@astrasyncai/verification-gateway 2.4.11 → 2.4.12

package/dist/adapters/express.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/access-levels.ts","../../src/version.ts","../../src/verify.ts","../../src/transport/http.ts","../../src/pdlss-pre-check.ts","../../src/adapters/express.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway - Access Level Definitions\n *\n * Defines the hierarchy and capabilities of each access level.\n *\n * v2.3.9 (defect #30): renamed `'guidance'` band → `'restricted'`. See\n * `types.ts` AccessLevel for the rationale (value-name collision with the\n * `guidance: {...}` help-payload object on VerificationResult).\n */\n\nimport type { AccessLevel, TrustLevel } from './types';\n\n/**\n * Access level hierarchy (higher number = more access)\n */\nexport const ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY: Record<AccessLevel, number> = {\n  none: 0,\n  restricted: 1,\n  'read-only': 2,\n  standard: 3,\n  full: 4,\n  internal: 5,\n};\n\n/**\n * Access level descriptions for UI\n */\nexport const ACCESS_LEVEL_DESCRIPTIONS: Record<AccessLevel, string> = {\n  none: 'No access - credentials required',\n  restricted: 'Restricted access - registration prompt only',\n  'read-only': 'Read-only access - can browse but not modify',\n  standard: 'Standard access - normal operations per PDLSS policy',\n  full: 'Full access - all operations for high-trust agents',\n  internal: 'Internal access - organization member privileges',\n};\n\n/**\n * Default trust score thresholds for access levels\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_TRUST_THRESHOLDS: Record<AccessLevel, number> = {\n  none: 0,\n  restricted: 0,\n  'read-only': 20,\n  standard: 40,\n  full: 70,\n  internal: 0, // Internal is based on org membership, not score\n};\n\n/**\n * Trust level score ranges\n */\nexport const TRUST_LEVEL_RANGES: Record<TrustLevel, { min: number; max: number }> = {\n  BRONZE: { min: 0, max: 39 },\n  SILVER: { min: 40, max: 59 },\n  GOLD: { min: 60, max: 79 },\n  PLATINUM: { min: 80, max: 100 },\n};\n\n/**\n * Determine trust level from score\n */\nexport function getTrustLevel(score: number): TrustLevel {\n  if (score >= 80) return 'PLATINUM';\n  if (score >= 60) return 'GOLD';\n  if (score >= 40) return 'SILVER';\n  return 'BRONZE';\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if access level A is greater than or equal to access level B\n */\nexport function hasMinimumAccess(actual: AccessLevel, required: AccessLevel): boolean {\n  return ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY[actual] >= ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY[required];\n}\n\n/**\n * Get the highest access level for a given trust score\n */\nexport function getAccessLevelForScore(\n  trustScore: number,\n  thresholds: Record<AccessLevel, number> = DEFAULT_TRUST_THRESHOLDS\n): AccessLevel {\n  if (trustScore >= thresholds.full) return 'full';\n  if (trustScore >= thresholds.standard) return 'standard';\n  if (trustScore >= thresholds['read-only']) return 'read-only';\n  return 'restricted';\n}\n\n/**\n * Determine access level from verification result.\n *\n * v2.3.9 (defect #30): unverified callers now return `'none'` (was\n * `'guidance'`). Denials grant zero — never a positive band.\n */\nexport function determineAccessLevel(\n  verified: boolean,\n  trustScore: number,\n  isOrgMember: boolean,\n  customThresholds?: Partial<Record<AccessLevel, number>>\n): AccessLevel {\n  if (!verified) {\n    return 'none';\n  }\n\n  if (isOrgMember) {\n    return 'internal';\n  }\n\n  const thresholds = {\n    ...DEFAULT_TRUST_THRESHOLDS,\n    ...customThresholds,\n  };\n\n  return getAccessLevelForScore(trustScore, thresholds);\n}\n\n/**\n * Access capabilities per level\n */\nexport interface AccessCapabilities {\n  canRead: boolean;\n  canWrite: boolean;\n  canDelete: boolean;\n  canAdmin: boolean;\n  canAccessInternal: boolean;\n  maxTransactionValue?: number;\n  allowedPurposes?: string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Get capabilities for an access level\n */\nexport function getCapabilities(accessLevel: AccessLevel): AccessCapabilities {\n  switch (accessLevel) {\n    case 'none':\n      return {\n        canRead: false,\n        canWrite: false,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'restricted':\n      return {\n        canRead: false,\n        canWrite: false,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'read-only':\n      return {\n        canRead: true,\n        canWrite: false,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'standard':\n      return {\n        canRead: true,\n        canWrite: true,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'full':\n      return {\n        canRead: true,\n        canWrite: true,\n        canDelete: true,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'internal':\n      return {\n        canRead: true,\n        canWrite: true,\n        canDelete: true,\n        canAdmin: true,\n        canAccessInternal: true,\n      };\n    default:\n      return {\n        canRead: false,\n        canWrite: false,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Round-13 (F14 closure / R13-7): single source-of-truth for the SDK's\n * package version emitted on verify-access bodies (and any future\n * telemetry). Bumped alongside `package.json#version` on every release.\n *\n * Why a constant rather than `import pkg from '../package.json'`:\n * - `tsconfig.json` sets `rootDir: ./src`; importing the sibling\n *   package.json fails the build with \"outside rootDir\".\n * - Build-time string replacement (tsup `define`, esbuild banner, etc.)\n *   adds toolchain coupling for a trivial gain.\n * - Embedded readonly constant works in every environment (Node, browser,\n *   bundlers, Deno) without runtime fs / network access.\n *\n * Release discipline: a CI lint can grep `package.json#version` against\n * this constant if the two ever diverge in the wild. Round-13 manual bump\n * is fine — bumping both in the release-ceremony commit keeps them\n * lockstep.\n */\nexport const SDK_VERSION = '2.4.11';\n","/**\n * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway - Core Verification Logic\n *\n * This module handles the core verification logic, calling the AstraSync API\n * and processing the response into a standardized VerificationResult.\n */\n\nimport type {\n  GatewayConfig,\n  AgentCredentials,\n  VerificationRequest,\n  VerificationResult,\n  VerifiedAgent,\n  VerifiedDeveloper,\n  VerifiedOrganization,\n  GuidanceInfo,\n  AccessLevel,\n  EnhancedVerificationResult,\n  TokenGuidance,\n  RuntimeChallengeResult,\n} from './types';\nimport { getTrustLevel, ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY } from './access-levels';\nimport { SDK_VERSION } from './version';\n\n/**\n * Default configuration values\n *\n * apiBaseUrl matches the OpenAPI authoritative server (https://astrasync.ai/api\n * for prod, https://staging.astrasync.ai/api for staging). Always include the\n * /api path prefix when overriding — registration / docs URLs are derived by\n * stripping it.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_CONFIG: Partial<GatewayConfig> = {\n  apiBaseUrl: 'https://astrasync.ai/api',\n  // v2.3.9 (defect #30): default for unconfigured callers is `'none'` (no\n  // access). Pre-rename this defaulted to `'guidance'`, which combined with\n  // a route gated at `'guidance'` to silently let unverified traffic\n  // through (`hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance') === true`).\n  defaultAccessLevel: 'none',\n  // minTrustScore + minTrustScoreForFull deprecated in v2.3.0 — server decides.\n  // Round-18.5 F4: cacheTtl deliberately unset. When undefined, cacheResult\n  // applies the split default (60s autonomous / 300s step-up). When the\n  // caller sets cacheTtl explicitly, that value is honoured uniformly.\n  // Set cacheTtl: 0 to disable caching entirely.\n  debug: false,\n};\n\n/**\n * Init self-test state. Fires once per process on first verify() call to warn\n * if apiBaseUrl is pointing at the wrong host (e.g. a marketing site that\n * 200s with text/html instead of the API).\n */\nlet initCheckPerformed = false;\n\n/** One-shot guard for v2.3.0 deprecation warning. */\nlet deprecationWarningShown = false;\n\nasync function performInitCheck(apiBaseUrl: string, debug?: boolean): Promise<void> {\n  initCheckPerformed = true;\n  try {\n    const probeUrl = `${apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access`;\n    // HEAD mirrors GET semantics (running the full request pipeline without a\n    // body) so the response carries the same content-type the marketing 404\n    // would return. OPTIONS often gets short-circuited by CORS-preflight\n    // handlers and returns no content-type, defeating the check.\n    const response = await fetch(probeUrl, { method: 'HEAD' });\n    const contentType = response.headers.get('content-type') ?? '';\n    if (contentType.startsWith('text/html')) {\n      console.warn(\n        `[VerificationGateway] apiBaseUrl '${apiBaseUrl}' returned HTML (content-type: ${contentType}). ` +\n          `This usually means apiBaseUrl is pointing at a marketing site instead of the API. ` +\n          `Expected: 'https://astrasync.ai/api' (prod) or 'https://staging.astrasync.ai/api' (staging). ` +\n          `Set disableInitChecks: true on GatewayConfig to silence this warning.`\n      );\n    } else if (debug) {\n      console.log(\n        `[VerificationGateway] init check passed for ${apiBaseUrl} (content-type: ${contentType})`\n      );\n    }\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (debug) {\n      console.log(`[VerificationGateway] init check failed (non-blocking): ${String(err)}`);\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Simple in-memory cache for verification results\n */\nconst verificationCache = new Map<string, { result: VerificationResult; expiresAt: number }>();\n\n/**\n * Generate cache key from the full request shape.\n *\n * Round-18.5 F4: pre-fix the key was credentials-only (`astraId-apiKey-jwt`),\n * which silently returned the cached result of a prior call even when the\n * subsequent call's purpose/action/counterparty/etc. differed. That was a\n * security gap — a warm cache could serve an allow verdict for a purpose the\n * agent hadn't actually been authorised for. Key now includes every field\n * that affects the backend verdict.\n *\n * MAINTAIN: when adding a field to VerificationRequest that affects the\n * backend verdict, add it to this key. Fields that don't affect verdict\n * (e.g. requestId, timestamps, sdkVersion) don't belong here — including\n * them would needlessly thrash the cache for repeated identical requests.\n */\nfunction getCacheKey(request: VerificationRequest): string {\n  const c = request.credentials;\n  return [\n    c.astraId || '',\n    c.apiKey || '',\n    c.jwt || '',\n    request.purpose || '',\n    request.action || '',\n    request.resourceType || '',\n    request.resource || '',\n    request.jurisdiction || '',\n    request.transactionValue ?? '',\n    request.currency || '',\n    request.counterpartyUrl || '',\n    request.counterpartyType || '',\n    request.isSubAgentRequest ? '1' : '0',\n    request.parentAgentId || '',\n    request.subAgentDepth ?? '',\n  ].join('|');\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if cached result is still valid\n */\nfunction getCachedResult(request: VerificationRequest): VerificationResult | null {\n  const key = getCacheKey(request);\n  const cached = verificationCache.get(key);\n\n  if (cached && cached.expiresAt > Date.now()) {\n    return cached.result;\n  }\n\n  if (cached) {\n    verificationCache.delete(key);\n  }\n\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Cache a verification result.\n *\n * Round-18.5 F4: TTL splits by step-up status when the caller hasn't pinned\n * `configuredTtl` explicitly. Autonomous verdicts cache for 60s (faster\n * policy-update propagation, better security posture); step-up verdicts cache\n * for 300s (matches human-paced approval cycles, prevents thrashing during\n * the user-action window). When `configuredTtl` is set (truthy positive\n * number), it's honoured uniformly for back-compat with partners pinning a\n * specific TTL today.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_AUTONOMOUS_TTL_SECONDS = 60;\nconst DEFAULT_STEP_UP_TTL_SECONDS = 300;\n\nfunction cacheResult(\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  result: VerificationResult,\n  configuredTtl: number | undefined\n): void {\n  const ttlSeconds =\n    configuredTtl && configuredTtl > 0\n      ? configuredTtl\n      : result.requiresStepUp\n        ? DEFAULT_STEP_UP_TTL_SECONDS\n        : DEFAULT_AUTONOMOUS_TTL_SECONDS;\n  const key = getCacheKey(request);\n  verificationCache.set(key, {\n    result,\n    expiresAt: Date.now() + ttlSeconds * 1000,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Clear the verification cache\n */\nexport function clearCache(): void {\n  verificationCache.clear();\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract agent credentials from various sources\n */\nexport function extractCredentials(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  query?: Record<string, string | undefined>\n): AgentCredentials {\n  const credentials: AgentCredentials = {};\n\n  // Check for ASTRA-ID in headers (case-insensitive). Accepts the historical\n  // X-Astra-Id name plus the X-Astra-AgentId / x-astra-agent-id alias the\n  // partner asked for in #9a — both surface the same field.\n  const astraIdHeader =\n    headers['x-astra-id'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-Id'] ||\n    headers['X-ASTRA-ID'] ||\n    headers['x-astra-agentid'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-AgentId'] ||\n    headers['x-astra-agent-id'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-Agent-Id'] ||\n    headers['X-ASTRA-AGENT-ID'];\n  if (astraIdHeader) {\n    credentials.astraId = Array.isArray(astraIdHeader) ? astraIdHeader[0] : astraIdHeader;\n  }\n\n  // Check for API key in headers\n  const apiKeyHeader = headers['x-api-key'] || headers['X-Api-Key'] || headers['X-API-KEY'];\n  if (apiKeyHeader) {\n    credentials.apiKey = Array.isArray(apiKeyHeader) ? apiKeyHeader[0] : apiKeyHeader;\n  }\n\n  // Check Authorization header for Bearer token\n  const authHeader = headers['authorization'] || headers['Authorization'];\n  if (authHeader) {\n    const authValue = Array.isArray(authHeader) ? authHeader[0] : authHeader;\n    credentials.authorizationHeader = authValue;\n\n    if (authValue.startsWith('Bearer ')) {\n      credentials.jwt = authValue.slice(7);\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Check query parameters as fallback\n  if (query) {\n    if (query.astraId && !credentials.astraId) {\n      credentials.astraId = query.astraId;\n    }\n    if (query.apiKey && !credentials.apiKey) {\n      credentials.apiKey = query.apiKey;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return credentials;\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if credentials are present\n */\nexport function hasCredentials(credentials: AgentCredentials): boolean {\n  return !!(credentials.astraId || credentials.apiKey || credentials.jwt);\n}\n\n/**\n * Source of a synthesised guidance response. Round-10 split — the\n * `'no_credentials'` shape is the original (caller has no AstraSync\n * credentials, suggest registration). The `'api_error'` shape is for when\n * the verify-access HTTP call itself failed (5xx, network, etc.) — DON'T\n * tell a verified-but-currently-blocked partner to \"register your agent\".\n */\ntype GuidanceSource = 'no_credentials' | 'api_error';\n\n/**\n * Create guidance response for unverified agents or for API-error fallback.\n *\n * Round-10 (#47, O5): split source so the `register your agent` template\n * doesn't fire on transient backend failures. Also threads `correlationId`\n * through so adapter `onDenied` handlers can surface it on the merchant's\n * response body for log correlation.\n */\nfunction createGuidanceResponse(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  reason?: string,\n  options: { source?: GuidanceSource; correlationId?: string } = {}\n): VerificationResult {\n  const source = options.source ?? 'no_credentials';\n  const isApiError = source === 'api_error';\n\n  const guidance: GuidanceInfo = isApiError\n    ? {\n        message:\n          'Verification is temporarily unavailable. Retry with exponential backoff; if the issue persists, contact support with the correlationId.',\n        registrationUrl: `${config.apiBaseUrl.replace('/api', '')}/register`,\n        documentationUrl: `${config.apiBaseUrl.replace('/api', '')}/docs/agent-access`,\n        steps: [\n          'Retry the request with exponential backoff',\n          'If failures persist, share the correlationId with support',\n        ],\n      }\n    : {\n        message:\n          'This service verifies AI agents before granting access. Please register your agent with AstraSync.',\n        registrationUrl: `${config.apiBaseUrl.replace('/api', '')}/register`,\n        documentationUrl: `${config.apiBaseUrl.replace('/api', '')}/docs/agent-access`,\n        steps: [\n          'Register for an AstraSync account',\n          'Create and register your agent',\n          'Add your ASTRA-ID to request headers',\n          'Retry your request',\n        ],\n      };\n\n  return {\n    // Round-18 G4: createGuidanceResponse fires for unverified-agent path or\n    // API-error fallback. Identity is not verified (no agent resolved);\n    // policy is not evaluated (we never reached the gate).\n    identityVerified: false,\n    policyAllowed: false,\n    // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denials grant `'none'`, NEVER a positive band.\n    // Adapters additionally short-circuit on `!identityVerified ||\n    // !policyAllowed` before the gate check, but the access level still has\n    // to be honest at the data layer so downstream consumers (SDK adapters\n    // in other languages, custom integrations) inherit the correct\n    // semantics.\n    accessLevel: 'none',\n    guidance,\n    denialReasons: reason ? [reason] : ['No valid agent credentials provided'],\n    // Round-10 (#47, O5): on API-error fallback, surface a typed failure so\n    // partners (and their custom onDenied handlers) can branch on\n    // dimension. Without this, the synthesised stub was indistinguishable\n    // from a real policy deny.\n    failures: isApiError\n      ? [\n          {\n            dimension: 'verify_access.api_error',\n            message: reason ?? 'Verification temporarily unavailable',\n            guidance: guidance.message,\n          },\n        ]\n      : undefined,\n    correlationId: options.correlationId,\n    verifiedAt: new Date(),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Call the AstraSync verify-access API\n */\nasync function callVerifyAccessAPI(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest\n): Promise<{\n  success: boolean;\n  access?: {\n    allowed: boolean;\n    /**\n     * Server-decided access level. Read verbatim — do NOT remap client-side.\n     * The server resolves this from endpoint policy + agent trust score using\n     * the canonical thresholds (see backend `apps/backend/src/utils/access-levels.ts`).\n     */\n    accessLevel?: AccessLevel;\n    reason?: string;\n    /**\n     * Aggregated denial failures (v2.9.8+). Empty / absent when allowed.\n     * Each entry is `{ dimension, message, guidance? }` — see\n     * `AccessFailure` for the contract.