@astram/guide 0.2.6 → 0.2.8

package/CAPABILITIES.md

@@ -17,12 +17,12 @@ below is wired by the two `forRoot` calls in your `app.module.ts`; you write no
 ## Wiring (the ONE seam, plus the identity module)
 
 ```ts
-import { ShieldModule } from '@astram/guard';
+import { ShieldModule, rootIdsFromEnv } from '@astram/guard';
 import {
   IdentityFeatureModule, identityAuthActionKeys, identityControlPlaneKeys,
 } from '@astram/identity';
 
-const rootIds = ['<platform-admin user uuid>'];   // from config, never from a request
+const rootIds = rootIdsFromEnv(process.env);       // SHIELD_ROOT_IDS; never from a request
 
 imports: [
   ShieldModule.forRoot({
@@ -62,6 +62,10 @@ imports: [
   HERE ONLY: the module builds the record authorization from them and `ShieldModule` decides with
   it. Passing `recordAuthorization`/`decisionAuthority` to `ShieldModule` as well fails the boot.
   Without `rootIds` it logs a boot warning.
+- **`rootIdsFromEnv(env)`** (`@astram/guard`) reads `SHIELD_ROOT_IDS` (comma-separated user
+  uuids, lower-case canonical form). Any invalid or duplicate entry fails boot (the value is never
+  echoed); unset returns an empty list. `npm run bootstrap:org` prints the line to set. An app that
+  reads its own variable keeps working; root is never inferred from `u_is_platform_superuser`.
 - `ShieldModule.forRoot()` with no options and no identity module = enforcement only (no DB, no
   Redis, boots without `.env`); it binds a stub that denies every `@Classified` route.
 
@@ -131,7 +135,62 @@ imports: [
   customer business data.
 - Migrations for `shield_identity`, `shield_authz`, `shield_app` identity tables ship in
   `@astram/identity` and `@astram/guard` and run through `@astram/migrate` automatically. Dev seeds
-  (099/100) run only with `NODE_ENV=development` or `ASTRAM_SEED_DEV=1`.
+  (099/100) run only with `NODE_ENV=development` or `ASTRAM_SEED_DEV=1`. Anywhere else, create the
+  first users with `npm run bootstrap:org` (below).
+- **API-created users can be reached by reset.** `POST /identity/users` with an email and a
+  company creates the user, an active membership and a **locked** credential in one transaction
+  (no password works until the user sets one). The response is `{ id, credential: 'locked' }`, or
+  `{ id, credential: 'none', reason }` (`no_email`, `no_company`; `no_provisioner` only when the
+  service is built without `IdentityFeatureModule.forRoot`) when no credential was made.
+  Once your `EmailSender` works, `POST /auth/forgot-password` reaches the user. A user whose email
+  is set later stays locked until the next `bootstrap:org` run gives them a credential.
+- **Role owner.** Every role records an owner company when it is created: a non-root admin's
+  active company; none when root creates it in the admin UI (a shared, root-only role). It cannot
+  be changed by update. Deleting a company clears the owner of its roles. This round records
+  ownership only: which roles an admin can see or administer is unchanged.
+
+## Organisation bootstrap (`npm run bootstrap:org`, `@astram/identity` `runOrgBootstrap`, ADR-0042)
+- **What it does.** Creates your organisation from one JSON file at deploy time: platform roots,
+  a company tree (tenants and `children`), departments and branches per company, roles with their
+  permission keys, and users with one active membership and their role postings. It runs against
+  your own `AppModule` (`NestFactory.createApplicationContext`), so keys of your `extraObjects` are
+  grantable. Every write goes through the framework's services and `decide()`, as the declared
+  operation `shield:org-bootstrap`; audit rows carry `operation`, `step` and `onBehalfOf` (the
+  operator). It needs auth on and `IdentityFeatureModule` wired; without the module it exits with
+  "wire IdentityFeatureModule in AppModule before running bootstrap:org".
+- **File.** `{ "version": 1, "roots": [{ username, email, homeCompany }], "tenants": [company] }`;
+  `company` = `{ name, departments?, branches?, roles?: [{ name, permissions }], users?:
+  [{ username, email, company?, postings?: [{ role, department?, branch? }] }], children? }`.
