ...DEFAULT_CONFIG, ...config };\n\n  // One-time init self-test — fire-and-forget, never blocks verify().\n  if (!initCheckPerformed && !mergedConfig.disableInitChecks && mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl) {\n    void performInitCheck(mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl, mergedConfig.debug);\n  }\n\n  // Deprecation warning for v2.3.0 removed config fields. Fires once per process.\n  if (\n    !deprecationWarningShown &&\n    (config.minTrustScore !== undefined || config.minTrustScoreForFull !== undefined)\n  ) {\n    deprecationWarningShown = true;\n    console.warn(\n      '[VerificationGateway] minTrustScore / minTrustScoreForFull are deprecated in v2.3.0 ' +\n        'and have no effect. Server is now the single source of truth for access-level decisions ' +\n        '(the SDK reads access.accessLevel from the verify-access response). To gate access ' +\n        \"to an endpoint, configure the endpoint's trust_score_requirement server-side.\"\n    );\n  }\n\n  // v2.3.0: anonymous traffic no longer short-circuits here. We forward the\n  // request to the server with no agentId; the server applies the endpoint's\n  // unverifiedAgentPolicy and returns advisory. createGuidanceResponse remains\n  // as the offline fallback if the API itself fails (handled below).\n\n  // Check cache first. Round-18.5 F4: caching on unless caller explicitly\n  // sets cacheTtl: 0 to disable. Undefined falls through to the split default\n  // (60s autonomous / 300s step-up) at cacheResult write time.\n  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0) {\n    const cached = getCachedResult(request);\n    if (cached) {\n      if (mergedConfig.debug) {\n        console.log('[VerificationGateway] Returning cached result');\n      }\n      return cached;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Inject counterparty info from config if not already set in request\n  const enrichedRequest = { ...request };\n  if (!enrichedRequest.counterpartyUrl && mergedConfig.counterpartyUrl) {\n    enrichedRequest.counterpartyUrl = mergedConfig.counterpartyUrl;\n  }\n  if (!enrichedRequest.counterpartyType && mergedConfig.counterpartyType) {\n    enrichedRequest.counterpartyType = mergedConfig.counterpartyType;\n  }\n\n  // Call the API\n  if (mergedConfig.debug) {\n    console.log('[VerificationGateway] Calling verify-access API');\n  }\n\n  const apiResponse = await callVerifyAccessAPI(mergedConfig, enrichedRequest);\n\n  // Handle API errors\n  if (!apiResponse.success) {\n    // Round-10 (#47, O5): distinguish API errors from missing-credentials.\n    // The previous default tagged any failure with the \"register your\n    // agent\" template, which is misleading to a verified partner whose\n    // verify-access call hit a 500. The `api_error` source surfaces a\n    // typed `verify_access.api_error` failure entry instead.\n    return createGuidanceResponse(mergedConfig, apiResponse.error, {\n      source: 'api_error',\n      correlationId: (apiResponse as { correlationId?: string }).correlationId,\n    });\n  }\n\n  // Check access result\n  if (!apiResponse.access?.allowed) {\n    // v2.9.8 (defect M1): aggregated failures across every gate that\n    // denied. Surface them on the result so the integrator can see every\n    // blocker in one go instead of the previous fail-fast cascade.\n    const aggregatedFailures = (apiResponse.access as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)\n      ?.failures as Array<{ dimension: string; message: string; guidance?: string }> | undefined;\n    // Round-18 G4: backend denied access (PDLSS or other gate); identity status\n    // depends on whether the backend resolved the caller. Read from\n    // verificationContext.idVerified; default false if absent (anonymous or\n    // identity-fail paths land here too). policyAllowed is false by definition\n    // in this branch (apiResponse.access.allowed === false).\n    const idVerifiedFromBackend =\n      (apiResponse.verificationContext as { idVerified?: boolean } | undefined)?.idVerified ===\n      true;\n    const result: EnhancedVerificationResult = {\n      identityVerified: idVerifiedFromBackend,\n      policyAllowed: false,\n      // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denials grant `'none'`, NEVER a positive band.\n      // Pre-rename this hardcoded `'guidance'`, which conflated with the\n      // colocated `guidance: {...}` help-payload object below and let\n      // denied requests pass any route gated at `'guidance'` because\n      // `hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance') === true`. Adapters now\n      // ALSO short-circuit on `!identityVerified || !policyAllowed` before\n      // the gate check — belt-and-braces.\n      accessLevel: 'none',\n      denialReasons:\n        aggregatedFailures && aggregatedFailures.length > 0\n          ? aggregatedFailures.map((f) => f.message)\n          : apiResponse.access?.reason\n            ? [apiResponse.access.reason]\n            : ['Access denied'],\n      failures: aggregatedFailures,\n      requiresStepUp: apiResponse.access?.requiresStepUp,\n      requiresApproval: apiResponse.access?.requiresApproval,\n      guidance: {\n        message: apiResponse.access?.reason || 'Access denied by PDLSS policy',\n        registrationUrl: `${mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl?.replace('/api', '')}/register`,\n        documentationUrl: `${mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl?.replace('/api', '')}/docs/pdlss`,\n      },\n      verifiedAt: new Date(),\n      // Extract sessionId so decisions can be recorded for denials too\n      sessionId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).sessionId as string | undefined,\n      // v2.3.10 (defect #34, round-4): anonymous traffic has no session →\n      // correlationId is the linking key for paired local_override events.\n      correlationId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).correlationId as string | undefined,\n      recommendation: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>)\n        .recommendation as EnhancedVerificationResult['recommendation'],\n      recommendationReasons: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).recommendationReasons as\n        | string[]\n        | undefined,\n    };\n\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  // Build successful result\n  const agent: VerifiedAgent | undefined = apiResponse.agent\n    ? {\n        astraId: apiResponse.agent.astraId,\n        name: apiResponse.agent.name,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.agent.trustScore,\n        trustLevel: getTrustLevel(apiResponse.agent.trustScore),\n        blockchainVerified: apiResponse.agent.blockchainStatus === 'verified',\n        status: apiResponse.agent.agentStatus as VerifiedAgent['status'],\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  const developer: VerifiedDeveloper | undefined = apiResponse.developer\n    ? {\n        astradId: apiResponse.developer.kyaOwnerId,\n        name: apiResponse.developer.fullName,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.developer.trustScore || 0,\n        verified: apiResponse.developer.identityVerified,\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  const organization: VerifiedOrganization | undefined = apiResponse.organization\n    ? {\n        name: apiResponse.organization.name,\n        verified: apiResponse.organization.verified,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.organization.trustScore,\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  // Verification context — structured \"why\" the merchant gets in v2.2.4+.