\n     */\n    failures?: Array<{ dimension: string; message: string; guidance?: string }>;\n    requiresStepUp?: boolean;\n    requiresApproval?: boolean;\n    appliedPolicy?: {\n      boundaryName: string;\n      policyVersion: string;\n    };\n    counterparty?: {\n      id: string;\n      name: string;\n      trustScoreRequirement: number;\n    };\n  };\n  agent?: {\n    kyaAgentId: string;\n    astraId: string;\n    name: string;\n    trustScore: number;\n    trustLevel: string;\n    agentStatus: string;\n    blockchainStatus: string;\n  };\n  developer?: {\n    kyaOwnerId: string;\n    fullName: string;\n    email: string;\n    identityVerified: boolean;\n    trustScore: number;\n  };\n  organization?: {\n    name: string;\n    verified: boolean;\n    trustScore: number;\n  };\n  /**\n   * Structured explanation of the verification decision. Tells the merchant\n   * WHY (id verified? challenge passed? request within PDLSS? trust score?)\n   * without exposing thresholds, scope lists, or other-tenant counterparty\n   * membership. Empty `attestations` unless the endpoint's access policy\n   * declared `required_attestations`.\n   */\n  verificationContext?: {\n    idVerified: boolean;\n    runtimeChallenge: {\n      status: 'passed' | 'skipped' | 'failed' | 'timeout' | 'not_supported';\n      checkedAt: string | null;\n    };\n    pdlssCheck: {\n      result: 'within' | 'exceeded' | 'denied' | 'not_evaluated';\n      purpose: 'approved' | 'denied';\n      scope: 'approved' | 'denied';\n    };\n    dynamicTrustScore: number;\n    attestations: Array<{\n      type: string;\n      status: 'passed' | 'failed';\n      validUntil?: string;\n      proofType: 'reference' | 'zkp';\n      proof: string;\n    }>;\n  };\n  error?: string;\n  /**\n   * Round-10 (#47, O5): when the verify-access server response carries a\n   * correlationId on an error envelope, propagate it so the SDK can thread\n   * it through createGuidanceResponse → adapter onDenied → merchant body.\n   */\n  correlationId?: string;\n}> {\n  const { credentials, ...requestData } = request;\n\n  // Build the request body. agentId is omitted when not provided so the\n  // server treats it as an anonymous canonical-flow call (Branch A/B/C).\n  const body: Record<string, unknown> = {\n    ...(credentials.astraId && { agentId: credentials.astraId }),\n    purpose: requestData.purpose || 'general',\n  };\n\n  // Add optional fields\n  if (requestData.action) body.action = requestData.action;\n  if (requestData.resourceType) body.resourceType = requestData.resourceType;\n  if (requestData.resource) body.resource = requestData.resource;\n  if (requestData.jurisdiction) body.jurisdiction = requestData.jurisdiction;\n  if (requestData.transactionValue) body.transactionValue = requestData.transactionValue;\n  if (requestData.currency) body.currency = requestData.currency;\n  if (requestData.isSubAgentRequest) body.isSubAgentRequest = requestData.isSubAgentRequest;\n  if (requestData.parentAgentId) body.parentAgentId = requestData.parentAgentId;\n  if (requestData.subAgentDepth !== undefined) body.subAgentDepth = requestData.subAgentDepth;\n  // Handshake Protocol v10 additions\n  if (requestData.enableRuntimeChallenge)\n    body.enableRuntimeChallenge = requestData.enableRuntimeChallenge;\n  if (requestData.createSession) body.createSession = requestData.createSession;\n  if (requestData.durationRequired) body.durationRequired = requestData.durationRequired;\n  if (requestData.counterpartyType) body.counterpartyType = requestData.counterpartyType;\n  if (requestData.counterpartyUrl) body.counterpartyUrl = requestData.counterpartyUrl;\n  if (config.counterpartyId) body.counterpartyId = config.counterpartyId;\n  if (requestData.runtimeChallengeOptions)\n    body.runtimeChallengeOptions = requestData.runtimeChallengeOptions;\n  // Round-12 (F19): transport-vs-intent separation. MCP middleware sets\n  // this to 'mcp'; non-MCP callers leave it unset.\n  if (requestData.invocationProtocol) body.invocationProtocol = requestData.invocationProtocol;\n\n  // Round-13 (F14 closure / R13-7): emit the SDK package version on every\n  // verify-access body so the backend can auto-populate `kya_counterparty.\n  // sdk_version` for the calling endpoint. Body field (not User-Agent\n  // header) is the canonical channel — works in Node, browser, behind\n  // Cloudflare, and across SDK bundlers without environment-specific\n  // header gymnastics. Backend's `validation.ts:verifyAccessSchema`\n  // accepts the semver regex; the auto-pop logic is forward-only.\n  body.sdkVersion = SDK_VERSION;\n\n  // Forward caller metadata when present. Merges the legacy top-level\n  // clientIp/userAgent into the nested block for backward compatibility.\n  if (requestData.callerMetadata || requestData.clientIp || requestData.userAgent) {\n    const meta = {\n      ...(requestData.clientIp && { sourceIp: requestData.clientIp }),\n      ...(requestData.userAgent && { userAgent: requestData.userAgent }),\n      ...requestData.callerMetadata,\n    };\n    if (Object.keys(meta).length > 0) body.callerMetadata = meta;\n  }\n\n  // Build headers\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n    'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n    ...config.customHeaders,\n  };\n\n  // verify-access requires authentication. The backend's authenticate middleware\n  // accepts either a JWT or an API key (starts with kya_) via `Authorization: Bearer <token>`.\n  // Credential-supplied auth header (e.g. the agent's own token) takes priority.\n  if (credentials.authorizationHeader) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = credentials.authorizationHeader;\n  } else if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n  }\n  // Legacy header kept for compatibility with any middleware that reads it directly.\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  try {\n    const response = await fetch(`${config.apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access`, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers,\n      body: JSON.stringify(body),\n    });\n\n    const data = await response.json();\n\n    // v2.3.8 (defect #29): treat 410 Gone as a deterministic deactivated-endpoint\n    // signal. Older SDKs may treat any non-2xx as transient and retry; v2.3.8+\n    // surfaces it as a structured denial with `reason: 'endpoint_deactivated'`\n    // so callers can distinguish \"endpoint gone\" from \"endpoint denied this\".\n    if (response.status === 410) {\n      return {\n        success: true,\n        access: {\n          allowed: false,\n          accessLevel: 'none',\n          reason: 'endpoint_deactivated',\n          failures: [\n            {\n              dimension: 'endpoint.deactivated',\n              message:\n                typeof data?.message === 'string' ? data.message : 'Endpoint has been deactivated',\n              guidance:\n                typeof data?.guidance === 'string'\n                  ? data.guidance\n                  : 'Reactivate via POST /api/endpoints/{id}/reactivate, or update the URL on the calling agent.',\n            },\n          ],\n        },\n      };\n    }\n\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      // Round-10 (#47, O5): propagate correlationId on the error path too if\n      // the server happened to include one (some 5xx error envelopes carry\n      // it). Lets the SDK pass it through to the adapter onDenied handler.\n      return {\n        success: false,\n        error: data.message || data.error || `API returned ${response.status}`,\n        correlationId: typeof data?.correlationId === 'string' ? data.correlationId : undefined,\n      };\n    }\n\n    return data;\n  } catch (error) {\n    const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error';\n    return {\n      success: false,\n      error: `Failed to call verify-access API: ${message}`,\n    };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Main verification function\n */\nexport async function verify(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest\n): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n  const mergedConfig = { ...DEFAULT_CONFIG, ...config };\n\n  // One-time init self-test — fire-and-forget, never blocks verify().\n  if (!initCheckPerformed && !mergedConfig.disableInitChecks && mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl) {\n    void performInitCheck(mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl, mergedConfig.debug);\n  }\n\n  // Deprecation warning for v2.3.0 removed config fields. Fires once per process.\n  if (\n    !deprecationWarningShown &&\n    (config.minTrustScore !== undefined || config.minTrustScoreForFull !== undefined)\n  ) {\n    deprecationWarningShown = true;\n    console.warn(\n      '[VerificationGateway] minTrustScore / minTrustScoreForFull are deprecated in v2.3.0 ' +\n        'and have no effect. Server is now the single source of truth for access-level decisions ' +\n        '(the SDK reads access.accessLevel from the verify-access response). To gate access ' +\n        \"to an endpoint, configure the endpoint's trust_score_requirement server-side.\"\n    );\n  }\n\n  // v2.3.0: anonymous traffic no longer short-circuits here. We forward the\n  // request to the server with no agentId; the server applies the endpoint's\n  // unverifiedAgentPolicy and returns advisory. createGuidanceResponse remains\n  // as the offline fallback if the API itself fails (handled below).\n\n  // Check cache first. Round-18.5 F4: caching on unless caller explicitly\n  // sets cacheTtl: 0 to disable. Undefined falls through to the split default\n  // (60s autonomous / 300s step-up) at cacheResult write time.\n  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0) {\n    const cached = getCachedResult(request);\n    if (cached) {\n      if (mergedConfig.debug) {\n        console.log('[VerificationGateway] Returning cached result');\n      }\n      return cached;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Inject counterparty info from config if not already set in request\n  const enrichedRequest = { ...request };\n  if (!enrichedRequest.counterpartyUrl && mergedConfig.counterpartyUrl) {\n    enrichedRequest.counterpartyUrl = mergedConfig.counterpartyUrl;\n  }\n  if (!enrichedRequest.counterpartyType && mergedConfig.counterpartyType) {\n    enrichedRequest.counterpartyType = mergedConfig.counterpartyType;\n  }\n\n  // Call the API\n  if (mergedConfig.debug) {\n    console.log('[VerificationGateway] Calling verify-access API');\n  }\n\n  const apiResponse = await callVerifyAccessAPI(mergedConfig, enrichedRequest);\n\n  // Handle API errors\n  if (!apiResponse.success) {\n    // Round-10 (#47, O5): distinguish API errors from missing-credentials.\n    // The previous default tagged any failure with the \"register your\n    // agent\" template, which is misleading to a verified partner whose\n    // verify-access call hit a 500. The `api_error` source surfaces a\n    // typed `verify_access.api_error` failure entry instead.\n    return createGuidanceResponse(mergedConfig, apiResponse.error, {\n      source: 'api_error',\n      correlationId: (apiResponse as { correlationId?: string }).correlationId,\n    });\n  }\n\n  // Check access result\n  if (!apiResponse.access?.allowed) {\n    // v2.9.8 (defect M1): aggregated failures across every gate that\n    // denied. Surface them on the result so the integrator can see every\n    // blocker in one go instead of the previous fail-fast cascade.\n    const aggregatedFailures = (apiResponse.access as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)\n      ?.failures as Array<{ dimension: string; message: string; guidance?: string }> | undefined;\n    // Round-18 G4: backend denied access (PDLSS or other gate); identity status\n    // depends on whether the backend resolved the caller. Read from\n    // verificationContext.idVerified; default false if absent (anonymous or\n    // identity-fail paths land here too). policyAllowed is false by definition\n    // in this branch (apiResponse.access.allowed === false).\n    const idVerifiedFromBackend =\n      (apiResponse.verificationContext as { idVerified?: boolean } | undefined)?.idVerified ===\n      true;\n    const result: EnhancedVerificationResult = {\n      identityVerified: idVerifiedFromBackend,\n      policyAllowed: false,\n      // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denials grant `'none'`, NEVER a positive band.\n      // Pre-rename this hardcoded `'guidance'`, which conflated with the\n      // colocated `guidance: {...}` help-payload object below and let\n      // denied requests pass any route gated at `'guidance'` because\n      // `hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance') === true`. Adapters now\n      // ALSO short-circuit on `!identityVerified || !policyAllowed` before\n      // the gate check — belt-and-braces.\n      accessLevel: 'none',\n      denialReasons:\n        aggregatedFailures && aggregatedFailures.length > 0\n          ? aggregatedFailures.map((f) => f.message)\n          : apiResponse.access?.reason\n            ? [apiResponse.access.reason]\n            : ['Access denied'],\n      failures: aggregatedFailures,\n      requiresStepUp: apiResponse.access?.requiresStepUp,\n      requiresApproval: apiResponse.access?.requiresApproval,\n      guidance: {\n        message: apiResponse.access?.reason || 'Access denied by PDLSS policy',\n        registrationUrl: `${mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl?.replace('/api', '')}/register`,\n        documentationUrl: `${mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl?.replace('/api', '')}/docs/pdlss`,\n      },\n      verifiedAt: new Date(),\n      // Extract sessionId so decisions can be recorded for denials too\n      sessionId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).sessionId as string | undefined,\n      // v2.3.10 (defect #34, round-4): anonymous traffic has no session →\n      // correlationId is the linking key for paired local_override events.\n      correlationId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).correlationId as string | undefined,\n      recommendation: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>)\n        .recommendation as EnhancedVerificationResult['recommendation'],\n      recommendationReasons: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).recommendationReasons as\n        | string[]\n        | undefined,\n    };\n\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  // Build successful result\n  const agent: VerifiedAgent | undefined = apiResponse.agent\n    ? {\n        astraId: apiResponse.agent.astraId,\n        name: apiResponse.agent.name,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.agent.trustScore,\n        trustLevel: getTrustLevel(apiResponse.agent.trustScore),\n        blockchainVerified: apiResponse.agent.blockchainStatus === 'verified',\n        status: apiResponse.agent.agentStatus as VerifiedAgent['status'],\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  const developer: VerifiedDeveloper | undefined = apiResponse.developer\n    ? {\n        astradId: apiResponse.developer.kyaOwnerId,\n        name: apiResponse.developer.fullName,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.developer.trustScore || 0,\n        verified: apiResponse.developer.identityVerified,\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  const organization: VerifiedOrganization | undefined = apiResponse.organization\n    ? {\n        name: apiResponse.organization.name,\n        verified: apiResponse.organization.verified,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.organization.trustScore,\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  // Verification context — structured \"why\" the merchant gets in v2.2.4+.\n  // Carries appliedPolicy (no UUIDs), pdlssCheck summary, dynamic trust score,\n  // and policy-driven attestations. Replaces the old over-sharing `pdlss` block.\n  const verificationContext = apiResponse.verificationContext;\n\n  // Server is the single source of truth for access level. SDK reads\n  // apiResponse.access.accessLevel verbatim — no client-side trust-score remap.\n  // Fallback to 'standard' if the server response is missing the field (older\n  // backend without the v2.3.0 contract); it covers the verified-access case.\n  const accessLevel: AccessLevel = apiResponse.access?.accessLevel ?? 'standard';\n\n  const result: EnhancedVerificationResult = {\n    // Round-18 G4: backend allowed access. Identity is verified (we resolved\n    // the caller to an agent) and policy passed all gates. Read idVerified\n    // from verificationContext for symmetry with the deny branch; default true\n    // on success path since `access.allowed === true` implies identity was\n    // resolvable (anonymous-allow paths flow through createGuidanceResponse).\n    identityVerified:\n      (apiResponse.verificationContext as { idVerified?: boolean } | undefined)?.idVerified !==\n      false,\n    policyAllowed: true,\n    accessLevel,\n    agent,\n    developer,\n    organization,\n    appliedPolicy: apiResponse.access?.appliedPolicy,\n    verificationContext,\n    requiresStepUp: apiResponse.access?.requiresStepUp,\n    requiresApproval: apiResponse.access?.requiresApproval,\n    verifiedAt: new Date(),\n    cacheTtl: mergedConfig.cacheTtl,\n    // Handshake Protocol v10 enhanced fields (present when backend returns them)\n    sessionId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).sessionId as string | undefined,\n    // v2.3.10 (defect #34, round-4): anonymous responses surface correlationId\n    // (no session row exists for unverified callers).\n    correlationId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).correlationId as string | undefined,\n    runtimeChallenge: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).runtimeChallenge as\n      | RuntimeChallengeResult\n      | undefined,\n    tokenGuidance: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).tokenGuidance as\n      | TokenGuidance\n      | undefined,\n    recommendation: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>)\n      .recommendation as EnhancedVerificationResult['recommendation'],\n    recommendationReasons: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).recommendationReasons as\n      | string[]\n      | undefined,\n    warningHeader: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).warningHeader as\n      | { name: string; value: string }\n      | undefined,\n  };\n\n  // Enforce AstraSync recommendation\n  if (result.recommendation === 'deny') {\n    // Round-18 G4: recommendation-driven deny lands on the success-path\n    // construction (identity was resolved). Flip policy only — identity stays\n    // verified — so adapters return 403 (re-auth won't help; the policy\n    // decision is the blocker).\n    result.policyAllowed = false;\n    result.accessLevel = 'none';\n    result.denialReasons = result.recommendationReasons || [\n      'Access denied by AstraSync recommendation',\n    ];\n    if (result.runtimeChallenge) {\n      result.guidance = {\n        message: `Verification failed: ${result.runtimeChallenge.reason || 'runtime challenge failed'}`,\n        registrationUrl: `${mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl?.replace('/api', '')}/register`,\n        documentationUrl: `${mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl?.replace('/api', '')}/docs/runtime-challenge`,\n      };\n    }\n  } else if (result.recommendation === 'step_up_required') {\n    result.requiresStepUp = true;\n    if (ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY[result.accessLevel] > ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY['read-only']) {\n      result.accessLevel = 'read-only';\n    }\n    result.denialReasons = result.recommendationReasons || ['Step-up verification required'];\n  }\n\n  // Cache the result (skip caching denials — agent may fix challenge endpoint\n  // and retry). Round-18.5 F4: cacheResult applies split default (60s/300s)\n  // when configuredTtl is undefined; honours the caller's value when set.