@astrasyncai/verification-gateway 2.2.0 → 2.3.4

package/dist/local-evaluator/evaluator.d.mts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { L as LocalPolicy, P as PDLSSContext, V as VerificationDecision, a as LocalPurposeRule } from '../types-DE0ooQJ6.mjs';
-import '../types-CrVMq_Td.mjs';
+import { L as LocalPolicy, P as PDLSSContext, V as VerificationDecision, a as LocalPurposeRule } from '../types-aN1UHhyy.mjs';
+import '../types-JMgPake9.mjs';
 
 /**
  * Local PDLSS Evaluator

package/dist/local-evaluator/evaluator.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { L as LocalPolicy, P as PDLSSContext, V as VerificationDecision, a as LocalPurposeRule } from '../types-rigu2bH3.js';
-import '../types-CrVMq_Td.js';
+import { L as LocalPolicy, P as PDLSSContext, V as VerificationDecision, a as LocalPurposeRule } from '../types-osMd_dpT.js';
+import '../types-JMgPake9.js';
 
 /**
  * Local PDLSS Evaluator

package/dist/{nextjs-yNzimC3a.d.ts → nextjs-B8o9C0t6.d.ts}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import * as next_server from 'next/server';
 import { NextRequest } from 'next/server';
-import { N as NextJsMiddlewareOptions } from './types-CrVMq_Td.js';
+import { N as NextJsMiddlewareOptions } from './types-JMgPake9.js';
 
 /**
  * Create Next.js middleware for agent verification

package/dist/{nextjs-BEqidT0U.d.mts → nextjs-DZHAn9j-.d.mts}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import * as next_server from 'next/server';
 import { NextRequest } from 'next/server';
-import { N as NextJsMiddlewareOptions } from './types-CrVMq_Td.mjs';
+import { N as NextJsMiddlewareOptions } from './types-JMgPake9.mjs';
 
 /**
  * Create Next.js middleware for agent verification

package/dist/{sdk-CP9C9Qu0.d.ts → sdk-BQ3olp3v.d.ts}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { a as AccessLevel, i as TrustLevel, S as SDKOptions, V as VerificationResult } from './types-CrVMq_Td.js';
+import { a as AccessLevel, i as TrustLevel, S as SDKOptions, V as VerificationResult } from './types-JMgPake9.js';
 
 /**
  * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway - Access Level Definitions
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ declare function getCapabilities(accessLevel: AccessLevel): AccessCapabilities;
  * import { createClient } from '@astrasyncai/verification-gateway/sdk';
  *
  * const gateway = createClient({
- *   apiBaseUrl: 'https://api.astrasync.ai',
+ *   apiBaseUrl: 'https://astrasync.ai/api',
  * });
  *
  * // Verify another agent before interacting

package/dist/{sdk-7fa9H0qa.d.mts → sdk-CRSUFQH2.d.mts}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { a as AccessLevel, i as TrustLevel, S as SDKOptions, V as VerificationResult } from './types-CrVMq_Td.mjs';
+import { a as AccessLevel, i as TrustLevel, S as SDKOptions, V as VerificationResult } from './types-JMgPake9.mjs';
 
 /**
  * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway - Access Level Definitions
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ declare function getCapabilities(accessLevel: AccessLevel): AccessCapabilities;
  * import { createClient } from '@astrasyncai/verification-gateway/sdk';
  *
  * const gateway = createClient({
- *   apiBaseUrl: 'https://api.astrasync.ai',
+ *   apiBaseUrl: 'https://astrasync.ai/api',
  * });
  *
  * // Verify another agent before interacting

