@astrasyncai/verification-gateway 2.2.3 → 2.3.7

package/dist/local-evaluator/evaluator.d.mts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { L as LocalPolicy, P as PDLSSContext, V as VerificationDecision, a as LocalPurposeRule } from '../types-CgXPKUwi.mjs';
-import '../types-DOrqNMgy.mjs';
+import { L as LocalPolicy, P as PDLSSContext, V as VerificationDecision, a as LocalPurposeRule } from '../types-DxY5zt4z.mjs';
+import '../types-Bxqj1sKY.mjs';
 
 /**
  * Local PDLSS Evaluator

package/dist/local-evaluator/evaluator.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { L as LocalPolicy, P as PDLSSContext, V as VerificationDecision, a as LocalPurposeRule } from '../types-BYKAY6Cc.js';
-import '../types-DOrqNMgy.js';
+import { L as LocalPolicy, P as PDLSSContext, V as VerificationDecision, a as LocalPurposeRule } from '../types-BecRpozv.js';
+import '../types-Bxqj1sKY.js';
 
 /**
  * Local PDLSS Evaluator

package/dist/{nextjs-B2kg19c1.d.ts → nextjs-B5ZBpHra.d.ts}

@@ -1,9 +1,15 @@
 import * as next_server from 'next/server';
 import { NextRequest } from 'next/server';
-import { N as NextJsMiddlewareOptions } from './types-DOrqNMgy.js';
+import { N as NextJsMiddlewareOptions } from './types-Bxqj1sKY.js';
 
 /**
- * Create Next.js middleware for agent verification
+ * Create Next.js middleware for agent verification.
+ *
+ * v2.9.7 moved per-route policy out of merchant-side source code into the
+ * AstraSync dashboard. The middleware fetches its routes from the backend
+ * via `GET /endpoints/:counterpartyId/routes` on init and refreshes
+ * periodically — see `ExpressMiddlewareOptions` for the rationale (defect
+ * 24, dual-config silent-conflict).
  */
 declare function createMiddleware(options: NextJsMiddlewareOptions): (request: NextRequest) => Promise<next_server.NextResponse<unknown>>;
 /**

package/dist/{nextjs-ZymQ8jDh.d.mts → nextjs-BLtjRbc-.d.mts}

@@ -1,9 +1,15 @@
 import * as next_server from 'next/server';
 import { NextRequest } from 'next/server';
-import { N as NextJsMiddlewareOptions } from './types-DOrqNMgy.mjs';
+import { N as NextJsMiddlewareOptions } from './types-Bxqj1sKY.mjs';
 
 /**
- * Create Next.js middleware for agent verification
+ * Create Next.js middleware for agent verification.
+ *
+ * v2.9.7 moved per-route policy out of merchant-side source code into the
+ * AstraSync dashboard. The middleware fetches its routes from the backend
+ * via `GET /endpoints/:counterpartyId/routes` on init and refreshes
+ * periodically — see `ExpressMiddlewareOptions` for the rationale (defect
+ * 24, dual-config silent-conflict).
  */
 declare function createMiddleware(options: NextJsMiddlewareOptions): (request: NextRequest) => Promise<next_server.NextResponse<unknown>>;
 /**

package/dist/{sdk-B7id0VFS.d.mts → sdk-BhkxvqnK.d.mts}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { a as AccessLevel, i as TrustLevel, S as SDKOptions, V as VerificationResult } from './types-DOrqNMgy.mjs';
+import { a as AccessLevel, i as TrustLevel, S as SDKOptions, V as VerificationResult } from './types-Bxqj1sKY.mjs';
 
 /**
  * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway - Access Level Definitions

package/dist/{sdk-Bso0FSI0.d.ts → sdk-YmE3RG8n.d.ts}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { a as AccessLevel, i as TrustLevel, S as SDKOptions, V as VerificationResult } from './types-DOrqNMgy.js';
+import { a as AccessLevel, i as TrustLevel, S as SDKOptions, V as VerificationResult } from './types-Bxqj1sKY.js';
 
 /**
  * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway - Access Level Definitions