\n  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0 && result.recommendation !== 'deny') {\n    cacheResult(request, result, mergedConfig.cacheTtl);\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Record a counterparty's grant/deny decision for a verification session.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\n/**\n * v2.3.9 (defect #34): optional override metadata. Set when the SDK's\n * local enforcement (toolGate / methodGate / trustScore floor) rejected\n * a request the SERVER had granted. Backend emits a distinct\n * `verification.local_override` event so the activity feed surfaces the\n * divergence as a separate row.\n */\nexport interface DecisionOverride {\n  overriddenBy: 'toolGate' | 'methodGate' | 'trustScore' | 'other';\n  toolName?: string;\n  requestedLevel?: AccessLevel;\n  grantedLevel?: AccessLevel;\n}\n\nexport async function recordDecision(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  sessionId: string,\n  decision: 'granted' | 'denied',\n  reason?: string,\n  override?: DecisionOverride\n): Promise<void> {\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  await fetch(`${config.apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access/${sessionId}/decision`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers,\n    body: JSON.stringify({\n      decision,\n      reason,\n      ...(override && {\n        overriddenBy: override.overriddenBy,\n        toolName: override.toolName,\n        requestedLevel: override.requestedLevel,\n        grantedLevel: override.grantedLevel,\n      }),\n    }),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * v2.3.10 (defect #34, round-4): record a SDK-side local override for an\n * anonymous verify-access response. Anonymous traffic has no session row, so\n * `recordDecision` (above) doesn't apply — but we still need to surface the\n * dashboard-vs-runtime divergence (e.g. server granted with audit warning\n * but local toolGate floor denied) on the activity feed.\n *\n * Backend ties the resulting `verification.local_override` event back to the\n * original `verification.unverified_audit` event via `correlationId`. The\n * endpoint is sessionless — see the docstring on the backend route for the\n * abuse-mitigation rationale (rate-limited per IP).\n *\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function recordAnonymousLocalOverride(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  correlationId: string,\n  override: DecisionOverride,\n  reason?: string\n): Promise<void> {\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  await fetch(`${config.apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access/local-override`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers,\n    body: JSON.stringify({\n      correlationId,\n      reason,\n      overriddenBy: override.overriddenBy,\n      toolName: override.toolName,\n      requestedLevel: override.requestedLevel,\n      grantedLevel: override.grantedLevel,\n    }),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Fetch the per-route policy for an endpoint from the AstraSync backend.\n * v2.9.7 moved policy authority into the dashboard — the SDK no longer\n * accepts `routes` from merchant-side source code, it fetches them from\n * here on init (and refreshes periodically).\n *\n * Returns `null` when the request fails for any reason — the caller decides\n * how to fall back (the middleware allows-all when no policy is loaded so\n * a misconfigured init doesn't take down the merchant's API).\n */\nexport async function fetchRoutes(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  counterpartyId: string\n): Promise<RouteAccessConfigShape[] | null> {\n  if (!counterpartyId) return null;\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n  try {\n    const response = await fetch(\n      `${config.apiBaseUrl}/endpoints/${encodeURIComponent(counterpartyId)}/routes`,\n      { method: 'GET', headers }\n    );\n    if (!response.ok) return null;\n    const body = (await response.json()) as { data?: { routes?: RouteAccessConfigShape[] } };\n    return body.data?.routes ?? [];\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Minimal shape of an EndpointRoute as the SDK consumes it. Mirrors the\n * server's `EndpointRoute` type and the SDK's `RouteAccessConfig` — same\n * JSON moves between server and SDK unchanged.\n */\nexport interface RouteAccessConfigShape {\n  pattern: string;\n  method: string;\n  minAccessLevel: 'none' | 'restricted' | 'read-only' | 'standard' | 'full' | 'internal';\n  minTrustScore?: number;\n  requiredPurposes?: string[];\n  allowedPurposes?: string[];\n  allowedJurisdictions?: string[];\n  maxDuration?: number;\n  maxTransactionValue?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify an agent AND automatically record the grant/deny decision.\n *\n * This is the recommended entry point for counterparties that call verify()\n * directly (e.g. MCP servers) rather than using createMiddleware().\n * It adds createSession: true, then fire-and-forgets the decision.\n */\nexport async function verifyAndRecord(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest\n): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n  const mergedConfig = { ...DEFAULT_CONFIG, ...config };\n  const result = await verify(mergedConfig, { ...request, createSession: true });\n  const sessionId = (result as EnhancedVerificationResult).sessionId;\n\n  if (sessionId) {\n    // Round-18 G4: a session is \"granted\" only if identity verified AND\n    // policy allowed; either failing is a deny.\n    if (result.identityVerified && result.policyAllowed) {\n      recordDecision(mergedConfig, sessionId, 'granted').catch(() => {});\n    } else {\n      recordDecision(mergedConfig, sessionId, 'denied', result.denialReasons?.[0]).catch(() => {});\n    }\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Report an unregistered agent attempt (no AstraSync credentials).\n * Called by SDK adapters when an agent is redirected to /docs/agent-access.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function reportUnregisteredAttempt(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  data: {\n    counterpartyUrl: string;\n    counterpartyType?: string;\n    sourceIp?: string;\n    userAgent?: string;\n    requestPath?: string;\n    requestMethod?: string;\n  }\n): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n\n  await fetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/verification-activity/unregistered-attempt`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n    body: JSON.stringify(data),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Report a counterparty-side PDLSS pre-check failure.\n * Called by SDK adapters when the agent's requested PDLSS exceeds\n * counterparty-defined maximums BEFORE calling verify-access.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function reportCounterpartyPreCheckFailure(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  data: {\n    agentId: string;\n    counterpartyUrl: string;\n    counterpartyType?: string;\n    failures: Array<{\n      field: string;\n      requested: string | number;\n      limit: string | number | string[];\n      message: string;\n    }>;\n    requestPath?: string;\n    requestMethod?: string;\n  }\n): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n\n  await fetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/verification-activity/counterparty-pre-check-failure`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n    body: JSON.stringify(data),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Quick verification — checks credentials and policy in one call.\n *\n * Round-18 G4: return shape mirrors `VerificationResult`'s split — partners\n * writing custom handlers around `quickVerify` get the same identity/policy\n * distinction as those calling `verify()` directly. Map to HTTP status the\n * same way: `!identityVerified` → 401; `identityVerified && !policyAllowed`\n * → 403.\n */\nexport async function quickVerify(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  credentials: AgentCredentials\n): Promise<{\n  identityVerified: boolean;\n  policyAllowed: boolean;\n  accessLevel: AccessLevel;\n  reason?: string;\n}> {\n  const result = await verify(config, {\n    credentials,\n    purpose: 'verification',\n  });\n\n  return {\n    identityVerified: result.identityVerified,\n    policyAllowed: result.policyAllowed,\n    accessLevel: result.accessLevel,\n    reason: result.denialReasons?.[0],\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * HTTP Transport Adapter\n *\n * Maps AstraSync credentials to/from HTTP headers (X-Astra-* convention).\n */\n\nimport type { AstraSyncCredentials } from '../types';\n\nconst HEADER_PREFIX = 'X-Astra-';\n\n/**\n * Inject AstraSync credentials into HTTP headers.\n */\nexport function setHttpHeaders(\n  headers: Record<string, string>,\n  credentials: AstraSyncCredentials,\n): Record<string, string> {\n  const result = { ...headers };\n\n  result[`${HEADER_PREFIX}ID`] = credentials.agentId;\n\n  if (credentials.verifyUrl) {\n    result[`${HEADER_PREFIX}Verify`] = credentials.verifyUrl;\n  }\n\n  if (credentials.challengeUrl) {\n    result[`${HEADER_PREFIX}Challenge`] = credentials.challengeUrl;\n  }\n\n  if (credentials.pdlss?.purpose) {\n    const purposeValue = credentials.pdlss.purpose.action\n      ? `${credentials.pdlss.purpose.category}:${credentials.pdlss.purpose.action}`\n      : credentials.pdlss.purpose.category;\n    result[`${HEADER_PREFIX}Purpose`] = purposeValue;\n  }\n\n  if (credentials.pdlss?.duration?.maxSessionDuration) {\n    result[`${HEADER_PREFIX}Duration`] = String(credentials.pdlss.duration.maxSessionDuration);\n  }\n\n  if (credentials.pdlss?.scope?.jurisdiction) {\n    result[`${HEADER_PREFIX}Scope`] = credentials.pdlss.scope.jurisdiction;\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract AstraSync credentials from HTTP headers.\n */\nexport function extractHttpCredentials(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n): AstraSyncCredentials | null {\n  const getValue = (key: string): string | undefined => {\n    const v = headers[key] ?? headers[key.toLowerCase()];\n    return Array.isArray(v) ? v[0] : v;\n  };\n\n  const agentId = getValue(`${HEADER_PREFIX}ID`) ?? getValue('x-astra-id');\n  if (!agentId) return null;\n\n  const credentials: AstraSyncCredentials = { agentId };\n\n  const verifyUrl = getValue(`${HEADER_PREFIX}Verify`) ?? getValue('x-astra-verify');\n  if (verifyUrl) credentials.verifyUrl = verifyUrl;\n\n  const challengeUrl = getValue(`${HEADER_PREFIX}Challenge`) ?? getValue('x-astra-challenge');\n  if (challengeUrl) credentials.challengeUrl = challengeUrl;\n\n  const purpose = getValue(`${HEADER_PREFIX}Purpose`) ?? getValue('x-astra-purpose');\n  if (purpose) {\n    const [category, action] = purpose.split(':');\n    credentials.pdlss = {\n      ...credentials.pdlss,\n      purpose: { category, action },\n    };\n  }\n\n  const duration = getValue(`${HEADER_PREFIX}Duration`) ?? getValue('x-astra-duration');\n  if (duration) {\n    credentials.pdlss = {\n      ...credentials.pdlss,\n      duration: { maxSessionDuration: parseInt(duration, 10) },\n    };\n  }\n\n  const scope = getValue(`${HEADER_PREFIX}Scope`) ?? getValue('x-astra-scope');\n  if (scope) {\n    credentials.pdlss = {\n      ...credentials.pdlss,\n      scope: { jurisdiction: scope },\n    };\n  }\n\n  return credentials;\n}\n","/**\n * Counterparty-side PDLSS pre-check.\n *\n * Compares the agent's requested PDLSS dimensions (from X-Astra-* headers)\n * against the counterparty-defined maximums on the route config.\n * Returns an array of failures — empty means all checks passed.\n *\n * This runs BEFORE calling verify-access on AstraSync. If it fails,\n * the request is rejected immediately without calling the platform.\n */\n\nimport type { RouteAccessConfig, AstraSyncCredentials, CounterpartyPreCheckFailure } from './types';\n\nexport function performCounterpartyPreCheck(\n  routeConfig: RouteAccessConfig,\n  astraCreds: AstraSyncCredentials | null,\n  purpose: string | undefined\n): CounterpartyPreCheckFailure[] {\n  const failures: CounterpartyPreCheckFailure[] = [];\n\n  // Check purpose against allowedPurposes whitelist. Route allow-lists are an\n  // OPTIONAL per-route refinement — undefined/empty = \"skip, let the backend\n  // evaluator be the authoritative gate\". The backend's PDLSS evaluator\n  // enforces the agent's own declared policy (round-18.5 F3 fail-closed there\n  // is correct: the agent declared its allowlist or didn't). Treating an\n  // undefined route allow-list as fail-closed breaks every partner that hasn't\n  // enumerated allowedPurposes (which is most of them — round-18.5 originally\n  // shipped this and was reverted in 2.4.11 after partner-wide auth break).\n  if (routeConfig.allowedPurposes && routeConfig.allowedPurposes.length > 0 && purpose) {\n    if (!routeConfig.allowedPurposes.includes(purpose)) {\n      failures.push({\n        field: 'purpose',\n        requested: purpose,\n        limit: routeConfig.allowedPurposes,\n        message: `Purpose \"${purpose}\" is not in the allowed list: [${routeConfig.allowedPurposes.join(', ')}]`,\n      });\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Check purpose against requiredPurposes (legacy field — agent must declare one of these)\n  if (routeConfig.requiredPurposes && routeConfig.requiredPurposes.length > 0 && purpose) {\n    if (!routeConfig.requiredPurposes.includes(purpose)) {\n      failures.push({\n        field: 'purpose',\n        requested: purpose,\n        limit: routeConfig.requiredPurposes,\n        message: `Purpose \"${purpose}\" is not in the required list: [${routeConfig.requiredPurposes.join(', ')}]`,\n      });\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Check duration against maxDuration — range-check (unchanged; undefined =\n  // no upper bound is conventional for opt-in range fields, not a request-\n  // driven allow-list).\n  if (routeConfig.maxDuration && astraCreds?.pdlss?.duration?.maxSessionDuration) {\n    const requested = astraCreds.pdlss.duration.maxSessionDuration;\n    if (requested > routeConfig.maxDuration) {\n      failures.push({\n        field: 'duration',\n        requested,\n        limit: routeConfig.maxDuration,\n        message: `Requested duration ${requested}s exceeds maximum ${routeConfig.maxDuration}s`,\n      });\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Check jurisdiction against allowedJurisdictions. Same reasoning as\n  // allowedPurposes above — route allow-lists are an optional per-route\n  // refinement; undefined/empty = skip and defer to the backend evaluator.\n  if (\n    routeConfig.allowedJurisdictions &&\n    routeConfig.allowedJurisdictions.length > 0 &&\n    astraCreds?.pdlss?.scope?.jurisdiction\n  ) {\n    const requested = astraCreds.pdlss.scope.jurisdiction;\n    if (!routeConfig.allowedJurisdictions.includes(requested)) {\n      failures.push({\n        field: 'jurisdiction',\n        requested,\n        limit: routeConfig.allowedJurisdictions,\n        message: `Jurisdiction \"${requested}\" is not in the allowed list: [${routeConfig.allowedJurisdictions.join(', ')}]`,\n      });\n    }\n  }\n\n  return failures;\n}\n","/**\n * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway - Express Middleware\n *\n * Express.js middleware for verifying AI agents on API endpoints.\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * import express from 'express';\n * import { createMiddleware } from '@astrasyncai/verification-gateway/express';\n *\n * const app = express();\n *\n * app.use(createMiddleware({\n *   apiBaseUrl: 'https://astrasync.ai/api',\n *   routes: [\n *     { pattern: '/api/public/*', method: '*', minAccessLevel: 'none' },\n *     { pattern: '/api/data/*', method: 'GET', minAccessLevel: 'read-only' },\n *     { pattern: '/api/data/*', method: '*', minAccessLevel: 'standard' },\n *     { pattern: '/api/admin/*', method: '*', minAccessLevel: 'internal' },\n *   ],\n * }));\n * ```\n */\n\nimport type { Request, Response, NextFunction, RequestHandler } from 'express';\nimport type {\n  ExpressMiddlewareOptions,\n  AgentCredentials,\n  VerificationResult,\n  EnhancedVerificationResult,\n  RouteAccessConfig,\n  AstraSyncCredentials,\n} from '../types';\nimport {\n  verify,\n  extractCredentials,\n  recordDecision,\n  reportCounterpartyPreCheckFailure,\n  fetchRoutes,\n} from '../verify';\nimport { hasMinimumAccess } from '../access-levels';\nimport { extractHttpCredentials } from '../transport/http';\nimport { performCounterpartyPreCheck } from '../pdlss-pre-check';\n\n/**\n * Extend Express Request with verification result\n */\ndeclare global {\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-namespace\n  namespace Express {\n    interface Request {\n      agentVerification?: VerificationResult;\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Default credential extractor\n */\nfunction defaultExtractCredentials(req: Request): AgentCredentials {\n  return extractCredentials(\n    req.headers as Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n    req.query as Record<string, string | undefined>\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract extended AstraSync credentials (X-Astra-* headers) from Express request.\n * Returns null if no AstraSync headers are present.\n */\nexport function extractAstraSyncCredentials(req: Request): AstraSyncCredentials | null {\n  return extractHttpCredentials(req.headers as Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>);\n}\n\n/**\n * Default purpose extractor.\n *\n * Priority:\n * 1. Agent's declared PDLSS purpose from X-Astra-Purpose header (e.g. \"read_data:search\")\n * 2. Explicit x-purpose header\n * 3. Query parameter ?purpose=\n * 4. HTTP method → PDLSS category fallback\n */\nfunction defaultExtractPurpose(req: Request): string | undefined {\n  // 1. Check agent's declared PDLSS purpose (X-Astra-Purpose header)\n  const astraPurpose = req.headers['x-astra-purpose'];\n  if (astraPurpose) {\n    const value = Array.isArray(astraPurpose) ? astraPurpose[0] : astraPurpose;\n    // Extract category from \"category:action\" format — the verify API expects the category\n    const category = value.split(':')[0];\n    return category;\n  }\n\n  // 2. Try explicit purpose header\n  const purposeHeader = req.headers['x-purpose'] || req.headers['X-Purpose'];\n  if (purposeHeader) {\n    return Array.isArray(purposeHeader) ? purposeHeader[0] : purposeHeader;\n  }\n\n  // 3. Try query parameter\n  if (req.query.purpose && typeof req.query.purpose === 'string') {\n    return req.query.purpose;\n  }\n\n  // 4. Infer from HTTP method using PDLSS-compatible categories\n  switch (req.method) {\n    case 'GET':\n      return 'read_data';\n    case 'POST':\n      return 'write_data';\n    case 'PUT':\n    case 'PATCH':\n      return 'write_data';\n    case 'DELETE':\n      return 'delete_data';\n    default:\n      return 'general';\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Match a route pattern against a path\n */\nfunction matchRoute(pattern: string, path: string): boolean {\n  // Convert pattern to regex\n  const regexPattern = pattern.replace(/\\*/g, '.