@astrasyncai/verification-gateway 2.4.12 → 2.4.14

package/dist/local-evaluator/evaluator.d.mts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { L as LocalPolicy, P as PDLSSContext, V as VerificationDecision, b as LocalPurposeRule } from '../types-DNK2BgIf.mjs';
-import '../types-L15pYd2c.mjs';
+import { L as LocalPolicy, P as PDLSSContext, V as VerificationDecision, b as LocalPurposeRule } from '../types-CgDCUfo8.mjs';
+import '../types-B3USs-Kx.mjs';
 
 /**
  * Local PDLSS Evaluator

package/dist/local-evaluator/evaluator.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { L as LocalPolicy, P as PDLSSContext, V as VerificationDecision, b as LocalPurposeRule } from '../types-DoWIuzfj.js';
-import '../types-L15pYd2c.js';
+import { L as LocalPolicy, P as PDLSSContext, V as VerificationDecision, b as LocalPurposeRule } from '../types-R5N4ET6x.js';
+import '../types-B3USs-Kx.js';
 
 /**
  * Local PDLSS Evaluator

package/dist/local-evaluator/evaluator.js

@@ -107,7 +107,10 @@ var LocalEvaluator = class {
       }
       const depth = context.metadata?.subAgentDepth || 0;
       if (this.policy.selfInstantiation.maxDepth !== void 0 && depth >= this.policy.selfInstantiation.maxDepth) {
-        return { recommendation: "DENY", reason: `Sub-agent depth ${depth} exceeds max depth ${this.policy.selfInstantiation.maxDepth}` };
+        return {
+          recommendation: "DENY",
+          reason: `Sub-agent depth ${depth} exceeds max depth ${this.policy.selfInstantiation.maxDepth}`
+        };
       }
     }
     if (purposeRule.requiresApproval) {
@@ -188,7 +191,10 @@ var LocalEvaluator = class {
       return { recommendation: "DENY", reason: `Risk score ${riskScore} exceeds block threshold` };
     }
     if (riskScore >= thresholds.requireApproval.min) {
-      return { recommendation: "MANUAL_REVIEW", reason: `Risk score ${riskScore} requires approval` };
+      return {
+        recommendation: "MANUAL_REVIEW",
+        reason: `Risk score ${riskScore} requires approval`
+      };
     }
     return null;
   }
@@ -253,6 +259,10 @@ var LocalEvaluator = class {
    */
   matchGlob(value, pattern) {
     if (pattern === value) return true;
+    const starCount = (pattern.match(/\*/g) ?? []).length;
+    if (starCount > 8) {
+      return false;
+    }
     const regexStr = pattern.replace(/[.+^${}()|[\]\\]/g, "\\$&").replace(/\*/g, ".*").replace(/\?/g, ".");
     try {
       return new RegExp(`^${regexStr}$`, "i").test(value);