package/dist/transport/index.d.mts

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-import '../types-DOrqNMgy.mjs';
-export { A as ACPEndpoint, a as ACPPaymentTokenType, b as ACPRequestContext, c as ACPRequestLike, d as ACPSignatureAlgorithm, e as ACPTotal, f as ACPVerifyInput, g as ACPVerifyResult, h as AP2CartMandateClaims, j as AP2ChainResult, k as AP2IntentMandateClaims, l as AP2MandateClaims, m as AP2MandateTriple, n as AP2MandateTripleInput, o as AP2MandateType, p as AP2PaymentDetailsTotal, q as AP2PaymentMandateClaims, r as AP2PaymentMandateForValue, s as AP2VerifyInput, C as CommerceContext, t as CommercePipelineInput, u as CommerceProtocol, v as CommercePurpose, w as CommerceSignatureStack, x as ConstraintEvalResult, y as ConstraintKey, z as ConstraintResult, E as ExtractorRequestLike, I as IdentityBindingResult, B as IdentityClaim, D as IdentityResolver, M as MPPChallengeForValue, F as MPPChallengeSummary, G as MPPCredentialSummary, H as MPPIntent, J as MPPKind, K as MPPReceiptSummary, L as MPPRequestContext, N as MPPRequestLike, O as MPPResponseLike, P as MPPVerifyInput, Q as MPPVerifyResult, R as ParsedRFC9421, S as PaymentMethodAllowlistInput, T as RFC9421SignatureParams, U as RFC9421Tag, V as RFC9421VerifyOptions, W as RFC9421VerifyRequest, X as RFC9421VerifyResult, Y as RegistryName, Z as RegistryResolver, _ as ResolveContext, $ as STRIPE_WEBHOOK_INFORMATIONAL_EVENTS, a0 as SpendingLimitInput, a1 as StripeWebhookInformationalEvent, a2 as TransactionContext, a3 as TransactionValueContext, a4 as TransportExtractor, a5 as UCPCheckoutContext, a6 as UCPManifestValidationResult, a7 as UCPRequestLike, a8 as UCPTotal, a9 as VIAllowedParty, aa as VIBudgetLimit, ab as VIClaimsForValue, ac as VIConstraintEvalInput, ad as VIConstraints, ae as VIExecutionMode, af as VIExtractedClaims, ag as VILayer, ah as VILineItem, ai as VIMandateType, aj as VIPaymentAmount, ak as VIRecurrence, al as VIVerifyInput, am as VIVerifyResult, an as VerifyStripeWebhookOptions, ao as VerifyStripeWebhookResult, ap as X402Kind, aq as X402RequestContext, ar as X402RequestForValue, as as X402RequestLike, at as X402RequirementsSummary, au as X402ResponseLike, av as applyCredentials, aw as bindIdentity, ax as claim, ay as clearTransportExtractors, az as createMastercardRegistry, aA as createVisaRegistry, aB as createWebBotAuthRegistry, aC as detectProtocol, aD as evaluatePaymentMethodAllowlist, aE as evaluateSpendingLimit, aF as evaluateVIConstraints, aG as extractA2ACredentials, aH as extractACPContext, aI as extractACPTransactionValue, aJ as extractAP2Mandate, aK as extractAP2Mandates, aL as extractAP2TransactionValue, aM as extractCredentialsFromProtocol, aN as extractHttpCredentials, aO as extractMPPContext, aP as extractMPPFromRequest, aQ as extractMPPFromResponse, aR as extractMPPTransactionValue, aS as extractMcpCredentials, aT as extractUCPContext, aU as extractUCPTransactionValue, aV as extractVIClaims, aW as extractVITransactionValue, aX as extractX402Context, aY as extractX402FromRequest, aZ as extractX402FromResponse, a_ as extractX402TransactionValue, a$ as fetchUCPManifest, b0 as getTransportExtractor, b1 as getTransportExtractors, b2 as isStripeWebhookInformational, b3 as mapACPRequestToPurpose, b4 as mapAP2MandateToPurpose, b5 as mapMPPRequestToPurpose, b6 as mapRFC9421TagToPurpose, b7 as mapUCPRequestToPurpose, b8 as mapVIMandateToPurpose, b9 as mapX402RequestToPurpose, ba as parseRFC9421, bb as registerTransportExtractor, bc as runCommercePipeline, bd as runMatchingExtractors, be as setA2AMetadata, bf as setHttpHeaders, bg as setMcpMeta, bh as validateUCPManifest, bi as verifyACPSignature, bj as verifyAP2Chain, bk as verifyMPP, bl as verifyRFC9421, bm as verifyStripeWebhook, bn as verifyVIChain } from '../index-BaxpmTGA.mjs';
+import '../types-Bxqj1sKY.mjs';
+export { A as ACPEndpoint, a as ACPPaymentTokenType, b as ACPRequestContext, c as ACPRequestLike, d as ACPSignatureAlgorithm, e as ACPTotal, f as ACPVerifyInput, g as ACPVerifyResult, h as AP2CartMandateClaims, j as AP2ChainResult, k as AP2IntentMandateClaims, l as AP2MandateClaims, m as AP2MandateTriple, n as AP2MandateTripleInput, o as AP2MandateType, p as AP2PaymentDetailsTotal, q as AP2PaymentMandateClaims, r as AP2PaymentMandateForValue, s as AP2VerifyInput, C as CommerceContext, t as CommercePipelineInput, u as CommerceProtocol, v as CommercePurpose, w as CommerceSignatureStack, x as ConstraintEvalResult, y as ConstraintKey, z as ConstraintResult, E as ExtractorRequestLike, I as IdentityBindingResult, B as IdentityClaim, D as IdentityResolver, M as MPPChallengeForValue, F as MPPChallengeSummary, G as MPPCredentialSummary, H as MPPIntent, J as MPPKind, K as MPPReceiptSummary, L as MPPRequestContext, N as MPPRequestLike, O as MPPResponseLike, P as MPPVerifyInput, Q as MPPVerifyResult, R as ParsedRFC9421, S as PaymentMethodAllowlistInput, T as RFC9421SignatureParams, U as RFC9421Tag, V as RFC9421VerifyOptions, W as RFC9421VerifyRequest, X as RFC9421VerifyResult, Y as RegistryName, Z as RegistryResolver, _ as ResolveContext, $ as STRIPE_WEBHOOK_INFORMATIONAL_EVENTS, a0 as SpendingLimitInput, a1 as StripeWebhookInformationalEvent, a2 as TransactionContext, a3 as TransactionValueContext, a4 as TransportExtractor, a5 as UCPCheckoutContext, a6 as UCPManifestValidationResult, a7 as UCPRequestLike, a8 as UCPTotal, a9 as VIAllowedParty, aa as VIBudgetLimit, ab as VIClaimsForValue, ac as VIConstraintEvalInput, ad as VIConstraints, ae as VIExecutionMode, af as VIExtractedClaims, ag as VILayer, ah as VILineItem, ai as VIMandateType, aj as VIPaymentAmount, ak as VIRecurrence, al as VIVerifyInput, am as VIVerifyResult, an as VerifyStripeWebhookOptions, ao as VerifyStripeWebhookResult, ap as X402Kind, aq as X402RequestContext, ar as X402RequestForValue, as as X402RequestLike, at as X402RequirementsSummary, au as X402ResponseLike, av as applyCredentials, aw as bindIdentity, ax as claim, ay as clearTransportExtractors, az as createMastercardRegistry, aA as createVisaRegistry, aB as createWebBotAuthRegistry, aC as detectProtocol, aD as evaluatePaymentMethodAllowlist, aE as evaluateSpendingLimit, aF as evaluateVIConstraints, aG as extractA2ACredentials, aH as extractACPContext, aI as extractACPTransactionValue, aJ as extractAP2Mandate, aK as extractAP2Mandates, aL as extractAP2TransactionValue, aM as extractCredentialsFromProtocol, aN as extractHttpCredentials, aO as extractMPPContext, aP as extractMPPFromRequest, aQ as extractMPPFromResponse, aR as extractMPPTransactionValue, aS as extractMcpCredentials, aT as extractUCPContext, aU as extractUCPTransactionValue, aV as extractVIClaims, aW as extractVITransactionValue, aX as extractX402Context, aY as extractX402FromRequest, aZ as extractX402FromResponse, a_ as extractX402TransactionValue, a$ as fetchUCPManifest, b0 as getTransportExtractor, b1 as getTransportExtractors, b2 as isStripeWebhookInformational, b3 as mapACPRequestToPurpose, b4 as mapAP2MandateToPurpose, b5 as mapMPPRequestToPurpose, b6 as mapRFC9421TagToPurpose, b7 as mapUCPRequestToPurpose, b8 as mapVIMandateToPurpose, b9 as mapX402RequestToPurpose, ba as parseRFC9421, bb as registerTransportExtractor, bc as runCommercePipeline, bd as runMatchingExtractors, be as setA2AMetadata, bf as setHttpHeaders, bg as setMcpMeta, bh as validateUCPManifest, bi as verifyACPSignature, bj as verifyAP2Chain, bk as verifyMPP, bl as verifyRFC9421, bm as verifyStripeWebhook, bn as verifyVIChain } from '../index-YNPs800Z.mjs';
 import 'jose';