*').replace(/\\//g, '\\\\/');\n\n  const regex = new RegExp(`^${regexPattern}$`);\n  return regex.test(path);\n}\n\n/**\n * Find the route configuration for a request\n */\nfunction findRouteConfig(\n  routes: RouteAccessConfig[],\n  path: string,\n  method: string\n): RouteAccessConfig | undefined {\n  return routes.find((route) => {\n    const methodMatches =\n      route.method === '*' || route.method.toUpperCase() === method.toUpperCase();\n    const pathMatches = matchRoute(route.pattern, path);\n    return methodMatches && pathMatches;\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Default denied handler\n *\n * Round-10 (#47, O5): the response body now carries the full `failures[]`\n * array and the `correlationId` so partners can render per-dimension UX\n * and tie a denial back to a server log line. Previously the merchant only\n * got the first denialReason — meaningful detail was thrown away before\n * the response left the SDK. Also stamps `X-Astra-Gateway-Mode: enforced`\n * so partners can tell a gate-evaluated denial apart from a gate-skipped\n * pass-through (#49/O10 — the `unenforced` complement).\n */\nfunction defaultOnDenied(result: VerificationResult, _req: Request, res: Response): void {\n  // Round-18 G4: identity-verification failures → 401 (re-authenticate);\n  // identity-verified-but-policy-denied → 403 (re-auth won't help; update\n  // PDLSS scope or escalate to step-up). Maps to the two distinct recovery\n  // actions that HTTP middleware acts on without parsing bodies. The\n  // impossible state `!identityVerified && policyAllowed` falls into the\n  // `!identityVerified` branch — identity is the more-fundamental missing\n  // precondition.\n  const statusCode = !result.identityVerified ? 401 : 403;\n\n  res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Mode', 'enforced');\n\n  res.status(statusCode).json({\n    success: false,\n    error: {\n      code: !result.identityVerified ? 'UNAUTHORIZED' : 'INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS',\n      message: result.denialReasons?.[0] || 'Access denied',\n      accessLevel: result.accessLevel,\n      guidance: result.guidance,\n      // Round-10: aggregated per-dimension detail + correlation handle.\n      failures: result.failures,\n      correlationId: result.correlationId,\n    },\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Refresh interval for the remote-fetched route policy. Default: every 5\n * minutes. Override via `routesRefreshMs` on the middleware options. Each\n * middleware instance keeps its own cache; multiple instances pointing at the\n * same endpoint will each fetch independently.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_ROUTES_REFRESH_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;\n\n/**\n * Create Express middleware for agent verification.\n *\n * v2.9.7 moved per-route policy authority out of merchant-side source code\n * into the AstraSync dashboard. `createMiddleware` no longer accepts a\n * `routes` array — it fetches the endpoint's stored policy via\n * `GET /endpoints/:counterpartyId/routes` on init and refreshes\n * periodically. Policy edits in the dashboard take effect on the next\n * refresh (or sooner if the operator manually restarts the SDK).\n *\n * `counterpartyId` is required: the SDK can't know which endpoint's policy\n * to fetch without it. Local-development workflows that don't have an\n * AstraSync endpoint registered can omit it — the middleware logs a\n * one-time warning and falls through (allows all) until a policy is\n * fetchable.\n */\nexport function createMiddleware(options: ExpressMiddlewareOptions): RequestHandler {\n  const {\n    extractCredentials: customExtractCredentials,\n    extractPurpose: customExtractPurpose,\n    skipPaths = [],\n    onDenied = defaultOnDenied,\n    recordDecisions,\n    enableRuntimeChallenge = true,\n    routesRefreshMs = DEFAULT_ROUTES_REFRESH_MS,\n    ...config\n  } = options;\n\n  // Per-middleware-instance route cache. Populated on first fetch; refreshed\n  // every `routesRefreshMs`. Until first successful fetch we hold an empty\n  // array which means \"no per-route gating active\" — the middleware falls\n  // through. Pre-fix the array came from merchant source, which both broke\n  // the auth-boundary story (defect 24) and silently disagreed with the\n  // dashboard.\n  let cachedRoutes: RouteAccessConfig[] = [];\n  let lastFetchAt = 0;\n  let refreshing: Promise<void> | null = null;\n  let warnedNoCounterparty = false;\n  let warnedEmptyRoutes = false;\n\n  async function refreshRoutes(): Promise<void> {\n    if (!config.counterpartyId) {\n      if (!warnedNoCounterparty) {\n        // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n        console.warn(\n          '[VerificationGateway] No counterpartyId configured — falling through (allow all). ' +\n            'Per-route policy lives in the AstraSync dashboard now; register the endpoint and ' +\n            'set counterpartyId in your middleware config to enforce policy.'\n        );\n        warnedNoCounterparty = true;\n      }\n      return;\n    }\n    const fetched = await fetchRoutes(config, config.counterpartyId);\n    if (fetched) {\n      cachedRoutes = fetched;\n      lastFetchAt = Date.now();\n      // v2.3.8 (defect #25): if the fetch succeeded but returned an empty\n      // policy, the endpoint is registered correctly but the operator hasn't\n      // configured any routes yet — every request will fall through ungated.\n      // Surface this loudly once so silent pass-through can't go unnoticed.\n      if (cachedRoutes.length === 0 && !warnedEmptyRoutes) {\n        const dashboard = config.dashboardUrl ?? 'https://app.astrasync.ai';\n        // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n        console.warn(\n          `[VerificationGateway] No route policy configured for ${config.counterpartyId}. ` +\n            `Gateway is in pass-through mode for ALL traffic until you add at least one route. ` +\n            `Configure at ${dashboard}/dashboard/endpoints/${config.counterpartyId}/routes`\n        );\n        warnedEmptyRoutes = true;\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Eager first fetch so the first request after init has policy loaded.\n  // Errors are swallowed (handled by fetchRoutes returning null).\n  refreshing = refreshRoutes().finally(() => {\n    refreshing = null;\n  });\n\n  return async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction): Promise<void> => {\n    try {\n      // Check if path should be skipped\n      const shouldSkip = skipPaths.some((pattern) => matchRoute(pattern, req.path));\n      if (shouldSkip) {\n        return next();\n      }\n\n      // Wait for in-flight init fetch (only on the very first request) so we\n      // don't admit traffic with no policy loaded.\n      if (refreshing) {\n        await refreshing.catch(() => {});\n      }\n      // Time-based refresh: kick off a background refresh if the cache is\n      // stale. Doesn't block the current request — readers see whatever is\n      // cached at this moment; the next request will see the refreshed copy.\n      if (config.counterpartyId && Date.now() - lastFetchAt > routesRefreshMs) {\n        refreshing = refreshRoutes().finally(() => {\n          refreshing = null;\n        });\n      }\n\n      // Find route configuration\n      const routeConfig = findRouteConfig(cachedRoutes, req.path, req.method);\n\n      // If no route config, skip verification (allow through)\n      if (!routeConfig) {\n        if (config.setPassThroughHeader) {\n          // Round-10 (#49, O10): `unenforced` replaces the previous\n          // `pass-through` label. The previous name conflated \"gateway\n          // didn't evaluate policy\" with \"request succeeded end-to-end\" —\n          // the downstream handler may still return any status. The new\n          // semantic describes the GATE state only.\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Mode', 'unenforced');\n          res.setHeader(\n            'X-Astra-Gateway-Reason',\n            cachedRoutes.length === 0 ? 'no-policy' : 'no-match'\n          );\n        }\n        return next();\n      }\n\n      // Extract credentials (hoisted from below the route-none check so the\n      // round-12 F9 evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed flag can decide whether to\n      // evaluate vs short-circuit).\n      const credentials = customExtractCredentials\n        ? customExtractCredentials(req)\n        : defaultExtractCredentials(req);\n\n      // Round-12 (F9): route-none short-circuit unless the caller wants\n      // evaluation-without-enforcement. With evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed\n      // set to true AND credentials present, the middleware calls\n      // verify-access for audit + req.agentVerification population, then\n      // proceeds without gating. Default behaviour (flag off) preserves\n      // pre-F9 short-circuit semantics.\n      const shouldEnforce = routeConfig.minAccessLevel !== 'none';\n      if (\n        routeConfig.minAccessLevel === 'none' &&\n        (!config.evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed || !credentials.astraId)\n      ) {\n        if (config.setPassThroughHeader) {\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Mode', 'unenforced');\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Reason', 'route-none');\n        }\n        return next();\n      }\n\n      // v2.3.0: anonymous traffic no longer short-circuits client-side.\n      // The server applies the endpoint's `unverifiedAgentPolicy` (deny /\n      // allow_partial / allow_full) and emits the verification event +\n      // blockchain record per the canonical flow. SDK forwards verbatim.\n\n      // Extract purpose\n      const purpose = customExtractPurpose ? customExtractPurpose(req) : defaultExtractPurpose(req);\n\n      // Extract full AstraSync credentials (includes PDLSS from X-Astra-* headers)\n      const astraCreds = extractAstraSyncCredentials(req);\n\n      // Auto-detect counterparty URL from the request if not explicitly configured.\n      // Since the SDK is installed at this endpoint, we always know the origin.\n      const counterpartyUrl = config.counterpartyUrl || `${req.protocol}://${req.get('host')}`;\n\n      // Step 2: Counterparty-side PDLSS pre-check — compare agent's requested PDLSS\n      // against counterparty-defined maximums on the route config.\n      // Rejects immediately if outside limits, BEFORE calling verify-access.\n      const preCheckFailures = performCounterpartyPreCheck(routeConfig, astraCreds, purpose);\n      if (preCheckFailures.length > 0) {\n        // Round-18 G4: counterparty pre-check failure — request rejected\n        // before reaching verify-access. Neither identity nor policy was\n        // remotely verified; both axes truthfully false.\n        const result: VerificationResult = {\n          identityVerified: false,\n          policyAllowed: false,\n          accessLevel: 'none',\n          denialReasons: preCheckFailures.map((f) => f.message),\n          guidance: {\n            message: 'Request exceeds counterparty-defined PDLSS limits.',\n            registrationUrl: `${config.apiBaseUrl?.replace('/api', '')}/register`,\n            documentationUrl: `${config.apiBaseUrl?.replace('/api', '')}/docs/pdlss`,\n          },\n          verifiedAt: new Date(),\n        };\n\n        req.agentVerification = result;\n\n        // Fire-and-forget: notify AstraSync of the pre-check failure\n        reportCounterpartyPreCheckFailure(config, {\n          agentId: astraCreds?.agentId || credentials.astraId || 'unknown',\n          counterpartyUrl,\n          counterpartyType: config.counterpartyType || 'api',\n          failures: preCheckFailures,\n          requestPath: req.path,\n          requestMethod: req.method,\n        }).catch(() => {});\n\n        onDenied(result, req, res);\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // Step 3: Call AstraSync verify-access with runtime challenge enabled\n      const shouldRecordDecisions = recordDecisions !== false;\n      const forwardedFor = req.headers['x-forwarded-for'];\n      const forwardedForStr = Array.isArray(forwardedFor) ? forwardedFor.join(', ') : forwardedFor;\n      // X-Forwarded-For's first entry is the original client. Fall back to req.ip\n      // (which Express already resolves via trust proxy settings when configured).\n      const originalClientIp = forwardedForStr ? forwardedForStr.split(',')[0].trim() : req.ip;\n      const agentCardUrl =\n        typeof req.headers['x-astrasync-agent-card'] === 'string'\n          ? (req.headers['x-astrasync-agent-card'] as string)\n          : undefined;\n\n      const result = await verify(config, {\n        credentials,\n        purpose,\n        action: req.method.toLowerCase(),\n        resource: req.path,\n        createSession: shouldRecordDecisions,\n        counterpartyUrl,\n        counterpartyType: config.counterpartyType || 'api',\n        enableRuntimeChallenge,\n        durationRequired: astraCreds?.pdlss?.duration?.maxSessionDuration,\n        callerMetadata: {\n          sourceIp: originalClientIp,\n          userAgent: req.headers['user-agent'] as string | undefined,\n          referer: req.headers.referer as string | undefined,\n          host: req.headers.host as string | undefined,\n          forwardedFor: forwardedForStr,\n          agentCardUrl,\n        },\n      });\n\n      // Attach result to request\n      req.agentVerification = result;\n      const sessionId = (result as EnhancedVerificationResult).sessionId;\n\n      // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denied verifications short-circuit BEFORE the\n      // gate-level comparison. Pre-rename, denials returned\n      // `accessLevel: 'guidance'` and routes gated at `'guidance'` passed\n      // `hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance') === true` — letting\n      // unverified anonymous traffic through to the merchant handler. The\n      // verify.ts denial branches now return `'none'` (so the gate check\n      // alone would correctly deny), but trusting access-level math for a\n      // denial is a category error: failing either identity OR policy already\n      // means \"deny.\" We check that first.\n      // Round-18 G4: short-circuit on either axis failing — identity-fail\n      // (no resolved caller) or policy-fail (PDLSS or recommendation deny).\n      if (!result.identityVerified || !result.policyAllowed) {\n        if (shouldRecordDecisions && sessionId) {\n          recordDecision(config, sessionId, 'denied', result.denialReasons?.[0]).catch(() => {});\n        }\n        onDenied(result, req, res);\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // Round-12 (F9): evaluation-without-enforcement. When the route is\n      // 'none' but we ran verify-access for audit, skip the gates and call\n      // next() — the result is on req.agentVerification for the handler\n      // to render tier-aware responses (e.g. anonymous vs verified\n      // catalog view on the same path).\n      if (!shouldEnforce) {\n        if (config.setPassThroughHeader) {\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Mode', 'enforced');\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Reason', 'evaluated-not-enforced');\n        }\n        if (shouldRecordDecisions && sessionId) {\n          recordDecision(config, sessionId, 'granted').catch(() => {});\n        }\n        return next();\n      }\n\n      // Check if access level is sufficient (verified caller path only —\n      // denials handled above)\n      if (!hasMinimumAccess(result.accessLevel, routeConfig.minAccessLevel)) {\n        // Round-12 (F12): synthesise the structured failure entry so the\n        // partner-facing response carries the same shape as every other\n        // denial dimension. Guidance positions step-up only — increasing\n        // trust score or lowering the route floor both read as gaming the\n        // gate. Step-up flow ships separately this month.\n        const insufficientFailure = {\n          dimension: 'access_level.insufficient',\n          message: `Endpoint requires accessLevel '${routeConfig.minAccessLevel}'; agent has '${result.accessLevel}'.`,\n          guidance:\n            \"Request elevated access via step-up verification (coming soon — ships this month). Step-up lets the agent owner approve a one-time elevation for this specific counterparty + purpose without changing the agent's baseline trust score.\",\n        };\n        result.failures = [...(result.failures ?? []), insufficientFailure];\n        result.denialReasons = [...(result.denialReasons ?? []), insufficientFailure.message];\n        if (shouldRecordDecisions && sessionId) {\n          recordDecision(config, sessionId, 'denied', insufficientFailure.message).catch(() => {});\n        }\n        onDenied(result, req, res);\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // Check trust score requirement if specified\n      if (routeConfig.minTrustScore && result.agent) {\n        if (result.agent.trustScore < routeConfig.minTrustScore) {\n          // Round-12 (F12): structured failure entry + step-up framing.\n          const trustFailure = {\n            dimension: 'access_level.insufficient',\n            message: `Trust score ${result.agent.trustScore} is below required ${routeConfig.minTrustScore} for this route.`,\n            guidance:\n              \"Request elevated access via step-up verification (coming soon — ships this month). Step-up lets the agent owner approve a one-time elevation for this specific counterparty + purpose without changing the agent's baseline trust score.\",\n          };\n          result.failures = [...(result.failures ?? []), trustFailure];\n          result.denialReasons = [trustFailure.message];\n          if (shouldRecordDecisions && sessionId) {\n            recordDecision(config, sessionId, 'denied', trustFailure.message).catch(() => {});\n          }\n          onDenied(result, req, res);\n          return;\n        }\n      }\n\n      // All checks passed — record grant decision\n      if (shouldRecordDecisions && sessionId) {\n        recordDecision(config, sessionId, 'granted').catch(() => {});\n      }\n      // v2.3.8 (defect #26): if the endpoint's `unverifiedAgentPolicy` is\n      // `'audit'` (allow + soft-launch warning), the server returns the\n      // header to relay. Lift it onto the merchant's response BEFORE\n      // calling next() so downstream handlers and the eventual response\n      // back to the agent both carry it.\n      const enhancedResult = result as EnhancedVerificationResult;\n      if (enhancedResult.warningHeader) {\n        res.setHeader(enhancedResult.warningHeader.name, enhancedResult.warningHeader.value);\n      }\n      next();\n    } catch (error) {\n      // Log error and continue (fail open by default)\n      console.error('[VerificationGateway] Middleware error:', error);\n      next();\n    }\n  };\n}\n\n// `requireAccess` and `verifyOnly` were removed in v2.9.7. Both injected a\n// local `routes` array into the merchant's source code, which is the exact\n// dual-config attack vector defect 24 closed. Per-route policy now lives in\n// the AstraSync dashboard (gated by team.role admin auth + audit + alerts).\n// To enforce a minimum tier, set the route's `minAccessLevel` in the\n// dashboard. For \"verify but don't block,\" set every route to `none` 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See\n * `types.ts` AccessLevel for the rationale (value-name collision with the\n * `guidance: {...