package/dist/transport/index.d.mts

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-import '../types-CrVMq_Td.mjs';
-export { A as ACPEndpoint, a as ACPPaymentTokenType, b as ACPRequestContext, c as ACPRequestLike, d as ACPSignatureAlgorithm, e as ACPTotal, f as ACPVerifyInput, g as ACPVerifyResult, h as AP2CartMandateClaims, j as AP2ChainResult, k as AP2IntentMandateClaims, l as AP2MandateClaims, m as AP2MandateTriple, n as AP2MandateTripleInput, o as AP2MandateType, p as AP2PaymentDetailsTotal, q as AP2PaymentMandateClaims, r as AP2PaymentMandateForValue, s as AP2VerifyInput, C as CommerceContext, t as CommercePipelineInput, u as CommerceProtocol, v as CommercePurpose, w as CommerceSignatureStack, x as ConstraintEvalResult, y as ConstraintKey, z as ConstraintResult, E as ExtractorRequestLike, I as IdentityBindingResult, B as IdentityClaim, D as IdentityResolver, M as MPPChallengeForValue, F as MPPChallengeSummary, G as MPPCredentialSummary, H as MPPIntent, J as MPPKind, K as MPPReceiptSummary, L as MPPRequestContext, N as MPPRequestLike, O as MPPResponseLike, P as MPPVerifyInput, Q as MPPVerifyResult, R as ParsedRFC9421, S as PaymentMethodAllowlistInput, T as RFC9421SignatureParams, U as RFC9421Tag, V as RFC9421VerifyOptions, W as RFC9421VerifyRequest, X as RFC9421VerifyResult, Y as RegistryName, Z as RegistryResolver, _ as ResolveContext, $ as STRIPE_WEBHOOK_INFORMATIONAL_EVENTS, a0 as SpendingLimitInput, a1 as StripeWebhookInformationalEvent, a2 as TransactionContext, a3 as TransactionValueContext, a4 as TransportExtractor, a5 as UCPCheckoutContext, a6 as UCPManifestValidationResult, a7 as UCPRequestLike, a8 as UCPTotal, a9 as VIAllowedParty, aa as VIBudgetLimit, ab as VIClaimsForValue, ac as VIConstraintEvalInput, ad as VIConstraints, ae as VIExecutionMode, af as VIExtractedClaims, ag as VILayer, ah as VILineItem, ai as VIMandateType, aj as VIPaymentAmount, ak as VIRecurrence, al as VIVerifyInput, am as VIVerifyResult, an as VerifyStripeWebhookOptions, ao as VerifyStripeWebhookResult, ap as X402Kind, aq as X402RequestContext, ar as X402RequestForValue, as as X402RequestLike, at as X402RequirementsSummary, au as X402ResponseLike, av as applyCredentials, aw as bindIdentity, ax as claim, ay as clearTransportExtractors, az as createMastercardRegistry, aA as createVisaRegistry, aB as createWebBotAuthRegistry, aC as detectProtocol, aD as evaluatePaymentMethodAllowlist, aE as evaluateSpendingLimit, aF as evaluateVIConstraints, aG as extractA2ACredentials, aH as extractACPContext, aI as extractACPTransactionValue, aJ as extractAP2Mandate, aK as extractAP2Mandates, aL as extractAP2TransactionValue, aM as extractCredentialsFromProtocol, aN as extractHttpCredentials, aO as extractMPPContext, aP as extractMPPFromRequest, aQ as extractMPPFromResponse, aR as extractMPPTransactionValue, aS as extractMcpCredentials, aT as extractUCPContext, aU as extractUCPTransactionValue, aV as extractVIClaims, aW as extractVITransactionValue, aX as extractX402Context, aY as extractX402FromRequest, aZ as extractX402FromResponse, a_ as extractX402TransactionValue, a$ as fetchUCPManifest, b0 as getTransportExtractor, b1 as getTransportExtractors, b2 as isStripeWebhookInformational, b3 as mapACPRequestToPurpose, b4 as mapAP2MandateToPurpose, b5 as mapMPPRequestToPurpose, b6 as mapRFC9421TagToPurpose, b7 as mapUCPRequestToPurpose, b8 as mapVIMandateToPurpose, b9 as mapX402RequestToPurpose, ba as parseRFC9421, bb as registerTransportExtractor, bc as runCommercePipeline, bd as runMatchingExtractors, be as setA2AMetadata, bf as setHttpHeaders, bg as setMcpMeta, bh as validateUCPManifest, bi as verifyACPSignature, bj as verifyAP2Chain, bk as verifyMPP, bl as verifyRFC9421, bm as verifyStripeWebhook, bn as verifyVIChain } from '../index-DlsYN3Et.mjs';
+import '../types-JMgPake9.mjs';
+export { A as ACPEndpoint, a as ACPPaymentTokenType, b as ACPRequestContext, c as ACPRequestLike, d as ACPSignatureAlgorithm, e as ACPTotal, f as ACPVerifyInput, g as ACPVerifyResult, h as AP2CartMandateClaims, j as AP2ChainResult, k as AP2IntentMandateClaims, l as AP2MandateClaims, m as AP2MandateTriple, n as AP2MandateTripleInput, o as AP2MandateType, p as AP2PaymentDetailsTotal, q as AP2PaymentMandateClaims, r as AP2PaymentMandateForValue, s as AP2VerifyInput, C as CommerceContext, t as CommercePipelineInput, u as CommerceProtocol, v as CommercePurpose, w as CommerceSignatureStack, x as ConstraintEvalResult, y as ConstraintKey, z as ConstraintResult, E as ExtractorRequestLike, I as IdentityBindingResult, B as IdentityClaim, D as IdentityResolver, M as MPPChallengeForValue, F as MPPChallengeSummary, G as MPPCredentialSummary, H as MPPIntent, J as MPPKind, K as MPPReceiptSummary, L as MPPRequestContext, N as MPPRequestLike, O as MPPResponseLike, P as MPPVerifyInput, Q as MPPVerifyResult, R as ParsedRFC9421, S as PaymentMethodAllowlistInput, T as RFC9421SignatureParams, U as RFC9421Tag, V as RFC9421VerifyOptions, W as RFC9421VerifyRequest, X as RFC9421VerifyResult, Y as RegistryName, Z as RegistryResolver, _ as ResolveContext, $ as STRIPE_WEBHOOK_INFORMATIONAL_EVENTS, a0 as SpendingLimitInput, a1 as StripeWebhookInformationalEvent, a2 as TransactionContext, a3 as TransactionValueContext, a4 as TransportExtractor, a5 as UCPCheckoutContext, a6 as UCPManifestValidationResult, a7 as UCPRequestLike, a8 as UCPTotal, a9 as VIAllowedParty, aa as VIBudgetLimit, ab as VIClaimsForValue, ac as VIConstraintEvalInput, ad as VIConstraints, ae as VIExecutionMode, af as VIExtractedClaims, ag as VILayer, ah as VILineItem, ai as VIMandateType, aj as VIPaymentAmount, ak as VIRecurrence, al as VIVerifyInput, am as VIVerifyResult, an as VerifyStripeWebhookOptions, ao as VerifyStripeWebhookResult, ap as X402Kind, aq as X402RequestContext, ar as X402RequestForValue, as as X402RequestLike, at as X402RequirementsSummary, au as X402ResponseLike, av as applyCredentials, aw as bindIdentity, ax as claim, ay as clearTransportExtractors, az as createMastercardRegistry, aA as createVisaRegistry, aB as createWebBotAuthRegistry, aC as detectProtocol, aD as evaluatePaymentMethodAllowlist, aE as evaluateSpendingLimit, aF as evaluateVIConstraints, aG as extractA2ACredentials, aH as extractACPContext, aI as extractACPTransactionValue, aJ as extractAP2Mandate, aK as extractAP2Mandates, aL as extractAP2TransactionValue, aM as extractCredentialsFromProtocol, aN as extractHttpCredentials, aO as extractMPPContext, aP as extractMPPFromRequest, aQ as extractMPPFromResponse, aR as extractMPPTransactionValue, aS as extractMcpCredentials, aT as extractUCPContext, aU as extractUCPTransactionValue, aV as extractVIClaims, aW as extractVITransactionValue, aX as extractX402Context, aY as extractX402FromRequest, aZ as extractX402FromResponse, a_ as extractX402TransactionValue, a$ as fetchUCPManifest, b0 as getTransportExtractor, b1 as getTransportExtractors, b2 as isStripeWebhookInformational, b3 as mapACPRequestToPurpose, b4 as mapAP2MandateToPurpose, b5 as mapMPPRequestToPurpose, b6 as mapRFC9421TagToPurpose, b7 as mapUCPRequestToPurpose, b8 as mapVIMandateToPurpose, b9 as mapX402RequestToPurpose, ba as parseRFC9421, bb as registerTransportExtractor, bc as runCommercePipeline, bd as runMatchingExtractors, be as setA2AMetadata, bf as setHttpHeaders, bg as setMcpMeta, bh as validateUCPManifest, bi as verifyACPSignature, bj as verifyAP2Chain, bk as verifyMPP, bl as verifyRFC9421, bm as verifyStripeWebhook, bn as verifyVIChain } from '../index-SEgnWzkf.mjs';
 import 'jose';