package/dist/local-evaluator/evaluator.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/local-evaluator/evaluator.ts","../../src/gateway/types.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Local PDLSS Evaluator\n *\n * Evaluates agent actions against a local PDLSS policy.\n * Same logic as the cloud evaluator but runs in-process with no I/O.\n *\n * Evaluation order:\n * 1. Purpose: find matching rule, check if allowed\n * 2. Purpose: check allowed targets (if specified)\n * 3. Purpose: check blocked patterns (if specified)\n * 4. Scope: check global blocked resources/domains\n * 5. Limits: check transaction/rate limits\n * 6. Risk thresholds + approval requirements\n */\n\nimport type { LocalPolicy, PDLSSContext, VerificationDecision, LocalPurposeRule } from '../gateway/types';\nimport { HIGH_RISK_COMMANDS, SENSITIVE_PATHS } from '../gateway/types';\n\nexport class LocalEvaluator {\n  private policy: LocalPolicy;\n  private requestCounts: Map<string, { count: number; windowStart: number }> = new Map();\n\n  constructor(policy: LocalPolicy) {\n    this.policy = policy;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Update the policy (e.g. after hot-reload or sync).\n   */\n  updatePolicy(policy: LocalPolicy): void {\n    this.policy = policy;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Evaluate an action context against the loaded policy.\n   */\n  evaluate(context: PDLSSContext): VerificationDecision {\n    // 1. Purpose: find matching rule\n    const purposeRule = this.policy.purposes.find((p) => p.id === context.purpose);\n    if (!purposeRule) {\n      return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: 'Purpose not in policy' };\n    }\n    if (!purposeRule.allowed) {\n      return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: 'Purpose explicitly blocked' };\n    }\n\n    // 2. Purpose: check allowed targets\n    if (purposeRule.targets && !this.matchesAnyPattern(context.target, purposeRule.targets)) {\n      return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: 'Target not in allowed list' };\n    }\n\n    // 3. Purpose: check blocked patterns\n    if (purposeRule.blockedPatterns && this.matchesAnyPattern(context.target, purposeRule.blockedPatterns)) {\n      return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: 'Target matches blocked pattern' };\n    }\n\n    // 4. Scope: check global blocked resources/domains\n    const scopeBlock = this.checkScopeBlock(context);\n    if (scopeBlock) {\n      return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: scopeBlock };\n    }\n\n    // 5. Limits: check transaction and rate limits\n    const limitViolation = this.checkLimits(context);\n    if (limitViolation) {\n      return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: limitViolation };\n    }\n\n    // 6. Self-instantiation: check sub-agent spawning rules\n    if (context.purpose === 'sub_agent.spawn' && this.policy.selfInstantiation) {\n      if (!this.policy.selfInstantiation.allowed) {\n        return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: 'Sub-agent spawning is not allowed' };\n      }\n      const depth = (context.metadata?.subAgentDepth as number) || 0;\n      if (this.policy.selfInstantiation.maxDepth !== undefined && depth >= this.policy.selfInstantiation.maxDepth) {\n        return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: `Sub-agent depth ${depth} exceeds max depth ${this.policy.selfInstantiation.maxDepth}` };\n      }\n    }\n\n    // 7. Risk thresholds + approval requirements\n    if (purposeRule.requiresApproval) {\n      return { recommendation: 'MANUAL_REVIEW', reason: 'Purpose requires approval' };\n    }\n\n    const riskDecision = this.checkRiskThresholds(context);\n    if (riskDecision) {\n      return riskDecision;\n    }\n\n    return {\n      recommendation: 'ALLOW',\n      reason: 'All PDLSS checks passed',\n      evaluatedDimensions: {\n        purpose: true,\n        scope: !!this.policy.scope,\n        limits: !!this.policy.limits,\n        riskThresholds: !!this.policy.riskThresholds,\n      },\n    };\n  }\n\n  private checkScopeBlock(context: PDLSSContext): string | null {\n    const scope = this.policy.scope;\n    if (!scope) return null;\n\n    // Check blocked domains against target and network access\n    if (scope.blockedDomains) {\n      const targetDomain = this.extractDomain(context.target);\n      if (this.matchesAnyPattern(targetDomain, scope.blockedDomains)) {\n        return `Target blocked by scope: ${context.target}`;\n      }\n      if (context.networkAccess) {\n        for (const domain of context.networkAccess) {\n          if (this.matchesAnyPattern(this.extractDomain(domain), scope.blockedDomains)) {\n            return `Domain blocked by scope: ${domain}`;\n          }\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    // Check blocked resources against target\n    if (scope.blockedResources && this.matchesAnyPattern(context.target, scope.blockedResources)) {\n      return `Resource blocked by scope: ${context.target}`;\n    }\n\n    // Check allowed domains (if specified, target must match)\n    if (scope.allowedDomains && context.networkAccess) {\n      for (const domain of context.networkAccess) {\n        if (!this.matchesAnyPattern(this.extractDomain(domain), scope.allowedDomains)) {\n          return `Domain not in allowed list: ${domain}`;\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  private checkLimits(context: PDLSSContext): string | null {\n    const limits = this.policy.limits;\n    if (!limits) return null;\n\n    // Transaction amount check\n    if (limits.maxTransactionAmount !== undefined && context.transactionValue !== undefined) {\n      if (context.transactionValue > limits.maxTransactionAmount) {\n        return `Transaction value ${context.transactionValue} exceeds limit ${limits.maxTransactionAmount}`;\n      }\n    }\n\n    // Rate limit check\n    if (limits.maxRequestsPerHour !== undefined) {\n      const key = context.purpose;\n      const now = Date.now();\n      const entry = this.requestCounts.get(key);\n      const hourMs = 3600000;\n\n      if (!entry || now - entry.windowStart > hourMs) {\n        this.requestCounts.set(key, { count: 1, windowStart: now });\n      } else {\n        entry.count++;\n        if (entry.count > limits.maxRequestsPerHour) {\n          return `Rate limit exceeded: ${entry.count}/${limits.maxRequestsPerHour} requests per hour`;\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  private checkRiskThresholds(context: PDLSSContext): VerificationDecision | null {\n    if (!this.policy.riskThresholds) return null;\n\n    const riskScore = this.calculateRiskScore(context);\n    const thresholds = this.policy.riskThresholds;\n\n    if (riskScore >= thresholds.autoBlock.min) {\n      return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: `Risk score ${riskScore} exceeds block threshold` };\n    }\n\n    if (riskScore >= thresholds.requireApproval.min) {\n      return { recommendation: 'MANUAL_REVIEW', reason: `Risk score ${riskScore} requires approval` };\n    }\n\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  private calculateRiskScore(context: PDLSSContext): number {\n    let score = 0;\n\n    // Explicit risk factors take priority (highest severity wins)\n    if (context.riskFactors?.length) {\n      const severityScores: Record<string, number> = {\n        low: 10,\n        medium: 40,\n        high: 70,\n        critical: 90,\n      };\n\n      for (const factor of context.riskFactors) {\n        const factorScore = severityScores[factor.severity] || 0;\n        if (factorScore > score) score = factorScore;\n      }\n      return score;\n    }\n\n    // Auto-detect risk from high-risk shell commands\n    if (context.purpose === 'shell.exec' && context.target) {\n      const targetLower = context.target.toLowerCase();\n      for (const cmd of HIGH_RISK_COMMANDS) {\n        if (targetLower.startsWith(cmd) || targetLower.includes(` ${cmd} `) || targetLower.includes(` ${cmd}`)) {\n          score = Math.max(score, 80);\n          break;\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    // Auto-detect risk from sensitive file paths (score 50 = review range)\n    if ((context.purpose === 'file.read' || context.purpose === 'file.write' || context.purpose === 'file.delete') && context.target) {\n      const targetLower = context.target.toLowerCase();\n      for (const sensitivePath of SENSITIVE_PATHS) {\n        if (targetLower.includes(sensitivePath.toLowerCase())) {\n          score = Math.max(score, 50);\n          break;\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    return score;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Extract domain from a URL-like string (strips protocol and path).\n   */\n  private extractDomain(value: string): string {\n    let domain = value;\n    // Strip protocol\n    const protoIndex = domain.indexOf('://');\n    if (protoIndex !== -1) domain = domain.slice(protoIndex + 3);\n    // Strip path\n    const slashIndex = domain.indexOf('/');\n    if (slashIndex !== -1) domain = domain.slice(0, slashIndex);\n    // Strip port\n    const colonIndex = domain.indexOf(':');\n    if (colonIndex !== -1) domain = domain.slice(0, colonIndex);\n    return domain;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Check if a value matches any of the given glob patterns.\n   */\n  private matchesAnyPattern(value: string, patterns: string[]): boolean {\n    return patterns.some((pattern) => this.matchGlob(value, pattern));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Simple glob pattern matching.\n   * Supports * (matches any characters including / and spaces) and ? (single char).\n   * Uses the same approach as the backend's matchGlobPattern.\n   */\n  private matchGlob(value: string, pattern: string): boolean {\n    // Exact match\n    if (pattern === value) return true;\n\n    // Convert glob to regex\n    const regexStr = pattern\n      .replace(/[.+^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\$&') // Escape special regex chars (except * and ?)\n      .replace(/\\*/g, '.*')                  // * matches anything\n      .replace(/\\?/g, '.');                  // ? matches single char\n\n    try {\n      return new RegExp(`^${regexStr}$`, 'i').test(value);\n    } catch {\n      return false;\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Convenience: find a matching purpose rule.\n */\nexport function findPurposeRule(policy: LocalPolicy, purposeId: string): LocalPurposeRule | undefined {\n  return policy.purposes.find((p) => p.id === purposeId);\n}\n","/**\n * AstraSync Gateway - Types for gateway modes, local evaluation, and adapter interface.\n */\n\n// ========================================================================\n// Gateway Configuration\n// ========================================================================\n\nexport type GatewayMode = 'online' | 'local' | 'hybrid';\n\n/**\n * Posture controls whether the gateway actively blocks or just monitors.\n * - active: Evaluate and enforce decisions (block/allow/review)\n * - passive: Evaluate and log but never block (telemetry-only mode)\n */\nexport type GatewayPosture = 'active' | 'passive';\n\nexport interface AstraSyncGatewayConfig {\n  mode: GatewayMode;\n  /** Enforcement posture: 'active' blocks actions, 'passive' logs only (default: 'active') */\n  posture?: GatewayPosture;\n  /** AstraSync API base URL (required for online/hybrid modes) */\n  apiBaseUrl?: string;\n  /** API key for authenticating with AstraSync (required for online/hybrid modes) */\n  apiKey?: string;\n  /** Path to local PDLSS policy YAML file (required for local/hybrid modes) */\n  policyFile?: string;\n  /** Inline policy object (alternative to policyFile) */\n  policy?: LocalPolicy;\n  /** Sync interval in seconds for hybrid mode (default: 3600) */\n  syncInterval?: number;\n  /** Cache verification results TTL in seconds (default: 300) */\n  cacheTtl?: number;\n  /** Enable debug logging */\n  debug?: boolean;\n  /** Enable trace logging to .astrasync/traces/ (default: false) */\n  traceEnabled?: boolean;\n  /** Trace log directory (default: .astrasync/traces/) */\n  tracePath?: string;\n  /** Default access level for unverified requests */\n  defaultAccessLevel?: import('../types').AccessLevel;\n  /** Minimum trust score for standard access (online/hybrid) */\n  minTrustScore?: number;\n  /** Minimum trust score for full access (online/hybrid) */\n  minTrustScoreForFull?: number;\n  /** Custom headers to send with API requests */\n  customHeaders?: Record<string, string>;\n  /** Counterparty URL for analytics */\n  counterpartyUrl?: string;\n  /** Counterparty type for analytics */\n  counterpartyType?: import('../types').CounterpartyType;\n}\n\n// ========================================================================\n// PDLSS Context (Agent-side action context)\n// ========================================================================\n\nexport interface PDLSSContext {\n  /** Purpose category (e.g. email.send, shell.exec, file.read) */\n  purpose: string;\n  /** Specific action within purpose */\n  action: string;\n  /** Target resource, recipient, or counterparty */\n  target: string;\n  /** Types of data access (read, write, delete) */\n  dataAccess?: string[];\n  /** Network domains/IPs being accessed */\n  networkAccess?: string[];\n  /** Resource type (customer, order, file, directory, process) */\n  resourceType?: string;\n  /** Risk factors for this action */\n  riskFactors?: RiskFactor[];\n  /** Transaction value (if financial) */\n  transactionValue?: number;\n  /** Currency for transaction */\n  currency?: string;\n  /** Additional metadata */\n  metadata?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\nexport interface RiskFactor {\n  type: 'financial' | 'data_sensitivity' | 'privilege_escalation' | 'network_scope' | 'destructive';\n  severity: 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' | 'critical';\n  detail: string;\n}\n\n// ========================================================================\n// Verification Decision\n// ========================================================================\n\nexport interface VerificationDecision {\n  recommendation: 'ALLOW' | 'DENY' | 'MANUAL_REVIEW';\n  reason: string;\n  trustScore?: number;\n  tokenGuidance?: import('../types').TokenGuidance;\n  sessionId?: string;\n  /** PDLSS dimensions that were evaluated */\n  evaluatedDimensions?: {\n    purpose: boolean;\n    scope: boolean;\n    limits: boolean;\n    riskThresholds: boolean;\n  };\n}\n\n// ========================================================================\n// Local Policy Types (YAML format)\n// ========================================================================\n\nexport interface LocalPolicy {\n  version: string;\n  name: string;\n  description?: string;\n  purposes: LocalPurposeRule[];\n  scope?: LocalScope;\n  limits?: LocalLimits;\n  riskThresholds?: LocalRiskThresholds;\n  selfInstantiation?: LocalSelfInstantiation;\n}\n\nexport interface LocalPurposeRule {\n  id: string;\n  allowed: boolean;\n  targets?: string[];\n  blockedPatterns?: string[];\n  requiresApproval?: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface LocalScope {\n  allowedDomains?: string[];\n  blockedDomains?: string[];\n  blockedResources?: string[];\n}\n\nexport interface LocalLimits {\n  maxTransactionAmount?: number;\n  maxRequestsPerHour?: number;\n  currency?