package/dist/transport/index.d.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-import '../types-DOrqNMgy.js';
-export { A as ACPEndpoint, a as ACPPaymentTokenType, b as ACPRequestContext, c as ACPRequestLike, d as ACPSignatureAlgorithm, e as ACPTotal, f as ACPVerifyInput, g as ACPVerifyResult, h as AP2CartMandateClaims, j as AP2ChainResult, k as AP2IntentMandateClaims, l as AP2MandateClaims, m as AP2MandateTriple, n as AP2MandateTripleInput, o as AP2MandateType, p as AP2PaymentDetailsTotal, q as AP2PaymentMandateClaims, r as AP2PaymentMandateForValue, s as AP2VerifyInput, C as CommerceContext, t as CommercePipelineInput, u as CommerceProtocol, v as CommercePurpose, w as CommerceSignatureStack, x as ConstraintEvalResult, y as ConstraintKey, z as ConstraintResult, E as ExtractorRequestLike, I as IdentityBindingResult, B as IdentityClaim, D as IdentityResolver, M as MPPChallengeForValue, F as MPPChallengeSummary, G as MPPCredentialSummary, H as MPPIntent, J as MPPKind, K as MPPReceiptSummary, L as MPPRequestContext, N as MPPRequestLike, O as MPPResponseLike, P as MPPVerifyInput, Q as MPPVerifyResult, R as ParsedRFC9421, S as PaymentMethodAllowlistInput, T as RFC9421SignatureParams, U as RFC9421Tag, V as RFC9421VerifyOptions, W as RFC9421VerifyRequest, X as RFC9421VerifyResult, Y as RegistryName, Z as RegistryResolver, _ as ResolveContext, $ as STRIPE_WEBHOOK_INFORMATIONAL_EVENTS, a0 as SpendingLimitInput, a1 as StripeWebhookInformationalEvent, a2 as TransactionContext, a3 as TransactionValueContext, a4 as TransportExtractor, a5 as UCPCheckoutContext, a6 as UCPManifestValidationResult, a7 as UCPRequestLike, a8 as UCPTotal, a9 as VIAllowedParty, aa as VIBudgetLimit, ab as VIClaimsForValue, ac as VIConstraintEvalInput, ad as VIConstraints, ae as VIExecutionMode, af as VIExtractedClaims, ag as VILayer, ah as VILineItem, ai as VIMandateType, aj as VIPaymentAmount, ak as VIRecurrence, al as VIVerifyInput, am as VIVerifyResult, an as VerifyStripeWebhookOptions, ao as VerifyStripeWebhookResult, ap as X402Kind, aq as X402RequestContext, ar as X402RequestForValue, as as X402RequestLike, at as X402RequirementsSummary, au as X402ResponseLike, av as applyCredentials, aw as bindIdentity, ax as claim, ay as clearTransportExtractors, az as createMastercardRegistry, aA as createVisaRegistry, aB as createWebBotAuthRegistry, aC as detectProtocol, aD as evaluatePaymentMethodAllowlist, aE as evaluateSpendingLimit, aF as evaluateVIConstraints, aG as extractA2ACredentials, aH as extractACPContext, aI as extractACPTransactionValue, aJ as extractAP2Mandate, aK as extractAP2Mandates, aL as extractAP2TransactionValue, aM as extractCredentialsFromProtocol, aN as extractHttpCredentials, aO as extractMPPContext, aP as extractMPPFromRequest, aQ as extractMPPFromResponse, aR as extractMPPTransactionValue, aS as extractMcpCredentials, aT as extractUCPContext, aU as extractUCPTransactionValue, aV as extractVIClaims, aW as extractVITransactionValue, aX as extractX402Context, aY as extractX402FromRequest, aZ as extractX402FromResponse, a_ as extractX402TransactionValue, a$ as fetchUCPManifest, b0 as getTransportExtractor, b1 as getTransportExtractors, b2 as isStripeWebhookInformational, b3 as mapACPRequestToPurpose, b4 as mapAP2MandateToPurpose, b5 as mapMPPRequestToPurpose, b6 as mapRFC9421TagToPurpose, b7 as mapUCPRequestToPurpose, b8 as mapVIMandateToPurpose, b9 as mapX402RequestToPurpose, ba as parseRFC9421, bb as registerTransportExtractor, bc as runCommercePipeline, bd as runMatchingExtractors, be as setA2AMetadata, bf as setHttpHeaders, bg as setMcpMeta, bh as validateUCPManifest, bi as verifyACPSignature, bj as verifyAP2Chain, bk as verifyMPP, bl as verifyRFC9421, bm as verifyStripeWebhook, bn as verifyVIChain } from '../index-Ba0Lvsjo.js';
+import '../types-Bxqj1sKY.js';
+export { A as ACPEndpoint, a as ACPPaymentTokenType, b as ACPRequestContext, c as ACPRequestLike, d as ACPSignatureAlgorithm, e as ACPTotal, f as ACPVerifyInput, g as ACPVerifyResult, h as AP2CartMandateClaims, j as AP2ChainResult, k as AP2IntentMandateClaims, l as AP2MandateClaims, m as AP2MandateTriple, n as AP2MandateTripleInput, o as AP2MandateType, p as AP2PaymentDetailsTotal, q as AP2PaymentMandateClaims, r as AP2PaymentMandateForValue, s as AP2VerifyInput, C as CommerceContext, t as CommercePipelineInput, u as CommerceProtocol, v as CommercePurpose, w as CommerceSignatureStack, x as ConstraintEvalResult, y as ConstraintKey, z as ConstraintResult, E as ExtractorRequestLike, I as IdentityBindingResult, B as IdentityClaim, D as IdentityResolver, M as MPPChallengeForValue, F as MPPChallengeSummary, G as MPPCredentialSummary, H as MPPIntent, J as MPPKind, K as MPPReceiptSummary, L as MPPRequestContext, N as MPPRequestLike, O as MPPResponseLike, P as MPPVerifyInput, Q as MPPVerifyResult, R as ParsedRFC9421, S as PaymentMethodAllowlistInput, T as RFC9421SignatureParams, U as RFC9421Tag, V as RFC9421VerifyOptions, W as RFC9421VerifyRequest, X as RFC9421VerifyResult, Y as RegistryName, Z as RegistryResolver, _ as ResolveContext, $ as STRIPE_WEBHOOK_INFORMATIONAL_EVENTS, a0 as SpendingLimitInput, a1 as StripeWebhookInformationalEvent, a2 as TransactionContext, a3 as TransactionValueContext, a4 as TransportExtractor, a5 as UCPCheckoutContext, a6 as UCPManifestValidationResult, a7 as UCPRequestLike, a8 as UCPTotal, a9 as VIAllowedParty, aa as VIBudgetLimit, ab as VIClaimsForValue, ac as VIConstraintEvalInput, ad as VIConstraints, ae as VIExecutionMode, af as VIExtractedClaims, ag as VILayer, ah as VILineItem, ai as VIMandateType, aj as VIPaymentAmount, ak as VIRecurrence, al as VIVerifyInput, am as VIVerifyResult, an as VerifyStripeWebhookOptions, ao as VerifyStripeWebhookResult, ap as X402Kind, aq as X402RequestContext, ar as X402RequestForValue, as as X402RequestLike, at as X402RequirementsSummary, au as X402ResponseLike, av as applyCredentials, aw as bindIdentity, ax as claim, ay as clearTransportExtractors, az as createMastercardRegistry, aA as createVisaRegistry, aB as createWebBotAuthRegistry, aC as detectProtocol, aD as evaluatePaymentMethodAllowlist, aE as evaluateSpendingLimit, aF as evaluateVIConstraints, aG as extractA2ACredentials, aH as extractACPContext, aI as extractACPTransactionValue, aJ as extractAP2Mandate, aK as extractAP2Mandates, aL as extractAP2TransactionValue, aM as extractCredentialsFromProtocol, aN as extractHttpCredentials, aO as extractMPPContext, aP as extractMPPFromRequest, aQ as extractMPPFromResponse, aR as extractMPPTransactionValue, aS as extractMcpCredentials, aT as extractUCPContext, aU as extractUCPTransactionValue, aV as extractVIClaims, aW as extractVITransactionValue, aX as extractX402Context, aY as extractX402FromRequest, aZ as extractX402FromResponse, a_ as extractX402TransactionValue, a$ as fetchUCPManifest, b0 as getTransportExtractor, b1 as getTransportExtractors, b2 as isStripeWebhookInformational, b3 as mapACPRequestToPurpose, b4 as mapAP2MandateToPurpose, b5 as mapMPPRequestToPurpose, b6 as mapRFC9421TagToPurpose, b7 as mapUCPRequestToPurpose, b8 as mapVIMandateToPurpose, b9 as mapX402RequestToPurpose, ba as parseRFC9421, bb as registerTransportExtractor, bc as runCommercePipeline, bd as runMatchingExtractors, be as setA2AMetadata, bf as setHttpHeaders, bg as setMcpMeta, bh as validateUCPManifest, bi as verifyACPSignature, bj as verifyAP2Chain, bk as verifyMPP, bl as verifyRFC9421, bm as verifyStripeWebhook, bn as verifyVIChain } from '../index-BtU9yFda.js';
 import 'jose';