package/dist/transport/index.d.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-import '../types-CrVMq_Td.js';
-export { A as ACPEndpoint, a as ACPPaymentTokenType, b as ACPRequestContext, c as ACPRequestLike, d as ACPSignatureAlgorithm, e as ACPTotal, f as ACPVerifyInput, g as ACPVerifyResult, h as AP2CartMandateClaims, j as AP2ChainResult, k as AP2IntentMandateClaims, l as AP2MandateClaims, m as AP2MandateTriple, n as AP2MandateTripleInput, o as AP2MandateType, p as AP2PaymentDetailsTotal, q as AP2PaymentMandateClaims, r as AP2PaymentMandateForValue, s as AP2VerifyInput, C as CommerceContext, t as CommercePipelineInput, u as CommerceProtocol, v as CommercePurpose, w as CommerceSignatureStack, x as ConstraintEvalResult, y as ConstraintKey, z as ConstraintResult, E as ExtractorRequestLike, I as IdentityBindingResult, B as IdentityClaim, D as IdentityResolver, M as MPPChallengeForValue, F as MPPChallengeSummary, G as MPPCredentialSummary, H as MPPIntent, J as MPPKind, K as MPPReceiptSummary, L as MPPRequestContext, N as MPPRequestLike, O as MPPResponseLike, P as MPPVerifyInput, Q as MPPVerifyResult, R as ParsedRFC9421, S as PaymentMethodAllowlistInput, T as RFC9421SignatureParams, U as RFC9421Tag, V as RFC9421VerifyOptions, W as RFC9421VerifyRequest, X as RFC9421VerifyResult, Y as RegistryName, Z as RegistryResolver, _ as ResolveContext, $ as STRIPE_WEBHOOK_INFORMATIONAL_EVENTS, a0 as SpendingLimitInput, a1 as StripeWebhookInformationalEvent, a2 as TransactionContext, a3 as TransactionValueContext, a4 as TransportExtractor, a5 as UCPCheckoutContext, a6 as UCPManifestValidationResult, a7 as UCPRequestLike, a8 as UCPTotal, a9 as VIAllowedParty, aa as VIBudgetLimit, ab as VIClaimsForValue, ac as VIConstraintEvalInput, ad as VIConstraints, ae as VIExecutionMode, af as VIExtractedClaims, ag as VILayer, ah as VILineItem, ai as VIMandateType, aj as VIPaymentAmount, ak as VIRecurrence, al as VIVerifyInput, am as VIVerifyResult, an as VerifyStripeWebhookOptions, ao as VerifyStripeWebhookResult, ap as X402Kind, aq as X402RequestContext, ar as X402RequestForValue, as as X402RequestLike, at as X402RequirementsSummary, au as X402ResponseLike, av as applyCredentials, aw as bindIdentity, ax as claim, ay as clearTransportExtractors, az as createMastercardRegistry, aA as createVisaRegistry, aB as createWebBotAuthRegistry, aC as detectProtocol, aD as evaluatePaymentMethodAllowlist, aE as evaluateSpendingLimit, aF as evaluateVIConstraints, aG as extractA2ACredentials, aH as extractACPContext, aI as extractACPTransactionValue, aJ as extractAP2Mandate, aK as extractAP2Mandates, aL as extractAP2TransactionValue, aM as extractCredentialsFromProtocol, aN as extractHttpCredentials, aO as extractMPPContext, aP as extractMPPFromRequest, aQ as extractMPPFromResponse, aR as extractMPPTransactionValue, aS as extractMcpCredentials, aT as extractUCPContext, aU as extractUCPTransactionValue, aV as extractVIClaims, aW as extractVITransactionValue, aX as extractX402Context, aY as extractX402FromRequest, aZ as extractX402FromResponse, a_ as extractX402TransactionValue, a$ as fetchUCPManifest, b0 as getTransportExtractor, b1 as getTransportExtractors, b2 as isStripeWebhookInformational, b3 as mapACPRequestToPurpose, b4 as mapAP2MandateToPurpose, b5 as mapMPPRequestToPurpose, b6 as mapRFC9421TagToPurpose, b7 as mapUCPRequestToPurpose, b8 as mapVIMandateToPurpose, b9 as mapX402RequestToPurpose, ba as parseRFC9421, bb as registerTransportExtractor, bc as runCommercePipeline, bd as runMatchingExtractors, be as setA2AMetadata, bf as setHttpHeaders, bg as setMcpMeta, bh as validateUCPManifest, bi as verifyACPSignature, bj as verifyAP2Chain, bk as verifyMPP, bl as verifyRFC9421, bm as verifyStripeWebhook, bn as verifyVIChain } from '../index-gM-lgX_X.js';
+import '../types-JMgPake9.js';
+export { A as ACPEndpoint, a as ACPPaymentTokenType, b as ACPRequestContext, c as ACPRequestLike, d as ACPSignatureAlgorithm, e as ACPTotal, f as ACPVerifyInput, g as ACPVerifyResult, h as AP2CartMandateClaims, j as AP2ChainResult, k as AP2IntentMandateClaims, l as AP2MandateClaims, m as AP2MandateTriple, n as AP2MandateTripleInput, o as AP2MandateType, p as AP2PaymentDetailsTotal, q as AP2PaymentMandateClaims, r as AP2PaymentMandateForValue, s as AP2VerifyInput, C as CommerceContext, t as CommercePipelineInput, u as CommerceProtocol, v as CommercePurpose, w as CommerceSignatureStack, x as ConstraintEvalResult, y as ConstraintKey, z as ConstraintResult, E as ExtractorRequestLike, I as IdentityBindingResult, B as IdentityClaim, D as IdentityResolver, M as MPPChallengeForValue, F as MPPChallengeSummary, G as MPPCredentialSummary, H as MPPIntent, J as MPPKind, K as MPPReceiptSummary, L as MPPRequestContext, N as MPPRequestLike, O as MPPResponseLike, P as MPPVerifyInput, Q as MPPVerifyResult, R as ParsedRFC9421, S as PaymentMethodAllowlistInput, T as RFC9421SignatureParams, U as RFC9421Tag, V as RFC9421VerifyOptions, W as RFC9421VerifyRequest, X as RFC9421VerifyResult, Y as RegistryName, Z as RegistryResolver, _ as ResolveContext, $ as STRIPE_WEBHOOK_INFORMATIONAL_EVENTS, a0 as SpendingLimitInput, a1 as StripeWebhookInformationalEvent, a2 as TransactionContext, a3 as TransactionValueContext, a4 as TransportExtractor, a5 as UCPCheckoutContext, a6 as UCPManifestValidationResult, a7 as UCPRequestLike, a8 as UCPTotal, a9 as VIAllowedParty, aa as VIBudgetLimit, ab as VIClaimsForValue, ac as VIConstraintEvalInput, ad as VIConstraints, ae as VIExecutionMode, af as VIExtractedClaims, ag as VILayer, ah as VILineItem, ai as VIMandateType, aj as VIPaymentAmount, ak as VIRecurrence, al as VIVerifyInput, am as VIVerifyResult, an as VerifyStripeWebhookOptions, ao as VerifyStripeWebhookResult, ap as X402Kind, aq as X402RequestContext, ar as X402RequestForValue, as as X402RequestLike, at as X402RequirementsSummary, au as X402ResponseLike, av as applyCredentials, aw as bindIdentity, ax as claim, ay as clearTransportExtractors, az as createMastercardRegistry, aA as createVisaRegistry, aB as createWebBotAuthRegistry, aC as detectProtocol, aD as evaluatePaymentMethodAllowlist, aE as evaluateSpendingLimit, aF as evaluateVIConstraints, aG as extractA2ACredentials, aH as extractACPContext, aI as extractACPTransactionValue, aJ as extractAP2Mandate, aK as extractAP2Mandates, aL as extractAP2TransactionValue, aM as extractCredentialsFromProtocol, aN as extractHttpCredentials, aO as extractMPPContext, aP as extractMPPFromRequest, aQ as extractMPPFromResponse, aR as extractMPPTransactionValue, aS as extractMcpCredentials, aT as extractUCPContext, aU as extractUCPTransactionValue, aV as extractVIClaims, aW as extractVITransactionValue, aX as extractX402Context, aY as extractX402FromRequest, aZ as extractX402FromResponse, a_ as extractX402TransactionValue, a$ as fetchUCPManifest, b0 as getTransportExtractor, b1 as getTransportExtractors, b2 as isStripeWebhookInformational, b3 as mapACPRequestToPurpose, b4 as mapAP2MandateToPurpose, b5 as mapMPPRequestToPurpose, b6 as mapRFC9421TagToPurpose, b7 as mapUCPRequestToPurpose, b8 as mapVIMandateToPurpose, b9 as mapX402RequestToPurpose, ba as parseRFC9421, bb as registerTransportExtractor, bc as runCommercePipeline, bd as runMatchingExtractors, be as setA2AMetadata, bf as setHttpHeaders, bg as setMcpMeta, bh as validateUCPManifest, bi as verifyACPSignature, bj as verifyAP2Chain, bk as verifyMPP, bl as verifyRFC9421, bm as verifyStripeWebhook, bn as verifyVIChain } from '../index--KzVRa32.js';
 import 'jose';