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface LocalRiskThresholds {\n  autoAllow: { min: number; max: number };\n  requireApproval: { min: number; max: number };\n  autoBlock: { min: number; max: number };\n}\n\nexport interface LocalSelfInstantiation {\n  /** Whether sub-agent spawning is allowed */\n  allowed: boolean;\n  /** Maximum depth of sub-agent chain */\n  maxDepth?: number;\n}\n\n// ========================================================================\n// Risk Scoring Defaults (cherry-picked from trust-harness-core)\n// ========================================================================\n\n/** Base risk scores per action category */\nexport const BASE_RISK_SCORES: Record<string, number> = {\n  'file.read': 10,\n  'file.write': 40,\n  'file.delete': 70,\n  'shell.exec': 50,\n  'network.fetch': 60,\n  'network.request': 60,\n  'email.send': 45,\n  'email.read': 15,\n  'calendar.create': 20,\n  'calendar.modify': 30,\n  'database.query': 25,\n  'database.write': 55,\n  'payment.execute': 80,\n  'sub_agent.spawn': 65,\n  'code.execute': 45,\n};\n\n/** Shell commands that significantly increase risk score */\nexport const HIGH_RISK_COMMANDS = [\n  'rm', 'rmdir', 'dd', 'mkfs', 'chmod', 'chown',\n  'sudo', 'su', 'curl', 'wget', 'nc', 'netcat',\n  'ssh', 'scp', 'rsync', 'git push', 'npm publish',\n  'docker', 'kubectl',\n];\n\n/** File paths that indicate sensitive data access */\nexport const SENSITIVE_PATHS = [\n  '.ssh', '.aws', '.gnupg', '.env', 'credentials',\n  'secrets', 'password', '.git/config', '/etc', '/var', '/root',\n  'id_rsa', '.npmrc', '.pypirc',\n];\n\n// ========================================================================\n// Trace Event Types\n// ========================================================================\n\nexport interface TraceEvent {\n  id: string;\n  timestamp: Date;\n  type: 'evaluation' | 'decision' | 'error' | 'mode_switch';\n  context?: PDLSSContext;\n  decision?: VerificationDecision;\n  metadata?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\n// ========================================================================\n// Adapter Interface Types\n// ========================================================================\n\nexport interface AdapterConfig {\n  /** The gateway instance (handles mode routing) */\n  gateway: unknown; // Typed as AstraSyncGateway at usage site to avoid circular deps\n  /** Platform-specific configuration */\n  adapterOptions: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\nexport interface AgentAction {\n  /** Raw action data from the platform */\n  raw: unknown;\n  /** Platform identifier (e.g. 'openclaw-cli', 'cursor', 'browser') */\n  platform: string;\n  /** Timestamp of the action */\n  timestamp: Date;\n}\n\nexport interface InterceptResult {\n  /** Whether the action was intercepted */\n  intercepted: boolean;\n  /** Extracted PDLSS context (if intercepted) */\n  context?: PDLSSContext;\n  /** Reason for not intercepting (if not intercepted) */\n  skipReason?: string;\n}\n\n// ========================================================================\n// Sync Queue Types (Hybrid mode)\n// ========================================================================\n\nexport interface SyncQueueEntry {\n  id: string;\n  context: PDLSSContext;\n  decision: VerificationDecision;\n  timestamp: Date;\n  retryCount: number;\n  status: 'pending' | 'synced' | 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Risk thresholds + approval requirements\n */\n\nimport type {\n  LocalPolicy,\n  PDLSSContext,\n  VerificationDecision,\n  LocalPurposeRule,\n} from '../gateway/types';\nimport { HIGH_RISK_COMMANDS, SENSITIVE_PATHS } from '../gateway/types';\n\nexport class LocalEvaluator {\n  private policy: LocalPolicy;\n  private requestCounts: Map<string, { count: number; windowStart: number }> = new Map();\n\n  constructor(policy: LocalPolicy) {\n    this.policy = policy;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Update the policy (e.g. after hot-reload or sync).\n   */\n  updatePolicy(policy: LocalPolicy): void {\n    this.policy = policy;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Evaluate an action context against the loaded policy.\n   */\n  evaluate(context: PDLSSContext): VerificationDecision {\n    // 1. Purpose: find matching rule\n    const purposeRule = this.policy.purposes.find((p) => p.id === context.purpose);\n    if (!purposeRule) {\n      return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: 'Purpose not in policy' };\n    }\n    if (!purposeRule.allowed) {\n      return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: 'Purpose explicitly blocked' };\n    }\n\n    // 2. Purpose: check allowed targets\n    if (purposeRule.targets && !this.matchesAnyPattern(context.target, purposeRule.targets)) {\n      return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: 'Target not in allowed list' };\n    }\n\n    // 3. Purpose: check blocked patterns\n    if (\n      purposeRule.blockedPatterns &&\n      this.matchesAnyPattern(context.target, purposeRule.blockedPatterns)\n    ) {\n      return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: 'Target matches blocked pattern' };\n    }\n\n    // 4. Scope: check global blocked resources/domains\n    const scopeBlock = this.checkScopeBlock(context);\n    if (scopeBlock) {\n      return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: scopeBlock };\n    }\n\n    // 5. Limits: check transaction and rate limits\n    const limitViolation = this.checkLimits(context);\n    if (limitViolation) {\n      return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: limitViolation };\n    }\n\n    // 6. Self-instantiation: check sub-agent spawning rules\n    if (context.purpose === 'sub_agent.spawn' && this.policy.selfInstantiation) {\n      if (!this.policy.selfInstantiation.allowed) {\n        return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: 'Sub-agent spawning is not allowed' };\n      }\n      const depth = (context.metadata?.subAgentDepth as number) || 0;\n      if (\n        this.policy.selfInstantiation.maxDepth !== undefined &&\n        depth >= this.policy.selfInstantiation.maxDepth\n      ) {\n        return {\n          recommendation: 'DENY',\n          reason: `Sub-agent depth ${depth} exceeds max depth ${this.policy.selfInstantiation.maxDepth}`,\n        };\n      }\n    }\n\n    // 7. Risk thresholds + approval requirements\n    if (purposeRule.requiresApproval) {\n      return { recommendation: 'MANUAL_REVIEW', reason: 'Purpose requires approval' };\n    }\n\n    const riskDecision = this.checkRiskThresholds(context);\n    if (riskDecision) {\n      return riskDecision;\n    }\n\n    return {\n      recommendation: 'ALLOW',\n      reason: 'All PDLSS checks passed',\n      evaluatedDimensions: {\n        purpose: true,\n        scope: !!this.policy.scope,\n        limits: !!this.policy.limits,\n        riskThresholds: !!this.policy.riskThresholds,\n      },\n    };\n  }\n\n  private checkScopeBlock(context: PDLSSContext): string | null {\n    const scope = this.policy.scope;\n    if (!scope) return null;\n\n    // Check blocked domains against target and network access\n    if (scope.blockedDomains) {\n      const targetDomain = this.extractDomain(context.target);\n      if (this.matchesAnyPattern(targetDomain, scope.blockedDomains)) {\n        return `Target blocked by scope: ${context.target}`;\n      }\n      if (context.networkAccess) {\n        for (const domain of context.networkAccess) {\n          if (this.matchesAnyPattern(this.extractDomain(domain), scope.blockedDomains)) {\n            return `Domain blocked by scope: ${domain}`;\n          }\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    // Check blocked resources against target\n    if (scope.blockedResources && this.matchesAnyPattern(context.target, scope.blockedResources)) {\n      return `Resource blocked by scope: ${context.target}`;\n    }\n\n    // Check allowed domains (if specified, target must match)\n    if (scope.allowedDomains && context.networkAccess) {\n      for (const domain of context.networkAccess) {\n        if (!this.matchesAnyPattern(this.extractDomain(domain), scope.allowedDomains)) {\n          return `Domain not in allowed list: ${domain}`;\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  private checkLimits(context: PDLSSContext): string | null {\n    const limits = this.policy.limits;\n    if (!limits) return null;\n\n    // Transaction amount check\n    if (limits.maxTransactionAmount !== undefined && context.transactionValue !== undefined) {\n      if (context.transactionValue > limits.maxTransactionAmount) {\n        return `Transaction value ${context.transactionValue} exceeds limit ${limits.maxTransactionAmount}`;\n      }\n    }\n\n    // Rate limit check\n    if (limits.maxRequestsPerHour !== undefined) {\n      const key = context.purpose;\n      const now = Date.now();\n      const entry = this.requestCounts.get(key);\n      const hourMs = 3600000;\n\n      if (!entry || now - 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[]).length;\n    if (starCount > 8) {\n      return false;\n    }\n\n    // Convert glob to regex\n    const regexStr = pattern\n      .replace(/[.+^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\$&') // Escape special regex chars (except * and ?)\n      .replace(/\\*/g, '.*') // * matches anything\n      .replace(/\\?/g, '.'); // ? matches single char\n\n    try {\n      return new RegExp(`^${regexStr}$`, 'i').test(value);\n    } catch {\n      return false;\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Convenience: find a matching purpose rule.\n */\nexport function findPurposeRule(\n  policy: LocalPolicy,\n  purposeId: string\n): LocalPurposeRule | undefined {\n  return policy.purposes.find((p) => p.id === purposeId);\n}\n","/**\n * AstraSync Gateway - Types for gateway modes, local evaluation, and adapter interface.\n */\n\n// ========================================================================\n// Gateway Configuration\n// ========================================================================\n\nexport type GatewayMode = 'online' | 'local' | 'hybrid';\n\n/**\n * Posture controls whether the gateway actively blocks or just monitors.\n * - active: Evaluate and enforce decisions (block/allow/review)\n * - passive: Evaluate and log but never block (telemetry-only mode)\n */\nexport type GatewayPosture = 'active' | 'passive';\n\nexport interface AstraSyncGatewayConfig {\n  mode: GatewayMode;\n  /** Enforcement posture: 'active' blocks actions, 'passive' logs only (default: 'active') */\n  posture?: GatewayPosture;\n  /** AstraSync API base URL (required for online/hybrid modes) */\n  apiBaseUrl?: string;\n  /** API key for authenticating with AstraSync (required for online/hybrid modes) */\n  apiKey?: string;\n  /** Path to local PDLSS policy YAML file (required for local/hybrid modes) */\n  policyFile?: string;\n  /** Inline policy object (alternative to policyFile) */\n  policy?: LocalPolicy;\n  /** Sync interval in seconds for hybrid mode (default: 3600) */\n  syncInterval?: number;\n  /** 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context)\n// ========================================================================\n\nexport interface PDLSSContext {\n  /** Purpose category (e.g. email.send, shell.exec, file.read) */\n  purpose: string;\n  /** Specific action within purpose */\n  action: string;\n  /** Target resource, recipient, or counterparty */\n  target: string;\n  /** Types of data access (read, write, delete) */\n  dataAccess?: string[];\n  /** Network domains/IPs being accessed */\n  networkAccess?: string[];\n  /** Resource type (customer, order, file, directory, process) */\n  resourceType?: string;\n  /** Risk factors for this action */\n  riskFactors?: RiskFactor[];\n  /** Transaction value (if financial) */\n  transactionValue?: number;\n  /** Currency for transaction */\n  currency?: string;\n  /** Additional metadata */\n  metadata?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\nexport interface RiskFactor {\n  type: 'financial' | 'data_sensitivity' | 'privilege_escalation' | 'network_scope' | 'destructive';\n  severity: 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' | 'critical';\n  detail: string;\n}\n\n// ========================================================================\n// Verification Decision\n// ========================================================================\n\nexport interface VerificationDecision {\n  recommendation: 'ALLOW' | 'DENY' | 'MANUAL_REVIEW';\n  reason: string;\n  trustScore?: number;\n  tokenGuidance?: import('../types').TokenGuidance;\n  sessionId?: string;\n  /** PDLSS dimensions that were evaluated */\n  evaluatedDimensions?: {\n    purpose: boolean;\n    scope: boolean;\n    limits: boolean;\n    riskThresholds: boolean;\n  };\n}\n\n// ========================================================================\n// Local Policy Types (YAML format)\n// ========================================================================\n\nexport interface LocalPolicy {\n  version: string;\n  name: string;\n  description?: string;\n  purposes: LocalPurposeRule[];\n  scope?: LocalScope;\n  limits?: LocalLimits;\n  riskThresholds?: LocalRiskThresholds;\n  selfInstantiation?: LocalSelfInstantiation;\n}\n\nexport interface LocalPurposeRule {\n  id: string;\n  allowed: boolean;\n  targets?: string[];\n  blockedPatterns?: string[];\n  requiresApproval?: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface LocalScope {\n  allowedDomains?: string[];\n  blockedDomains?: string[];\n  blockedResources?: string[];\n}\n\nexport interface LocalLimits {\n  maxTransactionAmount?: number;\n  maxRequestsPerHour?: number;\n  currency?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface LocalRiskThresholds {\n  autoAllow: { min: number; max: number };\n  requireApproval: { min: number; max: number };\n  autoBlock: { min: number; max: number };\n}\n\nexport interface LocalSelfInstantiation {\n  /** Whether sub-agent spawning is allowed */\n  allowed: boolean;\n  /** Maximum depth of sub-agent chain */\n  maxDepth?: number;\n}\n\n// ========================================================================\n// Risk Scoring Defaults (cherry-picked from trust-harness-core)\n// ========================================================================\n\n/** Base risk scores per action category */\nexport const BASE_RISK_SCORES: Record<string, number> = {\n  'file.read': 10,\n  'file.write': 40,\n  'file.delete': 70,\n  'shell.exec': 50,\n  'network.fetch': 60,\n  'network.request': 60,\n  'email.send': 45,\n  'email.read': 15,\n  'calendar.create': 20,\n  'calendar.modify': 30,\n  'database.query': 25,\n  'database.write': 55,\n  'payment.execute': 80,\n  'sub_agent.spawn': 65,\n  'code.execute': 45,\n};\n\n/** Shell commands that significantly increase risk score */\nexport const HIGH_RISK_COMMANDS = [\n  'rm', 'rmdir', 'dd', 'mkfs', 'chmod', 'chown',\n  'sudo', 'su', 'curl', 'wget', 'nc', 'netcat',\n  'ssh', 'scp', 'rsync', 'git push', 'npm publish',\n  'docker', 'kubectl',\n];\n\n/** File paths that indicate sensitive data access */\nexport const SENSITIVE_PATHS = [\n  '.ssh', '.aws', '.gnupg', '.env', 'credentials',\n  'secrets', 'password', '.git/config', '/etc', '/var', '/root',\n  'id_rsa', '.npmrc', '.pypirc',\n];\n\n// ========================================================================\n// Trace Event Types\n// ========================================================================\n\nexport interface TraceEvent {\n  id: string;\n  timestamp: Date;\n  type: 'evaluation' | 'decision' | 'error' | 'mode_switch';\n  context?: PDLSSContext;\n  decision?: VerificationDecision;\n  metadata?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\n// ========================================================================\n// Adapter Interface Types\n// ========================================================================\n\nexport interface AdapterConfig {\n  /** The gateway instance (handles mode routing) */\n  gateway: unknown; // Typed as AstraSyncGateway at usage site to avoid circular deps\n  /** Platform-specific configuration */\n  adapterOptions: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\nexport interface AgentAction {\n  /** Raw action data from the platform */\n  raw: unknown;\n  /** Platform identifier (e.g. 'openclaw-cli', 'cursor', 'browser') */\n  platform: string;\n  /** Timestamp of the action */\n  timestamp: Date;\n}\n\nexport interface InterceptResult {\n  /** Whether the action was intercepted */\n  intercepted: boolean;\n  /** Extracted PDLSS context (if intercepted) */\n  context?: PDLSSContext;\n  /** Reason for not intercepting (if not intercepted) */\n  skipReason?: string;\n}\n\n// ========================================================================\n// Sync Queue Types (Hybrid mode)\n// ========================================================================\n\nexport interface SyncQueueEntry {\n  id: string;\n  context: PDLSSContext;\n  decision: VerificationDecision;\n  timestamp: Date;\n  retryCount: number;\n  status: 'pending' | 'synced' | 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package/dist/local-evaluator/evaluator.mjs