package/dist/{types-BYKAY6Cc.d.ts → types-BecRpozv.d.ts}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { a as AccessLevel, C as CounterpartyType, T as TokenGuidance } from './types-DOrqNMgy.js';
+import { a as AccessLevel, C as CounterpartyType, T as TokenGuidance } from './types-Bxqj1sKY.js';
 
 /**
  * AstraSync Gateway - Types for gateway modes, local evaluation, and adapter interface.

package/dist/{types-DOrqNMgy.d.mts → types-Bxqj1sKY.d.mts}

@@ -140,32 +140,86 @@ interface VerifiedOrganization {
     trustScore: number;
 }
 /**
- * PDLSS policy information returned with verification
+ * PDLSS policy information returned with verification.
+ *
+ * @deprecated v2.2.4 — verify-access no longer returns the full PDLSS to the
+ * merchant. Read `EnhancedVerificationResult.verificationContext.pdlssCheck`
+ * instead for the merchant-facing summary, and `appliedPolicy` (top-level on
+ * the verification result) for the boundary name + policy version. The full
+ * PDLSS is owner-side only (queryable via `/api/agents/:id` when
+ * authenticated as the agent owner).
  */
 interface PDLSSInfo {
-    /** Whether purpose was allowed */
     purposeAllowed: boolean;
-    /** Whether within duration constraints */
     withinDuration: boolean;
-    /** Whether within limits */
     withinLimits: boolean;
-    /** Whether scope is allowed */
     scopeAllowed: boolean;
-    /** Whether self-instantiation is allowed (if applicable) */
     selfInstantiationAllowed: boolean;
-    /** Allowed purpose categories */
     allowedPurposes?: string[];
-    /** Transaction limits */
     limits?: Record<string, number>;
-    /** Allowed scope/resources */
     scope?: string[];
-    /** Applied policy details */
-    appliedPolicy?: {
-        boundaryId: string;
-        boundaryName: string;
-        policyId: string;
-        policyVersion: string;
+    /** Applied policy details. Boundary/policy UUIDs deliberately not included. */
+    appliedPolicy?: AppliedPolicy;
+}
+/**
+ * Applied policy — merchant-facing identifiers only.
+ *
+ * Boundary and policy UUIDs are deliberately not surfaced; merchants and
+ * agent owners are different tenants and internal join keys are a
+ * cross-tenant correlation primitive. Internal callers that need UUIDs
+ * query the boundary/policy tables directly.
+ */
+interface AppliedPolicy {
+    boundaryName: string;
+    policyVersion: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Structured "why" of a verification decision the merchant receives.
+ *
+ * Tells the merchant whether the agent ID was verified, whether the runtime
+ * challenge succeeded, whether the request was within PDLSS, and the agent's
+ * actual dynamic trust score — without exposing thresholds, scope lists, or
+ * other-tenant counterparty membership.
+ *
+ * `attestations` is empty unless the calling endpoint's access policy
+ * declared `required_attestations`. Each attestation carries a blockchain
+ * proof reference (or, in the future, a full ZKP) so the merchant can verify
+ * the underlying claim without seeing the raw underlying data (e.g. the
+ * Persona/ConnectID transaction).
+ */
+interface VerificationContext {
+    idVerified: boolean;
+    runtimeChallenge: {
+        status: 'passed' | 'skipped' | 'failed' | 'timeout' | 'not_supported';
+        checkedAt: string | null;
+    };
+    pdlssCheck: {
+        /** Outcome only — no thresholds disclosed. */
+        result: 'within' | 'exceeded' | 'denied' | 'not_evaluated';
+        /** Category-level only. */
+        purpose: 'approved' | 'denied';
+        scope: 'approved' | 'denied';
     };
+    /** Live composite score at decision time (not the stale snapshot column). */
+    dynamicTrustScore: number;
+    attestations: Attestation[];
+}
+/**
+ * Attestation returned in `VerificationContext.attestations`.
+ *
+ * `proofType: 'reference'` (interim) means `proof` is a blockchain txn hash
+ * the merchant CAN verify against on-chain records but doesn't HAVE to.
+ * `proofType: 'zkp'` (future) means `proof` is a zero-knowledge proof.
+ * Wire shape is forward-compatible — clients reading 'reference' today won't
+ * break when it becomes 'zkp'.
+ */
+interface Attestation {
+    /** Attestation kind (e.g. `verified_human_party`). */
+    type: string;
+    status: 'passed' | 'failed';
+    validUntil?: string;
+    proofType: 'reference' | 'zkp';
+    proof: string;
 }
 /**
  * Guidance information for unverified agents
@@ -183,6 +237,25 @@ interface GuidanceInfo {
 /**
  * Complete verification result
  */
+/**
+ * Single failed gate on a verify-access denial. Aggregated into
+ * `VerificationResult.failures[]` so partners can see every blocker in one
+ * response. v2.9.8 (defect M1) — pre-fix the response was fail-fast on the
+ * first failed gate, forcing a fix-and-retry cascade through PDLSS
+ * dimensions, counterparty allowlist, trust score, and attestations.
+ *
+ * `dimension` is namespaced so receivers can group by gate family:
+ *   - `agent.<lookup|status>`                  (hard prereqs)