\n  // Carries appliedPolicy (no UUIDs), pdlssCheck summary, dynamic trust score,\n  // and policy-driven attestations. Replaces the old over-sharing `pdlss` block.\n  const verificationContext = apiResponse.verificationContext;\n\n  // Server is the single source of truth for access level. SDK reads\n  // apiResponse.access.accessLevel verbatim — no client-side trust-score remap.\n  // Fallback to 'standard' if the server response is missing the field (older\n  // backend without the v2.3.0 contract); it covers the verified-access case.\n  const accessLevel: AccessLevel = apiResponse.access?.accessLevel ?? 'standard';\n\n  const result: EnhancedVerificationResult = {\n    // Round-18 G4: backend allowed access. Identity is verified (we resolved\n    // the caller to an agent) and policy passed all gates. Read idVerified\n    // from verificationContext for symmetry with the deny branch; default true\n    // on success path since `access.allowed === true` implies identity was\n    // resolvable (anonymous-allow paths flow through createGuidanceResponse).\n    identityVerified:\n      (apiResponse.verificationContext as { idVerified?: boolean } | undefined)?.idVerified !==\n      false,\n    policyAllowed: true,\n    accessLevel,\n    agent,\n    developer,\n    organization,\n    appliedPolicy: apiResponse.access?.appliedPolicy,\n    verificationContext,\n    requiresStepUp: apiResponse.access?.requiresStepUp,\n    requiresApproval: apiResponse.access?.requiresApproval,\n    verifiedAt: new Date(),\n    cacheTtl: mergedConfig.cacheTtl,\n    // Handshake Protocol v10 enhanced fields (present when backend returns them)\n    sessionId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).sessionId as string | undefined,\n    // v2.3.10 (defect #34, round-4): anonymous responses surface correlationId\n    // (no session row exists for unverified callers).\n    correlationId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).correlationId as string | undefined,\n    runtimeChallenge: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).runtimeChallenge as\n      | RuntimeChallengeResult\n      | undefined,\n    tokenGuidance: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).tokenGuidance as\n      | TokenGuidance\n      | undefined,\n    recommendation: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>)\n      .recommendation as EnhancedVerificationResult['recommendation'],\n    recommendationReasons: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).recommendationReasons as\n      | string[]\n      | undefined,\n    warningHeader: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).warningHeader as\n      | { name: string; value: string }\n      | undefined,\n  };\n\n  // Enforce AstraSync recommendation\n  if (result.recommendation === 'deny') {\n    // Round-18 G4: recommendation-driven deny lands on the success-path\n    // construction (identity was resolved). Flip policy only — identity stays\n    // verified — so adapters return 403 (re-auth won't help; the policy\n    // decision is the blocker).\n    result.policyAllowed = false;\n    result.accessLevel = 'none';\n    result.denialReasons = result.recommendationReasons || [\n      'Access denied by AstraSync recommendation',\n    ];\n    if (result.runtimeChallenge) {\n      result.guidance = {\n        message: `Verification failed: ${result.runtimeChallenge.reason || 'runtime challenge failed'}`,\n        registrationUrl: `${mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl?.replace('/api', '')}/register`,\n        documentationUrl: `${mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl?.replace('/api', '')}/docs/runtime-challenge`,\n      };\n    }\n  } else if (result.recommendation === 'step_up_required') {\n    result.requiresStepUp = true;\n    if (ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY[result.accessLevel] > ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY['read-only']) {\n      result.accessLevel = 'read-only';\n    }\n    result.denialReasons = result.recommendationReasons || ['Step-up verification required'];\n  }\n\n  // Cache the result (skip caching denials — agent may fix challenge endpoint\n  // and retry). Round-18.5 F4: cacheResult applies split default (60s/300s)\n  // when configuredTtl is undefined; honours the caller's value when set.\n  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0 && result.recommendation !== 'deny') {\n    cacheResult(request, result, mergedConfig.cacheTtl);\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Record a counterparty's grant/deny decision for a verification session.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\n/**\n * v2.3.9 (defect #34): optional override metadata. Set when the SDK's\n * local enforcement (toolGate / methodGate / trustScore floor) rejected\n * a request the SERVER had granted. Backend emits a distinct\n * `verification.local_override` event so the activity feed surfaces the\n * divergence as a separate row.\n */\nexport interface DecisionOverride {\n  overriddenBy: 'toolGate' | 'methodGate' | 'trustScore' | 'other';\n  toolName?: string;\n  requestedLevel?: AccessLevel;\n  grantedLevel?: AccessLevel;\n}\n\nexport async function recordDecision(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  sessionId: string,\n  decision: 'granted' | 'denied',\n  reason?: string,\n  override?: DecisionOverride\n): Promise<void> {\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  await fetch(`${config.apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access/${sessionId}/decision`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers,\n    body: JSON.stringify({\n      decision,\n      reason,\n      ...(override && {\n        overriddenBy: override.overriddenBy,\n        toolName: override.toolName,\n        requestedLevel: override.requestedLevel,\n        grantedLevel: override.grantedLevel,\n      }),\n    }),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * v2.3.10 (defect #34, round-4): record a SDK-side local override for an\n * anonymous verify-access response. Anonymous traffic has no session row, so\n * `recordDecision` (above) doesn't apply — but we still need to surface the\n * dashboard-vs-runtime divergence (e.g. server granted with audit warning\n * but local toolGate floor denied) on the activity feed.\n *\n * Backend ties the resulting `verification.local_override` event back to the\n * original `verification.unverified_audit` event via `correlationId`. The\n * endpoint is sessionless — see the docstring on the backend route for the\n * abuse-mitigation rationale (rate-limited per IP).\n *\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function recordAnonymousLocalOverride(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  correlationId: string,\n  override: DecisionOverride,\n  reason?: string\n): Promise<void> {\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  await fetch(`${config.apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access/local-override`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers,\n    body: JSON.stringify({\n      correlationId,\n      reason,\n      overriddenBy: override.overriddenBy,\n      toolName: override.toolName,\n      requestedLevel: override.requestedLevel,\n      grantedLevel: override.grantedLevel,\n    }),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Fetch the per-route policy for an endpoint from the AstraSync backend.\n * v2.9.7 moved policy authority into the dashboard — the SDK no longer\n * accepts `routes` from merchant-side source code, it fetches them from\n * here on init (and refreshes periodically).