@@ -80,7 +80,10 @@ var LocalEvaluator = class {
       }
       const depth = context.metadata?.subAgentDepth || 0;
       if (this.policy.selfInstantiation.maxDepth !== void 0 && depth >= this.policy.selfInstantiation.maxDepth) {
-        return { recommendation: "DENY", reason: `Sub-agent depth ${depth} exceeds max depth ${this.policy.selfInstantiation.maxDepth}` };
+        return {
+          recommendation: "DENY",
+          reason: `Sub-agent depth ${depth} exceeds max depth ${this.policy.selfInstantiation.maxDepth}`
+        };
       }
     }
     if (purposeRule.requiresApproval) {
@@ -161,7 +164,10 @@ var LocalEvaluator = class {
       return { recommendation: "DENY", reason: `Risk score ${riskScore} exceeds block threshold` };
     }
     if (riskScore >= thresholds.requireApproval.min) {
-      return { recommendation: "MANUAL_REVIEW", reason: `Risk score ${riskScore} requires approval` };
+      return {
+        recommendation: "MANUAL_REVIEW",
+        reason: `Risk score ${riskScore} requires approval`
+      };
     }
     return null;
   }
@@ -226,6 +232,10 @@ var LocalEvaluator = class {
    */
   matchGlob(value, pattern) {
     if (pattern === value) return true;
+    const starCount = (pattern.match(/\*/g) ?? []).length;
+    if (starCount > 8) {
+      return false;
+    }
     const regexStr = pattern.replace(/[.+^${}()|[\]\\]/g, "\\$&").replace(/\*/g, ".*").replace(/\?/g, ".");
     try {
       return new RegExp(`^${regexStr}$`, "i").test(value);