+  Unknown fields, unknown permission keys (allowed: catalog keys plus `<feature>:*` and
+  `<feature>:<type>:*`), duplicate usernames or emails and references to undeclared roles,
+  departments or branches are refused before any write. No password, uuid or secret in the file.
+  A user with no postings is allowed (signs in, holds nothing).
+- **Run.** `npm run bootstrap:org -- --file org.json` is a dry run (prints `create` / `unchanged` /
+  `drift` / `not-in-file` / `conflict`). Add `--apply` to write; it needs
+  `ASTRAM_BOOTSTRAP_OPERATOR`. Root passwords: `ASTRAM_BOOTSTRAP_ROOT_PASSWORD_<USERNAME>` (a
+  `secret-ref:` outside development/test, so a `SECRETS_PROVIDER` is needed) or `--interactive`.
+  Other flags: `--reissue-links`, `--link-ttl-hours <1..168>` (default 72), `--links-to-stdout`,
+  `--claim-unowned-roles`. Runs hold a database lock.
+- **First sign-in.** Non-root users get a locked credential and a one-time set-password link,
+  printed once, to a terminal only (`--links-to-stdout` sends them to a pipe, where logs can keep
+  them). The operator delivers each link; the user redeems it at the reset page. Outside
+  development/test `RESET_LINK_BASE_URL` must be set and not localhost.
+- **Roots.** The run prints each root's uuid and a `SHIELD_ROOT_IDS=…` line: set it and restart
+  (`rootIdsFromEnv`, above).
+- **Re-runs and new tenants.** Additive and idempotent: a second `--apply` writes nothing. A file
+  covers only the tenants it declares, so onboard a new tenant with a new file. A role name owned by
+  another tenant is a `conflict` (roles are still global by name); an unowned role needs
+  `--claim-unowned-roles`.
+- **What it does NOT do.** No deletes, renames, moves or revokes (differences are reported only);
+  it never activates an inactive membership or updates a changed email. No upload from the UI. No
+  administrator invite route or emailed link yet (G-010); department and branch admin routes are
+  separate too.
+- **Existing apps** (scaffolded before this release) have no `bootstrap:org`. Upgrade
+  `@astram/identity` and `@astram/guard` (`npm update @astram/identity @astram/guard`), copy
+  `src/bootstrap-org.ts` and `src/bootstrap-org.args.ts` from a freshly scaffolded app (or from
+  `create-astram-app/template/server/src/` in the framework repo) into `server/src/`, and add
+  `"bootstrap:org": "node --env-file-if-exists=.env dist/bootstrap-org.js"` to the `scripts` of
+  `server/package.json`. `npm run build` compiles both files; no other change is needed.
 
 ## The record pipe (`@astram/engine`)
 - **`RecordEngine`** (token `RECORD_ENGINE`) / `RecordsService` — create/get/update/delete/list,
@@ -313,7 +372,7 @@ upload(@Req() req: Record<string, unknown>) {
   the upload check.
 - **Lint wall** — the scaffold bans `multer`, `@aws-sdk/*`, `minio`, `fs` / `node:fs` (and
   `/promises`) in `src/features/**`: use `FileIntake` and `FilesService`, never the bucket.
-- Do not grant `stored_file:create` to app roles; uploads go through `FilesService`.
+- Roles that upload need `stored_file:create` (FilesService creates the record as the caller), but app code must create `stored_file` rows only through `FilesService.store()` — never `records.create('stored_file', …)` / `createMany`, which would let a caller set its own `storageKey` (downloads still refuse a key outside the caller's tenant, KI #137).
 - Not provided: malware scanning, per-tenant encryption of file bytes (SSE-S3 only), streaming
   downloads, dedup (each upload is its own record; `sha256` is returned so you can detect repeats).
 
@@ -346,7 +405,41 @@ upload(@Req() req: Record<string, unknown>) {
   `APP_DB_NAME`, set the same `DDL_DB_NAME` for migrate and the server.
 - The `<ns>_backup` and `<ns>_monitor` accounts keep server-wide grants and can see every
   namespace on the server.
-- One database per account (some managed hosts) is NOT supported yet (needs the four databases).
+- One database per account (some managed hosts): see the single-database layout below.
+
+## Single-database layout (`SHIELD_DB_LAYOUT=single`, ADR-0041, opt-in, reduced isolation)
+- For hosts that give one database per account. The four-database layout stays the default.