\n *\n * Returns `null` when the request fails for any reason — the caller decides\n * how to fall back (the middleware allows-all when no policy is loaded so\n * a misconfigured init doesn't take down the merchant's API).\n */\nexport async function fetchRoutes(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  counterpartyId: string\n): Promise<RouteAccessConfigShape[] | null> {\n  if (!counterpartyId) return null;\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n  try {\n    const response = await fetch(\n      `${config.apiBaseUrl}/endpoints/${encodeURIComponent(counterpartyId)}/routes`,\n      { method: 'GET', headers }\n    );\n    if (!response.ok) return null;\n    const body = (await response.json()) as { data?: { routes?: RouteAccessConfigShape[] } };\n    return body.data?.routes ?? [];\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Minimal shape of an EndpointRoute as the SDK consumes it. Mirrors the\n * server's `EndpointRoute` type and the SDK's `RouteAccessConfig` — same\n * JSON moves between server and SDK unchanged.\n */\nexport interface RouteAccessConfigShape {\n  pattern: string;\n  method: string;\n  minAccessLevel: 'none' | 'restricted' | 'read-only' | 'standard' | 'full' | 'internal';\n  minTrustScore?: number;\n  requiredPurposes?: string[];\n  allowedPurposes?: string[];\n  allowedJurisdictions?: string[];\n  maxDuration?: number;\n  maxTransactionValue?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify an agent AND automatically record the grant/deny decision.\n *\n * This is the recommended entry point for counterparties that call verify()\n * directly (e.g. MCP servers) rather than using createMiddleware().\n * It adds createSession: true, then fire-and-forgets the decision.\n */\nexport async function verifyAndRecord(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest\n): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n  const mergedConfig = { ...DEFAULT_CONFIG, ...config };\n  const result = await verify(mergedConfig, { ...request, createSession: true });\n  const sessionId = (result as EnhancedVerificationResult).sessionId;\n\n  if (sessionId) {\n    // Round-18 G4: a session is \"granted\" only if identity verified AND\n    // policy allowed; either failing is a deny.\n    if (result.identityVerified && result.policyAllowed) {\n      recordDecision(mergedConfig, sessionId, 'granted').catch(() => {});\n    } else {\n      recordDecision(mergedConfig, sessionId, 'denied', result.denialReasons?.[0]).catch(() => {});\n    }\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Report an unregistered agent attempt (no AstraSync credentials).\n * Called by SDK adapters when an agent is redirected to /docs/agent-access.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function reportUnregisteredAttempt(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  data: {\n    counterpartyUrl: string;\n    counterpartyType?: string;\n    sourceIp?: string;\n    userAgent?: string;\n    requestPath?: string;\n    requestMethod?: string;\n  }\n): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n\n  await fetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/verification-activity/unregistered-attempt`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n    body: JSON.stringify(data),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Report a counterparty-side PDLSS pre-check failure.\n * Called by SDK adapters when the agent's requested PDLSS exceeds\n * counterparty-defined maximums BEFORE calling verify-access.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function reportCounterpartyPreCheckFailure(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  data: {\n    agentId: string;\n    counterpartyUrl: string;\n    counterpartyType?: string;\n    failures: Array<{\n      field: string;\n      requested: string | number;\n      limit: string | number | string[];\n      message: string;\n    }>;\n    requestPath?: string;\n    requestMethod?: string;\n  }\n): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n\n  await fetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/verification-activity/counterparty-pre-check-failure`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n    body: JSON.stringify(data),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Quick verification — checks credentials and policy in one call.\n *\n * Round-18 G4: return shape mirrors `VerificationResult`'s split — partners\n * writing custom handlers around `quickVerify` get the same identity/policy\n * distinction as those calling `verify()` directly. Map to HTTP status the\n * same way: `!identityVerified` → 401; `identityVerified && !policyAllowed`\n * → 403.\n */\nexport async function quickVerify(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  credentials: AgentCredentials\n): Promise<{\n  identityVerified: boolean;\n  policyAllowed: boolean;\n  accessLevel: AccessLevel;\n  reason?: string;\n}> {\n  const result = await verify(config, {\n    credentials,\n    purpose: 'verification',\n  });\n\n  return {\n    identityVerified: result.identityVerified,\n    policyAllowed: result.policyAllowed,\n    accessLevel: result.accessLevel,\n    reason: result.denialReasons?.[0],\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * MCP server-side helpers — companion to `transport/mcp.ts` (which handles the\n * agent-side `_meta.astrasync` block).\n *\n * Surfaces a body-aware policy hook the existing `createMiddleware` couldn't\n * provide — MCP traffic is JSON-RPC over a single endpoint (`/mcp`), so the\n * default route-pattern gating is too coarse: every request looks the same\n * URL-wise, but `initialize` is low-risk handshake while `tools/call` of a\n * payment tool is high-risk. Cohort-3 beta merchants flagged this 🟡 in the\n * v2.9.5 round.\n *\n * What lives here:\n *   - `parseMcpJsonRpc(body)`    — peels JSON-RPC method + tool name + agent\n *                                   id without committing to a particular MCP\n *                                   server framework.\n *   - `mcpToPdlss(parsed)`       — canonical mapping JSON-RPC method → PDLSS\n *                                   purpose / action / resource. Doc-stable\n *                                   so audits can correlate.\n *   - `mcpRiskTier(parsed)`      — recommended `minAccessLevel` per method\n *                                   so a single MCP middleware can split\n *                                   `initialize` / `tools/list` (low gate)\n *                                   from `tools/call` (high gate).\n *   - `MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER`   — header convention for the dedupe pattern\n *                                   when an MCP tool calls an inner REST hop.\n *   - `serialize/parseVerifiedHop` helpers.\n *\n * The Express MCP adapter is in `adapters/mcp.ts` and consumes these.\n */\n\nimport type { AccessLevel } from '../types';\n\n/**\n * Header carrying upstream verify-access proof so an inner-hop REST endpoint\n * can dedupe (skip verify-access when the same ASTRA-id was already verified\n * a few ms earlier). Value format:\n *\n *   {astraId};{sessionId};{checkedAt-ms}\n *\n * Receivers MUST validate that `checkedAt` is recent (≤ 60s window\n * recommended) and that `astraId` matches the agent identity claimed on the\n * inner hop. The header alone is NOT proof-of-identity — it's a dedupe\n * advisory. Pair with the existing X-Astra-Id auth.