package/dist/local-evaluator/evaluator.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/gateway/types.ts","../../src/local-evaluator/evaluator.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * AstraSync Gateway - Types for gateway modes, local evaluation, and adapter interface.\n */\n\n// ========================================================================\n// Gateway Configuration\n// ========================================================================\n\nexport type GatewayMode = 'online' | 'local' | 'hybrid';\n\n/**\n * Posture controls whether the gateway actively blocks or just monitors.\n * - active: Evaluate and enforce decisions (block/allow/review)\n * - passive: Evaluate and log but never block (telemetry-only mode)\n */\nexport type GatewayPosture = 'active' | 'passive';\n\nexport interface AstraSyncGatewayConfig {\n  mode: GatewayMode;\n  /** Enforcement posture: 'active' blocks actions, 'passive' logs only (default: 'active') */\n  posture?: GatewayPosture;\n  /** AstraSync API base URL (required for online/hybrid modes) */\n  apiBaseUrl?: string;\n  /** API key for authenticating with AstraSync (required for online/hybrid modes) */\n  apiKey?: string;\n  /** Path to local PDLSS policy YAML file (required for local/hybrid modes) */\n  policyFile?: string;\n  /** Inline policy object (alternative to policyFile) */\n  policy?: LocalPolicy;\n  /** Sync interval in seconds for hybrid mode (default: 3600) */\n  syncInterval?: number;\n  /** Cache verification results TTL in seconds (default: 300) */\n  cacheTtl?: number;\n  /** Enable debug logging */\n  debug?: boolean;\n  /** Enable trace logging to .astrasync/traces/ (default: false) */\n  traceEnabled?: boolean;\n  /** Trace log directory (default: .astrasync/traces/) */\n  tracePath?: string;\n  /** Default access level for unverified requests */\n  defaultAccessLevel?: import('../types').AccessLevel;\n  /** Minimum trust score for standard access (online/hybrid) */\n  minTrustScore?: number;\n  /** Minimum trust score for full access (online/hybrid) */\n  minTrustScoreForFull?: number;\n  /** Custom headers to send with API requests */\n  customHeaders?: Record<string, string>;\n  /** Counterparty URL for analytics */\n  counterpartyUrl?: string;\n  /** Counterparty type for analytics */\n  counterpartyType?: import('../types').CounterpartyType;\n}\n\n// ========================================================================\n// PDLSS Context (Agent-side action context)\n// ========================================================================\n\nexport interface PDLSSContext {\n  /** Purpose category (e.g. email.send, shell.exec, file.read) */\n  purpose: string;\n  /** Specific action within purpose */\n  action: string;\n  /** Target resource, recipient, or counterparty */\n  target: string;\n  /** Types of data access (read, write, delete) */\n  dataAccess?: string[];\n  /** Network domains/IPs being accessed */\n  networkAccess?: string[];\n  /** Resource type (customer, order, file, directory, process) */\n  resourceType?: 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45,\n};\n\n/** Shell commands that significantly increase risk score */\nexport const HIGH_RISK_COMMANDS = [\n  'rm', 'rmdir', 'dd', 'mkfs', 'chmod', 'chown',\n  'sudo', 'su', 'curl', 'wget', 'nc', 'netcat',\n  'ssh', 'scp', 'rsync', 'git push', 'npm publish',\n  'docker', 'kubectl',\n];\n\n/** File paths that indicate sensitive data access */\nexport const SENSITIVE_PATHS = [\n  '.ssh', '.aws', '.gnupg', '.env', 'credentials',\n  'secrets', 'password', '.git/config', '/etc', '/var', '/root',\n  'id_rsa', '.npmrc', '.pypirc',\n];\n\n// ========================================================================\n// Trace Event Types\n// ========================================================================\n\nexport interface TraceEvent {\n  id: string;\n  timestamp: Date;\n  type: 'evaluation' | 'decision' | 'error' | 'mode_switch';\n  context?: PDLSSContext;\n  decision?: VerificationDecision;\n  metadata?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\n// ========================================================================\n// Adapter Interface Types\n// ========================================================================\n\nexport interface AdapterConfig {\n  /** The gateway instance (handles mode routing) */\n  gateway: unknown; // Typed as AstraSyncGateway at usage site to avoid circular deps\n  /** Platform-specific configuration */\n  adapterOptions: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\nexport interface AgentAction {\n  /** Raw action data from the platform */\n  raw: unknown;\n  /** Platform identifier (e.g. 'openclaw-cli', 'cursor', 'browser') */\n  platform: string;\n  /** Timestamp of the action */\n  timestamp: Date;\n}\n\nexport interface InterceptResult {\n  /** Whether the action was intercepted */\n  intercepted: boolean;\n  /** Extracted PDLSS context (if intercepted) */\n  context?: PDLSSContext;\n  /** Reason for not intercepting (if not intercepted) */\n  skipReason?: string;\n}\n\n// ========================================================================\n// Sync Queue Types (Hybrid mode)\n// ========================================================================\n\nexport interface SyncQueueEntry {\n  id: string;\n  context: PDLSSContext;\n  decision: VerificationDecision;\n  timestamp: Date;\n  retryCount: number;\n  status: 'pending' | 'synced' | 'failed';\n}\n","/**\n * Local PDLSS Evaluator\n *\n * Evaluates agent actions against a local PDLSS policy.\n * Same logic as the cloud evaluator but runs in-process with no I/O.\n *\n * Evaluation order:\n * 1. Purpose: find matching rule, check if allowed\n * 2. Purpose: check allowed targets (if specified)\n * 3. Purpose: check blocked patterns (if specified)\n * 4. Scope: check global blocked resources/domains\n * 5. Limits: check transaction/rate limits\n * 6. Risk thresholds + approval requirements\n */\n\nimport type { LocalPolicy, PDLSSContext, VerificationDecision, LocalPurposeRule } from '../gateway/types';\nimport { HIGH_RISK_COMMANDS, SENSITIVE_PATHS } from '../gateway/types';\n\nexport class LocalEvaluator {\n  private policy: LocalPolicy;\n  private requestCounts: Map<string, { count: number; windowStart: number }> = new Map();\n\n  constructor(policy: LocalPolicy) {\n    this.policy = policy;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Update the policy (e.g. after hot-reload or sync).\n   */\n  updatePolicy(policy: LocalPolicy): void {\n    this.policy = policy;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Evaluate an action context against the loaded policy.\n   */\n  evaluate(context: PDLSSContext): VerificationDecision {\n    // 1. Purpose: find matching rule\n    const purposeRule = this.policy.purposes.find((p) => p.id === context.purpose);\n    if (!purposeRule) {\n      return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: 'Purpose not in policy' };\n    }\n    if (!purposeRule.allowed) {\n      return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: 'Purpose explicitly blocked' };\n    }\n\n    // 2. Purpose: check allowed targets\n    if (purposeRule.targets && !this.matchesAnyPattern(context.target, purposeRule.targets)) {\n      return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: 'Target not in allowed list' };\n    }\n\n    // 3. Purpose: check blocked patterns\n    if (purposeRule.blockedPatterns && this.matchesAnyPattern(context.target, purposeRule.blockedPatterns)) {\n      return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: 'Target matches blocked pattern' };\n    }\n\n    // 4. Scope: check global blocked resources/domains\n    const scopeBlock = this.checkScopeBlock(context);\n    if (scopeBlock) {\n      return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: scopeBlock };\n    }\n\n    // 5. Limits: check transaction and rate limits\n    const limitViolation = this.checkLimits(context);\n    if (limitViolation) {\n      return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: limitViolation };\n    }\n\n    // 6. Self-instantiation: check sub-agent spawning rules\n    if (context.purpose === 'sub_agent.spawn' && this.policy.selfInstantiation) {\n      if (!this.policy.selfInstantiation.allowed) {\n        return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: 'Sub-agent spawning is not allowed' };\n      }\n      const depth = (context.metadata?.subAgentDepth as number) || 0;\n      if (this.policy.selfInstantiation.maxDepth !== undefined && depth >= this.policy.selfInstantiation.maxDepth) {\n        return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: `Sub-agent depth ${depth} exceeds max depth ${this.policy.selfInstantiation.maxDepth}` };\n      }\n    }\n\n    // 7. 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entry.windowStart > hourMs) {\n        this.requestCounts.set(key, { count: 1, windowStart: now });\n      } else {\n        entry.count++;\n        if (entry.count > limits.maxRequestsPerHour) {\n          return `Rate limit exceeded: ${entry.count}/${limits.maxRequestsPerHour} requests per hour`;\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  private checkRiskThresholds(context: PDLSSContext): VerificationDecision | null {\n    if (!this.policy.riskThresholds) return null;\n\n    const riskScore = this.calculateRiskScore(context);\n    const thresholds = this.policy.riskThresholds;\n\n    if (riskScore >= thresholds.autoBlock.min) {\n      return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: `Risk score ${riskScore} exceeds block threshold` };\n    }\n\n    if (riskScore >= thresholds.requireApproval.min) {\n      return { recommendation: 'MANUAL_REVIEW', reason: `Risk score ${riskScore} requires approval` };\n    }\n\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  private calculateRiskScore(context: PDLSSContext): number {\n    let score = 0;\n\n    // Explicit risk factors take priority (highest severity wins)\n    if (context.riskFactors?.length) {\n      const severityScores: Record<string, number> = {\n        low: 10,\n        medium: 40,\n        high: 70,\n        critical: 90,\n      };\n\n      for (const factor of context.riskFactors) {\n        const factorScore = severityScores[factor.severity] || 0;\n        if (factorScore > score) score = factorScore;\n      }\n      return score;\n    }\n\n    // Auto-detect risk from high-risk shell commands\n    if (context.purpose === 'shell.exec' && context.target) {\n      const targetLower = context.target.toLowerCase();\n      for (const cmd of HIGH_RISK_COMMANDS) {\n        if (targetLower.startsWith(cmd) || targetLower.includes(` ${cmd} `) || targetLower.includes(` ${cmd}`)) {\n          score = Math.max(score, 80);\n          break;\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    // Auto-detect risk from sensitive file paths (score 50 = review range)\n    if ((context.purpose === 'file.read' || context.purpose === 'file.write' || context.purpose === 'file.delete') && context.target) {\n      const targetLower = context.target.toLowerCase();\n      for (const sensitivePath of SENSITIVE_PATHS) {\n        if (targetLower.includes(sensitivePath.toLowerCase())) {\n          score = Math.max(score, 50);\n          break;\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    return score;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Extract domain from a URL-like string (strips protocol and path).\n   */\n  private extractDomain(value: string): string {\n    let domain = value;\n    // Strip protocol\n    const protoIndex = domain.indexOf('://');\n    if (protoIndex !== -1) domain = domain.slice(protoIndex + 3);\n    // Strip path\n    const slashIndex = domain.indexOf('/');\n    if (slashIndex !== -1) domain = domain.slice(0, slashIndex);\n    // Strip port\n    const colonIndex = domain.indexOf(':');\n    if (colonIndex !== -1) domain = domain.slice(0, colonIndex);\n    return domain;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Check if a value matches any of the given glob patterns.\n   */\n  private matchesAnyPattern(value: string, patterns: string[]): boolean {\n    return patterns.some((pattern) => this.matchGlob(value, pattern));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Simple glob pattern matching.\n   * Supports * (matches any characters including / and spaces) and ? 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+{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/gateway/types.ts","../../src/local-evaluator/evaluator.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * AstraSync Gateway - Types for gateway modes, local evaluation, and adapter interface.\n */\n\n// ========================================================================\n// Gateway Configuration\n// ========================================================================\n\nexport type GatewayMode = 'online' | 'local' | 'hybrid';\n\n/**\n * Posture controls whether the gateway actively blocks or just monitors.\n * - active: Evaluate and enforce decisions (block/allow/review)\n * - passive: Evaluate and log but never block (telemetry-only mode)\n */\nexport type GatewayPosture = 'active' | 'passive';\n\nexport interface AstraSyncGatewayConfig {\n  mode: GatewayMode;\n  /** Enforcement posture: 'active' blocks actions, 'passive' logs only (default: 'active') */\n  posture?: GatewayPosture;\n  /** AstraSync API base URL (required for online/hybrid modes) */\n  apiBaseUrl?: string;\n  /** API key for authenticating with AstraSync (required for online/hybrid modes) */\n  apiKey?: string;\n  /** Path to local PDLSS policy YAML file (required for local/hybrid modes) */\n  policyFile?: string;\n  /** Inline policy object (alternative to policyFile) */\n  policy?: LocalPolicy;\n  /** Sync interval in seconds for hybrid mode (default: 3600) */\n  syncInterval?: number;\n  /** Cache verification results TTL in seconds (default: 300) */\n  cacheTtl?: number;\n  /** Enable debug logging */\n  debug?: boolean;\n  /** Enable trace logging to .astrasync/traces/ (default: false) */\n  traceEnabled?: boolean;\n  /** Trace log directory (default: .astrasync/traces/) */\n  tracePath?: string;\n  /** Default access level for unverified requests */\n  defaultAccessLevel?: import('../types').AccessLevel;\n  /** Minimum trust score for standard access (online/hybrid) */\n  minTrustScore?: number;\n  /** Minimum trust score for full access (online/hybrid) */\n  minTrustScoreForFull?: number;\n  /** Custom headers to send with API requests */\n  customHeaders?: Record<string, string>;\n  /** Counterparty URL for analytics */\n  counterpartyUrl?: string;\n  /** Counterparty type for analytics */\n  counterpartyType?: import('../types').CounterpartyType;\n}\n\n// ========================================================================\n// PDLSS Context (Agent-side action context)\n// ========================================================================\n\nexport interface PDLSSContext {\n  /** Purpose category (e.g. email.send, shell.exec, file.read) */\n  purpose: string;\n  /** Specific action within purpose */\n  action: string;\n  /** Target resource, recipient, or counterparty */\n  target: string;\n  /** Types of data access (read, write, delete) */\n  dataAccess?: string[];\n  /** Network domains/IPs being accessed */\n  networkAccess?: string[];\n  /** Resource type (customer, order, file, directory, process) */\n  resourceType?: string;\n  /** Risk factors for this action */\n  riskFactors?: RiskFactor[];\n  /** Transaction value (if financial) */\n  transactionValue?: number;\n  /** Currency for transaction */\n  currency?: string;\n  /** Additional metadata */\n  metadata?