package/dist/{types-CrVMq_Td.d.mts → types-JMgPake9.d.mts}

@@ -8,19 +8,32 @@
  */
 type TrustLevel = 'BRONZE' | 'SILVER' | 'GOLD' | 'PLATINUM';
 /**
- * Access levels granted based on verification result
- * - none: No credentials provided, show guidance
- * - guidance: Commerce Shield overlay with registration info
- * - read-only: Can browse, no mutations
- * - standard: Normal access per PDLSS
- * - full: Full access for high-trust agents
- * - internal: Internal org access (same organization)
+ * Access levels granted based on verification result. Server is the single
+ * source of truth — these values are the resolved decision the server returns
+ * in `access.accessLevel`. SDK reads them verbatim (no client-side remap).
+ *
+ * For ANONYMOUS / unverified callers, the level is determined by the
+ * endpoint's `unverifiedAgentPolicy` per the verify-access canonical flow
+ * (see `docs/research/adapter-architecture-technical-requirements.md` §21):
+ * - Branch A (deny): `none` — caller is denied + advised to register
+ * - Branch B (allow_partial): `guidance` — reduced/browse-only access + advised
+ * - Branch C (allow_full): `standard` — unrestricted + advised to register for next time
+ * Every branch ALWAYS emits a verification event + queues a blockchain record.
+ *
+ * For VERIFIED callers (Branch D), the level is resolved server-side from the
+ * agent's live trust score plus the endpoint's `trust_score_requirement`:
+ * - none: agent below endpoint gate (denied; access.allowed=false)
+ * - guidance: 0–19 trust score
+ * - read-only: 20–39 trust score (browse, no mutations)
+ * - standard: 40–69 trust score (PDLSS-scoped operations)
+ * - full: 70+ trust score (PDLSS-scoped, high-trust)
+ * - internal: same-org membership, regardless of score
  */
 type AccessLevel = 'none' | 'guidance' | 'read-only' | 'standard' | 'full' | 'internal';
 /**
  * Types of counterparties that can integrate the gateway
  */
-type CounterpartyType = 'agent' | 'api' | 'mcp_server' | 'website' | 'other';
+type CounterpartyType = 'agent' | 'api' | 'mcp_server' | 'website' | 'other' | 'unknown';
 /**
  * Agent credentials extracted from request
  */
@@ -44,9 +57,17 @@ interface GatewayConfig {
     apiKey?: string;
     /** Default access level for unverified requests */
     defaultAccessLevel?: AccessLevel;
-    /** Minimum trust score required for standard access */
+    /**
+     * @deprecated Removed in v2.3.0 — server is the single source of truth for
+     * access-level decisions. Setting this no longer affects access decisions
+     * (the SDK reads `access.accessLevel` from the verify-access response).
+     * If you need a higher gate for an endpoint, configure it server-side via
+     * the endpoint's `trust_score_requirement`.
+     */
     minTrustScore?: number;
-    /** Minimum trust score required for full access */
+    /**
+     * @deprecated Removed in v2.3.0 — see `minTrustScore` above.
+     */
     minTrustScoreForFull?: number;
     /** Cache verification results (TTL in seconds) */
     cacheTtl?: number;
@@ -58,6 +79,24 @@ interface GatewayConfig {
     counterpartyUrl?: string;
     /** This counterparty's type (sent with verify-access requests for analytics) */
     counterpartyType?: CounterpartyType;
+    /**
+     * This counterparty's ASTRAE-id (issued at endpoint registration). When set,
+     * the SDK forwards it on verify-access calls so the server attributes traffic
+     * directly to this endpoint rather than resolving by URL. Useful when:
+     *  - The merchant has multiple endpoints under the same origin (each running
+     *    its own SDK instance with its own counterpartyId)
+     *  - The endpoint URL might be served behind a proxy / different host than
+     *    the registered origin
+     */
+    counterpartyId?: string;
+    /**
+     * Disable the one-time init self-test. The SDK normally fires a HEAD/OPTIONS
+     * to `${apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access` on first verify() call and warns
+     * if the response is HTML (indicating apiBaseUrl is pointing at a marketing
+     * site rather than the API). Set true for tests or environments where the
+     * extra request is undesirable.
+     */
+    disableInitChecks?: boolean;
 }
 /**
  * Verified agent information
@@ -101,32 +140,86 @@ interface VerifiedOrganization {
     trustScore: number;
 }
 /**
- * PDLSS policy information returned with verification
+ * PDLSS policy information returned with verification.
+ *
+ * @deprecated v2.2.4 — verify-access no longer returns the full PDLSS to the
+ * merchant. Read `EnhancedVerificationResult.verificationContext.pdlssCheck`
+ * instead for the merchant-facing summary, and `appliedPolicy` (top-level on
+ * the verification result) for the boundary name + policy version. The full
+ * PDLSS is owner-side only (queryable via `/api/agents/:id` when
+ * authenticated as the agent owner).
  */
 interface PDLSSInfo {
-    /** Whether purpose was allowed */
     purposeAllowed: boolean;