}` help-payload object on VerificationResult).\n */\n\nimport type { AccessLevel, TrustLevel } from './types';\n\n/**\n * Access level hierarchy (higher number = more access)\n */\nexport const ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY: Record<AccessLevel, number> = {\n  none: 0,\n  restricted: 1,\n  'read-only': 2,\n  standard: 3,\n  full: 4,\n  internal: 5,\n};\n\n/**\n * Access level descriptions for UI\n */\nexport const ACCESS_LEVEL_DESCRIPTIONS: Record<AccessLevel, string> = {\n  none: 'No access - credentials required',\n  restricted: 'Restricted access - registration prompt only',\n  'read-only': 'Read-only access - can browse but not modify',\n  standard: 'Standard access - normal operations per PDLSS policy',\n  full: 'Full access - all operations for high-trust agents',\n  internal: 'Internal access - organization member privileges',\n};\n\n/**\n * Default trust score thresholds for access levels\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_TRUST_THRESHOLDS: Record<AccessLevel, number> = {\n  none: 0,\n  restricted: 0,\n  'read-only': 20,\n  standard: 40,\n  full: 70,\n  internal: 0, // Internal is based on org membership, not score\n};\n\n/**\n * Trust level score ranges\n */\nexport const TRUST_LEVEL_RANGES: Record<TrustLevel, { min: number; max: number }> = {\n  BRONZE: { min: 0, max: 39 },\n  SILVER: { min: 40, max: 59 },\n  GOLD: { min: 60, max: 79 },\n  PLATINUM: { min: 80, max: 100 },\n};\n\n/**\n * Determine trust level from score\n */\nexport function getTrustLevel(score: number): TrustLevel {\n  if (score >= 80) return 'PLATINUM';\n  if (score >= 60) return 'GOLD';\n  if (score >= 40) return 'SILVER';\n  return 'BRONZE';\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if access level A is greater than or equal to access level B\n */\nexport function hasMinimumAccess(actual: AccessLevel, required: AccessLevel): boolean {\n  return ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY[actual] >= ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY[required];\n}\n\n/**\n * Get the highest access level for a given trust score\n */\nexport function getAccessLevelForScore(\n  trustScore: number,\n  thresholds: Record<AccessLevel, number> = DEFAULT_TRUST_THRESHOLDS\n): AccessLevel {\n  if (trustScore >= thresholds.full) return 'full';\n  if (trustScore >= thresholds.standard) return 'standard';\n  if (trustScore >= thresholds['read-only']) return 'read-only';\n  return 'restricted';\n}\n\n/**\n * Determine access level from verification result.\n *\n * v2.3.9 (defect #30): unverified callers now return `'none'` (was\n * `'guidance'`). Denials grant zero — never a positive band.\n */\nexport function determineAccessLevel(\n  verified: boolean,\n  trustScore: number,\n  isOrgMember: boolean,\n  customThresholds?: Partial<Record<AccessLevel, number>>\n): AccessLevel {\n  if (!verified) {\n    return 'none';\n  }\n\n  if (isOrgMember) {\n    return 'internal';\n  }\n\n  const thresholds = {\n    ...DEFAULT_TRUST_THRESHOLDS,\n    ...customThresholds,\n  };\n\n  return getAccessLevelForScore(trustScore, thresholds);\n}\n\n/**\n * Access capabilities per level\n */\nexport interface AccessCapabilities {\n  canRead: boolean;\n  canWrite: boolean;\n  canDelete: boolean;\n  canAdmin: boolean;\n  canAccessInternal: boolean;\n  maxTransactionValue?: number;\n  allowedPurposes?: string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Get capabilities for an access level\n */\nexport function getCapabilities(accessLevel: AccessLevel): AccessCapabilities {\n  switch (accessLevel) {\n    case 'none':\n      return {\n        canRead: false,\n        canWrite: false,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'restricted':\n      return {\n        canRead: false,\n        canWrite: false,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'read-only':\n      return {\n        canRead: true,\n        canWrite: false,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'standard':\n      return {\n        canRead: true,\n        canWrite: true,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'full':\n      return {\n        canRead: true,\n        canWrite: true,\n        canDelete: true,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n    case 'internal':\n      return {\n        canRead: true,\n        canWrite: true,\n        canDelete: true,\n        canAdmin: true,\n        canAccessInternal: true,\n      };\n    default:\n      return {\n        canRead: false,\n        canWrite: false,\n        canDelete: false,\n        canAdmin: false,\n        canAccessInternal: false,\n      };\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Round-13 (F14 closure / R13-7): single source-of-truth for the SDK's\n * package version emitted on verify-access bodies (and any future\n * telemetry). Bumped alongside `package.json#version` on every release.\n *\n * Why a constant rather than `import pkg from '../package.json'`:\n * - `tsconfig.json` sets `rootDir: ./src`; importing the sibling\n *   package.json fails the build with \"outside rootDir\".\n * - Build-time string replacement (tsup `define`, esbuild banner, etc.)\n *   adds toolchain coupling for a trivial gain.\n * - Embedded readonly constant works in every environment (Node, browser,\n *   bundlers, Deno) without runtime fs / network access.\n *\n * Release discipline: a CI lint can grep `package.json#version` against\n * this constant if the two ever diverge in the wild. Round-13 manual bump\n * is fine — bumping both in the release-ceremony commit keeps them\n * lockstep.\n */\nexport const SDK_VERSION = '2.4.12';\n","/**\n * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway - Core Verification Logic\n *\n * This module handles the core verification logic, calling the AstraSync API\n * and processing the response into a standardized VerificationResult.\n */\n\nimport type {\n  GatewayConfig,\n  AgentCredentials,\n  VerificationRequest,\n  VerificationResult,\n  VerifiedAgent,\n  VerifiedDeveloper,\n  VerifiedOrganization,\n  GuidanceInfo,\n  AccessLevel,\n  EnhancedVerificationResult,\n  TokenGuidance,\n  RuntimeChallengeResult,\n} from './types';\nimport { getTrustLevel, ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY } from './access-levels';\nimport { SDK_VERSION } from './version';\n\n/**\n * Default configuration values\n *\n * apiBaseUrl matches the OpenAPI authoritative server (https://astrasync.ai/api\n * for prod, https://staging.astrasync.ai/api for staging). Always include the\n * /api path prefix when overriding — registration / docs URLs are derived by\n * stripping it.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_CONFIG: Partial<GatewayConfig> = {\n  apiBaseUrl: 'https://astrasync.ai/api',\n  // v2.3.9 (defect #30): default for unconfigured callers is `'none'` (no\n  // access). Pre-rename this defaulted to `'guidance'`, which combined with\n  // a route gated at `'guidance'` to silently let unverified traffic\n  // through (`hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance') === true`).\n  defaultAccessLevel: 'none',\n  // minTrustScore + minTrustScoreForFull deprecated in v2.3.0 — server decides.\n  // Round-18.5 F4: cacheTtl deliberately unset. When undefined, cacheResult\n  // applies the split default (60s autonomous / 300s step-up). When the\n  // caller sets cacheTtl explicitly, that value is honoured uniformly.\n  // Set cacheTtl: 0 to disable caching entirely.\n  debug: false,\n};\n\n/**\n * Init self-test state. Fires once per process on first verify() call to warn\n * if apiBaseUrl is pointing at the wrong host (e.g. a marketing site that\n * 200s with text/html instead of the API).\n */\nlet initCheckPerformed = false;\n\n/** One-shot guard for v2.3.0 deprecation warning. */\nlet deprecationWarningShown = false;\n\nasync function performInitCheck(apiBaseUrl: string, debug?: boolean): Promise<void> {\n  initCheckPerformed = true;\n  try {\n    const probeUrl = `${apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access`;\n    // HEAD mirrors GET semantics (running the full request pipeline without a\n    // body) so the response carries the same content-type the marketing 404\n    // would return. OPTIONS often gets short-circuited by CORS-preflight\n    // handlers and returns no content-type, defeating the check.\n    const response = await fetch(probeUrl, { method: 'HEAD' });\n    const contentType = response.headers.get('content-type') ?? '';\n    if (contentType.startsWith('text/html')) {\n      console.warn(\n        `[VerificationGateway] apiBaseUrl '${apiBaseUrl}' returned HTML (content-type: ${contentType}). ` +\n          `This usually means apiBaseUrl is pointing at a marketing site instead of the API. ` +\n          `Expected: 'https://astrasync.ai/api' (prod) or 'https://staging.astrasync.ai/api' (staging). ` +\n          `Set disableInitChecks: true on GatewayConfig to silence this warning.`\n      );\n    } else if (debug) {\n      console.log(\n        `[VerificationGateway] init check passed for ${apiBaseUrl} (content-type: ${contentType})`\n      );\n    }\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (debug) {\n      console.log(`[VerificationGateway] init check failed (non-blocking): ${String(err)}`);\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Simple in-memory cache for verification results\n */\nconst verificationCache = new Map<string, { result: VerificationResult; expiresAt: number }>();\n\n/**\n * Generate cache key from the full request shape.\n *\n * Round-18.5 F4: pre-fix the key was credentials-only (`astraId-apiKey-jwt`),\n * which silently returned the cached result of a prior call even when the\n * subsequent call's purpose/action/counterparty/etc. differed. That was a\n * security gap — a warm cache could serve an allow verdict for a purpose the\n * agent hadn't actually been authorised for. Key now includes every field\n * that affects the backend verdict.\n *\n * MAINTAIN: when adding a field to VerificationRequest that affects the\n * backend verdict, add it to this key. Fields that don't affect verdict\n * (e.g. requestId, timestamps, sdkVersion) don't belong here — including\n * them would needlessly thrash the cache for repeated identical requests.\n */\nfunction getCacheKey(request: VerificationRequest): string {\n  const c = request.credentials;\n  return [\n    c.astraId || '',\n    c.apiKey || '',\n    c.jwt || '',\n    request.purpose || '',\n    request.action || '',\n    request.resourceType || '',\n    request.resource || '',\n    request.jurisdiction || '',\n    request.transactionValue ?? '',\n    request.currency || '',\n    request.counterpartyUrl || '',\n    request.counterpartyType || '',\n    request.isSubAgentRequest ? '1' : '0',\n    request.parentAgentId || '',\n    request.subAgentDepth ?? '',\n  ].join('|');\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if cached result is still valid\n */\nfunction getCachedResult(request: VerificationRequest): VerificationResult | null {\n  const key = getCacheKey(request);\n  const cached = verificationCache.get(key);\n\n  if (cached && cached.expiresAt > Date.now()) {\n    return cached.result;\n  }\n\n  if (cached) {\n    verificationCache.delete(key);\n  }\n\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Cache a verification result.\n *\n * Round-18.5 F4: TTL splits by step-up status when the caller hasn't pinned\n * `configuredTtl` explicitly. Autonomous verdicts cache for 60s (faster\n * policy-update propagation, better security posture); step-up verdicts cache\n * for 300s (matches human-paced approval cycles, prevents thrashing during\n * the user-action window). When `configuredTtl` is set (truthy positive\n * number), it's honoured uniformly for back-compat with partners pinning a\n * specific TTL today.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_AUTONOMOUS_TTL_SECONDS = 60;\nconst DEFAULT_STEP_UP_TTL_SECONDS = 300;\n\nfunction cacheResult(\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  result: VerificationResult,\n  configuredTtl: number | undefined\n): void {\n  const ttlSeconds =\n    configuredTtl && configuredTtl > 0\n      ? configuredTtl\n      : result.requiresStepUp\n        ? DEFAULT_STEP_UP_TTL_SECONDS\n        : DEFAULT_AUTONOMOUS_TTL_SECONDS;\n  const key = getCacheKey(request);\n  verificationCache.set(key, {\n    result,\n    expiresAt: Date.now() + ttlSeconds * 1000,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Clear the verification cache\n */\nexport function clearCache(): void {\n  verificationCache.clear();\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract agent credentials from various sources\n */\nexport function extractCredentials(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  query?: Record<string, string | undefined>\n): AgentCredentials {\n  const credentials: AgentCredentials = {};\n\n  // Check for ASTRA-ID in headers (case-insensitive). Accepts the historical\n  // X-Astra-Id name plus the X-Astra-AgentId / x-astra-agent-id alias the\n  // partner asked for in #9a — both surface the same field.\n  const astraIdHeader =\n    headers['x-astra-id'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-Id'] ||\n    headers['X-ASTRA-ID'] ||\n    headers['x-astra-agentid'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-AgentId'] ||\n    headers['x-astra-agent-id'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-Agent-Id'] ||\n    headers['X-ASTRA-AGENT-ID'];\n  if (astraIdHeader) {\n    credentials.astraId = Array.isArray(astraIdHeader) ? astraIdHeader[0] : astraIdHeader;\n  }\n\n  // Check for API key in headers\n  const apiKeyHeader = headers['x-api-key'] || headers['X-Api-Key'] || headers['X-API-KEY'];\n  if (apiKeyHeader) {\n    credentials.apiKey = Array.isArray(apiKeyHeader) ? apiKeyHeader[0] : apiKeyHeader;\n  }\n\n  // Check Authorization header for Bearer token\n  const authHeader = headers['authorization'] || headers['Authorization'];\n  if (authHeader) {\n    const authValue = Array.isArray(authHeader) ? authHeader[0] : authHeader;\n    credentials.authorizationHeader = authValue;\n\n    if (authValue.startsWith('Bearer ')) {\n      credentials.jwt = authValue.slice(7);\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Check query parameters as fallback\n  if (query) {\n    if (query.astraId && !credentials.astraId) {\n      credentials.astraId = query.astraId;\n    }\n    if (query.apiKey && !credentials.apiKey) {\n      credentials.apiKey = query.apiKey;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return credentials;\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if credentials are present\n */\nexport function hasCredentials(credentials: AgentCredentials): boolean {\n  return !!(credentials.astraId || credentials.apiKey || credentials.jwt);\n}\n\n/**\n * Source of a synthesised guidance response. Round-10 split — the\n * `'no_credentials'` shape is the original (caller has no AstraSync\n * credentials, suggest registration). The `'api_error'` shape is for when\n * the verify-access HTTP call itself failed (5xx, network, etc.) — DON'T\n * tell a verified-but-currently-blocked partner to \"register your agent\".\n */\ntype GuidanceSource = 'no_credentials' | 'api_error';\n\n/**\n * Create guidance response for unverified agents or for API-error fallback.\n *\n * Round-10 (#47, O5): split source so the `register your agent` template\n * doesn't fire on transient backend failures. Also threads `correlationId`\n * through so adapter `onDenied` handlers can surface it on the merchant's\n * response body for log correlation.\n */\nfunction createGuidanceResponse(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  reason?: string,\n  options: { source?: GuidanceSource; correlationId?: string } = {}\n): VerificationResult {\n  const source = options.source ?? 'no_credentials';\n  const isApiError = source === 'api_error';\n\n  const guidance: GuidanceInfo = isApiError\n    ? {\n        message:\n          'Verification is temporarily unavailable. Retry with exponential backoff; if the issue persists, contact support with the correlationId.',\n        registrationUrl: `${config.apiBaseUrl.replace('/api', '')}/register`,\n        documentationUrl: `${config.apiBaseUrl.replace('/api', '')}/docs/agent-access`,\n        steps: [\n          'Retry the request with exponential backoff',\n          'If failures persist, share the correlationId with support',\n        ],\n      }\n    : {\n        message:\n          'This service verifies AI agents before granting access. Please register your agent with AstraSync.',\n        registrationUrl: `${config.apiBaseUrl.replace('/api', '')}/register`,\n        documentationUrl: `${config.apiBaseUrl.replace('/api', '')}/docs/agent-access`,\n        steps: [\n          'Register for an AstraSync account',\n          'Create and register your agent',\n          'Add your ASTRA-ID to request headers',\n          'Retry your request',\n        ],\n      };\n\n  return {\n    // Round-18 G4: createGuidanceResponse fires for unverified-agent path or\n    // API-error fallback. Identity is not verified (no agent resolved);\n    // policy is not evaluated (we never reached the gate).\n    identityVerified: false,\n    policyAllowed: false,\n    // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denials grant `'none'`, NEVER a positive band.\n    // Adapters additionally short-circuit on `!identityVerified ||\n    // !policyAllowed` before the gate check, but the access level still has\n    // to be honest at the data layer so downstream consumers (SDK adapters\n    // in other languages, custom integrations) inherit the correct\n    // semantics.\n    accessLevel: 'none',\n    guidance,\n    denialReasons: reason ? [reason] : ['No valid agent credentials provided'],\n    // Round-10 (#47, O5): on API-error fallback, surface a typed failure so\n    // partners (and their custom onDenied handlers) can branch on\n    // dimension. Without this, the synthesised stub was indistinguishable\n    // from a real policy deny.\n    failures: isApiError\n      ? [\n          {\n            dimension: 'verify_access.api_error',\n            message: reason ?? 'Verification temporarily unavailable',\n            guidance: guidance.message,\n          },\n        ]\n      : undefined,\n    correlationId: options.correlationId,\n    verifiedAt: new Date(),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Call the AstraSync verify-access API\n */\nasync function callVerifyAccessAPI(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest\n): Promise<{\n  success: boolean;\n  access?: {\n    allowed: boolean;\n    /**\n     * Server-decided access level. Read verbatim — do NOT remap client-side.\n     * The server resolves this from endpoint policy + agent trust score using\n     * the canonical thresholds (see backend `apps/backend/src/utils/access-levels.ts`).\n     */\n    accessLevel?: AccessLevel;\n    reason?: string;\n    /**\n     * Aggregated denial failures (v2.9.8+). Empty / absent when allowed.\n     * Each entry is `{ dimension, message, guidance? }` — see\n     * `AccessFailure` for the contract.