+- **Set:** `SHIELD_DB_LAYOUT=single`, `SHIELD_DB_NAME=<db>` (`^[a-z0-9_]{1,64}$`),
+  `SHIELD_DB_LAYOUT_ACK_REDUCED_ISOLATION=1` (exactly `1`, every environment, production
+  included), `APP_DB_USER`. Leave `SHIELD_DB_NAMESPACE` unset; `APP_DB_NAME`/`DDL_DB_NAME` unset
+  or `<db>`. Same values for the server and `npm run migration:run`. Anything else refuses to boot
+  and to migrate.
+- **Set `POOL_MAX_ENGINE`** (e.g. 10). Unset, the engine pool uses `APP_DB_MAX_CONNECTIONS`, and
+  the single-layout budget `workers × (POOL_MAX_CORE + POOL_MAX_ENGINE + APP_AUTHZ_POOL_MAX) +
+  headroom` fails boot. `APP_DB_MAX_USER_CONNECTIONS` (the account's cap, if the host sets one) is
+  checked too.
+- All framework tables keep their names in `<db>`; your tables live there too. **Reserved
+  table names:** your object types and migrations must not use a framework table name (`companies`,
+  `users`, `roles`, `departments`, `branches`, `company_membership`, `membership_posting`,
+  `company_departments`, `company_branches`, `service_account`, `shared_resource`, `stored_file`,
+  `identity_credential`, `session`, `refresh_token`, `mfa_device`, `password_reset_token`,
+  `mfa_recovery_code`, `email_change_token`, `permission`, `role_permission`,
+  `authz_permission_version`, `access_bundle`, `access_bundle_permission`,
+  `record_permission_rule`, `record_share`, `scope_closure`, `service_account_key`,
+  `cross_tenant_grant`, `audit_log`, the ledger `schema_migrations`) or `prune_audit`. In single
+  mode a clash refuses to boot (object type) or to migrate (`CREATE TABLE` in your migrations);
+  in the four layout it only warns, so you see it early. The migration check reads whole files,
+  `down()` included: an app whose migrations ever created or renamed onto a reserved name cannot
+  migrate in single mode.
+- **One account** (`DDL_DB_*` unset ⇒ `APP_DB_*`): migrations and the server share the account
+  (`ALL PRIVILEGES ON <db>.*`). You lose append-only audit (#6), no runtime DDL and schema
+  separation (#11), the DB-enforced retention floor, and the separate DDL account; `audit:prune`
+  refuses to run. Boot logs this list every time (the privilege probe runs with
+  `ShieldModule.forRoot({ auth: true })`).
+- **Two accounts** (if the host allows a second user): the framework repo's
+  `db-provision --layout single` keeps `audit_log` append-only and the runtime free of DDL, and
+  installs `prune_audit`; re-run it after a migration adds a table. Schema separation is still lost.
+- Choose the layout at install: switching an existing install is not supported. MariaDB only.
 
 ## Migrations (`@astram/migrate`)
 - `migrate` / `migrate:revert` / `migrate:status` with the deploy-time DDL account (`DDL_DB_*`);
@@ -389,6 +482,8 @@ upload(@Req() req: Record<string, unknown>) {
 - External identity providers (OIDC, SAML, LDAP, Entra ID, Cognito, Okta, Google Workspace) and
   WebAuthn ceremonies.
 - Tenant- or role-mandated MFA (MFA is enforced for users who enrolled a device).
-- Single-database hosting (all framework tables in one database per account).
+- An administrator invite (admin-console route that emails a set-password link) and framework
+  email/SMS delivery adapters (framework item G-010). Today first sign-in links come from
+  `npm run bootstrap:org` only.
 
 If you need one of these, STOP and flag it in `.astram/guide/gaps.md` (Rule 4).

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@astram/guide",
-  "version": "0.2.6",
+  "version": "0.2.8",
   "license": "MIT",
   "description": "Astram framework — the AI/dev GUIDE layer (ADR-0025). Ships the framework's hard rules + capabilities manifest as installed, upgrade-refreshed docs. A consumer app's CLAUDE.md references FRAMEWORK_RULES.md from this package; `npm update` replaces it wholesale so new rules arrive cleanly, while the app's own .astram/guide/ layer is never touched. This is the framework-owned FLOOR: an app rule may tighten it, never weaken it.",
   "type": "commonjs",