\n */\nexport const MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER = 'X-Astra-Verified-Hop';\n\n/** Default acceptable age (ms) for an X-Astra-Verified-Hop header. */\nexport const MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_MAX_AGE_MS = 60_000;\n\nexport interface VerifiedHopMarker {\n  astraId: string;\n  sessionId?: string;\n  checkedAt: number; // epoch ms\n}\n\nexport function serializeVerifiedHop(marker: VerifiedHopMarker): string {\n  return `${marker.astraId};${marker.sessionId ?? ''};${marker.checkedAt}`;\n}\n\nexport function parseVerifiedHop(value: string | undefined | null): VerifiedHopMarker | null {\n  if (!value) return null;\n  const parts = value.split(';');\n  if (parts.length !== 3) return null;\n  const [astraId, sessionId, checkedAtRaw] = parts;\n  if (!astraId) return null;\n  const checkedAt = Number(checkedAtRaw);\n  if (!Number.isFinite(checkedAt) || checkedAt <= 0) return null;\n  return {\n    astraId,\n    ...(sessionId ? { sessionId } : {}),\n    checkedAt,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when `marker.astraId` matches the inner-hop's claimed\n * ASTRA-id AND the marker is recent enough. Inner-hop middleware uses this\n * to skip a duplicate verify-access call.\n */\nexport function isVerifiedHopValidFor(\n  marker: VerifiedHopMarker | null,\n  expectedAstraId: string,\n  opts: { maxAgeMs?: number; now?: number } = {}\n): boolean {\n  if (!marker) return false;\n  if (marker.astraId !== expectedAstraId) return false;\n  const maxAge = opts.maxAgeMs ?? MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_MAX_AGE_MS;\n  const now = opts.now ?? Date.now();\n  return now - marker.checkedAt <= maxAge && now >= marker.checkedAt;\n}\n\n/**\n * Output of `parseMcpJsonRpc`. Self-describing so the middleware doesn't have\n * to re-introspect the body to figure out gating.\n */\nexport interface ParsedMcpRequest {\n  /** JSON-RPC method (e.g. `tools/call`, `initialize`, `tools/list`). */\n  method: string;\n  /** Set when method === 'tools/call'; the tool name from `params.name`. */\n  toolName?: string;\n  /** Initialize-specific protocolVersion handshake info, when present. */\n  protocolVersion?: string;\n  /**\n   * Agent id read from the body, in priority order:\n   *   1. `params._meta.astrasync.agentId` (the canonical SDK location, see\n   *      `transport/mcp.ts → setMcpMeta`)\n   *   2. `params.arguments.agent_id` (legacy / hand-written tool callers)\n   * Header-supplied id (X-Astra-Id) is read separately by the adapter and\n   * compared to this for the mismatch check.\n   */\n  agentIdFromBody?: string;\n  /**\n   * Round-12 (F19) + round-13 (R13-1): purpose extracted from the MCP body\n   * with the symmetric precedence chain. Sourced from `_meta.astrasync.purpose`\n   * (canonical SDK location) OR `params.arguments.purpose` (legacy /\n   * conventional callers). The discriminator is on `purposeSourceFromBody`.\n   * Adapter combines this with the `X-Astra-Purpose` header (header wins)\n   * before mapping; final fallback at `mcpToPdlss` is `'mcp_invoke'`.\n   */\n  purposeFromBody?: string;\n  /** Which body location resolved `purposeFromBody`. */\n  purposeSourceFromBody?: 'meta' | 'tool_argument';\n  /**\n   * Round-13 (R13-2): action extracted from the MCP body with the same\n   * symmetric chain as purpose. Sourced from `_meta.astrasync.action`\n   * (canonical) OR `params.arguments.action` (legacy). Adapter combines\n   * with the `X-Astra-Action` header (header wins) before mapping; final\n   * fallback at `mcpToPdlss` is the transport-layer default\n   * (`tools/call:<toolname>` or just `<method>`).\n   */\n  actionFromBody?: string;\n  /** Which body location resolved `actionFromBody`. */\n  actionSourceFromBody?: 'meta' | 'tool_argument';\n  /** True for handshake methods that must succeed before any tool call. */\n  isInitialize: boolean;\n  /** True for `tools/call`. */\n  isToolCall: boolean;\n  /** True for low-risk introspection (`tools/list`, `prompts/list`, etc.). */\n  isIntrospection: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Peel the JSON-RPC envelope. Returns `null` if the body isn't a JSON-RPC\n * request (callers can short-circuit with a 400 or treat as untyped traffic).\n *\n * Accepts both single-request and notification shapes. Batch requests are\n * NOT supported here — the verify-access contract is single-agent-per-call;\n * a batch body should be split before policy gating.\n */\nexport function parseMcpJsonRpc(body: unknown): ParsedMcpRequest | null {\n  if (!body || typeof body !== 'object' || Array.isArray(body)) return null;\n  const obj = body as Record<string, unknown>;\n  if (obj.jsonrpc !== '2.0' && obj.jsonrpc !== '1.0') return null;\n  const method = typeof obj.method === 'string' ? obj.method : null;\n  if (!method) return null;\n  const params = obj.params as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n\n  // Tool-name lookup. MCP `tools/call` puts the tool under `params.name`.\n  let toolName: string | undefined;\n  if (method === 'tools/call' && params && typeof params.name === 'string') {\n    toolName = params.name;\n  }\n\n  // protocolVersion only on the initialize request.\n  let protocolVersion: string | undefined;\n  if (method === 'initialize' && params && typeof params.protocolVersion === 'string') {\n    protocolVersion = params.protocolVersion;\n  }\n\n  const meta = params?._meta as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n  const astrasyncMeta = meta?.astrasync as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n  const args = params?.arguments as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n\n  // Agent-id lookup with documented precedence: _meta.astrasync.agentId\n  // wins over params.arguments.agent_id. (The argument-shape uses\n  // `agent_id` snake_case for legacy conventional callers; meta is the\n  // canonical SDK location.)\n  let agentIdFromBody: string | undefined;\n  if (astrasyncMeta && typeof astrasyncMeta.agentId === 'string') {\n    agentIdFromBody = astrasyncMeta.agentId;\n  } else if (args && typeof args.agent_id === 'string') {\n    agentIdFromBody = args.agent_id;\n  }\n\n  // Round-13 (R13-1, R13-2) — symmetric body-extraction for purpose +\n  // action. Per `feedback_symmetric_fallbacks_for_symmetric_concepts.md`:\n  // these two concepts are paired in the MCP middleware, so their\n  // fallback chains MUST mirror each other exactly. Drift between them\n  // generates the same support-ticket class repeatedly (\"I set X in\n  // arguments and it didn't take\" — happened for purpose in round-12\n  // post-F19, and was about to happen for action in round-13).\n  //\n  // Body precedence (applies to both): _meta.astrasync.<key> wins over\n  // params.arguments.<key>. The discriminator is exported alongside the\n  // value so the adapter can fold it into purposeSource / actionSource\n  // for debug logging and adoption tracking.\n  const purposeBodyResult = extractFromMcpBody(astrasyncMeta, args, 'purpose');\n  const actionBodyResult = extractFromMcpBody(astrasyncMeta, args, 'action');\n\n  const isInitialize = method === 'initialize';\n  const isToolCall = method === 'tools/call';\n  const isIntrospection =\n    method === 'tools/list' ||\n    method === 'prompts/list' ||\n    method === 'resources/list' ||\n    method === 'ping' ||\n    method === 'notifications/initialized';\n\n  return {\n    method,\n    ...(toolName ? { toolName } : {}),\n    ...(protocolVersion ? { protocolVersion } : {}),\n    ...(agentIdFromBody ? { agentIdFromBody } : {}),\n    ...(purposeBodyResult.value ? { purposeFromBody: purposeBodyResult.value } : {}),\n    ...(purposeBodyResult.source ? { purposeSourceFromBody: purposeBodyResult.source } : {}),\n    ...(actionBodyResult.value ? { actionFromBody: actionBodyResult.value } : {}),\n    ...