-    /** Whether within duration constraints */
     withinDuration: boolean;
-    /** Whether within limits */
     withinLimits: boolean;
-    /** Whether scope is allowed */
     scopeAllowed: boolean;
-    /** Whether self-instantiation is allowed (if applicable) */
     selfInstantiationAllowed: boolean;
-    /** Allowed purpose categories */
     allowedPurposes?: string[];
-    /** Transaction limits */
     limits?: Record<string, number>;
-    /** Allowed scope/resources */
     scope?: string[];
-    /** Applied policy details */
-    appliedPolicy?: {
-        boundaryId: string;
-        boundaryName: string;
-        policyId: string;
-        policyVersion: string;
+    /** Applied policy details. Boundary/policy UUIDs deliberately not included. */
+    appliedPolicy?: AppliedPolicy;
+}
+/**
+ * Applied policy — merchant-facing identifiers only.
+ *
+ * Boundary and policy UUIDs are deliberately not surfaced; merchants and
+ * agent owners are different tenants and internal join keys are a
+ * cross-tenant correlation primitive. Internal callers that need UUIDs
+ * query the boundary/policy tables directly.
+ */
+interface AppliedPolicy {
+    boundaryName: string;
+    policyVersion: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Structured "why" of a verification decision the merchant receives.
+ *
+ * Tells the merchant whether the agent ID was verified, whether the runtime
+ * challenge succeeded, whether the request was within PDLSS, and the agent's
+ * actual dynamic trust score — without exposing thresholds, scope lists, or
+ * other-tenant counterparty membership.
+ *
+ * `attestations` is empty unless the calling endpoint's access policy
+ * declared `required_attestations`. Each attestation carries a blockchain
+ * proof reference (or, in the future, a full ZKP) so the merchant can verify
+ * the underlying claim without seeing the raw underlying data (e.g. the
+ * Persona/ConnectID transaction).
+ */
+interface VerificationContext {
+    idVerified: boolean;
+    runtimeChallenge: {
+        status: 'passed' | 'skipped' | 'failed' | 'timeout' | 'not_supported';
+        checkedAt: string | null;
+    };
+    pdlssCheck: {
+        /** Outcome only — no thresholds disclosed. */
+        result: 'within' | 'exceeded' | 'denied' | 'not_evaluated';
+        /** Category-level only. */
+        purpose: 'approved' | 'denied';
+        scope: 'approved' | 'denied';
     };
+    /** Live composite score at decision time (not the stale snapshot column). */
+    dynamicTrustScore: number;
+    attestations: Attestation[];
+}
+/**
+ * Attestation returned in `VerificationContext.attestations`.
+ *
+ * `proofType: 'reference'` (interim) means `proof` is a blockchain txn hash
+ * the merchant CAN verify against on-chain records but doesn't HAVE to.
+ * `proofType: 'zkp'` (future) means `proof` is a zero-knowledge proof.
+ * Wire shape is forward-compatible — clients reading 'reference' today won't
+ * break when it becomes 'zkp'.
+ */
+interface Attestation {
+    /** Attestation kind (e.g. `verified_human_party`). */
+    type: string;
+    status: 'passed' | 'failed';
+    validUntil?: string;
+    proofType: 'reference' | 'zkp';
+    proof: string;
 }
 /**
  * Guidance information for unverified agents
@@ -318,14 +411,21 @@ interface SDKOptions extends GatewayConfig {
     };
 }
 /**
- * Token guidance returned from verify-access
+ * Token guidance returned from verify-access.
+ *
+ * `recommendedRateLimit` carries `requestsPerMinute` and `currency` only.
+ * `maxTransactionValue` was removed in v2.2.4 — it leaked the agent's
+ * spending headroom to the merchant, which is a price-discrimination signal
+ * (a merchant could see the agent's autonomous threshold and price the
+ * transaction just under it to capture surplus). The agent's SDK receives
+ * its own limits separately for client-side budgeting; the merchant's
+ * decision doesn't need amount info.
  */
 interface TokenGuidance {
     recommendedScopes: string[];
     recommendedTtlSeconds: number;
     recommendedRateLimit?: {
         requestsPerMinute: number;
-        maxTransactionValue?: number;
         currency?: string;
     };
     jurisdictionConstraints?: string[];
@@ -349,12 +449,19 @@ interface RuntimeChallengeResult {
     reason?: string;
 }
 /**
- * Enhanced verification result (extends existing VerificationResult)
+ * Enhanced verification result (extends existing VerificationResult).
+ *
+ * - `appliedPolicy`: surfaces the boundary name + policy version that drove
+ *   the decision (no UUIDs).
+ * - `verificationContext`: structured "why" for the merchant — see
+ *   `VerificationContext` for the full shape.
  */
 interface EnhancedVerificationResult extends VerificationResult {
     sessionId?: string;
     runtimeChallenge?: RuntimeChallengeResult;
     tokenGuidance?: TokenGuidance;
+    appliedPolicy?: AppliedPolicy;
+    verificationContext?: VerificationContext;
     recommendation?: 'grant' | 'deny' | 'step_up_required';
     recommendationReasons?: string[];
 }