\n     */\n    failures?: Array<{ dimension: string; message: string; guidance?: string }>;\n    requiresStepUp?: boolean;\n    requiresApproval?: boolean;\n    appliedPolicy?: {\n      boundaryName: string;\n      policyVersion: string;\n    };\n    counterparty?: {\n      id: string;\n      name: string;\n      trustScoreRequirement: number;\n    };\n  };\n  agent?: {\n    kyaAgentId: string;\n    astraId: string;\n    name: string;\n    trustScore: number;\n    trustLevel: string;\n    agentStatus: string;\n    blockchainStatus: string;\n  };\n  developer?: {\n    kyaOwnerId: string;\n    fullName: string;\n    email: string;\n    identityVerified: boolean;\n    trustScore: number;\n  };\n  organization?: {\n    name: string;\n    verified: boolean;\n    trustScore: number;\n  };\n  /**\n   * Structured explanation of the verification decision. Tells the merchant\n   * WHY (id verified? challenge passed? request within PDLSS? trust score?)\n   * without exposing thresholds, scope lists, or other-tenant counterparty\n   * membership. Empty `attestations` unless the endpoint's access policy\n   * declared `required_attestations`.\n   */\n  verificationContext?: {\n    idVerified: boolean;\n    runtimeChallenge: {\n      status: 'passed' | 'skipped' | 'failed' | 'timeout' | 'not_supported';\n      checkedAt: string | null;\n    };\n    pdlssCheck: {\n      result: 'within' | 'exceeded' | 'denied' | 'not_evaluated';\n      purpose: 'approved' | 'denied';\n      scope: 'approved' | 'denied';\n    };\n    dynamicTrustScore: number;\n    attestations: Array<{\n      type: string;\n      status: 'passed' | 'failed';\n      validUntil?: string;\n      proofType: 'reference' | 'zkp';\n      proof: string;\n    }>;\n  };\n  error?: string;\n  /**\n   * Round-10 (#47, O5): when the verify-access server response carries a\n   * correlationId on an error envelope, propagate it so the SDK can thread\n   * it through createGuidanceResponse → adapter onDenied → merchant body.\n   */\n  correlationId?: string;\n}> {\n  const { credentials, ...requestData } = request;\n\n  // Build the request body. agentId is omitted when not provided so the\n  // server treats it as an anonymous canonical-flow call (Branch A/B/C).\n  const body: Record<string, unknown> = {\n    ...(credentials.astraId && { agentId: credentials.astraId }),\n    purpose: requestData.purpose || 'general',\n  };\n\n  // Add optional fields\n  if (requestData.action) body.action = requestData.action;\n  if (requestData.resourceType) body.resourceType = requestData.resourceType;\n  if (requestData.resource) body.resource = requestData.resource;\n  if (requestData.jurisdiction) body.jurisdiction = requestData.jurisdiction;\n  if (requestData.transactionValue) body.transactionValue = requestData.transactionValue;\n  if (requestData.currency) body.currency = requestData.currency;\n  if (requestData.isSubAgentRequest) body.isSubAgentRequest = requestData.isSubAgentRequest;\n  if (requestData.parentAgentId) body.parentAgentId = requestData.parentAgentId;\n  if (requestData.subAgentDepth !== undefined) body.subAgentDepth = requestData.subAgentDepth;\n  // Handshake Protocol v10 additions\n  if (requestData.enableRuntimeChallenge)\n    body.enableRuntimeChallenge = requestData.enableRuntimeChallenge;\n  if (requestData.createSession) body.createSession = requestData.createSession;\n  if (requestData.durationRequired) body.durationRequired = requestData.durationRequired;\n  if (requestData.counterpartyType) body.counterpartyType = requestData.counterpartyType;\n  if (requestData.counterpartyUrl) body.counterpartyUrl = requestData.counterpartyUrl;\n  if (config.counterpartyId) body.counterpartyId = config.counterpartyId;\n  if (requestData.runtimeChallengeOptions)\n    body.runtimeChallengeOptions = requestData.runtimeChallengeOptions;\n  // Round-12 (F19): transport-vs-intent separation. MCP middleware sets\n  // this to 'mcp'; non-MCP callers leave it unset.\n  if (requestData.invocationProtocol) body.invocationProtocol = requestData.invocationProtocol;\n\n  // Round-13 (F14 closure / R13-7): emit the SDK package version on every\n  // verify-access body so the backend can auto-populate `kya_counterparty.\n  // sdk_version` for the calling endpoint. Body field (not User-Agent\n  // header) is the canonical channel — works in Node, browser, behind\n  // Cloudflare, and across SDK bundlers without environment-specific\n  // header gymnastics. Backend's `validation.ts:verifyAccessSchema`\n  // accepts the semver regex; the auto-pop logic is forward-only.\n  body.sdkVersion = SDK_VERSION;\n\n  // Forward caller metadata when present. Merges the legacy top-level\n  // clientIp/userAgent into the nested block for backward compatibility.\n  if (requestData.callerMetadata || requestData.clientIp || requestData.userAgent) {\n    const meta = {\n      ...(requestData.clientIp && { sourceIp: requestData.clientIp }),\n      ...(requestData.userAgent && { userAgent: requestData.userAgent }),\n      ...requestData.callerMetadata,\n    };\n    if (Object.keys(meta).length > 0) body.callerMetadata = meta;\n  }\n\n  // Build headers\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n    'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n    ...config.customHeaders,\n  };\n\n  // verify-access requires authentication. The backend's authenticate middleware\n  // accepts either a JWT or an API key (starts with kya_) via `Authorization: Bearer <token>`.\n  // Credential-supplied auth header (e.g. the agent's own token) takes priority.\n  if (credentials.authorizationHeader) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = credentials.authorizationHeader;\n  } else if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n  }\n  // Legacy header kept for compatibility with any middleware that reads it directly.\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  try {\n    const response = await fetch(`${config.apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access`, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers,\n      body: JSON.stringify(body),\n    });\n\n    const data = await response.json();\n\n    // v2.3.8 (defect #29): treat 410 Gone as a deterministic deactivated-endpoint\n    // signal. Older SDKs may treat any non-2xx as transient and retry; v2.3.8+\n    // surfaces it as a structured denial with `reason: 'endpoint_deactivated'`\n    // so callers can distinguish \"endpoint gone\" from \"endpoint denied this\".\n    if (response.status === 410) {\n      return {\n        success: true,\n        access: {\n          allowed: false,\n          accessLevel: 'none',\n          reason: 'endpoint_deactivated',\n          failures: [\n            {\n              dimension: 'endpoint.deactivated',\n              message:\n                typeof data?.message === 'string' ? data.message : 'Endpoint has been deactivated',\n              guidance:\n                typeof data?.guidance === 'string'\n                  ? data.guidance\n                  : 'Reactivate via POST /api/endpoints/{id}/reactivate, or update the URL on the calling agent.',\n            },\n          ],\n        },\n      };\n    }\n\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      // Round-10 (#47, O5): propagate correlationId on the error path too if\n      // the server happened to include one (some 5xx error envelopes carry\n      // it). Lets the SDK pass it through to the adapter onDenied handler.\n      return {\n        success: false,\n        error: data.message || data.error || `API returned ${response.status}`,\n        correlationId: typeof data?.correlationId === 'string' ? data.correlationId : undefined,\n      };\n    }\n\n    return data;\n  } catch (error) {\n    const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error';\n    return {\n      success: false,\n      error: `Failed to call verify-access API: ${message}`,\n    };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Main verification function\n */\nexport async function verify(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest\n): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n  const mergedConfig = { ...DEFAULT_CONFIG, ...config };\n\n  // One-time init self-test — fire-and-forget, never blocks verify().\n  if (!initCheckPerformed && !mergedConfig.disableInitChecks && mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl) {\n    void performInitCheck(mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl, mergedConfig.debug);\n  }\n\n  // Deprecation warning for v2.3.0 removed config fields. Fires once per process.\n  if (\n    !deprecationWarningShown &&\n    (config.minTrustScore !== undefined || config.minTrustScoreForFull !== undefined)\n  ) {\n    deprecationWarningShown = true;\n    console.warn(\n      '[VerificationGateway] minTrustScore / minTrustScoreForFull are deprecated in v2.3.0 ' +\n        'and have no effect. Server is now the single source of truth for access-level decisions ' +\n        '(the SDK reads access.accessLevel from the verify-access response). To gate access ' +\n        \"to an endpoint, configure the endpoint's trust_score_requirement server-side.\"\n    );\n  }\n\n  // v2.3.0: anonymous traffic no longer short-circuits here. We forward the\n  // request to the server with no agentId; the server applies the endpoint's\n  // unverifiedAgentPolicy and returns advisory. createGuidanceResponse remains\n  // as the offline fallback if the API itself fails (handled below).\n\n  // Check cache first. Round-18.5 F4: caching on unless caller explicitly\n  // sets cacheTtl: 0 to disable. Undefined falls through to the split default\n  // (60s autonomous / 300s step-up) at cacheResult write time.\n  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0) {\n    const cached = getCachedResult(request);\n    if (cached) {\n      if (mergedConfig.debug) {\n        console.log('[VerificationGateway] Returning cached result');\n      }\n      return cached;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Inject counterparty info from config if not already set in request\n  const enrichedRequest = { ...request };\n  if (!enrichedRequest.counterpartyUrl && mergedConfig.counterpartyUrl) {\n    enrichedRequest.counterpartyUrl = mergedConfig.counterpartyUrl;\n  }\n  if (!enrichedRequest.counterpartyType && mergedConfig.counterpartyType) {\n    enrichedRequest.counterpartyType = mergedConfig.counterpartyType;\n  }\n\n  // Call the API\n  if (mergedConfig.debug) {\n    console.log('[VerificationGateway] Calling verify-access API');\n  }\n\n  const apiResponse = await callVerifyAccessAPI(mergedConfig, enrichedRequest);\n\n  // Handle API errors\n  if (!apiResponse.success) {\n    // Round-10 (#47, O5): distinguish API errors from missing-credentials.\n    // The previous default tagged any failure with the \"register your\n    // agent\" template, which is misleading to a verified partner whose\n    // verify-access call hit a 500. The `api_error` source surfaces a\n    // typed `verify_access.api_error` failure entry instead.\n    return createGuidanceResponse(mergedConfig, apiResponse.error, {\n      source: 'api_error',\n      correlationId: (apiResponse as { correlationId?: string }).correlationId,\n    });\n  }\n\n  // Check access result\n  if (!apiResponse.access?.allowed) {\n    // v2.9.8 (defect M1): aggregated failures across every gate that\n    // denied. Surface them on the result so the integrator can see every\n    // blocker in one go instead of the previous fail-fast cascade.\n    const aggregatedFailures = (apiResponse.access as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)\n      ?.failures as Array<{ dimension: string; message: string; guidance?: string }> | undefined;\n    // Round-18 G4: backend denied access (PDLSS or other gate); identity status\n    // depends on whether the backend resolved the caller. Read from\n    // verificationContext.idVerified; default false if absent (anonymous or\n    // identity-fail paths land here too). policyAllowed is false by definition\n    // in this branch (apiResponse.access.allowed === false).\n    const idVerifiedFromBackend =\n      (apiResponse.verificationContext as { idVerified?: boolean } | undefined)?.idVerified ===\n      true;\n    const result: EnhancedVerificationResult = {\n      identityVerified: idVerifiedFromBackend,\n      policyAllowed: false,\n      // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denials grant `'none'`, NEVER a positive band.\n      // Pre-rename this hardcoded `'guidance'`, which conflated with the\n      // colocated `guidance: {...}` help-payload object below and let\n      // denied requests pass any route gated at `'guidance'` because\n      // `hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance') === true`. Adapters now\n      // ALSO short-circuit on `!identityVerified || !policyAllowed` before\n      // the gate check — belt-and-braces.\n      accessLevel: 'none',\n      denialReasons:\n        aggregatedFailures && aggregatedFailures.length > 0\n          ? aggregatedFailures.map((f) => f.message)\n          : apiResponse.access?.reason\n            ? [apiResponse.access.reason]\n            : ['Access denied'],\n      failures: aggregatedFailures,\n      requiresStepUp: apiResponse.access?.requiresStepUp,\n      requiresApproval: apiResponse.access?.requiresApproval,\n      guidance: {\n        message: apiResponse.access?.reason || 'Access denied by PDLSS policy',\n        registrationUrl: `${mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl?.replace('/api', '')}/register`,\n        documentationUrl: `${mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl?.replace('/api', '')}/docs/pdlss`,\n      },\n      verifiedAt: new Date(),\n      // Extract sessionId so decisions can be recorded for denials too\n      sessionId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).sessionId as string | undefined,\n      // v2.3.10 (defect #34, round-4): anonymous traffic has no session →\n      // correlationId is the linking key for paired local_override events.\n      correlationId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).correlationId as string | undefined,\n      recommendation: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>)\n        .recommendation as EnhancedVerificationResult['recommendation'],\n      recommendationReasons: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).recommendationReasons as\n        | string[]\n        | undefined,\n    };\n\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  // Build successful result\n  const agent: VerifiedAgent | undefined = apiResponse.agent\n    ? {\n        astraId: apiResponse.agent.astraId,\n        name: apiResponse.agent.name,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.agent.trustScore,\n        trustLevel: getTrustLevel(apiResponse.agent.trustScore),\n        blockchainVerified: apiResponse.agent.blockchainStatus === 'verified',\n        status: apiResponse.agent.agentStatus as VerifiedAgent['status'],\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  const developer: VerifiedDeveloper | undefined = apiResponse.developer\n    ? {\n        astradId: apiResponse.developer.kyaOwnerId,\n        name: apiResponse.developer.fullName,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.developer.trustScore || 0,\n        verified: apiResponse.developer.identityVerified,\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  const organization: VerifiedOrganization | undefined = apiResponse.organization\n    ? {\n        name: apiResponse.organization.name,\n        verified: apiResponse.organization.verified,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.organization.trustScore,\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  // Verification context — structured \"why\" the merchant gets in v2.2.4+.\n  // Carries appliedPolicy (no UUIDs), pdlssCheck summary, dynamic trust score,\n  // and policy-driven attestations. Replaces the old over-sharing `pdlss` block.\n  const verificationContext = apiResponse.verificationContext;\n\n  // Server is the single source of truth for access level. SDK reads\n  // apiResponse.access.accessLevel verbatim — no client-side trust-score remap.\n  // Fallback to 'standard' if the server response is missing the field (older\n  // backend without the v2.3.0 contract); it covers the verified-access case.\n  const accessLevel: AccessLevel = apiResponse.access?.accessLevel ?? 'standard';\n\n  const result: EnhancedVerificationResult = {\n    // Round-18 G4: backend allowed access. Identity is verified (we resolved\n    // the caller to an agent) and policy passed all gates. Read idVerified\n    // from verificationContext for symmetry with the deny branch; default true\n    // on success path since `access.allowed === true` implies identity was\n    // resolvable (anonymous-allow paths flow through createGuidanceResponse).\n    identityVerified:\n      (apiResponse.verificationContext as { idVerified?: boolean } | undefined)?.idVerified !==\n      false,\n    policyAllowed: true,\n    accessLevel,\n    agent,\n    developer,\n    organization,\n    appliedPolicy: apiResponse.access?.appliedPolicy,\n    verificationContext,\n    requiresStepUp: apiResponse.access?.requiresStepUp,\n    requiresApproval: apiResponse.access?.requiresApproval,\n    verifiedAt: new Date(),\n    cacheTtl: mergedConfig.cacheTtl,\n    // Handshake Protocol v10 enhanced fields (present when backend returns them)\n    sessionId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).sessionId as string | undefined,\n    // v2.3.10 (defect #34, round-4): anonymous responses surface correlationId\n    // (no session row exists for unverified callers).\n    correlationId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).correlationId as string | undefined,\n    runtimeChallenge: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).runtimeChallenge as\n      | RuntimeChallengeResult\n      | undefined,\n    tokenGuidance: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).tokenGuidance as\n      | TokenGuidance\n      | undefined,\n    recommendation: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>)\n      .recommendation as EnhancedVerificationResult['recommendation'],\n    recommendationReasons: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).recommendationReasons as\n      | string[]\n      | undefined,\n    warningHeader: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).warningHeader as\n      | { name: string; value: string }\n      | undefined,\n  };\n\n  // Enforce AstraSync recommendation\n  if (result.recommendation === 'deny') {\n    // Round-18 G4: recommendation-driven deny lands on the success-path\n    // construction (identity was resolved). Flip policy only — identity stays\n    // verified — so adapters return 403 (re-auth won't help; the policy\n    // decision is the blocker).\n    result.policyAllowed = false;\n    result.accessLevel = 'none';\n    result.denialReasons = result.recommendationReasons || [\n      'Access denied by AstraSync recommendation',\n    ];\n    if (result.runtimeChallenge) {\n      result.guidance = {\n        message: `Verification failed: ${result.runtimeChallenge.reason || 'runtime challenge failed'}`,\n        registrationUrl: `${mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl?.replace('/api', '')}/register`,\n        documentationUrl: `${mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl?.replace('/api', '')}/docs/runtime-challenge`,\n      };\n    }\n  } else if (result.recommendation === 'step_up_required') {\n    result.requiresStepUp = true;\n    if (ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY[result.accessLevel] > ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY['read-only']) {\n      result.accessLevel = 'read-only';\n    }\n    result.denialReasons = result.recommendationReasons || ['Step-up verification required'];\n  }\n\n  // Cache the result (skip caching denials — agent may fix challenge endpoint\n  // and retry). Round-18.5 F4: cacheResult applies split default (60s/300s)\n  // when configuredTtl is undefined; honours the caller's value when set.