+ *   - `pdlss.<purpose|duration|limits|scope|selfInstantiation>`
+ *   - `counterparty.<allowlist|trust>`
+ *   - `attestation.<type>` (e.g. `attestation.verified_human_party`)
+ *   - `endpoint.<deactivated|trust|policy>`
+ */
+interface AccessFailure {
+    dimension: string;
+    message: string;
+    guidance?: string;
+}
 interface VerificationResult {
     /** Whether the agent is verified */
     verified: boolean;
@@ -200,6 +273,13 @@ interface VerificationResult {
     guidance?: GuidanceInfo;
     /** Reasons for denial (if not allowed) */
     denialReasons?: string[];
+    /**
+     * All policy / gate failures detected on this verify-access call.
+     * v2.9.8+ — empty when allowed. Iterate this for the full debug picture
+     * instead of consuming `denialReasons` (which only carries the headline
+     * message of each failure).
+     */
+    failures?: AccessFailure[];
     /** Whether step-up authentication is required */
     requiresStepUp?: boolean;
     /** Whether approval is required */
@@ -306,11 +386,18 @@ interface RouteAccessConfig {
     maxTransactionValue?: number;
 }
 /**
- * Express middleware options
+ * Express middleware options.
+ *
+ * v2.9.7 removed the `routes` field — per-route policy now lives in the
+ * AstraSync dashboard (gated by team.role admin auth + audit + alerts).
+ * The middleware fetches routes from the backend via
+ * `GET /endpoints/:counterpartyId/routes` on init and refreshes
+ * periodically (override interval via `routesRefreshMs`). Set
+ * `counterpartyId` on `GatewayConfig` so the middleware knows which
+ * endpoint to fetch policy for; without it, the middleware logs a warning
+ * and falls through (allows all) — useful for local dev only.
  */
 interface ExpressMiddlewareOptions extends GatewayConfig {
-    /** Route access configurations */
-    routes?: RouteAccessConfig[];
     /** Function to extract credentials from request */
     extractCredentials?: (req: unknown) => AgentCredentials;
     /** Function to extract purpose from request */
@@ -323,15 +410,24 @@ interface ExpressMiddlewareOptions extends GatewayConfig {
     recordDecisions?: boolean;
     /** Enable runtime challenge for all verify-access calls (default: true) */
     enableRuntimeChallenge?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Refresh interval (ms) for the remote-fetched route policy. Default:
+     * 5 minutes. Operators can shorten this to test policy edits faster, or
+     * lengthen it to reduce network chatter.
+     */
+    routesRefreshMs?: number;
 }
 /**
- * Next.js middleware options
+ * Next.js middleware options.
+ *
+ * v2.9.7 removed the `routes` field — see `ExpressMiddlewareOptions` for
+ * the rationale. Same fetch-from-backend model applies here.
  */
 interface NextJsMiddlewareOptions extends GatewayConfig {
-    /** Route access configurations */
-    routes?: RouteAccessConfig[];
     /** Paths to skip verification */
     skipPaths?: string[];
+    /** Refresh interval (ms) for the remote-fetched route policy. Default: 5 minutes. */
+    routesRefreshMs?: number;
     /** Whether to show Commerce Shield overlay for unverified */
     showCommerceShield?: boolean;
     /** Commerce Shield configuration */
@@ -357,14 +453,21 @@ interface SDKOptions extends GatewayConfig {
     };
 }
 /**
- * Token guidance returned from verify-access
+ * Token guidance returned from verify-access.
+ *
+ * `recommendedRateLimit` carries `requestsPerMinute` and `currency` only.
+ * `maxTransactionValue` was removed in v2.2.4 — it leaked the agent's
+ * spending headroom to the merchant, which is a price-discrimination signal
+ * (a merchant could see the agent's autonomous threshold and price the
+ * transaction just under it to capture surplus). The agent's SDK receives
+ * its own limits separately for client-side budgeting; the merchant's
+ * decision doesn't need amount info.
  */
 interface TokenGuidance {
     recommendedScopes: string[];
     recommendedTtlSeconds: number;
     recommendedRateLimit?: {
         requestsPerMinute: number;
-        maxTransactionValue?: number;
         currency?: string;
     };
     jurisdictionConstraints?: string[];
@@ -388,12 +491,19 @@ interface RuntimeChallengeResult {
     reason?: string;
 }
 /**
- * Enhanced verification result (extends existing VerificationResult)
+ * Enhanced verification result (extends existing VerificationResult).
+ *
+ * - `appliedPolicy`: surfaces the boundary name + policy version that drove
+ *   the decision (no UUIDs).
+ * - `verificationContext`: structured "why" for the merchant — see
+ *   `VerificationContext` for the full shape.
  */
 interface EnhancedVerificationResult extends VerificationResult {
     sessionId?: string;
     runtimeChallenge?: RuntimeChallengeResult;
     tokenGuidance?: TokenGuidance;
+    appliedPolicy?: AppliedPolicy;
+    verificationContext?: VerificationContext;
     recommendation?: 'grant' | 'deny' | 'step_up_required';
     recommendationReasons?: string[];
 }