package/dist/{types-CrVMq_Td.d.ts → types-JMgPake9.d.ts}

@@ -8,19 +8,32 @@
  */
 type TrustLevel = 'BRONZE' | 'SILVER' | 'GOLD' | 'PLATINUM';
 /**
- * Access levels granted based on verification result
- * - none: No credentials provided, show guidance
- * - guidance: Commerce Shield overlay with registration info
- * - read-only: Can browse, no mutations
- * - standard: Normal access per PDLSS
- * - full: Full access for high-trust agents
- * - internal: Internal org access (same organization)
+ * Access levels granted based on verification result. Server is the single
+ * source of truth — these values are the resolved decision the server returns
+ * in `access.accessLevel`. SDK reads them verbatim (no client-side remap).
+ *
+ * For ANONYMOUS / unverified callers, the level is determined by the
+ * endpoint's `unverifiedAgentPolicy` per the verify-access canonical flow
+ * (see `docs/research/adapter-architecture-technical-requirements.md` §21):
+ * - Branch A (deny): `none` — caller is denied + advised to register
+ * - Branch B (allow_partial): `guidance` — reduced/browse-only access + advised
+ * - Branch C (allow_full): `standard` — unrestricted + advised to register for next time
+ * Every branch ALWAYS emits a verification event + queues a blockchain record.
+ *
+ * For VERIFIED callers (Branch D), the level is resolved server-side from the
+ * agent's live trust score plus the endpoint's `trust_score_requirement`:
+ * - none: agent below endpoint gate (denied; access.allowed=false)
+ * - guidance: 0–19 trust score
+ * - read-only: 20–39 trust score (browse, no mutations)
+ * - standard: 40–69 trust score (PDLSS-scoped operations)
+ * - full: 70+ trust score (PDLSS-scoped, high-trust)
+ * - internal: same-org membership, regardless of score
  */
 type AccessLevel = 'none' | 'guidance' | 'read-only' | 'standard' | 'full' | 'internal';
 /**
  * Types of counterparties that can integrate the gateway
  */
-type CounterpartyType = 'agent' | 'api' | 'mcp_server' | 'website' | 'other';
+type CounterpartyType = 'agent' | 'api' | 'mcp_server' | 'website' | 'other' | 'unknown';
 /**
  * Agent credentials extracted from request
  */
@@ -44,9 +57,17 @@ interface GatewayConfig {
     apiKey?: string;
     /** Default access level for unverified requests */
     defaultAccessLevel?: AccessLevel;
-    /** Minimum trust score required for standard access */
+    /**
+     * @deprecated Removed in v2.3.0 — server is the single source of truth for
+     * access-level decisions. Setting this no longer affects access decisions
+     * (the SDK reads `access.accessLevel` from the verify-access response).
+     * If you need a higher gate for an endpoint, configure it server-side via
+     * the endpoint's `trust_score_requirement`.
+     */
     minTrustScore?: number;
-    /** Minimum trust score required for full access */
+    /**
+     * @deprecated Removed in v2.3.0 — see `minTrustScore` above.
+     */
     minTrustScoreForFull?: number;
     /** Cache verification results (TTL in seconds) */
     cacheTtl?: number;
@@ -58,6 +79,24 @@ interface GatewayConfig {
     counterpartyUrl?: string;
     /** This counterparty's type (sent with verify-access requests for analytics) */
     counterpartyType?: CounterpartyType;
+    /**
+     * This counterparty's ASTRAE-id (issued at endpoint registration). When set,
+     * the SDK forwards it on verify-access calls so the server attributes traffic
+     * directly to this endpoint rather than resolving by URL. Useful when:
+     *  - The merchant has multiple endpoints under the same origin (each running
+     *    its own SDK instance with its own counterpartyId)
+     *  - The endpoint URL might be served behind a proxy / different host than
+     *    the registered origin
+     */
+    counterpartyId?: string;
+    /**
+     * Disable the one-time init self-test. The SDK normally fires a HEAD/OPTIONS
+     * to `${apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access` on first verify() call and warns
+     * if the response is HTML (indicating apiBaseUrl is pointing at a marketing
+     * site rather than the API). Set true for tests or environments where the
+     * extra request is undesirable.
+     */
+    disableInitChecks?: boolean;
 }
 /**
  * Verified agent information
@@ -101,32 +140,86 @@ interface VerifiedOrganization {
     trustScore: number;
 }
 /**
- * PDLSS policy information returned with verification
+ * PDLSS policy information returned with verification.
+ *
+ * @deprecated v2.2.4 — verify-access no longer returns the full PDLSS to the
+ * merchant. Read `EnhancedVerificationResult.verificationContext.pdlssCheck`
+ * instead for the merchant-facing summary, and `appliedPolicy` (top-level on
+ * the verification result) for the boundary name + policy version. The full
+ * PDLSS is owner-side only (queryable via `/api/agents/:id` when
+ * authenticated as the agent owner).
  */
 interface PDLSSInfo {
-    /** Whether purpose was allowed */
     purposeAllowed: boolean;