(actionBodyResult.source ? { actionSourceFromBody: actionBodyResult.source } : {}),\n    isInitialize,\n    isToolCall,\n    isIntrospection,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Shared body-extraction helper for the symmetric purpose + action\n * fallback chain (round-13 R13-1, R13-2). Returns the resolved value AND\n * the source discriminator so adapters can fold it into per-call debug\n * logs (`purpose_source` / `action_source`).\n *\n * Precedence:\n *   1. `params._meta.astrasync.<key>` — canonical SDK location, source: 'meta'\n *   2. `params.arguments.<key>`        — legacy / conventional, source: 'tool_argument'\n *   3. neither present                 — value: undefined, source: undefined\n *\n * The HTTP-header tier (`X-Astra-<concept>`) is the adapter's job; this\n * helper only handles body sources. Adapters combine the two: header\n * wins over body. See `mcpToPdlss` for the final precedence assembly.\n */\nfunction extractFromMcpBody(\n  astrasyncMeta: Record<string, unknown> | undefined,\n  args: Record<string, unknown> | undefined,\n  key: 'purpose' | 'action'\n): { value: string | undefined; source: 'meta' | 'tool_argument' | undefined } {\n  if (astrasyncMeta && typeof astrasyncMeta[key] === 'string') {\n    return { value: astrasyncMeta[key] as string, source: 'meta' };\n  }\n  if (args && typeof args[key] === 'string') {\n    return { value: args[key] as string, source: 'tool_argument' };\n  }\n  return { value: undefined, source: undefined };\n}\n\n/**\n * PDLSS mapping for an MCP request. The platform's PDLSS taxonomy is\n * `purpose / action / resource`; for MCP traffic the audit-useful dimensions\n * are the JSON-RPC method and (for `tools/call`) the tool name. Doc-stable so\n * dashboards and audits can correlate consistently across cohort-3 partners.\n *\n * Rules:\n *   - `purpose` is always `mcp_invoke` for MCP traffic — sets the high-level\n *     PDLSS bucket.\n *   - `action` is the JSON-RPC method, optionally `:tool_name` suffixed for\n *     `tools/call`. Lets PDLSS allowlist specific tools.\n *   - `resource` is `mcp:tool/<name>` for `tools/call`, `mcp:method/<method>`\n *     otherwise. Lets PDLSS scope on tool identity.\n */\nexport interface McpPdlssMapping {\n  purpose: string;\n  action: string;\n  resource: string;\n  /**\n   * Round-13 (R13-1 / R13-2): the resolution channel for purpose and\n   * action — disjoint enums sharing the same structure per\n   * `feedback_symmetric_fallbacks_for_symmetric_concepts.md`. Adapters\n   * log both at debug level so partners can confirm header / body\n   * pass-through, support can triage tickets, and we can watch the\n   * `default_*` / `transport_layer` decay over time as integrations\n   * mature.\n   *\n   * Round-12 (F19) used a narrower `purposeSource: 'header' |\n   * 'tool_argument' | 'default_mcp_invoke'` — round-13 widens to also\n   * carry the `_meta` source distinct from `tool_argument`, so the round-13\n   * R13-1 fallback (which now reads both `_meta.astrasync.purpose` AND\n   * `params.arguments.purpose`) can report WHICH body location resolved.\n   */\n  purposeSource: 'header' | 'meta' | 'tool_argument' | 'default_mcp_invoke';\n  actionSource: 'header' | 'meta' | 'tool_argument' | 'transport_layer';\n}\n\n/**\n * Round-13 (R13-1 + R13-2) — canonical precedence chain documented ONCE,\n * applied identically to both purpose and action. Per\n * `feedback_symmetric_fallbacks_for_symmetric_concepts.md` — drift\n * between two paired concepts generates the same support-ticket class\n * repeatedly, so the resolution order is:\n *\n *   1. `X-Astra-<concept>` HTTP header (caller's explicit override)\n *   2. `params._meta.astrasync.<concept>` body field (canonical SDK location)\n *   3. `params.arguments.<concept>` body field (legacy / conventional)\n *   4. Transport-layer default:\n *        purpose → 'mcp_invoke'\n *        action  → '<method>:<toolName>' (or just '<method>')\n *\n * The header tier is the adapter's job (it has `req.headers` access);\n * this function takes the resolved `headerPurpose` / `headerAction`\n * inputs and combines them with the body extraction already done in\n * `parseMcpJsonRpc`. The discriminator is reported on `purposeSource` /\n * `actionSource` for debug logging.\n */\nexport function mcpToPdlss(\n  parsed: ParsedMcpRequest,\n  headerPurpose?: string,\n  headerAction?: string\n): McpPdlssMapping {\n  const resource = parsed.toolName ? `mcp:tool/${parsed.toolName}` : `mcp:method/${parsed.method}`;\n\n  // Purpose resolution: header > body (_meta, then tool_argument) > default\n  let purpose: string;\n  let purposeSource: McpPdlssMapping['purposeSource'];\n  if (headerPurpose) {\n    purpose = headerPurpose;\n    purposeSource = 'header';\n  } else if (parsed.purposeFromBody && parsed.purposeSourceFromBody) {\n    purpose = parsed.purposeFromBody;\n    purposeSource = parsed.purposeSourceFromBody;\n  } else {\n    purpose = 'mcp_invoke';\n    purposeSource = 'default_mcp_invoke';\n  }\n\n  // Action resolution: identical chain, transport-layer default differs\n  let action: string;\n  let actionSource: McpPdlssMapping['actionSource'];\n  if (headerAction) {\n    action = headerAction;\n    actionSource = 'header';\n  } else if (parsed.actionFromBody && parsed.actionSourceFromBody) {\n    action = parsed.actionFromBody;\n    actionSource = parsed.actionSourceFromBody;\n  } else {\n    action = parsed.toolName ? `${parsed.method}:${parsed.toolName}` : parsed.method;\n    actionSource = 'transport_layer';\n  }\n\n  return { purpose, action, resource, purposeSource, actionSource };\n}\n\n/**\n * Recommended minimum access level per method type. The MCP middleware uses\n * this to split low-risk handshake / introspection traffic from high-risk\n * tool execution — defect (a) from the cohort-3 review.\n *\n *   - `initialize` / `notifications/initialized`        → `none`     (handshake must work for unregistered probes)\n *   - `tools/list` / `prompts/list` / `resources/list`  → `none`     (introspection is public-surface)\n *   - `ping`                                            → `none`\n *   - `resources/read`                                  → `read-only`\n *   - `tools/call`                                      → `standard` (default — overridable per-tool)\n *   - everything else                                   → `standard` (least-privilege fallback)\n */\nexport function mcpRiskTier(parsed: ParsedMcpRequest): AccessLevel {\n  if (parsed.isInitialize || parsed.method === 'notifications/initialized') return 'none';\n  if (parsed.isIntrospection) return 'none';\n  if (parsed.method === 'resources/read') return 'read-only';\n  if (parsed.isToolCall) return 'standard';\n  return 'standard';\n}\n","/**\n * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway — MCP middleware\n *\n * Express-shaped middleware tailored to the JSON-RPC body of an MCP\n * (Model Context Protocol) endpoint. Closes the cohort-3 gaps the default\n * `createMiddleware` couldn't:\n *\n *   (a) **Body-aware gating**.  All MCP traffic targets the same `/mcp` URL.\n *       The default route-pattern matcher can't tell `initialize` (low risk)\n *       from `tools/call start_checkout` (high risk). This middleware peels\n *       the JSON-RPC body and applies a per-method risk tier.\n *\n *   (b) **PDLSS mapping**.  Forwards `purpose=mcp_invoke`,\n *       `action=method[:tool]`, `resource=mcp:tool/<name>` so audit traces\n *       are stable across cohort-3 partners. See `transport/mcp-server.ts`\n *       for the exact mapping.\n *\n *   (c) **Inner-hop dedupe**.  Outbound responses set\n *       `X-Astra-Verified-Hop` so a downstream REST endpoint that the tool\n *       calls can skip a duplicate verify-access. The receiving REST\n *       middleware checks `parseVerifiedHop` and skips when valid.