package/dist/{types-DOrqNMgy.d.ts → types-Bxqj1sKY.d.ts}

@@ -140,32 +140,86 @@ interface VerifiedOrganization {
     trustScore: number;
 }
 /**
- * PDLSS policy information returned with verification
+ * PDLSS policy information returned with verification.
+ *
+ * @deprecated v2.2.4 — verify-access no longer returns the full PDLSS to the
+ * merchant. Read `EnhancedVerificationResult.verificationContext.pdlssCheck`
+ * instead for the merchant-facing summary, and `appliedPolicy` (top-level on
+ * the verification result) for the boundary name + policy version. The full
+ * PDLSS is owner-side only (queryable via `/api/agents/:id` when
+ * authenticated as the agent owner).
  */
 interface PDLSSInfo {
-    /** Whether purpose was allowed */
     purposeAllowed: boolean;
-    /** Whether within duration constraints */
     withinDuration: boolean;
-    /** Whether within limits */
     withinLimits: boolean;
-    /** Whether scope is allowed */
     scopeAllowed: boolean;
-    /** Whether self-instantiation is allowed (if applicable) */
     selfInstantiationAllowed: boolean;
-    /** Allowed purpose categories */
     allowedPurposes?: string[];
-    /** Transaction limits */
     limits?: Record<string, number>;
-    /** Allowed scope/resources */
     scope?: string[];
-    /** Applied policy details */
-    appliedPolicy?: {
-        boundaryId: string;
-        boundaryName: string;
-        policyId: string;
-        policyVersion: string;
+    /** Applied policy details. Boundary/policy UUIDs deliberately not included. */
+    appliedPolicy?: AppliedPolicy;
+}
+/**
+ * Applied policy — merchant-facing identifiers only.
+ *
+ * Boundary and policy UUIDs are deliberately not surfaced; merchants and
+ * agent owners are different tenants and internal join keys are a
+ * cross-tenant correlation primitive. Internal callers that need UUIDs
+ * query the boundary/policy tables directly.
+ */
+interface AppliedPolicy {
+    boundaryName: string;
+    policyVersion: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Structured "why" of a verification decision the merchant receives.
+ *
+ * Tells the merchant whether the agent ID was verified, whether the runtime
+ * challenge succeeded, whether the request was within PDLSS, and the agent's
+ * actual dynamic trust score — without exposing thresholds, scope lists, or
+ * other-tenant counterparty membership.
+ *
+ * `attestations` is empty unless the calling endpoint's access policy
+ * declared `required_attestations`. Each attestation carries a blockchain
+ * proof reference (or, in the future, a full ZKP) so the merchant can verify
+ * the underlying claim without seeing the raw underlying data (e.g. the
+ * Persona/ConnectID transaction).
+ */
+interface VerificationContext {
+    idVerified: boolean;
+    runtimeChallenge: {
+        status: 'passed' | 'skipped' | 'failed' | 'timeout' | 'not_supported';
+        checkedAt: string | null;
+    };
+    pdlssCheck: {
+        /** Outcome only — no thresholds disclosed. */
+        result: 'within' | 'exceeded' | 'denied' | 'not_evaluated';
+        /** Category-level only. */
+        purpose: 'approved' | 'denied';
+        scope: 'approved' | 'denied';
     };
+    /** Live composite score at decision time (not the stale snapshot column). */
+    dynamicTrustScore: number;
+    attestations: Attestation[];
+}
+/**
+ * Attestation returned in `VerificationContext.attestations`.
+ *
+ * `proofType: 'reference'` (interim) means `proof` is a blockchain txn hash
+ * the merchant CAN verify against on-chain records but doesn't HAVE to.
+ * `proofType: 'zkp'` (future) means `proof` is a zero-knowledge proof.
+ * Wire shape is forward-compatible — clients reading 'reference' today won't
+ * break when it becomes 'zkp'.
+ */
+interface Attestation {
+    /** Attestation kind (e.g. `verified_human_party`). */
+    type: string;
+    status: 'passed' | 'failed';
+    validUntil?: string;
+    proofType: 'reference' | 'zkp';
+    proof: string;
 }
 /**
  * Guidance information for unverified agents
@@ -183,6 +237,25 @@ interface GuidanceInfo {
 /**
  * Complete verification result
  */
+/**
+ * Single failed gate on a verify-access denial. Aggregated into
+ * `VerificationResult.failures[]` so partners can see every blocker in one
+ * response. v2.9.8 (defect M1) — pre-fix the response was fail-fast on the
+ * first failed gate, forcing a fix-and-retry cascade through PDLSS
+ * dimensions, counterparty allowlist, trust score, and attestations.
+ *
+ * `dimension` is namespaced so receivers can group by gate family:
+ *   - `agent.<lookup|status>`                  (hard prereqs)
+ *   - `pdlss.<purpose|duration|limits|scope|selfInstantiation>`
+ *   - `counterparty.<allowlist|trust>`
+ *   - `attestation.<type>` (e.g. `attestation.verified_human_party`)