\n  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0 && result.recommendation !== 'deny') {\n    cacheResult(request, result, mergedConfig.cacheTtl);\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Record a counterparty's grant/deny decision for a verification session.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\n/**\n * v2.3.9 (defect #34): optional override metadata. Set when the SDK's\n * local enforcement (toolGate / methodGate / trustScore floor) rejected\n * a request the SERVER had granted. Backend emits a distinct\n * `verification.local_override` event so the activity feed surfaces the\n * divergence as a separate row.\n */\nexport interface DecisionOverride {\n  overriddenBy: 'toolGate' | 'methodGate' | 'trustScore' | 'other';\n  toolName?: string;\n  requestedLevel?: AccessLevel;\n  grantedLevel?: AccessLevel;\n}\n\nexport async function recordDecision(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  sessionId: string,\n  decision: 'granted' | 'denied',\n  reason?: string,\n  override?: DecisionOverride\n): Promise<void> {\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  await fetch(`${config.apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access/${sessionId}/decision`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers,\n    body: JSON.stringify({\n      decision,\n      reason,\n      ...(override && {\n        overriddenBy: override.overriddenBy,\n        toolName: override.toolName,\n        requestedLevel: override.requestedLevel,\n        grantedLevel: override.grantedLevel,\n      }),\n    }),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * v2.3.10 (defect #34, round-4): record a SDK-side local override for an\n * anonymous verify-access response. Anonymous traffic has no session row, so\n * `recordDecision` (above) doesn't apply — but we still need to surface the\n * dashboard-vs-runtime divergence (e.g. server granted with audit warning\n * but local toolGate floor denied) on the activity feed.\n *\n * Backend ties the resulting `verification.local_override` event back to the\n * original `verification.unverified_audit` event via `correlationId`. The\n * endpoint is sessionless — see the docstring on the backend route for the\n * abuse-mitigation rationale (rate-limited per IP).\n *\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function recordAnonymousLocalOverride(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  correlationId: string,\n  override: DecisionOverride,\n  reason?: string\n): Promise<void> {\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  await fetch(`${config.apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access/local-override`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers,\n    body: JSON.stringify({\n      correlationId,\n      reason,\n      overriddenBy: override.overriddenBy,\n      toolName: override.toolName,\n      requestedLevel: override.requestedLevel,\n      grantedLevel: override.grantedLevel,\n    }),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Fetch the per-route policy for an endpoint from the AstraSync backend.\n * v2.9.7 moved policy authority into the dashboard — the SDK no longer\n * accepts `routes` from merchant-side source code, it fetches them from\n * here on init (and refreshes periodically).\n *\n * Returns `null` when the request fails for any reason — the caller decides\n * how to fall back (the middleware allows-all when no policy is loaded so\n * a misconfigured init doesn't take down the merchant's API).\n */\nexport async function fetchRoutes(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  counterpartyId: string\n): Promise<RouteAccessConfigShape[] | null> {\n  if (!counterpartyId) return null;\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n  try {\n    const response = await fetch(\n      `${config.apiBaseUrl}/endpoints/${encodeURIComponent(counterpartyId)}/routes`,\n      { method: 'GET', headers }\n    );\n    if (!response.ok) return null;\n    const body = (await response.json()) as { data?: { routes?: RouteAccessConfigShape[] } };\n    return body.data?.routes ?? [];\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Minimal shape of an EndpointRoute as the SDK consumes it. Mirrors the\n * server's `EndpointRoute` type and the SDK's `RouteAccessConfig` — same\n * JSON moves between server and SDK unchanged.\n */\nexport interface RouteAccessConfigShape {\n  pattern: string;\n  method: string;\n  minAccessLevel: 'none' | 'restricted' | 'read-only' | 'standard' | 'full' | 'internal';\n  minTrustScore?: number;\n  requiredPurposes?: string[];\n  allowedPurposes?: string[];\n  allowedJurisdictions?: string[];\n  maxDuration?: number;\n  maxTransactionValue?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify an agent AND automatically record the grant/deny decision.\n *\n * This is the recommended entry point for counterparties that call verify()\n * directly (e.g. MCP servers) rather than using createMiddleware().\n * It adds createSession: true, then fire-and-forgets the decision.\n */\nexport async function verifyAndRecord(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest\n): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n  const mergedConfig = { ...DEFAULT_CONFIG, ...config };\n  const result = await verify(mergedConfig, { ...request, createSession: true });\n  const sessionId = (result as EnhancedVerificationResult).sessionId;\n\n  if (sessionId) {\n    // Round-18 G4: a session is \"granted\" only if identity verified AND\n    // policy allowed; either failing is a deny.\n    if (result.identityVerified && result.policyAllowed) {\n      recordDecision(mergedConfig, sessionId, 'granted').catch(() => {});\n    } else {\n      recordDecision(mergedConfig, sessionId, 'denied', result.denialReasons?.[0]).catch(() => {});\n    }\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Report an unregistered agent attempt (no AstraSync credentials).\n * Called by SDK adapters when an agent is redirected to /docs/agent-access.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function reportUnregisteredAttempt(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  data: {\n    counterpartyUrl: string;\n    counterpartyType?: string;\n    sourceIp?: string;\n    userAgent?: string;\n    requestPath?: string;\n    requestMethod?: string;\n  }\n): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n\n  await fetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/verification-activity/unregistered-attempt`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n    body: JSON.stringify(data),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Report a counterparty-side PDLSS pre-check failure.\n * Called by SDK adapters when the agent's requested PDLSS exceeds\n * counterparty-defined maximums BEFORE calling verify-access.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function reportCounterpartyPreCheckFailure(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  data: {\n    agentId: string;\n    counterpartyUrl: string;\n    counterpartyType?: string;\n    failures: Array<{\n      field: string;\n      requested: string | number;\n      limit: string | number | string[];\n      message: string;\n    }>;\n    requestPath?: string;\n    requestMethod?: string;\n  }\n): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n\n  await fetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/verification-activity/counterparty-pre-check-failure`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n    body: JSON.stringify(data),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Quick verification — checks credentials and policy in one call.\n *\n * Round-18 G4: return shape mirrors `VerificationResult`'s split — partners\n * writing custom handlers around `quickVerify` get the same identity/policy\n * distinction as those calling `verify()` directly. Map to HTTP status the\n * same way: `!identityVerified` → 401; `identityVerified && !policyAllowed`\n * → 403.\n */\nexport async function quickVerify(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  credentials: AgentCredentials\n): Promise<{\n  identityVerified: boolean;\n  policyAllowed: boolean;\n  accessLevel: AccessLevel;\n  reason?: string;\n}> {\n  const result = await verify(config, {\n    credentials,\n    purpose: 'verification',\n  });\n\n  return {\n    identityVerified: result.identityVerified,\n    policyAllowed: result.policyAllowed,\n    accessLevel: result.accessLevel,\n    reason: result.denialReasons?.[0],\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * HTTP Transport Adapter\n *\n * Maps AstraSync credentials to/from HTTP headers (X-Astra-* convention).\n */\n\nimport type { AstraSyncCredentials } from '../types';\n\nconst HEADER_PREFIX = 'X-Astra-';\n\n/**\n * Inject AstraSync credentials into HTTP headers.\n */\nexport function setHttpHeaders(\n  headers: Record<string, string>,\n  credentials: AstraSyncCredentials,\n): Record<string, string> {\n  const result = { ...headers };\n\n  result[`${HEADER_PREFIX}ID`] = credentials.agentId;\n\n  if (credentials.verifyUrl) {\n    result[`${HEADER_PREFIX}Verify`] = credentials.verifyUrl;\n  }\n\n  if (credentials.challengeUrl) {\n    result[`${HEADER_PREFIX}Challenge`] = credentials.challengeUrl;\n  }\n\n  if (credentials.pdlss?.purpose) {\n    const purposeValue = credentials.pdlss.purpose.action\n      ? `${credentials.pdlss.purpose.category}:${credentials.pdlss.purpose.action}`\n      : credentials.pdlss.purpose.category;\n    result[`${HEADER_PREFIX}Purpose`] = purposeValue;\n  }\n\n  if (credentials.pdlss?.duration?.maxSessionDuration) {\n    result[`${HEADER_PREFIX}Duration`] = String(credentials.pdlss.duration.maxSessionDuration);\n  }\n\n  if (credentials.pdlss?.scope?.jurisdiction) {\n    result[`${HEADER_PREFIX}Scope`] = credentials.pdlss.scope.jurisdiction;\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract AstraSync credentials from HTTP headers.\n */\nexport function extractHttpCredentials(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n): AstraSyncCredentials | null {\n  const getValue = (key: string): string | undefined => {\n    const v = headers[key] ?? headers[key.toLowerCase()];\n    return Array.isArray(v) ? v[0] : v;\n  };\n\n  const agentId = getValue(`${HEADER_PREFIX}ID`) ?? getValue('x-astra-id');\n  if (!agentId) return null;\n\n  const credentials: AstraSyncCredentials = { agentId };\n\n  const verifyUrl = getValue(`${HEADER_PREFIX}Verify`) ?? getValue('x-astra-verify');\n  if (verifyUrl) credentials.verifyUrl = verifyUrl;\n\n  const challengeUrl = getValue(`${HEADER_PREFIX}Challenge`) ?? getValue('x-astra-challenge');\n  if (challengeUrl) credentials.challengeUrl = challengeUrl;\n\n  const purpose = getValue(`${HEADER_PREFIX}Purpose`) ?? getValue('x-astra-purpose');\n  if (purpose) {\n    const [category, action] = purpose.split(':');\n    credentials.pdlss = {\n      ...credentials.pdlss,\n      purpose: { category, action },\n    };\n  }\n\n  const duration = getValue(`${HEADER_PREFIX}Duration`) ?? getValue('x-astra-duration');\n  if (duration) {\n    credentials.pdlss = {\n      ...credentials.pdlss,\n      duration: { maxSessionDuration: parseInt(duration, 10) },\n    };\n  }\n\n  const scope = getValue(`${HEADER_PREFIX}Scope`) ?? getValue('x-astra-scope');\n  if (scope) {\n    credentials.pdlss = {\n      ...credentials.pdlss,\n      scope: { jurisdiction: scope },\n    };\n  }\n\n  return credentials;\n}\n","/**\n * Counterparty-side PDLSS pre-check.\n *\n * Compares the agent's requested PDLSS dimensions (from X-Astra-* headers)\n * against the counterparty-defined maximums on the route config.\n * Returns an array of failures — empty means all checks passed.\n *\n * This runs BEFORE calling verify-access on AstraSync. If it fails,\n * the request is rejected immediately without calling the platform.\n */\n\nimport type { RouteAccessConfig, AstraSyncCredentials, CounterpartyPreCheckFailure } from './types';\n\nexport function performCounterpartyPreCheck(\n  routeConfig: RouteAccessConfig,\n  astraCreds: AstraSyncCredentials | null,\n  purpose: string | undefined\n): CounterpartyPreCheckFailure[] {\n  const failures: CounterpartyPreCheckFailure[] = [];\n\n  // Check purpose against allowedPurposes whitelist. Route allow-lists are an\n  // OPTIONAL per-route refinement — undefined/empty = \"skip, let the backend\n  // evaluator be the authoritative gate\". The backend's PDLSS evaluator\n  // enforces the agent's own declared policy (round-18.5 F3 fail-closed there\n  // is correct: the agent declared its allowlist or didn't). Treating an\n  // undefined route allow-list as fail-closed breaks every partner that hasn't\n  // enumerated allowedPurposes (which is most of them — round-18.5 originally\n  // shipped this and was reverted in 2.4.11 after partner-wide auth break).\n  if (routeConfig.allowedPurposes && routeConfig.allowedPurposes.length > 0 && purpose) {\n    if (!routeConfig.allowedPurposes.includes(purpose)) {\n      failures.push({\n        field: 'purpose',\n        requested: purpose,\n        limit: routeConfig.allowedPurposes,\n        message: `Purpose \"${purpose}\" is not in the allowed list: [${routeConfig.allowedPurposes.join(', ')}]`,\n      });\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Check purpose against requiredPurposes (legacy field — agent must declare one of these)\n  if (routeConfig.requiredPurposes && routeConfig.requiredPurposes.length > 0 && purpose) {\n    if (!routeConfig.requiredPurposes.includes(purpose)) {\n      failures.push({\n        field: 'purpose',\n        requested: purpose,\n        limit: routeConfig.requiredPurposes,\n        message: `Purpose \"${purpose}\" is not in the required list: [${routeConfig.requiredPurposes.join(', ')}]`,\n      });\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Check duration against maxDuration — range-check (unchanged; undefined =\n  // no upper bound is conventional for opt-in range fields, not a request-\n  // driven allow-list).\n  if (routeConfig.maxDuration && astraCreds?.pdlss?.duration?.maxSessionDuration) {\n    const requested = astraCreds.pdlss.duration.maxSessionDuration;\n    if (requested > routeConfig.maxDuration) {\n      failures.push({\n        field: 'duration',\n        requested,\n        limit: routeConfig.maxDuration,\n        message: `Requested duration ${requested}s exceeds maximum ${routeConfig.maxDuration}s`,\n      });\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Check jurisdiction against allowedJurisdictions. Same reasoning as\n  // allowedPurposes above — route allow-lists are an optional per-route\n  // refinement; undefined/empty = skip and defer to the backend evaluator.\n  if (\n    routeConfig.allowedJurisdictions &&\n    routeConfig.allowedJurisdictions.length > 0 &&\n    astraCreds?.pdlss?.scope?.jurisdiction\n  ) {\n    const requested = astraCreds.pdlss.scope.jurisdiction;\n    if (!routeConfig.allowedJurisdictions.includes(requested)) {\n      failures.push({\n        field: 'jurisdiction',\n        requested,\n        limit: routeConfig.allowedJurisdictions,\n        message: `Jurisdiction \"${requested}\" is not in the allowed list: [${routeConfig.allowedJurisdictions.join(', ')}]`,\n      });\n    }\n  }\n\n  return failures;\n}\n","/**\n * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway - Express Middleware\n *\n * Express.js middleware for verifying AI agents on API endpoints.\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * import express from 'express';\n * import { createMiddleware } from '@astrasyncai/verification-gateway/express';\n *\n * const app = express();\n *\n * app.use(createMiddleware({\n *   apiBaseUrl: 'https://astrasync.ai/api',\n *   routes: [\n *     { pattern: '/api/public/*', method: '*', minAccessLevel: 'none' },\n *     { pattern: '/api/data/*', method: 'GET', minAccessLevel: 'read-only' },\n *     { pattern: '/api/data/*', method: '*', minAccessLevel: 'standard' },\n *     { pattern: '/api/admin/*', method: '*', minAccessLevel: 'internal' },\n *   ],\n * }));\n * ```\n */\n\nimport type { Request, Response, NextFunction, RequestHandler } from 'express';\nimport type {\n  ExpressMiddlewareOptions,\n  AgentCredentials,\n  VerificationResult,\n  EnhancedVerificationResult,\n  RouteAccessConfig,\n  AstraSyncCredentials,\n} from '../types';\nimport {\n  verify,\n  extractCredentials,\n  recordDecision,\n  reportCounterpartyPreCheckFailure,\n  fetchRoutes,\n} from '../verify';\nimport { hasMinimumAccess } from '../access-levels';\nimport { extractHttpCredentials } from '../transport/http';\nimport { performCounterpartyPreCheck } from '../pdlss-pre-check';\n\n/**\n * Extend Express Request with verification result\n */\ndeclare global {\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-namespace\n  namespace Express {\n    interface Request {\n      agentVerification?: VerificationResult;\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Default credential extractor\n */\nfunction defaultExtractCredentials(req: Request): AgentCredentials {\n  return extractCredentials(\n    req.headers as Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n    req.query as Record<string, string | undefined>\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract extended AstraSync credentials (X-Astra-* headers) from Express request.\n * Returns null if no AstraSync headers are present.\n */\nexport function extractAstraSyncCredentials(req: Request): AstraSyncCredentials | null {\n  return extractHttpCredentials(req.headers as Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>);\n}\n\n/**\n * Default purpose extractor.\n *\n * Priority:\n * 1. Agent's declared PDLSS purpose from X-Astra-Purpose header (e.g. \"read_data:search\")\n * 2. Explicit x-purpose header\n * 3. Query parameter ?purpose=\n * 4. HTTP method → PDLSS category fallback\n */\nfunction defaultExtractPurpose(req: Request): string | undefined {\n  // 1. Check agent's declared PDLSS purpose (X-Astra-Purpose header)\n  const astraPurpose = req.headers['x-astra-purpose'];\n  if (astraPurpose) {\n    const value = Array.isArray(astraPurpose) ? astraPurpose[0] : astraPurpose;\n    // Extract category from \"category:action\" format — the verify API expects the category\n    const category = value.split(':')[0];\n    return category;\n  }\n\n  // 2. Try explicit purpose header\n  const purposeHeader = req.headers['x-purpose'] || req.headers['X-Purpose'];\n  if (purposeHeader) {\n    return Array.isArray(purposeHeader) ? purposeHeader[0] : purposeHeader;\n  }\n\n  // 3. Try query parameter\n  if (req.query.purpose && typeof req.query.purpose === 'string') {\n    return req.query.purpose;\n  }\n\n  // 4. Infer from HTTP method using PDLSS-compatible categories\n  switch (req.method) {\n    case 'GET':\n      return 'read_data';\n    case 'POST':\n      return 'write_data';\n    case 'PUT':\n    case 'PATCH':\n      return 'write_data';\n    case 'DELETE':\n      return 'delete_data';\n    default:\n      return 'general';\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Match a route pattern against a path\n */\nfunction matchRoute(pattern: string, path: string): boolean {\n  // Convert pattern to regex\n  const regexPattern = pattern.replace(/\\*/g, '.