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\nexport interface RiskFactor {\n  type: 'financial' | 'data_sensitivity' | 'privilege_escalation' | 'network_scope' | 'destructive';\n  severity: 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' | 'critical';\n  detail: string;\n}\n\n// ========================================================================\n// Verification Decision\n// ========================================================================\n\nexport interface VerificationDecision {\n  recommendation: 'ALLOW' | 'DENY' | 'MANUAL_REVIEW';\n  reason: string;\n  trustScore?: number;\n  tokenGuidance?: import('../types').TokenGuidance;\n  sessionId?: string;\n  /** PDLSS dimensions that were evaluated */\n  evaluatedDimensions?: {\n    purpose: boolean;\n    scope: boolean;\n    limits: boolean;\n    riskThresholds: boolean;\n  };\n}\n\n// ========================================================================\n// Local Policy Types (YAML format)\n// ========================================================================\n\nexport interface LocalPolicy {\n  version: string;\n  name: string;\n  description?: string;\n  purposes: LocalPurposeRule[];\n  scope?: LocalScope;\n  limits?: LocalLimits;\n  riskThresholds?: LocalRiskThresholds;\n  selfInstantiation?: LocalSelfInstantiation;\n}\n\nexport interface LocalPurposeRule {\n  id: string;\n  allowed: boolean;\n  targets?: string[];\n  blockedPatterns?: string[];\n  requiresApproval?: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface LocalScope {\n  allowedDomains?: string[];\n  blockedDomains?: string[];\n  blockedResources?: string[];\n}\n\nexport interface LocalLimits {\n  maxTransactionAmount?: number;\n  maxRequestsPerHour?: number;\n  currency?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface LocalRiskThresholds {\n  autoAllow: { min: number; max: number };\n  requireApproval: { min: number; max: number };\n  autoBlock: { min: number; max: number };\n}\n\nexport interface LocalSelfInstantiation {\n  /** Whether sub-agent spawning is allowed */\n  allowed: boolean;\n  /** Maximum depth of sub-agent chain */\n  maxDepth?: number;\n}\n\n// ========================================================================\n// Risk Scoring Defaults (cherry-picked from trust-harness-core)\n// ========================================================================\n\n/** Base risk scores per action category */\nexport const BASE_RISK_SCORES: Record<string, number> = {\n  'file.read': 10,\n  'file.write': 40,\n  'file.delete': 70,\n  'shell.exec': 50,\n  'network.fetch': 60,\n  'network.request': 60,\n  'email.send': 45,\n  'email.read': 15,\n  'calendar.create': 20,\n  'calendar.modify': 30,\n  'database.query': 25,\n  'database.write': 55,\n  'payment.execute': 80,\n  'sub_agent.spawn': 65,\n  'code.execute': 45,\n};\n\n/** Shell commands that significantly increase risk score */\nexport const HIGH_RISK_COMMANDS = [\n  'rm', 'rmdir', 'dd', 'mkfs', 'chmod', 'chown',\n  'sudo', 'su', 'curl', 'wget', 'nc', 'netcat',\n  'ssh', 'scp', 'rsync', 'git push', 'npm publish',\n  'docker', 'kubectl',\n];\n\n/** File paths that indicate sensitive data access */\nexport const SENSITIVE_PATHS = [\n  '.ssh', '.aws', '.gnupg', '.env', 'credentials',\n  'secrets', 'password', '.git/config', '/etc', '/var', '/root',\n  'id_rsa', '.npmrc', '.pypirc',\n];\n\n// ========================================================================\n// Trace Event Types\n// ========================================================================\n\nexport interface TraceEvent {\n  id: string;\n  timestamp: Date;\n  type: 'evaluation' | 'decision' | 'error' | 'mode_switch';\n  context?: PDLSSContext;\n  decision?: VerificationDecision;\n  metadata?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\n// ========================================================================\n// Adapter Interface Types\n// ========================================================================\n\nexport interface AdapterConfig {\n  /** The gateway instance (handles mode routing) */\n  gateway: unknown; // Typed as AstraSyncGateway at usage site to avoid circular deps\n  /** Platform-specific configuration */\n  adapterOptions: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\nexport interface AgentAction {\n  /** Raw action data from the platform */\n  raw: unknown;\n  /** Platform identifier (e.g. 'openclaw-cli', 'cursor', 'browser') */\n  platform: string;\n  /** Timestamp of the action */\n  timestamp: Date;\n}\n\nexport interface InterceptResult {\n  /** Whether the action was intercepted */\n  intercepted: boolean;\n  /** Extracted PDLSS context (if intercepted) */\n  context?: PDLSSContext;\n  /** Reason for not intercepting (if not intercepted) */\n  skipReason?: string;\n}\n\n// ========================================================================\n// Sync Queue Types (Hybrid mode)\n// ========================================================================\n\nexport interface SyncQueueEntry {\n  id: string;\n  context: PDLSSContext;\n  decision: VerificationDecision;\n  timestamp: Date;\n  retryCount: number;\n  status: 'pending' | 'synced' | 'failed';\n}\n","/**\n * Local PDLSS Evaluator\n *\n * Evaluates agent actions against a local PDLSS policy.\n * Same logic as the cloud evaluator but runs in-process with no I/O.\n *\n * Evaluation order:\n * 1. Purpose: find matching rule, check if allowed\n * 2. Purpose: check allowed targets (if specified)\n * 3. Purpose: check blocked patterns (if specified)\n * 4. Scope: check global blocked resources/domains\n * 5. Limits: check transaction/rate limits\n * 6. Risk thresholds + approval requirements\n */\n\nimport type {\n  LocalPolicy,\n  PDLSSContext,\n  VerificationDecision,\n  LocalPurposeRule,\n} from '../gateway/types';\nimport { HIGH_RISK_COMMANDS, SENSITIVE_PATHS } from '../gateway/types';\n\nexport class LocalEvaluator {\n  private policy: LocalPolicy;\n  private requestCounts: Map<string, { count: number; windowStart: number }> = new Map();\n\n  constructor(policy: LocalPolicy) {\n    this.policy = policy;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Update the policy (e.g. after hot-reload or sync).\n   */\n  updatePolicy(policy: LocalPolicy): void {\n    this.policy = policy;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Evaluate an action context against the loaded policy.\n   */\n  evaluate(context: PDLSSContext): VerificationDecision {\n    // 1. Purpose: find matching rule\n    const purposeRule = this.policy.purposes.find((p) => p.id === context.purpose);\n    if (!purposeRule) {\n      return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: 'Purpose not in policy' };\n    }\n    if (!purposeRule.allowed) {\n      return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: 'Purpose explicitly blocked' };\n    }\n\n    // 2. Purpose: check allowed targets\n    if (purposeRule.targets && !this.matchesAnyPattern(context.target, purposeRule.targets)) {\n      return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: 'Target not in allowed list' };\n    }\n\n    // 3. Purpose: check blocked patterns\n    if (\n      purposeRule.blockedPatterns &&\n      this.matchesAnyPattern(context.target, purposeRule.blockedPatterns)\n    ) {\n      return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: 'Target matches blocked pattern' };\n    }\n\n    // 4. Scope: check global blocked resources/domains\n    const scopeBlock = this.checkScopeBlock(context);\n    if (scopeBlock) {\n      return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: scopeBlock };\n    }\n\n    // 5. Limits: check transaction and rate limits\n    const limitViolation = this.checkLimits(context);\n    if (limitViolation) {\n      return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: limitViolation };\n    }\n\n    // 6. Self-instantiation: check sub-agent spawning rules\n    if (context.purpose === 'sub_agent.spawn' && this.policy.selfInstantiation) {\n      if (!this.policy.selfInstantiation.allowed) {\n        return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: 'Sub-agent spawning is not allowed' };\n      }\n      const depth = (context.metadata?.subAgentDepth as number) || 0;\n      if (\n        this.policy.selfInstantiation.maxDepth !== undefined &&\n        depth >= this.policy.selfInstantiation.maxDepth\n      ) {\n        return {\n          recommendation: 'DENY',\n          reason: `Sub-agent depth ${depth} exceeds max depth ${this.policy.selfInstantiation.maxDepth}`,\n        };\n      }\n    }\n\n    // 7. Risk thresholds + approval requirements\n    if (purposeRule.requiresApproval) {\n      return { recommendation: 'MANUAL_REVIEW', reason: 'Purpose requires approval' };\n    }\n\n    const riskDecision = this.checkRiskThresholds(context);\n    if (riskDecision) {\n      return riskDecision;\n    }\n\n    return {\n      recommendation: 'ALLOW',\n      reason: 'All PDLSS checks passed',\n      evaluatedDimensions: {\n        purpose: true,\n        scope: !!this.policy.scope,\n        limits: !!this.policy.limits,\n        riskThresholds: !!this.policy.riskThresholds,\n      },\n    };\n  }\n\n  private checkScopeBlock(context: PDLSSContext): string | null {\n    const scope = this.policy.scope;\n    if (!scope) return null;\n\n    // Check blocked domains against target and network access\n    if (scope.blockedDomains) {\n      const targetDomain = this.extractDomain(context.target);\n      if (this.matchesAnyPattern(targetDomain, scope.blockedDomains)) {\n        return `Target blocked by scope: ${context.target}`;\n      }\n      if (context.networkAccess) {\n        for (const domain of context.networkAccess) {\n          if (this.matchesAnyPattern(this.extractDomain(domain), scope.blockedDomains)) {\n            return `Domain blocked by scope: ${domain}`;\n          }\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    // Check blocked resources against target\n    if (scope.blockedResources && this.matchesAnyPattern(context.target, scope.blockedResources)) {\n      return `Resource blocked by scope: ${context.target}`;\n    }\n\n    // Check allowed domains (if specified, target must match)\n    if (scope.allowedDomains && context.networkAccess) {\n      for (const domain of context.networkAccess) {\n        if (!this.matchesAnyPattern(this.extractDomain(domain), scope.allowedDomains)) {\n          return `Domain not in allowed list: ${domain}`;\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  private checkLimits(context: PDLSSContext): string | null {\n    const limits = this.policy.limits;\n    if (!limits) return null;\n\n    // Transaction amount check\n    if (limits.maxTransactionAmount !== undefined && context.transactionValue !== undefined) {\n      if (context.transactionValue > limits.maxTransactionAmount) {\n        return `Transaction value ${context.transactionValue} exceeds limit ${limits.maxTransactionAmount}`;\n      }\n    }\n\n    // Rate limit check\n    if (limits.maxRequestsPerHour !== undefined) {\n      const key = context.purpose;\n      const now = Date.now();\n      const entry = this.requestCounts.get(key);\n      const hourMs = 3600000;\n\n      if (!entry || now - entry.windowStart > hourMs) {\n        this.requestCounts.set(key, { count: 1, windowStart: now });\n      } else {\n        entry.count++;\n        if (entry.count > limits.maxRequestsPerHour) {\n          return `Rate limit exceeded: ${entry.count}/${limits.maxRequestsPerHour} requests per hour`;\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  private checkRiskThresholds(context: PDLSSContext): VerificationDecision | null {\n    if (!this.policy.riskThresholds) return null;\n\n    const riskScore = this.calculateRiskScore(context);\n    const thresholds = this.policy.riskThresholds;\n\n    if (riskScore >= thresholds.autoBlock.min) {\n      return { recommendation: 'DENY', reason: `Risk score ${riskScore} exceeds block threshold` };\n    }\n\n    if (riskScore >= thresholds.requireApproval.min) {\n      return {\n        recommendation: 'MANUAL_REVIEW',\n        reason: `Risk score ${riskScore} requires approval`,\n      };\n    }\n\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  private calculateRiskScore(context: PDLSSContext): number {\n    let score = 0;\n\n    // Explicit risk factors take priority (highest severity wins)\n    if (context.riskFactors?.length) {\n      const severityScores: Record<string, number> = {\n        low: 10,\n        medium: 40,\n        high: 70,\n        critical: 90,\n      };\n\n      for (const factor of context.riskFactors) {\n        const factorScore = severityScores[factor.severity] || 0;\n        if (factorScore > score) score = factorScore;\n      }\n      return score;\n    }\n\n    // Auto-detect risk from high-risk shell commands\n    if (context.purpose === 'shell.exec' && context.target) {\n      const targetLower = context.target.toLowerCase();\n      for (const cmd of HIGH_RISK_COMMANDS) {\n        if (\n          targetLower.startsWith(cmd) ||\n          targetLower.includes(` ${cmd} `) ||\n          targetLower.includes(` ${cmd}`)\n        ) {\n          score = Math.max(score, 80);\n          break;\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    // Auto-detect risk from sensitive file paths (score 50 = review range)\n    if (\n      (context.purpose === 'file.read' ||\n        context.purpose === 'file.write' ||\n        context.purpose === 'file.delete') &&\n      context.target\n    ) {\n      const targetLower = context.target.toLowerCase();\n      for (const sensitivePath of SENSITIVE_PATHS) {\n        if (targetLower.includes(sensitivePath.toLowerCase())) {\n          score = Math.max(score, 50);\n          break;\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    return score;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Extract domain from a URL-like string (strips protocol and path).\n   */\n  private extractDomain(value: string): string {\n    let domain = value;\n    // Strip protocol\n    const protoIndex = domain.indexOf('://');\n    if (protoIndex !== -1) domain = domain.slice(protoIndex + 3);\n    // Strip path\n    const slashIndex = domain.indexOf('/');\n    if (slashIndex !== -1) domain = domain.slice(0, slashIndex);\n    // Strip port\n    const colonIndex = domain.indexOf(':');\n    if (colonIndex !== -1) domain = domain.slice(0, colonIndex);\n    return domain;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Check if a value matches any of the given glob patterns.\n   */\n  private matchesAnyPattern(value: string, patterns: string[]): boolean {\n    return patterns.some((pattern) => this.matchGlob(value, pattern));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Simple glob pattern matching.\n   * Supports * (matches any characters including / and spaces) and ? (single char).\n   * Uses the same approach as the backend's matchGlobPattern.\n   */\n  private matchGlob(value: string, pattern: string): boolean {\n    // Exact match\n    if (pattern === value) return true;\n\n    // Audit F-A1-13: ReDoS guard. Patterns with too many `*` segments\n    // produce catastrophic-backtracking regexes (e.g. `a*a*a*a*a*a*a*a*b`\n    // against `aaaaaaaa` runs in exponential time). Local policies are\n    // operator-controlled so attacker access requires operator-side\n    // compromise, but a copy-pasted-from-internet example pattern could\n    // still DoS the gateway when matched against request input.\n    const starCount = (pattern.match(/\\*/g) ?? []).length;\n    if (starCount > 8) {\n      return false;\n    }\n\n    // Convert glob to regex\n    const regexStr = pattern\n      .replace(/[.+^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\$&') // Escape special regex chars (except * and ?)\n      .replace(/\\*/g, '.*') // * matches anything\n      .replace(/\\?/g, '.'); // ? matches single char\n\n    try {\n      return new RegExp(`^${regexStr}$`, 'i').test(value);\n    } catch {\n      return false;\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Convenience: find a matching purpose rule.\n */\nexport function findPurposeRule(\n  policy: LocalPolicy,\n  purposeId: string\n): LocalPurposeRule | undefined {\n  return policy.purposes.find((p) => p.id === 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package/dist/{nextjs-BIORS__0.d.ts → nextjs-66R1KW8e.d.ts}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import * as next_server from 'next/server';
 import { NextRequest } from 'next/server';
-import { N as NextJsMiddlewareOptions } from './types-L15pYd2c.js';
+import { N as NextJsMiddlewareOptions } from './types-B3USs-Kx.js';
 