+ *   - `endpoint.<deactivated|trust|policy>`
+ */
+interface AccessFailure {
+    dimension: string;
+    message: string;
+    guidance?: string;
+}
 interface VerificationResult {
     /** Whether the agent is verified */
     verified: boolean;
@@ -200,6 +273,13 @@ interface VerificationResult {
     guidance?: GuidanceInfo;
     /** Reasons for denial (if not allowed) */
     denialReasons?: string[];
+    /**
+     * All policy / gate failures detected on this verify-access call.
+     * v2.9.8+ — empty when allowed. Iterate this for the full debug picture
+     * instead of consuming `denialReasons` (which only carries the headline
+     * message of each failure).
+     */
+    failures?: AccessFailure[];
     /** Whether step-up authentication is required */
     requiresStepUp?: boolean;
     /** Whether approval is required */
@@ -306,11 +386,18 @@ interface RouteAccessConfig {
     maxTransactionValue?: number;
 }
 /**
- * Express middleware options
+ * Express middleware options.
+ *
+ * v2.9.7 removed the `routes` field — per-route policy now lives in the
+ * AstraSync dashboard (gated by team.role admin auth + audit + alerts).
+ * The middleware fetches routes from the backend via
+ * `GET /endpoints/:counterpartyId/routes` on init and refreshes
+ * periodically (override interval via `routesRefreshMs`). Set
+ * `counterpartyId` on `GatewayConfig` so the middleware knows which
+ * endpoint to fetch policy for; without it, the middleware logs a warning
+ * and falls through (allows all) — useful for local dev only.
  */
 interface ExpressMiddlewareOptions extends GatewayConfig {
-    /** Route access configurations */
-    routes?: RouteAccessConfig[];
     /** Function to extract credentials from request */
     extractCredentials?: (req: unknown) => AgentCredentials;
     /** Function to extract purpose from request */
@@ -323,15 +410,24 @@ interface ExpressMiddlewareOptions extends GatewayConfig {
     recordDecisions?: boolean;
     /** Enable runtime challenge for all verify-access calls (default: true) */
     enableRuntimeChallenge?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Refresh interval (ms) for the remote-fetched route policy. Default:
+     * 5 minutes. Operators can shorten this to test policy edits faster, or
+     * lengthen it to reduce network chatter.
+     */
+    routesRefreshMs?: number;
 }
 /**
- * Next.js middleware options
+ * Next.js middleware options.
+ *
+ * v2.9.7 removed the `routes` field — see `ExpressMiddlewareOptions` for
+ * the rationale. Same fetch-from-backend model applies here.
  */
 interface NextJsMiddlewareOptions extends GatewayConfig {
-    /** Route access configurations */
-    routes?: RouteAccessConfig[];
     /** Paths to skip verification */
     skipPaths?: string[];
+    /** Refresh interval (ms) for the remote-fetched route policy. Default: 5 minutes. */
+    routesRefreshMs?: number;
     /** Whether to show Commerce Shield overlay for unverified */
     showCommerceShield?: boolean;
     /** Commerce Shield configuration */
@@ -357,14 +453,21 @@ interface SDKOptions extends GatewayConfig {
     };
 }
 /**
- * Token guidance returned from verify-access
+ * Token guidance returned from verify-access.
+ *
+ * `recommendedRateLimit` carries `requestsPerMinute` and `currency` only.
+ * `maxTransactionValue` was removed in v2.2.4 — it leaked the agent's
+ * spending headroom to the merchant, which is a price-discrimination signal
+ * (a merchant could see the agent's autonomous threshold and price the
+ * transaction just under it to capture surplus). The agent's SDK receives
+ * its own limits separately for client-side budgeting; the merchant's
+ * decision doesn't need amount info.
  */
 interface TokenGuidance {
     recommendedScopes: string[];
     recommendedTtlSeconds: number;
     recommendedRateLimit?: {
         requestsPerMinute: number;
-        maxTransactionValue?: number;
         currency?: string;
     };
     jurisdictionConstraints?: string[];
@@ -388,12 +491,19 @@ interface RuntimeChallengeResult {
     reason?: string;
 }
 /**
- * Enhanced verification result (extends existing VerificationResult)
+ * Enhanced verification result (extends existing VerificationResult).
+ *
+ * - `appliedPolicy`: surfaces the boundary name + policy version that drove
+ *   the decision (no UUIDs).
+ * - `verificationContext`: structured "why" for the merchant — see
+ *   `VerificationContext` for the full shape.
  */
 interface EnhancedVerificationResult extends VerificationResult {
     sessionId?: string;
     runtimeChallenge?: RuntimeChallengeResult;
     tokenGuidance?: TokenGuidance;
+    appliedPolicy?: AppliedPolicy;
+    verificationContext?: VerificationContext;
     recommendation?: 'grant' | 'deny' | 'step_up_required';
     recommendationReasons?: string[];
 }