-    /** Whether within duration constraints */
     withinDuration: boolean;
-    /** Whether within limits */
     withinLimits: boolean;
-    /** Whether scope is allowed */
     scopeAllowed: boolean;
-    /** Whether self-instantiation is allowed (if applicable) */
     selfInstantiationAllowed: boolean;
-    /** Allowed purpose categories */
     allowedPurposes?: string[];
-    /** Transaction limits */
     limits?: Record<string, number>;
-    /** Allowed scope/resources */
     scope?: string[];
-    /** Applied policy details */
-    appliedPolicy?: {
-        boundaryId: string;
-        boundaryName: string;
-        policyId: string;
-        policyVersion: string;
+    /** Applied policy details. Boundary/policy UUIDs deliberately not included. */
+    appliedPolicy?: AppliedPolicy;
+}
+/**
+ * Applied policy — merchant-facing identifiers only.
+ *
+ * Boundary and policy UUIDs are deliberately not surfaced; merchants and
+ * agent owners are different tenants and internal join keys are a
+ * cross-tenant correlation primitive. Internal callers that need UUIDs
+ * query the boundary/policy tables directly.
+ */
+interface AppliedPolicy {
+    boundaryName: string;
+    policyVersion: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Structured "why" of a verification decision the merchant receives.
+ *
+ * Tells the merchant whether the agent ID was verified, whether the runtime
+ * challenge succeeded, whether the request was within PDLSS, and the agent's
+ * actual dynamic trust score — without exposing thresholds, scope lists, or
+ * other-tenant counterparty membership.
+ *
+ * `attestations` is empty unless the calling endpoint's access policy
+ * declared `required_attestations`. Each attestation carries a blockchain
+ * proof reference (or, in the future, a full ZKP) so the merchant can verify
+ * the underlying claim without seeing the raw underlying data (e.g. the
+ * Persona/ConnectID transaction).
+ */
+interface VerificationContext {
+    idVerified: boolean;
+    runtimeChallenge: {
+        status: 'passed' | 'skipped' | 'failed' | 'timeout' | 'not_supported';
+        checkedAt: string | null;
+    };
+    pdlssCheck: {
+        /** Outcome only — no thresholds disclosed. */
+        result: 'within' | 'exceeded' | 'denied' | 'not_evaluated';
+        /** Category-level only. */
+        purpose: 'approved' | 'denied';
+        scope: 'approved' | 'denied';
     };
+    /** Live composite score at decision time (not the stale snapshot column). */
+    dynamicTrustScore: number;
+    attestations: Attestation[];
+}
+/**
+ * Attestation returned in `VerificationContext.attestations`.
+ *
+ * `proofType: 'reference'` (interim) means `proof` is a blockchain txn hash
+ * the merchant CAN verify against on-chain records but doesn't HAVE to.
+ * `proofType: 'zkp'` (future) means `proof` is a zero-knowledge proof.
+ * Wire shape is forward-compatible — clients reading 'reference' today won't
+ * break when it becomes 'zkp'.
+ */
+interface Attestation {
+    /** Attestation kind (e.g. `verified_human_party`). */
+    type: string;
+    status: 'passed' | 'failed';
+    validUntil?: string;
+    proofType: 'reference' | 'zkp';
+    proof: string;
 }
 /**
  * Guidance information for unverified agents
@@ -318,14 +411,21 @@ interface SDKOptions extends GatewayConfig {
     };
 }
 /**
- * Token guidance returned from verify-access
+ * Token guidance returned from verify-access.
+ *
+ * `recommendedRateLimit` carries `requestsPerMinute` and `currency` only.
+ * `maxTransactionValue` was removed in v2.2.4 — it leaked the agent's
+ * spending headroom to the merchant, which is a price-discrimination signal
+ * (a merchant could see the agent's autonomous threshold and price the
+ * transaction just under it to capture surplus). The agent's SDK receives
+ * its own limits separately for client-side budgeting; the merchant's
+ * decision doesn't need amount info.
  */
 interface TokenGuidance {
     recommendedScopes: string[];
     recommendedTtlSeconds: number;
     recommendedRateLimit?: {
         requestsPerMinute: number;
-        maxTransactionValue?: number;
         currency?: string;
     };
     jurisdictionConstraints?: string[];
@@ -349,12 +449,19 @@ interface RuntimeChallengeResult {
     reason?: string;
 }
 /**
- * Enhanced verification result (extends existing VerificationResult)
+ * Enhanced verification result (extends existing VerificationResult).
+ *
+ * - `appliedPolicy`: surfaces the boundary name + policy version that drove
+ *   the decision (no UUIDs).
+ * - `verificationContext`: structured "why" for the merchant — see
+ *   `VerificationContext` for the full shape.
  */
 interface EnhancedVerificationResult extends VerificationResult {
     sessionId?: string;
     runtimeChallenge?: RuntimeChallengeResult;
     tokenGuidance?: TokenGuidance;
+    appliedPolicy?: AppliedPolicy;
+    verificationContext?: VerificationContext;
     recommendation?: 'grant' | 'deny' | 'step_up_required';
     recommendationReasons?: string[];
 }