\n *\n *   (d) **Header-vs-body identity precedence**.  Reads ASTRA-id from\n *       `X-Astra-Id` first, body second. If both are present and disagree,\n *       returns a structured 400 by default (configurable). Pre-fix,\n *       integrators had to re-discover this on their own.\n *\n * Usage:\n *\n * ```typescript\n * import express from 'express';\n * import { createMcpMiddleware } from '@astrasyncai/verification-gateway/mcp';\n *\n * const app = express();\n * app.use(express.json());\n *\n * app.post(\n *   '/mcp',\n *   createMcpMiddleware({\n *     apiBaseUrl: 'https://astrasync.ai/api',\n *     apiKey: process.env.ASTRASYNC_API_KEY,\n *     // Optional per-tool overrides — tools not listed get the default tier\n *     // from `mcpRiskTier` (`tools/call` → 'standard').\n *     toolGates: {\n *       start_checkout: 'standard',\n *       confirm_purchase: 'full',\n *       browse_catalog: 'read-only',\n *     },\n *   }),\n *   yourMcpServerHandler,\n * );\n * ```\n */\n\nimport type { Request, Response, NextFunction, RequestHandler } from 'express';\nimport type {\n  GatewayConfig,\n  AccessLevel,\n  VerificationResult,\n  EnhancedVerificationResult,\n} from '../types';\nimport {\n  verify,\n  extractCredentials,\n  recordDecision,\n  recordAnonymousLocalOverride,\n} from '../verify';\nimport { hasMinimumAccess } from '../access-levels';\nimport {\n  parseMcpJsonRpc,\n  mcpToPdlss,\n  mcpRiskTier,\n  serializeVerifiedHop,\n  parseVerifiedHop,\n  isVerifiedHopValidFor,\n  MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER,\n  type ParsedMcpRequest,\n} from '../transport/mcp-server';\n\ndeclare global {\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-namespace\n  namespace Express {\n    interface Request {\n      mcpRequest?: ParsedMcpRequest;\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nexport interface McpMiddlewareOptions extends GatewayConfig {\n  /**\n   * Per-tool override for the minimum access level. Tools not listed inherit\n   * the default tier from `mcpRiskTier` (`tools/call` → `'standard'`). Use\n   * for high-risk tools that demand `'full'` or low-risk read-only tools.\n   */\n  toolGates?: Record<string, AccessLevel>;\n  /**\n   * Per-method override (e.g. tighten `tools/list` to `'read-only'` if you\n   * don't want unregistered probes seeing your tool catalogue). Matches by\n   * exact JSON-RPC method string.\n   */\n  methodGates?: Record<string, AccessLevel>;\n  /**\n   * What to do when the agent id supplied in the X-Astra-Id header\n   * disagrees with the agent id in the JSON-RPC body\n   * (`params._meta.astrasync.agentId` or `params.arguments.agent_id`).\n   *\n   *   - `'reject'` (default) — return 400 `AGENT_ID_MISMATCH`. Safest.\n   *   - `'prefer-header'` — log + verify against the header value. Keeps\n   *     bodies that were authored before X-Astra-Id was the canonical\n   *     identity slot working.\n   *   - `'prefer-body'` — log + verify against the body value. Useful in\n   *     reverse-proxy setups that strip auth headers.\n   */\n  onAgentIdMismatch?: 'reject' | 'prefer-header' | 'prefer-body';\n  /** Skip verification + dedupe entirely. For testing. */\n  skip?: boolean;\n  /** Custom denied handler. Defaults to a structured JSON-RPC error response. */\n  onDenied?: (result: VerificationResult, req: Request, res: Response) => void;\n  /**\n   * If `false`, don't trust an inbound `X-Astra-Verified-Hop` header (always\n   * call verify-access). Default `true` — recommended for inner-hop endpoints\n   * called by your own MCP tools.\n   */\n  trustVerifiedHop?: boolean;\n  /** Window for accepting an upstream verified-hop marker. Default 60_000ms. */\n  verifiedHopMaxAgeMs?: number;\n  /**\n   * Automatically record grant/deny decisions for every MCP call. Default\n   * `true` — matches the express adapter.\n   */\n  recordDecisions?: boolean;\n  /** Forward runtime challenge (default `true`). */\n  enableRuntimeChallenge?: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Default MCP denied handler.\n *\n * Round-10 (#47, O5): mirrors the express adapter — surfaces `failures[]`\n * and `correlationId` on the response so partners can render rich UX and\n * tie a denial to a log line. Also stamps `X-Astra-Gateway-Mode: enforced`\n * (#49/O10) so the header reliably distinguishes gate-evaluated denials\n * from gate-skipped pass-throughs.\n */\n/**\n * Round-13: shared single-value HTTP header reader. Same shape used for\n * both `X-Astra-Purpose` and `X-Astra-Action` extraction (symmetric\n * fallback chain — see `mcpToPdlss` for the full precedence rule).\n * Returns the first value if the header repeats (Express turns repeated\n * headers into an array); returns undefined when the header is absent.\n */\nfunction readSingleHeader(value: string | string[] | undefined): string | undefined {\n  if (typeof value === 'string') return value;\n  if (Array.isArray(value)) return value[0];\n  return undefined;\n}\n\nfunction defaultMcpDenied(result: VerificationResult, req: Request, res: Response): void {\n  // JSON-RPC error envelope so MCP-aware clients render it correctly.\n  const id = (req.body as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)?.id ?? null;\n  // Round-18 G4: see express.defaultOnDenied for full rationale on the\n  // identity-vs-policy split → 401/403 mapping. Same logic here so MCP\n  // clients get HTTP status semantics aligned with REST adapters.\n  const status = !result.identityVerified ? 401 : 403;\n\n  res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Mode', 'enforced');\n\n  res.status(status).json({\n    jsonrpc: '2.0',\n    id,\n    error: {\n      // JSON-RPC error codes:\n      //   -32000 → unauthorized (no identity resolved)\n      //   -32001 → insufficient access (identity OK, policy denied)\n      code: !result.identityVerified ? -32000 : -32001,\n      message: result.denialReasons?.[0] ?? 'Access denied',\n      data: {\n        accessLevel: result.accessLevel,\n        guidance: result.guidance,\n        // Round-10: aggregated per-dimension detail + correlation handle.\n        failures: result.failures,\n        correlationId: result.correlationId,\n      },\n    },\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the effective minimum access level for a parsed MCP request.\n * Order: per-tool override → per-method override → tier-default from\n * `mcpRiskTier`.\n *\n * v2.3.9 (defect #34) returns the SOURCE of the resolution alongside the\n * level so the gate-failure site can attribute a local override correctly\n * (`toolGate` / `methodGate` / `tier`) when reporting back to the\n * activity feed.\n */\nfunction resolveMinAccessLevel(\n  parsed: ParsedMcpRequest,\n  opts: { toolGates?: Record<string, AccessLevel>; methodGates?: Record<string, AccessLevel> }\n): { level: AccessLevel; source: 'toolGate' | 'methodGate' | 'tier' } {\n  if (parsed.toolName && opts.toolGates && opts.toolGates[parsed.toolName] !== undefined) {\n    return { level: opts.toolGates[parsed.toolName], source: 'toolGate' };\n  }\n  if (opts.methodGates && opts.methodGates[parsed.method] !== undefined) {\n    return { level: opts.methodGates[parsed.method], source: 'methodGate' };\n  }\n  return { level: mcpRiskTier(parsed), source: 'tier' };\n}\n\n/**\n * Create the MCP middleware. Attach AFTER `express.json()` — the body must\n * already be a parsed object.