 /**
  * Create Next.js middleware for agent verification.

package/dist/{nextjs-CjzHdaXA.d.mts → nextjs-DSpisQst.d.mts}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import * as next_server from 'next/server';
 import { NextRequest } from 'next/server';
-import { N as NextJsMiddlewareOptions } from './types-L15pYd2c.mjs';
+import { N as NextJsMiddlewareOptions } from './types-B3USs-Kx.mjs';
 
 /**
  * Create Next.js middleware for agent verification.

package/dist/{sdk-Chhz-FcT.d.mts → sdk-5U_CBRpr.d.mts}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { A as AccessLevel, h as TrustLevel, S as SDKOptions, i as VerificationResult } from './types-L15pYd2c.mjs';
+import { A as AccessLevel, h as TrustLevel, S as SDKOptions, i as VerificationResult } from './types-B3USs-Kx.mjs';
 
 /**
  * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway - Access Level Definitions

package/dist/{sdk-CqTEQAc6.d.ts → sdk-Bm8np66n.d.ts}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { A as AccessLevel, h as TrustLevel, S as SDKOptions, i as VerificationResult } from './types-L15pYd2c.js';
+import { A as AccessLevel, h as TrustLevel, S as SDKOptions, i as VerificationResult } from './types-B3USs-Kx.js';
 
 /**
  * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway - Access Level Definitions

package/dist/transport/index.d.mts

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-import '../types-L15pYd2c.mjs';
-export { A as ACPEndpoint, a as ACPPaymentTokenType, b as ACPRequestContext, c as ACPRequestLike, d as ACPSignatureAlgorithm, e as ACPTotal, f as ACPVerifyInput, g as ACPVerifyResult, h as AP2CartMandateClaims, i as AP2ChainResult, j as AP2IntentMandateClaims, k as AP2MandateClaims, l as AP2MandateTriple, m as AP2MandateTripleInput, n as AP2MandateType, o as AP2PaymentDetailsTotal, p as AP2PaymentMandateClaims, q as AP2PaymentMandateForValue, r as AP2VerifyInput, C as CommerceContext, s as CommercePipelineInput, t as CommerceProtocol, u as CommercePurpose, v as CommerceSignatureStack, w as ConstraintEvalResult, x as ConstraintKey, y as ConstraintResult, E as ExtractorRequestLike, I as IdentityBindingResult, z as IdentityClaim, B as IdentityResolver, M as MPPChallengeForValue, D as MPPChallengeSummary, F as MPPCredentialSummary, G as MPPIntent, H as MPPKind, J as MPPReceiptSummary, K as MPPRequestContext, L as MPPRequestLike, N as MPPResponseLike, O as MPPVerifyInput, P as MPPVerifyResult, Q as ParsedRFC9421, R as PaymentMethodAllowlistInput, S as RFC9421SignatureParams, T as RFC9421Tag, U as RFC9421VerifyOptions, V as RFC9421VerifyRequest, W as RFC9421VerifyResult, X as RegistryName, Y as RegistryResolver, Z as ResolveContext, _ as STRIPE_WEBHOOK_INFORMATIONAL_EVENTS, $ as SpendingLimitInput, a0 as StripeWebhookInformationalEvent, a1 as TransactionContext, a2 as TransactionValueContext, a3 as TransportExtractor, a4 as UCPCheckoutContext, a5 as UCPManifestValidationResult, a6 as UCPRequestLike, a7 as UCPTotal, a8 as VIAllowedParty, a9 as VIBudgetLimit, aa as VIClaimsForValue, ab as VIConstraintEvalInput, ac as VIConstraints, ad as VIExecutionMode, ae as VIExtractedClaims, af as VILayer, ag as VILineItem, ah as VIMandateType, ai as VIPaymentAmount, aj as VIRecurrence, ak as VIVerifyInput, al as VIVerifyResult, am as VerifyStripeWebhookOptions, an as VerifyStripeWebhookResult, ao as X402Kind, ap as X402RequestContext, aq as X402RequestForValue, ar as X402RequestLike, as as X402RequirementsSummary, at as X402ResponseLike, au as applyCredentials, av as bindIdentity, aw as claim, ax as clearTransportExtractors, ay as createMastercardRegistry, az as createVisaRegistry, aA as createWebBotAuthRegistry, aB as detectProtocol, aC as evaluatePaymentMethodAllowlist, aD as evaluateSpendingLimit, aE as evaluateVIConstraints, aF as extractA2ACredentials, aG as extractACPContext, aH as extractACPTransactionValue, aI as extractAP2Mandate, aJ as extractAP2Mandates, aK as extractAP2TransactionValue, aL as extractCredentialsFromProtocol, aM as extractHttpCredentials, aN as extractMPPContext, aO as extractMPPFromRequest, aP as extractMPPFromResponse, aQ as extractMPPTransactionValue, aR as extractMcpCredentials, aS as extractUCPContext, aT as extractUCPTransactionValue, aU as extractVIClaims, aV as extractVITransactionValue, aW as extractX402Context, aX as extractX402FromRequest, aY as extractX402FromResponse, aZ as extractX402TransactionValue, a_ as fetchUCPManifest, a$ as getTransportExtractor, b0 as getTransportExtractors, b2 as isStripeWebhookInformational, b3 as mapACPRequestToPurpose, b4 as mapAP2MandateToPurpose, b5 as mapMPPRequestToPurpose, b6 as mapRFC9421TagToPurpose, b7 as mapUCPRequestToPurpose, b8 as mapVIMandateToPurpose, b9 as mapX402RequestToPurpose, ba as parseRFC9421, bb as registerTransportExtractor, bc as runCommercePipeline, bd as runMatchingExtractors, be as setA2AMetadata, bf as setHttpHeaders, bg as setMcpMeta, bh as validateUCPManifest, bi as verifyACPSignature, bj as verifyAP2Chain, bk as verifyMPP, bl as verifyRFC9421, bm as verifyStripeWebhook, bn as verifyVIChain } from '../index-D8IEntil.mjs';
+import '../types-B3USs-Kx.mjs';
+export { A as ACPEndpoint, a as ACPPaymentTokenType, b as ACPRequestContext, c as ACPRequestLike, d as ACPSignatureAlgorithm, e as ACPTotal, f as ACPVerifyInput, g as ACPVerifyResult, h as AP2CartMandateClaims, i as AP2ChainResult, j as AP2IntentMandateClaims, k as AP2MandateClaims, l as AP2MandateTriple, m as AP2MandateTripleInput, n as AP2MandateType, o as AP2PaymentDetailsTotal, p as AP2PaymentMandateClaims, q as AP2PaymentMandateForValue, r as AP2VerifyInput, C as CommerceContext, s as CommercePipelineInput, t as CommerceProtocol, u as CommercePurpose, v as CommerceSignatureStack, w as ConstraintEvalResult, x as ConstraintKey, y as ConstraintResult, E as ExtractorRequestLike, I as IdentityBindingResult, z as IdentityClaim, B as IdentityResolver, M as MPPChallengeForValue, D as MPPChallengeSummary, F as MPPCredentialSummary, G as MPPIntent, H as MPPKind, J as MPPReceiptSummary, K as MPPRequestContext, L as MPPRequestLike, N as MPPResponseLike, O as MPPVerifyInput, P as MPPVerifyResult, Q as ParsedRFC9421, R as PaymentMethodAllowlistInput, S as RFC9421SignatureParams, T as RFC9421Tag, U as RFC9421VerifyOptions, V as RFC9421VerifyRequest, W as RFC9421VerifyResult, X as RegistryName, Y as RegistryResolver, Z as ResolveContext, _ as STRIPE_WEBHOOK_INFORMATIONAL_EVENTS, $ as SpendingLimitInput, a0 as StripeWebhookInformationalEvent, a1 as TransactionContext, a2 as TransactionValueContext, a3 as TransportExtractor, a4 as UCPCheckoutContext, a5 as UCPManifestValidationResult, a6 as UCPRequestLike, a7 as UCPTotal, a8 as VIAllowedParty, a9 as VIBudgetLimit, aa as VIClaimsForValue, ab as VIConstraintEvalInput, ac as VIConstraints, ad as VIExecutionMode, ae as VIExtractedClaims, af as VILayer, ag as VILineItem, ah as VIMandateType, ai as VIPaymentAmount, aj as VIRecurrence, ak as VIVerifyInput, al as VIVerifyResult, am as VerifyStripeWebhookOptions, an as VerifyStripeWebhookResult, ao as X402Kind, ap as X402RequestContext, aq as X402RequestForValue, ar as X402RequestLike, as as X402RequirementsSummary, at as X402ResponseLike, au as applyCredentials, av as bindIdentity, aw as claim, ax as clearTransportExtractors, ay as createMastercardRegistry, az as createVisaRegistry, aA as createWebBotAuthRegistry, aB as detectProtocol, aC as evaluatePaymentMethodAllowlist, aD as evaluateSpendingLimit, aE as evaluateVIConstraints, aF as extractA2ACredentials, aG as extractACPContext, aH as extractACPTransactionValue, aI as extractAP2Mandate, aJ as extractAP2Mandates, aK as extractAP2TransactionValue, aL as extractCredentialsFromProtocol, aM as extractHttpCredentials, aN as extractMPPContext, aO as extractMPPFromRequest, aP as extractMPPFromResponse, aQ as extractMPPTransactionValue, aR as extractMcpCredentials, aS as extractUCPContext, aT as extractUCPTransactionValue, aU as extractVIClaims, aV as extractVITransactionValue, aW as extractX402Context, aX as extractX402FromRequest, aY as extractX402FromResponse, aZ as extractX402TransactionValue, a_ as fetchUCPManifest, a$ as getTransportExtractor, b0 as getTransportExtractors, b2 as isStripeWebhookInformational, b3 as mapACPRequestToPurpose, b4 as mapAP2MandateToPurpose, b5 as mapMPPRequestToPurpose, b6 as mapRFC9421TagToPurpose, b7 as mapUCPRequestToPurpose, b8 as mapVIMandateToPurpose, b9 as mapX402RequestToPurpose, ba as parseRFC9421, bb as registerTransportExtractor, bc as runCommercePipeline, bd as runMatchingExtractors, be as setA2AMetadata, bf as setHttpHeaders, bg as setMcpMeta, bh as validateUCPManifest, bi as verifyACPSignature, bj as verifyAP2Chain, bk as verifyMPP, bl as verifyRFC9421, bm as verifyStripeWebhook, bn as verifyVIChain } from '../index-CEg_WG6y.mjs';
 import 'jose';