*').replace(/\\//g, '\\\\/');\n\n  const regex = new RegExp(`^${regexPattern}$`);\n  return regex.test(path);\n}\n\n/**\n * Find the route configuration for a request\n */\nfunction findRouteConfig(\n  routes: RouteAccessConfig[],\n  path: string,\n  method: string\n): RouteAccessConfig | undefined {\n  return routes.find((route) => {\n    const methodMatches =\n      route.method === '*' || route.method.toUpperCase() === method.toUpperCase();\n    const pathMatches = matchRoute(route.pattern, path);\n    return methodMatches && pathMatches;\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Default denied handler\n *\n * Round-10 (#47, O5): the response body now carries the full `failures[]`\n * array and the `correlationId` so partners can render per-dimension UX\n * and tie a denial back to a server log line. Previously the merchant only\n * got the first denialReason — meaningful detail was thrown away before\n * the response left the SDK. Also stamps `X-Astra-Gateway-Mode: enforced`\n * so partners can tell a gate-evaluated denial apart from a gate-skipped\n * pass-through (#49/O10 — the `unenforced` complement).\n */\nfunction defaultOnDenied(result: VerificationResult, _req: Request, res: Response): void {\n  // Round-18 G4: identity-verification failures → 401 (re-authenticate);\n  // identity-verified-but-policy-denied → 403 (re-auth won't help; update\n  // PDLSS scope or escalate to step-up). Maps to the two distinct recovery\n  // actions that HTTP middleware acts on without parsing bodies. The\n  // impossible state `!identityVerified && policyAllowed` falls into the\n  // `!identityVerified` branch — identity is the more-fundamental missing\n  // precondition.\n  const statusCode = !result.identityVerified ? 401 : 403;\n\n  res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Mode', 'enforced');\n\n  res.status(statusCode).json({\n    success: false,\n    error: {\n      code: !result.identityVerified ? 'UNAUTHORIZED' : 'INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS',\n      message: result.denialReasons?.[0] || 'Access denied',\n      accessLevel: result.accessLevel,\n      guidance: result.guidance,\n      // Round-10: aggregated per-dimension detail + correlation handle.\n      failures: result.failures,\n      correlationId: result.correlationId,\n    },\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Refresh interval for the remote-fetched route policy. Default: every 5\n * minutes. Override via `routesRefreshMs` on the middleware options. Each\n * middleware instance keeps its own cache; multiple instances pointing at the\n * same endpoint will each fetch independently.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_ROUTES_REFRESH_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;\n\n/**\n * Create Express middleware for agent verification.\n *\n * v2.9.7 moved per-route policy authority out of merchant-side source code\n * into the AstraSync dashboard. `createMiddleware` no longer accepts a\n * `routes` array — it fetches the endpoint's stored policy via\n * `GET /endpoints/:counterpartyId/routes` on init and refreshes\n * periodically. Policy edits in the dashboard take effect on the next\n * refresh (or sooner if the operator manually restarts the SDK).\n *\n * `counterpartyId` is required: the SDK can't know which endpoint's policy\n * to fetch without it. Local-development workflows that don't have an\n * AstraSync endpoint registered can omit it — the middleware logs a\n * one-time warning and falls through (allows all) until a policy is\n * fetchable.\n */\nexport function createMiddleware(options: ExpressMiddlewareOptions): RequestHandler {\n  const {\n    extractCredentials: customExtractCredentials,\n    extractPurpose: customExtractPurpose,\n    skipPaths = [],\n    onDenied = defaultOnDenied,\n    recordDecisions,\n    enableRuntimeChallenge = true,\n    routesRefreshMs = DEFAULT_ROUTES_REFRESH_MS,\n    ...config\n  } = options;\n\n  // Per-middleware-instance route cache. Populated on first fetch; refreshed\n  // every `routesRefreshMs`. Until first successful fetch we hold an empty\n  // array which means \"no per-route gating active\" — the middleware falls\n  // through. Pre-fix the array came from merchant source, which both broke\n  // the auth-boundary story (defect 24) and silently disagreed with the\n  // dashboard.\n  let cachedRoutes: RouteAccessConfig[] = [];\n  let lastFetchAt = 0;\n  let refreshing: Promise<void> | null = null;\n  let warnedNoCounterparty = false;\n  let warnedEmptyRoutes = false;\n\n  async function refreshRoutes(): Promise<void> {\n    if (!config.counterpartyId) {\n      if (!warnedNoCounterparty) {\n        // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n        console.warn(\n          '[VerificationGateway] No counterpartyId configured — falling through (allow all). ' +\n            'Per-route policy lives in the AstraSync dashboard now; register the endpoint and ' +\n            'set counterpartyId in your middleware config to enforce policy.'\n        );\n        warnedNoCounterparty = true;\n      }\n      return;\n    }\n    const fetched = await fetchRoutes(config, config.counterpartyId);\n    if (fetched) {\n      cachedRoutes = fetched;\n      lastFetchAt = Date.now();\n      // v2.3.8 (defect #25): if the fetch succeeded but returned an empty\n      // policy, the endpoint is registered correctly but the operator hasn't\n      // configured any routes yet — every request will fall through ungated.\n      // Surface this loudly once so silent pass-through can't go unnoticed.\n      if (cachedRoutes.length === 0 && !warnedEmptyRoutes) {\n        const dashboard = config.dashboardUrl ?? 'https://app.astrasync.ai';\n        // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n        console.warn(\n          `[VerificationGateway] No route policy configured for ${config.counterpartyId}. ` +\n            `Gateway is in pass-through mode for ALL traffic until you add at least one route. ` +\n            `Configure at ${dashboard}/dashboard/endpoints/${config.counterpartyId}/routes`\n        );\n        warnedEmptyRoutes = true;\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Eager first fetch so the first request after init has policy loaded.\n  // Errors are swallowed (handled by fetchRoutes returning null).\n  refreshing = refreshRoutes().finally(() => {\n    refreshing = null;\n  });\n\n  return async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction): Promise<void> => {\n    try {\n      // Check if path should be skipped\n      const shouldSkip = skipPaths.some((pattern) => matchRoute(pattern, req.path));\n      if (shouldSkip) {\n        return next();\n      }\n\n      // Wait for in-flight init fetch (only on the very first request) so we\n      // don't admit traffic with no policy loaded.\n      if (refreshing) {\n        await refreshing.catch(() => {});\n      }\n      // Time-based refresh: kick off a background refresh if the cache is\n      // stale. Doesn't block the current request — readers see whatever is\n      // cached at this moment; the next request will see the refreshed copy.\n      if (config.counterpartyId && Date.now() - lastFetchAt > routesRefreshMs) {\n        refreshing = refreshRoutes().finally(() => {\n          refreshing = null;\n        });\n      }\n\n      // Find route configuration\n      const routeConfig = findRouteConfig(cachedRoutes, req.path, req.method);\n\n      // If no route config, skip verification (allow through)\n      if (!routeConfig) {\n        if (config.setPassThroughHeader) {\n          // Round-10 (#49, O10): `unenforced` replaces the previous\n          // `pass-through` label. The previous name conflated \"gateway\n          // didn't evaluate policy\" with \"request succeeded end-to-end\" —\n          // the downstream handler may still return any status. The new\n          // semantic describes the GATE state only.\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Mode', 'unenforced');\n          res.setHeader(\n            'X-Astra-Gateway-Reason',\n            cachedRoutes.length === 0 ? 'no-policy' : 'no-match'\n          );\n        }\n        return next();\n      }\n\n      // Extract credentials (hoisted from below the route-none check so the\n      // round-12 F9 evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed flag can decide whether to\n      // evaluate vs short-circuit).\n      const credentials = customExtractCredentials\n        ? customExtractCredentials(req)\n        : defaultExtractCredentials(req);\n\n      // Round-12 (F9): route-none short-circuit unless the caller wants\n      // evaluation-without-enforcement. With evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed\n      // set to true AND credentials present, the middleware calls\n      // verify-access for audit + req.agentVerification population, then\n      // proceeds without gating. Default behaviour (flag off) preserves\n      // pre-F9 short-circuit semantics.\n      const shouldEnforce = routeConfig.minAccessLevel !== 'none';\n      if (\n        routeConfig.minAccessLevel === 'none' &&\n        (!config.evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed || !credentials.astraId)\n      ) {\n        if (config.setPassThroughHeader) {\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Mode', 'unenforced');\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Reason', 'route-none');\n        }\n        return next();\n      }\n\n      // v2.3.0: anonymous traffic no longer short-circuits client-side.\n      // The server applies the endpoint's `unverifiedAgentPolicy` (deny /\n      // allow_partial / allow_full) and emits the verification event +\n      // blockchain record per the canonical flow. SDK forwards verbatim.\n\n      // Extract purpose\n      const purpose = customExtractPurpose ? customExtractPurpose(req) : defaultExtractPurpose(req);\n\n      // Extract full AstraSync credentials (includes PDLSS from X-Astra-* headers)\n      const astraCreds = extractAstraSyncCredentials(req);\n\n      // Auto-detect counterparty URL from the request if not explicitly configured.\n      // Since the SDK is installed at this endpoint, we always know the origin.\n      const counterpartyUrl = config.counterpartyUrl || `${req.protocol}://${req.get('host')}`;\n\n      // Step 2: Counterparty-side PDLSS pre-check — compare agent's requested PDLSS\n      // against counterparty-defined maximums on the route config.\n      // Rejects immediately if outside limits, BEFORE calling verify-access.\n      const preCheckFailures = performCounterpartyPreCheck(routeConfig, astraCreds, purpose);\n      if (preCheckFailures.length > 0) {\n        // Round-18 G4: counterparty pre-check failure — request rejected\n        // before reaching verify-access. Neither identity nor policy was\n        // remotely verified; both axes truthfully false.\n        const result: VerificationResult = {\n          identityVerified: false,\n          policyAllowed: false,\n          accessLevel: 'none',\n          denialReasons: preCheckFailures.map((f) => f.message),\n          guidance: {\n            message: 'Request exceeds counterparty-defined PDLSS limits.',\n            registrationUrl: `${config.apiBaseUrl?.replace('/api', '')}/register`,\n            documentationUrl: `${config.apiBaseUrl?.replace('/api', '')}/docs/pdlss`,\n          },\n          verifiedAt: new Date(),\n        };\n\n        req.agentVerification = result;\n\n        // Fire-and-forget: notify AstraSync of the pre-check failure\n        reportCounterpartyPreCheckFailure(config, {\n          agentId: astraCreds?.agentId || credentials.astraId || 'unknown',\n          counterpartyUrl,\n          counterpartyType: config.counterpartyType || 'api',\n          failures: preCheckFailures,\n          requestPath: req.path,\n          requestMethod: req.method,\n        }).catch(() => {});\n\n        onDenied(result, req, res);\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // Step 3: Call AstraSync verify-access with runtime challenge enabled\n      const shouldRecordDecisions = recordDecisions !== false;\n      const forwardedFor = req.headers['x-forwarded-for'];\n      const forwardedForStr = Array.isArray(forwardedFor) ? forwardedFor.join(', ') : forwardedFor;\n      // X-Forwarded-For's first entry is the original client. Fall back to req.ip\n      // (which Express already resolves via trust proxy settings when configured).\n      const originalClientIp = forwardedForStr ? forwardedForStr.split(',')[0].trim() : req.ip;\n      const agentCardUrl =\n        typeof req.headers['x-astrasync-agent-card'] === 'string'\n          ? (req.headers['x-astrasync-agent-card'] as string)\n          : undefined;\n\n      const result = await verify(config, {\n        credentials,\n        purpose,\n        // RFC 7230 § 3.1.1 — HTTP method tokens uppercase by IANA convention.\n        // Backend evaluator tolerates either case as defense-in-depth\n        // (round-18.6 batch 2); SDK emits canonical form.\n        action: req.method.toUpperCase(),\n        resource: req.path,\n        createSession: shouldRecordDecisions,\n        counterpartyUrl,\n        counterpartyType: config.counterpartyType || 'api',\n        enableRuntimeChallenge,\n        durationRequired: astraCreds?.pdlss?.duration?.maxSessionDuration,\n        callerMetadata: {\n          sourceIp: originalClientIp,\n          userAgent: req.headers['user-agent'] as string | undefined,\n          referer: req.headers.referer as string | undefined,\n          host: req.headers.host as string | undefined,\n          forwardedFor: forwardedForStr,\n          agentCardUrl,\n        },\n      });\n\n      // Attach result to request\n      req.agentVerification = result;\n      const sessionId = (result as EnhancedVerificationResult).sessionId;\n\n      // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denied verifications short-circuit BEFORE the\n      // gate-level comparison. Pre-rename, denials returned\n      // `accessLevel: 'guidance'` and routes gated at `'guidance'` passed\n      // `hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance') === true` — letting\n      // unverified anonymous traffic through to the merchant handler. The\n      // verify.ts denial branches now return `'none'` (so the gate check\n      // alone would correctly deny), but trusting access-level math for a\n      // denial is a category error: failing either identity OR policy already\n      // means \"deny.\" We check that first.\n      // Round-18 G4: short-circuit on either axis failing — identity-fail\n      // (no resolved caller) or policy-fail (PDLSS or recommendation deny).\n      if (!result.identityVerified || !result.policyAllowed) {\n        if (shouldRecordDecisions && sessionId) {\n          recordDecision(config, sessionId, 'denied', result.denialReasons?.[0]).catch(() => {});\n        }\n        onDenied(result, req, res);\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // Round-12 (F9): evaluation-without-enforcement. When the route is\n      // 'none' but we ran verify-access for audit, skip the gates and call\n      // next() — the result is on req.agentVerification for the handler\n      // to render tier-aware responses (e.g. anonymous vs verified\n      // catalog view on the same path).\n      if (!shouldEnforce) {\n        if (config.setPassThroughHeader) {\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Mode', 'enforced');\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Reason', 'evaluated-not-enforced');\n        }\n        if (shouldRecordDecisions && sessionId) {\n          recordDecision(config, sessionId, 'granted').catch(() => {});\n        }\n        return next();\n      }\n\n      // Check if access level is sufficient (verified caller path only —\n      // denials handled above)\n      if (!hasMinimumAccess(result.accessLevel, routeConfig.minAccessLevel)) {\n        // Round-12 (F12): synthesise the structured failure entry so the\n        // partner-facing response carries the same shape as every other\n        // denial dimension. Guidance positions step-up only — increasing\n        // trust score or lowering the route floor both read as gaming the\n        // gate. Step-up flow ships separately this month.\n        const insufficientFailure = {\n          dimension: 'access_level.insufficient',\n          message: `Endpoint requires accessLevel '${routeConfig.minAccessLevel}'; agent has '${result.accessLevel}'.`,\n          guidance:\n            \"Request elevated access via step-up verification (coming soon — ships this month). Step-up lets the agent owner approve a one-time elevation for this specific counterparty + purpose without changing the agent's baseline trust score.\",\n        };\n        result.failures = [...(result.failures ?? []), insufficientFailure];\n        result.denialReasons = [...(result.denialReasons ?? []), insufficientFailure.message];\n        if (shouldRecordDecisions && sessionId) {\n          recordDecision(config, sessionId, 'denied', insufficientFailure.message).catch(() => {});\n        }\n        onDenied(result, req, res);\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // Check trust score requirement if specified\n      if (routeConfig.minTrustScore && result.agent) {\n        if (result.agent.trustScore < routeConfig.minTrustScore) {\n          // Round-12 (F12): structured failure entry + step-up framing.\n          const trustFailure = {\n            dimension: 'access_level.insufficient',\n            message: `Trust score ${result.agent.trustScore} is below required ${routeConfig.minTrustScore} for this route.`,\n            guidance:\n              \"Request elevated access via step-up verification (coming soon — ships this month). Step-up lets the agent owner approve a one-time elevation for this specific counterparty + purpose without changing the agent's baseline trust score.\",\n          };\n          result.failures = [...(result.failures ?? []), trustFailure];\n          result.denialReasons = [trustFailure.message];\n          if (shouldRecordDecisions && sessionId) {\n            recordDecision(config, sessionId, 'denied', trustFailure.message).catch(() => {});\n          }\n          onDenied(result, req, res);\n          return;\n        }\n      }\n\n      // All checks passed — record grant decision\n      if (shouldRecordDecisions && sessionId) {\n        recordDecision(config, sessionId, 'granted').catch(() => {});\n      }\n      // v2.3.8 (defect #26): if the endpoint's `unverifiedAgentPolicy` is\n      // `'audit'` (allow + soft-launch warning), the server returns the\n      // header to relay. Lift it onto the merchant's response BEFORE\n      // calling next() so downstream handlers and the eventual response\n      // back to the agent both carry it.\n      const enhancedResult = result as EnhancedVerificationResult;\n      if (enhancedResult.warningHeader) {\n        res.setHeader(enhancedResult.warningHeader.name, enhancedResult.warningHeader.value);\n      }\n      next();\n    } catch (error) {\n      // Log error and continue (fail open by default)\n      console.error('[VerificationGateway] Middleware error:', error);\n      next();\n    }\n  };\n}\n\n// `requireAccess` and `verifyOnly` were removed in v2.9.7. Both injected a\n// local `routes` array into the merchant's source code, which is the exact\n// dual-config attack vector defect 24 closed. Per-route policy now lives in\n// the AstraSync dashboard (gated by team.role admin auth + audit + alerts).\n// To enforce a minimum tier, set the route's `minAccessLevel` in the\n// dashboard. For \"verify but don't block,\" set every route to `none` 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package/dist/adapters/mcp.js

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ function hasMinimumAccess(actual, required) {
 }
 
 // src/version.ts
-var SDK_VERSION = "2.4.11";
+var SDK_VERSION = "2.4.12";
 
 // src/verify.ts
 var DEFAULT_CONFIG = {