\n */\nexport function createMcpMiddleware(options: McpMiddlewareOptions): RequestHandler {\n  const {\n    toolGates,\n    methodGates,\n    onAgentIdMismatch = 'reject',\n    skip = false,\n    onDenied = defaultMcpDenied,\n    trustVerifiedHop = true,\n    verifiedHopMaxAgeMs,\n    recordDecisions,\n    enableRuntimeChallenge = true,\n    ...config\n  } = options;\n\n  return async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction): Promise<void> => {\n    try {\n      if (skip) return next();\n\n      const parsed = parseMcpJsonRpc(req.body);\n      if (!parsed) {\n        // Not a JSON-RPC body. Either the route is misconfigured or the\n        // client sent a non-MCP payload. We don't 400 here — let the actual\n        // MCP server handler render its own error so the middleware doesn't\n        // pre-empt valid framework error shapes.\n        if (config.setPassThroughHeader) {\n          // Round-10 (#49, O10): `unenforced` describes the GATE state, not\n          // the downstream response. Renamed from the ambiguous\n          // `pass-through` (which partners read as \"request succeeded\").\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Mode', 'unenforced');\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Reason', 'non-jsonrpc-body');\n        }\n        return next();\n      }\n      req.mcpRequest = parsed;\n\n      // ── Identity reconciliation (defect d) ─────────────────────────────\n      // Header value is the SDK-canonical slot; body slot exists for legacy\n      // hand-written tool callers and the MCP `_meta.astrasync.agentId`\n      // convention.\n      const headerRaw = req.headers['x-astra-id'] ?? req.headers['x-astra-agentid'];\n      const headerAstraId =\n        typeof headerRaw === 'string'\n          ? headerRaw\n          : Array.isArray(headerRaw)\n            ? headerRaw[0]\n            : undefined;\n      const bodyAstraId = parsed.agentIdFromBody;\n\n      let effectiveAstraId: string | undefined;\n      if (headerAstraId && bodyAstraId && headerAstraId !== bodyAstraId) {\n        if (onAgentIdMismatch === 'reject') {\n          const id = (req.body as Record<string, unknown>)?.id ?? null;\n          res.status(400).json({\n            jsonrpc: '2.0',\n            id,\n            error: {\n              code: -32602,\n              message: 'AGENT_ID_MISMATCH',\n              data: {\n                detail:\n                  'The agent id in the X-Astra-Id header disagrees with params._meta.astrasync.agentId / params.arguments.agent_id. Reconcile before calling the tool — see https://astrasync.ai/docs/mcp-integration#identity-reconciliation.',\n                headerAstraId,\n                bodyAstraId,\n              },\n            },\n          });\n          return;\n        }\n        effectiveAstraId = onAgentIdMismatch === 'prefer-header' ? headerAstraId : bodyAstraId;\n      } else {\n        effectiveAstraId = headerAstraId ?? bodyAstraId;\n      }\n\n      // ── Inner-hop dedupe (defect c) ────────────────────────────────────\n      // If a trusted upstream MCP hop already verified this exact ASTRA-id\n      // a few ms ago, we accept the marker and skip a redundant verify-access\n      // call. Only valid when the header is fresh AND matches the agent id\n      // we resolved above.\n      if (trustVerifiedHop && effectiveAstraId) {\n        const hopRaw = req.headers[MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER.toLowerCase()];\n        const hopValue =\n          typeof hopRaw === 'string' ? hopRaw : Array.isArray(hopRaw) ? hopRaw[0] : undefined;\n        const marker = parseVerifiedHop(hopValue);\n        if (\n          isVerifiedHopValidFor(marker, effectiveAstraId, {\n            ...(verifiedHopMaxAgeMs !== undefined ? { maxAgeMs: verifiedHopMaxAgeMs } : {}),\n          })\n        ) {\n          // Skip verify-access — pass straight through. Don't re-emit the\n          // header since the MCP framework will issue the response (the\n          // outer hop already tagged it for any further inner hops).\n          return next();\n        }\n      }\n\n      // ── Resolve gating ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n      const { level: minAccessLevel, source: gateSource } = resolveMinAccessLevel(parsed, {\n        toolGates,\n        methodGates,\n      });\n\n      // ── Build verify-access request ────────────────────────────────────\n      // Round-13 (R13-5) — credentials extraction hoisted above the\n      // mcp-tier-none short-circuit (mirrors round-12 F9 express adapter\n      // restructure). The `evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed` flag lets the\n      // caller turn unenforced tier-none calls into evaluated-not-enforced\n      // calls when credentials are present, so the agent verification\n      // result populates `req.agentVerification` for tier-aware handler\n      // rendering (e.g. anonymous vs verified MCP tool listings).\n      const credentials = extractCredentials(\n        req.headers as Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n        req.query as Record<string, string | undefined>\n      );\n      // Override the SDK's default credential extraction with the resolved\n      // ASTRA-id so the verify-access call sees the post-precedence value\n      // (defect d). When neither header nor body supplied an id, the SDK's\n      // anonymous-canonical-flow handles it.\n      if (effectiveAstraId) credentials.astraId = effectiveAstraId;\n\n      // Risk tier `none` short-circuit. Default behaviour: skip\n      // verify-access (handshake / introspection must work for\n      // unregistered probes). With `evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed: true`\n      // AND credentials present, fall through to verify-access for the\n      // audit trail; the post-verify gate-skipping branch below handles\n      // the rendering side. Round-12 F9 parity (closes the round-12\n      // deferral).\n      const shouldEnforce = minAccessLevel !== 'none';\n      if (\n        minAccessLevel === 'none' &&\n        (!config.evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed || !credentials.astraId)\n      ) {\n        if (config.setPassThroughHeader) {\n          // Round-10 (#49, O10): `unenforced` describes the GATE state, not\n          // the downstream response.\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Mode', 'unenforced');\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Reason', 'mcp-tier-none');\n        }\n        return next();\n      }\n\n      // Round-12 (F19) + round-13 (R13-1, R13-2): symmetric purpose+action\n      // resolution. Per `feedback_symmetric_fallbacks_for_symmetric_concepts.md`,\n      // both concepts share the precedence chain documented at\n      // `mcpToPdlss`:\n      //   header → _meta.astrasync.<concept> → params.arguments.<concept> → default\n      //\n      // Round-12 shipped purpose with `header → _meta → default`;\n      // round-13 R13-1 closed the `params.arguments.purpose` fallback\n      // gap. Round-13 R13-2 ships action with the same full chain in\n      // one round (not staggered) to pre-empt the parallel \"I set\n      // action in arguments and it didn't take\" support tickets.\n      const headerPurpose = readSingleHeader(req.headers['x-astra-purpose']);\n      const headerAction = readSingleHeader(req.headers['x-astra-action']);\n      const pdlss = mcpToPdlss(parsed, headerPurpose, headerAction);\n\n      // Telemetry: debug log per resolution. Adoption tracking, support\n      // triage, and the `default_*` / `transport_layer` decay signals\n      // all read this. Both purpose and action emit their source so we\n      // can spot which integration path each partner is using.