package/dist/{types-CgXPKUwi.d.mts → types-DxY5zt4z.d.mts}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { a as AccessLevel, C as CounterpartyType, T as TokenGuidance } from './types-DOrqNMgy.mjs';
+import { a as AccessLevel, C as CounterpartyType, T as TokenGuidance } from './types-Bxqj1sKY.mjs';
 
 /**
  * AstraSync Gateway - Types for gateway modes, local evaluation, and adapter interface.

package/dist/ui/index.d.mts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { d as CommerceShieldProps, V as VerificationResult, b as AgentCredentials, f as GuidanceInfo, i as TrustLevel } from '../types-DOrqNMgy.mjs';
+import { d as CommerceShieldProps, V as VerificationResult, b as AgentCredentials, f as GuidanceInfo, i as TrustLevel } from '../types-Bxqj1sKY.mjs';
 
 /**
  * AstraSync Commerce Shield Component

package/dist/ui/index.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { d as CommerceShieldProps, V as VerificationResult, b as AgentCredentials, f as GuidanceInfo, i as TrustLevel } from '../types-DOrqNMgy.js';
+import { d as CommerceShieldProps, V as VerificationResult, b as AgentCredentials, f as GuidanceInfo, i as TrustLevel } from '../types-Bxqj1sKY.js';
 
 /**
  * AstraSync Commerce Shield Component

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@astrasyncai/verification-gateway",
-  "version": "2.2.3",
+  "version": "2.3.7",
   "description": "Universal Verification Gateway for AstraSync KYA Platform - verify AI agents across any counterparty type",
   "main": "./dist/index.js",
   "module": "./dist/index.mjs",
@@ -16,6 +16,11 @@
       "import": "./dist/adapters/express.mjs",
       "require": "./dist/adapters/express.js"
     },
+    "./mcp": {
+      "types": "./dist/adapters/mcp.d.ts",
+      "import": "./dist/adapters/mcp.mjs",
+      "require": "./dist/adapters/mcp.js"
+    },
     "./nextjs": {
       "types": "./dist/adapters/nextjs.d.ts",
       "import": "./dist/adapters/nextjs.mjs",