package/dist/{types-DE0ooQJ6.d.mts → types-aN1UHhyy.d.mts}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { a as AccessLevel, C as CounterpartyType, T as TokenGuidance } from './types-CrVMq_Td.mjs';
+import { a as AccessLevel, C as CounterpartyType, T as TokenGuidance } from './types-JMgPake9.mjs';
 
 /**
  * AstraSync Gateway - Types for gateway modes, local evaluation, and adapter interface.

package/dist/{types-rigu2bH3.d.ts → types-osMd_dpT.d.ts}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { a as AccessLevel, C as CounterpartyType, T as TokenGuidance } from './types-CrVMq_Td.js';
+import { a as AccessLevel, C as CounterpartyType, T as TokenGuidance } from './types-JMgPake9.js';
 
 /**
  * AstraSync Gateway - Types for gateway modes, local evaluation, and adapter interface.

package/dist/ui/index.d.mts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { d as CommerceShieldProps, V as VerificationResult, b as AgentCredentials, f as GuidanceInfo, i as TrustLevel } from '../types-CrVMq_Td.mjs';
+import { d as CommerceShieldProps, V as VerificationResult, b as AgentCredentials, f as GuidanceInfo, i as TrustLevel } from '../types-JMgPake9.mjs';
 
 /**
  * AstraSync Commerce Shield Component

package/dist/ui/index.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { d as CommerceShieldProps, V as VerificationResult, b as AgentCredentials, f as GuidanceInfo, i as TrustLevel } from '../types-CrVMq_Td.js';
+import { d as CommerceShieldProps, V as VerificationResult, b as AgentCredentials, f as GuidanceInfo, i as TrustLevel } from '../types-JMgPake9.js';
 
 /**
  * AstraSync Commerce Shield Component