package/dist/transport/index.d.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-import '../types-L15pYd2c.js';
-export { A as ACPEndpoint, a as ACPPaymentTokenType, b as ACPRequestContext, c as ACPRequestLike, d as ACPSignatureAlgorithm, e as ACPTotal, f as ACPVerifyInput, g as ACPVerifyResult, h as AP2CartMandateClaims, i as AP2ChainResult, j as AP2IntentMandateClaims, k as AP2MandateClaims, l as AP2MandateTriple, m as AP2MandateTripleInput, n as AP2MandateType, o as AP2PaymentDetailsTotal, p as AP2PaymentMandateClaims, q as AP2PaymentMandateForValue, r as AP2VerifyInput, C as CommerceContext, s as CommercePipelineInput, t as CommerceProtocol, u as CommercePurpose, v as CommerceSignatureStack, w as ConstraintEvalResult, x as ConstraintKey, y as ConstraintResult, E as ExtractorRequestLike, I as IdentityBindingResult, z as IdentityClaim, B as IdentityResolver, M as MPPChallengeForValue, D as MPPChallengeSummary, F as MPPCredentialSummary, G as MPPIntent, H as MPPKind, J as MPPReceiptSummary, K as MPPRequestContext, L as MPPRequestLike, N as MPPResponseLike, O as MPPVerifyInput, P as MPPVerifyResult, Q as ParsedRFC9421, R as PaymentMethodAllowlistInput, S as RFC9421SignatureParams, T as RFC9421Tag, U as RFC9421VerifyOptions, V as RFC9421VerifyRequest, W as RFC9421VerifyResult, X as RegistryName, Y as RegistryResolver, Z as ResolveContext, _ as STRIPE_WEBHOOK_INFORMATIONAL_EVENTS, $ as SpendingLimitInput, a0 as StripeWebhookInformationalEvent, a1 as TransactionContext, a2 as TransactionValueContext, a3 as TransportExtractor, a4 as UCPCheckoutContext, a5 as UCPManifestValidationResult, a6 as UCPRequestLike, a7 as UCPTotal, a8 as VIAllowedParty, a9 as VIBudgetLimit, aa as VIClaimsForValue, ab as VIConstraintEvalInput, ac as VIConstraints, ad as VIExecutionMode, ae as VIExtractedClaims, af as VILayer, ag as VILineItem, ah as VIMandateType, ai as VIPaymentAmount, aj as VIRecurrence, ak as VIVerifyInput, al as VIVerifyResult, am as VerifyStripeWebhookOptions, an as VerifyStripeWebhookResult, ao as X402Kind, ap as X402RequestContext, aq as X402RequestForValue, ar as X402RequestLike, as as X402RequirementsSummary, at as X402ResponseLike, au as applyCredentials, av as bindIdentity, aw as claim, ax as clearTransportExtractors, ay as createMastercardRegistry, az as createVisaRegistry, aA as createWebBotAuthRegistry, aB as detectProtocol, aC as evaluatePaymentMethodAllowlist, aD as evaluateSpendingLimit, aE as evaluateVIConstraints, aF as extractA2ACredentials, aG as extractACPContext, aH as extractACPTransactionValue, aI as extractAP2Mandate, aJ as extractAP2Mandates, aK as extractAP2TransactionValue, aL as extractCredentialsFromProtocol, aM as extractHttpCredentials, aN as extractMPPContext, aO as extractMPPFromRequest, aP as extractMPPFromResponse, aQ as extractMPPTransactionValue, aR as extractMcpCredentials, aS as extractUCPContext, aT as extractUCPTransactionValue, aU as extractVIClaims, aV as extractVITransactionValue, aW as extractX402Context, aX as extractX402FromRequest, aY as extractX402FromResponse, aZ as extractX402TransactionValue, a_ as fetchUCPManifest, a$ as getTransportExtractor, b0 as getTransportExtractors, b2 as isStripeWebhookInformational, b3 as mapACPRequestToPurpose, b4 as mapAP2MandateToPurpose, b5 as mapMPPRequestToPurpose, b6 as mapRFC9421TagToPurpose, b7 as mapUCPRequestToPurpose, b8 as mapVIMandateToPurpose, b9 as mapX402RequestToPurpose, ba as parseRFC9421, bb as registerTransportExtractor, bc as runCommercePipeline, bd as runMatchingExtractors, be as setA2AMetadata, bf as setHttpHeaders, bg as setMcpMeta, bh as validateUCPManifest, bi as verifyACPSignature, bj as verifyAP2Chain, bk as verifyMPP, bl as verifyRFC9421, bm as verifyStripeWebhook, bn as verifyVIChain } from '../index-CzJMCgEy.js';
+import '../types-B3USs-Kx.js';
+export { A as ACPEndpoint, a as ACPPaymentTokenType, b as ACPRequestContext, c as ACPRequestLike, d as ACPSignatureAlgorithm, e as ACPTotal, f as ACPVerifyInput, g as ACPVerifyResult, h as AP2CartMandateClaims, i as AP2ChainResult, j as AP2IntentMandateClaims, k as AP2MandateClaims, l as AP2MandateTriple, m as AP2MandateTripleInput, n as AP2MandateType, o as AP2PaymentDetailsTotal, p as AP2PaymentMandateClaims, q as AP2PaymentMandateForValue, r as AP2VerifyInput, C as CommerceContext, s as CommercePipelineInput, t as CommerceProtocol, u as CommercePurpose, v as CommerceSignatureStack, w as ConstraintEvalResult, x as ConstraintKey, y as ConstraintResult, E as ExtractorRequestLike, I as IdentityBindingResult, z as IdentityClaim, B as IdentityResolver, M as MPPChallengeForValue, D as MPPChallengeSummary, F as MPPCredentialSummary, G as MPPIntent, H as MPPKind, J as MPPReceiptSummary, K as MPPRequestContext, L as MPPRequestLike, N as MPPResponseLike, O as MPPVerifyInput, P as MPPVerifyResult, Q as ParsedRFC9421, R as PaymentMethodAllowlistInput, S as RFC9421SignatureParams, T as RFC9421Tag, U as RFC9421VerifyOptions, V as RFC9421VerifyRequest, W as RFC9421VerifyResult, X as RegistryName, Y as RegistryResolver, Z as ResolveContext, _ as STRIPE_WEBHOOK_INFORMATIONAL_EVENTS, $ as SpendingLimitInput, a0 as StripeWebhookInformationalEvent, a1 as TransactionContext, a2 as TransactionValueContext, a3 as TransportExtractor, a4 as UCPCheckoutContext, a5 as UCPManifestValidationResult, a6 as UCPRequestLike, a7 as UCPTotal, a8 as VIAllowedParty, a9 as VIBudgetLimit, aa as VIClaimsForValue, ab as VIConstraintEvalInput, ac as VIConstraints, ad as VIExecutionMode, ae as VIExtractedClaims, af as VILayer, ag as VILineItem, ah as VIMandateType, ai as VIPaymentAmount, aj as VIRecurrence, ak as VIVerifyInput, al as VIVerifyResult, am as VerifyStripeWebhookOptions, an as VerifyStripeWebhookResult, ao as X402Kind, ap as X402RequestContext, aq as X402RequestForValue, ar as X402RequestLike, as as X402RequirementsSummary, at as X402ResponseLike, au as applyCredentials, av as bindIdentity, aw as claim, ax as clearTransportExtractors, ay as createMastercardRegistry, az as createVisaRegistry, aA as createWebBotAuthRegistry, aB as detectProtocol, aC as evaluatePaymentMethodAllowlist, aD as evaluateSpendingLimit, aE as evaluateVIConstraints, aF as extractA2ACredentials, aG as extractACPContext, aH as extractACPTransactionValue, aI as extractAP2Mandate, aJ as extractAP2Mandates, aK as extractAP2TransactionValue, aL as extractCredentialsFromProtocol, aM as extractHttpCredentials, aN as extractMPPContext, aO as extractMPPFromRequest, aP as extractMPPFromResponse, aQ as extractMPPTransactionValue, aR as extractMcpCredentials, aS as extractUCPContext, aT as extractUCPTransactionValue, aU as extractVIClaims, aV as extractVITransactionValue, aW as extractX402Context, aX as extractX402FromRequest, aY as extractX402FromResponse, aZ as extractX402TransactionValue, a_ as fetchUCPManifest, a$ as getTransportExtractor, b0 as getTransportExtractors, b2 as isStripeWebhookInformational, b3 as mapACPRequestToPurpose, b4 as mapAP2MandateToPurpose, b5 as mapMPPRequestToPurpose, b6 as mapRFC9421TagToPurpose, b7 as mapUCPRequestToPurpose, b8 as mapVIMandateToPurpose, b9 as mapX402RequestToPurpose, ba as parseRFC9421, bb as registerTransportExtractor, bc as runCommercePipeline, bd as runMatchingExtractors, be as setA2AMetadata, bf as setHttpHeaders, bg as setMcpMeta, bh as validateUCPManifest, bi as verifyACPSignature, bj as verifyAP2Chain, bk as verifyMPP, bl as verifyRFC9421, bm as verifyStripeWebhook, bn as verifyVIChain } from '../index-CCdZxvAr.js';
 import 'jose';