\n      if (config.debug) {\n        // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n        console.debug('[mcp-middleware] pdlss resolved', {\n          purpose_source: pdlss.purposeSource,\n          resolved_purpose: pdlss.purpose,\n          action_source: pdlss.actionSource,\n          resolved_action: pdlss.action,\n        });\n      }\n\n      const counterpartyUrl =\n        config.counterpartyUrl || `${req.protocol}://${req.get('host')}${req.path}`;\n      const shouldRecordDecisions = recordDecisions !== false;\n\n      const result = await verify(config, {\n        credentials,\n        purpose: pdlss.purpose,\n        action: pdlss.action,\n        resource: pdlss.resource,\n        // Round-12 (F19): mark transport protocol separately from intent.\n        // The MCP middleware always sets this to 'mcp'; non-MCP callers\n        // leave it unset (server-side default is 'rest').\n        invocationProtocol: 'mcp',\n        createSession: shouldRecordDecisions,\n        counterpartyUrl,\n        counterpartyType: config.counterpartyType || 'mcp_server',\n        enableRuntimeChallenge,\n        callerMetadata: {\n          sourceIp: req.ip,\n          userAgent: req.headers['user-agent'] as string | undefined,\n          host: req.headers.host as string | undefined,\n        },\n      });\n\n      req.agentVerification = result;\n      const sessionId = (result as EnhancedVerificationResult).sessionId;\n      const correlationId = (result as EnhancedVerificationResult).correlationId;\n\n      // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denied verifications short-circuit BEFORE the\n      // gate-level comparison. See express.ts for the full rationale —\n      // mirroring it here so the MCP path inherits the same belt-and-braces\n      // protection against access-level/help-payload conflation.\n      // Round-18 G4: short-circuit on either axis failing.\n      if (!result.identityVerified || !result.policyAllowed) {\n        if (shouldRecordDecisions && sessionId) {\n          recordDecision(config, sessionId, 'denied', result.denialReasons?.[0]).catch(() => {});\n        }\n        onDenied(result, req, res);\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // Round-13 (R13-5): evaluation-without-enforcement parity with the\n      // express F9 adapter. When the route is `none` but we ran\n      // verify-access because `evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed: true` AND\n      // credentials were present, skip the gates and call next() — the\n      // result is on `req.agentVerification` for the MCP handler to\n      // render tier-aware responses (e.g. anonymous vs verified\n      // tool-listing on the same `/mcp` endpoint).\n      if (!shouldEnforce) {\n        if (config.setPassThroughHeader) {\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Mode', 'enforced');\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Reason', 'evaluated-not-enforced');\n        }\n        if (shouldRecordDecisions && sessionId) {\n          recordDecision(config, sessionId, 'granted').catch(() => {});\n        }\n        return next();\n      }\n\n      if (!hasMinimumAccess(result.accessLevel, minAccessLevel)) {\n        // Round-12 (F12): synthesise the structured failure entry so the\n        // partner-facing response carries the same shape as every other\n        // denial dimension. Guidance positions step-up only — increasing\n        // trust score or lowering the route floor both read as gaming the\n        // gate. Step-up flow ships separately this month.\n        const insufficientFailure = {\n          dimension: 'access_level.insufficient',\n          message: `Tool requires accessLevel '${minAccessLevel}'; agent has '${result.accessLevel}'.`,\n          guidance:\n            \"Request elevated access via step-up verification (coming soon — ships this month). Step-up lets the agent owner approve a one-time elevation for this specific counterparty + purpose without changing the agent's baseline trust score.\",\n        };\n        result.failures = [...(result.failures ?? []), insufficientFailure];\n        result.denialReasons = [...(result.denialReasons ?? []), insufficientFailure.message];\n\n        // v2.3.9 (defect #34): server granted but local enforcement\n        // (toolGate / methodGate / tier floor) is rejecting. Record this\n        // as a local override so the activity feed surfaces the\n        // dashboard-vs-runtime divergence as a distinct event.\n        //\n        // v2.3.10 (defect #34, round-4): anonymous traffic has no session\n        // → fall back to `correlationId` and the sessionless local-override\n        // endpoint. Authenticated traffic still uses sessionId/recordDecision.\n        if (shouldRecordDecisions) {\n          const overrideKind: 'toolGate' | 'methodGate' | 'other' =\n            gateSource === 'toolGate'\n              ? 'toolGate'\n              : gateSource === 'methodGate'\n                ? 'methodGate'\n                : 'other';\n          const override = {\n            overriddenBy: overrideKind,\n            ...(parsed.toolName && { toolName: parsed.toolName }),\n            requestedLevel: minAccessLevel,\n            grantedLevel: result.accessLevel,\n          };\n          if (sessionId) {\n            recordDecision(config, sessionId, 'denied', result.denialReasons?.[0], override).catch(\n              () => {}\n            );\n          } else if (correlationId) {\n            recordAnonymousLocalOverride(\n              config,\n              correlationId,\n              override,\n              result.denialReasons?.[0]\n            ).catch(() => {});\n          }\n        }\n        onDenied(result, req, res);\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // ── Tag the outbound response with X-Astra-Verified-Hop ────────────\n      // Inner-hop REST endpoints called by this tool can read the header\n      // and skip a duplicate verify-access. We set it on the response so\n      // downstream proxies see it; tools that perform fetch() to an inner\n      // hop should also forward it themselves (the MCP server framework\n      // controls outbound calls — out of scope here).\n      if (effectiveAstraId) {\n        res.setHeader(\n          MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER,\n          serializeVerifiedHop({\n            astraId: effectiveAstraId,\n            ...(sessionId ? { sessionId } : {}),\n            checkedAt: Date.now(),\n          })\n        );\n      }\n\n      if (shouldRecordDecisions && sessionId) {\n        recordDecision(config, sessionId, 'granted').catch(() => {});\n      }\n      // v2.3.8 (defect #26): relay X-Astra-Unverified-Warning when the\n      // server returned an audit-mode advisory.\n      const enhancedResult = result as EnhancedVerificationResult;\n      if (enhancedResult.warningHeader) {\n        res.setHeader(enhancedResult.warningHeader.name, enhancedResult.warningHeader.value);\n      }\n      next();\n    } catch (error) {\n      // Fail open by default — the underlying MCP server handler still\n      // exists and can apply its own access control. A logger hook is a\n      // future enhancement.\n      // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n      console.error('[VerificationGateway/MCP] Middleware error:', error);\n      next();\n    }\n  };\n}\n\n// Re-export the helpers so consumers can mix-and-match (e.g. read the\n// verified-hop header themselves on a custom inner-hop handler).\nexport {\n  parseMcpJsonRpc,\n  mcpToPdlss,\n  mcpRiskTier,\n  serializeVerifiedHop,\n  parseVerifiedHop,\n  isVerifiedHopValidFor,\n  MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER,\n};\nexport type { ParsedMcpRequest } from 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